THE  RELATIONS   OF  THE 
UNITED    STATES   AND   SPAIN 


DIPLOMACY 


THE  RELATIONS  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND  SPAIN 


DIPLOMACY 


BY 
FRENCH  ENSOR  CHADWICK 

BEAR-ADMIRAL  U.  S.  NAVY 
AUTHOR   OF   "CAUSES   OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR" 


NEW   YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 
1909 


'-'. 


Copyright,  1909,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  December,  1909 


TO 
JOHN  BIGELOW  AND  SIDNEY  WEBSTER 

"  Wise  friends  are  the  best  book  of  life." — CALDERON. 


193738 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 


PAGE 


INTRODUCTION 3 


I.  THE  ATTITUDE  OF  SPAIN  IN  THE  AMERICAN  REVO 
LUTION  13 

II.    DISCONTENT  AND  INTRIGUE  IN  THE  SOUTH-WEST  AND 

THE  TREATY  OF  1795 29 

III.  THE  TRANSFERS  OF  LOUISIANA 42 

IV.  CESSION   OF   LOUISIANA   AND   QUESTION   OF   THE 

FLORIDAS 61 

V.  WAVERING  BETWEEN  WAR  AND  PEACE. — PROPOSED 
ALLIANCE  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  ABANDONED 
FOR  INTRIGUE  WITH  FRANCE 86 

VI.    THE  EFFECT  IN  AMERICA  OF  NAPOLEON'S  INVASION 

•OF1  SPAIN. — EVENTS  IN  THE  FLORIDAS     .    .    .   108 

VII.    THE  FLORIDA  TREATY  AND  JACKSON'S  INVASION    .     121 , 

.    THE  RECOGNITION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICAN  INDEPEN 
DENCE     148 

IX.    THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  THE  INVASION  OF  SPAIN    156 
X.    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     .    179 

XI.    THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS 205 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  pAGE 

XII.    CUBAN  CONDITIONS.— THE  LOPEZ  EXPEDITIONS.— 

BRITISH  AND  FRENCH  INTERFERENCE  224 


x 

XIII.  THE  CASE  OF  THE  BLACK  WARRIOR.— THE  OSTEND 

MANIFESTO 251 

XIV.  THE  EFFORT  OF  1865  TOWARD  REFORM  IN  CUBAN 

ADMINISTRATION. — CUBAN  REVOLT     ....    273 

XV.    THE  EARLIER  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  TEN  YEARS'  WAR    287 

XVI.    THE    FIRM    AND    CORRECT    STAND    OF    GENERAL 

GRANT'S  ADMINISTRATION. — THE  "VIRGINIUS"    306 

XVII.    THE  " VIRGINIUS" .    .    323 

XVIII.    THE  CARLIST  WAR.— THE  ACCESSION  OF  ALFONSO 

XII.— MR.  FISH'S  NUMBER  266 358 

XIX.    THE  END  OF  THE  TEN  YEARS'  WAR 387 

XX.    THE    FILIBUSTERING    CASES. — THE    "ALLIANCA" 

INCIDENT. — THE  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF  1895    .    411 

XXL     CASES  OF  AMERICAN  CITIZENS. — WEYLER  SUCCEEDS   ' 
CAMPOS. —  WEYLER'S  PROCLAMATIONS. —  CUBA 
IN  THE  SENATE. — THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES 
THE  NEWSPAPERS. — SENOR  CANOVAS. — SENATE 
DEBATE 427 

XXII.    THE  ATTITUDE  OF  THE  CLEVELAND  ADMINISTRATION 

DEFINED. — THE  CASE  OF  THE  " COMPETITOR"    451 

XXIII.  THE  CASE  OF  THE  "  COMPETITOR."— THE  ANNUAL 

MESSAGE  OF  1896. — THE  ACTION  IN  CONGRESS    468 

XXIV.  CUBA  IN  CONGRESS. — THE  NEW  ADMINISTRATION. — 

RECONCENTRATION 486 


CONTENTS 

AFTER 

XXV.  THE  NEW  AMERICAN  ADMINISTRATION. — A  LIBERAL 
SPANISH  GOVERNMENT. — MR.  MCKINLEY'S 
FIRST  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  . 


XXVI. 


XXVII. 


XXVIII. 


XXIX. 


CUBAN    RELIEF. — HAVANA    RIOTS. — THE    INTER 
CEPTED  LETTER  AND  RESIGNATION  OF  DUPUY 

DE  LOME. — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  "MAINE"     . 

j» 

THE  FIFTY  MILLION  BILL. — EXCHANGE  OF  VIEWS  AT 
MADRID. — SPAIN'S  FATAL  PROCRASTINATION 


IX 

PAGE 

508 

529 
544 


THE  REPORT  ON  THE  "MAINE"  BEFORE  CONGRESS. 
—RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS. — SPANISH  PROP 
OSITIONS  561 

SPAIN'S  PRACTICAL  ACCEPTANCE  OF  AMERICAN  DE 
MANDS. — COLLECTIVE  NOTE  OF  THE  FOREIGN 
POWERS. — THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE. — THE 
JOINT  RESOLUTION  OF  CONGRESS. — THE  DECLA 
RATION  OF  WAR 572 


INDEX   ....  589 


THE   RELATIONS  OF  THE 
UNITED   STATES  AND  SPAIN 


DIPLOMACY 


INTRODUCTION 

THIS  book  is  the  outcome  of  a  study  of  the  causes  of  the  war  of 
1898  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  Beginning  as  a  pre 
liminary  chapter  of  the  war,  it  was  soon  found  that  these  causes 
were  of  such  long  growth  and  of  such  intricate  character  that  it 
was  vain  to  hope  to  bring  them  into  short  compass.  The  attempt 
at  compression  was  abandoned  and  the  book  is  thus  an  effort  to 
bring  before  the  reader  the  story  of  more  than  a  hundred  years  of 
what  has  been  really  a  racial  strife;  on  the  part  of  one  race  for 
actual  domination  over  regions  in  which  apparently  it  could  not 
brook  a  division  of  rule;  on  the  part  of  the  other  for  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  status  quo. 

The  late  war  was  thus  but  the  culmination  of  difficulties  which 
had  their  seed  in  the  peace  of  1763.  They  sprung  into  life  twenty 
years  later  with  the  advent  on  the  world's  stage  of  the  American 
Union;  remained  in  full  vigor  for  half  a  century  thereafter  with 
scarcely  an  interval  of  repose,  and  waxed  and  waned  for  seventy- 
five  years  more,  until  finally  war  came  in  1898  to  remove  the  last 
cause  of  friction.  Few  of  the  115  years  from  1783  to  1898  were 
free  from  bitterness  of  feeling.  The  war  was  thus  but  a  final 
episode  in  a  century  of  diplomatic  ill-feeling,  sometimes  dormant 
but  more  often  dangerously  acute. 

One  of  the  races  involved  is  essentially  practical,  untrammeled 
by  the  conventions  and  conservatism  natural  to  an  old  civilization; 
protestant  in  the  large  sense  of  ignoring  generally  the  ways  of  the 
past,  and  with  its  natural  and  racial  protestantism  accentuated  by 
a  democratic  development  of  nearly  three  hundred  years.  The 
other,  offspring  of  all  the  ancient  races  of  the  Mediterranean,  was 
in  the  grip  of  antiquity,  with  the  inherited  traits  of  the  most  ancient 
civilizations  of  the  Mediterranean  world  and  naturally  antagonistic 
in  all  its  ways  of  thought  and  action  to  a  people  which,  from  its 

3 


4  INTRODUCTION 

point  of  view,  was  an  upstart  without  traditions;  whose  ancestors 
were  barbarians  when  of  literature,  art  and  law  Spain  had  possessed 
for  a  thousand  years  all  that  the  ancient  world  had  to  give. 

But  it  was  more  than  antiquity,  more  than  an  old  civilization, 
which  produced  the  differences  which  made  it  impossible  for  the 
North  American  Anglo-Saxon  to  live  near  his  Spanish  neighbor 
without  friction.  The  chief  cause  was  in  the  absolute  racial  un- 
likeness  itself,  and  though  racial  differences  are  somewhat  modified 
by  more  modern  conditions,  the  basis  of  this  unlikeness,  this  racial 
temperament,  still  has  an  influence  over  the  relations  of  men,  im- 
measureable  in  degree,  and  more  potent,  though  so  intangible, 
than  any  other  force  in  humanity. 

Of  the  many  races  which  have  gone  to  make  up  the  varying  type 
of  men  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  the  early  Afro-Semitic  and  the 
Saracen  have  made  the  strongest  impress  upon  the  national  char 
acter,  and  have  given  it  mainly  its  qualities,  good  and  bad;  its 
tribal  tendencies,  its  artistic  temperament,  its  courtesy,  its  fanati 
cism,  its  fatalism,  its  gloomy  pride  and  conservatism,  and,  not 
least,  its  cruelty.  For  the  Iberian,  the  earliest  known  occupant  of 
the  Peninsula,  was  a  Semite,  and  we  have  to-day  his  counterpart 
in  the  men  of  the  Kabyl  tribes  of  the  Atlas.  Says  one  who  of 
Anglo-Saxons  perhaps  knows  best  the  Spanish  people:  "Not  alone 
in  physique  do  these  tribes  resemble  what  the  early  Iberian  must 
have  been,  but  in  the  more  unchanging  peculiarities  of  character 
and  institutions  the  likeness  is.  easily  traceable  to  the  Spaniards  of 
to-day.  .  .  .  The  village  granary  (posito)  still  stands  in  the  Spanish 
village  as  its  counterpart  does  in  the  Atlas  regions;  the  town  pasture 
and  communal  tillage  land  continue  on  both  sides  of  the  straits  to 
testify  to  the  close  relationship  of  the  early  Iberians  with  the  Afro- 
Semitic  races,  which  included  the  Egyptian  or  Copt,  the  Kabyl,  the 
Touareg,  and  the  Berber.  The  language  of  the  Iberian  has  been 
lost,  but  enough  of  it  remains  on  the  coins  of  the  later  Celtiberian 
period  to  prove  that  it  had  a  common  root  with  the  Egyptian  and 
Saharan  tongues,  which  extend  from  Senegal  to  Nubia  on  the 
hither  side  of  the  negro  zone."  1 

Wave  after  wave  of  Semitic  blood  added  itself  to  the  kindred 
strain  of  the  original  Iberian.  The  Phoenician  came  for  six 
1  Hume,  The  Spanish  People,  3-4. 


INTRODUCTION  5 

hundred  years  and  he  again  was  followed  and  displaced  by  his 
near  relative,  the  Carthagenian,  who  was  dominant  in  all  the 
coasts  of  the  land  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  more,  when  their  power 
sank  in  the  final  defeat  of  Hannibal  and  in  the  victory  of  Scipio 
Africanus,  202  years  before  Christ.  Cadiz,  the  last  stronghold  of 
Carthagenian  power,  was  then  abandoned  and  Rome  ruled  the 
land  as  long  as  there  was  Roman  power. 

In  the  north  the  Celt  had  preceded  the  Phoenician,  and  Goth 
and  Vandal  and  Visigoth  had  followed  the  Roman  and  left  marked 
traces;  but  all  the  varied  races  of  the  Peninsula  were  engulfed  300 
years  after  the  downfall  of  the  Romans  by  the  last  and  greatest  of 
the  historic  invasions  from  Africa  (A.  D.  711)  when  Arab  and 
Berber  began  a  conquest  which  was  for  a  time  to  include  all  Spain, 
and  was  to  hold  its  fairest  provinces  for  a  longer  period  than  any 
other  race  within  man's  knowledge.  Islam  did  not  rule  the  greater 
part  of  Spain  for  500  years  and  these  fairest  provinces  300  years 
longer  without  leaving  more  than  a  memory.  It  made  a  deep 
impress  on  the  blood  as  well  as  the  thought  and  history  of  Spain, 
and,  added  to  the  Iberian-Phcenician-Carthagenian  strain,  accent 
uated  the  already  strong  Semitic  qualities  of  the  race,  and  made 
the  man  of  the  Peninsula  closely  akin  in  temperament  and  mental 
qualities  to  the  Oriental  and  very  different  even  from  his  closest 
neighbor  north  of  the  Pyrenees.  During  the  most  of  this  period, 
nearly  as  long  as  from  the  conquest  of  England  by  the  Norman 
to  the  present  day,  the  Moor-Berber  was  the  dominant  race, 
physically  and  intellectually,  and  after  the  last  remnant  of  their 
dominion  had  passed  there  continued  to  live  in  Spain,  subject  to 
the  Spanish  Christians,  a  host  of  men  of  Moorish  blood,  a  great  por 
tion  of  whom  became  merged  into  what  came  to  be  known  only 
four  centuries  since  as  the  Spanish  nation. 

It  is  clearly  impossible  that  the  great  Moorish  power  which  so 
long  ruled  the  Peninsula,  built  great  cities,  reared  a  great  and  at 
the  time  an  unapproached  civilization,  could  have  been  represented 
only  by  the  comparatively  small  remnant  of  500,000  Moors  driven  to 
Africa  in  the  early  part  of  the  XVIIth  century  by  the  mad  religious 
fury  which  came  into  being  with  the  closing  years  of  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella  and  reached  its  acme  under  Philip  II.  Says  an  able 
historian:  "When  we  compare  the  inconsiderable  number  of 


6  INTRODUCTION 

exiles  with  the  original  large  Moorish  population  of  the  lands  re 
covered  during  the  reconquest  we  can  realize  how  great  a  propor 
tion  of  the  Mudejares  must  have  become  Christians  and  have 
merged  indistinguishably  with  their  conquerors.  Medieval  toler 
ation  had  won  them  over  and  its  continuance  would  in  time  have 
completed  the  process.  Not  only  would  an  infinite  sum  of  human 
misery  have  been  averted,  but  Spain  would  to  some  extent  have 
escaped  the  impoverishment  and  debility  which  served  as  so  cruel 
an  expiation."  1 

The  impress  of  the  Moor  differed  from  that  of  the  Romans  as  a 
national  migration  differs  from  military  occupancy.  The  Moors 
were  a  resident  race;  the  Romans  a  governing  class.  However 
great  the  effect  of  Roman  language,  laws,  and  methods  upon  Iberia, 
and  it  was  of  course  very  great  and  lasting,  there  could  not  be  a 
blood  mixture  in  any  degree  commensurable  with  that  due  to  the 
presence  for  so  much  longer  a  period  of  the  millions  who  had  so 
much  of  race  feeling  common  with  the  Iberian  native  to  the  soil. 

It  thus  could  not  be  otherwise  than  that  this  latest  comer  and 
longest  stayer  should  leave  a  great  mark,  and  that  we  have  in  the 
Spaniard,  a  man  in  whom  so  much  is  not  understandable  until  we 
reckon  with  him,  not  as  a  European,  but  as  the  More-Iberian  which 
he  is;  a  man  apart,  and  differentiated  from  the  other  races  of 
Europe.  Looked  at  so,  much  becomes  explicable  which  is  other 
wise  strange,  and  has  defied  the  effort  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  un 
derstand  the  philosophy  of  the  acts  and  ways  of  the  conglomerate 
race  of  the  Peninsula,  which,  in  its  incapacity  for  government,  its 
regionalism,  its  chronic  state  of  revolution,  its  religiosity,  its 
fatalism  and  procrastination,  its  sloth  in  material  development, 
have  made  the  Spanish  nation  an  enigma  to  the  northern  mind. 

But  with  whatever  shortcomings,  the  race  has,  or  certainly  has 
had,  great  qualities.  It  did  a  work  in  the  exploitation  of  America 
which  in  its  energy  and  its  earlier  results;  in  the  actual  work  of 
building  cities;  in  exploration;  in  the  missionizing  of  savage  races, 
surpassed  for  a  century  and  a  half  that  done  or  even  attempted  by 
any  other  race  of  the  time.  Though  the  basis  of  this  energy  was 
chiefly  a  fames  auri  of  a  most  sordid  type;  though  no  great  part  of 
the  Spanish  migration  had  for  cause  such  motives  as  those  of  the 
1  Lea,  The  Moriscos  of  Spam,  360. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

founders  of  New  England,  or  even  the  more  prosaic  desire  to 
colonize  a  new  land  in  a  true  sense,  this  energy  must  remain  one 
of  the  marvels  of  accomplishment.  One  can  only  wonder  to-day 
at  the  immensity  of  the  force,  whatever  its  basis,  which  made,  so 
long  since,  great  and  important  places  of  Mexico,  Caracas,  Lima, 
Havana;  which  built  the  walls  of  Cartagena  and  Panama,  pene 
trated  to  Bogota,  to  Quito,  and  to  the  inmost  recesses  of  Paraguay, 
when  the  colonies  of  France  and  England  were  but  in  their  infancy. 

The  Spaniard  left  a  mighty  impress  upon  the  New  World;  an 
impress  in  many  ways  Roman  in  character.  While  so  like  the 
Roman  in  building  up  a  world  empire,  there  is  also  a  striking 
analogy  in  Rome's  decay.  As  did  Rome,  so  Spain  sent  her  lieuten 
ants  to  rule  the  provinces  and  build  their  fortunes  in  greed  and  op 
pression.  She  laid  the  heavy  band  of  tribute  upon  the  western 
world  for  the  benefit  of  Spain  alone  and  in  large  degree  became 
the  rapacious  metropolis  as  was  Rome;  and  faction  and  anarchy, 
as  in  her  great  exemplar,  ruled  at  home  until  she  stands  to-day 
shorn  of  her  ancient  power,  but  still,  like  Rome,  preserving  to  the 
last  her  gladiatorial  games. 

But  while  leaving  this  material  impress  in  America,  the  Spaniard 
has  also  left  much  of  the  spiritual  in  the  lofty  courtesy,  temperance, 
and  the  strong  and  kindly  family  feeling  of  his  race,  for  which  the 
Anglo-Saxon  would  be  the  better  man.  No  one  nation  has  all  the 
virtues,  and  while  the  more  marked  of  the  Spaniard  may  not  be 
those  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  he  has  a  large  share  of  those  of  his  own 
kind,  and  it  is  hoped  that  wherever  the  one  race  may  be  associated 
with  the  other,  it  will  be,  not  to  supplant  but  to  unite  the  admirable 
qualities  01  both. 

The  marriage  of  Fernando  of  Aragon  and  Isabella  of  Castile, 
whose  destruction  of  the  Moorish  power  and  the  establishment  of 
the  Inquisition  brought  them  the  title  of  the  "Catholic  Kings," 
was  the  first  step  toward  solidifying  Spain.  Until  then  the  Penin 
sula  was  a  collection  of  diverse  petty  kingdoms  with  its  fairest  parts 
still  in  Moorish  control,  and  all  at  sword's  point  with  one  an 
other.  "Castilians  hated  Aragonese,  Catalans  detested  Castilians, 
Navarrese  had  nothing  whatever  in  common  with  either  nation. 
Galicians  were  a  race  akin  to  the  Portuguese,  but  had  no  fellow- 
feeling  with  the  half-Moorish  Andalusians  and  Valencians.  There 


8  INTRODUCTION 

was,  indeed,  still  no  Spain,  either  ethnologically  or  politically,  for 
the  country  consisted  of  half  a  score  of  separate  dominions  each 
with  its  own  laws,  customs,  traditions,  prejudices,  and  racial  dis 
tinctions,"  l  and  much  of  this  remains  to  this  day. 

The  religious  fanaticism  instigated  and  fomented  by  Fernando 
and  Isabella  had  for  its  object  chiefly  the  unification  of  the  Spanish 
people  through  the  establishment  of  a  great  and  moving  sentiment 
which  should  be  common  to  all.  It  was,  in  one  respect,  unfortu 
nately  only  too  successful.  It  wakened  the  old  Iberic  spirit  of 
fanaticism  which  the  race  had  in  common  with  its  African  ancestors, 
whose  descendants  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean 
had  ranged  themselves  under  the  banners  of  Islam,  and  developed 
the  spirit  of  mysticism  and  religious  exaltation  which  made  Spain 
the  depository  in  its  own  eyes  of  the  only  true  religion,  and  raised 
it  to  an  exaltation  which  demanded  that  it  should  not  only  carry 
this  religion  to  the  heathen  of  newly  discovered  America,  but  that 
it  should  force  the  heretic  parts  of  Europe  into  the  true  way.  Nor 
was  the  futility  of  this  felt  or  in  any  great  degree  recognized  until 
the  stern  lesson  of  the  loss  in  1588  of  the  missionizing  fleet  known 
as  the  Spanish  Armada  and  the  defeat  in  the  Netherlands  forced 
the  conviction  upon  the  Spanish  king  and  nation  that  they  were 
unequal  to  the  task. 

The  elevation  of  Charles  I  to  the  imperial  throne  as  Charles  V, 
while  flattering  to  pride,  drew  Spain  into  the  innermost  whirlpool 
of  European  politics  and  made  her  merely  the  money  chest  of  wide 
spread  and  interminable  wars  in  which  she  had  no  real  concern, 
and  which  brought  her  to  the  depth  of  ruin  and  poverty  from  which 
she  never  had  the  political  or  commercial  ability  to  rise.  She  was 
trailed  in  the  wake  of  the  so-called  Holy  Roman  Empire,  hugging 
the  delusion  that  she  was  leading  when  she  was  only  dragged,  bled 
white  by  the  incessant  demands  of  one  who  was  practically  a 
foreign  ruler.  Her  sons  and  her  treasure  were  spent  in  Flanders 
and  Italy,  not  for  the  purposes  of  the  King  of  Spain,  but  for  those 
of  the  Roman  emperor,  who  completed  the  ruin  of  the  country 
by  leaving  as  a  heritage  to  Spain  the  Netherlands,  which  had  come 
to  him  through  his  Austrian  father,  Philip.  It  was  this  heirship 
which  continued  to  Spain  her  unfortunate  linking  with  a  political 
1  Hume,  The  Spanish  People,  310. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

system  which  was  in  no  sense  hers,  and  which,  combined  with  the 
economic  effects  of  the  expulsion  of  the  Moriscos  under  the  edict 
of  September  22, 1609,  by  Philip  III,  and  the  growth  of  the  Inquisi 
tion  into  the  most  terrible  national  flail  known  in  history,1  gave 
the  final  blow  which  sank  Spain  into  the  deepest  depths  of  political, 
moral,  and  economic  ruin. 

The  extraordinary  obliquity  of  mind  which  in  the  thought  of 
many  not  only  of  the  time  but  still  for  centuries  to  come  placed 
Spain  as  a  great  power  is  illustrated  by  the  remark  of  James  I: 
"The  King  of  Spain  is  greater  than  us  all  together."  This  was 
said  not  only  when  her  navy  had  been  ruined,  and  when  she 
aad  been  defeated  in  the  Netherlands,  but  at  a  time  when  she  was 
in  direst  poverty,  without  commerce,  bereft  of  everything  but  her 
fanaticism  and  spirit  of  adventure  and  of  her  ardor  for  literature 
and  art,  which  last  were  to  make  her  really  great  in  the  noblest 
fields.  Jews  and  Moriscos  had  been  slaughtered  and  driven  from 
the  country  of  which  they  were  the  main  wealth  producers;  the 
export  of  gold  and  silver  was  prohibited  and  the  use  of  these  metals 
for  any  other  purposes  than  as  coin  forbidden;  certain  goods  could 
not  be  sent  to  America,  as  it  was  supposed  that  the  American  de 
mand  made  them  dear  in  Spain;  articles  of  food  were  taxed  an 
eighth  of  their  value;  and  above  all,  trade  was  ruined  by  a  tax, 
termed  the  alcabala,  of  ten  per  cent,  rising  later  to  fourteen,  on 
every  sale  and  which  necessarily  crushed  commercial  movement  of 
every  kind.  Labor,  which  had  been  the  perquisite  of  the  Jew  and 
of  the  Moor,  was  despised  by  the  "Old  Christian,"  misery  and 
squalor  stalked  through  the  land,  while  the  court  was  given  over 
to  reckless  extravagance.  Says  Hume:  "The  religious  fervor 
which  first  demonstrated  itself  in  Isabel  the  Catholic,  the  exalta 
tion  induced  by  the  Inquisition,  and  the  ascetic  mysticism  which 
was  at  once  the  chief  characteristic  and  the  main  policy  of  Philip 
II,  provided  for  the  Spanish  people  the  direction  for  which  their 
spirit  yearned.  Priests  and  friars  were  ever  present.  In  court, 
in  camp,  and  in  every-day  life  the  atmosphere  of  rigid  unified 
religion  enveloped  all  things  and  persons.  Hard,  severe,  and  as 
cetic  as  a  protest  against  Moorish  grace,  cleanliness,  and  elegance, 
and  equally  against  the  sensuous  beauty  with  which  the  Italians 
1  See  Lea,  History  of  the  Inquisition  in  Spain,  passim. 


10  INTRODUCTION 

had  invested  their  worship,  the  Spanish  mind  revelled  in  the  pain 
ful  self-sacrificing  side  of  religion  which  appealed  to  their  nature. 
They  became  a  nation  of  mystics  in  which  each  person  felt  his 
community  with  God,  and,  as  a  consequence,  capable  of  any  sacri 
fice,  any  heroism,  any  suffering  in  this  cause.  The  ruling  idea 
was  one  of  celestial  knighthood,  of  daring  adventure  to  rescue  the 
cause  of  the  suffering  Christ  even  as  the  now-waning  knights- 
errant  had  undertaken  to  rescue  ill-treated  ladies.  Saint  Teresa  de 
Jesus,  Saint  Ignatius  de  Loyola  and  his  marvellous  company,  and 
Saint  Juan  de  la  Cruz,  with  their  visions  and  their  ecstasies,  were 
merely  types;  there  was  hardly  a  monastery  without  its  fasting 
seer  or  its  saintly  dreamer,  hardly  a  nunnery  without  its  cataleptic 
miracle  worker,  hardly  a  barren  hill-side  without  its  hermit,  living 
in  filth  and  abject  misery  of  the  flesh,  but  with  the  exalted  con 
viction  of  his  personal  community  with  God.  Not  churchmen 
alone,  but  laymen  and  soldiers  too,  were  swayed  by  the  strange 
thought,  and  went  forth  to  work  or  war  in  a  spirit  of  sacrifice, 
relieved  by  orgies  of  hideous  immorality.  Philip  himself,  living 
like  a  hermit  and  toiling  like  a  slave  in  his  stone  cell,  practising 
rigid  mortifications,  and  undergoing  the  voluntary  suffering  in 
which  he  gloried,  was  beloved  by  his  people,  because  he  was 
moved  by  the  same  instinct  that  they  were.  He  led  them,  it  is 
true,  but  he  did  so  because  they  wished  to  tread  the  same  road."1 
The  three  hundred  years  after  Philip  II,  which  so  altere4  most 
of  Europe,  wrought  but  slow  changes  in  Spain,  harrowed  as  was 
its  people  by  poverty,  misrule,  and  frequent  anarchy.  Demo 
cratic  in  its  impulses  as  are  all  its  kindred  races,  the  theocratic 
rule  of  centuries  fitted  that  of  Spain  but  illy  to  adjust  itself  to 
the  realities  of  democracy  as  developed  in  other  European  coun 
tries.  Intensely  provincialized  both  by  reason  of  ignorance  and 
by  the  barriers  set  by  nature  between  the  various  kingdoms  of 
Spain;  with  difficult  and  infrequent  communications;  segregated 

?  from  the  rest  of  Europe  by  a  lofty  mountain  range;  holding  with 
overweening  pride  the  conviction  of  a  superiority  of  race  which, 
it  was  felt,  only  accident  had  thwarted;  unable  by  race  charac- 

:  teristics  to  develop  a  sane  and  wholesome  polity,  Spain,  almost 
equally  with  Turkey,  had  become  a  synonym  for  ineptitude 
» Hume,  The  Spanish  People,  375-376. 


INTRODUCTION  11 

in  government  and  for  maladministration  in  such  governmental  f 
systems  as  the  nation  was  able  to  form. 

It  was  this  inability  or  slowness  of  adaptation  to  the  world's 
new  conditions  which  caused  the  century  just  ended  to  be  darkened  j 
with  struggles  in  Spain's  American  dependencies,  for  what  appeared 
to  Anglo-Saxons  for  generations  inherent  rights.  These  depend 
encies,  less  enthralled  as  to  thought  in  the  last  hundred  years  than 
the  mother  country,  demanded  more  than,  unhappily,  the  mother 
country  could  see  its  way  to  give.  The  practical  political  knowl-  \ 
edge  which  should  have  developed  in  Spain  as  elsewhere  in  Europe 
came  a  century  too  late,  and  was  acted  upon  only  when  the  last  of 
the  numerous  brood  to  which  she  had  given  birth  had  snapped  the 
ties  which  had  so  long  been  weakening  through  the  misrule  which 
did  not  vary,  in  principle  or  in  practice,  during  a  period  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty  years. 

A  notable  Spaniard  himself  says:  "If  some  day  a  mature 
judgment  of  our  decadence  and  fall  (vencimiento)  be  written, 
there  will  be  placed  as  first  of  all  their  causes  the  evident  inferiority 
of  our  aptitude  for  administration  and  government.  One  will  then 
see  how  small  are  the  matters  which  fix  the  attention  of  historians 
and  statisticians  in  the  incapacity  and  small  emotions  which  have 
been  so  largely  the  peculiar  attribute  of  our  governors.  At  the 
moment  when  vast  territories  and  complicated  interests  demand 
elevated  intelligence  and  large  ability  we  appear  before  the  world 
with  the  admirable  court  of  artists,  captains,  mystics,  colonists, 
navigators,  and  even  political  writers  of  value,  but  without  lighting 
upon  a  single  man  skilled  in  government;  a  Cromwell,  Sully, 
Richelieu,  Colbert,  Louvois,  etc.,  in  whom  the  ancient  personal 
strength  has  happened  to  be  cast  in  the  new  moulds  of  modern 
nations."  l 

But  it  has  not  been  a  Cromwell  or  Richelieu  that  has  been 
needed;  it  has  been  chiefly  a  want  of  political  aptitude  in  the  race 
itself,  without  which  the  individual  leader  is  of  but  small  avail. 

Great  leadership  is  but  die  exponent  of  national  feeling  and 
aspiration.  There  was  a  nucleus  of  such  in  Spain  a  hundred  years 
since  and  in  its  encouragement  was  Spain's  need  and  safety.  But 

*Don  Pablo  cle  Al/ola,  quoting  Don  Fernando  de  Silvela,  Revista  Con- 
temporanea,  V,  111  (1898). 


12  INTRODUCTION 

this  encouragement  was  denied  her.  Spanish  effort  in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  keep  step  with  the  spirit  of  democ 
racy  awakened  by  the  French  revolution  was  stifled,  not  by  Span 
iards  but  by  the  France  of  Louis  XVIII  and  the  Holy  Alliance. 
The  utmost  evils  which  could  be  attributed  to  the  Napoleonic  de 
signs  of  1808  and  the  sufferings  from  the  savage  devastation  of 
Spanish  cities  and  the  shameless  rapacity  of  French  generals  at 
this  melancholy  period,  could  not  equal  in  unhappiness  to  the 
Spanish  people  the  results  of  the  atrocity  of  the  French  invasion 
of  1823.  This  invasion,  the  only  reason  for  which  was  the  sup 
pression  of  the  liberal  movement  and  the  constitution,  re-estab 
lished  absolutism  in  the  person  of  an  incapable  and  degraded 
monarch,  Fernando  VII,  and  dealt  Spanish  liberalism  a  blow 
which  rent  the  country  with  anarchic  strife,  stunted  the  moral 
and  material  growth  of  the  kingdom,  and  fastened  upon  Cuba  the 
despotic  regime  embodied  in  the  king's  decree  of  1825. 

It  must  thus  be  recognized  that  the  vast  evils  befalling  Spain  and 
her  island  dependencies  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  evils  so 
great  that  no  qualifying  words  can  express  their  enormity,  were  not 
all  of  her  own  making.  France,  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia 
were  the  culpable  partners  in  a  crime  which,  more  than  all  things 
else  together,  fastened  woe  upon  a  brave  people  and  made  certain 
the  continuance  of  the  evil  elements  of  the  country. 

Without  this  action  Spain,  with  her  more  liberal  forces  free  to 
develop,  might  in  some  degree  at  least  have  advanced  politically 
with  the  rest  of  Europe.  Cuba  might  have  been  to-day  a  Spanish 
Canada  and  the  Philippines  a  Spanish  India.  But  these  things 
were  not  to  be.  Racial  peculiarities,  regionalism,  religious  bigotry, 
and  the  ignorance  which  went  hand  in  hand  with  fanatical  sub 
servience  to  priestly  rule  were  possibly  sufficient  to  have  prevented 
such  a  change;  but  the  French  invasion,  or  to  speak  more  truly, 
the  invasion  by  the  Holy  Alliance,  made  this  change  impossible, 
and  by  its  reinstallation  of  absolutism  made  certain  anarchy  at 
home  and  loss  of  empire  abroad.  Spanish  history  when  truly 
written  will  recognize  this  great  fact. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  ATTITUDE  OF  SPAIN  IN  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 

THE  difficulties  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  began 
with  the  advent  of  the  former  as  an  independent  power.  These 
difficulties,  as  already  mentioned,1  were  a  heritage  of  the  peace  of 
1763.  By  the  preliminary  articles,  dated  November  3,  1762,  of 
the  definitivejreaty  signed  February  10,  1763,  a^treatyjvhich L  ended 
the  great  colonial  wars  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
France  yielded  Canada  to  Great  Britain  and  the  latter  took  over 
Florida  in  exchange  for  Havana,  which  had  fallen  in  1762  to  the 
English  and  colonial  forces  under  Lord  Albemarle  and  Admiral 
Pocock.  On  the  same  day,  with  the  adoption  of  the  preliminary 
articles  of  the  treaty,  the  French  king  "  ceded  to  his  cousin  of  Spain 
and  to  his  successors,  forever,  in  full  ownership  and  without  ex 
ception  or  reservation  whatever,  from  pure  impulse  of  his  generous 
heart  and  from  the  sense  of  the  affection  and  friendship  existing 
between  these  two  royal  persons,  all  the  country  known  under  the 
name  of  J^ouisiana."  This  act  had  been  so  unforeseen  that  the 
Spanish  ambassador,  who  had  had  no  instructions  in  the  subject, 
accepted  the  gift  conditionally,  that  is,  sub  spe  rati,  subject  to  the 
ratification  of  his  Catholic  Majesty.  On  the  13th  of  the  same 
month  the  latter  accepted  the  donation,2  but  it  was  not  until  by 
letter  of  April  21,  1764,  to  the  Governor  of  Louisiana  that  the 
transfer  was  made  public.  Thus  so  easily,  and  apparently  with 
no  other  cause  than  to  recompense  Spain  for  the  loss  of  Florida, 
was  signed  away  an  empire. 

The  definitive  treaty  gave  no  indication  of  this  transfer,  but 
proceeded  in  Article  VII  to  assign  limits  as  if  it  had  not  been 
made:  "The  limits  of  the  British  and  French  territories  in  that 
part  of  the  world  shall  be  fixed  irrevocably  by  a  line  down  the 
middle  of  the  river  Mississippi,  from  its  source  to  the  river  Iberville, 

1  Introduction.  *  GayarrS,  History  of  Louisiana,  II,  92. 

13 


14  CESSION  OF  LOUISIANA  TO  SPAIN  [1763 

and  from  thence  by  a  line  drawn  along  the  middle  of  this  river  and 
the  lakes  Maurepas  and  Pontchartrain  to  the  sea;  and  for  this 
purpose  the  Most  Christian  King  cedes  in  full  right,  and  guarantees 
to  his  Britannic  Majesty,  the  river  and  port  of  Mobile,  and  every 
thing  he  possesses  or  ought  to  possess  on  the  left  side  of  the  river 
Mississippi,  except  the  town  of  New  Orleans  and  the  island  in 
which  it  is  situated,  which  shall  remain  to  France;  provided  the 
river  Mississippi  shall  be  equally  free,  as  well  to  the  subjects  of 
Great  Britain  as  to  those  of  France,  in  its  whole  breadth  or  length, 
from  its  source  to  the  sea,  and  expressly  that  part  which  is  between 
the  said  island  of  New  Orleans  and  the  right  bank  of  that  river, 
as  well  as  the  passage  both  in  and  out  of  its  mouth.  It  is  further 
more  stipulated  that  the  vessels  belonging  to  the  subjects  of  either 
nation  shall  not  be  stopped,  visited,  or  subjected  to  the  payment  of 
any  duty  whatsoever." 

In  this  clause  rested  later  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  the 
right  of  navigation  of  the  river  as  successor  to  all  the  rights  of 
Great  Britain  under  the  treaty  of  1763. 

Spain  in  exchange  for  the  restitution  of  Havana  and  Cuba 
ceded  "Florida,  with  Fort  St.  Augustin  and  the  bay  of  Pensacola, 
as  well  as  all  that  Spain  possesses  on  the  continent  of  North  America 
to  the  east  or  to  the  south  east  of  the  river  Mississippi,  and  in 
general  everything  that  depends  on  said  countries  and  lands." 
By  this  treaty  all  the  North  American  continent  east  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  except  the  island  of  New  Orleans,  became  British  territory. 

But  this  was  not  the  whole  of  the  rearrangement  of  North 
American  boundaries.  By  British  royal  proclamation  of  October 
7,  1763,  the  ceded  territories  were  divided  into  four  governmental 
districts — Quebec,  East  Florida,  West  Florida,  and  Granada, 
which  last  included  the  whole  of  the  British  West  Indies;  a  fifth 
district  comprising  the  region  between  the  Alleghany  and  the 
Mississippi  was  set  aside  for  the  Indians.  In  this  last  vast  area 
British  subjects  were  prohibited  from  making  "any  purchases  or 
settlements  whatever,  or  taking  possession  of  any  of  the  lands 
above  reserved,  without  our  special  leave  or  license." 1  Naturally 

1  For  text  of  this  proclamation,  see  Annual  Register,  1763,  Winsor,  "Nar 
rative  and  Critical  History,"  VI,  ch.  IX,  Hart  and  Channing,  American  History 
Leaflets,  No.  5. 


1776]  SPAIN'S  APPREHENSIONS  15 

the  English  colonists  paid  practically  no  attention  to  this  attempt 
to  set  new  bounds  to  the  ancient  charters,  and  the  westward 
movement  across  the  Alleghanies,  already  begun,  went  forward 
with  constant  acceleration.1 

The  provinces  known  as  East  Florida  and  West  Florida  were 
divided  by  the  Appalachicola  River;  both  had  at  first  the  thirty- 
first  parallel  of  latitude  as  a  northern  boundary,  but  this,  for  West 
Florida,  was  changed  the  next  year  to  32°  28',  marking  the  mouth 
of  the  Yazoo,  a  change  which  later  gave  rise  to  no  little  discussion. 

Spain  by  the  treaty  came  into  the  greatest  potential  heritage 
with  which  a  nation  was  ever  dowered.  Her  possessions  included 
three- fourths  the  habitable  parts  of  North  and  South  America; 
the  richest  and  greatest  islands  of  the  West  Indies  were  hers;  she 
stretched  %  from  frozen  north  to  frozen  south  through  110  degrees 
of  latitude,  holding  within  her  grasp  the  richest  mines  then  known 
of  the  world,  and  far  richer  which  were  yet  to  be  discovered. 
Never  had  race  or  nation  such  opportunities.  But  this  great 
estate  was  in  hands  powerless  to  use  it;  the  gift  from  France  of 
half  a  continent  was  in  itself  a  cause  of  terror  and  foreboding,  as 
bringing  Spain  into  direct  and  hated  contact  with  the  Anglo- 
Saxon,  a  contact  she  had  hoped  to  avoid  through  the  continuance 
of  a  buffer  state  under  the  dominion  of  France. 

Spain  saw  in  the  American  Revolution  her  supposed  oppor 
tunity  for  safeguarding  her  American  interests,  in  weakening  the 
dominion  of  the  English  race  through  the  revolt  of  the  colonies, 
and  gave  secretly  to  France  1,000,000  of  the  3,000,000  francs 
handed  by  the  French  in  1776  to  the  American  Commissioners. 
As  the  war  progressed,  "and  the  issue  was  independence,  Spain 
was  no  longer  inclined  to  help  on  a  movement  which  would  be  a 
dangerous  precedent  to  her  own  colonies,  and  which,  if  successful, 
would  build  up  on  her  borders  a  sovereignty  in  its  political  prin 
ciples  very  hostile  to  her  traditions,  and  occupied  by  a  people  whose 
energy  and  aggressiveness  would  be  made  more  formidable  by  a 
successful  war.  This  was  the  second  attitude  assumed  by  Spain 

1  Eleven  years  later,  in  1774,  this  was  followed  by  a  parliamentary  act  known 
as  the  Quebec  bill,  the  passing  of  which  was  largely  influenced  by  the  revolu 
tionary  commotions  of  the  period  in  Boston  and  which  extended  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  the  Quebec  government  to  the  Ohio.  The  colonies  affected  vigorously 
protested  against  this  as  a  violation  of  their  ancient  charters. 


16         THE  FRENCH-SPANISH  TREATY  OF  1778          [1778 

to  our  Revolution;  an  attitude  of  annoyance,  of  displeasure,  of 
anxiety,  causing  her  to  repel  any  advance  made  by  us  with  a  sullen 
though  adroit  persistence."  l 

The  treaty  of  alliance,  signed  February  6,  1778,  between  France 
and  the  United  States  had  included  a  secret  article  enabling  the 
King  of  Spain  to  become  a  party  to  the  alliance,  but  Spain  did 
not  move  until  April  29,  1779,  when  she  made  a  secret  convention 
with  France  to  become  a  party  to  the  war  with  Great  Britain,  a 
provision  of  which  was  that  the  war  should  continue  until  Gibraltar 
should  be  taken.  Six  days  later  she  made  proposals  of  alliance 
with  England,  but  these  being  refused,  she  declared  war  May 
3,  1779.  Article  4  of  the  secret  convention,  notwithstanding 
Spain's  real  dislike  to  such  an  outcome,  engaged  the  Spanish 
King  "not  to  lay  down  his  arms  until"  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  "  is  recognized  by  the  King  of  Great  Britain,  it  being 
indispensable  that  this  point  shall  be  the  essential  basis  of  all  ne 
gotiations  for  peace  which  may  be  instituted  hereafter,"  an  article 
instigated  not  by  French  altruism  for  the  benefit  of  the  United 
States  but  by  the  determination  to  continue  the  war  to  the  com 
pletion  of  England's  humiliation. 

The  proposal  and  request  of  the  King  of  France  in  the  same 
article,  that  on  the  day  the  King  of  Spain  should  declare  war 
against  England  he  should  recognize  the  "sovereign  independence" 
of  the  United  States  ended  with  the  proposition.  The  policy  of 
Spain  was  moved  by  very  different  views  from  that  of  France. 
The  latter  was  already  disinherited  of  her  American  continental 
possessions;  the  former  was  potentially  a  great  American  power, 
and,  as  mentioned,  there  was  wisdom  enough  in  Spain  to  cause  her 
ministers  to  dread  the  formation  of  a  new  and  independent  empire, 
protestant  in  religion  and  moved  by  a  spirit  of  intense  democracy. 
Said  Florida  Blanca,  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  to  the  French 
ambassador  Montmorin,  "The  King,  my  master,  will  never  ac 
knowledge  their  independence  until  the  English  themselves  shall 
be  forced  to  recognize  it  by  the  peace.  He  fears  the  example 
which  he  should  otherwise  give  to  his  own  possessions."  2  From 
this  attitude  Spain  did  not  move. 

1  Wharton,  Diplom.  Cor.  of  the  American  Revolution,  I,  427. 
0  Bancroft,  United  States,  V,  307,  Ed.  1890. 


1780]  JAY,    ENVOY  TO  SPAIN  17 

Spain  thus,  inasmuch  as  she  became  a  party  to  the  war, 
had  a  common  interest  with  the  United  States.  But  she  was 
powerless  to  aid  effectively  in  such  a  contest.  Her  fleet  was 
what  it  always  had  been  and  continued  to  be — ill-manned,  ill- 
equipped  and  in  bad  repair.  Such  resources  as  she  had  were 
swallowed  in  the  siege  of  Gibraltar,  and  the  slight  efforts  she 
made  in  America  were  all  directed  to  the  later  despoilment  of 
the  colonies.  She  was  never  an  ally  of  the  United  States,  morally 
or  by  treaty. 

In  1779  an  agent,  Don  Juan  de  Miralles,  was  sent  from  Cuba, 
who,  through  the  French  minister,  Gerard,  addressed  a  memorial 
to  Congress,  May  19,  on  the  subject  of  the  seizure  by  American 
privateers  of  three  vessels  under  the  Spanish  flag.1  This  was  fol 
lowed  by  a  letter  to  Congress,  November  24,  1779,  stating  that  he 
"was  commissioned  with  sufficient  authority  by  order  from  his 
Excellency  Don  Diego  Joseph  Navarro,  Governor  and  Captain- 
General  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  dated  at  the  Havana,  the  19th  and 
22d  of  July  last/'  to  announce  formally  the  fact  of  the  declaration 
of  war  by  Spain  published  in  Havana  July  22,  1779,  and  to  urge 
upon  Congress  the  capture  of  St.  Augustine,  Florida,  in  order  that 
it  might  be  restored  to  Spain  and  also  that  assault  upon  this  place 
might  withdraw  some  of  the  British  forces  from  the  defence  of 
Pensacola  and  Mobile.2  This  letter  presents  Spain  in  the  extraor 
dinary  attitude  of  a  suppliant  for  favors  rather  than  as  a  friend 
who  had  come  to  aid  in  a  great  struggle,  and  it  was,  indeed,  to 
this  former  attitude  that  with  scarcely  any  exception  she  held 
throughout. 

Though  Mr.  John  Jay,  sent  as  envoy  to  Madrid  in  the  hope 
of  effecting  an  alliance,  reached  Cadiz  January  22, 1780,  it  was  not 
until  May  10  of  that  year  that  he  was  able  to  have  audience  with 
the  Count  of  Florida  Blanca,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  who  inti 
mated  that  the  chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of  any  treaty  laid  in  the 
pretensions  of  the  United  States  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
This  had  already  been  made  plain  when  a  committee  of  Congress 
reported  (February  2,  1780)  a  communication  from  the  French 
government,  the  presentation  of  which  was  significant  of  the  later 
antagonistic  attitude  of  France  herself.  By  this  the  King  of  Spain 
lDiplom.  Cor.,  Ill,  170.  *  Diplom.  Cor.,  Ill,  412-415. 


18  SPAIN'S  EXCESSIVE  DEMANDS  [1780 

made  known  the  "articles  which  his  Catholic  Majesty  deems  of 
great  importance  to  the  interests  of  his  crown,  and  on  which  it  is 
highly  necessary  that  the  United  States  explain  themselves  with 
precision  and  with  such  moderation  as  may  consist  with  their 
essential  rights. 

"That  the  articles  are: 

"(1).  A  precise  and  invariable  western  boundary  of  the  states. 

"(2).  The  exclusive  navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi. 

"(3).  The  possession  of  the  Floridas;    and 

"  (4).  The  lands  on  the  left  or  eastern  bank  of  the  river  Mis 
sissippi. 

"That  in  the  first  article  it  is  the  idea  of  the  cabinet  of  Madrid 
that  the  United  States  extend  to  the  westward  no  farther  than  set 
tlements  were  permitted  by  the  royal  proclamation  bearing  date 
the  [seventh]  day  of  [October,]  1763. 

"On  the  second,  that  the  United  States  do  not  consider  them 
selves  as  having  any  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  no  territory 
belonging  to  them  being  situated  thereon. 

"  On  the  third,  that  it  is  probable  that  the  King  of  Spain  will  con 
quer  the  Floridas  during  the  course  of  the  present  war;  and  in 
such  event  every  cause  of  dispute  relative  thereto  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States  ought  to  be  removed. 

"On  the  fourth,  that  the  lands  lying  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  whereon  the  settlements  were  prohibited  by  the  aforesaid 
proclamation,  are  possessions  of  the  crown  of  Great  Britain,  and 
proper  objects  against  which  the  arms  of  Spain  may  be  employed 
for  the  purpose  of  making  a  permanent  conquest  for  the  Spanish 
crown.  That  such  conquest  may  probably  be  made  during  the 
present  war;  that  therefore  it  would  be  advisable  to  restrain  the 
Southern  states  from  making  any  settlements  or  conquests  in  those 
territories;  that  the  council  of  Madrid  consider  the  United  States 
as  having  no  claim  to  those  territories,  either  as  not  having  had 
possession  of  them  before  the  present  war,  or  not  having  any  foun 
dation  for  a  claim  in  the  right  of  the  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain, 
whose  dominion  they  have  abjured." 

It  cannot  be  said  that  Spain  did  not  state  her  position  with  ab 
solute  clearness.     It  is  also  the  first  hint  of  an  understanding 
lDiplom.  Cor.,  111,489. 


1780]  SPAIN'S  EXCESSIVE   DEMANDS  19 

between  France  and  Spain  that  when  peace  came  the  Alleghanies 
should  be  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States,  an  understanding 
in  which  there  is  little  doubt  that  there  was  also  bound  up  the 
hope  of  France  to  recover  to  herself  the  main  part  of  the  great 
territory  so  recklessly  yielded  in  1763. 

In  his  despatch  of  November  6,  1780,  to  the  President  of  Con 
gress,1  Jay  detailed  the  events  connected  with  his  mission.  The 
use  of  the  word  "events"  was  a  figure  of  speech,  as,  in  fact,  there 
were  no  events;  there  was  practically  simple  inaction  on  the  part  of 
Spain.  Her  aid  was  confined  to  that  of  guaranteeing  bills  drawn 
against  Mr.  Jay  to  the  extent  of  some  fourteen  thousand  dollars 
to  be  payable  in  three  years.  Florida  Blanca  also,  in  a  note  of 
June  7, 1780,2  suggested  the  possibility  of  becoming  responsible  for 
bills  to  the  extent  of  a  hundred  thousand  pounds,  if  "Congress 
should  engage  to  build  without  delay  some  handsome  frigates  and 
other  smaller  vessels  of  war"  for  Spain,  to  be  manned  by  Americans 
and  sailed  under  Spanish  colors  and  to  be  used  for  the  intercep 
tion  of  the  British  East  Indian  commerce. 

The  proposition  in  itself  was  an  absurdity  such  as  could  only 
have  been  devised  by  Spanish  officialdom  of  the  period.  Even  if 
Congress  had  been  in  a  situation  to  "  build,  equip,  and  man"  them, 
two  years  at  least  would  have  elapsed  before  the  squadron  of 
"four  good  frigates  and  some  other  lighter  vessels"  could  be  made 
ready.  Jay  endeavored  to  impress  upon  the  Spanish  minister  of 
state  that  money  was  necessary  in  the  beginning  to  undertake  such 
work  and  that  no  funds  were  available;  that  what  Congress  de 
sired  was  a  loan  outright  for  the  repayment  of  which  the  credit  of 
the  United  States  would  be  pledged. 

The  situation  of  the  American  minister  became  very  embarrassing 
as  it  was  only  by  courtesy  of  the  bankers  that  the  bills  drawn  against 
him,  small  in  actual  amount  as  they  were,  were  not  sent  to  protest. 
His  notes  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  were  left  unanswered 
and  his  treatment  altogether  was  one  of  extreme  humiliation  and 
anxiety^" 

Throughout  the  whole  period  Spain  held  rigidly  to  her  views 
already  expressed  regarding  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  in  a  conference  which  took  place  September  23,  1780,  the 

1Diplom.  Cor.,  IV,  112  et  seq.  *  Ibid.,  IV,  115. 


20  MISSISSIPPI  NAVIGATION  YIELDED  [1781 

Spanish  attitude  was  expressed  in  the  notes  of  Mr.  Jay  as  follows : 
"The  count  .  .  .  made  several  observations  tending  to  show  the 
importance  of  this  object  to  Spain  and  its  determination  to  adhere 
to  it,  saying  with  some  degree  of  warmth  that  unless  Spain  could 
exclude  all  nations  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  they  might  as  well 
admit  all;  that  the  king  would  never  relinquish  it;  that  the  min 
ister  regarded  it  as  a  principal  object  to  be  obtained  by  the  war; 
and  that  obtained,  he  should  be  perfectly  easy  whether  Spain  pro 
cured  any  other  cession;  that  he  considered  it  far  more  important 
than  the  acquisition  of  Gibraltar;  and  that  if  they  did  not  get  it, 
it  was  a  matter  of  indifference  to  him  whether  the  English  possessed 
Mobile  or  not."  1 

J  In  such  manner,  with  almost  absolute  indifference  on  the  part 
I  of  Spain  to  the  cause  of  the  United  States,  with  cynical  disregard  of 
the  straits  to  which  the  war  in  which  both  were  engaged  subjected 
the  latter,  and  with  no  thought  but  of  despoiling  them,  did  Jay's 
efforts  at  negotiation  stagger  on  from  month  to  month.  The 
plain  truth  as  to  financial  assistance  was  no  doubt  Spain's  own 
chronic  poverty.  But  while  thus  poverty-stricken  at  home,  with 
out  resources  in  money,  energy,  or  excess  of  population,  she  was 
greedily  grasping  to  extend  an  empire  already  vastly  greater  than 
her  ability  to  populate  or  control,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  which 
was  to  slip  from  her  hold  within  the  next  forty  years. 

But  the  spell  of  supposed  Spanish  power  was  still  over  the 
world,  and  so  eager  was  youthful  America  to  form  an  alliance  with 
this  decrepit  government,  that  Congress  withdrew  from  its  position 
regarding  the  Mississippi,  and  Jay  was  informed  under  date  of 
May  28,  1781,  that  "a  reconsideration  of  that  subject  determined 
Congress  on  the  15th  day  of  February  last  to  recede  from  that 
instruction  (of  October  4,  1780)  so  far  as  it  insisted  on  their  claim 
to  the  navigation  of  that  river  below  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north 
latitude  and  to  free  port  or  ports  below  the  same.3  This  was  a 
complete  yielding  of  the  position  taken  in  the  letters  of  October 
6  and  17,  1780,  the  latter  of  which  had  been  drawn  by  Madison s 
and  represented  an  attitude  from  which  he  never  swerved.  The 
former  of  these  directed  a  strict  adherence  to  the  preceding  in- 

lDiplom.  Cor.,  IV,  146.  'Ibid.,  IV,  453. 

3  Madison,  Writings,  edited  by  Hunt,  I,  82. 


1781]  SPAIN   CLAIMS   GULF  OF  MEXICO  21 

structions  as  to  boundaries  and  an  insistence  on  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  for  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  common  with 
the  subjects  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  as  well  as  a  free  port  or  ports 
below  the  northern  limit  of  West  Florida  for  the  use  of  the  former. 
The  letter  of  October  17  entered  at  length  into  the  demands  of 
Spain,  the  occupancy  of  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  north 
of  the  thirty-first  degree  of  latitude  by  right  of  conquest,  and  stated 
"particularly  and  ably  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  the  free 
navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi,  and  enumerates  the  various 
reasons  which  induce  them  (Congress)  to  decline  relinquishing  it."  1 

"The  minister,  however,  did  not  at  any  time  enter  into  the  merits 
of  these  arguments  nor  appear  in  the  least  affected  by  them. 
His  answer  to  them  all  was  that  the  King  of  Spain  must  have  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  to  himself;  that  the  maxims  of  policy  adopted  in 
the  management  of  their  colonies  required  it;  and  that  he  had 
hoped  the  friendly  disposition  [!]  shown  by  this  court  toward  us 
would  have  induced  a  compliance  on  the  part  of  Congress." 2 

Jay  had  received,  May  18,  a  copy  of  the  resolution  of  the  15th 
of  February,  1781,  through  Mr.  Lovell.  It  had  been  brought  to 
Cadiz  by  the  Virginia.  "  It  is  remarkable,"  says  Jay,  "  that  none  of 
the  journals  or  gazettes  nor  the  letters  from  Congress  which  Mr. 
Lovell  gave  me  reason  to  expect  ever  came  to  my  hands.  But  as  all 
the  papers  brought  by  the  Virginia  passed  through  the  hands  of  the 
governor  of  Cadiz,  and  afterward  through  the  post-office,  the 
suppression  of  some  of  them  may  be  easily  accounted  for."  3  As 
Jay  had  not  received  the  copy  of  the  resolution  officially,  he  thought 
he  was  justified  in  delaying  to  bring  the  matter  before  the  Spanish 
minister,  though  it  became  evident  that  the  latter  was  aware  of 
the  existence  of  the  resolution.  "My  only  difficulty,"  said  Jay, 
"arose  from  this  single  question,  whether  I  could  prudently  risk 
acting  on  a  presumption  either  that  Spain  did  not  already  or 
would  not  soon  be  acquainted  with  the  contents  of  this  instruction. 
If  such  a  presumption  had  been  admissible,  I  should,  without  the 
least  hesitation,  have  played  the  game  a  little  further,  keeping  this 
instruction  in  my  hands  as  a  trump  card,  to  prevent  a  separate 
peace  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  in  case  such  an  event 

1  Jay  to  President  of  Congress,  October  3,  1781,  Diplom.  Cor.,  IV,  738. 
'Ibid.  'Ibid.,  740. 


22  FRANKLIN'S  VIEWS  [1781 

should  otherwise  prove  inevitable.  Had  Spain  been  at  peace  with 
our  enemies,  and  offered  to  acknowledge,  guarantee,  and  fight  for 
our  independence,  provided  we  would  yield  them  this  point  (as 
once  seemed  to  be  the  case),  I  should  for  my  own  part  have  no 
more  hesitation  about  it  now  than  I  had  then.  But  Spain  being 
now  at  war  with  Great  Britain  to  gain  her  own  objects,  she  doubt 
less  will  prosecute  it  full  as  vigorously  as  if  she  fought  for  our  ob 
jects.  There  was  and  is  little  reason  to  suppose  that  such  a  cession 
would  render  her  exertions  more  vigorous  or  her  aid  more  liberal. 
The  effect  which  an  alliance  between  Spain  and  America  would 
have  on  Britain  and  other  nations  would  certainly  be  in  our  favor, 
but  whether  more  so  than  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  is 
less  certain.  The  cession  of  this  navigation  will,  in  my  opinion, 
render  a  future  war  with  Spain  inevitable,  and  I  shall  look  upon 
my  subscribing  to  the  one  as  fixing  the  certainty  of  the  other."  l 

This  was  both  sound  policy  and  sound  sense,  in  which  Jay  was 
supported  by  Franklin,  who,  with  a  prescience  far  beyond  that  of 
Congress,  wrote  Jay  from  France,  October  2,  1880:  "Poor  as  we 
are  yet  as  I  know  we  shall  be  rich,  I  would  rather  agree  with  them 
to  buy,  at  a  great  price,  the  whole  of  their  right  on  the  Mississippi 
than  to  sell  a  drop  of  its  waters.  A  neighbor  might  as  well  ask 
me  to  sell  my  street  door." 2  Jay  felt  obliged,  however,  to  mention 
the  fact  of  the  change  in  the  views  of  Congress,  and  did  so  in  con 
versation  May  23,  following  this  up  by  a  note  of  July  2,  1781, 
stating  "that  Congress,  in  order  to  manifest  in  the  most  striking 
manner  the  sincerity  of  their  professions  to  his  majesty,  and  with 
a  view  that  the  common  cause  may  immediately  reap  all  advan 
tages  naturally  to  be  expected  from  a  cordial  and  permanent  union 
between  France,  Spain,  and  the  United  States,  have  authorized 
me  to  agree  to  such  terms  relative  to  the  point  in  question  as  to  re 
move  the  difficulties  to  which  it  has  hitherto  given  occasion." 3 

It  was  not  until  July  1 1  that  Jay  received  the  official  information 
of  the  action  of  Congress,  February  15,  conveyed  in  a  letter  from 
the  President  of  Congress  of  May  28.  Nothing  came  from  the 
Spanish  minister  but  two  short  notes  acknowledging  the  reception 
of  those  of  Mr.  Jay;  but  as  an  issue  of  a  conference  at  St.  Ildefonso 

lDiplom.  Cor.  IV,  743.  *  Ibid.,  IV,  75. 

'Ibid.,  VI,  747. 


1782]  GUARANTEE  OFFERED  SPAIN  23 

September  19,  1781,  Mr.  Jay  submitted,  on  September  22,  propo 
sitions  for  a  basis  of  amity  and  alliance1  which  included  two  of 
extreme  importance,  as  follows : 

"VI.  The  United  States  shall  relinquish  to  his  Catholic  Maj 
esty,  and  in  future  forbear  to  use  or  attempt  to  use,  the  navigation 
of  the  river  Mississippi  from  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  lati 
tude — that  is,  from  the  point  where  it  leaves  the  United  States — 
down  to  the  ocean." 

"VIII.  That  the  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  his  Catholic 
Majesty  all  his  dominions  in  North  America." 

Jay,  however,  most  fortunately  and  wisely  added  on  his  own  re 
sponsibility  a  statement  that  this  offer  must  necessarily  be  limited 
by  the  duration  of  the  pending  circumstances,  "and  consequently 
that  if  the  acceptance  of  it  should,  together  with  the  proposed 
alliance,  be  postponed  to  a  general  peace,  the  United  States  will 
cease  to  consider  themselves  bound  to  any  propositions  or  offers 
which  he  may  now  make  on  their  behalf." 2  He  was  upheld 
throughout  by  a  resolution  in  Congress  April  30,  1782,3  which 
might  be  read  as  a  withdrawal  of  the  offer  itself,  an  interpretation 
no  doubt  intended  by  Madison,  its  introducer  and  a  vehement 
opponent  of  such  concession. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  fortunate  than  Spain's  vacil 
lations  and  procrastination.  They  saved  the  United  States  from  an 
unhappy  situation  whose  only  solution  later  was  war  or  a  dis 
memberment  of  the  newly  formed  Confederation  and  the  erection 
of  a  separate  sovereignty  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 

A  forcible  indication  of  Spain's  intentions  appeared  in  the 
Madrid  Gazette  of  March  12,  1782,  which  mentioned  the  arrival 
of  a  letter  from  the  commander-in-chief  at  Havana  giving  news 
of  an  expedition  of  sixty-five  militia  and  sixty  Indians  which  had 
left  St.  Louis  January  2  and  had  seized  the  post  of  St.  Joseph  on 
Lake  Michigan,  "which  the  English  occupied  at  two  hundred  and 
twenty  leagues  distant  from  that  of  the  above-mentioned  St.  Louis. 
.  .  .  They  made  prisoners  of  the  few  English  they  found  in  it.  ... 
Don  Eugenio  Purre  took  possession,  in  the  name  of  the  king,  of  that 
place  and  its  dependencies,  and  of  the  river  of  the  Illinois;  in  con- 

lDiplom.  Cor.,  IV,  760-762.  'Ibid.,  IV,  761. 

3  Ibid.,  V,  380. 


24  SPAIN  CAPTURES  PENSACOLA  [1782 

sequence  whereof  the  standard  of  his  majesty  was  there  displayed 
during  the  whole  time."  *  As  Jay  well  said,  it  was  not  necessary 
for  him  to  swell  his  letter  with  remarks  on  this  subject;  the  mean 
ing  was  self-evident:  it  was  carrying  out  the  views  as  to  the  occu 
pancy  of  the  lands  east  of  the  Mississippi  expressed  in  the  fourth 
proposition  of  Spain  in  the  communication  laid  before  Congress 
February  2,  1780.2  The  Spanish  action,  however,  was  more  than 
offset  by  Clark's  expedition  and  his  capture  of  Kaskaskia,  in  south 
western  Illinois,  and  it  was  this  little  border  army  which  gave  the 
United  States  the  claim  of  actual  conquest  and  occupancy  of  this 
region  which  became  of  such  importance  in  the  discussion  of  the 
final  settlement  of  our  boundaries.  The  one  real  success  of  the 
Spanish  arms  was  in  the  capture  by  Galvez,  the  young  governor  of 
Louisiana,  of  the  British  posts  in  West  Florida,  that  at  Pensacola 
falling  May  9,  1781,  a  success  which  gave  Congress  much  concern 
as  giving  Spain  a  claim  to  the  region  in  the  coming  negotiations  for 
peace. 

Franklin  was  of  one  mind  with  Jay  as  to  the  attitude  of  Spain. 
"I  am  surprised,"  he  writes,  "at  the  dilatory,  reserved  manner  of 
your  court.  I  know  not  to  what  amount  you  have  obtained  aids  from 
it,  but  if  they  are  not  considerable  it  were  to  be  wished  you  had 
never  been  sent  there,  as  the  slight  they  put  upon  our  offered 
friendship  is  very  disreputable  to  us,  and  of  course  hurtful  to  our 
affairs  elsewhere.  I  think  they  are  short-sighted  and  don't  look 
very  far  into  futurity,  or  they  would  seize  with  avidity  so  excellent 
an  opportunity  of  securing  a  neighbor's  friendship,  which  may 
hereafter  be  of  great  consequence  to  their  American  affairs.  If  I 
were  in  Congress  I  should  advise  your  being  instructed  to  thank 
them  for  past  favors  and  take  your  leave." '  He  gave  this  advice 
a  little  later  in  any  case.  He  wrote  April  22,  1782:  "Here  you 
are  greatly  wanted,  for  messengers  begin  to  come  and  go  and 
there  is  much  talk  of  a  treaty  proposed,  but  I  can  neither  make 
nor  agree  to  propositions  of  peace  without  the  assistance  of  my 
colleagues.  I  wish,  therefore,  that  you  would  resolve  upon  the 
journey  and  render  yourself  here  as  soon  as  possible.  You  could 
be  of  infinitive  service.  Spain  has  taken  four  years  to  consider 

1  Diplom.  Cor.,  V,  363.  *  Supra.,  18. 

'Franklin  to  Jay,  January  19,  1782,  Diplom.  Cor.,  V,  119. 


1782]  BOUNDARIES   CLAIMED  BY  SPAIN  25 

whether  she  would  treat  with  us  or  not.     Give  her  forty,  and  let 
us  in  the  meantime  mind  our  own  business."  l 

Jay  accepted  Franklin's  advice,  and  in  June,  1782,  left 
Madrid  for  Paris,  leaving  Mr.  Carmichael  as  charge*  d'affaires. 
The  dismal  failure  of  the  final  attack  on  Gibraltar,  September  13, 
1782,  paved  the  way  to  a  general  pacification.  Peace  negotiations 
began  with  both  France  and  her  Spanish  ally,  secretly  and  actively 
opposed  to  the  broad  and  generous  treatment  of  the  United  States 
by  Great  Britain.  Both  allies  would  gladly  have  seen  the  United 
States  hemmed  in  by  the  Alleghanies,  and  both  lent  their  efforts  to 
this.  Count  d'Aranda,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris,  charged 
with  the  Spanish  negotiations  for  peace,  soon  made  known  the 
reason  for  Spain's  unwillingness  to  enter  into  alliance  with  the 
United  States  on  the  bases  offered  by  stating  Spain's  real  expectan 
cies.  He  insisted,  "First,  that  the  western  country  had  never  be 
longed  to,  or  been  claimed  as  belonging  to,  the  ancient  colonies. 
That  previous  to  the  last  war  it  had  belonged  to  France,  and  after 
its  cession  to  Britain  remained  a  distinct  part  of  her  dominions, 
until,  by  the  conquest  of  West  Florida  and  certain  ports  on  the 
Mississippi  and  Illinois,  it  became  vested  in  Spain.  Secondly,  that 
supposing  the  Spanish  right  of  conquest  did  not  extend  over  all 
that  country,  still  it  was  possessed  by  free  and  independent  nations 
of  Indians  whose  lands  we  could  not  with  any  propriety  consider 
as  belonging  to  us." 2  A  few  days  later  Count  d'Aranda  sent  Mr. 
Jay  a  map  "with  his  proposed  lines  marked  on  it  in  red  ink.  He 
ran  it  from  a  lake  near  the  confines  of  Georgia,  but  east  of  the 
Flint  River,  to  the  confluence  of  the  Kanawha  with  the  Ohio, 
thence  round  the  western  shores  of  Lakes  Erie  and  Huron, 
and  thence  round  Lake  Michigan  to  Lake  Superior." 3 

The  evident  association  of  France  with  Spain,  to  despoil  the 
United  States  of  territories  into  parts  of  which  had  already  begun 
the  stream  of  settlers  from  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  brought  a 
separate  settlement  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
and  the  signing  of  a  provisional  treaty,  November  30,  1782,  effected 
without  the  knowledge  of  France  or  Spain  as  to  details,  and  in 
direct,  and  as  we  now  know,  necessary  disregard  of  the  explicit 

1  Diplom.  Cor.,  V,  320. 

'Jay  to  Livingston,  November  17,  1782,  Ibid.,  VI,  22.  •  Ibid.,  23. 


26  INSTRUCTIONS  OF  CONGRESS  [1782 

instructions  of  Congress  to  "make  the  most  candid  and  confidential 
communications  upon  all  subjects  to  the  ministers  of  our  generous 
ally,  the  King  of  France,  and  to  undertake  nothing  in  the  negotia 
tions  for  peace  or  truce  without  their  knowledge  and  concurrence, 
and  ultimately  to  govern  yourselves  by  their  advice  and  opinion."  l 

The  action  of  France  in  supporting  Spain's  claims,  and  in 
urging,  even  so  early  as  1781,  the  presentation  of  the  American 
"demands  with  the  greatest  moderation  and  reserve,  save  inde 
pendence,"  2  cannot  now  be  regarded  as  due  to  a  mere  desire  to 
please  Spain.  Such  support  can  only  be  understood  when  we 
recognize  that  French  statesmen  had  already  begun  to  look  to 
Spain  for  the  restitution  of  Louisiana,  which  had  been  given  her 
twenty  years  before,  and  which  was  to  be  forced  from  her  by 
France  twenty  years  later.  Vergennes  himself  attempted  its 
recovery  for  France,  and  "Spain  was  willing  to  return  it,  but  asked 
a  price  which,  although  the  mere  reimbursement  of  expenses, 
exceeded  the  means  of  the  French  treasury." ; 

Had  the  instructions  from  Congress  been  followed,  the  new 
republic  would  have  ended  with  the  Alleghanies;  Canada  would 
have  been  bounded  by  the  Ohio,  and  Spanish  North  America 
would  have  reached  east  to  Georgia  and  the  Kanawha.  The 
large  views  of  the  British  government  of  the  period  on  one  hand, 
the  independent  action  of  the  American  commissioners  on  the 
other,  saved  the  United  States  from  so  serious  a  situation.  The 
Spanish  and  French  Bourbons  were  thwarted  in  reality  by  the 
adhesion  of  England  to  the  old  colonial  charters.4  It  is  true  that 
there  were  intrigues  later,  on  the  part  of  British  officials  in  Canada, 
to  restore  the  Quebec  boundary  of  1774;  and  Spain,  as  will  be  seen, 
conspired  to  separate  Kentucky  and  the  South-west  from  the 
Union,  but  with  slight  adjustment  the  lines  consented  to  by  Shel- 
burne  were  to  stand  until  carried  to  the  Pacific,  at  the  expense  of 
the  power  which  had  desired  to  restrain  the  Union  to,  roughly, 
what  are  now  New  England  and  the  Atlantic  states  north  of  Florida. 

The  time  has  come  for  Americans  to  recognize  the  magnanimity, 
taking  the  word  in  its  broadest  sense,  of  the  English  ministry 

1  Secret  Journals,  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  IV,  477  and  505. 

'Report  of  Conference  to  Congress,  May  28,  1781,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  453-457. 

3  Adams,  United  States,  I,  353.       4Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  213. 


1783]  DISAPPOINTMENT  OF  SPAIN  27 

which  made  the  peace  of  1783.  The  names  of  Shelburne,  Oswald, 
Jay,  Franklin,  and  Adams  are  those  of  the  men  who  stood  at  the 
parting  of  the  ways  and  guided  so  fortunately  the  affairs  of  the 
two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  at  a  most  critical 
period  for  both.  The  first  held,  following  the  views  of  Adam 
Smith  and  Dr.  Price,  that  it  was  "better  by  far  for  England  that 
North  America  should  become  a  powerful  sovereignty,  controlled 
by  men  of  English  blood,  embracing  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley, 
than  that  that  fertile  valley  should  be  subjected  to  the  paralyzed 
power  of  Spain;  and  that  the  English-speaking  people  of  America 
should  in  this  way  be  so  weakened  as  to  be  permanently  dependent 
upon  an  alliance  with  France.  It  was  on  these  principles  that  the 
peace  of  1782-3  was  negotiated."  l 

The  deep  disappointment  of  Spain  was  expressed  in  a  paper 
submitted  to  the  king  by  the  Spanish  negotiator,  Count  d'Aranda, 
"The  independence  of  the  English  colonies  has  been  recognized. 
It  is  for  me  a  subject  of  grief  and  fear.  France  had  but  few  pos 
sessions  in  America,  but  she  was  bound  to  consider  that  Spain, 
her  most  intimate  ally,  had  many,  and  that  she  naw^staiwis  ex 
posed  to  terrible  reverses.  From  the  beginning  France  has  acted 
against  her  true  interests  in  encouraging  and  supporting  this  in 
dependence,  and  so  I  have  often  declared  to  the  minister  of  that 
nation."  2 

It  was  not  until  February  22,  1783  that  the  Spanish  government 
was  able  to  bring  itself  to  declare  its  acceptance  of  the  situation. 
The  foreign  minister,  Florida  Blanca,  then  informed  La  Fayette, 
who  at  the  moment  was  at  Madrid,  in  a  note  which  carried  a 

'Wharton,  Introduction  to  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  p.  328.  "It  is 
impossible,"  says  Lecky,  "not  to  be  struck  with  the  skill,  hardihood,  and 
good  fortune  that  marked  the  American  negotiation.  Everything  the  United 
States  could  with  any  shadow  of  plausibility  demand  from  England  they 
obtained,  and  much  of  what  they  obtained  was  granted  them  in  opposition 
to  the  two  great  powers  by  whose  assistance  they  had  triumphed." — Lecky, 
England  in  the  XVIII  Century,  V,  199,  ed.,  1893.  This  treaty,  made  with 
such  secrecy,  had  also,  by  securing  America  on  the  side  of  peace,  the  very 
important  result  of  saving  Gibraltar  to  Great  Britain.  The  British  cabinet 
had  "  actually  resolved  to  exchange  Gibraltar  for  Guadeloupe  when  the  news 
of  the  accomplished  peace  with  America  induced  them  to  reconsider  their 
determination."— Lecky,  IV,  284.  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  III,  305- 
306,  314. 

1  John  Basset  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  18. 


28  SPAIN'S  UNFRIENDLY  ATTITUDE  [1783 

threat,  that  it  was  "his  majesty's  intentions  to  abide  for  the  present 
by  the  limits  established  by  the  treaty  of  the  30th  of  November 
1782,  between  the  English  and  Americans;  yet  the  king  intends  to 
inform  himself  particularly  whether  it  can  be  in  any  way  incon 
venient  or  prejudicial  to  settle  that  affair  amicably  with  the  United 
States."1 

Spain  for  twelve  years  more  was  to  occupy  the  same  sinister 

/  position.     "All  this  while  she  was  seeking  to  lure  any  one  who 

would  act  in  concert  with  her,  both  among  the  wild  tribes  of  the 

South-west  and  among  the  almost  as  wild  frontiersmen  of  the 

outlying  settlements  of  the  confederacy  and  the  later  Union." 2 

1  Count  of  Florida  Blanca  to  La  Fayette,  February  22,  1783,  Diplom.  Cor., 
VI,  261. 
'Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  p.  327. 


"     OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY 


CHAPTER  II 

DISCONTENT  AND  INTRIGUE  IN  THE  SOUTH-WEST  AND  THE  TREATY 

OF  1795 

BY  the  provisional  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  which  was  to  go  into  effect  when  terms  of  peace  should  be 
concluded  between  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain,  the  northern 
boundary  of  West  Florida  was  established  at  the  parallel  of  thirty- 
one  degrees.  A  separate  secret  article  however  provided  that, 
should  Great  Britain  recover  West  Florida,  its  northern  boundary 
should  run  due  east  from  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  in  latitude  32° 
28',  a  line  established  by  England  in  1764  for  her  own  administra 
tive  purposes.  The  concession  was  yielded  by  the  American  com 
missioners  as  a  compromise  with  the  British  negotiator,  Oswald, 
who  had  endeavored  to  extend  this  boundary  to  the  Ohio.1 

The  provisional  treaty  between  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain, 
of  January  20,  1783,  made  definitive  as  also  that  with  the  United 
States,  September  3,  1783,  yielded  the  Floridas  to  Spain  without 
assignment  of  limits.  WThen  the  British  and  American  understand 
ing  came  to  be  known,  Spain  naturally  took  her  stand  upon  the  line 
32°  28'  as  the  boundary  not  only  established  in  1764,  but  recognized 
by  both  England  and  the  United  States.  She  claimed  the  territory 
by  right  of  conquest  during  the  war,  and  when  the  conquest  was 
made,  the  more  northerly  line  was  undoubtedly  that  in  force. 
There  is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  of  the  strength  of  Spain's  contention. 

Spain  during  the  war  had  also  extended  her  posts  northward  and 
was  in  occupancy  at  Natchez  and  Walnut  Hills,  (now  Vicksburg.) 
Settlers  from  the  American  side  had  been  moving  in  under  Span 
ish  control.  As  soon  as  the  secret  article  became  known,  Spain  at 
once  demanded  that  this  region  should  be  regarded  as  within  the 
boundaries  of  Florida  as  ceded  to  herself,  and  held  to  her  contention 

lDiplom.  Cor.,  VI,  567. 
29 


30  GARDOQUI'S  MISSION  [1785 

by  the  continuation  therein  of  her  military  posts.     The  American 
J  confederacy  thus  found  itself,  in  1784,  with  every  river  of  its  terri- 
\  tory,  leading  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  in  the  hands  of  a  power  which 
I  did  not  dissemble  its  unfriendliness;    and,  what  was  of  deeper 
importance,  it  was  itself  threatened  by  dissolution  and  civil  war. 
The  almost  anarchy  of  the  four  years  succeeding  the  revolution 
was  Spain's  opportunity,  and  she  did  not  hesitate  to  use  her  ad 
vantage. 

Spain's  first  envoy,  Senor  Gardoqui,  with  the  title  of  charge* 
d'affaires,  a  title  the  modesty  of  which  was  in  itself  indicative  of 
Spanish  reluctance  to  deal  with  the  new  nation,  did  not  arrive  in 
the  United  States  until  May  15,  1785,  nearly  six  years  from  the 
first  effort  of  Congress  to  enter  into  diplomatic  relations  with  his 
country.  He  carried  plenary  powers  to  arrange  all  questions  of 
dispute,  but  his  mission  was  destined  to  be  chiefly  one  of  intrigue 
for  separation  of  the  western  country  from  the  Union.  He  was 
already  well  known  to  Mr.  Jay,  to  whom  he  had  given  much 
assistance  in  his  difficulties  while  near  the  Spanish  court. 

It  was  the  era  of  the  most  picturesque  episode  of  American 
history — the  great  crossing.  From  1769,  when  that  fine  type  of 
courage  and  self-reliance,  Daniel  Boone,  had  gone  into  Kentucky, 
a  stream  of  daring  and  independent  frontiersmen  had  been  pouring 
over  the  Alleghanies,  and  the  region  which  is  now  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  had  nearly  a  hundred  thousand  people  who,  in  reason 
and  by  right,  looked  upon  the  Mississippi  as  their  proper  highway 
to  the  ocean.  To  close  this  only  outlet  meant  to  them  either  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  or  the  setting  up  of  an  inde 
pendent  West,  which  would  settle  the  difficulty  in  its  own  way 
either  by  hostile  operations  against  Spain  on  its  own  account,  by 
a  recognition  of  Spanish  sovereignty  or,  as  was  in  the  minds  of 
some,  by  reuniting  with  Great  Britain. 

The  chaotic  condition  of  the  affairs  of  the  American  confederacy, 

the  widespread  belief,  preceding   the  almost  fortuitous   forming 

of  the  constitution,  in  the  disruption  of  the  existing  weak  union  of 

the  states,  and  the  leaning  toward  Spain  of   some  of  the  most 

;  influential  men  of  the  West,  gave  Gardoqui  good  grounds  for  be- 

.jlieving  that  it  was  possible  to  unite  again  the  western  country, 

j  south  of  the  Ohio,  to  Louisiana.     The  withholding  of  any  conces- 


1785]  SOUTH-WESTERN  INTRIGUE  31 

sion  of  the  navigation  of  the  great  highway  of  the  people,  combined 
with  dissatisfaction  with  their  political  status,  was  Gardoqui's 
main  hope  toward  bringing  this  about.  His  attitude  was  a  per 
fectly  reasonable  one.  It  could  not  be  otherwise  when  feeling 
was  such  that  Sevier,  the  ex-governor  of  Franklin,  the  short-lived 
state  of  a  year,  set  up,  in  1786,  from  the  western  portion  of  North 
Carolina,  could  write  the  governor  of  Louisiana,  September  12, 
1788,  informing  him  that  the  inhabitants  of  Franklin  were  unani 
mous  "  in  their  vehement  desire  to  form  an  alliance  and  treaty  of 
commerce  with  Spain,  and  put  themselves  under  her  protection,"  * 
Sevier  continued,  begging  "for  ammunition,  money  and  whatever 
other  assistance  Miro  could  grant,  to  aid  the  contemplated  separa 
tion  from  North  Carolina;"  "which,"  said  Sevier,  "has  refused  to 
accept  the  new  constitution  proposed  for  the  confederacy,  and  there 
fore  a  considerable  time  will  elapse  before  she  becomes  a  member 
of  the  Union,  if  that  event  ever  happen." 2 

Intrigue  had  begun  indeed,  before  the  arrival  of  Gardoqui. 
Miro,  the  acting  governor  at  New  Orleans,  had  entered  into  a 
treaty,  May,  1784,  with  representatives  of  the  various  tribes  of  the 
then  South-west,  headed  by  a  half-breed  named  McGillivray,  the 
product  of  a  Scotch  father  and  an  Indian  mother,  who  desired 
to  put  his  people  under  the  protection  of  Spain,  in  anticipation 
of  the  setting  up  of  an  independent  government  by  the  western 
Americans. 3 

Washington,  who,  in  addition  to  his  other  great  qualities,  was 
the  greatest  practical  statesman  of  the  revolutionary  period,  ex 
pressed  in  the  same  year  after  a  trip  to  the  Wrest  covering  nearly 
seven  hundred  miles,  his  deep  sense  of  the  danger,  in  a  letter  to 
Governor  Benjamin  Harrison  of  Virginia.  "The  western  states," 
he  said,  "  (I  speak  now  from  my  own  observation)  stand  as  it 
were  upon  a  pivot.  The  touch  of  a  feather  would  turn  them 
any  way." 4 

It  was  in  such  conditions,  of  which  the  above  is  necessarily  but 
the  barest  sketch,  that  Jay,  elected  by  Congress,  May  7,  1785, 
secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  received  from  Congress,  July  21, 

1  GayarrS,  Louisiana,  257.  a  Ibid.,  258. 

3  See  McGillivray  to  Miro,  Ibid.,  159. 

4  Washington  to  Harrison,  October  10,  1784,  Correspondence,  IX,  63. 


32  JAY  AND   GARDOQUI  [1786 

powers  to  treat  with  the  Spanish  envoy;  limited,  however,  by  in 
structions  "that  he  enter  into  no  treaty,  compact  or  convention 
whatever,  with  the  said  representative  of  Spain,  which  did  not 
stipulate  our  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
boundaries  as  established  in  our  treaty  with  Great  Britain." 
Gardoqui  was  equally  explicit,  his  letter  to  Jay,  May  25,  1786, 
stating  that  "the  king  will  not  permit  any  nation  to  navigate  be 
tween  the  two  banks  belonging  to  his  majesty." l  The  result  was  an 
impasse  in  dealing  with  which  Jay,  for  once,  failed  to  reach  the  high 
standard  of  judgment  and  statesmanship  which  so  distinguished 
his  fine  career.  On  August  3,  1786,  he  addressed  Congress  in 
a  speech  advising,  as  the  negotiation  seemed  otherwise  impossible 
of  accomplishment,  acceptance  of  a  treaty;  one  of  the  articles  of 
which  would  stipulate  that  the  United  States  would  forbear  the 
use  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  below  their  territories, 
but  that  on  account  of  this  the  treaty  should  be  limited  to  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  years. 

Jay's  arguments  were:  "1.  Because  unless  that  matter  can  in 
some  way  or  other  be  settled,  the  treaty,  however  advantageous, 
will  not  be^  concluded.  2.  As  that  navigation  is  not  at  present 
important,  nor  will  probably  become  much  so,  in  less  than  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  years,  a  forbearance  to  use  it  while  we  do  not  want  it 
is  no  great  sacrifice.  3.  Spain  now  excludes  us  from  that  naviga 
tion  and  with  a  strong  hand  holds  it  against  us.  She  will  not  yield 
it  peaceably  and  therefore  we  can  only  acquire  it  by  war.  Now, 
as  we  are  not  prepared  for  a  war  with  any  power;  as  many  of  the 
states  would  be  little  inclined  to  a  war  with  Spain  for  that  object 
at  this  day,  and  as  such  a  war  would  for  those  and  a  variety  of 
obvious  reasons  be  inexpedient,  it  follows  that  Spain  will,  for  a 
long  space  of  time  yet  to  come,  exclude  us  from  that  navigation. 
Why,  therefore,  should  we  not  (for  a  valuable  consideration,  too) 
consent  to  forbear  to  use  what  we  know  is  not  in  our  power  to  use  ? 
4.  If  Spain  and  the  United  States  should  part  on  this  point,  what 
are  the  latter  to  do  ?  Will  it  after  that  be  consistent  with  their  dig 
nity  to  permit  Spain  forcibly  to  exclude  them  from  a  right  which,  at 
the  expense  of  a  beneficial  treaty,  they  have  asserted  ?  They  will 
find  themselves  obliged  either  to  do  this,  and  be  humiliated,  or  they 
1  State  Papers,  I,  249. 


1786]  DEMANDS  OF  THE  NORTH  33 

must  attack  Spain.  Are  they  ripe  and  prepared  for  this  ?  I  wish 
I  could  say  they  are."  * 

The  navigation  interests  of  the  North,  ignoring  the  situation  in 
the  Western  country,  demanded  the  trade  facilities  which  Spain 
was  willing  to  offer,  and  were  ready  to  sacrifice  the  West  to  these. 
The  North  felt  that  its  own  interests  were  being  sunk,  for  what  ap 
peared  to  it  a  contest  for  an  abstract  right  which  it  would  require 
years  to  make  into  concrete  value.  The  ocean-carrying  trade  was 
perishing  under  British  orders  in  council  which  forbade  American 
vessels  to  carry  fish  to  the  West  Indies  or  any  but  British  ships  to 
carry  American  goods  to  Britain.  Spanish-American  ports  were 
closed  to  all  but  Spanish  vessels.  The  proposed  treaty  with  Spain 
would  open  Spain  and  the  Canaries  to  American  products,  to  the 
lumber,  tar,  fish,  grain,  and  flour  which  America  was  ready  to 
supply  so  cheaply,  and  in  such  quantities.  Why  should  this  po 
tentially  great  and  lucrative  traffic,  the  only  one  which  could 
bring  money  into  a  country  destitute  of  mines  of  gold  and  silver,  be 
forgone  for  the  benefit,  still  in  the  far  future,  of  a  small  community 
of  widely  scattered  frontiersmen,  who  would  be  occupied,  for  years 
to  come,  chiefly  in  fighting  the  Indians  ? 

In  the  vote  taken  August  29,  1786,  on  the  motion  to  repeal  the 
instructions  of  a  year  before,  exacting  the  right  of  navigation,  every 
member  present  from  the  seven  Northern  states  voted  "aye"; 
every  Southern  member  present  (all  the  states  of  the  South  being 
represented  except  Delaware)  voted  "no."  The  motion  was 
entered  in  the  journal  as  carried.  An  objection  brought  forward 
next  day,  that  the  Articles  of  Confederation  required  the  assent 
of  nine  states  to  treaties,  brought  a  storm  of  debate  in  which  the 
North  and  South  were  as  rigidly  and  oppositely  arrayed  as  they 
were  to  be  seventy-five  years  later. 

Madison,  greatly  depressed,  wrote  Jefferson:  "To  speak  the 
truth,  I  almost  despair  even  of  [having  the  convention  of  1786 
called  at  Annapolis  fulfill  the  first  intent,  the  accomplishment 
of  a  commercial  reform].  You  will  find  the  cause  in  a  measure  now 
before  Congress,  of  which  you  will  receive  the  detail  from  Colonel 
Monroe.  I  content  myself  with  hinting  that  it  is  a  proposed  treaty 
with  Spain,  one  article  of  which  shuts  up  the  Mississippi  twenty-five 
1  Congress,  Secret  Journals,  IV,  53-54. 


34  FEARS  OF  SEPARATION  [1788 

or  thirty  years;  passing  by  the  other  Southern  states,  figure  to 
yourself  the  effect  of  such  a  stipulation  on  the  Assembly  of  Virginia 
already  jealous  of  Northern  politics,  and  which  will  be  composed 
of  about  thirty  members  from  the  Western  waters;  of  a  majority 
of  others  attached  to  the  Western  country  from  interests  of  their 
own,  of  their  friends  or  their  constituents,  and  of  many  others  who, 
though  indifferent  to  the  Mississippi,  will  zealously  play  off  the 
disgust  of  its  friends  against  federal  measures.  Figure  to  yourself 
its  effect  upon  the  people  at  large  on  the  Western  waters,  who  are 
patiently  waiting  for  a  favorable  result  to  the  negotiation  with 
Gardoqui,  and  who  will  consider  themselves  as  sold  by  their  At 
lantic  brethren.  Will  it  be  an  unnatural  consequence  if  they  con 
sider  themselves  as  absolved  from  every  federal  tie,  and  court  some 
protection  for  their  betrayed  rights  ?  This  protection  will  appear 
more  obtainable  from  the  maritime  power  of  Britain,  than  from 
any  other  quarter;  and  Britain  will  be  more  ready  than  any  other 
nation  to  seize  an  opportunity  of  embroiling  our  affairs.  ...  As 
far  as  I  can  learn  the  assent  of  nine  states  in  Congress  will  not  at 
this  time  be  got  to  the  projected  treaty,  but  an  unsuccessful  at 
tempt  by  six  or  seven  will  favor  the  views  of  Spain,  and  be  fatal  I 
fear  to  an  augmentation  of  the  federal  authority,  if  not  to  the  little 
now  existing.  My  personal  situation  is  rendered  by  this  business 
particularly  mortifying.  Ever  since  I  have  been  out  of  Congress 
I  have  been  inculcating  on  our  assembly  a  confidence  in  the  equal 
attention  of  Congress  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  every  part  of 
the  republic,  and  on  the  Western  members  in  particular,  the  neces 
sity  of  making  the  Union  respectable  by  new  powers  to  Congress 
if  they  wished  Congress  to  negotiate  with  effect  for  the  Mississippi." 

On  September  16,  1788,  the  adoption  of  a  resolution  by  the  ex 
piring  Congress  of  the  old  confederacy  that  the  subject  "be  re 
ferred  to  the  federal  government  which  is  to  assemble  in  March 
next,"  gave  the  death  blow  to  Spain's  contention.  She  was  now 
to  deal  with  a  concrete  government  instead  of  with  the  representa 
tives  of  thirteen  loosely  bound  states. 

Gardoqui  returned  to  Spain  in  1789,  with  nothing  accomplished 
in  the  way  of  a  treaty,  leaving  behind  him  a  state  of  extreme  ten 
sion,  which  Senores  Saunders  and  Viar,  who,  together,  were  now 
1  Madison  to  Jefferson,  August  12,  1786,  Writings,  II,  262. 


1791]  NEGOTIATIONS  REOPENED  35 

the  representatives  of  Spain  near  the  American  government,  pro 
ceeded  to  increase  by  threatening  letters  respecting  the  "United 
States  meddling  with  the  affairs  of  nations  who  are,  by  treaties 
solemn  and  ratified,  allied  with  Spain,"  l  these  nations  and  allies 
being  the  Indians  of  the  South-west. 

The  South  was  wiser  than  the  North.  The  West's  only  prac 
tical  outlet,  in  a  day  which  knew  only  the  creeping  transport  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  slow-moving  wagon  over  almost  impos 
sible  mountain  roads,  was  the  Mississippi.  It  knew  no  other 
sea  than  the  great  river,  and  no  other  ship  but  the  flatboat.  The 
government  of  the  Union  must  stand  by  their  demands  or  the 
hundred  thousand  of  population  now  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky 
would  arrange  the  question  in  their  own  way,  by  setting  up  an 
independent  government  which  would  win  the  right  of  navigation 
by  force  of  arms,  or  by  becoming  a  part  of  the  Spanish  dominions. 
The  West  was  seething  with  intrigue,  and  no  conspirator  was  more 
deeply  immersed  than  James  Wilkinson,  a  Marylander,  a  soldier 
of  the  revolution,  who  was  later  to  become  general-in-chief  of 
the  American  army;  was  to  be  allied  with  Burr's  adventure;  was 
long  the  paid  agent  of  Spain,  and  was  to  play  a  part  in  American 
history  as  ignoble  as  that  of  Benedict  Arnold,  but  more  fortunate 
than  his  brother  traitor  through  the  long  burial  of  the  proofs  of 
his  villainy  in  the  archives  of  Simancas.2 

The  constant  and  rapid  flow  of  population  across  the  moun 
tains  and  down  the  Ohio  added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. 
There  were  but  so  many  more  voices  to  be  raised  in  protest 
against  the  trying  conditions  now  also  accentuated  by  the  dif 
ficulties  with  the  Indians  of  the  South-west,  whom  Spain,  as  men 
tioned,  had  taken  under  her  protection.  It  was  clear  that  an 
agreement  or  war  must  come.  This  was  as  plain  to  Spain  as  to 
Washington  and  his  cabinet,  and  December  16,  1791,  the  Spanish 
minister  for  foreign  affairs  made  known  the  readiness  of  Madrid 
to  negotiate.  William  Carmichael,  charge*  d'affaires  at  Madrid, 
and  William  Short,  charge*  at  Paris,  were  appointed  the  American 
commissioners,  with  lengthy  instructions  dated  March  18,  1792, 

1  State  Papers,  I,  265. 

2  For  copies  of  Wilkinson's  treasonable  correspondence  see  Gayarre,  Louisi 
ana  (Spanish  Domination). 


36  TREATY  OR  SEPARATION  [1793 

which  demanded  the  parallel  of  thirty-one  degrees  as  a  boundary, 
the  free  navigation  of  the  river,  and  a  place  of  deposit  for  Ameri 
can  goods  near  the  mouth.1 

But  Gardoqui  was  again  the  commissioner  for  Spain,  and  the 
American  commissioners  found  Spanish  views,  as  expressed  by 
him,  unchanged.  In  their  despatch  of  May  5, 1793,  they  stated  very 
clearly  the  impressions  which  Gardoqui  had  received  in  the  United 
States.  "  He  still  sees  them  divided  among  themselves  and  without 
efficient  government.  .  .  .  He  saw  some  individuals  of  the  West 
ern  country,  or  going  to  settle  there,  who  treated  their  adhesion  to 
the  rest  of  the  Union  as  visionary.  From  hence  he  has  formed  opin 
ions,  which  he  has  not  concealed  from  us,  that  the  United  States 
do  not  desire  this  navigation  or  the  limits  we  ask,  or  at  least  do  not 
desire  it  so  generally  as  that  they  could  be  brought  to  make  any 
general  effort  to  obtain  it.  ...  He  did  not  conceal  from  us  that 
he  thought  it  impossible  the  Northern,  Middle,  and  Southern  states 
should  ever  be  brought  to  act  in  concert  with  respect  to  a  foreign 
enemy  out  of  their  territory;  and  even  if  they  should,  that  they  had 
no  means  of  acting  efficaciously  until  they  should  have  a  marine 
— an  event  he  regarded  as  never  to  take  place,  or  at  least  to  be 
so  far  off  as  not  to  be  worthy  of  present  consideration." 2 

Gardoqui's  impressions  did  not  differ  so  greatly  from  those 
of  American  statesmen  at  this  moment.  In  1794  it  was  the  opinion 
of  Randolph,  who  had  succeeded  Jefferson  as  secretary  of  state, 
that  "the  people  of  Kentucky  either  contemning  or  ignorant  of 
the  consequences,  are  restrained  from  hostility  by  a  pack-thread. 
They  demand  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  or  a  categorical 
answer  from  Spain.  .  .  .  What  if  the  government  of  Kentucky 
should  force  us  either  to  support  them  in  their  hostilities  against 
Spain,  or  to  disavow  and  renounce  them,  war  at  this  moment  would 
not  be  war  with  Spain  alone.  The  lopping  off  of  Kentucky  from 
the  Union  is  dreadful  to  contemplate,  even  if  it  should  not  attach 
itself  to  some  other  power." 3 

This  other  power  was  now  England.  Simcoe  wrote  to  the  Lords 
of  Trade  (September  1):  "It  is  generally  understood  that  above 

1  State  Papers,  I,  252-257. 

3  Carmichael  and  Short  to  secretary  of  state,  Ibid.,  1,  262-263. 

'Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  542-543. 


1794]  TREATY  CONCLUDED  37 

half  the  inhabitants  of  Kentucky  and  the  Western  waters  are 
already  inclined  to  a  connection  with  Great  Britain."  Thurs- 
ton,  a  Kentucky  observer,  had  just  before  written  to  Washington 
that  a  powerful  faction  was  scheming  to  place  the  country  under 
British  protection.1 

The  French  minister,  Gen6t,  who  arrived  in  1793,  had  views 
which  looked  to  reuniting  Louisiana  with  France.  He  was  enlist 
ing  in  the  West  men  in  the  French  service,  to  act  against  Spain, 
which  was  now  (1794)  at  war  with  France;  and  was  commission 
ing  officers,  among  whom,  as  major  general,  was  George  Rogers 
Clark,  now  through  drink  but  the  shadow  of  a  once  great  figure. 

The  whole  so-called  civilized  world  was,  however,  in  one  of  its 
periodic  throes  of  social  reconstruction;  the  French  revolution  was 
in  full  progress;  the  French  nation  was  spreading  its  new-found 
views  with  the  sword;  America,  which  had  but  just  come  to  its 
real  birth,  in  the  newly  formed  constitution,  was  still  with  the  un 
formed  mind  and  the  weakness  of  infantile  conditions,  and  appar 
ently,  to  the  European  observer,  and  to  many  patriotic  but  despair 
ing  Americans,  ready  for  despoilment. 

On  November  24,  1794,  in  the  month  and  year  in  which  the  new 
treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  was  signed  in 
London  by  John  Jay  and  Lord  Grenville,  Thomas  Pinckney, 
American  minister  in  London,  was  commissioned  envoy  extra 
ordinary  to  attempt  to  conclude  the  long  abortive  negotiations  at 
Madrid.  He  arrived  June  28, 1795,  and  found  changed  conditions. 
Godoy,  Duke  of  Alcudia,  soon  to  be  known  as  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
from  the  peace  with  France  signed  at  Bale,  July  22,  1795,  was 
now  an  all  powerful  minister.  The  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  in 
which  was  seen  a  possible  alliance  between  that  country  and  the 
United  States,  and  the  former's  threatening  posture  toward  Spain, 
were  taken  to  heart  by  Godoy,2  and  on  October  27, 1795,  was  signed 
a  treaty  which  conceded  all  the  United  States  could  fairly  ask  and 
more  than  could  have  been  hoped.  It  stands  a  memorial  of  eleva 
tion  of  mind  and  breadth  of  view  not  generally  accorded  the  young 
favorite  of  Charles  IV  and  his  queen,  and  who  was  far  more  the 
statesman  and  able  man  of  affairs  than  history  has  generally 
allowed.  Free  ships  were  to  make  free  goods;  a  convention  was 

1  Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  542-543.          3  Godoy,  Memoirs,  I,  458. 


38  TERMS   OF  TREATY  [1795 

arranged  to  consider  the  claims  for  depredations  upon  American 
shipping  in  the  war  just  ended  between  Spain  and  France;  the  claim 
of  the  United  States  to  a  southern  boundary  of  31°  was  agreed  to; 
the  joint  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  in  its  whole  length,  assured; 
a  right  of  deposit  of  American  merchandise  at  New  Orleans 
without  duties  was  granted,  and  after  three  years,  if  the  right  at 
New  Orleans  should  be  withdrawn,  another  place  should  be  sub 
stituted;  both  nations  were  "expressly  to  restrain  by  force  all 
hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indian  nations  living  within  their 
boundary;  so  that  Spain  will  not  suffer  her  Indians  to  attack  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  nor  the  Indians  inhabiting  their 
territory;  nor  will  the  United  States  permit  these  last  mentioned 
Indians  to  commence  hostilities  against  the  subjects  of  his  Catholic 
Majesty,  or  his  Indians,  in  any  manner  whatever";  all  places  held 
by  Spain  in  what  now  became  American  territory  were  to  be 
evacuated  within  six  months. 

Article  7  stipulated  that  "in  all  cases  of  seizure,  detention  or 
arrest,  for  debts  contracted,  or  offenses  committed,  by  any  citizen 
or  subject  of  the  one  party,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  other, 
the  same  shall  be  made  and  prosecuted  by  order  and  authority  of 
law  only,  and  according  to  the  regular  course  of  proceedings  usual 
in  such  cases.  The  citizens  and  subjects  of  both  parties  shall  be 
allowed  to  employ  such  advocates,  solicitors,  notaries,  agents,  and 
factors  as  they  may  judge  proper  in  all  their  affairs,  and  in  all  their 
trials  at  law,  in  which  they  may  be  concerned  before  the  tribunals 
of  the  other  party;  and  such  agents  shall  have  free  access  to  be 
present  at  the  proceedings  in  such  causes  and  at  the  taking  of  all  ex 
aminations  and  evidence  which  may  be  exhibited  in  the  said  trials." ] 
This  article  was  to  bear  a  momentous  part  in  Spanish-American 
diplomatic  discussion  throughout  the  whole  of  the  next  century. 

1  For  the  text  of  this  treaty  see  State  Papers,  I,  546-549.  The  treaty  with 
Great  Britain  (1794)  did  not  stand  on  so  high  a  plane.  It  set  aside  the 
principle  of  exemption  from  seizure  of  enemy  goods  in  neutral  ships  and 
made  all  materials  for  ship-building  contraband.  When  the  treaty  was  made 
public  in  1795,  the  Spanish  minister  to  the  United  States,  the  Marquis  de 
Yrujo,  very  properly  took  strong  exception  to  the  articles  (17  and  18)  deal 
ing  with  these  subjects,  as  abrogating  express  stipulations  with  Spain;  as  also 
to  article  3,  which  stipulated  that  Great  Britain  should  have  the  right  of  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  from  its  source  to  the  ocean.  (For  this  protest 
see  State  Papers,  Jp.4.) 


1796]  INNES,  SEBASTIAN,  AND  WILKINSON  39 

Washington,  when  the  treaty  had  passed  the  Senate,  "expressed 
the  hope  that  it  would  prove  soothing  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Western  waters.  .  .  .  He  little  knew  that  Judge  Innes,  in  whom  he 
had  confided  all  along  to  quiet  the  discontent,  was  deep  in  the 
nefarious  plot  of  Sebastian — the  former  being  a  circuit  judge  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  other  the  Chief  Justice  of  Kentucky. 
The  infamous  Sebastian  engaged  to  give  his  services  to  Spain  to 
subserve  her  interests  and  subvert  those  of  his  own  country,  for  a 
yearly  pension  of  $2,000,  and  he  received  the  stipend  regularly. 
After  thus  debasing  himself,  Sebastian,  accompanied  by  Power,1 
in  the  spring  of  1796  sailed  from  New  Orleans  for  Philadelphia, 
and  thence  passed  westward  with  propositions  from  Carondelet 
[who  had  succeeded  Miro  in  1791  as  governor  of  Louisiana]:  To 
prepare  Kentucky  for  a  revolution,  and  to  give  them  money  to  or 
ganize  the  project  $100,000  will  be  sent  to  Kentucky.  When  in 
dependence  is  declared,  Fort  Massac  [near  the  junction  of  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi]  shall  be  occupied  by  Spanish  troops,  and  $100,000 
shall  be  applied  in  supporting  the  garrison.  The  northern  bounds 
of  Spanish  territory  are  to  be  a  line  running  east  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Yazoo  River  to  the  Tombigbee,  while  all  north  of  such  a  line 
shall,  except  the  reservation  recently  fortified  at  the  Chickasaw 
bluff,  belong  to  the  revolted  state,  which  shall  enter  into  a  defensive 
alliance  with  Spain.  The  new  treaty  of  San  Lorenzo  shall  not 
be  observed;  but  the  new  state  shall  enjoy  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi.  Ten  thousand  dollars  were  to  be  sent  in  sugar  bar 
rels  up  the  river  to  Wilkinson,  now  the  general-in-chief  of  the 
American  army!"  part  of  which  safely  arrived;  the  remainder  being 
lost  through  the  murder  by  the  boatmen  of  the  messenger  in  charge. 
"  Neither  Wilkinson  nor  Judge  Innes  thought  it  prudent  to  bring  the 
felons  to  justice  and  they  were  hurried  off  beyond  the  Mississippi." 2 

Such,  even  now,  was  the  uncertainty  of  the  outcome  of  the  treaty; 
but  events  were  rapidly  altering  Western  conditions.  The  sweep 
of  population  across  the  Alleghanies  was  in  full  progress,  and  the 
conspirators  had  to  deal  with  new  forces,  whose  prepossessions  were 
for  the  Union,  backed  as  they  now  were  by  a  treaty  which  promised 
at  least  all  that  Kentucky  demanded. 

1  Thomas  Power,  who  professed  to  be  a  wandering  naturalist  in  America. 
8  Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  556-557. 


40  SOUTH-WEST  AND  SPAIN  [1796 

The  treaty  was,  however,  really  but  a  stop-gap  to  difficulties; 
the  situation  was  of  a  character  which  forbade  permanent  quiet. 
Jefferson,  as  vice-president,  in  1798  was  writing  Madison:  "Very 
acrimonious  altercations  are  going  on  between  the  Spanish  minister 
and  the  executive,  and  at  the  Natchez  something  worse  than  mere 
altercation.  If  hostilities  have  not  begun  there  it  has  not  been 
for  want  of  endeavors  to  bring  them  on  by  our  agents."  l 

Much  more  than  the  questions  of  the  south-west  frontier  was 
involved;  the  many  seizures  of  American  vessels  by  those  of  Spain, 
and  the  reception  in  her  ports  and  condemnation  there  of  those 
seized  by  French  privateers  and  cruisers,  were  subjects  of  bitter 
correspondence  in  which  right  certainly  laid  with  the  United  States. 
Spain  was,  however,  under  the  heel  of  France,  and  it  is  at  the  door 
of  the  latter  the  iniquities  complained  of  should  be  laid,  instead 
of  at  that  of  the  moribund  state,  which  was  practically  powerless. 
More  than  three  hundred  American  vessels  had  been  seized  by 
France  in  the  latter  half  of  1796,  and  Spanish  ports  were  used  by 
the  French  privateers  as  their  own.  Spain  was  helpless. 

But  the  main  difficulty  was  in  the  impossibility  that  the  men  who 
settled  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  should  accept  the  dominancy  by 
the  King  of  Spain  of  the  right  of  way  to  the  sea.  An  able  histo 
rian  sums  up  the  feeling  which  had  grown  in  the  South  and  West: 
"Of  all  foreign  powers  Spain  alone  stood  in  such  a  position  as  to 
make  violence  seem  sooner  or  later  inevitable,  even  to  the  pacific 
Jefferson;  and  every  Southern  or  Western  state  looked  to  the  mili 
tary  occupation  of  Mobile,  Pensacola,  and  New  Orleans  as  a 
future  political  necessity.  By  a  sort  of  tacit  agreement  the  ordi 
nary  rules  of  American  politics  were  admitted  not  to  apply  to  this 
case.  To  obtain  Pensacola,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans,  the  warmest 
states-rights  champions  in  the  South,  even  John  Taylor  of  Carolina 
and  John  Randolph  of  Roanoke,  were  ready  to  employ  every  instru 
ment  of  centralization.  On  the  Southern  and  Western  states  this 
eagerness  to  expel  Spain  from  their  neighborhood  acted  like  a 
magnet,  affecting  all  without  regard  to  theories  or  parties.  .  .  . 
They  could  not  endure  that  their  wheat,  tobacco,  and  timber 
should  have  value  only  by  the  sufferance  of  a  Spanish  official  and 
a  corporal's  guard  of  Spanish  soldiers  at  New  Orleans  and  Mobile. 
1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  January  25,  1798,  Writings,  VIII,  191. 


1796]  DESPOILMENT  OF  SPAIN  41 

Hatred  of  the  Spaniard  was  to  the  Tennesseean  as  natural  as 
hatred  of  an  Indian,  and  contempt  for  the  rights  of  the  Spanish 
government  was  no  more  singular  than  for  those  of  an  Indian 
tribe.  Against  Indians  and  Spaniards  the  Western  settler  held  loose 
notions  of  law;  his  settled  purpose  was  to  drive  both  races  from 
the  country  and  to  take  their  lands.  ...  In  the  end  far  more  than 
half  the  territory  j)f  the  United  States  was  despoiled  of  iHe  "Spanish 
empire,  rarely  acquired  with  perfect  propriety.  To  sum  up  in  a 
single  word,  Spain  had  immense  influence  over  the  United  States; 
but  it  was  the  influence  of  the  whale  over  its  captors — the  charm 
of  a  huge,  helpless,  and  profitable  victim."  l 

1  Henry  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  338-340. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    TRANSFERS    OF    LOUISIANA 

A  FEW  years,  however,  were  to  bring  a  complete  and  unexpected 
change  of  situation.  Bonaparte  had  appeared  on  the  stage  of 
world  politics  and  had  become  the  boldest  and  most  impressive 
actor  upon  it;  and  upon  no  country  did  his  action  have  more 
momentous  influence  than  upon  the  United  States.  On  September 
30,  1800,  was  signed  the  treaty  between  France  and  the  United 
States  nominally  ending  the  difficulties  which  had  brought  about 
a  quasi  war  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  next  day,  October 
1,  was  signed  at  St.  Ildefonso  a  treaty  by  which  Spain  ceded  to 
France  "the  colony  or  province  of  Louisiana  with  the  same  ex 
tent  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  that  it  had  when  France  pos 
sessed  it,  and  such  as  it  ought  to  be  according  to  the  treaties  sub 
sequently  passed  between  Spain  and  other  states."  l 

The  price  paid  by  Napoleon  was  the  easy  promise  to  erect  for 
the  heir  presumptive  of  the  Duchy  of  Parma,  the  nephew  and  son- 
in-law  of  Charles  IV  of  Spain,  a  kingdom  of  which  Tuscany  was 
to  form  the  chief  part,  and  to  procure  the  consent  of  Austria  and 
other  states  thereto.  This  treaty  was  preliminary  to  another 
signed  at  Madrid,  March  31,  1801,  which  definitely  fixed  the  status 
of  the  new  kingdom  of  Etruria,  which  was  to  be  regarded  as 
the  property  of  Spain  and  an  inalienable  appanage  of  its  royal 
house.2  Its  fifth  article  arranged  to  carry  into  execution  the  pre 
liminary  agreement  of  the  preceding  year  regarding  the  cession  of 
Louisiana. 

Talleyrand  had  been  the  deus  ex  machina  in  bringing  about  this 
change,  which,  in  a  way  so  unforeseen  by  himself  and  to  his  deep 

1  Treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso,  October  1,  1800,  State  Papers,  II,  576. 
"Art.  6  of  treaty,  Ibid.,  II,  511. 

42 


1801]  TALLEYRAND'S  ADVICE  TO  SPAIN  43 

vexation,  was  to  be  so  momentous  to  the  United  States.  So  early 
as  1798  in  his  instructions  to  Guillemardet,  French  minister  to 
Madrid  he  had  said:  "There  are  no  other  means  of  putting  an  end 
to  the  ambition  of  the  Americans  than  that  of  shutting  them  up 
within  the  limits  which  nature  seems  to  have  traced  for  them;  but 
Spain  is  not  in  a  condition  to  do  this  work  alone.  She  cannot, 
therefore,  hasten  too  quickly  to  engage  the  aid  of  a  preponderating 
power,  yielding  to  it  a  small  part  of  her  immense  domains  in  order 
to  preserve  the  rest.  Let  the  court  of  Madrid  cede  these  districts 
(the  Floridas  and  Louisiana)  to  France,  and  from  that  moment 
the  power  of  America  is  bounded  by  the  limits  which  may  suit  the 
interests  and  the  tranquility  of  France  and  Spain  to  assign  her. 
The  French  republic,  mistress  of  these  two  provinces,  will  be  a  wall 
of  brass  forever  impenetrable  to.  the  combined  efforts  of  England 
and  America.  The  Court  of  Madrid  has  nothing  to  fear  from 
France."  l 

The  scheme  of  a  buffer  state,  however,  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Spanish  provinces  was  not  a  sufficient  bait.  It 
failed,  and  thersubject  did  not  move  again  until  the  conquering  will 
of  Napoleon,  now  First  Consul,  came  into  the  question.  He 
failed,  however,  to  add  the  Floridas  to  the  cession,  the  King  of 
Spain  through  sentiment  holding  with  unexpected  tenacity  to 
these  as  being  part  of  the  national  domain  originally  settled  by 
Spain. 

Rumors  of  the  transfer  of  Louisiana,  as  arranged  by  the  treaties 
mentioned  between  Spain  and  France,  had  begun  to  come  to  the 
United  States  early  in  1801  through  Mr.  Rufus  King,  United  States 
minister  in  London,2  and  these  rumors  were  sufficiently  convincing 
to  cause  Madison,  Jefferson's  secretary  of  state,  to  instruct  Liv 
ingston,  United  States  minister  to  France,  and  then  about  to  sail, 
respecting  the  anxiety  of  the  United  States  government  to  obtain 
the  Floridas,  or  if  it  should  not  be  possible  to  obtain  both,  at  least 
West  Florida.8 

Mr.  King  was  able,  November  20,  1801,  to  send  a  copy  of  the 
treaty  of  March  31,  1801,  the  fifth  clause  of  which  removed  any 

1  Instructions  dqnne>j  au  Citoyen    Guillemardet,  May  20-June   19,  1798, 
Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MSS.     Henry  Adams,  United  States,  I,  355  et  seq. 
'King  to  Madison,  March  29  and  June  1,  1801,  State  Papert,  II,  509. 
'September  28,  1801,  Ibid.,  II,  510. 


44  DOUBTS  AS  TO  EXTENT  OF  CESSION        [1802 

doubt  of  the  cession.1  Livingston,  at  Paris,  could  get  nothing  but 
false  or  evasive  replies  from  Talleyrand,  who  was  French  min 
ister  of  foreign  affairs.  Livingston  wrote  April  24,  1802:  "The 
minister  will  give  no  answer  to  any  inquiries  I  make  on  the  sub 
ject.  He  will  not  say  what  their  boundaries  are,  what  are  their  in 
tentions,  and  when  they  are  to  take  possession.  And  what  appears 
very  extraordinary  to  me,  is  that  by  a  letter  I  have  just  received 
from  Mr.  Pinckney  [American  minister  to  Spain]  I  find  that  he  still 
supposes  the  Floridas  are  not  included  in  the  cession;  and  he 
writes  me  that  he  has  made  a  proposition  to  purchase  them,  which 
lies  before  the  minister  with  whom  he  is  to  have  a  conference  on 
the  subject.  You  may,  however,  be  fully  assured  that  the  Floridas 
are  given  to  France;  that  they  are  at  this  moment  fitting  out  an 
armament  from  here  to  take  possession.  This  will  be  commanded 
by  General  Bernadotte."  2 

So  late  as  June  2,  1802,  even  Senor  d'Azara,  the  Spanish 
minister  at  Paris,  was  unable,  though  willing  to  give  what  informa 
tion  he  could,  to  state  in  reply  to  a  letter  of  Livingston,  whether 
the  Floridas  had  been  included  in  the  cession  to  France.3 

Mr.  Madison  wrote,  May  11,  1802,  to  Mr.  Charles  Pinckney  in 
Madrid:  "We  are  still  without  a  line  from  you  since  your  arrival 
in  Madrid  and  feel  an  increasing  solicitude  to  hear  from  you  on 
the  subject  of  Louisiana.  .  .  .  What  the  intentions  of  Spain  may  be 
we  wait  to  learn  from  you.  Verbal  information,  from  unofficial 
sources,  has  led  us  to  infer  that  she  disowns  the  instrument  of  ces 
sion,  and  will  rigorously  oppose  it.  Should  the  cession  actually 
fail  from  this  or  any  other  cause,  and  Spain  retain  New  Orleans 
and  the  Floridas,  I  repeat  to  you  the  wish  of  the  President  that 
every  effort  and  address  be  employed  to  obtain  the  arrangement  by 
which  the  territory  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  including 
New  Orleans,  may  be  ceded  to  the  United  States,  and  the  Missis 
sippi  made  a  common  boundary,  with  a  common  use  of  its  naviga 
tion  for  them  and  Spain.  The  inducements  to  be  held  out  to 
Spain  were  intimated  in  your  original  instructions  on  this  point. 
I  am  charged  by  the  President  now  to  add  that  you  may  not  only 
receive  and  transmit  a  proposition  of  guarantee  of  her  territory 
beyond  the  Mississippi,  as  a  condition  of  her  ceding  to  the  United 

*State  Papers,  II,  511.  2  Ibid.,  II,  515.  *  Ibid.,  II,  519. 


1802]  GUARANTEE   OFFERED  SPAIN  45 

States  the  territory  including  New  Orleans  on  this  side,  but,  in 
case  it  be  necessary,  may  make  the  proposition  yourself,  in  the 
forms  required  by  our  constitution.  You  will  infer  from  this  en 
largement  of  your  authority  how  much  importance  is  attached  to 
the  object  in  question,  as  securing  a  precious  acquisition  to  the 
United  States  as  well  as  a  natural  and  quiet  boundary  with  Spain." ; 

By  September  Livingston  was  convinced  that  the  Floridas  were 
not  included  in  the  cession,2  and  he  had,  acting  upon  his  instruc 
tions,  informed  Joseph  Bonaparte  "  that  we  had  no  wish  to  extend 
our  boundary  across  the  Mississippi." 3 

This  proposition  conveyed  by  Madison  of  guarantee  to  Spain, 
so  startling  from  our  present  point  of  view,  is  proof  of  the  limited 
vision  of  the  administration;  a  limitation  the  narrowness  of  which 
is  accentuated  by  Jefferson's  extraordinary  statement  two  years 
later  in  a  letter  to  Dr.  Joseph  Priestly:  "Whether  we  remain  in  one 
confederacy,  or  form  into  Atlantic  and  Mississippi  confederacies,  I 
believe  not  very  important  to  either  part."  4  It  is  no  excuse  to 
say  that  the  statesmen  named  were  not  above  their  fellows  in  this 
respect;  that  no  one  dreamed  at  the  time  of  a  trans-Mississippi 
empire;  the  fact  remains  that  it  required  Napoleon  himself  to  ' 
open  their  minds  to  the  true  destiny  which  lay  before  their 
country  and  rouse  an  ideal  before  which  even  the  scruples  of 
Jefferson  on  the  constitutional  question  involved  gave  way.  That 
Jefferson's  views  as  to  the  trans-Mississippi  and  the  proposition  to 
guaranty  the  vast  region  to  Spain  came  to  naught,  was  an  enormous 
good  fortune  which  came  to  the  United  States  through  Napoleon 
alone. 

The  authority  to  give  this  extraordinary  promise  was  some 
what  modified  a  year  later  by  instructions  saying:  "The  guar 
antee  of  the  country  beyond  the  Mississippi  is  another  condition 
which  it  is  well  to  avoid  if  possible,  not  only  for  the  reasons  you 
already  possess,  but  because  it  seems  not  improbable,  from  the 
communication  of  Mr.  King,  that  Great  Britain  is  meditating 
plans  for  the  emancipation  and  independence  of  the  whole  of  the 

1  State  Papers,  II,  517. 

"Livingston  to  Madison,  September  1,  1802,  Ibid.,  II,  525. 
•Livingston  to  Jefferson,  October  28,  1802,  Ibid.,  II,  525. 
4  Letter  to  Priestly,  January  29,  1804,  Writings,  VIII,  295. 


46  JEFFERSON'S   WARLIKE   MOOD  [1802 

American  continent  south  of  the  United  States,  and  consequently 
such  a  guarantee  would  not  only  be  disagreeable  to  her,  but  em 
barrassing  to  the  United  States.  Should  war  indeed  precede  your 
conventional  arrangements  with  France,  the  guarantee,  if  admitted 
at  all,  must  necessarily  be  suspended  and  limited  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  be  applicable  only  to  the  state  of  things  which  may  be  fixed 
by  a  peace";1  a  modification  induced  by  information  from  Mr. 
Addington  to  Mr.  King  that  if  war  should  happen  "it  would, 
perhaps,  be  one  of  their  first  steps  to  occupy  New  Orleans."  2 
Addington  at  the  same  time  disclaimed  any  desire  on  the  part 
of  England  of  permanent  possession. 

The  thought  of  the  possession  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas 
by  what  was  now  in  Europe  an  all-conquering  France,  stirred 
even  the  pacific  Jefferson  to  something  of  a  warlike  impulse. 
In  a  letter  of  April  18,  1802,  to  Livingston  in  Paris,  he  said: 
"There  is  on  the  globe  one  single  spot,  the  possessor  of  which  is 
our  natural  and  habitual  enemy.  It  is  New  Orleans.  .  .  . 
France  placing  herself  in  that  door  assumes  to  us  the  attitude  of 
defiance.  Spain  might  have  retained  it  quietly  for  years.  Her 
pacific  dispositions,  her  feeble  state,  would  induce  her  to  in 
crease  our  facilities  there,  so  that  her  possession  of  the  place  would 
hardly  be  felt  by  us,  and  it  would  not  perhaps  be  very  long  be 
fore  some  circumstance  might  arise  which  might  make  the  cession 
of  it  to  us  the  price  of  something  of  more  worth  to  her.  Not  so 
can  it  ever  be  in  the  hands  of  France.  The  impetuosity  of  her 
temper,  the  energy  and  restlessness  of  her  character,  placed  in  a 
point  of  eternal  friction  with  us,  and  our  character,  which,  though 
quiet  and  loving  peace  and  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  is  high-minded, 
despising  wealth  in  competition  with  insult  or  injury,  enterprising 
and  energetic  as  any  nation  on  earth,  these  circumstances  render 
it  impossible  that  France  and  the  United  States  can  continue  long 
friends  when  they  meet  in  so  irritable  a  position.  They  as  well  as 
we  must  be  blind  if  they  do  not  see  this;  and  we  must  be  very  im 
provident  if  we  do  not  begin  to  make  arrangements  on  that  hy 
pothesis.  The  day  that  France  takes  possession  of  New  Orleans 
fixes  the  sentence  which  is  to  restrain  her  forever  within  her  low 

1  Madison  to  Livingston  and  Monroe,  May  28,  1803,  State  Papers,  II,  562. 
aKing  to  secretary  of  state,  April  2,  1803,  Ibid.,  II,  551. 


1802]  JEFERSON'S  THREAT  TO  FRANCE  47 

water-mark.  It  seals  the  union  of  two  nations  who  in  conjunction 
can  maintain  exclusive  possession  of  the  ocean.  From  that 
moment  we  must  marry  ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation. 
We  must  turn  all  our  attention  to  a  maritime  force,  for  which  our 
resources~pfece*'!is  on  very  high  grounds;  and  having  formed  and 
cemented  together  a  power  which  may  render  reinforcement  of 
her  settlements  here  impossible  to  France,  make  the  first  cannon 
which  shall  be  fired  in  Europe  the  signal  for  tearing  up  any  settle 
ment  she  may  have  made,  and  for  holding  the  two  continents  of 
America  in  sequestration  for  the  common  purposes  of  the  united 
British  and  American  nations."  * 

Jefferson's  abstractions  and  French  leanings  were  scattered  to 
nothingness  by  the  danger  which  the  real  common  sense  at  the 
base  of  his  character  made  clear  to  him.  He  also  wrote  Mr. 
Dupont  de  Nemours,  a  French  gentleman  returning  from  America 
to  France  and  whom  he  selected  to  carry  the  despatches  giving 
these  views:  "I  wish  you  to  be  possessed  of  the  subject  because  you 
may  be  able  to  impress  on  the  government  of  France  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  their  taking  possession  of  Louisiana;  and  though, 
as  I  here  mention,  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  to 
us  would  be  a  palliation,  yet  I  believe  it  would  be  no  more,  and  that 
this  measure  will  cost  France,  and  perhaps  not  very  long  hence,  a 
war  which  will  annihilate  her  on  the  ocean  and  place  that  element 
under  the  despotism  of  two  nations — which  I  am  not  reconciled 
to  the  more  because  my  own  would  be  one  of  them."  2  Brave 
phrases  which  were,  however,  but  the  expression  of  a  passing 
feeling,  and  which  in  the  bitter  years  of  national  humiliation,  soon 
to  come  at  the  hands  of  both  France  and  Great  Britain,  it  had 
been  well  to  have  changed  to  action.  They  were  the  more  ex 
traordinary,  too,  as  coming  from  one  whose  ideas  of  a  naval 
force  were  bounded  by  trifling  gun-boats,  and  whose  use  for  dry 
docks  was  principally  to  lay  up  therein  the  few  frigates  we  pos 
sessed,  unmanned  and  dismantled. 

While,  however,  using  the  bold  words  which  were  to  be  carried 
by  Dupont  to  Napoleon,  and  while  bent  upon  precipitating  a 
crisis  by  threats  the  more  astonishing  as  coming  from  a  man  who 

Jefferson,  Writings,  VIII,  143  (Putnam's,  1897). 

*  Jefferson  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  April  25,  1802,  Works,  IV,  435. 


48  FRENCH  ARMY  FOR  SANTO  DOMINGO      [1802 

had  apparently  been  bent  upon  reducing  to  nullity  the  little  navy 
we  had,  Jefferson  weakly  attempted  to  influence  Talleyrand  by  a 
message  derogatory  both  to  his  own  character  and  good  sense; 
representing  the  overthrow  of  the  Federal  party  as  an  American 
rehabilitation  of  Talleyrand,  whose  astonishing  venality  in  his 
demand  of  payment  for  his  services  from  the  American  com 
missioners  who  negotiated  the  French  treaty  of  1800,  had  been 
exposed  in  the  previous  administration;1  a  message  which  in 
itself  could  be  read  as  nullifying  the  thunder  carried  by  Dupont, 
even  had  Napoleon,  an  impossible  supposition,  been  disposed  to 
notice  it. 

The  transfer  of  Louisiana  to  French  authority  had  been  delayed 
by  the  inability  or  unwillingness  of  Napoleon  to  meet  the  condi 
tions  of  the  treaty  of  March,  1801,  regarding  the  new  kingdom 
of  Etruria,  in  such  manner  at  least  as  would  satisfy  the  awakened 
conscience  of  the  weak-minded  king,  supported  as  he  now  was  by 
Godoy,  who  had  returned  to  power  after  the  treaty  of  October  1, 

1800.  Talleyrand,  however,  was  directed  by  Napoleon,  July  27, 

1801,  to  demand  of  Spain  the  authorization  to  take  possession  of 
Louisiana,2  and  in  preparation  for  its  occupancy  detailed  directions 
were  given  October  21,  1801,  to  Berthier,  minister  of  war,  to  com 
plete  arrangements  for  an  imposing  expedition  which  was  fitting 
out  at  Flushing,  Havre,  Brest,  Lorient,  Rochefort,  Cadiz,  and 
Toulon  to  crush  the  government  by  the  blacks  under  Toussaint 
TOuverture  in  Santo  Domingo,3  but  which  was  later  to  form  the 
garrison    of   the   transatlantic    empire    repossessed    by    France. 
Napoleon's  brother-in-law,  Leclerc,  was  designated  as  commander- 
in-chief,  with  Villaret,  Joyeuse,  and  Latouche-Treville,  in  command 
of  the  fleet  of  thirty-three  ships  of  the  line  and  twenty-one  frigates, 
besides  transports,  the  main  body  of  which  left  Brest  November 
22,  1801.     On  January  29,  1802,  they  were,  except  those  driven 
back  by  gales  to  European  ports  (among  which  was  the  Spanish 
admiral  in  command  of  the  contingent  which  Spain  was  ordered 
by  Napoleon  to  furnish)  finally  assembled  in  Samand  Bay. 

Napoleon,  moved  by  the  prospect  of  the  certain  subjuga 
tion  of  Santo  Domingo,  reversed  the  solemn  declaration  in  his 

1  Cf.  Adams,  I,  412.  'Napoleon's  Correspondence,  VII,  210. 

•Ibid.,  VII,  297,  320. 


1802]  FRENCH  ARMY  FOR  LOUISIANA  49 

proclamation  of  November  8, 1801,  to  the  people  of  the  island,"  that 
whatever  your  origin  and  color,  you  are  all  Frenchmen;  you  are 
all  free  and  all  equal  before  God  and  the  Republic."  1  In  this  re 
versal  he  stifled  his  instincts,  which  were  those  of  an  intense  demo 
crat,  dug  the  grave  of  French  dominion  in  the  new  world,  and 
brought  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  Spaniard  face  to  face  in  the  battle  for 
supremacy.  For  it  was  the  resistance  of  the  blacks  to  this  decree, 
in  which  was  swallowed  the  over-sea  resources  of  France,  which 
was  the  great  determinant  of  the  destiny  of  Louisiana. 

Almost  at  the  same  moment  with  the  issuance  of  this  decree, 
Napoleon  gave  orders  respecting  a  new  armament  to  the  minister 
of  marine,  saying:  "My  intention,  citizen  minister,  is  to  take  pos 
session  of  Louisiana  with  the  shortest  delay;  that  this  expedition 
be  made  with  the  greatest  secrecy;  that  it  shall  appear  to  be 
directed  to  Santo  Domingo.  The  troops  which  I  intend  sending 
being  upon  the  Scheldt,  I  desire  that  they  shall  leave  from  Antwerp 
and  Flushing;  finally,  I  desire  that  you  inform  me  as  to  the  number 
of  men  you  think  necessary  to  send,  bgth  of  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  that  you  give  me  a  project  of  organization  for  this  colony, 
both  military  and  administrative,  the  works  that  we  shall  have 
to  undertake  and  the  batteries  we  shall  have  to  construct  in  order 
to  have  an  anchorage  and  a  shelter  for  ships  of  war  against  superior 
forces.  In  order  to  do  this,  I  desire  that  you  have  prepared  for 
me  a  chart  of  the  coast,  from  St.  Augustine  and  Florida  to  Mexico, 
and  a  geographical  description  of  the  different  cantons  of  Loui 
siana,  with  the  population  and  resources  of  each  canton."2  He 
followed  this  quickly  with  instructions  to  St.  Cyr,  French  ambas 
sador  at  Madrid,  to  press  Spain  to  deliver  Louisiana,3  and  by 
additional  orders  for  the  preparation  of  an  expedition  which  was  to 
be  commanded  by  General  Victor.4 

St.  Cyr,  in  making  known  Napoleon's  wishes  to  Spain,  presented, 
July  22,  1802,  a  note  giving  a  promise  of  most  binding  character, 
which  a  few  months  later  Napoleon  was  to  entirely  ignore.  The 
note  said:  "His  Catholic  Majesty  has  appeared  to  wish  that  France 

1  Napoleon's  Correspondence,  June  14,  1802,  VII,  315. 
•  Ibid.,  June  4,  1802,  VII,  485. 
•Ibid.,  July  25,  1802,  VII,  532. 
•Ibid.,  August  24,  1802,  VIII,  4. 


50  FRANCE  LOSES   THE   FLORIDAS  [1802 

should  engage  not  to  sell  or  alienate,  in  any  manner,  the  property 
and  the  enjoyment  of  Louisiana.  Its  wish  in  this  respect  is  perfect 
ly  conformable  with  the  intentions  of  the  Spanish  government; 
and  its  sole  motive  for  entering  therein  was  because  it  respected  a 
possession  which  has  constituted  a  part  of  the  French  territory. 
I  am  authorized  to  declare  to  you,  in  the  name  of  the  First  Consul, 
that  France  will  never  alienate  it."  1 

The  preparation  for  the  new  expeditionary  force,  which  was  never 
to  leave,  pressed  forward,2  and  October  15,  1802,  the  order  was 
signed  at  Barcelona  by  the  king  for  the  delivery  of  Louisiana  to 
France.  That  Napoleon  had  no  immediate  views  beyond  French 
occupancy  is  evident  by  his  still  decided  desire  to  add  Florida  to  the 
concession.  The  bribe  of  Parma  and  two  other  duchies  had  been 
held  before  the  new  King  of  Etruria,  if  in  return  the  King  of 
Spain  would  but  annex  Florida  to  Louisiana.3  The  exchange  was 
pressed  later  in  a  letter  from  Napoleon  to  the  King  of  Spain 
himself,4  but  the  imperious  will  of  the  First  Consul  was  finally 
thwarted  by  Godoy,  upheld  as  he  was  by  the  British  minister, 
John  Hookham  Frere.  Napoleon  was  informed  by  General  Beur- 
nonville,  his  new  minister  at  Madrid,  in  January,  1803,  that  "The 
Prince  [Godoy]  told  me  that  the  British  minister  had  declared  to 
him,  in  the  name  of  his  government,  that  his  Britannic  Majesty, 
being  informed  of  the  projects  of  exchange  which  existed  between 
France  and  Spain,  could  never  consent  that  the  two  Floridas  should 
become  an  acquisition  of  the  Republic;  that  the  United  States  of 
America  were  in  this  respect  of  one  mind  with  the  Court  of  London; 
and  that  Russia  equally  objected  to  France  disposing  of  the  estates 
of  Parma  in  favor  of  Spain,  since  the  Emperor  Alexander  intended 
to  have  them  granted  as  indemnity  to  the  King  of  Sardinia.  In 
imparting  to  me  this  proceeding  of  the  British  minister,  the  prince 
had  a  satisfied  air,  which  showed  how  much  he  wishes  that  the 
exchange,  almost  agreed  upon  and  so  warmly  desired  by  the  Queen 
of  Spain,  may  not  take  place."  5 

1  The  Spanish  minister  to  the  secretary  of  state,  State  Papers,  II,  569. 
"Napoleon  Correspondence,  August  24  and  November  23, 1802,  VIII,  4,  106. 
8  Ibid.,  August  29,  1802 ,  VIII,  12. 
*Ibid.,  November  27,  1802,  VIII,  111. 

6  Beurnonville  to  Talleyrand,  January  17,  1803,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.,  MSS., 
quoted  by  Adams,  I,  402. 


1802]        WITHDRAWAL  OF  RIGHT  OF  DEPOSIT          51 

Two  anxious  years  had  been  passed  during  which  the  Jeffer 
son  administration  saw  itself  apparently  powerless  between  the 
grinding  of  the  French  and  Spanish  millstones  of  state  policy; 
the  motive  power  of  both  was,  however,  altogether  the  mind  and 
will  of  the  most  forceful  genius  that  has  ever  appeared  among 
mankind.  In  the  meantime  the  South-west  was  in  warlike  mood 
through  the  action  of  the  Spanish  intendant  at  New  Orleans  in 
closing  the  Mississippi  by  annulment,  October  16,  1802,  of  the 
right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans.  The  administration,  in  No 
vember,  1802,  received  information  that  this  had  been  done  by 
proclamation,  without  an  equivalent  establishment  being  arranged 
for  as  required  by  the  treaty  of  1795.  By  one  of  the  curiosities  of 
Spanish  administration,  the  officials  of  the  superior  departments 
were  independent  of  one  another,  and  apparently  the  governor  was 
in  nowise  a  party  to  the  transaction;  there  seems  little  doubt  that 
the  intendant  was  acting  of  his  own  motion,  and  it  is  more  than 
likely  that,  foreseeing  the  almost  certain  transfer  to  France,  he  was 
merely  desirous  of  acting  as  a  marplot  and  of  bringing  between  the 
United  States  and  her  new  neighbor  a  burning  question  which 
might  easily  develop  into  flame.  It  is  clear  that  the  Spanish  minis 
ter  to  the  United  States,  the  Marquis  of  Casa  Yrujo,  son-in-law  of 
Governor  McKean  of  Pennsylvania,  was  not  only  not  forewarned, 
but  that  he  was  markedly  averse  to  the  intendant's  action.  He 
wrote  him  sharply,  at  the  same  time  disclaiming  to  the  American 
government  the  intendant's  act. 

Madison  wrote  Pinckney,  minister  to  Spain,  November  27, 
1802,1  saying:  "This  proceeding  is  so  direct  and  palpable  a  viola 
tion  of  the  treaty  of  1795,  that,  in  candor,  it  is  to  be  imputed  rather 
to  the  intendant  solely,  than  to  instructions  of  his  government. 
The  Spanish  minister  takes  pains  to  impress  his  belief,  and  it  is 
favored  by  private  accounts  from  New  Orleans,  mentioning  that 
the  governor  did  not  concur  with  the  intendant.  But  from  what 
ever  source  the  measure  may  have  proceeded,  the  President  expects 
that  the  Spanish  government  will  neither  lose  a  moment  in  counter 
manding  it,  nor  hesitate  to  repair  every  damage  which  may  result 
from  it.  You  are  aware  of  the  sensibility  of  our  Western  citizens 
to  such  an  occurrence.  This  sensibility  is  justified  by  the  interest 
1  State  Papers,  II,  527. 


, 


52         FEELING  IN   CONGRESS  AND  THE  WEST      [1802 

they  have  at  stake.  The  Mississippi  is  to  them  everything.  It  is 
the  Hudson,  the  Delaware,  the  Potomac,  and  all  the  navigable 
rivers  of  the  Atlantic  states,  formed  into  one  stream."  1 

Nor  did  Madison  exaggerate.  The  one  great  and  incomparably 
cheapest  method  of  transport  was  by  water,  and  the  great  trade 
artery  of  the  West  into  which  flowed  all  the  others  of  the  more 
settled  Western  country  was  the  Mississippi.  It  was,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  day,  vital.  The  Western  country  was  then  so 
distant  from  the  East  in  communication,  that  its  isolation  is  now 
hardly  conceivable.  There  were  many  who  thought  it  impossible 
that  there  should  not  be  several  Anglo-Saxon  nations  to  the  North 
American  Continent,  south  of  Canada.  And  such  thought  was 
not  wholly  unjustified  by  the  conditions.  The  Alleghanies  formed 
a  barrier  which  separated  countries  facing  in  wholly  different 
directions.  One  looked  east  toward  the  Atlantic,  to  which  all  its 
natural  highways  tended;  the  other  west  and  south,  its  interests 
governed  thitherward  by  inexorable  natural  conditions.  The 
dream  of  a  south-western  empire,  which  undoubtedly  was  in  the 
minds  of  many,  had  a  realistic  base  which  might  in  time  have  de 
veloped  into  reality,  had  not  the  steam  motor,  of  which  there  was 
then  a  faintest  dawn  visible  to  a  few  far-seeing  and  wisely  imagi 
native  men,  come  to  keep  step  with  the  growth  of  the  American 
Republic  and  bring  its  widely  separated  borders  into  neighbor 
hood. 

It  was  thus  not  without  cause  that  the  House  resolved,  January 
7,  1803,  that  it  viewed  the  news  of  the  Spanish  intendant's  action 
"with  deep  sensibility,"  and  expressed  its  "unalterable  determi 
nation  to  maintain  the  rights  of  navigation  and  commerce  through 
the  river  Mississippi  as  established  by  existing  treaties." 2  Happily, 
the  Marquis  of  Casa  Yrujo  came,  April  19,  1803,  to  the  secretary 
of  state  to  announce  that  the  Spanish  government  had  given 
orders  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  right — action  which  caused 
doubts  in  Madison's  mind  of  the  actuality  of  Spain's  transfer  of 
Louisiana  to  France.3 

The  President's  message,  December  15,  1802,  barely  touched 
upon  the  momentous  change  of  masters  in  Louisiana,  of  which 

1  Madison  to  Pinckney,  November  27, 1802,  State  Papers,  II,  527. 
*Ibid.,  11,471.  'Ibid.,  11,556. 


1802]  JEFFERSON'S   COLORLESS  MESSAGE  53 

there  was  yet  no  sign  of  actual  transfer.  He  said:  "The  cession  of 
the  Spanish  province  of  Louisiana  to  France,  which  took  place  in., 
the  course  of  the  late  war,  will,  if  carried  into  effect,  make  a  change 
in  the  aspect  of  our  foreign  relations  which  will  doubtless  have 
just  weight  in  any  deliberations  of  the  legislature  connected  with 
the  subject."  Nothing  of  Jefferson's  views  on  this  momentous 
subject,  beyond  this  meaningless  phrase,  was  given  to  the  public, 
nor  was  there,  respecting  France,  anything  of  belligerency  in  his 
announcements  regarding  the  navy,  such  as  appeared  in  his  per 
sonal  letters  to  Livingston  and  Dupont  de  Nemours.  His  mes 
sage  stated  that  "a  small  force  in  the  Mediterranean  will  be  neces 
sary  to  restrain  the  Tripoline  cruisers,  and  the  uncertain  tenure 
of  peace  with  some  other  of  the  Barbary  powers  may  eventually 
require  that  force  to  be  augmented,"  but  far  more  stress  was  given 
to  the  proposal  of  the  message  (amazing  in  the  reason  assigned) 
"to  add  to  our  navy  yard  here  a  dock  within  which  our  vessels  may 
be  laid  up  dry  and  under  cover  from  the  sun." 

But  the  political  turmoil  which  was  the  product  of  the  intend- 
ant's  action  roused  an  energy  and  an  apprehension  in  the  adminis 
tration  which  no  mere  transfer  of  half  a  continent  had  been  able 
to  produce.  Madison  wrote  Pinckney  at  Madrid,  January  10, 
1803:  "The  House  has  passed  a  resolution  explicitly  declaring 
that  the  stipulated  right  of  the  United  States  on  the  Mississippi 
will  be  inviolably  maintained.  The  disposition  of  many  members 
was  to  give  to  the  resolution  a  tone  and  complexion  still  stronger. 
To  these  proofs  of  the  sensation  which  has  been  produced,  it  is 
added  that  representations  expressing  the  peculiar  sensibility  of  the 
Western  country  are  on  their  way  from  every  quarter  of  it  to  the 
government.  There  is,  in  fact,  but  one  sentiment  throughout 
the  Union  with  respect  to  the  duty  of  maintaining  our  rights  of 
navigation  and  boundary.  The  only  existing  difference  relates 
to  the  degree  of  patience  which  ought  to  be  exercised  during  the 
appeal  to  friendly  modes  of  redress;"  l  all  of  which  had  much 
better  have  been  said  to  our  minister  in  France,  which  govern 
ment  was  now,  as  by  this  time  Jefferson  was  well  assured,  master 
of  the  situation. 

The  temper  and  tone  of  Congress  were  such  that  action  by  the 
1  State  Papers,  II,  528. 


54  MONROE  SPECIAL  ENVOY  [1803 

Executive  was  imperative.  Jefferson  thus  putting  aside  his  war 
like  views  of  a  few  months  before,  sent  on  January  11,  1803, 
a  message  to  the  Senate,  saying:  "The  cession  of  the  Spanish 
province  of  Louisiana  to  France,  and  perhaps  of  the  Floridas,  and 
the  late  suspension  of  the  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans,  are 
events  of  primary  interest  to  the  United  States.  On  both  occasions 
such  measures  were  promptly  taken  as  were  thought  most  likely 
amicably  to  remove  the  present  and  prevent  future  causes  of 
inquietude.  The  objects  of  those  measures  were  to  obtain  the 
territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  and  eastward  of  that 
if  practicable,  on  conditions  to  which  the  proper  authorities  of 
our  country  would  agree;  or  at  least  to  prevent  any  changes  which 
might  lessen  the  exercise  of  our  rights.  While  my  confidence,  in 
our  minister  plenipotentiary  is  entire  and  undiminished,  I  still 
think  that  these  objects  might  be  promoted  by  joining  with  him 
a  person  sent  from  hence  directly,  carrying  with  him  the  feelings 
and  sentiments  of  the  nation,  excited  on  the  late  occurrence, 
impressed  by  full  communications  of  all  the  views  we  entertain  on 
this  interesting  subject.  ..."  He  therefore  nominated  Livings 
ton  as  minister  plenipotentiary  and  Monroe  as  minister  extraor 
dinary  and  plenipotentiary  to  France,  and,  as  Spain  was  still  in 
possession  "and  the  course  of  events  may  retard  or  prevent  the 
cession  to  France  being  carried  into  effect,"  Pinckney  and  Monroe 
were  nominated  as  envoys  to  Spain,  to  enter  into  a  treaty  or  con 
vention  with  either  power  as  events  should  demand,  "for  the 
purpose  of  enlarging  and  more  effectually  securing  our  rights  and 
interests  in  the  river  Mississippi  and  in  the  territories  eastward 
thereof." 

There  is  no  word,  nor  is  there  hint,  either  in  the  message  or  in 
the  elaborate  instructions  of  March  2,  1803,  to  the  several  envoys 
named,  of  any  desire  to  go  beyond  the  Mississippi.  The  instruc 
tions  accepted  as  almost  a  certainty  that  the  Floridas  also  had  been 
ceded  to  France  and  outlined  in  seven  articles  the  proposed  basis 
of  a  treaty.  France  was  to  be  induced  to  cede  "  the  territory  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  comprehending  the  two  Floridas,  the  island  of 
New  Orleans,  and  the  islands  lying  to  the  north  and  east  of  that 
channel  of  the  said  river,  which  is  commonly  called  the  South  Pass, 
together  with  all  such  other  islands  as  appertain  to  either  West  or 


1803]  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  ENVOYS  55 

East  Florida — France  reserving  to  herself  all  her  territory  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Mississippi."  The  boundary  above  the  thirty- 
first  degree  of  latitude  was  to  be  the  middle  of  the  channel;  the 
navigation  of  the  river  in  its  whole  length  and  breadth  was  to  be 
Free  to  both  nations;  there  was  to  be  equality  of  treatment  in  fiscal 
matters;  French  citizens  were  to  be  allowed  for  ten  years  to  de 
posit  their  goods  at  New  Orleans  and  other  ports  on  the  ceded 
shore  of  the  Mississippi;  it  was  to  be  expected,  though  such  pro 
visions  could  not  be  made  in  the  treaty,  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
ceded  territory  would  be  incorporated  with  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  on  an  equal  footing  without  unnecessary  delay.  In 
the  observations  upon  this  plan  there  is  a  hint  of  objection  on  the 
part  of  Spain,  and  care  was  to  be  taken  to  conserve  the  treaty  of 
1795  between  Spain  and  the  United  States.  It  may  seem  some 
what  strange  to  the  American  public  of  this  day,  that  the  subject 
which,  after  that  of  the  cession  itself,  gave  most  concern  to  the 
American  Department  of  States,  was  the  possible  attitude  of  Great 
Britain  in  regard  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  river  to  which,  by 
the  treaties  of  1783  and  1794,  she  had  a  clear  right  in  so  far  as  the 
United  States  could  give  such  right. 

Should  France  refuse  to  cede  any  territory,  it  "remained  to  ex 
plain  and  improve  the  existing  right  of  deposit  by  adding  the  privi 
leges  of  holding  real  estate  for  commercial  purposes,  of  providing 
hospitals,  or  residences  for  consuls  or  other  agents;  and  should 
not  a  cession  of  the  Floridas  be  obtainable,  to  arrange  for  the 
right  of  deposit  on  rivers  of  the  United  States  passing  through  the 
Floridas,  and  for  their  free  navigation."  "The  President,"  says 
the  instructions,  "  has  made  up  his  mind  to  go  as  far  as  fifty  mil 
lions  of  livres  tournois,  rather  than  lose  the  main  object."  * 

To  this  dwindled  our  demands  after  the  exciting  debates  in  the 
Senate  at  the  end  of  February  and  beginning  of  March,  1803, 
on  resolutions  which  proposed  authorizing  the  President  to  take 
immediate  possession  of  such  places  as  he  might  deem  fit  and  con 
venient  for  places  of  deposit,  and  authorizing  him  to  call  into 
active  service  any  number  of  militia  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia, 
Ohio,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Mississippi,  not  to  exceed  fifty 
thousand,  for  effecting  these  objects.2  Gouverneur  Morris,  one 

1  State  Papers,  II,  540.  3  Abridgment  Debates,  II,  670. 


56  CALL  OF  MILITIA  AUTHORIZED  [1803 

of  the  senators  from  New  York,  and  certainly  one  of  the  ablest 
and  most  acute  rninds  this  country  has  produced,  said:  "I  have 
endeavored  to  show  that,  under  the  existing  circumstances,  we  are 
now  actually  at  war,  and  have  no  choice  but  manly  resistance  or 
vile  submission;  that  the  possession  of  this  country  by  France  is 
dangerous  to  other  nations  but  fatal  to  us;  that  it  forms  a  natural 
and  necessary  part  of  our  empire.  ...  I  have  no  hesitation  in  say 
ing  that  you  ought  to  have  taken  possession  of  New  Orleans  and 
the  Floridas  the  instant  your  treaty  was  violated.  You  ought  to 
do  it  now.  Your  rights  are  invaded — confidence  in  negotiation  is 
vain;  there  is  therefore  no  alternative  but  force.  You  are  exposed 
to  imminent  present  danger.  You  have  the  prospect  of  great  future 
advantage.  You  are  justified  by  the  clearest  principles  of  right. 
You  are  urged  by  the  strongest  motives  of  policy.  You  are  com 
manded  by  every  sentiment  of  natural  dignity." 

There  were  some  who  deprecated  such  extreme  measures,  but 
the  sense  of  the  Senate  was  expressed  in  resolutions,  passed  unani 
mously,  authorizing  the  President,  "whenever  he  shall  judge  it 
expedient,  to  require  the  executives  of  the  several  states  to  take 
effectual  measures  to  arm  and  equip,  according  to  law,  and  hold 
in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  warning,  eighty  thousand 
effective  militia,"  also  to  appropriate  for  them  pay  and  subsis 
tence,  and  to  erect  arsenals  at  such  points  on  the  Western  waters 
as  he  might  deem  necessary.2 

The  turmoil  in  Jefferson's  mind  showed  in  the  suggestion  which 
he  had  advanced  to  extend  the  domination  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
alliance,  and  which  he  forecast,  over  both  Americas.  Spain 
seems  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  in  the  mental  shuffle  which  he 
was  experiencing.  How  serious  for  the  moment  he  was  in  the 
expression  of  such  views  is  shown  by  the  propositions  laid  before 
the  cabinet,  April  8,  1803,  at  a  time  when  "a  French  prefect  was 

1  Abridgment  of  Debates,  II,  684.  Senator  Morris  also  said  in  this  speech: 
"  When  we  have  twenty  ships  of  the  line  at  sea,  and  there  is  no  good  reason 
why  we  should  not  have  them,  we  shall  be  respected  by  all  Europe.  .  .  .  The 
expense  compared  with  the  benefit  is  moderate,  nay,  trifling.  .  .  .  Whatever 
sums  are  necessary  to  secure  the  national  independence  must  be  paid.  ...  If 
we  will  not  pay  to  be  defended  we  must  pay  for  being  conquered."  (Annals 
of  Congress,  1802,  1803,  199.)  His  words  were  soon  to  have  most  melancholy 
significance. 

"  Ibid.,  692,  Annals  of  Congress,  1802,  1803,  255. 


1803]  ALLIANCE  PROPOSED  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN      57 

actually  in  New  Orleans  and  the  delivery  of  Louisiana  to  Bona 
parte  might  from  day  to  day  be  expected,"  of  an  alliance  with 
England  in  case  France,  as  he  expressed  it,  "  refused  our  rights." 
He  suggested  "  three  inducements  which  might  be  offered  to  Great 
Britain:  '1.  Not  to  make  a  separate  peace.  2.  To  let  her  take 
Louisiana.  3.  Commercial  privileges.'  The  cabinet  unanimously 
rejected  the  second  and  third  concessions;  but  Dearborn  and 
Lincoln  were  alone  in  opposing  the  first,  and  a  majority  agreed 
to  instruct  Monroe  and  Livingston,  'as  soon  as  they  find  that  no 
arrangements  can  be  made  with  France,  to  use  all  possible  pro 
crastination  with  them,  and  in  the  meantime  to  enter  into  confer 
ences  with  the  British  government,  through  their  ambassador  at 
Paris,  to  fix  principles  of  alliance,  and  leave  us  in  peace  until 
Congress  meets;  and  prevent  a  war  until  next  spring.'  " l 

Madison,  in  the  instructions  dated  'ten  days  later,  directed  the 
two  ministers  in  case  France  "instead  of  friendly  arrangements  or 
views,  should  be  found  to  meditate  hostilities,  or  to  have  formed 
projects  which  will  constrain  the  United  States  to  resort  to  hostil 
ities,"  that  co-operation  of  England  was  to  be  sought  with  the  ex 
pectation  that  the  support  of  the  United  States  would  induce  her 
to  begin  again  a  war  which  had  but  so  lately  closed,  and  which  was 
not  to  end  or  be  suspended  except  by  mutual  consent.  Should  the 
right  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  not  be  disputed  by  France  but 
the  right  of  deposit  denied,  it  should  be  left  to  Congress  to  decide 
between  an  "instant  resort  to  arms"  or  further  procrastination.2 

War  anew  between  France  and  Great  Britain  was  now  imminent. 
The  very  disquieting  remarks  of  Napoleon,  March  13,  1803,  to 
Lord  Whitworth,  the  British  ambassador,  and  the  active  prepara 
tions  in  both  countries,  combined  with  the  almost  certain  action  of 
England,  which  would  be  to  occupy  New  Orleans,3  must  have 
rendered  the  peace-loving  Jefferson  anxious  indeed.  Livingston 
in  Paris  pressed  the  subject  of  purchase  of  territory  east  of  the 
river  with  increased  persistence,  knowing  now  that  he  would  have 
to  share  with  a  colleague  any  honor  which  might  come  from  suc- 

1  Cabinet  Memoranda  of  Jefferson,  April  8,  1803;  Jefferson  MSS.,  quoted  by 
Adams,  United  States,  II,  1,  2. 
a  State  Papers,  II,  555-556. 
3  Letter  of  Mr.  King  to  secretary  of  state,  April  2, 1803,  State  Papers,  II,  551. 


58  TALLEYRAND  AND  LIVINGSTON  [1803 

cess  later.  "The  affairs  of  New  Orleans  gave  me  two  very  im 
portant  strings  to  touch:  I  endeavored  to  convince  the  govern 
ment  that  the  United  States  would  avail  themselves  of  the  breach  of 
the  treaty  to  possess  themselves  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas; 
that  Britain  would  never  suffer  Spain  to  grant  the  Floridas  to 
France,  even  were  she  so  disposed,  but  would  immediately  seize 
upon  them  as  soon  as  the  transfer  was  made;  that  without  the 
Floridas,  Louisiana  would  be  indefensible,  as  it  possesses  not  one 
port  even  for  frigates;  and  I  showed  the  effect  of  suffering  that 
important  country  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  British,  both  as  it 
affected  our  country  and  the  naval  force  of  all  Europe.  These 
reasons,  with  the  probability  of  war,  have  had,  I  trust,  the  desired 
effect.  Mr.  Talleyrand  asked  me  this  day,  when  pressing  the  sub 
ject,  whether  we  wished  to  have  the  whole  of  Louisiana.  I  told 
him  no;  that  our  wishes  extended  only  to  New  Orleans  and  the 
Floridas;  that  the  policy  of  France,  however,  should  dictate  (as  I 
have  shown  in  an  official  note)  to  give  us  the  country  above  the 
river  Arkansas,  in  order  to  place  a  barrier  between  them  and 
Canada.  He  said  that  if  they  gave  New  Orleans  the  rest  would 
be  of  little  value,  and  that  he  would  wish  to  know  "what  we  would 
give  for  the  whole."  I  told  him  it  was  a  subject  I  had  not  thought 
of;  but  that  I  supposed  that  we  should  not  object  to  twenty  mil 
lions,  provided  our  citizens  were  paid."  1 

Though  Talleyrand  even  the  next  day  was  denying  that  Loui 
siana  was  theirs  and  that  his  proposition  was  only  personal,2 
Napoleon  himself  had  already  decided  the  question.  On  Easter 
Sunday,  April  10,  1803,  he  had  announced  to  two  of  his  minis 
ters  his  intention  to  give  Louisiana  to  the  United  States.  One  was 
Barbe*  Marbois  who  had  been  consul-general  of  France  in  America, 
had  married  an  American  wife,  and  had  American  predilections. 
The  story  told  by  Marbois  at  great  length,  though  strongly  colored, 
has  enough  verisimilitude  for  acceptance.  Napoleon  said:  "I 
know  the  full  value  of  Louisiana,  and  I  have  been  desirous  of  re 
pairing  the  fault  of  the  French  negotiator  who  abandoned  it  in  1763. 
A  few  lines  of  a  treaty  have  restored  it  to  me  and  I  have  scarcely 
recovered  it  when  I  must  expect  to  lose  it.  ...  [The  British]  sail 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  April  11,  1803,  State  Papers,  II,  552. 
'Livingston  to  Madison,  April  13,  1803,  Ibid.,  552. 


1803]  NAPOLEON  ORDERS  CESSION  59 

over  those  seas  as  sovereigns,  whilst  our  affairs  in  Santo  Domingo 
have  been  growing  worse  every  day  since  the  death  of  Leclerc. 
The  conquest  of  Louisiana  would  be  easy.  ...  I  have  not  a  mo 
ment  to  lose  in  putting  it  out  of  their  reach.  ...  I  think  of  ceding 
it  to  the  United  States.  .  .  .  They  only  ask  of  me  one  town  in 
Louisiana,  but  I  already  consider  the  colony  entirely  lost,  and,  it 
appears  to  me,  in  the  hands  of  this  growing  power,  it  will  be  more 
useful  to  the  policy  and  even  the  commerce  of  France  than  if  I 
should  attempt  to  keep  it."  1 

Marbois  was  as  cordial  in  agreement  with  the  First  Consul  as 
the  other  minister — who,  as  an  officer  of  the  French  army  had  been 
also  in  America  during  the  Revolution — was  opposed.  The  confer 
ence  lasted  late  into  the  night  without  determination.  The  min 
isters  remained  at  St.  Cloud,  and  early  next  morning  Napoleon 
summoned  Marbois,  read  to  him  the  disquieting  despatches  from 
London,  and  said:  "I  renounce  Louisiana.  It  is  not  only  New 
Orleans  that  I  will  cede,  it  is  the  whole  colony  without  reservation. 
I  know  the  price  of  what  I  abandon,  and  I  have  sufficiently  proved 
the  importance  that  I  attach  to  this  province,  since  my  first  diplo 
matic  act  with  Spain  had  for  its  object  the  recovery  of  it.  I 
renounce  it  with  the  greatest  regret.  To  attempt  obstinately  to 
retain  it  would  be  folly.  I  direct  you  to  negotiate  this  affair  with 
the  envoys  of  the  United  States.  Do  not  even  await  the  arrival  of 
Mr.  Monroe;2  have  an  interview  this  very  day  with  Mr.  Livingston; 
but  I  require  a  great  deal  of  money  for  this  war,  and  I  would  not 
like  to  commence  it  with  new  contributions.  ...  If  I  should  regu 
late  my  terms  according  to  the  value  of  these  vast  regions  to  the 
United  States,  the  indemnity  would  have  no  limits.  I  will  be  mod 
erate  in  consideration  of  the  necessity  in  which  I  am  of  making  a 
sale.  But  keep  this  to  yourself.  I  want  fifty  millions  [francs]  and 
for  less  than  that  sum  I  will  not  treat."  3 

It  is  not  the  province  of  this  work  to  treat  of  the  details  which 
passed  between  Marbois  and  the  American  envoys.  The  latter 
were  wise  enough  to  exceed  their  instructions,  particularly  as  it  was 
found  as  they  "advanced  in  the  negotiations,  that  M.  Marbois  was 

1  Barbe*  Marbois,  History  of  Louisiana,  263. 

'Monroe,  however,  arrived  the  evening  of  this  same  day,  April  11. 

•Barbe"  Marbois,  Louisiana,  274. 


60  INITIATIVE  WHOLLY  NAPOLEON'S  [1803 

absolutely  restricted  to  the  disposition  of  the  whole;  that  he  would 
treat  for  no  less  portion,  and  of  course  it  was  useless  to  urge  it. 
On  mature  consideration,  therefore,  we  finally  concluded  a  treaty 
[signed  April  30,  1803,]  on  the  best  terms  we  could  obtain  for  the 
whole."  1  These  terms  were  the  payment  of  sixty  millions  of  francs 
and  undertaking  the  payment  of  the  claims  of  the  American  citizens 
against  France  for  the  illegal  capture  and  condemnation  of  vessels, 
which  were  estimated  at  twenty  millions  more;  much  less,  it 
should  be  said,  than  the  amount  of  claims  admitted  in  principle, 
and  falling  far  short  of  the  reality. 

Thus,  for  a  sum  of  $15,360,000,  came  into  the  hands  of  the 
United  States  a  territory  in  extent  a  great  empire,  and  with  its 
possession  passed  a  danger  which  included  the  alternative  of 
a  war  with  France  or  the  possession  of  Louisiana  by  Great 
Britain.  It  seems  strange  that  the  vast  potentialities  involved 
should  have  been  haggled  over  by  the  American  negotiators  for  a 
moment.  Napoleon  was  not  a  man  with  whom  to  chaffer  and  at 
any  moment  might  have  changed  his  mind  or  raised  his  price. 
The  truth  is  that  the  possibility  of  so  great  a  coup  had  never 
entered  the  minds  of  the  Americans.  It  came  with  an  absolute 
unpreparedness  which  staggered  them.  The  purchase  of  Louisi 
ana  was  in  fact  forced  upon  us,  so  far  as  the  great  country  across 
the  Mississippi  was  concerned.  It  was  not  the  work  of  Jefferson 
or  Madison  or  Livingston  (who  in  his  own  words  had  never  thought 
of  it)  or  of  Monroe.  It  was  wholly  the  act  of  Napoleon,  who  recog 
nized  that  Spain's  forced  gift  was  now,  in  the  circumstances,  in  the 
nature  of  the  proverbial  white  elephant,  and  he  preferred  that  the 
country  should  be  in  the  hands  of  a  friend  rather  than  almost  cer 
tainly  fall  to  the  foe  with  whom  he  was  again  about  to  go  to  war. 

1  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  Madison,  May  13,  1803,  State  Papers,  II,  559. 


'  * 


CHAPTER  IV 

CESSION   OF  LOUISIANA  AND   QUESTION   OF  THE   FLORIDAS 

BUT  it  remained  to  deal  with  Spain.  The  territory  was  ceded 
to  the  United  States  in  the  terms  of  the  Spanish  cession  to  France, 
which  were  quoted  in  the  first  article  of  the  new  treaty,  viz. :  "  With 
the  same  extent  that  is  now  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and  that  it  had 
when  France  possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  should  be  after  the  treaties 
subsequently  entered  into  between  Spain  and  other  states;"  an 
ambiguity  which  the  American  ministers  vainly  attempted  to  have 
removed,  and  which  again  brought  Spain  and  the  United  States 
to  the  verge  of  war. 

The  treaty  arrived  in  Washington  July  14,  1803.  On  September 
4,  the  Marquis  de  Casa  Yrujo  addressed  a  note  to  the  secretary 
of  state  informing  him  that  the  knowledge  of  the  treaty  had  come 
to  the  King  of  Spain  through  his  ambassador  in  Paris,  and  calling 
attention  to  the  solemn  engagement  entered  into  by  Napoleon 
never  to  alienate  the  territory.1  Yrujo  wrote  again,  September 
27,  reiterating  the  statement  of  his  previous  note  that  France  had 
no  power  to  make  such  transfer,  and  calling  attention  to  the  fact 
that  France  had  not  even  fulfilled  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  by 
which  it  was  transferred  to  herself  by  Spain. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  as  between  France  and  Spain,  all 

of  the  rights  of  the  question  were  with  the  latter.     She  had  been 

bullied  into  the  transfer  in  the  first  instance;  there  had  never  been 

a  delivery  of  the  promised  equivalent,  and  there  was  the  solemn 

engagement  of  France  not  to  sell  or  alienate  the  territory.     But 

this,  as  a  diplomatic  question,  did  not  affect  the  United  States, 

though  the  latter  was  unquestionably  somewhat  in  the  attitude  of 

a  receiver  of  stolen  goods.     Napoleon's  promise  was  no  part  of 

1  State  Papers,  II,  569. 

61 


62  SPAIN  OBJECTS  TO  TRANSFER  [1803 

the  treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso  and  had  not  been  known  to  the  United 
States;  nor  was  the  latter  in  any  wise  concerned  with  the  arrange 
ment  regarding  Etruria.  The  recriminations  of  Spain  could  apply 
to  France  alone. 

Mr.  Madison  in  answering  Yrujo's  note,  October  4,  1803,  with, 
it  must  be  acknowledged,  somewhat  of  casuistry,  said:  "The 
repugnance  manifested  in  these  communications  on  the  part  of 
his  Catholic  Majesty  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  lately  made  by 
the  French  Republic  to  the  United  States,  was  as  little  expected 
as  the  objections  to  the  transaction  can  avail  against  the  solidity."  l 
He  referred  to  the  communication  of  Mr.  Cevallos  to  the  American 
plenipotentiary  at  Madrid  in  a  note  of  the  4th  of  May,  1803 :  "  By 
the  retrocession  made  to  France  of  Louisiana  this  power  has  re 
covered  the  said  province  with  the  limits  which  it  had  and  saving 
the  rights  acquired  by  other  powers.  The  United  States  can  ad 
dress  themselves  to  the  French  government  to  negotiate  the  ac 
quisition  of  territory  which  may  suit  their  interests."2  The  ad 
ministration  regarded  this  as  an  explicit  and  positive  recognition 
(which  it  was)  of  the  right  of  the  United  States  and  France  to 
enter  into  the  transaction  which  had  taken  place.  M.  Pichon,  the 
French  minister,  of  course  supported  Jefferson;  he  cited  the  facts 
that  the  promise  was  made  fifteen  months  after  the  signature  of  the 
treaty  and  that,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  Great  Britain  at  the 
peace  of  Amiens,  March  27,  1802,  to  acknowledge  the  King  of 
Etruria,  the  Court  of  Madrid  had  ordered  the  transfer  of  Louisiana 
to  France  in  the  following  October.3  The  objections  were  regarded, 
however,  as  so  serious  that  it  was  feared  delivery  would  be  re 
fused  and  steps  were  taken  to  use  forces  if  necessary,  consisting  "of 
the  regular  troops  near  at  hand,  as  many  of  the  militia  as  may  be 
requisite  and  can  be  drawn  from  the  Mississippi  territory,  and  as 
many  volunteers  from  any  quarter  as  can  be  picked  up.  To  them 
will  be  added  five  hundred  mounted  militia  from  Tennessee,  who 
it  is  expected  will  proceed  to  Natchez."  4  Jefferson  had  thought 
in  case  the  Spanish  authorities  should  resist  the  transfer  "to  take 
by  surprise  New  Madrid,  St.  Genevieve,  St.  Louis,  and  all  the  other 
small  posts,  and  that  all  this  should  be  made  as  much  as  possible 

1  State  Papers,  II,  569.  2  Ibid.,  II,  570.  3  Ibid.t  II,  572. 

4  Madison  to  Livingston,  November  9,  1803,  Ibid.,  II,  572. 


1803]  FRANCE  MAKES  TRANSFER  63 

the  act  of  France,  by  including  Laussat,  with  the  aid  of  Clark, 
to  raise  an  insurrectionary  force  of  the  inhabitants,  to  which  ours 
might  be  only  auxiliary."  A 

But  such  forcible  action  was  unnecessary.  Spain  was  power 
less.  Napoleon  treated  her  as  an  appanage  of  France,  and  his 
promise  to  Charles  IV  as  a  promise  made  to  himself  and  to  be 
broken  at  will.  Spain  thus  interposed  no  real  obstacle,  but  it 
was  not  until  February  10,  1804,  after  a  note  of  "  sharp  remon 
strance"  from  France,2  that  the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  stated  that  he  had  orders  to  declare  to  the  American  gov 
ernment  "that  his  majesty  has  thought  fit  to  renounce  his  op 
position  to  the  alienation  of  Louisiana  made  by  France,  notwith 
standing  the  solid  reasons  on  which  it  was  founded ;  thereby  giving 
a  new  proof  of  his  good  feeling  and  friendship  toward  the  United 
States."3 

Though  the  Spanish  decree  ordering  the  delivery  of  the  colony 
to  France  was  dated  October  15,  1802,  the  charge*  d'affaires  of 
France  at  Washington  had  orders  to  combine  the  proceedings  of 
the  two  cessions,  that  from  Spain  to  France  and  that  from  France 
to  the  United  States,  without  leaving  such  an  interval  as  would 
justify  an  expedition  on  the  part  of  the  English.4  It  was  thus  not 
until  the  30th  of  November,  1803,  that  M.  Laussat,  the  commission 
er  of  the  French  government,  took  over  the  government  which  he 
administered  a  short  three  weeks  only,  or  until  December  20,  when 
he  in  turn  ceded  his  authority  to  the  United  States  commissioners, 
one  of  whom  was  Governor  Claiborne  of  Mississippi  Territory, 
the  other  the  unspeakable  Wilkinson.  It  certainly  was  one  of 
the  most  curious  of  the  turns  of  fortune  that  should  have  caused 
this  archtraitor  to  play  such  a  part.  He  had  conspired,  and  was 
still  to  conspire,  to  separate  the  West  from  the  East,  and  deliver- 
it  into  the  hands  of  Spain;  he  was  in  Spain's  pay  as  her  secret 
agent,  and  was  now  to  sign  his  name  to  the  letter  addressed  by 
the  two  commissioners  on  this  notable  day  to  the  secretary  of 
state,  saying:  "We  have  the  satisfaction  to  announce  to  you  that 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  October  29,  1803,  Writings,  VIII,  274. 
'Talleyrand  to  Spanish  minister  in  Paris,  January  3,  1804,  Archives  des 
Aff.,  Etr,  MSS.,  Adams,  II,  277. 

8  Don  Pedro  Cevallos  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  State  Papers,  II,  583. 
4Barb6  Marbois,  History  of  Louisiana,  321. 


64  QUESTION  OF  WEST  FLORIDA  [1803 

the  province  of  Louisiana  was  this  day  surrendered  to  the  United 
States  by  the  commissioner  of  France,  and  to  add  that  the  flag  of 
our  country  was  raised  in  this  city  midst  the  acclamations  of  the 
inhabitants."  1  History  presents  few  stranger  incidents  and  provi 
dence,  in  its  treatment  of  individuals,  as  judged  from  mortal  stand 
point,  has  seldom  seemed  more  at  fault. 

No  mention  at  the  time  was  made  of  West  Florida,  but  it  was 
one  which  almost  immediately  became  a  burning  dispute.  Cer 
tain  facts  are  clear:  that  French  claims  previous  to  1763  extended 
to  the  Perdido  River,  which  was  fixed  as  a  boundary  between 
French  and  Spanish  possessions  in  1719;  that  France  ceded  all 
her  possessions  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  island  of  New  Orleans 
to  Great  Britain;  that  Spain  ceded  Florida  to  Great  Britain  in 
exchange  for  Havana,  which  the  latter  had  captured  in  1762;  that 
Great  Britain  had  organized  the  region  bordering  on  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  east  of  the  Iberville  River  and  of  Lake  Ponchartrain,  into 
two  governments,  East  and  West  Florida;  that  Spain  owned 
again  nothing  east  of  this  dividing  line  until  1783  when  Great 
Britain  in  the  general  peace  ceded  to  her  both  the  Floridas. 

The  first  phrase  of  the  San  Ildefonso  treaty  describes  the  ceded 
territory  as  "  the  colony  or  province  of  Louisiana  with  the  same  ex 
tent  that  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain."  This  much  in  any  case 
is  perfectly  definite  and  by  no  twist  of  meaning  could  cover  West 
Florida.  The  second  descriptive  phrase  of  its  extent,  "  that  it  had 
when  France  possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  ought  to  be  according  to  the 
treaties  subsequently  passed  between  Spain  and  other  states,*  would 
seem  as  clear.  The  words  "when  France  possessed  it,*  modified 
as  they  were  by  the  succeeding  words,  could  only  apply  to  the  other 
boundaries  of  this  vast  area,  and  not  to  the  boundaries  "subsequently 
passed  between  Spain  and  other  states,"  viz.,  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  That  Livingston  himself  earlier  held  the  view 
that  West  Florida  was  not  included  in  the  cession  to  France  is  most 
clear.  He  writes,  July  30,  1802,  that  he  had  received  verbally 
from  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris  "...  his  explicit  assur 
ance  that  the  Floridas  are  not  included  in  the  cession;  and  I  have 
been  applied  to,  by  one  of  the  ministers  here,  to  know  what  we 
understand,  in  America,  by  Louisiana.  You  can  easily  conceive 
1  State  Papers,  II,  581. 


1803]  QUESTION  OF  EAST  BOUNDARY  65 

my  answer.  Since  the  possession  of  the  Floridas  by  Britain  and 
the  treaty  of  1763,  I  think  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  precise 
meaning  of  the  terms.  In  the  meantime  all  that  can  be  done  here 
will  be  to  endeavor  to  obtain  a  cession  of  New  Orleans  either  by 
purchase  or  by  offering  to  make  it  a  port  of  entry  to  France  on 
such  terms  as  shall  promise  advantages  to  her  commerce.  ...  If 
to  this  we  could  add  a  stipulation  that  she  shall  never  possess  the 
Floridas,  but  on  the  contrary,  in  case  of  a  rupture  with  Spain 
and  a  conquest  of  them,  cede  them  to  us,  our  affairs  in  that  quarter 
would  stand  as  well  as  I  would  wish;  and  the  colonies  that  France 
might  attempt  to  establish  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi 
would  be  too  feeble  to  injure  us.  I  find  them  very  anxious  to  have 
the  ports  of  Pensacola  and  St.  Augustine,  as  they  dread  our  having 
command  of  the  Gulf.  I  confess  this  appears  to  me  no  very  im 
portant  object,  and  if  they  would  be  content  with  these,  and  give 
us  West  Florida  and  New  Orleans,  even  at  a  large  price,  we  should 
not  hesitate.  ...  "  l 

September  1,  1802,  he  writes  to  the  secretary  of  state:  "I  have 
every  reason  to  believe  the  Floridas  are  not  included.  They  will 
for  the  present  at  least  remain  in  the  hands  of  Spain." :  Even  so 
late  as  May  12,  1803,  Livingston  writes:  "I  am  satisfied  ...  if 
they  could  have  concluded  with  Spain  we  should  also  have  had 
West  Florida."  Eight  days  later  he  completely  changed  his  atti 
tude,  if  not  his  mind,  moved  by  a  conversation  with  Marbois  which 
conveyed  the  idea  that  Mobile  was  a  part  of  the  cession,  uncon 
scious  that  Napoleon  himself  was  the  instigator  of  the  attitude  of  his 
ministers  in  the  remark  to  Marbois  who  went  to  him  bearing  the 
request  of  the  American  commissioners  to  define  the  boundary:  "If 
an  obscurity  did  not  already  exist,  it  would  perhaps  be  good 
policy  to  put  one  there."  3  Calling  upon  Talleyrand,  the  minister 
for  foreign  affairs,  he  writes  the  result:  "I  asked  the  minister  what 
were  the  east  bounds  of  the  territory  ceded  to  us.  He  said  he  did 
not  know;  we  must  take  it  as  they  received  it.  I  asked  him  how 
Spain  meant  to  give  them  possession.  He  said  according  to  the 
words  of  the  treaty.  But  what  did  you  mean  to  take  ?  I  do  not 
know.  Then  you  mean  that  we  shall  construe  it  our  own  way  ?  I 

1  Livingston  to  Madison,  State  Papers,  II,  519. 

'State  Papers,  II,  525.  3 Marbois,  Louisiana,  283. 


66  WEST  FLORIDA  CLAIMED  [1803 

can  give  you  no  direction;  you  have  made  a  noble  bargain  for 
yourselves,  and  I  suppose  you  will  make  the  most  of  it." 

This,  Livingston  advised  Madison  to  proceed  to  do.  "Now, 
sir,  the  sum  of  this  business  is  to  recommend  to  you,  in  the  strong 
est  terms,  after  having  obtained  the  possession  that  the  French 
commissary  will  give  you,  to  insist  upon  this  as  part  of  your  right; 
and  to  take  possession,  at  all  events,  to  the  river  Perdido.  I  pledge 
myself  that  your  right  is  good.  ...  It  may  also  be  important  to 
anticipate  any  designs  that  Britain  may  have  upon  that  country. 
Should  she  possess  herself  of  it,  and  the  war  terminate  favorably 
for  her,  she  will  not  readily  relinquish  it.  With  this  in  your 
hand,  East  Florida  will  be  of  little  moment,  and  may  be  yours 
whenever  you  please.  At  all  events  proclaim  your  right  and  take 
possession."  * 

This  was  followed,  June  7,  by  a  letter  signed  by  both  Livingston 
and  Monroe  forwarding  the  ratification  by  the  First  Consul  of 
the  treaty  and  conventions  of  April  30,  1803,  saying:  "We  are 
happy  to  have  it  in  our  power  to  assure  you  that  on  a  thorough 
examination  of  the  subject  we  consider  it  incontrovertible  that 
West  Florida  is  comprised  in  the  cession  of  Louisiana.  West 
Florida  was  a  part  of  Louisiana  when  it  was  in  the  hands  of  France, 
and  it  was  not  in  her  hands  in  any  other  situation.*  The  transfer 
of  the  whole  was  on  the  same  day,  the  3d  of  November,  1762, 
that  being  the  day  of  the  secret  convention  between  France  and 
Great  Britain.  The  treaty  of  1783  between  Britain  and  Spain,  by 
which  the  Floridas  were  ceded  to  the  latter,  put  Louisiana  in  her 
hands  in  the  same  state  it  was  in  the  hands  of  France;  and  the 
remaining  or  third  member  of  the  article  in  the  treaty  of  St.  Ilde- 
fonso  between  France  and  Spain,  under  which  we  claim,  by  refer 
ring  to  that  of  1783  (as  to  that  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States  of  1795)  and  of  course  in  the  above  character,  only  tends 
to  confirm  this  doctrine.  We  consider  ourselves  so  strongly 
founded  in  this  conclusion  that  we  are  of  opinion  the  United  States 
should  act  on  it  in  all  the  measures  relative  to  Louisiana,  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  West  Florida  was  comprised  within  the 
island  of  New  Orleans,  or  lay  to  the  west  of  the  river  Iberville, 
and  to  the  lakes  through  which  its  waters  pass  to  the  ocean. 

1  Livingston  to  Monroe  and  Madison,  May  20,  1803,  State  Papers,  II,  560. 


1803]  WEST  FLORIDA  CLAIMED  67 

Hence  the  acquisition  becomes  of  proportionally  greater  value  to 
the  United  States."  l 

This  was  enough  for  Jefferson  and  Madison,  although  the  latter, 
in  a  despatch  to  Pinckney  at  Madrid,  July  29,  1803,  had  stated  his  J 
understanding  that  the  Floridas  were  not  ceded,  and  directing 
Pinckney  to  await  Monroe's  arrival  before  beginning  negotiations 
looking  to  a  purchase.2  Jefferson  particularly,  at  the  moment, 
had  an  elevated  faith  in  Monroe's  judgment  and  abilities  for  which 
we  of  later  generations  do  not  seem  to  find  altogether  adequate 
justification,  and  which  Jefferson  himself  was  later  to  come  to 
doubt,  and  Madison  was  instructed  by  Jefferson  to  claim  as  the 
two  plenipotentiaries  advised,  though  in  his  letter  to  Livingston, 
January  31,  1804,  he  says:  "It  does  not  appear  that  in  the  delivery 
of  the  province  by  the  Spanish  authorities  to  M.  Laussat,  anything 
passed  denoting  its  limits  either  to  the  east,  the  west,  or  the  north; 
nor  was  any  step  taken  by  M.  Laussat,  either  while  the  province 
was  in  his  hands  or  at  the  time  of  his  transferring  it  to  ours,  calcu 
lated  to  dispossess  Spain  of  any  part  of  the  territory  east  of  the 
Mississippi.  On  the  contrary,  in  a  private  conference  he  stated 
positively  that  no  part  of  the  Floridas  was  comprised  in  the  eastern 
boundary — France  having  strenuously  insisted  to  have  it  extended 
to  the  Mobile,  which  was  peremptorily  refused  by  Spain.  We 
learn  from  Mr.  Pinckney  that  the  Spanish  government  holds  the 
same  language  to  him.  To  the  declaration  of  M.  Laussat,  how 
ever,  we  can  oppose  that  of  the  French  minister,  made  to  you, 
that  Louisiana  extended  to  the  river  Perdido;  and  to  the  Spanish 
government,  as  well  as  to  that  of  France,  we  can  oppose  the  treaty 
of  St.  Ildefonso,  and  [that]  of  September  30,  1803,  interpreted  by 
facts  and  fair  inferences.  ...  As  the  question  relates  to  the  French 
government,  the  President  relies  on  your  prudence  and  attention 
for  availing  yourself  of  the  admission  by  M.  Marbois  that  Loui 
siana  extended  to  the  river  Perdido,  and  for  keeping  the  weight  of 
that  government  in  our  scale  against  that  of  Spain.  With  respect 
to  the  western  extent  of  Louisiana,  M.  Laussat  held  language  more 
satisfactory.  He  considered  the  Rio  Bravo  or  del  Norte,8  as  far  as 
the  30th  degree  of  north  latitude,  as  its  true  boundary  on  that  side."4 

1  State  Papers,  II,  564.  'Ibid.,  II,  614. 

•The  Rio  Grande.  4 State  Papers,  II,  574. 


68  AMERICAN  CLAIM  UNJUST  [1803 

In  the  question  of  the  ownership  of  West  Florida,  it  is  impossible 
not  to  think  the  United  States  greatly  in  the  wrong,  and  that  our 
action  redounds  to  the  credit  of  no  one  of  the  American  adminis 
tration  connected  with  it.  Madison's  despatch,  just  cited,  which 
was  equally,  of  course,  Jefferson's,  was  a  piece  of  pettifoggery  un 
worthy  of  high-minded  statesmen.  The  President,  the  secretary 
of  state,  and  the  negotiators  were  equally  in  the  wrong  and  wrong 
in  the  face  of  seemingly  patent  facts.  Livingston  "was  forced 
at  last  to  maintain  that  Spain  had  retroceded  West  Florida  to 
France  without  knowing  it,  that  France  had  sold  it  to  the  United 
States  without  suspecting  it,  that  the  United  States  had  bought  it 
without  paying  for  it,  and  that  neither  France  nor  Spain,  although 
the  original  contracting  parties,  were  competent  to  decide  the 
meaning  of  their  own  contract."1  Not  only  was  the  American 
administration  wrong  in  making  and  pressing  the  demand,  but  it 
was  to  do  so  in  vain.  It  was  to  cover  its  diplomacy  with  humilia 
tion,  bring  the  country  to  the  verge  of  war  with  France  and  Spain, 
and  lose  Texas;  the  whole  through  an  unworthy  demand  which 
seemed  to  become  an  obsession.  It  was  moved  by  the  fact  that 
they  had  met  the  wishes  of  the  Southwest  but  half  way;  the  great 
empire  so  unexpectedly  thrust  upon  us  was  not  felt  to  be  an  offset 
to  the  failure  to  acquire  the  control  of  all  the  rivers  of  the  United 
States  entering  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  Livingston-Monroe 
despatch  of  June  7  was  eagerly  taken  as  a  basis  for  an  immoral 
and  unjust  claim.  It  can  have  but  OTIC  defence;  a  false  view  of 
its  necessity. 

How  truly  aright  is  such  judgment  as  applied  to  the  conduct  of 
the  American  government,  is  shown  not  only  by  Livingston's 
earlier  statements  but  by  the  instructions  which  were  issued  by 
Decres,  the  minister  of  marine  and  of  the  colonies,  to  Victor  and 
Laussat,  November  26,  1802.  The  former  was  to  command  the 
expeditionary  army,  which  was  never  to  reach  Louisiana;  the 
latter  was  to  be  the  prefect  whose  only  duty,  as  determined  by  the 
fates,  was  to  deliver  Louisiana  to  the  United  States.  These  in 
structions  bounded  Louisiana  "on  the  west  by  the  Rio  Bravo, 
[Rio  Grande]  from  its  mouth  to  about  the  30°  parallel;  the  line  of 
demarcation  stops  after  reaching  this  point  and  there  seems  never 
1  Adams,  United  States,  II,  246,  247. 


1803]  EAST  AND  WEST  BOUNDARIES  69 

to  have  been  any  agreement  in  regard  to  this  part  of  the  frontier. 
The  farther  we  go  northward,  the  more  undecided  is  the  boun 
dary.  .  .  .  There  also  exists  none  between  Louisiana  and  Canada." 
Decres  quoted  the  treaty  of  1763,  when  Florida  became  a  British 
possession,  fixing  "  its  terms  as  still  binding  upon  all  the  interested 
parties."  "'It  is  agreed' "  said  the  seventh  article  of  this  treaty, 
"'that  in  the  future  the  boundaries  between  the  states  of  his 
Most  Christian  Majesty  and  those  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  shall 
be  irrevocably  fixed  by  a  line  drawn  down  the  middle  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  River  from  its  source  to  the  river  Iberville,  and  from  there 
by  a  line  down  the  middle  of  that  river  and  of  the  lakes  Maurepas 
and  Pontchartrain  to  the  sea.  New  Orleans  and  the  island  on 
which  it  stands  shall  belong  to  France.'  Such  is  still  to-day  the 
eastern  limit  of  Louisiana.  All  to  the  east  and  north  of  this  limit 
makes  part  of  the  United  States  or  West  Florida."  l 

"Nothing  could  be  clearer.  Louisiana  stretched  from  the 
Iberville  to  the  Rio  Bravo;  West  Florida  from  the  Iberville  to  the 
Appalachicola.  The  retrocession  of  Louisiana  by  Spain  to  France 
could  restore  only  what  France  had  ceded  to  Spain  in  1762.  West 
Florida  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  cession  [to  Spain]  of  1762,  or 
of  the  retrocession  [to  France]  of  1800,  and  being  Spanish  by  a 
wholly  different  title  could  not  even  be  brought  in  question  by 
the  First  Consul,  much  as  he  wanted  Baton  Rouge,  Mobile  and 
Pensacola."  2 

The  eagerness  to  press  the  claim,  thus  caused  the  administra 
tion  to  put  aside  the  much  greater  claim  westward,  the  already 
acknowledged  right  to  the  territory  later  to  become  Texas.  This, 
by  the  understanding  between  France  and  Spain,  and  by  the  terms 
of  the  transfer  from  France  to  the  United  States,  was  unquestion 
able.  The  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  a  few  intervening  posts 
between  that  region  and  New  Orleans  had  but  to  be  occupied  and 
Texas  would  have  become  an  appanage  to  the  United  States  in 
1803  instead  of  a  state  of  the  Union  forty-five  years  later  at  the 
expense  of  an  unfair  and  despoiling  war. 

1  Instructions  secretes,  November  26,  1802,  Archives  de  la  Marine,  MSS., 
Adams,  II,  6,  7. 

2  Adams,  II,  7.     See  Senor  Don  Pedro  Cevallos  to  Monroe  and  Pinckney, 
February  24,  1805,  State  Papers,  II,  644. 


70  THE  MOBILE  ACT  [1804 

Jefferson  throughout  was  dominated  by  the  Western  feeling  that 
every  river  of  the  United  States  passing  through  Spanish  territory 
must  be  in  American  hands  throughout  its  length.  Expansion 
westward  seemed  so  vague  and  still  so  distant  that  it  did  not  seem 
to  him  to  come  within  the  domain  of  practical  politics.  The  re 
sult  was  the  introduction,  November  30,  1803,  by  John  Randolph, 
now  the  spokesman,  but  soon  to  become  the  bitter  enemy  of  the 
administration,  of  a  bill  giving  effect  to  the  revenue  laws  of  the 
United  States  within  the  ceded  territory,  which  passed  and,  Feb 
ruary  24,  1804,  received  the  President's  signature.  The  fourth 
section  directed  that  the  territories  ceded  to  the  United  States  by 
the  treaty,  "  and  also  all  the  navigable  waters,  rivers,  creeks,  bays 
and  inlets  lying  within  the  United  States  which  empty  into  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  east  of  the  River  Mississippi,  shall  be  annexed  to 
the  Mississippi  district  and  shall  together  with  the  same  constitute 
one  district  and  be  called  the  District  of  Mississippi."  The 
eleventh  section  authorized  the  President,  "whenever  he  shall 
deem  it  expedient,  to  erect  the  shores,  waters,  and  inlets  of  the  bay 
and  river  of  Mobile,  and  of  the  other  rivers,  creeks,  inlets,  and  bays 
emptying  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  east  of  the  said  river  Mobile, 
and  west  thereof  to  the  Pascagoula  inclusive,  into  a  separate  dis 
trict  and  to  establish  such  places  within  the  same  as  he  shall  deem 
expedient  to  be  the  port  of  entry  and  delivery  for  such  district." 

This,  so  far  as  words  had  meaning,  was  a  frank  declaration  that 
the  United  States  had  determined  to  take  over  the  territory  the 
cession  of  which  was  so  strenuously  denied,  and  denied  justly, 
by  both  France  and  Spain.  The  intent  of  the  bill  was,  moreover, 
accentuated  by  the  fact  that  its  introducer  had  declared  officially 
in  October,  1803,  that  Mobile  belonged  to  the  United  States.  An 
elaborate  brief  sent  Livingston  by  Madison  two  days  after  the 
adjournment  of  Congress  supported  the  claim  in  the  fullest  degree.1 
The  situation  logically  meant  war. 

It  was  impossible  that  such  action  should  pass  unnoticed  by 
Spain,  and  the  Spanish  minister,  a  few  days  after  the  publication  of 
the  act,  called  at  the  Department  of  State,  "with  the  gazette  in  his 
hand  and  entered  upon  a  very  angry  comment  on  the  eleventh 
section  which  was  answered  by  remarks  .  .  .  calculated  to  as- 
1  Madison  to  Livingston,  March  31,  1804,  State  Papers,  II,  575. 


1804]  PRESIDENT  EVADES  THE  LAW  71 

suage  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  law,  as  far  as  was  consistent 
with  a  candid  declaration  to  him  that  we  considered  all  of  West 
Florida  westward  of  the  Perdido,  as  clearly  ours  by  the  treaty  of 
April  30,  1803,  and  that  of  St.  Ildefonso."  i 

Yrujo  naturally  was  not  to  be  satisfied  with  such  an  explanation, 
and  followed  it  by  notes  of,  in  Madison's  words,  "a  rudeness 
which  no  government  can  tolerate,"  2  but  which  in  reality  the 
gross  indignity  to  Spain  of  the  passage  of  such  an  act  justified.  It 
was  the  end  of  good-will  between  the  Spanish  minister  and  the 
American  secretary  of  state;  turned  Yrujo,  himself  half  American 
by  long  residence  and  marriage,  into  an  enemy  of  the  American 
government;  made  him  an  intriguer  with  the  press,  and  ended 
his  career  in  America  with  a  bitterness  of  feeling  between  the 
administration  and  himself  such  as  has  rarely  existed  toward  a 
diplomatic  official.  He  was  to  defy  every  effort  toward  removal, 
and  remained  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  department  of  state,  until  on 
his  own  request  he  was,  in  1807,  transferred  to  Milan  as  minister 
near  the  court  of  Eugene  Beauharnais.  The  injustice  involved  in 
the  Mobile  act  was  finally  too  much  even  for  the  administration, 
and  on  May  30,  1804,  a  proclamation  was  issued  which,  after  re 
citing  the  terms  of  the  act,  overrode  the  law,  and  by  an  executive 
usurpation  of  authority  declared  the  "  shores,  waters,  inlets,  creeks, 
and  rivers  lying  within  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States,  a  collec 
tion  district,  with  Fort  Stoddert  as  a  port  of  entry."3 

The  Mobile  act  had  further  the  effect  of  setting  aside  the  Spanish 
ratification  of  the  "  Spanish  claims  convention  "  of  August  4,  1802, 
covering  the  question  of  damages  to  American  shipping  during  the 
quasi  war  with  France  in  which  Spain,  then  an  ally  of  France,  had 
agreed  to  consider  the  claims  for  captures  made  by  Spanish  cruisers 
while  reserving  for  later  action  those  made  by  the  French  and 
brought  into  Spanish  ports.  Very  improperly,  and  for  wholly  in 
sufficient  reasons,  action  upon  this  had  been  delayed  in  the  Ameri 
can  Senate  until  January  4, 1804.  The  time  for  ratification  having 
long  since  expired,  it  was  necessary  to  ask  a  renewal  of  ratification 
by  Spain.  This  request  was  naturally  met  by  a  refusal,  unless  the 
Mobile  act  should  be  revoked,  and  in  addition  the  abandonment  of 
the  reserved  claim  for  the  French  spoliations  was  now  demanded. 

1  State  Papers,  II,  576.  ' Ibid.,  II,  576.  3  Ibid.,  II,  583 


72  SPAIN'S  CASE  [1804 

French  influence  had  begun  to  be  felt  in  the  latter  demand.  It 
could  be  easily  foreseen  that  Napoleon  would  now  allow  no  Span 
ish  money  to  go  into  other  coffers  than  his  own,  and,  besides, 
Spain  had  begun  to  see  that  it  was  possible,  even  as  a  matter  of 
legal  right,  that  she  should  be  absolved  from  such  an  obligation. 
Yrujo  had  obtained  an  opinion  from  five  eminent  American 
lawyers  upon  an  hypothetical  case  which  he  stated  as  follows: 
"The  Power  A  lives  in  perfect  harmony  and  friendship  with  Power 
B.  The  Power  C,  with  reason  or  without,  commits  hostilities 
against  the  subjects  of  Power  B,  takes  some  of  their  vessels,  carries 
them  into  the  ports  of  A,  friend  of  both,  where  they  are  con 
demned  and  sold  by  the  official  agents  of  Power  C  without  Power 
A  being  able  to  prevent  it.  At  last  a  treaty  is  entered  into  by  which 
the  Powers  B  and  C  adjust  their  differences,  and  in  this  treaty  the 
Power  B  renounces  and  abandons  to  Power  C  the  right  to  any  claim 
for  the  injuries  and  losses  occasioned  to  its  subjects  by  the  hos 
tilities  from  Power  C.  Query:  Has  the  Power  B  any  right  to 
call  upon  the  Power  A  for  indemnification  for  the  losses  occasioned 
in  its  ports  and  coasts  under  the  conditions  mentioned?"  The 
treaty  thus  cited  was  the  convention  of  1800  with  France,  the 
erasure  of  the  second  article  of  which  released  France  from  in 
demnity  for  American  claims  of  that  date. 

An  opinion  was  given,  November  15,  1802,  by  Jared  Ingersoll, 
William  Rawle,  J.  B.  McKean,  and  P.  S.  Duponceau;  ten  days 
earlier  one  had  been  sent  by  Edward  Livingston,  of  New  York, 
which  may  be  taken  as  a  short  resume*  of  the  later  and  more  elabor 
ate  paper.  Livingston  said,  "According  to  the  above  statement, 
I  have  no  doubt  that  B,  having  abandoned  his  rights  to  indemnity 
against  C,  would  have  no  claim  whatever  against  A,  more  especially 
as  the  case  supposes  it  out  of  the  power  of  A  to  have  prevented 
the  transaction."1 

Spain  had  a  strong  case,  made  stronger  also  by  the  ninth  article 
of  the  treaty  of  cession  of  Louisiana  which  released  France  in 
full  of  all  indemnities,  the  payment  of  these  being  taken  over  by 
the  United  States  government.  Notwithstanding  the  attitude  of 
Spain  thus  bolstered  both  by  American  legal  opinion  and  by  the 
interested  friendship  of  France  which  was  now  becoming  ap- 
1  For  these  and  the  Spanish  argument,  see  State  Papers,  II,  604,  605. 


1804]  AMERICAN  TERMS  OF  SETTLEMENT  73 

parent,  Madison  issued  instructions  on  April  15,  1804,  to  Monroe 
to  proceed  to  Madrid  and,  acting  jointly  with  Pinckney,  to  press 
these  claims  as  well  as  the  claim  to  West  Florida.  "The  objects 
to  be  pursued"  he  said,  "are  1st,  an  acknowledgment  by  Spain 
that  Louisiana,  as  ceded  to  the  United  States,  extends  to  the  river 
Perdido;  2d,  a  cession  of  all  her  remaining  territory  eastward  of 
that  river,  including  East  Florida;  3d,  a  provision  for  arbitrating 
and  paying  all  the  claims  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  not  pro 
vided  for  by  the  late  convention,  consisting  of  those  for  wrongs 
done  prior  to  the  last  peace,  by  other  than  Spanish  subjects  within 
Spanish  responsibility;  for  wrongs  done  in  the  Spanish  colonies  by 
Spanish  subjects  or  officers,  and  for  wrongs  of  every  kind  for  which 
Spain  is  justly  responsible,  committed  since  the  last  peace." 
This  was  followed  by  the  first  hint  of  withdrawal  from  any  claim 
to  extend  to  the  Rio  Grande.  Madison  continued,  "On  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  it  may  be  stipulated  that  the  territory  on  the 
western  side  of  the  Mississippi  shall  not  be  settled  for  a  given  term 
of  years,  beyond  a  limit  not  very  distant  from  that  river,  leaving  a 
spacious  interval  between  our  settlements  and  those  of  Spain,  and 
that  a  sum  in  no  event  to  exceed  two  million  dollars  shall  be  paid 
by  the  United  States  to  be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  awards  to 
their  citizens.  It  may  also  be  stipulated,  or  rather  may  be  under 
stood,  that  no  charge  shall  be  brought  by  the  United  States  against 
Spain  for  losses  sustained  from  the  interruption  of  the  deposit 
at  New  Orleans."  The  interval  of  non-settlement  was  suggested 
as  that  between  the  Sabine  and  Colorado  Rivers.  "No  final  ces 
sion"  was  "to  be  made  to  Spain  of  any  part  of  the  territory  on  this 
side  of  the  Rio  Bravo,  but  in  the  event  of  a  cession  to  the  United 
States  of  the  territory  east  of  the  Perdido;  and  in  that  event,  in 
case  of  absolute  necessity  only."  l 

During  these  months  Pinckney  had  been  pressing  Spain,  "in 
that  positive  and  decided  manner  which  the  circumstances  of 
Europe  and  the  particular  situation  of  Spain  seemed  ...  to  war 
rant,"  2  and  which  bade  fair  to  disturb  President  Jefferson's 
dream  of  unbroken  peace.  In  regard  to  the  spoliations  he  justly 
said:  "There  has  been  such  a  treatment  to  the  vessels,  cargoes, 

1  State  Papers,  II,  627. 

'  Pinckney  to  Madison,  August  2,  1803,  Ibid.,  II,  597. 


74  PINCKNEY  THREATENS  WAR  [1804 

and  in  many  instances  persons  of  our  citizens,  as  no  man  could 
believe  who  has  not  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  archives  of 
our  mission  to  this  court.  The  individual  sufferings  have  been 
incredible  and  the  property  lost  of  immense  value.  There  is 
scarcely  a  part  or  port  of  his  Catholic  Majesty's  dominions  in 
Europe  and  America,  that  has  not  been  the  scene  and  witness 
of  their  sufferings — sufferings  such  as  I  believe  no  people  ever 
endured  from  a  nation  to  whose  coasts  they  went  under  the  solemn 
protection  of  treaties,  the  laws  of  nations,  and  in  many  instances, 
express  royal  orders  or  permissions  from  the  king,"  1 

Previous  to  this  he  had  already  hinted  strongly  at  the 
probability  of  war,  and  when,  on  July  2,  1804,  Cevallos  declined 
a  ratification  of  the  convention  of  1802  unless  the  French  claims 
were  withdrawn  and  the  Mobile  act  revoked,2  Pinckney  wrote: 
"I  shall  proceed  without  delay  to  give  your  Excellency  that  decisive 
answer  to  yours  of  the  2d,  and  to  take  those  definite  measures 
which  my  instructions  and  duty  now  make  necessary";  but  be 
fore  doing  so  he  wished  to  know  specifically  if  his  Majesty  would 
not  ratify  the  convention  except  under  the  conditions  stated  by 
Cevallos.  If  so,  he  requested  the  return  of  the  ratification  and 
papers  sent  Cevallos  some  time  since  at  Aranjuez.  He  proceeded : 
"On  Tuesday,  I  send  a  courier  with  circular  letters  to  all  our  con 
suls  in  the  ports  of  Spain,  stating  to  them  the  critical  situation 
of  things  between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  the  probability 
of  a  speedy  and  serious  misunderstanding,  and  directing  them 
to  give  notice  thereof  to  all  our  citizens,  advising  them  so  to  ar 
range  and  prepare  their  affairs  as  to  be  able  to  move  off  within 
the  time  limited  by  the  treaty.  Should  things  end  as  I  now  expect, 
I  am  also  preparing  the  same  information  for  the  commander  of 
our  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean,  for  his  own  notice  and  gov 
ernment  and  that  of  all  the  American  merchant  vessels  he  may 
meet."  3 

Senor  Cevallos  replied  to  this  outburst  that  he  could  not  con 
ceive  how  Pinckney's  instructions  could  authorize  him  to  pro 
ceed  to  such  extremes.  He  referred  to  the  opinions  of  the  dis- 

1  Charles  Pinckney  to  Senor  Cevallos,  June  22,  1804,  State  Papers,  II,  618. 

3  State  Papers,  II,  619. 

3  Charles  Pinckney  to  Senor  Cevallos,  July  5,  1804,  State  Papers,  II,  620. 


1804]  ALARM  OF  CEVALLOS  75 

tinguished  jurists  of  the  United  States,  upholding  the  Spanish 
contention  regarding  depredations  by  French  ships;  showed  that 
Spain  was  merely  demanding  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  such 
clauses  of  the  Mobile  act  as  infringed  the  rights  of  the  Spanish 
crown,  and  stated  that  the  king  had  resolved  to  transfer  the 
negotiation  to  Washington.1  Pinckney's  reply  was  to  despatch  his 
circular  letter,  which  created  a  panic  among  American  traders  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  to  inform  Cevallos  that  so  soon  as  he  could 
arrange  his  affairs  he  would  ask  for  his  passports.2 

Pinckney,  in  conversation  with  Cevallos,  now  listened  to  some 
severe  remarks  and  some  rough  truths  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States:  that  the  Spanish  government  had  ten  times  more 
trouble  with  them  than  with  any  other  nation,  and  for  his  part  he 
did  not  wish  to  see  the  trade  with  the  United  States  extended. 
Spain  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  United  States  and  had  heard 
with  contempt  the  threats  of  senators  like  Ross  and  Gouverneur 
Morris.  The  Americans  had  no  right  to  expect  much  kindness 
from  the  king;  in  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  they  had  paid  no  at 
tention  to  his  repeated  remonstrances  against  the  injustice  and  nul 
lity  of  that  transaction,  whereas  if  they  had  felt  the  least  friendship 
they  would  have  done  so.  They  were  well  known  to  be  a  nation  of 
calculators  bent  on  making  money  and  nothing  else." 3 

Though  Cevallos  talked  so  severely  and  apparently  boldly,  he 
was  much  alarmed,  and  he  appealed  to  the  minister  of  France,  now 
Spain's  ally,  or,  to  speak  more  in  accord  with  facts,  her  master. 
"The  French  representative  wrote  to  Talleyrand  that  Pinckney 
had  terrified  the  secretary  beyond  reason,"  4  and  a  few  days  later 
reported  Senor  Cevallos  as  saying,  "If  the  emperor  would  but 
say  a  word  and  let  the  United  States  understand  that  he  is  not 
pleased  at  seeing  them  abuse  the  advantages  which  they  owe  to 
their  strength  and  to  the  nearness  of  their  resources  over  an  ally 
of  France,  this  would  reconcile  all  difficulties  and  save  his  Majesty 


1  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  July  8,  1805,  State  Papers,  II,  620. 
8  State  Papers,  II,  621. 

3  Charles  Pinckney  to  Madison,  July  20,  1804,  MSS.    State  Department, 
Adams,  II,  283. 

4  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  July  26, 1804,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MSS.,  Adams, 
II,  284. 


76  MONROE  ORDERED  TO  MADRID  [1804 

the  necessity  of  exacting  satisfaction  for  an  insult  which  is  as 
good  as  inflicted."  1 

On  the  arrival  in  the  United  States  of  the  correspondence  be 
tween  Pinckney  and  Cevallos,  giving  the  news  of  the  strained 
relations  thus  established,  Yrujo  sent  a  note  to  Madison  repeating 
the  objections  made  by  Cevallos,  which  was  answered  by  ex 
pressing  surprise  that  the  Mobile  act  should  have  given  rise  to 
complaint  and  declaring  that  the  President  had  a  right  to  expect 
that  such  an  act,  "depending  essentially  for  its  effect  in  the  par 
ticular  case  on  his  discretion,  would  have  been  left  to  the  regular 
exposition  and  execution,  before  it  should  become  the  object  of 
criticism  and  complaint  from  any  foreign  government,"2  ignoring 
the  fact  that  the  President,  who  controlled  the  diplomacy  of  the 
government,  was  also  part  of  the  law-making  power,  and  having 
affixed  his  signature  as  such  to  the  document,  the  law  was  in  part 
of  his  own  making  and  had  to  be  taken  by  Spain  according  to  the 
letter  and  not  as  later  amended  by  the  President's  own  authority. 
Madison  assured  the  Spanish  minister  that  the  operation  of  the 
act  should  only  be  within  the  acknowledged  limits  of  the  United 
States  and  "should  not  extend  beyond  them  until  it  should  be 
rendered  expedient  by  friendly  elucidation  and  adjustments  with 
the  Spanish  government."  Yrujo  was  informed  of  Monroe's 
mission  and  that  "in  the  meantime  the  President  concurs"  with 
the  Spanish  government  "in  the  expediency  of  leaving  things  pre 
cisely  in  statu  quo."  3 

Monroe  was  thus,  on  October  25,  1804,  ordered  to  Madrid 
"without  delay,"  with  directions  to  press  the  demands  in  his  in 
structions  of  April  25,  1804,  except  that  the  indemnities  for  the 
interruption  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans  might  be  tacitly  waived, 
and  if  Spain  refused  to  cede  the  territory  east  of  the  Perdido,  and 
should  require  as  indispensable  to  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
American  title  to  West  Florida  an  acknowledgment  by  the  United 
States  that  their  pretensions  should  not  go  west  of  the  Colorado, 
the  joint  negotiators,  after  reasonable  endeavors  to  effect  their  ob 
ject,  were  to  acquiesce.4 

1  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  August  6,  1804,  MSS.,  ibid.,  285. 
a  Yrujo  to  Madison,  October  13;    Madison's  reply,  October  15,  1804,  State 
Papers,  II,  624,  625.  3  Ibid.,  625. 

4  Madison  to  Monroe,  State  Papers,  II,  631. 


1804]  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE  77 

At  the  moment  that  Pinckney  was  threatening  Spain  with  war, 
and  the  American  government  giving  him  good  reasons,  in  the 
passage  of  the  Mobile  act,  to  suppose  that  it  wished  war,  a  powerful 
influence,  personified  in  Talleyrand,  was  exerted  to  defeat  the 
negotiations  which  Jefferson  had  so  much  at  heart.  Talleyrand 
had  become  bitterly  inimical  to  the  United  States,  first,  through 
the  exposure  of  his  venality  in  connection  with  the  commission  of 
1797  charged  with  the  settlement  of  the  difficulties  of  that  period 
between  France  and  the  Union; *  and,  secondly,  through  mortifi 
cation  on  account  of  the  miscarriage  of  his  work  in  the  reannexa- 
tion  of  Louisiana  to  France,  the  result  of  which  had  inured  wholly 
to  the  benefit  of  the  United  States.  The  recovery  of  Louisiana  by 
France  had  been  Talleyrand's  work,  begun  by  him  in  1797,  when 
minister  for  foreign  affairs  under  the  Directory,  necessarily 
dropped  in  1799  on  his  dismissal  from  office,  and  taken  up  again 
on  his  restoration  in  1800  by  Napoleon,  in  whom  Talleyrand  found 
a  chief  like-minded  with  himself.  He  had  failed  to  acquire  the 
Floridas,  which  had  been  included  in  his  designs,  but  he  had  suc 
ceeded  as  to  Louisiana,  only  to  see  it  pass  almost  immediately  to 
the  nation,  the  limiting  of  whose  power  by  making  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas,  in  the  possession  of  France,  "  a  wall  of  brass  for 
ever  impenetrable  to  the  combined  efforts  of  England  and  America," 
had  been  one  of  his  chief  arguments  in  the  earlier  negotiation.2 

He  had  thus,  in  these  months  of  stormy  diplomacy,  and  while 
Madison  was  engaged  in  the  preparation  of  arguments  for  the 
pressure  of  the  claims  for  the  actions  of  French  privateers  in 
Spain,  written  Admiral  Gravina,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris, 
on  July  27,  1804:  "Certainly  if  I  had  been  informed  that  the 
ministers  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  had  carried  their  condescensions 
to  the  United  States  so  far  as  to  engage  Spain  to  be  responsible 
to  it  for  the  indemnities  for  pretended  violations  made  by  France, 
I  should  most  assuredly  have  received  from  my  government  an 
order  to  manifest  the  discontent  which  France  would  have  ex 
perienced  by  a  condescension  so  improper,  a  discontent  that  would 
have  been  expressed  more  strongly  toward  the  government  of  the 

1  State  Papers,  II,  204^-238. 

*  Instructions  au  Citoyen  Guillemardet  (minister  to  Spain),  May  20,  June 
19,  1798,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MSS.,  Adams,  I,  357. 


78  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE  [1804 

United  States  than  toward  Spain.  Besides,  the  explanations 
which  have  already  been  given  to  your  court,  .  .  .  and  those  which 
I  have  authorized  to  be  again  made  to  the  government  of  the 
United  States  by  the  charge*  d'affaires  of  his  Imperial  Majesty, 
ought  to  leave  the  presumption  that,  from  the  opinion  which  his 
Majesty  has  adopted  on  this  question,  that  as  it  has  already  been 
the  subject  of  a  long  negotiation,  and  of  a  formal  convention  between 
France  and  the  United  States,  it  cannot  again  become  the  subject 
of  a  new  discussion."  l 

This  was  followed  by  instructions  to  General  Turreau,  the  French 
charge*  d'affaires  at  Washington,  regarding  Louisiana,  that  "if  the 
Mississippi  and  Iberville  trace  with  precision  the  eastern  boun 
dary  of  that  colony,  it  has  less  precise  limits  to  the  westward. 
No  river,  no  chain  of  mountains  separates  it  from  the  Spanish 
possessions.  .  .  .  Spain  already  appears  to  fear  that  the  United 
States,  who  show  an  intention  of  forcing  back  the  western  limits  of 
Louisiana,  may  propose  to  advance  in  this  direction  to  the  ocean, 
and  establish  themselves  on  that  part  of  the  American  coast  which 
lies  north  of  California." 2 

A  week  later  Turreau  was  fully  instructed  as  to  the  attitude  of 
France  upon  the  question  of  the  claims  against  Spain,3  and  on 
August  30,  1804,  a  note  assured  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris 
that  in  the  treaty  of  cession  and  in  the  negotiations  which  preceded 
it  "France  could  not  even  take  upon  herself  to  indicate  what 
ought  to  be  [the  precise  western  limit  of  Louisiana]  for  fear  of 
wounding  upon  this  point  the  pretensions  of  one  or  other  power 
directly  interested.  .  .  .  Nevertheless,  as  the  Americans  derive  their 
rights  from  France,  I  have  been  enabled  to  express  to  his  Imperial 
Majesty's  minister  plenipotentiary  near  the  United  States  the 
chief  bases  on  which  the  emperor  would  have  planted  himself  in 
the  demand  for  the  demarcation  of  boundaries;  starting  from  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  we  should  have  sought  to  distinguish  between 
settlements  that  belong  to  the  kingdom  of  Mexico,  and  settlements 
that  had  been  formed  by  the  French  or  by  those  who  succeeded 

1  Cevallos  to  Pinckney  and  Monroe,  February  16,  1805,  State  Papers,  II, 
643.  Italics  in  original. 

3  Talleyrand  to  Turreau,  August  8,  1804,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MSS., 
Adams,  II,  295.  3  Ibid.,  296. 


1804]  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND  79 

them  in  this  colony.  This  distinction  between  settlements  formed 
by  the  French  or  by  the  Spaniards  would  have  been  made  equally 
in  ascending  northward.  All  those  which  are  of  French  founda 
tion  would  have  belonged  to  Louisiana.  .  .  .  The  great  spaces 
which  sometimes  exist  between  the  last  French  settlements  and 
the  last  Spanish  missions  might  have  left  still  some  doubts  on  the 
direction  of  the  boundary  to  be  traced  between  them,  but  with  the 
views  of  friendship  and  conciliation  which  animate  their  Majesties, 
these  difficulties  would  have  been  soon  smoothed  away."  1 

It  was  a  misfortune  to  the  United  States  that  the  administration 
of  its  government  was  at  this  period  almost  completely  in  the  hands 
of  lawyers,  seldom  good  administrators,  and  those  in  power  dis 
played  to  the  full  the  defects  of  their  training.  Jefferson  and 
Madison  had  as  their  antagonists  three  of  the  ablest  statesmen — 
Napoleon,  Talleyrand,  and  William  Pitt — the  world  has  produced, 
and  two  of  these  were  the  most  unscrupulous  of  history.  To  dis 
cuss  with  these  two  legal  technicalities  based  upon  the  loose 
phraseology  of  a  treaty  the  understanding  of  which  by  France  and 
Spain,  so  far  as  the  eastern  boundary  of  Louisiana  was  concerned, 
had  time  and  again  been  stated,  was  to  fly  in  the  face  of  fate.  This, 
however,  Monroe,  as  their  agent,  proceeded  to  do. 

Monroe  had  already  left  London  on  October  8,  1804,  for  Paris, 
en  route  for  Madrid,  with  Madison's  voluminous  instructions 
of  April  15,  1804,  for  his  guidance.  On  his  arrival  in  France, 
though  in  nowise  accredited  to  its  government  and  despite  the 
evident  and  just  dissatisfaction  of  Livingston,  still  minister  (though 
General  Armstrong  had  arrived  to  succeed  him),  and  with  the 
fatuous  idea  that  he  might  bring  Napoleon  to  assist  him  in  his 
Spanish  negotiation,  he  addressed  a  letter  to  Talleyrand  setting 
forth  the  object  of  his  journey  as  "due  to  the  candor  which  the 
President  will  never  fail  to  observe  in  his  transactions  with  the 
emperor,"  and  repeating  the  well-worn  arguments  as  to  the  owner 
ship  of  West  Florida.3  One  can  well  imagine  the  smile  upon  the 
saturnine  countenance  of  Talleyrand,  upon  the  reception  of  the 
document. 

Monroe  left  Paris  on  December  8,  for  Madrid  without  a  formal 

1  Talleyrand  to  Gravina,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MSS.,  Adams,  II,  299. 

2  Monroe  to  Talleyrand,  November  8,  1804,  State  Papers,  II,  634. 


80  MONROE  AND  TALLEYRAND  [1804 

reply,  but  he  had  learned  from  "an  informal  but  authentic  source" 
that  a  report  had  been  made  to  the  emperor,  "the  substance  of 
which  was  that  West  Florida  was  not  comprised  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  or  intention  of  the  parties  .  .  .  and  also  that  the  claim  on 
Spain  by  the  United  States  for  vessels  condemned  then  taken  by 
French  privateers  was  precluded  by  our  treaty  with  France  of 
1800."  1 

Monroe,  who  knew,  as  did  his  colleagues  in  diplomacy  and  every 
member  of  the  American  administration,  that  upon  the  attitude 
of  Napoleon  depended  his  success,  might  well  have  spared  his 
government  and  himself  the  humiliation  which  he  invited  by  pro 
ceeding  on  his  mission  in  the  face  of  such  information.  Napoleon 
had,  in  fact,  determined  that  if  Spain  ceded  Florida,  the  United 
States  must  pay  money,  and  that  the  money  should  be  for  the 
benefit  of  France.2 

Of  all  this  Monroe  had  been  informed,  but  with  his  slow  mentality 
and  dogged  persistence  of  character,  he  held  the  course  laid  out 
for  him  by  the  two  men,  Jefferson  and  Madison,  he  most  trusted, 
and  who  were  equally  at  fault  in  pursuing  a  course  which  the 
dullest  should  have  known,  long  before  the  negotiations  were 
closed,  could  end  only  in  failure. 

While  Monroe  was  now  at  least  conscious  that  the  French  govern 
ment  did  not  uphold  the  American  pretensions,  he  was  far  from 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Bordeaux,  December  16,  1804,  Writings,  IV,  277. 

a  On  September  21,  1804,  Livingston  had  written  Madison.  "While  Spain 
wishes  to  limit  us  as  much  as  possible  [in  the  question  of  boundaries],  France 
wishes  to  make  our  controversy  favorable  to  her  finances.  Yesterday  Marbois 
again  spoke  to  me  on  the  subject  of  purchasing  the  Floridas  and  giving  sixty 
millions  [of  francs]  for  them  and  even  pressed  the  matter  very  strongly  upon 
me.  You  see  by  this  which  way  the  wind  sets.  The  distresses  of  Spain 
make  them  fear  that  she  shall  not  be  able  to  comply  with  her  engagements  and 
the  threatening  war  and  internal  expenses  render  the  state  of  the  Treasury 
here  very  precarious."  (Monroe's  Writings,  IV,  305).  On  December  24, 
1804,  Armstrong  wrote  Madison:  "This  country  has  determined  to  convert 
the  negotiation  into  a  sale,  to  draw  from  it  advantages  merely  pecuniary  to 
herself,  or  in  other  words  to  her  agents.  It  is  this  venality  which  explains 
her  present  reserve,  the  degree  of  excitement  displayed  by  the  emperor  on 
reading  the  note,  and  the  marked  incivility  with  which  Mr.  Monroe  was 
treated  by  Talleyrand.  Since  his  departure  repeated  intimations  have  been 
given  me  that  if  certain  persons  could  be  sufficiently  gratified,  the  negotiation 
should  be  transferred  hither,  and  brought  to  a  close  with  which  we  should 
have  no  reason  to  find  fault."  (MSS.  State  Department.) 


1805]         MONROE  AND  PINCKNEY  AT  MADRID  81 

knowing  the  acrimony  of  the  language  of  the  report  of  which  he 
had  been  informed.  "Only,"  said  Talleyrand,  "in  case  the  United 
States  should  desist  from  their  unjust  pretensions  to  West  Florida, 
and  return  to  forms  of  civility  and  decorum,  .  .  .  could  the 
emperor  allow  himself  to  second  at  the  court  of  Madrid  the  project 
of  the  acquisition  of  the  two  Floridas."  l 

Backed  by  such  views  and  by  the  knowledge  soon  to  come,  of  a 
letter  of  similar  tenor  to  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  December 
21,  1804,  which  was  a  reply  to  Monroe's  own  to  Talleyrand,  and 
which  specifically  stated  that  France  had  laid  no  claim  to  West 
Florida  by  the  treaty  of  retrocession,  but  two  years  later  had 
endeavored,  without  effect,  to  open  negotiations  for  its  cession,2 
the  Spanish  minister  of  state  could  well  afford  to  treat  the  American 
negotiators  with  perfect  ease  of  mind.  Spain's  enemies  were  now 
by  treaty  enemies  of  France,  for  even  while  Monroe  was  on  his 
month's  journey  from  Paris  to  Madrid,  where  he  arrived  January 
2,  1805,  Spain  had  declared  war  with  England. 

It  was  not  until  January  28,  1805,  that  the  negotiation  was 
opened  with  a  note  from  Monroe  and  Pinckney  devoted  to  the  claim 
of  the  Rio  Perdido  on  the  east  (which  was  unjust)  and  the  Rio 
Bravo  on  the  west  (which  was  just),  as  the  boundaries  of  the 
Louisiana  cession;  and  to  the  propriety  of  Spain's  yielding  the 
remainder  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States  for  a  money  con 
sideration.  Appended  to  this  paper  was  a  project  of  a  convention, 
drawn  in  accordance  with  Madison's  instructions,  already  mention 
ed,  but  including  the  claims  arising  from  the  suppression  by  the 
Spanish  intendant,  in  1802  and  1803,  of  the  right  of  deposit  at  New 
Orleans.3 

Thus  began  a  futile  four  months'  discussion  aggravated  by  the 
pressure  to  their  limit  of  the  American  claims  for  depredations, 
a  pressure  scarcely  to  be  avoided  by  the  American  negotiators  in 
the  face  of  their  instructions  backed  as  they  were  by  a  private 
letter  from  Madison  to  Monroe  saying  "Spain  must  also,  sooner  or 
later,  swallow  the  claim  for  French  injuries.  All  she  can  expect  is 

1  Rapport  a  1'Empereur,  November  19,  1804,  Archives  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres,  etc.  MSS.,  Adams,  United  States,  II,  312. 
8  Talleyrand  to  Armstrong,  State  Papers,  II,  435. 
8  State  Papers,  II,  636-639. 


82  TALLEYRAND'S  THREATENING  NOTE          [1805 

to  have  the  pill  wrapped  up  in  the  least  nauseous  disguise."  Madi 
son  wrote  as  if  France  herself  was  not  to  be  considered,  and  as  if 
he  were  backed  by  battle-ships  instead  of  by  the  petty  gun-boats 
which  were  Jefferson's  ideal  of  naval  power  for  the  United  States. 
He  informed  Monroe  that  Pinckney's  recall  had  been  asked  by  the 
Spanish  government  and  that  Bowdoin  was  to  succeed  him. 
"He  [Pinckney]  is  well  off  in  escaping  reproof,  for  his  agency  has 
been  very  faulty  as  well  as  feeble,"  words  which  we  of  this  day  may 
well  think  should  apply  even  more  forcibly  to  Madison  himself 
and  to  his  chief.  The  vanity  of  Godoy,  who  was  regarded  as  all- 
powerful,  was  to  be  appealed  to  as  his  special  weakness.  "Such  a 
resource  is  not  to  be  neglected.  But  the  main  one  will  lie  in  a 
skilful  appeal  to  the  fears  of  Spain  and  the  interest  which  France 
as  well  as  Spain  has  in  not  favoring  a  coalition  of  the  United  States 
with  Great  Britain.1 

The  demand  for  the  inclusion  of  the  French  claims  brought  at 
once  from  Sefior  Cevallos  the  disclosure  of  the  note  from  the  French 
government  to  its  ambassador  at  Madrid  forbidding  its  becoming 
the  subject  of  a  new  discussion.2  The  sharpness  of  the  Spanish 
note,  particularly  in  regard  to  the  question  of  the  deposit,  caused 
the  American  negotiators  to  fear  an  end  of  the  negotiation,  and 
they  requested  a  conference.  Senor  Cevallos  followed  this  with 
a  temperate  discussion  of  the  eastern  boundary  of  Louisiana.3 

By  this  time  Monroe  had  also  Talleyrand's  note  of  December  21, 
1804,  to  Armstrong,  emphatically  denying  the  right  of  France,  by 
the  treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso,  to  West  Florida  and  consequently  the 
right  of  the  United  States.  Monroe  had  written  Armstrong  twice 
during  February  to  sound  the  French  government  in  the  general 
question  of  Florida,  sending  copies  of  his  correspondence  with 
Cevallos;  these  last,  however,  were  not  shown  to  the  French  foreign 
office  in  view  of  the  very  emphatic  declaration  which  Armstrong 
received  and  conveyed  in  a  letter  of  March  12,  1805,  to  Monroe, 
that  the  French  government  declared  that  the  claim  for  French 
spoliations  within  Spanish  territory  must  be  abandoned,  and  that 
in  the  event  of  rupture  with  Spain  "we  can  neither  doubt  nor 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  November  9,  1804,  Works,  II,  208. 
3  February  16,  1805,  State  Papers,  II,  643,  Supra.  78. 
3  February  24,  1805,  Ibid.,  II,  644. 


1805]  TERMS  DICTATED  BY  FRANCE  83 

hesitate:  we  must  take  part  with  Spain,  and  our  note  of  Decem 
ber  21,  1804,  was  intended  to  communicate  and  impress  this 
idea."  l 

The  remainder  of  the  negotiation  was  but  a  beating  of  the  air. 
Though  the  American  negotiators,  in  a  note  of  April  9,  made  a 
distinct  threat  of  war,  saying  if  Spain  was  indisposed  to  "adjust 
these  important  concerns  ...  on  fair  and  equal  terms,"  that  "  the 
United  States  are  not  unprepared  for  or  unequal  to  any  crisis  that 
may  occur,"  and  declaring  that  they  had  submitted  with  unex 
ampled  patience  to  the  injuries  of  which  they  complain,"2  Senor 
Cevallos,  feeling  secure  under  the  aegis  of  Napoleon  took  no  notice 
of  the  threat  and  proceeded  four  days  later  to  discuss  the  western 
boundary  of  Louisiana,  which  he  said  "  should  be  by  a  line  begin 
ning  on  the  Gulf  between  the  river  Caricut,  or  Cascassia,  and  the 
Armenta,  or  Marmentoa,  (and)  should  go  to  the  north,  passing 
between  the  Adaes  and  Natchitoches,  until  it  cuts  the  Red  River." 
The  boundary  thence  only  was  to  be  a  subject  of  negotiation.3 

Monroe  at  this  time  could  write  in  his  diary,  "  No  other  alterna 
tive  presented  itself  to  me  than  to  abandon  the  object  and  return 
to  London,  or  to  submit  to  the  terms  which  it  was  sufficiently 
understood  France  was  willing  to  accept,  and  seemed  in  some 
measure  to  dictate,  which  amounted  to  this :  that  we  should  create 
a  new  loan  of  about  seventy  millions  of  livres,  and  transfer  the  same 
to  Spain,  who  would  immediately  pass  them  over  to  France,  in 
consideration  of  which  we  should  be  put  in  possession  of  the  dis 
puted  territory,  under  stipulations  which  should  provide  for  the 
adjustment  of  the  ultimate  right  there,  and  reimbursement  of  the 
money  by  instalment  in  seven  years." 

Notwithstanding  this  conviction  and  the  passing  of  four  months 
in  unavailing  discussion,  the  American  envoys  on  May  12,  1805, 
made  one  more  effort  in  a  statement  of  what  they  termed  their 
"ultimate  conditions."  These  were,  in  case  Spain  would  cede  all 
territory  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  arbitrate  the  claims  of  the 
citizens  and  subjects  of  each  power  under  the  convention  of 
August  11,  1802,  the  United  States  would  waive  all  other  claims 
and  cede  all  right  to  territory  west  of  the  line  formed  by  the  Rio 

1  State  Papers,  II,  636.  a  Ibid.,  II,  659.  8  Ibid.,  II,  662. 

4  Monroe's  diary  at  Aranjuez,  April  22,  1805,  MSS.  State  Department. 


84  MONROE'S  COMPLETE  FAILURE  [1805 

Colorado  to  its  headwaters,  thence  to  the  south-westerly  source  of 
the  Red  River,  thence  along  the  highland  forming  the  watershed 
of  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  and  of  the  Rio  Bravo,  thence  north, 
with  a  belt  of  thirty  leagues  on  each  side  of  the  line,  or  on  the 
American  side  only,  to  "remain  neutral  and  unsettled  forever."! l 

The  Spanish  minister  of  state,  denying  the  claim  of  the  United 
States  to  the  territory  which  they  offered  to  cede  for  the  Floridas, 
and  declaring  the  propositions  wholly  unjust  to  Spain  and  inadmis 
sible,2  the  American  envoys,  on  May  18, 1805,  stated  that  they  con 
sidered  the  negotiations  closed.  Three  days  later,  Monroe  had 
audience  of  their  Spanish  Majesties,  left  Madrid  May  26,  reached 
Paris  June  20,  remained  there  until  July  17,  in  the  vain  hope  that 
the  French  government  would  relent,  and  reached  his  post  at  Lon 
don  July  23,  conscious  of  humiliating  failure.  Pinckney  was  re 
called  in  October  and  G.  W.  Erving  was  sent  from  London  to  take 
charge  of  the  legation  as  charge*  d'affaires.  Pinckney 's  successor, 
James  Bowdoin,  did  not  leave  the  United  States  until  the  following 
summer,  and  then  only  to  touch  at  Santander,  proceed  to  London 
for  consultation  with  Monroe,  and  thence  to  France,  where  he  was 
to  be  associated  with  General  Armstrong  in  Paris,  to  which  capital 
any  further  negotiation  in  Spanish  matters  was  now  transferred, 
the  presence  of  a  minister  at  Madrid  being  regarded  undesirable 
in  what  had  become  very  strained  relations.  How  strained,  may 
be  judged  from  the  reception  by  Godoy,  in  December,  of  Mr. 
Erving's  remonstrances  against  the  seizures  of  American  ships  in 
flagrant  violation  of  the  treaty  of  1795.  Receiving  Erving  with 
"the  good-natured  courtesy  which  marked  his  manners,"  he  asked, 
"How  go  our  affairs?  Are  we  to  have  peace  or  war?"  As  to  the 
seizures  the  prince  said  it  was  impossible  for  Spain  to  allow  Ameri 
can  vessels  to  carry  English  property.  "But,"  said  Erving,  "we 
have  a  treaty  which  secures  us  that  right";  to  which  Godoy  replied, 
''Certainly,  I  know  you  have  a  treaty,  for  I  made  it  with  Mr. 
Pinckney";  and  proceeding  to  announce  that  the  free  goods  pro 
vision  would  be  no  longer  respected,  said:  "You  may  choose  either 
peace  or  war.  It's  the  same  thing  to  me.  I  will  tell  you  candidly 
that  if  you  will  go  to  war  this  is  certainly  the  moment  and  you  may 
take  our  possessions  from  us.  I  advise  you  to  go  to  war  now,  if  you 

1  State  Papers,  II,  665.  •  Ibid.,  666. 


1805]  GODOY  OFFERS  PEACE  OR  WAR  85 

think  this  is  best  for  you ;  and  then  the  peace  which  will  be  made  in 
Europe  will  leave  us  two  at  war."  l 

There  was  in  this- a  hint  of  the  foreboding  which  Godoy — far 
the  cleverest  Spaniard  of  his  time — must  have  had  of  the  storm 
which  was  soon  to  break  upon  Spain  from  France.  He  may  have 
hoped  that  an  American  war  would  bring  difficulties  to  France,  in 
which  would  lie  safety  to  the  peninsula  which  itself  was  soon  to  be 
much  more  seriously  threatened  than  was  distant  Florida. 

1  Erving  to  Madison,  December  7,  1805,  MSS.  State  Department,  Adams, 
III,  38. 


CHAPTER  V 

WAVERING  BETWEEN  WAR  AND  PEACE.      PROPOSED  ALLIANCE  WITH 
GREAT  BRITAIN  ABANDONED  FOR  INTRIGUE  WITH  FRANCE 

HAD  Jefferson  had  a  tithe  of  Napoleon's  foresight  and  decision 
he  would  now  have  acted  as  Armstrong  advised  in  a  letter  sent  to 
Monroe  while  still  at  Madrid.  "It  is  simply,"  he  said,  "to  take  a 
strong  and  prompt  possession  of  the  northern  bank  of  the  Rio 
Bravo,  leaving  the  eastern  limit  in  statu  quo.  A  stroke  of  this  kind 
would  at  once  bring  Spain  to  reason  and  France  to  her  rescue,  and 
without  giving  either  room  to  quarrel.  You  might  then  negotiate 
and  shape  the  bargain  pretty  much  as  you  pleased." 

But  the  timidity  of  character  common  to  both  Jefferson  and 
Madison  stood  in  the  way  of  such  action,  politically  wise  and 
morally  just.  While  deprecating  even  the  possibility  of  war,  they 
had  been  pressing  the  claim  to  West  Florida  to  the  very  verge  of 
hostilities,  and  this,  though  assured  by  statement  after  statement, 
official  and  unofficial,  from  Frenchman  and  Spaniard  of  its  base 
lessness.  Nor  was  Madison  blind  to  the  truth  and  meaning  of 
such  statements.  He  could  write  Jefferson:  "If  [France]  should 
persist  in  disavowing  her  right  to  sell  West  Florida  to  the  United 
States,  and  above  all  can  prove  it  to  have  been  the  mutual  under 
standing  with  Spain  that  West  Florida  was  no  part  of  Louisiana,  it 
will  place  our  claim  on  very  different  ground — such  probably  as 
would  not  be  approved  by  the  world,  and  such  certainly  as  would 
not  with  that  approbation  be  maintained  by  force."  2 

Jefferson,  every  effort  of  whose  administration  thus  far  had  been 
toward  the  unjust  despoilment  of  Spain,  could  write:  "That  our 
relations  with  Spain  should  be  of  a  peaceable  and  friendly  character 

1  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  May  4,  1805,  MSS.  State  Department. 

2  Madison  to  Jefferson,  March  27,  1805,  Jefferson  MSS.,  Adams,  III,  55. 

86 


1805]  GALLATIN  FAVORS  A  NAVY  87 

has  been  our  most  earnest  desire.  Had  Spain  met  us  with  the 
same  dispositions,  our  idea  was  that  her  existence  in  this  hemisphere 
and  ours  should  have  rested  on  the  same  bottom;  we  should  have 
swam  or  sunk  together.  We  want  nothing  of  hers  and  we  want  no 
other  nation  to  possess  what  is  hers.  But  she  has  met  our  advances 
with  jealousy,  secret  malice,  and  ill-faith.  Our  patience  under  this 
unworthy  return  of  disposition  is  now  on  its  last  trial.  And  the 
issue  of  what  is  now  depending  between  us  will  decide  whether  our 
relations  with  her  are  to  be  sincerely  friendly  or  permanently 
hostile.  I  still  wish  and  would  cherish  the  former  but  have  ceased 
to  expect  it."  * 

It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  conduct  of  the  American  executive 
and  the  sentiment  of  these  letters.  Gallatin,  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  and  in  many  ways  the  most  solid  mind  of  the  adminis 
tration,  said:  "The  demands  from  Spain  were  too  hard  to  have 
expected,  even  independent  of  French  interference,  any  success 
from  the  negotiation."  Though  he  had  been  steadily  opposed  to 
any  increase  of  expenditures  for  the  navy,  he  now  said  that  which 
was  the  only  real  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  preservation  of 
American  dignity.  "Perhaps  a  law  making  efficient  provision  for 
building  a  dozen  of  ships  of  the  line  would  be  the  most  dignified 
and  most  forcible  mode  of  reopening  the  negotiation."  He  could 
not  help,  however,  hedging  somewhat  in  remarking,  "But  it  will  be 
a  doubt  with  some  whether  the  remedy  be  not  worse  than  the 
disorder." 2 

Deeply  moved  by  the  humiliation  which  his  diplomacy  had 
brought,  Jefferson's  thoughts  now  turned  again  to  a  British  alliance. 
On  August  7,  1805  he  wrote  Madison  the  suggestion,  and  asked 
that  he  would  consult  the  secretaries  of  war  and  of  the  navy, 3  and 
himself  on  the  same  date  4  wrote  Gallatin,  on  whose  judgment  he 
had  special  reliance.  Jefferson's  views,  given  more  fully  in  a  later 
letter  to  Madison,  were  that  "the  treaty  should  be  provisional 
only,  to  come  into  force  on  the  event  of  our  being  engaged  in  war 
with  either  France  or  Spain  during  the  present  war  in  Europe. 
In  that  event  we  should  make  common  cause  and  England  should 

1  Jefferson  to  Bowdoin,  April  27,  1805,  Writings,  VIII,  351. 
J  Gallatin  to  Madison,  August  6,  1805,  Writings,  I,  238. 
3  Jefferson,  Writings,  VIII,  375.  4  Ibid.,  VIII,  375. 


88  JEFFERSON  ON  A  BRITISH  ALLIANCE          [1805 

stipulate  not  to  make  peace  without  our  obtaining  the  objects  for 
which  we  go  to  war,  to  wit:  the  acknowledgment  by  Spain  of  the 
rightful  boundaries  of  Louisiana  (which  we  should  reduce  to  our 
minimum  by  a  secret  article),  and,  second,  indemnification  for 
spoliations,  for  which  purpose  we  should  be  allowed  to  make 
reprisal  on  the  Floridas,  and  retain  them  as  an  indemnification. 
Our  co-operation  in  the  war  (if  we  should  actually  enter  into  it) 
would  be  a  sufficient  consideration  for  Great  Britain  to  engage  for 
its  object;  and  it  being  generally  known  to  France  and  Spain  that 
we  had  entered  into  treaty  with  England  would  probably  insure  us 
a  peaceable  and  immediate  settlement  of  both  points." 

Gallatin's  reply  to  Jefferson's  request  for  an  opinion,  delayed 
by  the  illness  and  death  of  a  child,  did  not  come  until  September. 
A  strong  criticism  of  the  character  of  our  diplomacy  with  Spain, 
and  an  appeal  for  peace,  it  carried  Jefferson's  wavering  mind  with 
it.  Gallatin  held  that  the  failure  of  the  American  negotiators  of 
the  treaty  of  cession  of  Louisiana  to  demand  exact  boundaries 
was  a  failure  for  which  Spain  was  not  responsible  and  which 
should  not  be  remedied  by  war.  Nor  were  the  spoliations  in 
the  circumstances  sufficient  justification  for  war.  As  to  the  policy 
of  war  he  was  even  more  emphatic.  He  dreaded  the  expense; 
he  saw  melting  away  the  yearly  surplus  which  was  rapidly  reducing 
the  debt,  and  could  only  expect  a  disrupture  of  the  orderly  system 
of  federal  finance  of  which  he  was  the  careful  nurse.  He  asked, 
"What  are  both  Floridas  worth  ?  For  this  is  exactly  what  we  may 
gain  .  .  .  what  would  be  the  cost  of  one  year's  war,  not  merely 
the  positive  expense,  but  the  national  loss  ?  ...  In  case  of  rupture 
it  is  to  be  expected  that  France  and  Spain  will  seize  or  sequester 
property  to  an  immense  amount;  Amsterdam,  Antwerp,  and  even 
Bordeaux,  Cadiz,  and  Leghorn  are  filled  with  our  merchants' 
property,  exclusive  of  vessels  which  might  be  there  at  the  time." 
Gallatin  discussed  " boundaries,"  the  "status  quo"  the  question 
of  " Mobile,"  the  "convention  of  1802,"  "new  aggressions"  by 
French  and  Spanish  privateers  ("often  armed  in  Cuba  and  who 
uniformly  take  their  prizes  there  and  plunder  them"),  and  finally 
"preparations"  which  meant  the  building  of  a  navy.  He  would 
apply  the  surplus  of  two  millions  a  year  ("and  it  is  a  very  low 
1  Jefferson,  Writings,  VIII,  377. 


1805]  GALLATIN  ON  A  NAVY  89 

calculation"),  which  he  considered  would  be  lost  in  case  of  war, 
wholly  "to  the  building  of  ships  of  the  line  .  .  .  that  the  act 
would  have  a  favorable  effect  on  our  foreign  relations,  and  even 
on  the  pending  negotiation,  is  also  certain.  Nor  indeed,  sup 
posing  Congress  to  be  at  all  events  averse  to  a  war  with  Spain  for 
the  present,  would  it  be  an  undignified  course  to  make  efficient 
provision  for  the  preparation  of  a  force  which  would  prevent  a 
repetition  of  wrongs  which  the  United  States  did  not  at  this  moment 
feel  prepared  properly  to  resent"  l — wise  words  to  which,  almost 
at  the  moment  of  their  writing,  a  deeper  significance  was  to  be 
given  by  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  events  to  which  the  previous 
"  wrongs  "  mentioned  were  but  as  trifles. 

Scarcely  anything  could  be  more  surprising,  in  the  face  of  Gal- 
latin's  long-continued  opposition  to  such  a  course,  than  this  turn 
ing  of  his  thoughts  to  a  powerful  navy,  truest  statesmanship  as  this 
was.  His  argument  was  for  this  and  for  three  or  four  years  of 
peace.  His  wish  for  the  latter,  which  the  mere  beginning  of  naval 
preparation  would  have  assured  with  honor,  was  fulfilled  by  supinely 
cowering  with  dishonor;  his  suggestion  for  the  former  was  un 
heeded.  The  result  to  America  was  humiliation  which  should 
have  entered  as  iron  into  the  soul  of  her  rulers. 

Without  entirely  dropping  the  idea  of  a  British  alliance,  Jefferson, 
who  had  received  and  now  leaned  to  Armstrong's  suggestion 
of  the  occupancy  of  Texas,  wrote  Madison:  "Supposing  a  previous 
alliance  with  England  to  guard  us  in  the  worst  event,  I  should 
propose  that  Congress  should  pass  acts  (1)  authorizing  the  execu 
tive  to  suspend  intercourse  with  Spain  at  discretion;  (2)  to  dis 
lodge  the  new  establishments  of  Spain  between  the  Mississippi  and 
Bravo;  (3)  to  appoint  commissioners  to  examine  and  ascertain 
all  claims  for  spoliation."2 

But  news  was  about  reaching  America  which  brought  an  end 
to  any  idea  of  a  British  alliance,  and  as  Jefferson  was  not  of  the 
fibre  to  hold  long  to  the  bold  views  which  he  had  thus  expressed, 
he  turned  to  the  underhand  proposals  of  France  which  had  been 
sufficiently  accurately  expressed  in  the  quotation  already  given 
from  Monroe's  diary.3 

1  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  15,  1805,  Writings,  I,  241-254. 
'Jefferson  to  Madison,  September  16,  1805,  Works,  IV,  587.    3  Supra,  83. 


90  THE  NEUTRAL  CARRYING  TRADE  [1805 

Some  words  of  explanation  are  now  necessary  to  the  understand 
ing  of  our  relations  with  Great  Britain  which  had  so  great  a  bearing 
upon  those  with  Spain. 

The  United  States  at  this  period  was,  through  her  neutrality, 
practically  the  world's  carrier.  Nations  at  this  period  were  still 
wholly  under  the  bondage  of  the  idea  that  the  trade  of  colonies 
should  be  the  perquisite  of  the  parent  state,  the  first  break  in  which 
was  the  opening  by  France  of  her  colonial  ports  to  neutral  com 
merce  in  1793,  she  being  then  at  war  with  England  and  her  own 
carriers  swept  from  the  sea.  So  long  as  this  neutral  trade  con 
tinued  the  colonies  prospered  as  in  peace,  and  the  trade  of  the 
European  continent  kept  pace  with  this  prosperity,  but  the  gainer 
above  all  was  the  American  ship-owner.  England  invoked  "the 
rule  of  1756"  which  in  substance  was  "that  a  neutral  has  no  right 
to  deliver  a  belligerent  from  the  pressure  of  his  enemies'  hostilities 
by  trading  with  his  colonies  in  time  of  war  in  a  manner  not  allowed 
in  time  of  peace."  The  effect  was  decree  and  counter  decree  under 
which  American  ships  were  seized  or  detained  in  hundreds  by 
France,  Spain,  and  England.  It  is  impossible  to  detail  here  the 
complexities  of  this  subject,  with  which  it  was  difficult  for  the  ship 
owner  himself  to  keep  pace.  In  1800,  however,  it  was  possible 
for  American  ships  to  bring  cargoes  from  the  Dutch  and  Spanish 
colonies  to  the  United  States  and  re-export  such  goods  to  Holland 
and  Spain.  The  direct  voyage  was  not  allowed,  but  it  soon  became 
a  question  as  to  what  constituted  an  actual  re-export  from  America. 
In  February,  1800,  Sir  William  Scott  (later  Lord  Stowell)  gave  a 
momentous  decision  in  the  matter.  The  ship  Polly  had  brought  a 
cargo  from  Havana  to  Marblehead,  had  landed  and  paid  duty  upon 
this,  had  repaired,  effected  a  new  insurance  and  had  reshipped 
the  cargo  and  sailed  for  Bilboa.  She  was  seized  and  brought  in 
as  a  prize,  but  Scott  held  that  she  had  not  made  a  continuous 
voyage  and  the  ship  was  released.  During  the  remainder  of  the 
war,  closed  by  the  short  peace  of  Amiens,  American  shipping 
prospered  amazingly,  and  when  war  broke  again,  protected  by 
Scott's  decision,  it  was  again  the  great  carrier.  Practically  every 
merchant  flag  had  disappeared  from  the  seas  except  those  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  the  former  had  largely  taken 
over  that  which  naturally  would  have  been  the  trade  of  British 


1805]  THE  "ESSEX"  DECISION  91 

ships.  "So  far  was  the  rule  of  1756  relaxed  that  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  of  America  became  so  many  entrepots  for  the  manu 
factures  and  commodities  of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  from 
whence  they  were  re-exported  under  the  American  flag  to  their  re 
spective  colonies;  they  brought  back  the  produce  of  those  colonies 
to  the  ports  of  America;  they  reshipped  them  for  the  enemies' 
ports  of  Europe;  they  entered  freely  all  the  ports  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  with  cargoes  brought  directly  from  the  hostile  colonies; 
thus,  in  fact,  not  only  carrying  on  the  whole  trade  of  one  of  the 
belligerents,  which  that  belligerent  would  have  carried  on  in  time 
of  peace,  but  superadding  their  own  and  part  of  ours.  .  .  .  One 
single  American  house  contracted  for  the  whole  of  the  merchandise 
of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  at  Batavia,  amounting  to  no 
less  a  sum  than  £1,700,000  sterling.  The  consequence  was  that 
while  not  a  single  merchant  ship  belonging  to  the  enemy  crossed 
the  Atlantic  or  doubled  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  the  produce  of 
the  Eastern  and  Western  worlds  sold  cheaper  in  the  markets  of 
France  and  Holland  than  in  our  own.  .  .  .  The  commerce  of 
England  became  every  month  more  languid  and  prostrate,  till 
reduced,  as  justly  observed,  .  .  .  'to  a  state  of  suspended  ani 
mation.'  " l 

It  was  not  in  human  nature  for  England  to  sit  calmly  and  see 
the  world's  carrying  trade  pass  to  other  hands  and  make  pros 
perous  her  enemies,  while,  moreover,  she  was,  in  her  view,  fight 
ing  the  battle  of  the  world's  freedom.  Thus  on  July  23,  1805,  the 
very  day  Monroe  reached  London  from  Madrid  and  Paris,  worn 
with  the  knowledge  of  a  great  failure/ Scott  reversed  his  decision 
of  three  years  before,  and  held  as  fair  prize  the  Essex,  which  had 
sailed  from  Barcelona,  had  landed  her  goods  at  Salem,  given  bond 
only  for  the  payment  of  duties  on  goods  not  exported,  and,  reladen 
with  the  same  cargo,  had  sailed  for  Havana.  The  voyage  was  held 
by  Scott  as  in  effect  a  direct  voyage,  a  decision,  be  it  said,  which 
was  to  have  a  weighty  bearing  against  British  shipping  in  the 
American  civil  war. 

The  immediate  effect  of  Sir  William  Scott's  decision  was  the 
seizure  of  a  large  number  of  American  ships.  Fifty  were  known  to 
have  been  carried  to  ports  in  the  British  islands  and  as  many  were 

1  London  Quarterly  Review,  March,  1812,    5-7;    Moore,  Digest,  VII,  384. 


92        THE  ADMINISTRATION  TURNS  TO  FRANCE    [1805 

believed  to  have  been  libelled  in  the  West  Indies.  *  The  American 
loss  was  enormous  and  the  situation  one  of  despair  to  the  American 
commercial  world.  The  new  rule  was  but  the  beginning  of  further 
restrictions,  of  decrees  by  Napoleon  and  orders  in  council  by 
Great  Britain  which  were  as  sentences  of  death  to  the  American 
carrying  trade.2 

But  the  Essex  decision  had  a  secondary  effect  of  much  greater 
consequence  than  mere  monetary  loss.  Added  to  the  already  over 
bearing  conduct  of  British  naval  commanders,  who  carried  on  the 
right  of  search  and  impressment  even  in  our  own  waters  and  were 
practically  blockading  New  York;  with  Englishman,  Frenchman, 
and  Spaniard  as  naval  officer,  privateer,  or  pirate  seizing  American 
ships  in  every  part  of  the  world,  the  American  executive  naturally 
gave  up  the  hope  of  an  English  alliance  and  turned  to  France, 
knowing  that  in  the  terms  she  was  willing  to  make  was  the  only 
road  to  the  peaceable  possession  of  the  Floridas.  Qualms  of  con 
science  wholly  disappeared;  there  was  to  be  a  complete  negation 
both  of  morals  and  bold  words  despite  Madison's  expressions  of 
lofty  morality  ("entirely"  approved  by  Jefferson)  in  a  despatch 
to  Armstrong  of  June  6,  1805,  in  which  he  spoke  of  the  venal  sug 
gestions  emanating  from  the  French  functionaries,"  and  Jefferson's 
bold  remark  that  "considering  the  character  of  Bonaparte,  I  think 
it  material  at  once  to  let  him  see  we  are  not  of  the  powers  who  will 
receive  his  orders."  3  The  occasion  was  at  the  meeting  of  the  cabi 
net,  on  Jefferson's  initiative  and  following  his  suggestions,4  Novem 
ber  12,  1805;  the  results  are  set  down  in  Jefferson's  own  hand: 

"  Present  the  four  secretaries;  subject,  Spanish  affairs.  The 
extension  of  the  war  in  Europe  leaving  us  without  danger  of  a  sud 
den  peace,  depriving  us  of  the  chance  of  an  ally,  I  proposed  we 
should  address  ourselves  to  France,  informing  her  it  was  a  last 
effort  at  amicable  settlement  with  Spain  and  offer  to  her  or  through 
her:  (1)  A  sum  of  money  for  the  rights  of  Spain  east  of  Iberville, 
say  the  Floridas;  (2)  To  cede  the  part  of  Louisiana  from  the  Rio 

1  Monroe  to  British  secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  September  25,  1805. 

2  For  an  admirable  analysis  of  the  maritime  difficulties  of  the  period,  see 
Admiral  Mahan,  Sea  Power  in  Its  Relations  to  the  War  of  1812. 

3  Jefferson  to  Madison,  August  27,  1805,  Writings,  VIII,  377. 

4  Jefferson  to  Madison,  October  23,  1805,  and  to  Robert  Smith,  secretary 
of  the  navy,  October  24,  1805,  Ibid.,  VIII,  380,  381. 


1805]  THE  ADMINISTRATION'S  PROPOSALS  93 

Bravo  to  the  Guadeloupe;  (3)  Spain  to  pay  within  a  certain  time 
spoliations  under  her  own  flag,  agreed  to  by  the  convention  (which 
we  guess  to  be  a  hundred  vessels,  worth  two  millions),  and  those 
subsequent  (worth  as  much  more),  and  to  hypothecate  for  these 
payments  the  country  from  Guadeloupe  to  the  Rio  Bravo;  Arm 
strong  to  be  employed.  The  first  was  to  be  the  exciting  motive 
with  France,  to  whom  Spain  is  in  arrears  for  subsidies,  and  who 
will  be  glad  also  to  secure  us  from  going  into  the  scale  of  England ; 
the  second,  the  soothing  motive  with  Spain,  which  France  would 
press  bona  fide  because  she  claimed  to  the  Rio  Bravo ;  the  third  to 
quiet  our  merchants.  It  was  agreed  to  unanimously,  and  the  sum 
to  be  offered  fixed  not  to  exceed  five  million  dollars.  Mr.  Gallatin 
did  not  like  purchasing  Florida  under  an  apprehension  of  war,  lest 
we  should  be  thought  in  fact  to  purchase  peace.  We  thought  this 
overweighted  by  taking  advantage  of  an  opportunity  which  might 
not  occur  again  of  getting  a  country  essential  to  our  peace  and  to  the 
security  of  the  commerce  of  the  Mississippi.  It  was  agreed  that 
Yrujo  should  be  sounded  through  Dallas  whether  he  is  not  going 
away,  and  if  not  he  should  be  made  to  understand  that  his  presence 
at  Washington  will  not  be  agreeable  and  that  his  departure  is 
expected.  Casa  Calvo,  Morales,  and  all  the  Spanish  officers  at 
New  Orleans  are  to  be  desired  to  depart  with  a  discretion  to  Clai- 
borne  [Governor  of  Louisiana]  to  let  any  friendly  ones  remain  who 
will  resign  and  become  citizens,  and  also  women  receiving  pen 
sions  to  remain  if  they  choose."  l 

The  day  after  this  meeting,  in  which  the  President  and  his  coun 
sellors  had  decided  to  succumb  to  the  covert  overtures  of  France 
made  months  before,  arrived  from  General  Armstrong  deh'nife 
propositions.  The  French  situation  gave  an  earnest  of  its  inten 
tions.  Napoleon  in  August  had  changed  his  menace  from  England 
to  Austria ;  his  vast  schemes  demanded  money ;  this  his  ally  Spain 
could  only  supply  through  the  concessions  for  which  the  United 
States  would  pay.  An  unsigned  note  in  Talleyrand's  handwriting 
was  handed  to  the  American  minister  advising  that  Spain  be  fright 
ened  by  vigorous  language  and  conduct,  "to  unite  in  reclaiming 
the  good  offices  of  France."  Said  the  note:  "The  more  you  refer 
to  the  decisions  of  the  emperor  the  more  sure  and  easy  will  be  the 
1  Cabinet  Memoranda,  Jefferson  MSS.,  Adams,  III,  78. 


94  THE  FRENCH  TERMS  [1805 

settlement.  .  .  .  The  following  conditions  will  probably  be  ac 
ceptable  to  France  and  all  her  efforts  will  be  given  to  have  them 
executed."  France  and  Spain  to  have  the  same  trade  privileges  in 
the  Floridas  as  in  Louisiana ;  the  boundary  to  be  the  Colorado  and 
a  line  northwardly  including  the  headwaters  of  all  rivers  entering 
the  Mississippi,  with  thirty  leagues  on  each  side  to  be  unoccupied 
forever;  the  debts  due  from  Spain  (excluding  the  French  spolia 
tions)  to  be  paid  by  bills  on  the  Spanish  colonies ;  ten  million  dol 
lars  to  be  given  by  the  United  States  to  Spain.1 

On  September  4,  Napoleon  was  in  Paris  en  route  for  Austria. 
Talleyrand's  agent  reappeared ;  Armstrong  objected  to  the  proposals 
as  sacrificing  the  country  between  the  Colorado  and  Rio  Bravo; 
as  accommodating  Spain  in  the  payment  of  her  debts  beyond  what 
she  herself  required;  as  sacrificing  part  of  West  Florida;  as  aban 
doning  the  entrepot  claim  and  that  for  the  French  spoliations. 
Finally,  ten  millions  was  an  enormous  sum  for  East  Florida.  What, 
declared  Armstrong,  is  to  prevent  our  occupancy  to  the  Rio  Bravo, 
the  holding  of  the  Floridas  as  indemnity  for  Spain's  debt,  or  lay 
ing  an  embargo  on  Spanish  commerce?  He  was  answered:  "I 
see  where  the  shoe  pinches.  It  is  the  enormous  sum  of  ten  mill 
ions  of  dollars;  but  say  seven.  Your  undisputed  claims  on  Spain 
amount  to  two  and  a  half  or  three  millions."  On  September  10, 
1805,  Armstrong  sent  his  despatch.2 

In  a  cabinet  meeting,  November  14,  terms  were  agreed  upon  by 
which  territory  extending  to  the  Rio  Bravo  (Texas)  was  to  remain 
unsettled  for  but  thirty  years,  and  meanwhile  to  be  hypothecated 
by  Spain  to  the  United  States  as  a  guarantee  for  the  payment,  by 
December  31, 1807,  of  $4,000,000  indemnity,  for  spoliations  under 
her  flag  prior  to  November  1,  1805.3  But  on  November  19,  these 
were  abandoned  and  Napoleon's  proposition  was  accepted  in  full 
except  that  five  millions  instead  of  seven  should  be  paid ;  for  this 
last  the  authority  of  Congress  was  necessary.4 

Jefferson  at  once  acted  upon  Talleyrand's  advice  as  energetically 
as  the  latter  could  have  hoped.  On  the  opening  of  Congress, 
December  3,  1805,  he  sent  a  message  which  was  taken  by  the 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  September  10,  1805,  MSS.  State  Department. 

2  Ibid.  3  Cabinet  decision  on  Spain,  Jefferson's  Writings,  VIII,  383. 
4  For  the  cabinet  memoranda  in  full,  see  Adams,  111,  106. 


1805]  A  PSEUDO-WARLIKE  MESSAGE  95 

public  as  equivalent  to  advising  a  declaration  of  war  against 
Spain.  Nothing  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the  year  had 
been  made  public;  nothing  other  than  the  message  was  in  the 
hands  of  Congress  to  enable  it  to  read  the  mind  of  the  executive. 
The  message  said:  "With  Spain  our  negotiations  for  the  settle 
ment  of  differences  have  not  had  a  satisfactory  issue.  Spoliations 
during  the  former  war,  for  which  she  had  formally  acknowledged 
herself  responsible,  have  been  refused  to  be  compensated,  but  on 
conditions  affecting  other  claims  in  nowise  connected  with  them. 
Yet  the  same  practices  are  renewed  in  the  present  war  and  are 
already  of  great  amount.  On  the  Mobile  our  commerce  passing 
through  that  river  continues  to  be  obstructed  by  arbitrary  duties  and 
vexatious  searches.  Propositions  for  adjusting  amicably  the  boun 
daries  of  Louisiana  have  not  been  acceded  to.  While,  however,  the 
right  is  unsettled,  we  have  avoided  changing  the  state  of  things  by 
taking  new  coasts  or  strengthening  ourselves  in  the  disputed  terri 
tories  in  the  hope  that  the  other  powers  would  not,  by  a  contrary 
conduct,  oblige  us  to  meet  their  example  and  endanger  conflicts 
of  authority  the  issue  of  which  may  not  be  entirely  controlled. 
But  in  this  hope  we  have  now  reason  to  lessen  our  confidence. 
Inroads  have  been  recently  made  into  the  territories  of  Orleans 
and  the  Mississippi.  Our  citizens  have  been  seized  and  their 
property  plundered  in  the  very  parts  of  the  former  which  had 
actually  been  delivered  up  by  Spain,  and  this  by  the  regular  officers 
and  soldiers  of  that  government.  I  have  therefore  found  it  neces 
sary  at  length  to  give  orders  to  our  troops  on  that  frontier  to  be  in 
readiness  to  protect  our  citizens  and  to  repel  by  arms  any  similar 
aggressions  in  future.  Other  details  necessary  for  your  informa 
tion  of  the  state  of  things  between  this  country  and  that  shall  be 
the  subject  of  another  communication. 

"  In  reviewing  these  injuries  from  some  of  the  belligerent  powers, 
the  moderation,  the1  firmness  and  the  wisdom  of  the  legislature  will 
all  be  called  into  action.  We  ought  still  to  hope  that  time  and  a 
more  correct  estimate  of  interests  as  well  as  of  character  will  pro 
duce  the  justice  we  are  bound  to  expect.  But  should  any  nation 
deceive  itself  by  false  calculations  and  disappoint  that  expecta 
tion  we  must  join  in  the  unprofitable  contest  of  trying  which  party 
can  do  the  other  most  harm.  Some  of  these  injuries  may  perhaps 


96  PUBLIC  EXPECTS  WAR  [1805 

admit  a  peaceable  remedy.  Where  that  is  competent  it  is  always 
the  most  desirable.  But  some  of  them  are  of  a  nature  to  be  met 
by  force  only  and  all  of  them  may  lead  to  it.  I  cannot  therefore 
but  recommend  such  preparations  as  circumstances  call  for.  The 
first  object  is  to  place  our  seaport  towns  out  of  danger  of  insult. 
Measures  have  been  already  taken  for  furnishing  them  with  heavy 
cannon  for  the  service  of  such  land  batteries  as  make  a  part  of 
their  defence  against  armed  vessels  approaching  them." 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  seaboard  was  thrown  by  such  a  docu 
ment  into  a  state  of  anxious  expectancy  and  that  sea  insurance 
doubled.  The  President  continued  his  message  with  a  statement 
of  what  was  desirable  for  defence — "a  competent  number  of  gun 
boats,  and  the  number,  to  be  competent,  must  be  considerable"; 
and  such  an  organization  of  the  militia  "as  would  enable  us  on 
any  sudden  emergency  to  call  for  the  services  of  the  younger  por 
tion"  were  recommended.  No  word  of  a  navy  was  uttered  be 
yond  discussing  whether  it  was  advisable  to  limit  the  comple 
ment  of  the  few  frigates  to  two-thirds  the  full  number  as  the  law 
now  required. 

Six  days  later,  on  December  9,  a  second  message  promised  in  the 
first  was  sent  as  a  confidential  document  with  the  papers  relating  to 
the  late  abortive  negotiation,  and  next  day  additional  documents 
illustrating  the  seizures  and  plunders  of  American  property  in 
Cuba,  Puerto  Rico,  West  Florida,  and  Louisiana.  The  documents, 
said  the  message,  "authorize  the  inference  that  it  is  the  [Spaniards'] 
intention  to  advance  on  our  possessions  until  they  shall  be  repressed 
by  an  opposing  force."  No  recommendation,  however,  was  made, 
the  President  confining  his  warlike  fervor  of  a  few  days  before  to 
the  remark  that  "considering  that  Congress  alone  is  constitution 
ally  invested  with  the  power  of  changing  our  condition  from  peace 
to  war,  I  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  await  their  authority  for 
using  force  in  any  degree  which  could  be  avoided."1 

There  was  no  hint  in  the  message  of  the  entirely  new  direction 
which  his  diplomacy  had  taken,  and  which  he  was  confident  would 
solve  the  anxious  situation  which  he  so  graphically  detailed  in  his 
message  of  December  3,  and  which  in  reality  was  but  a  play  en- 

1  The  message  and  accompanying  documents  are  in  State  Papers,  II,  613- 
669;  those  regarding  depredations,  in  ibid.,  669-695. 


1805]        RANDOLPH  OPPOSES  ADMINISTRATION  97 

acted  for  the  supposed  benefit  of  the  French  government,  to  be 
taken  to  heart  by  Spain  in  the  new  negotiation  now  proposed  to  be 
set  on  foot.1  For  the  benefit  of  Congress,  John  Randolph  (the 
chairman  of  the  committee  to  which  the  message  was  referred)  was 
informed  privately  that  what  was  really  wanted  was  an  appropria 
tion  of  $2,000,000  to  carry  out  what  was  now  considered  a  compact 
with  France,  a  request  which  Randolph  bitterly  opposed,  as  laying 
the  burden  of  initiative  upon  Congress  and  not  upon  the  administra 
tion  which  had  brought  about  the  situation  and  which  should  be 
courageous  enough  to  say  what  it  wanted  and  what  it  intended 
doing.  Madison  told  Randolph  "that  France  would  not  permit 
Spain  to  settle  her  differences  with  us ;  that  she  wanted  money  and 
that  we  must  give  her  money  or  take  a  Spanish  or  French  war." 
"From  that  moment,"  said  Randolph,  "all  the  objections  I  had  to 
the  procedure  were  aggravated  in  the  highest  possible  degree.  I 
considered  it  a  base  prostration  of  the  national  character  to  excite 
one  nation  by  money  to  bully  another  out  of  its  property."  2 

It  is  out  of  place  to  discuss  the  party  schism  which  now  occurred, 
the  causes  of  which  laid  deeper  than  in  distaste  for  Jefferson's 
proposal,  so  properly  stigmatized  by  Randolph.  The  latter,  how 
ever,  failed  in  his  opposition,  and  a  bill  was  passed,  signed  by  the 
President,  February  13,  1806,  appropriating  the  money. 

But  more  than  this  was  necessary  to  propitiate  Napoleon. 
Santo  Domingo  had  now  almost  entirely  escaped  from  the  grasp  of 
France,  but,  as  the  richest  island  of  the  time,  the  trade  of  which, 
inward  and  outward,  had  at  times  amounted  to  $140,000,000, 
Napoleon  held  to  its  possession  with  a  fixity  of  purpose  which 
made  abhorrent  to  him  the  support  given  the  insurgent  blacks  by 
the  trade  with  the  United  States.  The  American  ships  left  their 
home  ports  armed,  a  procedure  in  itself  a  necessary  precaution 
against  the  swarm  of  piratical  rovers  in  the  Caribbean,  but  there 
was  frequently  a  superfluous  equipment  which  found  its  way  to 
the  Haytians.  In  a  despatch  from  Armstrong  of  August  10,  1805, 
was  enclosed  a  note  from  Talleyrand  written  in  terms  of  deep 
indignation,  which  closed  with  "his  Majesty  charges  me,  sir,  to 

1  See  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  November  24,  1805,  Gallatin's  Writings,  I,  264. 
1  Randolph's  speeches,  April  5  and  7,  1806,  Annals  of  Congress,  1805-1806, 
pp.  947,  985. 


98  NAPOLEON  OBEYED  [1806 

request,  in  his  name,  that  they  interdict  every  private  adventure 
which,  under  any  pretext  or  designation  whatever,  may  be  destined 
to  the  ports  of  St.  Domingo  occupied  by  the  rebels."  1 

This  note  was  soon  followed  by  another  in  much  more  peremp 
tory  terms,  saying,  "This  complaint  obliges  his  Majesty  to  con 
sider  as  good  prize  everything  which  shall  enter  the  port  of  St. 
Domingo  occupied  by  the  rebels,  and  everything  coming  out," 
ending  with:  "This  system  of  impunity  and  intolerance  can  no 
longer  continue  (ne  pourroit  durer  davantage),  and  his  Majesty 
is  convinced  that  your  government  will  think  it  due  from  its  frank 
ness  promptly  to  put  an  end  to  it."2 

Despite  the  strong  opposition  which  came  from  ship-owners  and 
from  the  men  of  more  independent  spirit  in  Congress,  Napoleon's 
mandate,  aided  by  the  South's  fears  of  the  rebel  negroes,  was 
obeyed  and  on  February  28,  1806,  a  bill  received  the  President's 
signature  declaring  forfeited  any  American  ship,  including  cargo, 
"which  shall  be  voluntarily  carried  or  shall  be  destined  to  proceed," 
to  Santo  Domingo.  The  law  was  limited  to  one  year. 

France  propitiated  at  every  point,  the  way  to  Florida  now  seemed 
clear,  and  on  March  13,  1806,  Madison  wrote  Armstrong  and 
Bowdoin  in  Paris,  directing  them  to  express  the  views  of  the 
administration  in  a  way  "which,  without  any  improper  conde 
scensions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  will  best  conciliate 
the  French  government  to  our  objects";  the  latter  was  to  be  in 
formed  "that  no  direct  communication  on  the  subject  has  been 
made  to  the  Spanish  government." 3  But  the  sacrifice  was  in  vain. 
Napoleon  was  now  holding  Florida  as  a  bait  for  an  American  al 
liance.  When,  on  May  1,  1806,  Armstrong  made  known  to  the 
French  foreign  office  his  instructions  just  received,  and  when  next 
day  Talleyrand  carried  the  subject  to  Napoleon,  the  latter  placed 
in  Talleyrand's  hands  a  formal  declaration  from  Charles  IV,  that 
on  no  account  would  he  alienate  the  Floridas.  This,  no  doubt, 
was  a  part  of  the  play  arranged  by  the  arch-schemer  himself,  for 
when  the  French  ambassador  in  Madrid,  urged  by  Talleyrand,  and 
making  the  mistake  of  supposing  constancy  in  Napoleon's  wishes 

1  State  Papers,  II,  726. 

1  Talleyrand  to  Armstrong,  August  16,  1805,  Ibid.,  II,  727. 

8  Ibid.,  Ill,  539. 


1808]  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  THE  PRICE  OF  FLORIDA       99 

or  plans,  obtained  from  Godoy,  in  June,  an  agreement  to,  refer  the 
negotiation  of  the  questions  in  dispute  to  Paris,  he  met  stern  rebuke 
from  the  emperor  for  his  meddlesomeness.  The  subject  passed 
beyond  the  influence  of  the  American  minister  to  cause  a  recall, 
until  Napoleon  nearly  two  years  later  was  to  offer  the  Floridas  to 
America  if  she  would  join  with  France. 

The  autumn  of  1806  found  Napoleon,  through  the  battle  of  Jena, 
master  of  Prussia,  from  whose  capital,  on  November  21,  he  issued 
the  famous  Berlin  decree,  followed  a  year  later  by  the  yet  more 
drastic  decree  from  Milan  which  practically  annulled  neutral  rights 
and  carried  despair  to  the  American  ship-owner.  These  were  his 
answers  to  Jefferson's  attempts  at  propitiation.  He  was  determined 
if  possible,  now  that  the  French  navy  had  been  engulfed  at  Traf 
algar,  to  force  the  United  States  to  take  sides  against  England. 

The  great  numbers  of  sequestered  ships  soon  to  be  held  in  French 
ports  could,  the  American  minister  was  informed,  only  be  released 
when  the  American  government  should  take  sides  with  France,1  and 
on  February  2,  1808,  the  French  army  now  occupying  Spain,  Na 
poleon  directed  Champagny,  now  foreign  minister,  to  "Let  the 
American  minister  know  that  whenever  war  shall  be  declared  be 
tween  America  and  England,  and  whenever  .  .  .  the  Americans 
shall  send  troops  into  the  Floridas  to  help  the  Spaniards  and  repulse 
the  English,  I  shall  much  approve  of  it.  You  will  even  let  him  per 
ceive  that  in  case  America  should  be  disposed  to  enter  into  a  treaty 
of  alliance,  and  make  common  cause  with  me,  I  shall  not  be  un 
willing  to  intervene  with  the  court  of  Spain  to  obtain  the  cession 
of  these  same  Floridas  in  favor  of  the  Americans."2  Armstrong 
besought  "  the  government  to  select  its  enemy,  either  France  or 
England,"  but  "in  either  case  do  not  suspend  for  a  moment  the 
seizure  of  the  Floridas"3  and  informed  the  state  department  a 
week  later  that  the  emperor  was  determined  "that  the  Americans 
should  be  compelled  to  take  the  positive  character  either  of  allies  or 
enemies,"  ending  with  the  significant  words:  "If  I  am  right  in  sup 
posing  that  the  emperor  has  definitively  taken  his  ground  I  cannot 
be  wrong  in  concluding  that  you  will  immediately  take  yours."4 

1  Champagny  to  Armstrong,  January  15, 1808,  State  Papers,  III,  249. 
8  Napoleon,  Correspondence,  XVI,  301. 

•Armstrong  to  Madison,  February  15,  1808,  MSS.,  State  Department. 
4  Armstrong  to  Madison,  February  22,  1808,  State  Papers,  III,  250. 


100  INTRIGUE  WITH  FRANCE  ENDS  [1808 

Before  this  was  received  the  administration  had  taken  its  ground, 
but  not  in  the  sense  intimated  by  Armstrong.  On  May  2,  1808, 
Madison  wrote,  referring  to  Champagny's  note  of  January  15: 
"To  present  to  the  United  States  the  alternative  of  bending  to  the 
views  of  France  against  her  enemy,  or  of  incurring  a  confiscation 
of  all  the  property  of  their  citizens  carried  into  the  French  prize 
courts,  implied  that  they  were  susceptible  of  impressions  by  which 
no  independent  and  honorable  nation  can  be  guided,"  l  a  sentiment 
conveyed  to  the  French  government  in  a  note  of  July  4,  from  Arm 
strong,  who  six  days  later,  in  a  note  declining  more  definitely  the 
alliance,  expressed  the  satisfaction  of  the  administration  in  hearing 
of  the  emperor's  approval  of  "a  cautionary  occupation  of  the 
Floridas,"  which  had  come  to  the  American  government  through 
the  French  minister  at  Washington. 2  Napoleon  threw  over  the 
subject  as  if  never  in  question.  He  directed  the  foreign  minister: 
"Answer  the  American  minister  that  you  do  not  know  what  he 
means  about  the  occupation  of  the  Floridas,  and  that  the  Ameri 
cans,  being  at  peace  with  the  Spaniards,  cannot  occupy  the  Floridas 
without  the  permission  or  request  of  the  King  of  Spain."  3 

Intrigue  at  least  with  France  was  ended.  On  December  31, 
1808,  the  two  millions  appropriated  for  the  purchase,  but  in  reality 
as  a  bribe  to  Napoleon,  lapsed  and  the  American  minister  was  in 
formed:  "From  this  and  other  considerations  it  is  deemed  ex 
pedient  at  present  to  suspend  the  negotiation  in  relation  to  that 
subject."  4 

There  were,  however,  during  1805  and  1806,  other  serious  causes 
of  trouble  with  Spain  besides  the  attempts  of  the  American  ad 
ministration  to  close  the  questions  of  Florida  and  Louisiana.  Two 
men,  both  of  fervid  imagination  and  reckless  in  scheme,  appeared 
in  the  troubled  world  of  Spanish- American  politics.  One,  Miranda, 
can  be  granted  a  spirit  of  patriotism;  the  other,  Aaron  Burr,  ex- 
vice-president  of  the  United  States,  and  slayer  of  Hamilton,  looked 
to  the  dismemberment  of  the  western  country  from  the  Union,  and 

1  Madison  to  Armstrong,  State  Papers,  III,  252. 

1  Champagny  to  Turreau,  February  15,  1808,  Archives  des  Aff.  Etr.  MS8.t 
Adams,  IV,  308. 

a  Napoleon,  Correspondence,  XVII,  326. 

4  Robert  Smith,  secretary  of  state  to  Armstrong,  March  15,  1809,  State 
Papers,  III,  542. 


1806]  AARON  BURR  101 

the  setting  up  of  an  independent  empire  which  should  include 
Mexico.  Burr  intrigued  with  the  British  minister,  Jackson,  who 
lent  himself  to  his  views.  Failing,  however,  the  support  of  the 
money  and  fleet  requested  of  the  British  government,  which  in  no 
wise  accorded  with  its  minister,  Burr  turned  to  the  Spanish  minis 
ter  for  aid  in  Louisiana,  the  population  of  which  was  deeply  dis 
affected  and  ready  to  return  to  the  mastership  of  either  France  or 
Spain.  ^Should  circumstances  favorjthe  fault  was  largely  with  the 
federal  administration,  which,  besides  being  indifferent  to  their 
demands  for  self-government,  had  sent  a  governor  unfitted  for 
such  a  post,  and  retained  in  command  of  its  forces  a  traitor  in 
the  pay  of  Spain.  The  French  prefect  of  a  few  weeks  thus  de 
scribes  Claiborne,  the  governor,  and  Wilkinson,  the  general.  "The 
first,  with  estimable  private  qualities,  has  little  capacity  and  much 
awkwardness,  and  is  extremely  beneath  his  place;  the  second, 
already  long  known  here  in  a  bad  way,  is  a  flighty,  rattle-headed 
fellow,  often  drunk,  who  has  committed  a  hundred  impertinent 
follies."  *  That  Wilkinson  was  deep  in  Burr's  conspiracy,  though 
he  was  later,  but  very  tardily,  to  assist  in  revealing  it,  is  undoubted. 
To  what  point  his  Spanish  connections  would  have  led  him  is, 
of  course,  but  wild  conjecture  with  such  a  character.  Spain  had 
full  knowledge  of  Burr's  plans  and  was  apprehensive  as  to  Mexico 
and  the  Floridas.  That  there  was  hope  in  the  heart  of  the  Spanish 
minister  at  Washington  of  a  gain  to  Spain  through  Wilkinson's 
association  with  Burr's  project  may  be  supposed  from  his  despatch 
home  of  December  4,  1806.  "  I  wrote  to  the  governors  of  both 
Floridas  and  to  the  viceroy  of  Mexico,  giving  them  a  general  idea  of 
this  affair  and  recommending  them  to  watch  the  movements  of 
Colonel  Burr  and  his  adventurers.  This  is  an  excess  of  precau 
tion  since  by  this  time  they  must  not  only  know  through  the  New 
Orleans  and  Natchez  newspapers  of  the  projects  attributed  to 
Colonel  Burr,  but  through  the  confidential  channel  of  the  No.  13 
[Wilkinson]  of  the  Marquis  of  Casa  Calvo's  cipher  with  the  Prince 
of  Peace,  who  is  one  of  the  conspirators,  and  who  is  to  contrib 
ute  very  efficaciously  to  the  scheme  in  case  it  shall  be  carried 
into  effect."  2 

1  Laussat  to  Decree,  April  8, 1804,  Gayarre",  III,  10;  Adams,  III,  298. 
1  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  MSS.,  Spanish  Archives,  Adams,  III,  263. 


102  FRANCISCO  DE  MIRANDA  [1806 

The  conspiracy  dwindled  to  but  a  picturesque  episode  and  left  the 
Louisianians  unsettled  and  uncertain.  It  did  one  good,  however; 
it  opened  the  eyes  of  the  administration  to  the  serious  character  of 
the  feeling  of  the  French-Spanish  population.  Fifteen  hundred 
Spanish  troops  were  in  the  Red  River  region,  with  a  strong  gar 
rison  at  Bayou  Pierre  and  a  force  close  to  Natchitoches.  There 
was  evidently  now  no  intention  on  the  part  of  Spain  of  yielding 
Texas  except  under  pressure.! 

Francisco  de  Miranda,  born  at  Caracas  June  9,  1756,  had  been 
an  officer  in  the  Spanish  army,  which  he  left  in  1783  under  strong 
suspicion  of  disloyalty.  He  then  passed  some  time  in  the  United 
States  and  became  very  friendly  with  Hamilton,  whom  he  imbued 
with  his  ideas  of  independence  for  the  South  American  provinces. 
He  went  to  Europe  and  was  general  of  a  division  under  Dumouriez 
in  the  French  republican  army.  Obliged  to  leave  France,  he  went 
to  England,  then  (1798)  at  war  with  France  and  Spain,  and  inter 
ested  Pitt  in  his  schemes,  as  also  Mr.  Rufus  King,  the  American 
minister  at  London,  who  regarded  the  situation  of  affairs  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain  as  very  serious  and  Miranda's  pro 
jects  as  offering  a  welcome  aid  to  the  former  in  case  of  war.  Eng 
land's  action  depended  entirely  on  Spain's  attitude  toward  France.1 

Miranda  came  to  the  United  States  in  November,  1805,  with 
numerous  letters  of  introduction  which  gave  him  an  excellent 
standing  with  the  prominent  men  he  sought  to  meet;  among  them 
Jefferson  and  Madison.  All  were  undoubtedly  sympathetic, 
though  he  was  informed  by  Madison  that  the  United  States  could 
not  aid  or  countenance  any  secret  enterprise  and  would  interfere 
in  case  of  infraction  of  the  law.  Madison's  attitude  was  represented 
very  differently  to  William  Smith,  surveyor  of  the  port  of  New 
York  and  a  warm  friend  of  Miranda's,  and  to  a  Mr.  Samuel  Ogden, 
who  both,  moved  by  the  impression  of  the  government's  favor,  gave 
him  aid,  Ogden  furnishing  him  the  ship  Leander  in  which  he  was  to 
sail  with  his  expedition.  He  left  New  York  February  1,  1806,  his 
almost  last  act  being  to  write  a  most  compromising  letter  to  Madison, 
which  gave  the  impression  that  the  latter  was  fully  informed  of  the 
expedition  and  was  in  sympathy  with  its  purpose.  Miranda 
touched  Jamaica,  purchasing  there  two  schooners  in  which  thirty- 

1  King  to  Madison,  April  6,  1798,  King,  Life  and  Correspondence,  II,  653. 


1806]  ADMINISTRATION  COMPROMISED  103 

six  Americans  of  the  expedition  were  placed,  and  proceeded  to  the 
Venezuelan  coast. 

The  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  had,  however,  been  fully 
informed  of  Miranda's  preparations,  and  had  despatched  swift 
vessels  to  warn  the  officials  of  the  Spanish  main.  The  result  was 
the  capture  of  the  schooners,  the  escape  of  the  Leander,  and  the 
failure  of  the  expedition,  which  had  no  real  result  except  to  deeply 
compromise  the  administration  and  give  grounds  for  Spanish  re 
sentment,  of  which  every  advantage  was  taken  by  the  Spanish 
minister,  now  so  completely  persona  non  grata  that  the  action  he 
desired  had  to  be  taken  through  the  representative  of  France. 

Smith  was  removed  from  office;  both  he  and  Ogden  were  in 
dicted  and  tried.  Though  the  judge  charged  strongly  against  them, 
the  jury  found  them  not  guilty.  Both  claimed  that  the  scheme  had 
the  secret  support  of  the  government.  Madison,  however,  though 
both  he  and  Jefferson  were  unwise  in  the  outwardly  cordial  treat 
ment  given  Miranda,  must  be  believed  in  the  statement  "that  the 
government  proceeded  with  the  most  delicate  attention  to  its  duty," 
adding,  "I  do  not  believe  that  in  any  instance  a  more  unexception 
able  course  was  ever  pursued  by  any  government."  l 

Not  only  Madison's  word  but  circumstances  speak  for  the  truth 
of  this.  That  the  American  executive  should  hazard  the  friendship 
and  good  offices  of  France  in  the  subject  of  Florida,  so  near  the 
heart  of  the  President,  by  favoring  the  schemes  of  an  adventurer, 
the  success  of  which  meant  the  enmity  of  France,  was  not  in  reason. 
Miranda's  adventure,  though  appearances  favored  Spain's  strong 
animadversions,  cannot  be  regarded  as  important  other  than  as 
being  the  forerunner  of  the  great  revolt  which  was  to  begin  four 
years  later,  with  all  the  horrors  which  have  ever  accompanied  the 
civil  strifes  of  the  Spanish  race.2 

It  has  been  seen  how  completely  the  concession  to  France  in  the 
matter  of  Florida  failed  of  its  purpose.  The  American  govern- 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  March  10,  1806,  Works,  II,  220. 

3  Miranda  returned  to  England,  where  his  views  would  have  met  with  success 
but  for  the  invasion  of  Spain.  He  reappeared  in  Venezuela  in  1810,  was 
dictator  in  1812,  and  surrendered  to  the  Spanish  forces  July  25  of  that  year; 
imprisoned  at  Cadiz,  he  died  there  July  14,  1816.  See  an  admirable  history  of 
his  picturesque  life,  by  W.  S.  Robertson,  An.  Rep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1907,  vol.  I. 


104  NATIONAL  HUMILIATION  [1807 

ment  was  left  with  the  consciousness  that  it  had  lent  itself  to  an 
immoral  scheme  and,  moreover,  that  it  had  done  so  uselessly. 
Beset  with  the  idea  that  he  must  obtain  Florida  at  any  cost,  Jef 
ferson,  in  his  intrigue  with  Napoleon,  stifled  conscience  and  threw 
over  any  constitutional  scruples,  such  as  he  expressed  as  to  the  ac 
quirement  of  Louisiana,  which  may  have  remained.  He  was  ready 
to  despoil  Spain  by  a  money  payment  to  her  oppressor,  hugging  the 
idea  of  treating  the  warring  powers  of  Europe  with  impartial  neu 
trality  while  all,  in  effect,  were  waging  war  against  his  country.  It 
was  with  too  much  truth  that  the  French  minister  could  write  "  that 
[the  United  States]  is  disposed  to  suffer  every  kind  of  humiliation, 
provided  it  can  satisfy  both  its  sordid  avarice  and  its  projects  of 
usurpation  over  the  Floridas."  1 

Great  Britain  had  begun  a  course  which  called  for  war  even  more 
strongly  than  did  that  of  France  and  Spain,  and  which  in  a  few 
years  was  to  bring  war,  with  a  vast  expenditure  of  treasure  and, 
except  for  the  conduct  of  the  navy  and  the  saving  victory  of  New 
Orleans,  still  vaster  humiliation.  New  York  was  practically 
at  times  a  blockaded  port.  In  1806  two  British  frigates,  the 
Cambrian  and  Leander,  were  boarding  and  searching  every  entering 
vessel.  Shot  were  freely  used  to  bring  them  to,  and  so  carelessly 
that  a  man  in  a  coasting  sloop,  in  line  with  the  vessel  brought  to, 
was  killed.  Many  ships  were  seized,  and  if  not  condemned  at 
Halifax,  whither  they  were  sent,  were  subjected  to  almost  intermi 
nable  delays  and  great  costs.  A  thousand  seamen  were  being  im 
pressed  from  American  ships  yearly.  The  European  world  was 
now  in  the  throes  of  war,  and  passive  America  was  one  of  the  vic 
tims.  Spain,  February  19,  1807,  had  followed  Napoleon's  Berlin 
decree  of  November  21,  1806,  and  American  merchant-men  were  a 
natural  prey;  they  were  equally  the  victims  of  the  British  orders  in 
council,  and  the  whole  was  crowned,  June  22,  1807,  by  the  attack 
of  the  British  ship  Leopard  upon  the  practically  defenceless  frigate 
Chesapeake,  which  has  just  left  the  capes  of  Virginia  for  Tripoli, 
the  killing  of  three  men,  the  wounding  of  eighteen,  and  the  removal 
of  four.  The  ignoble  answer  to  all  these  insults  was,  on  December 
22,  1807,  the  embargo,  which  forbade  American  ships  to  go  to  sea, 
and  brought  American  foreign  commerce  to  a  stand-still. 

1  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  September  4,  1807,  Archives  des  Aft.  Etr.  MSS., 
Adams,  IV,  141. 


1807]  AMERICA'S  TRUE  COURSE  105 

There  are  some  things  worse  than  war,  and  among  them  was  the 
course  of  Jefferson's  administration  at  this  period.  Jefferson's 
failure  to  appreciate  the  degradation  to  which  his  policy  was  bring 
ing  the  country  was  a  mental  shortness  of  vision,  a  defective 
judgment  such  as  makes  it  impossible  to  rank  him  as  a  statesman, 
if  a  statesman  be  "one  with  broad,  sagacious  views  and  distin 
guished  ability  in  dealing  with  questions  arising  in  public  affairs." 
With  national  insult  and  injury  which  an  unsuccessful  war  could 
hardly  exceed,  he  held  to  the  view  that  a  navy  was  "a  ruinous 
folly,"  2  and  the  only  approach  to  armament  to  which  he  could 
bring  his  mind  (and  he  had  his  way)  was  to  build  a  great  number 
of  petty  and  useless  gun-boats  which  could  not  go  to  sea  with  safety 
without  striking  their  one  gun  into  the  hold,  and  lay  up  the  few 
frigates  (which  later  were  to  save  the  country's  good  name)  to 
"serve  as  receptacles  for  enlisting  seamen,  to  fill  the  gun-boats 
occasionally."  3 

The  only  true  and  statesman-like  course  which  the  administration 
could  have  taken  was  that  suggested  by  Gallatin:  to  expend  the 
yearly  surplus  of  from  two  to  three  millions  in  line  of  battle  ships. 
Trafalgar  had  been  fought.4  The  navy  of  France,  already  ineffi 
cient  and  demoralized  through  the  loss  of  trained  officers  by  the 
revolution,  and  through  inability,  on  account  of  the  superior  force 
of  England,  to  keep  the  sea  and  acquire  the  sea-habit  so  necessary 
to  efficiency,  was  now  powerless;  that  of  Spain  was  always  at 
the  period  a  negligible  quantity.  The  action  for  America,  even 
had  Trafalgar  not  been,  was  to  arm;  to  occupy  Texas  to  the  boun 
daries  set  in  the  instructions  by  France  to  her  agent  when  Louisiana 
was  transferred;  to  have  let  come  war  with  Spain  or  with  both 
Spain  and  France  if  it  would.  Spain's  depredations  against  our 
commerce,  her  militant  attitude  in  what  should  have  been  non- 
debatable  territory,  her  unwarrantable  impositions  against  Ameri 
can  cargoes  in  transit  at  Mobile  fully  justified  such  a  course. 

The  bare  fact  of  putting  afloat  such  a  naval  force  as  the  proposed 
Florida  expenditure  would  have  provided,  would  have  made  both 
Napoleon  and  Canning  (the  latter  now  the  deus  ex  machina 

1  Standard  Dictionary. 

1  Letter  to  Paine,  September  6,  1807,  Writings,  IX,  136. 

*  Cabinet  Memoranda,  October  22,  1807,  Jefferson,  MSS.,  Adams,  IV,  159. 

4  October  21,  1805. 


106  WHAT  A  NAVY  WOULD  HAVE  SAVED  [1808 

Britannica)  our  friends.  The  one  would  have  curried  favor  in 
the  hope  of  such  naval  assistance;  the  other  would  have  recog 
nized  the  impolicy  and  danger  of  driving  to  the  wall  a  power  whose 
seamen  had  shown  themselves  as  able  and  daring  sailors  as  the 
English,  and  of  a  temper  and  training  which  made  meeting  them 
a  very  different  proposition  to  that  in  which  the  British  navy,  since 
the  French  revolution,  had  won  such  easy  renown. 

Whether  with  or  without  a  war,  a  navy  would  have  saved  us  the 
six  years  of  humiliation  which  were  to  intervene  between  1806  and 
1812;  it  would  have  saved  the  embargo  which  was  to  tie  to  the 
wharves  in  rotting  idleness  more  than  a  million  tons  of  shipping 
which  had  been  engaged  in  foreign  trade;  to  bring  grass-grown 
streets  in  our  greatest  ports,  and  to  strain  the  sentiment  of  the 
several  sections  of  the  Union  to  the  point  of  separation.  It  would 
have  saved  the  war  of  1812,  the  capture  and  burning  of  Washington, 
and  the  shameful  ineptitude,  with  one  brilliant  exception,  of  our 
army  commanders  in  that  contest;  it  would  have  saved  Texas  and 
the  war  with  Mexico.  There  would  have  been  a  cessation  of 
British  impressment,  and  there  would  have  been  no  such  orders 
in  council  as  those  directed  to  the  destruction  of  American  com 
merce;  or  had  these  come  before  America  was  ready  with  her  ships, 
there  would  have  been,  as  soon  as  these  were  afloat,  quick  renun 
ciation. 

England  was  now  losing  an  empire  on  the  river  Plate  by  the  sur 
render  by  General  Whitelock  at  Buenos  Ayres,  July  7,  1807,  of 
an  army  of  twelve  thousand  men  sent  to  conquer  the  country; 
the  first  effort  toward  the  revolt  of  Spanish  America,  as  just  seen, 
had  failed;  Spain,  by  February,  1808,  was  occupied  by  a  French 
army.  On  March  19  the  old  King  Charles  IV  abdicated  in  favor 
of  his  worthless  son  known  as  Fernando  VII.  By  April  both 
were  in  France  in  the  clutches  of  Napoleon,  the  former  never  to 
return  to  Spain,  the  latter  to  be  a  willing  prisoner  in  exile  until  1814* 
For  five  years  Spain,  occupied  as  a  battle-field  by  French  and 
English,  was,  as  a  nationality,  effaced.  But  the  schemes  wrought 
by  Napoleon's  vast  imagination  had  reached  too  far.  The  insur 
rection  of  the  second  of  May,  1808,  at  Madrid,  was  the  signal  of 
his  own  coming  defeat  and  the  forerunner  of  a  movement  which 
carried  "  the  vast  Spanish  empire  into  the  vortex  of  dissolution.  .  .  . 


1808]  A  NEW  ERA  107 

Spain,  France,  Germany,  England  were  swept  into  a  vast  and 
bloody  torrent  which  dragged  America,  from  Montreal  to  Valparaiso, 
slowly  into  its  movements,  while  the  familiar  figures  of  famous 
men — Napoleon,  Alexander,  Canning,  Godoy,  Jefferson,  Madison, 
Talleyrand,  emperors,  generals,  presidents,  conspirators,  patriots, 
tyrants,  and  martyrs  by  the  thousand — were  borne  away  by  the 
stream,  struggling,  gesticulating,  praying,  robbing,  each  blind  to 
everything  but  selfish  interest,  and  all  helping  more  or  less  un 
consciously  to  reach  the  new  level  which  society  was  obliged  to 
seek.  Half  a  century  of  disorder  failed  to  settle  the  problems  raised 
by  the  Dos  de  Maio,  but  from  the  first  even  a  child  could  see  that 
in  the  ruin  of  a  world  like  the  empire  of  Spain,  the  only  nation  cer 
tain  to  find  a  splendid  and  inexhaustible  booty  was  the  republic 
of  the  United  States."1 

1  Adams,  IV,  301. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   EFFECT    IN    AMERICA    OF    NAPOLEON 's    INVASION    OF   SPAIN- 
EVENTS   IN  THE   FLORIDAS 

THE  United  States  thus  had  already  been  drawn  into  the  seeth 
stirred  by  the  magic  wand  of  the  great  emperor  when  came  Na 
poleon's  invasion  of  Spain  which  was  to  bring  his  own  ruin  and 
that  of  the  Spanish  dominion  in  America. 

The  revolt  against  his  domination  of  the  peninsula  found  ex 
pression,  after  the  fateful  second  of  May,  1808,  in  the  formation 
of  juntas  in  every  province  of  Spain,  as  well  as  in  London,  each  of 
these  assuming  authority  as  the  government  of  the  kingdom.  Out 
of  these  by  a  natural  survival,  due  to  escape  to  Cadiz  before  the 
victorious  advance  of  the  French  hosts,  grew  what  became  known 
as  the  Central  Junta,  which  though  it  soon  became  odious  to  the 
Spaniards  themselves,  offered  a  semblance  of  nationality  sufficient 
for  England  to  recognize  it  as  government  and  form  with  it  an 
alliance  about  which  gathered  such  forces  as  Spanish  revolt  against 
the  French  could  offer.  The  coming  into  existence  of  the  junta 
saved  European  Spain  but  it  wrecked  the  Spanish  empire  beyond 
the  seas. 

The  junta,  discredited  as  a  body,  was  finally  forced  to  appoint  a 
committee  of  five,  known  as  "The  Regency,"  which  assumed 
collectively,  as  had  the  junta  itself,  the  designation  of  "Majesty" 
and  exercised  in  Fernando's  name  the  authority  of  the  absent 
prince,  whom  the  junta  had  declared  king,  and  issued  decrees  as  if 
he  were  present.  It  ordered  the  election  of  a  cortes  with  one  mem 
ber  for  every  50,000  of  population  in  Spain,  but  only  allowed  one 
member  for  each  of  the  Spanish  provinces  of  America,  though  these 
had  been  declared  integral  members  of  the  Spanish  kingdom. 
As  the  peninsular  provinces  were  allowed  208  members  besides 
a  deputy  from  each  provincial  junta  and  one  from  each  city 

108 


1810]  SPANISH-AMERICAN  JUNTAS  109 

which  had  sent  deputies  to  the  Cortes  of  1789,  it  will  be  seen  how 
great  was  the  departure  from  a  theory  of  equality  which  had 
been  thrice  enunciated  in  a  few  months.  The  formation  of  pro 
vincial  juntas  in  America  in  imitation  of  those  in  Spain  was  but 
a  natural  and  proper  act  of  self-preservation  forced  upon  them  by 
the  apparent  fact  that  Spain  was  to  become  French  and  by  the 
beginnings  of  an  assumption  of  authority  by  the  latter  in  America 
itself.  The  new  juntas  in  the  beginning,  in  an  access  of  loyalty, 
and  in  their  fear  of  French  domination,  had  declared  for  Fernando 
and  had  enthusiastically  allied  themselves  with  the  central  junta 
at  Cadiz,  demonstrating  their  faith  by  contributions  of  many 
millions.  *  Appeals  were  made  for  reforms  most  of  which  were  self- 
evidently  rightful.  Among  them:  no  distinction  between  the  prov 
inces  of  the  Peninsula  and  those  of  America  in  national  representa 
tion;  freedom  to  cultivate  whatever  they  could  produce;  freedom 
to  manufacture,  to  trade  with  other  nations,  to  trade  with  one 
another  and  with  the  Spanish  possessions  in  Asia;  freedom  to 
trade  from  all  portions  of  Spanish  America  and  the  Philippines 
with  other  parts  of  Asia;  suppression  of  monopolies;  freedom  to 
work  the  quicksilver  mines;  equal  eligibility  of  all  persons  of 
Spanish  or  Indian  descent  to  office;  that  half  the  nominations  in 
the  kingdoms  of  Spanish  America  be  given  to  natives;  that  the 
order  of  the  Jesuits  be  restored  (the  last  on  account  of  the  success 
of  the  society  in  civilizing  the  Indians).  Through  the  remon 
strances  of  Cuba,  the  council  of  regency  had  passed  a  decree 
permitting  the  American  provinces  to  trade  with  foreign  nations 
in  their  own  productions  in  cases  where  there  was  no  market  for 
them  in  Spain.  "This  decree,  morally  just  and  politically  wise 
and  necessary,  did  not  suit  the  interests  and  was  offensive  in  the 
highest  degree  to  the  merchants  of  Cadiz, 2  on  whom  the  regency 
were  in  a  great  measure  dependent  for  the  means  of  continuing 
their  new,  feeble,  and  slippery  government.  This  decree  was  there 
fore  revoked  on  the  17th  of  June  [1810].  And  the  regency  had 
even  the  ridiculous  folly  to  pretend  that  it  was  not  authentic,  but 

1  Estimated  at  ninety  millions  of  dollars,  fifty-five  of  which  came  from 
Mexico,  Walton,  Dissensions  of  Spanish  America,  137. 

2  Spain  at  this  time  had  the  monopoly,  by  decree,  of  the  trade  with  the 
Spanish-American  possessions.     This  was  earlier  confined  to  the  one  port  of 
Seville;  later  the  sole  right  to  trade  was  transferred  to  Cadiz. 


110  THE  UNWISE  SPANISH  REGENCY  [1810 

an  imposition  on  the  public."1  It  ordered  "the  arrest  of  its 
minister  of  the  Indies  and  the  first  official  of  the  secretariat  of 
this  ministry,  and  sent  to  America  viceroys  and  royal  commis 
sioners  empowered  to  replace  the  juntas  which  had  been  established 
in  these  states,  commanding  them  in  a  jargon  of  affected  royalty 
'to  reassemble  in  whole  or  in  part  all  authority,  to  suspend  or 
set  aside  employees  of  whatever  class  or  grade,  to  use  whatever 
funds  pertain  to  my  royal  exchequer,  to  pardon  or  punish  as  you 
may  find  good,  and  give  such  orders  as  you  may  think  proper,  which 
shall  be  complied  with  as  if  from  my  royal  person,  so  that  in  no 
case  may  there  be  doubt  of  your  powers  for  want  of  sufficient 
expression.' ' 

But  the  actions  of  the  regency  developed  into  still  greater  mad 
ness  when,  on  July  27th,  1810,  the  formation  of  the  Caracas  junta 
was  proclaimed  treasonable,  and  the  ports  of  the  province  declared 
in  a  state  of  blockade  until  the  inhabitants  should  recognize  the 
regency  of  Cadiz  as  the  true  and  legitimate  representatives  of 
Fernando  VII. 

The  success  of  the  population  of  the  river  Plate  region  against 
the  British  in  1807  had  prepared  the  way  for  independent  action 
when  Spain,  by  1810,  had  apparently  become  permanently  a  prov 
ince  of  the  French  empire.  The  new  military  spirit  along  with  the 
spread  of  free  ideas  in  the  seven  months  of  British  occupation  of 
Montevideo,  the  active  trade  which  had  sprung  up  under  their 
auspices,  and  the  general  liberalism  of  their  policy  made  it  impos 
sible  to  cling  to  what  was  apparently  a  dying  cause  and  which  at 
the  same  time  was  insistent  in  continuing  the  ancient  despotism. 

Though  certain  to  come  with  time,  unless  there  had  been  an 
absolute  transformation  of  Spanish  political  character,  the  great 
movement  of  Spanish-American  secession  was  thus  precipitated, 
not  by  the  American  provinces,  but  by  Spaniards  of  Spain,  claim 
ing  at  the  time  to  rule  the  empire  in  the  name  of  the  absent  king; 
and  thus,  with  their  country  in  the  throes  of  an  agony  almost  that 
of  death,  and  which  would  have  resulted  in  its  extinction  as  a 
sovereign  state  but  for  English  aid,  they  began  a  contest  the  last 
shot  in  which  was  to  be  fired  eighty-eight  years  later.  With 
fatuous  light-mindedness  and  folly  they  led  Spain  to  despoilment; 
1  Annual  Register,  1810,  p.  225. 


1808]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  SPAIN  111 

one  by  one,  amid  the  horrors  of  a  civil  strife  rarely  matched  in 
history,  were  to  drop  away  all  the  provinces  of  her  vast  American 
empire,  leaving  for  the  moment  only  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  pro 
tected  awhile  by  the  slave  power  of  the  United  States  which  was 
to  forbid  the  action  of  their  sister  provinces  which  would  have  set 
them  free. 

The  influence  of  the  occupancy  of  Spain  by  the  French,  while 
thus  reaching  far  beyond  Europe,  had  perhaps  the  most  moment 
ous  of  its  effects  through  making  the  greater  part  of  South  Amer 
ica  permanently  Spanish  in  character  instead  of  Anglo-Saxon. 
For  the  Spanish  revolt  against  Napoleon  and  the  establishment  of 
even  a  nominal  national  government  brought  peace  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  Spanish  people;  the  ten  thousand  men 
assembled  at  Cork,  under  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  (soon  to  be  Duke  of 
Wellington),  for  the  purpose  of  invading  the  Spanish  possessions, 
were  diverted  to  the  Peninsula,  and  supremacy  in  the  southern 
continent  was  lost  to  Great  Britain  through  her  new  attitude.1 

Thus,  August  1,  1808,  Wellesley  and  his  army  were  landed  in 
Portugal  instead  of  in  South  America.  Thenceforward  Spain,  or 
that  which  was  accepted  by  England  as  the  Spanish  government, 
had  to  be  dealt  with  as  an  ally  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  latter  in 
some  degree  at  least  had  to  be  reckoned  with  by  the  United  States 
during  the  tightening  of  their  grip  upon  the  Floridas.  The  revolt 
of  the  South  American  provinces  now  about  to  develop  through 
the  ineptitude  and  folly  of  the  Cadiz  regency  could  but  have  the 
sympathy  of  the  American  government  and  people;  a  sympathy 
which  brought  in  its  train  numerous  complications  which  came 
through  the  material  assistance  rendered  the  provinces  by  the 
many  privateers  fitted  out  and  manned  in  the  United  States  and 
sailing  under  the  flags  of  the  new  states. 

Senor  Valentino  de  Foronda  had  succeeded  the  Marquis  de  Casa 
Yrujo  as  envoy  to  the  United  States  and  his  time  during  1808  and 
1809  was  taken  up  in  the  presentation  of  complaints  of  raids  and 

1  Wellesley  himself,  influenced  by  Miranda,  inclined  to  the  invasion  of 
Venezuela.  The  British  cabinet  apparently  wavered  between  this  and  the 
river  Plate.  Had  political  circumstances  favored,  simultaneous  attacks 
would  have  been  made  upon  both.  See  W.  S.  Robertson,  Francisco  de 
Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of  Spanish  America,  An.  Rep.,  Amer.  Histor. 
Assn.,  1907,  pp.  406-410. 


112  REVOLUTION  IN  WEST  FLORIDA  [1810 

plots.  In  1810  the  Chevalier  Don  Luis  de  Onis  was  accredited  as 
minister,  but  the  American  government,  now  holding  a  position  of 
strict  neutrality  until  the  question  of  occupancy  of  the  Spanish 
throne  should  be  decided,  refused  to  receive  him  as  such.  Such 
Spanish  consuls  as  had  been  received  before  the  invasion  of  Spain, 
were  continued,  but  none  others  received  an  exequatur.  Erving, 
charge*  d'affaires  in  Spain,  left  Madrid  in  May,  1810,  and  there 
were  no  recognized  diplomatic  officials  in  the  two  countries,  until 
1814,  when  the  same  official  was  appointed  minister  to  Spain. 
De  Onis  against  whom  were  charges  of  complicity  in  the  intrigues 
for  dismemberment  of  the  American  South-west,  besides  being  so 
unfortunate  as  to  write  a  depreciatory  letter  concerning  the  Amer 
ican  government  to  the  captain-general  of  Caracas,  February  2, 
1810,  which  was  made  public,1  was,  after  much  undignified  wran 
gling,  received  by  the  United  States  in  1815. 

Until  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from  Spain,  however,  the 
uncertainty  whether  Napoleon  or  Fernando  was  to  be  the  putative 
master  of  Spanish  America  brought  to  the  Floridas,  even  more 
than  to  the  other  American  provinces  of  Spain,  the  natural  unrest 
which  came  from  want  of  headship.  The  population  was  chiefly 
an  extraordinary  mixture  of  adventurers,  filibusters,  and  men  of 
piratical  inclinations  and  life,  a  large  proportion  of  whom  were 
fugitives  from  justice.  These,  with  fugitive  slaves,  and  Indians 
sensitive  as  to  the  future  of  their  lands,  made  a  restless  community 
which  could  scarcely  be  expected  in  the  circumstances  of  Spanish 
anarchy  to  remain  quiescent  under  the  weak  domination  of  a  nomi 
nal  government. 

The  result  was  a  convention  in  the  spring  of  1810  of  the  inhabi 
tants  of  West  Feliciana,  which  declared  independence  of  Spain. 
The  fort  at  Baton  Rouge  was  seized  and  a  proposal  transmitted  to 
Washington  by  the  insurgent  president,  John  Rhea,  for  incorpora 
tion  with  the  United  States.  The  answer  was  a  proclamation, 
October  27,  1810,  by  Madison,  now  President,  taking  possession 
of  West  Florida,  which  while  claiming  the  region  justly  to  be  our 
own,  stated  that  a  crisis  had  "at  length  arrived,  subversive  of 
the  order  of  things  under  the  Spanish  authorities,  whereby  the 
failure  of  the  United  States  to  take  said  territory  into  its  possession 
1  State  Papers,  III,  404. 


1810]  WEST  FLORIDA  OCCUPIED  113 

may  lead  to  events  ultimately  contravening  the  views  of  both  par 
ties,  whilst  in  the  meantime,  the  tranquillity  and  security  of  our  ad 
joining  territories  are  endangered  and  new  facilities  given  to  the 
violators  of  our  revenue  and  commercial  laws  and  of  those  pro 
hibiting  the  introduction  of  slaves."  l 

Madison  unquestionably  had  inward  doubts  of  the  justice  of  his 
claim  of  actual  title,  however  much  the  necessities  of  the  case  de 
manded  such  action,  and  the  necessity  did  exist,  unless  anarchy 
were  to  be  tolerated.  Madison's  doubt  was  shown  by  the  mention 
in  the  proclamation  that  the  situation  would  "not  cease  to  be  a 
subject  of  fair  and  friendly  negotiation  and  adjustment."  It  was 
ordered  that  the  district  be  considered  a  part  of  the  territory  of 
Orleans,  soon  to  become  the  state  of  Louisiana. 

The  hint  of  events  "contravening  the  views  of  both  parties," 
meant  the  possibility  of  British  occupancy.  In  any  case  Great 
Britain  could  not  look  kindly  upon  such  action  as  that  now 
taken  against  the  interests  of  her  ally,  and  Mr.  Morier,  the 
British  charge*  d'affaires,  addressed  a  note  of  protest,  December 
15,  1810,  to  the  secretary  of  state  saying  that  "such  are  the  ties 
by  which  his  [Britannic]  Majesty  is  bound  to  Spain,  that  he  can 
not  see  with  any  indifference,  any  attack  upon  her  interests  in 
America."  2 

The  Spanish  governor  of  Florida,  Don  Vicente  Folch,  reinforced 
Madison's  action  by  writing  the  secretary  of  state  from  Mobile,  on 
December  2, 1810,  that  he  had  decided  "on  delivering  this  province 
[West  Florida]  to  the  United  States  under  an  equitable  capitulation, 
provided  I  do  not  receive  succor  from  the  Havana  or  Vera  Cruz, 
during  the  present  month;  or  that  his  Excellency,  the  Marquis  of 
Someruelos  (on  whom  I  depend)  should  not  have  opened  directly  a 
negotiation  on  this  point.  The  incomprehensible  abandonment  in 
which  I  see  myself,  and  the  afflicted  situation  to  which  this  province 
sees  itself  reduced,  not  only  authorize  me,  but  force  me  to  have  re 
course  to  this  determination,  the  only  one  to  save  it  from  the  ruin 
which  threatens  it.' 3 

President  Madison,  "  taking  into  view  the  tenor  of  these  several 
communications"  and  "the  posture  of  things  with  which  they  are 
connected,"  as  he  phrased  a  confidential  message  sent  to  Congress 

1  State  Papers,  III,  396,  397.  *  Ibid.,  Ill,  399.  3  Ibid.,  Ill,  398. 


114  BRITISH  PROTEST  [1811 

January  3,  1811,  and  moved  by  apprehension  of  the  Floridas  pass 
ing  from  Spain  to  another  power,  which  power  was  England, 
advised  an  act  which  was  passed  by  Congress  in  secret  session 
authorizing  the  President  to  take  possession  of  East  Florida, 
in  case  the  local  authority  should  consent  or  a  foreign  power 
attempt  to  occupy  it.  Two  commissioners,  George  Matthews 
and  John  McKee,  were  appointed  with  instructions,  dated  Jan 
uary  26,  1811,  from  Monroe,  secretary  of  state,  that  if  they  should 
find  the  local  authority  inclined  to  surrender  East  Florida  and  the 
remaining  portions  of  West  Florida,  the  surrender  was  to  be  ac 
cepted,  with  the  engagement  of  "re-delivery  to  the  lawful  sover 
eign,"  should  such  a  stipulation  be  insisted  upon.  Effective 
measures  were  to  be  taken  "in  case  of  the  actual  appearance  of 
any  attempt  to  take  possession  by  a  foreign  power."  The  aid  of 
military  and  naval  forces  was  assured  in  case  of  need.  Any 
stipulation  as  to  redelivery  was  not  to  impair  the  title  of  the 
United  States  to  the  country  west  of  the  River  Perdido.  * 

Mr.  Augustus  J.  Foster  had  been  transferred  in  April,  1811, 
from  Sweden  as  British  minister  to  the  United  States,  with  in 
structions  to  protest  against  the  occupation  of  West  Florida.  With 
the  added  reason  now  given  by  the  action  of  the  President  and  Con 
gress,  he  followed  up  Morier's  expostulation,  July  2,  1811,  with 
"  the  solemn  protest  of  his  Royal  Highness  [George,  Regent],  in  the 
name  and  on  behalf  of  his  Majesty,  against  an  attempt  so  contrary 
to  every  principle  of  public  justice,  faith,  and  national  honor,  and  so 
injurious  to  the  alliance  existing  between  his  Majesty  and  the 
Spanish  nation."  2 

Affairs  between  America  and  England  were  now  tending  toward 
war.  A  few  weeks  before  Foster's  arrival,  the  British  sloop  of 
war  Little  Belt  had  been  almost  destroyed  off  the  capes  of  the  Chesa 
peake  by  the  President  in  a  night  action,  claimed  by  the  Americans 
to  have  been  brought  on  by  a  first  shot  from  the  former,  and  the 
new  minister  found  the  American  government  in  any  but  a  mood 
to  be  expostulated  with  on  the  subject  of  Spain's  possessions.  He 
was  thus  vigorously  answered  by  Monroe,  secretary  of  state,  on 
November  2,  1811,  intimating  that  it  was  impossible  to  be  un 
mindful  of  the  possibility  of  the  occupancy  of  Florida  by  another 

1  State  Papers,  III,  571,  572.  '  Ibid.,  Ill,  543. 


1812]  EAST  FLORIDA  115 

power. *  Foster  had  already  given  vent  to  his  feelings  in  a  letter, 
July  5,  to  the  British  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  "It  w$s  with 
real  pain,  my  lord,  that  I  was  forced  to  listen  to  arguments  of 
the  most  profligate  nature,  such  as  that  other  nations  were  not  so 
scrupulous;  that  the  United  States  showed  sufficient  forbearance 
in  not  assisting  the  insurgents  of  South  America,  and  looking  to 
their  own  interests  in  the  present  situation  of  that  country"  2— - 
words  which  scarcely  came  well  from  the  minister  of  a  power  in 
whose  diplomacy  the  word  Copenhagen  had  but  a  short  time  before 
been  written  in  deepest  black. 

Matthews  read  as  the  spirit  of  his  instructions  much  more  than 
appeared  in  the  letter  and  the  result  was  the  seizure,  March  18, 
1812,  of  Fernandina  by  some  two  hundred  adventurers  under  the 
name  of  insurgents,  organized  with  Matthews's  aid  and  backed  by  a 
force  of  gun-boats,  stationed  in  the  near-by  waters  of  the  St.  Mary's 
to  enforce  the  non-importation  act  then  in  force  and  prevent  the 
illegal  traffic  of  which  Fernandina,  a  nest  of  smugglers,  was  a  centre. 
The  Spanish  garrison  of  an  officer  and  ten  men  surrendered,  the 
independent  flag  of  the  "patriots"  was  raised,  and  Matthews  with 
a  company  of  the  regular  army  crossed  the  river,  March  19,  and 
took  possession  of  Amelia  Island  subject  to  the  President's  approval. 
But  his  action  was  more  vigorous  than  desired.  On  April  4, 
Matthews  was  informed  that  it  was  not  "  the  policy  of  the  law,  or 
purpose  of  the  executive  to  wrest  the  province  forcibly  from  Spain," 
but  to  occupy  it  (with  the  consent  of  the  authorities)  to  prevent  its 
falling  into  the  hands  of  any  foreign  power,  "and  to  hold  that  place 
under  the  existing  peculiarity  of  the  circumstances  of  the  Spanish 
monarchy  for  a  just  result  in  an  amicable  negotiation  with  Spain." 
Matthews's  powers  were  revoked,  and  transferred  to  the  governor 
of  Georgia,  with,  however,  practically  no  change  in  the  situation.3 

President  Madison  regarded  the  event  as  making  "a  most  dis 
tressing  dilemma,"  4  but,  as  Monroe  mentioned  to  Serrurier,  the 
French  minister,  "there  would  be  more  danger  in  retreating  than 
in  advancing;  and  so,  while  disavowing  the  general's  too  precipi- 

1  State  Papers,  III,  544. 

3  MSS.,  British  Archives,  Adams,  VI,  38. 

1  State  Papers,  III,  572.     See  also  McMaster's  United  States,  III,  537-540. 

'  Madison  to  Jefferson,  April  24,  1812,  Works,  II,  532. 


116  BRITISH  FORCES  IN  FLORIDA  [1814 

tate  conduct,  they  would  maintain  the  occupation."  1  The  fear 
of  Great  Britain's  possible  course  justified  the  action.  On  June  18, 
1812,  the  United  States  declared  war  against  England,  and,  in 
anticipation  of  her  occupancy  of  Florida,  a  bill  was  introduced 
in  Congress  authorizing  the  President  to  establish  a  government 
over  the  whole  of  the  Floridas.  It  passed  the  House  June  25, 
1812,  and,  though  lost  in  the  Senate,  the  occupation  of  Fernan- 
dina  was  maintained  until  May  16,  1813. 

Nor  in  the  circumstances  of  a  scattered  freebooting  population 
of  whites  of  many  races,  of  warlike  Indians  and  fugitive  slaves, 
was  the  action,  in  the  face  of  the  oncoming  war,  unjustified.  Law, 
at  the  best  uncertain  in  its  justice,  is  a  mirror  with  many  reflections, 
and  among  these  stands  out  boldly  as  a  rule  of  conduct  that  of  self- 
preservation.  We  have  not  arrived  at  the  point  of  altruism  which 
leads  a  nation,  unless  under  stress  of  force,  to  sacrifice  a  course 
it  deems  necessary  to  its  safety. 

The  events  of  the  war  now  beginning  were  soon  to  go  far  toward 
justifying  the  proposed  action.  On  July  23,  1814,  Pensacola, 
Fort  St.  Michael  and  Fort  Barrancas,  the  latter  six  miles  distant 
from  the  town  at  the  entrance  of  Pensacola  Bay,  were  occupied, 
regardless  of  Spain's  neutrality,  by  a  British  force  of  some  hundred 
"colonial  marines,"  under  a  Lieutenant-Colonel  Edward  Nichols, 
supported  by  Captain  W.  H.  Percy,  the  senior  officer  of  the  Hermes 
and  Canon,  sloops  of  war.  Among  the  officers  of  the  marines 
were  a  Captain  Woodbine  and  Lieutenant  Ambrister,  both  of  whom 
were  to  be  heard  of  later.  Nichols  hoisted  the  British  flag  in  the 
forts  along  with  the  Spanish  and  issued  a  proclamation  which, 
while  appealing  to  Kentuckians  to  "range  yourselves  under  the 
standard  of  your  forefathers  or  be  neutral,"  was  described  four 
years  later  by  the  American  secretary  of  state  as  inviting  "all  the 
runaway  negroes,  all  the  savage  Indians,  all  the  pirates,  and  all  the 
traitors  to  their  country  whom  they  knew  or  imagined  to  exist  within 
reach  of  their  summons,  to  join  their  standard  and  wage  an  exter 
minating  war  against  the  portion  of  the  United  States  immediately 
bordering  upon  this  neutral  and  thus  violated  territory  of  Spain."  2 

1  Archives  des  Affaires  £trang'eres,  MSS.,  Adams,  VI,  242. 
*  J.  Q.  Adams,  November  28,  1818,  to  minister  at  Madrid,  State  Papers, 
IV,  539. 


1814]  JACKSON  OCCUPIES  PENSACOLA  117 

The  picture  was  not  overdrawn.  Pensacola  was  held  by  the 
English  in  amicable  sufferance  on  Spanish  part,  and  was  made 
the  central  point  of  distribution  of  arms  to  the  Indians,  the  move 
ment  being  but  a  belated  item  of  the  endeavor  by  British  officials 
to  combine  all  the  Western  tribes  in  war  against  the  United  States. 
The  battle  of  the  Thames,  October  5,  1813,  and  the  death  of  Te<- 
cumseh,  broke  the  Indian  power  of  the  Northwest;  on  March  27, 
1814,  an  equally  destructive  blow  had  been  struck  against  the 
Creeks,  who  by  a  treaty  made  August  9,  1814,  by  General  Jackson 
in  command  of  the  American  army,  were  forced  to  cede  the  greater 
part  of  their  lands  within  the  limits  of  the  Union  to  the  United 
States. 

The  Creek  war  brought  upon  the  borders  of  Florida  and  at 
Mobile  an  army  which,  now  used  to  expel  the  British  forces  in  the 
vicinity,  was  to  inflict  a  little  later  upon  the  British  expedition, 
intended  to  wrest  New  Orleans  and  Louisiana  from  the  United 
States  and  effect  their  return  to  Spain, 3  the  most  signal  defeat 
in  the  annals  of  the  British  army. 

The  English  commander,  shortly  after  Jackson's  arrival  at 
Mobile,  left  Pensacola  with  four  sloops  of  war  and  a  strong  de 
tachment  of  white  troops  and  Indians.  On  September  15  an 
attack  was  made  upon  Fort  Bowyer  at  the  entrance  to  Mobile 
Bay,  which  was  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  the  senior  officer's  ship 
the  Hermes.  Jajck^oa,  on  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  moved 
upon  Pensacola  and,  November  7,  occupied  the  place  and  took 
possession  of  the  Spanish  posts,  the  whole  of  the  British  forces 
leaving  the  bay  the  next  day  after  blowing  up  Fort  Barrancas.  By 
November  1 1  Jackson  was  again  in  Mobile  with  his  army. 

Monroe  had  written,  October  21, 1814,  warning  Jackson  against; 
"  measures  which  would  involve  this  government  in  a  contest  with  | 
Spain."     This  was  not  received  by  Jackson  until  his  expedition 
had  been  accomplished,  but  had  it  been  otherwise  it  is  very  sure 
that  such  an  impetuous  and  headstrong  character,  whose  only 

1  "You  will  discountenance  any  proposition  of  the  inhabitants  to  place  them 
selves  under  the  dominion  of  Great  Britain,  and  you  will  direct  their  disposi 
tion  toward  returning  under  the  protection  of  the  Spanish  crown  rather  than 
to  the  attempting  to  maintain  what  will  be  much  more  difficult  to  secure 
substantially,  their  independence  as  a  separate  state." — Instructions  to 
Ross,  September  6,  1814,  MSS.  British  Archives,  Adams,  VIII,  314,  315. 


118  THE  NEGRO  FORT  [1815 

government  was  his  own  judgment,  would  have  given  such  in 
structions  no  heed.  And  in  this  case  he  was  entirely  in  the  right. 
So  strongly,  however,  did  affairs  in  Florida  occupy  his  mind  that 
it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  and  with  much  delay  that  the 
seriousness  of  the  threat  against  New  Orleans  was  brought  to  his 
perception,  a  passiveness  which  was  to  be  nobly  retrieved  the  8th 
of  the  following  January. 

Peace  came  and  ColoneL  Nichols  had  returned  to  Florida  in 
April,  1815.  Of  his  own  motion,  as  his  action  was  entirely  dis 
avowed  by  the  British  government,  he  made  an  offensive  and  de 
fensive  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Seminoles,  "declared 
by  his  Britannic  Majesty  a  free  and  independent  people,"  and 
prompted  them  to  demand  the  return  of  the  lands  ceded  by  the 
treaty  made  by  Jackson,  as  in  accord  with  the  ninth  article  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain.  He  built  a  powerful  fort  on  the 
Appalachicola  River,  15  miles  above  its  mouth  and  120  miles  east 
of  Pensacola,  armed  with  a  number  of  cannon,  among  which  were 
one  32-pounder  and  three  twenty-fours,  and  stored  with  2,500 
muskets  and  accoutrements,  500  carbines,  500  swords,  400  pistols, 
300  quarter  casks  of  rifle  powder  and  763  barrels  of  common 
powder,1  and  this  while  the  governor  of  Pensacola  in  whose  juris 
diction  the  fort  was,  had  not  powder  enough  to  fire  a  salute.2 

Nichols  left  for  England  during  the  summer,  carrying  with  him 
the  chief  Francis  and  other  Indians  who  received  in  London  at 
tention  which  extended  to  the  giving  by  the  government  of  a  uni 
form  to  the  prophet  Francis,  the  presentation  of  other  gifts  and 
a  reception  by  the  prince  regent.  These  acts,  and  the  great  value 
of  the  arms  and  stores  in  the  Appalachicola  fort,  show,  despite  the 
asseverations  to  Mr.  Adams  the  American  minister,3  a  certain 
governmental  interest,  besides  a  powerful  financial  support  far  in 
excess  of  ordinary  individual  means. 

The  fort,  occupied  on  the  departure  of  Nichols  by  a  large  num 
ber  of  escaped  negroes  from  Georgia,  became  known  as  Negro 
Fort  and  was  soon  the  centre  of  raids  upon  the  Georgia  frontier. 
General  Jackson,  who  commanded  the  Southern  military  division, 

1  Parton,  Jackson,  II,  399. 

8  Captain  Amelung  to  Jackson,  June  4,  1816,  State  Papers,  V,  557. 

•  Adams  to  Monroe,  September  19,  1815,  Ibid,,  IV,  554. 


1816]  BORDER  DIFFICULTIES  119 

was  ordered,  March  15,  1816,  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Spanish 
governor  at  Pensacola  to  the  situation,  and  he  demanded,  un 
der  the  treaty  of  1795,  a  suppression  of  the  nuisance,  a  demand 
which,  though  made  by  Jackson  in  friendly  terms,  assured  the 
governor  that  if  not  put  down  by  Spanish  authority  the  United 
States  would  be  compelled,  in  self-defence,  to  act.1  The  governor 
declared  his  good-will  and  perfect  accord  with  Jackson's  views, 
and  that  he  had  proposed  to  the  captain-general  of  Cuba,  under 
whose  jurisdiction  he  was,  to  take  action,  but  that  he  could  not  act 
until  he  should  receive  orders  and  the  necessary  assistance.2 

General  Edmund  P.  Gaines,  second  in  command  to  Jackson  in 
the  district  and,  under  him,  charged  with  the  preservation  of  its 
peace,  had,  in  order  to  overawe  the  negroes,  built  Foit  Scott  close 
to  the  Florida  boundary,  at  the  junction  of  the  Flint  and  Chat- 
tahoochee  Rivers  which  form  the  Appalachicola.  The  difficulty 
of  transport  through  the  wild  and  roadless  region  made  it  necessary 
to  send  supplies  by  water  from  New  Orleans.  The  first  convoy 
sailed  thence,  June  24, 1816,  under  the  command  of  Sailing-Master 
Jairus  Loomis  of  the  navy.  Gaines  thinking  trouble  probable, 
ordered  Colonel  Clinch,  in  command  at  Fort  Scott,  to  go  down  the 
Appalachicola  to  the  vicinity  of  the  negro  fort,  to  secure  the  safe 
passage  of  the  convoy;  a  message  was  sent  Loomis  to  await  notice 
of  the  arrival,  near  the  fort,  of  these  troops.  He  arrived  off  the 
Appalachicola  River  July  10.  While  lying  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river  a  boat  was  fired  upon,  July  15.  Two  days  later  an  armed 
boat  under  Midshipman  Luffborough  was  sent  in  with  four  men 
for  fresh  water.  The  boat  was  attacked,  the  midshipman  and 
two  men  killed;  one  man  escaped,  and  one,  Edward  Danieils, 
was  carried  off  prisoner  and,  as  later  known,  tarred  and  burned 
to  death. 

On  July  16  Clinch  with  116  men  had  started  down  the  river. 
While  on  the  way  he  was  joined  by  a  large  body  of  Seminoles,  who 
were  at  enmity  with  the  negroes  and  who  agreed  to  act  in  concert 
with  him.  The  Indians,  scouting  in  advance,  seized  a  negro  with 
a  fresh  scalp  from  a  white  man,  and  learned  from  him  of  the 
attack  upon  the  boat's  crew  and  the  retirement  of  the  attacking 

1  Jackson  to  Governor  Zuniga,  April  23,  1816,  State  Papers,  IV,  556. 
a  Zuniga  to  Jackson,  May  26,  1818,  Ibid.,  V,  556. 


120  DESTRUCTION  OF  NEGRO  FORT  [1816 

party  to  the  negro  fort.  Word  was  sent  to  Loomis,  but  fifteen 
miles  away,  to  come  up  the  river  and  assist  in  an  attack.  The 
negroes  hoisted  the  British  union  jack  and  under  it  a  red  flag,  and 
opened  fire  with  their  heavy  guns,  with,  however,  no  effect.  All 
the  negroes  of  the  vicinity  had  on  Clinch's  advance  hurried  to  the 
fort,  which  now  contained  100  men  and  234  women  and  children. 
Loomis  arrived  July  27,  and  opened  fire  without  effect  until  a  shot 
heated  in  the  galley  fire  was  fired.  The  result  was  the  explosion 
of  the  10,000  pounds  of  powder  in  the  fort  and  the  destruction  of 
nearly  all  its  inmates.  Two  hundred  and  seventy  were  killed  in 
stantly.  But  three  were  unharmed,  among  them  the  leader  Gar9on, 
who,  delivered  over  to  the  Seminoles,  was  put  to  death.  An  unwise 
promise  by  Colonel  Clinch  to  the  Indians  to  give  them,  for  their  aid, 
the  arms  found  in  the  fort,  caused  the  distribution  among  them  of 
the  many  hundreds  of  muskets  and  pistols  later  to  be  used  effect 
ively  against  the  United  States,  and  the  possession  of  which,  no 
doubt,  had  influence  in  encouraging  the  Indians  to  the  hostilities 
soon  to  come.1 

>  Condensed  from  Parton,  Jackson,  II,  402-407. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  FLORIDA  TREATY  AND  JACKSON'S  INVASION 

FERNANDO  VII,  released  by  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  had 
returned  to  Spain  in  1814.  He  refused  to  accept  the  revolution 
ary  "liberal"  constitution  formed  at  Cadiz  in  1812,  and  urged,  it 
must  be  said,  by  a  large  proportion  of  the  Spanish  people,  reverted 
to  absolutism  as  it  was  understood  by  the  most  absolute  of  his 
predecessors.  The  Jesuits  were  brought  back,  the  monastic  orders 
restored  to  all  their  ancient  privileges,  the  inquisition  reinstated, 
and  the  prisons  filled  with  political  prisoners.  "  The  king's  crown 
ing  act  was  to  decree  the  death  penalty  to  any  one  who  dared  even 
to  speak  in  favor  of  the  constitution."1 

It  was  with  such  a  government,  now  also  faced  by  the  revolt  of 
the  Spanish-American  world,  that  the  United  States  had  to  deal. 
The  Chevalier  Luis  de  Onis,  after  much  unseemly  wrangling, 
had  been  received  at  Washington  in  December,  1815,  as  minister. 
He  was  to  demand  the  return  of  West  Florida  to  Spanish 
jurisdiction,  and  call  attention  to  the  fitting  out  in  United  States 
ports  of  privateers  and  expeditions  on  behalf  of  the  revolted 
provinces.2 

There  is  no  doubt  of  the  great  extent  of  such  procedure  or  of  the 
great  damage  to  Spain.  Such  vessels  under  the  flags  of  the  new 
born  sovereignties,  manned  largely  by  Americans,  swarmed  in 
the  western  seas,  with  little  inquiry  on  the  part  of  United  States 
authorities  as  to  the  validity  of  those  which  frequented  our  ports 
and  sold  their  captured  goods  with  impunity.  The  great  booty 
available  to  such  freebooters,  the  chaotic  state  which  was  the 
natural  result  of  a  world  everywhere  at  war,  brought  into  being  a 
great  number  of  such  rovers  whose  deeds  were  as  often  as  not  pirati- 

1  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  192. 

8  De  Onis  to  Monroe,  December  30,  1815,     State  Papers,  IV,  422-424. 

121 


122  THE  SCANDAL  OF  THE  PRIVATEERS  [1815 

cal  and  whose  extirpation  took  years  of  effort  and  long  occupied  the 
attention  of  the  greater  part  of  the  American  navy.  Baltimore  and 
Charleston  were  the  two  ports  more  particularly  concerned  in  this 
great  scandal.  Regarding  the  former:  "The  misfortune,"  said 
Adams,  when  he  became  the  American  secretary  of  state  in  1817, 
"  is  not  only  that  this  abomination  has  spread  over  a  large  portion 
of  the  merchants  and  population  of  Baltimore,  but  that  it  has  in-. 
fected  almost  every  officer  of  the  United  States  in  the  place.  They 
are  all  fanatics  of  the  South  American  cause.  Skinner,  the  post 
master,  has  been  indicted  for  being  concerned  in  the  piratical 
privateers.  Glenn,  the  district  attorney,  besides  being  a  weak, 
incompetent  man,  has  a  son  said  to  be  concerned  in  the  privateers. 
.  .  .  The  district  judge,  Houston,  and  the  circuit  judge,  Duval, 
are  both  feeble,  inefficient  men  over  whom  William  Pinkney  [one 
of  the  most  noted  lawyers  of  the  time],  employed  by  all  the  pirates  as 
their  counsel,  domineers  like  a  slave-driver  over  his  negroes." 

The  correspondence  which  ensued  between  the  American  secre 
tary  of  state  and  the  Spanish  minister  reiterated  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  to  West  Florida.  Monroe  affirmed  that  there  was 
not  only  no  doubt  as  to  the  justice  of  the  claim,  but  that  the 
United  States  government  had  "  never  doubted,  since  the  treaty 
of  1803,"  that  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana  "extended  to 
the  Rio  Bravo  (Rio  Grande)."  2  He  showed  that  the  enterprises 
to  aid  the  revolutionists  of  New  Spain  (Mexico),  of  which  De  Onis 
complained,  had  been  forestalled  by  the  American  authorities 
wherever  such  authority  extended,  and  gave,  in  a  report  of  the 
United  States  attorney  for  the  district  of  Louisiana,  the  names  of 

1  Adams,  Memoirs,   IV,  318,    319.    Adams   continues:   "The  grand   jury 
indicted  many,  and  the  petit  jury  convicted  one  man,  but  every  one  of  the 
causes  fell  through  upon  flaws  in  Glenn's  bills  of  indictment.     The  conduct  of 
the  juries  proves  the  real  soundness  of  the  public  mind;  .  .  .  the  political 
condition  of  Baltimore  is  as  rotten  as  corruption  can  make  it.     Now  that  it 
has  brought  the  whole  body  of  European  allies  upon  us  [the  Holy  Alliance]  in 
the  form  of  remonstrances,  the  President  is  somewhat  concerned  about  it, 
but  he  had  nothing  but  directions  altogether  general  to  give  me  concerning  it. 
I  must  take  the  brunt  of  the  battle  upon  myself  and  rely  upon  the  justice  of 
the  cause."     The  editor  appends  a  note:  "These  proceedings  formed  much  of 
the  staple  of  the  argument  of  the  British  government  in  justification  of  its 
•wn  course  during  the  late  civil  war.     It  will  appear  from  this  passage  how 
little  the  American  government  was  disposed  to  justify  them." 

2  State  Papers,  IV,  430. 


1816]  FLORIDA  NEGOTIATION  OPENED  123 

a  number  of  persons  presented  for  attempting  violation  of  neutral 
ity,  and  a  list  of  vessels  libelled  for  illegal  outfits  and  a  number  of 
those  captured  by  illegally  fitted  out  privateers,  which  were  re 
stored  to  their  owners.1 

The  European  world  being  now  at  peace  and  our  own  govern 
ment  freed  from  the  incubus  of  war,  serious  effort  was  making  to 
preserve  neutrality  in  connection  with  Spanish  America,  and  a 
statute  was  passed,  March  3, 1817,  in  accord  with  the  recommenda 
tion  of  President  Madison's  special  message,  December  26,  1816, 
to  strengthen  the  neutrality  act,  imposing  a  fine  not  to  exceed 
$10,000,  forfeiture  of  the  vessel,  and  imprisonment  not  exceeding 
ten  years  on  any  engaged  in  fitting  out  vessels  in  American  ports 
to  cruise  against  powers  with  which  the  United  States  was  at  peace.2 

The  American  occupancy  of  West  Florida;  the  necessary  tem 
porary  occupancy  of  East  Florida;  the  glaring  evidence  of  Spain's 
inability  to  control  the  scant  and  unwholesome  mixture  of  Indians, 
lawless  adventurers,  and  negroes  which  formed  the  chief  part  of 
the  population,  made  it  clear  to  Spain  that  the  Florida  provinces 
were  lost,  and  the  Spanish  government  soon  recognized  the  policy 
of  giving  Florida  for  as  much  of  Texas  as  the  American  govern 
ment  might  be  willing  to  yield,  and  as  a  set-off  to  the  still  unad 
justed  claims  of  the  United  States  for  commercial  depredations. 

De  Onis,  in  his  note  of  December,  1815,  and  in  conference, 
had  stated  the  desire  of  Spain  to  arrange  pending  differences, 
and  Mr.  Erving,  now  American  minister  at  Madrid,  was  thus 
directed  to  present  the  points  on  which  the  United  States  sought 
redress  and  indemnity,  these  being  "spoliations  on  their  com 
merce,  the  suppression  of  the  right  to  deposit  at  New  Orleans, 
and  the  refusal  of  the  Spanish  government  to  settle  the  boundaries 
of  Louisiana  on  just  principles/'  To  these  were  added  the 
encouragement  given  in  East  Florida  to  the  Indian  tribes  in 
Georgia  and  on  the  southern  frontier  to  make  war  on  the  United 
States;  the  aid  given  them;  the  aid  afforded  Great  Britain  by 
permitting  supplies  to  pass  through  East  Florida  to  its  Indian 
allies  and  allowing  her  to  establish  a  place  of  arms  in  Florida  to 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  432. 

2  The  extent  of  the  difficulties  arising  in  this  subject  may  be  judged  by  the 
complaints  of  the  Spanish  minister  in  1817,  Ibid.,  IV,  184-201. 


124  FLORIDA  NEGOTIATION  [1818 

support  the  Indians;  and  allowing  the  frigate  Essex  to  be  attacked 
by  two  British  frigates  in  Valparaiso  Bay.1 

Cevallos,  the  Spanish  foreign  minister,  in  a  note  of  September 
15,  1816,  informed  the  American  minister  that  De  Onis  was  em 
powered  to  enter  upon  the  negotiations  which  were  to  end  in  the 
treaty  known  as  that  of  1819.  The  Spanish  project  of  conditions, 
first  developed,  included  the  return  of  the  whole  of  Louisiana 
west  of  the  Mississippi  in  exchange  for  both  of  the  Floridas.2 

Monroe  was  now,  since  March  4,  1817,  President.  John 
Quincy  Adams,  minister  to  England,  had  come  thence  to  be 
secretary  of  state,  the  best-equipped  and  ablest  statesman  who 
during  our  history  has  held  the  office.  A  war  of  correspondence 
ensued  with  De  Onis  in  which  De  Onis  ably  upheld  the  Spanish 
view.3  On  two  of  the  contentions  he  held  impregnable  positions: 
1.  That  France  had  never  claimed  West  Florida  as  part  of  the  terri 
tory  ceded  by  the  French-Spanish  treaty  of  1800,  and  2.  That  the 
claims  against  Spain  for  French  depredations  on  American  com 
merce  were  ^unjust  in  view  of  the  French- American  treaties  of 
1800  and  1803.  The  United-States  stood  on  equally  firm  ground 
as  to  the  western  limit  of  Louisiana,  which  was  understood  by 
France  to  extend  to  the  Rio  Grande  and  thus  include  Texas,  as 
certainly  as  France  understood  that  the  eastern  boundary  was 
to  be  the  Iberville  and  Lake  Pontchartrain. 

On  January  16,  1818,  Adams,  in  a  short  despatch  to  De  Onis, 
laid  down  the  American  proposals :  Spain  was  to  cede  all  territory 
east  of  the  Mississippi;  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana  to  be 
the  Colorado,  to  its  source  and  from  thence  to  the  northern  limits 
of  Louisiana,  or  to  leave  that  boundary  unsettled  for  future  arrange 
ment;  the  claims  for  spoliations,  whether  Spanish  or  French,  Jx>  be 
arbitrated  as  agreed  in  the  convention  of  1802;  the  Florida  lands 
from  the  east  to  the  Perdido  River  to  be  answerable  for  such  claims; 
no  Spanish  grants  of  lands  subsequent  to  August  11,  1802,  to  be 
valid;  Spain  to  be  exonerated  from  the  payment  of  any  debts. 

These  proposals  did  not  differ  materially  from  those  made  in 
1805 4  and  were  in  accord  with  the  views  expressed  by  President 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  433,  434. 

3  Pizarro  to  Erving,  August  17,  1817,  Ibid.,  IV,  445. 

8  Ibid.,  452-463.  'Ibid.,  464. 


1817]  SEIZURE  OF  AMELIA  ISLAND  125 

Monroe  from  the  beginning  of  the  American  ownership  of  Louisi 
ana,  as  to  the  desirability  of  exchanging  part  at  least  of  Texas  for 
the  Floridas.  Adams  was  of  another  mind  and  held,  until  over 
borne  in  the  cabinet,  to  the  whole  of  Texas.  The  ensuing  corre 
spondence  embodied  the  ablest  statement  of  the  American  claims 
yet  made  in  one  of  the  best  papers  written  by  Adams  during  his 
term  of  office,  in  which  he  held  firmly  to  the  Rio  Grande  as  a 
boundary  by  all  historical  evidence.1 

But  the  negotiations  were  to  have  a  road  beset  with  dangers. 
On  June_29j_18I7,  there  landed  at  Amelia  Island,  on  the  north 
east  point  of  Florida,  on  the  Atlantic,  a  force  of  fifty jjdYfenturers 
gathered  chiefly  in  Baltimore  by  an  erratic  Scotchman  of  rank 
and  fortune,  a  Sir  Gregor  McGregor,  who  announced  him 
self  "  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  forces  both  naval  and  military, 
destined  to  effect  the  independence  of  the  Floridas,  duly  authorized 
by  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  republics  of  Mexico,  Buenos 
Ayres,  New  Granada,  and  Venezuela."  2  He  demanded  and  re 
ceived  the  surrender,  June  29,  1817,  of  the  Spanish  garrison  under 
Don  Francisco  de  Morales,  the  civil  and  military  commandant 
on  the  island.  He  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  Florida  in  a 
state  of  blockade, 3  and  shortly  after,  accompanied  by  the  British 
intriguer,  Captain  Woodbine,  of  Nichol's  late  command,  who  had 
arrived  from  Nassau,  left  for  New  Providence  to  gather  recruits, 
leaving  in  charge  R.  Hubbert,  a  man  who  had  been  sheriff  of 
New  York  City.  Woodbine,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant  Am- 
brister,  had  previously  to  this  made  his  appearance  on  the  Ap- 
palachicola  in  an  endeavor  to  arouse  the  Indians.  Going  in  an 

1  Adams  to  De  Onis,  March  12,  1818;  De  Onis  to  Adams,  March  23,  1818, 
State  Papers,  IV,  468-486.  This  paper  and  De  Onis's  reply  form  a  complete 
history  of  the  claims  of  the  contending  parties  in  this  celebrated  and  mo 
mentous  question.  As  to  Adams's  attitude,  he  himself  says,  "  in  all  the  nego 
tiations  conducted  by  me  while  secretary  of  state,  whether  with  Spain, 
France,  or  England,  I  insisted  invariably  upon  all  the  claims  of  the  United 
States  to  their  utmost  extent;  and  whenever  anything  was  conceded,  it  was 
by  direction  of  the  President  himself,  and  always  after  consultation  in  cabinet 
meetings,  and  that  it  was  especially  so  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Florida 
treaty." — Memoirs,  VIII,  186;  see  also  his  diary  for  February,  1819.  It  would 
seem  clear  that  the  loss  of  Texas  at  this  time  was  due  to  Monroe,  supported 
by  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet. 

3  State  Papers,  IV,  144. 

« Niles's  Register,  September  6,  1817,  p.  28. 


126      "MEXICAN"   INVASION  OF  AMELIA  ISLAND    [1817 

armed  vessel  elsewhere  for  supplies,  he  left  Ambrister  as  his 
agent,  to  the  latter's  final  great  undoing. 

A  thousand  miles  away,  in  distant  Mexico,  was  a  "Commodore" 
Aury  who,  "with  a  few  small  schooners  from  Aux  Cayes  [in 
Hayti],  manned  in  a  great  measure  with  refugees  from  Barataria, 
and  mulattoes,  and  reinforced  by  a  few  more  men,  French  and 
Italians,  who  had  been  hanging  loose  upon  society  in  and  about 
New  Orleans,"  had  set  up  a  semblance  of  government  at  Galveston, 
under  the  Mexican  flag.  From  this  station,  "fed  and  drawing  all 
its  resources  from  New  Orleans,  ...  an  active  system  of  plunder 
was  commenced  on  the  high  seas,  chiefly  of  Spanish  property,  but 
often  without  much  concern  as  to  the  national  character"  of  the 
prizes,  the  cargoes  of  which,  including  every  sort  of  merchandise, 
from  jewelry  and  laces  to  slaves,  were  chiefly  surreptitiously  carried 
into  Louisiana.1 

Aury  transferred  himself  to  Matagorda,  and  hearing  of  Mc 
Gregor's  venture  sailed  for  Fernandina  with  a  force  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty  men.  Arriving  in  October  with  his  "squadron  of  priva 
teers  and  prizes,"  he  found  Sheriff  Hubbert  and  the  others  of 
McGregor's  supporters  entirely  out  of  funds,  and  refused  them 
aid  unless  "on  condition  of  being  made  commander-in-chief; 
and  that  as  "General"  McGregor  never  had  any  commission 
whatever,  the  flag  of  the  Florida  republic  must  be  struck  and  that 
of  the  Mexican  hoisted;  and  that  Fernandina  should  be  con 
sidered  as  a  conquest  of  the  Mexican  republic  (under  which 
he  was  commissioned)  without  its  being  necessary  that  any  other 
part  of  the  province  of  East  Florida  should  be  conquered."  2 

McGregor's  force  of  necessity  yielded.  Hubbert  died  through 
intemperance  and  mortification  of  spirit,  and  his  party,  mostly 
American,  English,  and  Irish  sailors,  were  without  a  leader  and 
under  the  heel  of  Aury's  followers,  "composed  chiefly  of  brigand 
negroes,"  though  as  the  Americans  were  reported  by  Captain 
Henley  of  the  navy  as  apparently  "much  worse  than  any  others," 
sympathy  need  not  be  wasted. 

(The  President's  duty  under  the  joint  resolution  of  January  15, 

1  dhew,  collector  of  the  port  at  New  Orleans,  to  Crawford,  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  August  1,  1817,  State  Papers,  IV,  134. 

2  Mclntosh  to  Crawford,  October  30,  1817,  Ibid.,  IV,  138. 


1817]  AMERICAN  OCCUPANCY  127 

1811,  empowering  him  to  occupy  any  part  of  the  territory  of  Florida, 
in  the  event  of  an  attempt  to  occupy  it  on  the  part  of  any  foreign 
power,  was  clear.  In  Spain's  powerless  condition  the  action 
taken  was  a  kindness  to  the  Spanish  government.  A  naval  force 
under  Captain  J.  D.  Henley  and  an  army  detachment  under  Major 
James  Bankhead  were  sent,  and  December  22,  1817,  Aury,  after 
protest,  surrendered.  The  American  flag  was  hoisted,  and  Aury  with 
his  squadron  withdrew. 

The  incident  had  but  a  six  months'  life,  but  it  illustrated  in  full 
the  desperate  condition  of  Spain,  and  her  inability  to  preserve  the 
peace  in  the  wild  region  bordering  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  at  this 
period  the  happy  hunting  ground  of  the  most  lawless  of  the  world's 
adventurers.  In  all  the  region  of  Florida,  as  large  as  England  and 
Wales,  there  were  but  about  ten  thousand  persons.  The  whole  coast 
was  a  nest  of  piracy.  It  was  vain  to  hope  that  Spain,  bled  to  her 
last  resources  by  the  futile  endeavor  to  put  down  an  insurrection 
which  extended  over  a  third  of  the  parts  of  the  world  peopled  by 
men  of  European  blood,  should  have  the  vigor  to  restrain  the  wild 
population  inhabiting  her  lands  on  the  southern  borders  of  the 
United  States.  She  did  not  even  attempt  it. 

Meanwhile  the  restlessness  of  the  Indians  under  the  loss  of  their 
lands  had  burst  into  flame.  Almost  the  whole  of  the  southern 
tribes  were  within  the  limits  of  Florida,  whence,  with  the  assistance 
of  the  many  escaped  Georgia  negroes,  murders  and  depredations 
began  against  the  American  settlers  on  the  frontier,  and  con 
tinued  through  the  spring  and  summer  of  1817.  It  is  fair  to 
presume  that  the  latter  were  by  no  means  guiltless  of  impositions 
against  the  Indians.  On  November  21  an  attack  by  American 
troops  upon  the  Indian  village  known  as  Fowltown,  brought  on  by 
a  detachment  sent  by  General  Gaines  from  Fort  Scott  to  seize  and 
bring  to  the  fort  the  chief  and  few  warriors  in  the  village,  began 
the  Seminole  war.  Nine  days  later  the  burning  of  the  village  was 
followed  by  the  massacre  or  torture  to  death  of  forty  soldiers  ac 
companied  by  seven  women  and  children  on  their  way  up  the 
Appalachicola  to  Fort  Scott. 

The  war  department,  as  yet  not  informed  of  an  Indian  outbreak, 
had,  November  12,  ordered  General  Gaines  to  go  to  Amelia  Island 
to  take  charge  of  the  operations  in  contemplation  against  the  fili- 


128  THE  INDIAN  WAR  [1818 

busters.  As  soon  as  it  was  informed  of  these  events  General 
Jackson  was  directed,  December  20,  to  take  personal  command 
at  Fort  Scott  and  carry  the  war  to  a  conclusion. 

The  earlier  orders  to  Gaines  had  at  first  deprecated,  in  the  event 
that  hostilities  should  occur,  crossing  the  Spanish  line,  but  later 
he  was  instructed,  in  case  the  Indians  should  refuse  reparation,  to 
"consider  himself  at  liberty  to  march  across  the  Florida  line  and 
attack  them  within  its  limits  should  it  be  found  necessary,  unless 
they  should  shelter  themselves  under  a  Spanish  post.  In  the  last 
event  you  will  immediately  notify  this  department."  *  Japkson 
had  proposed,  in  a  letter  written  before  the  reception  of  his 
orders,  to  improve  upon  the  orders  to  Gaines,  which  latter  were 
wholly  justifiable.  He  wrote,  January  6,  1818,  to  President  Mon 
roe,  urging  the  seizure  of  the  whole  of  East  Florida  to  be  "  held  #s 
an  indemnity  for  the  outrages  of  Spain,"  and  saying,  "Let  it  be 
signified  to  me  through  any  channel  (say  Mr.  J.  Rhea)  that  the 
possession  of  the  Floridas  would  be  desirable  to  the  United  States 
and  in  sixty  days  it  will  be  accomplished."  2 

President  Monroe  was  ill  when  the  letter  reached  him.  He  took 
but  little  note  of  its  contents,  and  it  was  inexplicably  disregarded. 
In  any  case,  without  going  into  the  intricacies  of  a  much-vexed 
and  undecidable  question,  Jackson  came  to  understand  that  his 
suggestion  was  approved,  and  his  action  was  prompt.  Authorized 
by  his  orders  to  call  upon  the  governors  of  the  adjacent  states  for 
as  many  of  the  militia  as  he  thought  necessary  (there  was  in  reality 
but  one  state,  Georgia,  adjacent  to  Florida,  and  the  militia  of  this 
was  already  called  out),  Jackson  took  the  matter  into  his  own 
hands  and  enlisted  a  thousand  mounted  men  in  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky.  He  did  not  arrive  at  Fort  Scott,  four  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  from  Nashville,  until  March  9,  1818,  after  great  hard 
ships  from  the  weather  and  such  want  of  provisions  as  to  threaten 
famine.  On  March  16  he  was,  now  with  a  force  of  two  thousand 
white  troops  and  friendly  Indians,  at  the  negro  fort  which  he  at 
once  gave  orders  to  rebuild.  By  the  26th  he  marched,  determined 
to  occupy  St.  Marks.  He  swept  away  the  Indian  villages  in  his 

1  Secretary  of  war  to  Gaines,  December  16,  1817,  State  Papers,  Military 
Affairs,  I,  689. 

2  Parton,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  II,  433,  434. 


1818]  ST.  MARKS  OCCUPIED  129 

path,  captured  "  the  greatest  abundance  of  corn,  cattle,  etc."  "  In 
the  council  houses  of  Kenhageestown,  .  .  .  more  than  fifty  fresh 
scalps  were  found." 

St.  Marks  was  occupied  April  6,  Jackson  giving  as  his  reasons 
that  "Fort  St.  Marks  could  not  be  maintained  by  the  Spanish 
force  garrisoning  it.  The  Indians  and  negroes  viewed  it  as  an 
asylum  if  driven  from  their  towns  and  were  preparing  to  occupy  it 
in  this  event.  It  was  necessary  to  anticipate  their  movements, 
independent  of  the  position  being  deemed  essential  as  a  depot  on 
which  the  success  of  my  future  operations  measurably  depended. 
In  the  spirit  of  friendship,  therefore,  I  demanded  its  surrender  .  .  . 
until  the  close  of  the  Seminole  war."  During  the  negotiation 
"circumstances  transpired  convicting"  the  Spanish  commandant  of 
a  disposition  to  favor  the  Indians  and  of  having  taken  an  active 
part  in  aiding  and  abetting  them  in  their  war.  "I  hesitated," 
continues  Jackson,  "no  longer,  and  as  I  could  not  be  received  in 
friendship  I  entered  the  fort  by  violence."  Three  companies  of 
infantry  were  "  ordered  to  advance,  lower  the  Spanish  colors,  and 
hoist  the  star-spangled  banner  on  the  ramparts  of  Fort  St.  Marks. 
The  order  was  executed  promptly  and  no  resistance  attempted  on 
the  part  of  the  Spanish  garrison.  The  duplicity  of  the  Spanish 
commandant  in  professing  friendship  for  the  United  States  while 
he  was  aiding  and  supplying  her  savage  enemies,  .  .  .  appropriat 
ing  the  king's  stores  to  their  use,  issuing  ammunition  and  muni 
tions  of  war  to  them,  and  knowingly  purchasing  of  them  prop 
erty  plundered  from  citizens  of  the  United  States,  is  clearly 
evinced  by  the  documents  accompanying  my  correspondence."  l 

An  inventory  of  Spanish  property  was  taken  and  the  garrison 
shipped  to  Pensacola,  the  commanding  officer  being  provided 
with  a  letter  from  Jackson,  in  which  he  declared  that  he  came 
"not  as  the  enemy  but  the  friend  of  Spain,"  with  the  additional 
statement  that  his  "possession  of  the  garrison  of  St.  Marks  will  be 
referred  to  our  respective  governments  for  amicable  adjustment."  2 

A  Scotch  trader  named  Arbuthnot,  who  in  Jackson's  mind,  at 
least,  was  guilty  of  inciting  the  Indians  to  war,  was  found  at  the 
Spanish  fort  and  seized.  A  few  days  later  another  British  subject, 
Ambrister,  the  lieutenant  of  the  "notorious"  Woodbine,  was 

Jackson's   report,  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  I,  702.  2  Ibid.,  704. 


130        FATE   OF  AMBRISTER  AND   ARBUTHNOT     [1818 

captured  on  his  way  to  join  the  Indians.  A  court-martial  was  con 
vened  at  St.  Marks,  April  26,  for  the  trial  of  these  men  for  inciting 
the  Indians  to  war,  and  "aiding,  abetting,  and  comforting  the 
enemy."  Arbuthnot  was  sentenced  to  be  hanged,  Ambrister  to  be 
shot.  They  were  executed  April  29.  Like  measures  were  taken 
with  two  notable  Indians,  who,  lured  aboard  a  supply  transport 
from  New  Orleans  by  the  hoisting  of  the  British  flag,  were  seized 
and  hanged  by  Jackson's  order;  one  of  these  was  the  prophet 
Francis,  but  just  lately  returned  from  England,  and  against  whom 
But  little  could  be  said;  the  other  a  murderous  chief  who  had 
taken  part  in  all  the  late  horrors  and  who  well  deserved  his  fate. 

As  to  the  equity  of  the  execution  of  Arbuthnot  there  has  been 
much  controversy.  His  name  has  come  down  declared  by  many  as 
that  of  a  man  of  character  and  ability  (which  he  undoubtedly  was), 
against  whom  there  was  nothing  but  that  he  was  a  trader  supplying 
the  Indians  with  such  arms  and  ammunition  as  they  could  buy, 
and  acting  as  their  agent  in  correspondence  with  British  and 
Spanish  authorities.  But  the  mere  fact  that  he  was  a  foreign 
trader  among  the  Indians  on  the  soil  of  a  nationality  peculiarly 
jealous  of  such  intrusion  goes  for  much.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Adams  was  correct  in  declaring  him  "only  the  successor  of 
Nichols." 

There  was  no  doubt  about  Ambrister;  he  pleaded  guilty  and 
threw  himself  upon  the  mercy  of  the  court.  But  aside  from 
questions  of  equity,  there  was  no  need  for  action  of  such  haste  and 
severity.  Jackson  was  in  the  territory  of  a  friendly  power;  to 
seize  and  execute  in  this  territory  the  subjects  of  another  friendly 
power,  even  under  the  circumstances,  which,  it  may  be  granted, 
were  difficult,  and  thus  bring  upon  his  government  the  burden  of 
explanation,  was  a  violation  of  every  principle  of  international  law 
and  good  sense.  It  aroused  violent  feeling  in  the  English  press  and 
public,  and  but  for  the  firmness  of  the  British  cabinet,  which  held 
the  conduct  of  these  two  men  "unwarrantable"  and  as  not  calling 
for  interference,1  would  have  brought  war.  "Such,"  said  Lord 
Castleraugh  in  1819,  to  Rush,  the  American  minister,  "was  the 
temper  of  Parliament  and  such  the  feeling  of  the  country  that 
he  believed  war  might  have  been  produced  by  holding  up  a  fin- 
1  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  312. 


1818]  FORT  BARRANCAS  ASSAULTED  131 

ger";  "and  he  even  thought  that  an  address  to  the  crown  might 
have  been  carried  for  one  by  nearly  an  unanimous  vote." 

While  scouring  the  region,  Jackson  received,  May  23, 1818,  a  pro 
test  from  the  Spanish  governor  at  Pensacola  "remonstrating"  (us 
ing  Jackson's  words)  "against  my  proceedings,  and  ordering  me 
and  my  forces  instantly  to  quit  the  territory  of  his  Catholic  Majesty, 
with  a  threat  to  apply  force  in  the  event  of  non-compliance."  No 
one  could  thus  throw  down  the  gauntlet  to  Jackson  and  escape  the 
acceptance  of  such  a  challenge.  Says  Jackson,  "This  was  so  open 
an  indication  of  hostile  feeling  .  .  .  that  I  hesitated  no  longer.  .  .  . 
I  marched  for  and  entered  Fort  St.  Michael,  Pensacola,  with  only 
a  show  of  resistance  on  the  21st  of  May."  The  governor  fled 
to  Fort  Barrancas,  six  miles  distant,  at  the  mouth  of  the  bay. 
Jackson  demanded  its  surrender.  "This  is  the  third  time,"  says 
Jackson,  in  a  letter  of  May  23, 1818,  to  the  governor,  D.  Jose*  Masot, 
at  Fort  Barrancas,  "  that  the  American  troops  have  been  compelled 
to  visit  Pensacola  from  the  same  causes.  Twice  had  the  enemy 
been  expelled,  and  the  place  left  in  quiet  possession  of  those  who 
had  permitted  the  irregular  occupancy.  This  time  it  must  be  held 
until  Spain  has  the  power  or  will  to  maintain  her  neutrality.  .  .  . 
If  the  peaceable  surrender  be  refused,  I  shall  enter  Pensacola  by 
violence  and  assume  the  government  until  the  transaction  can  be 
amicably  adjusted  by  the  two  governments.  The  military  in  this 
case  must  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war."  3 

The  action  against  the  fort  is  described  in  Jackson's  report:  "I 
marched  for  and  invested  it  on  the  evening  of  the  25th  of  May, 
and  on  the  same  night  pushed  reconnoitring  parties  under  its 
very  guns. "  Cannon  were  planted.  "A  spirited  and  well-directed 
fire  was  kept  up  the  greater  part  of  the  morning  and  at  intervals  in 
the  afternoon"  of  May  27.  In  the  evening  the  Spanish  comman 
dant  offered  to  capitulate,  and  next  day  articles  were  signed  "more 
favorable,"  says  Jackson,  with  extraordinary  naivete',  "  than  a  con 
quered  enemy  would  have  merited,  but,  under  the  peculiar  circum 
stances  of  the  case,  my  object  obtained,  there  was  no  motive  for 
wounding  the  feelings  of  those  [whom]  military  pride  or  honor  had 
prompted  to  the  resistance  made."4  The  Spanish  troops  were  to 

1  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  1819-1825,  120.     The  italics  are  Rush's. 
3  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  1,  708.  3  Ibid.,  712.  4  Ibid.,  708. 


132  SPAIN  DEMANDS  REPARATION  [1818 

leave  the  fort  with  the  honors  of  war  and  to  be  transported  with  their 
families  and  goods  to  Havana  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States 
government.  Article  19  stated  that  "This  capitulation  is  made 
under  the  confidence  that  the  general  of  the  American  troops 
will  comply  with  his  offer  of  returning  integral  this  province  in  the 
state  in  which  he  receives  it,  as  explained  in  his  official  letter." 

Jackson  appointed  his  aide-de-camp  as  collector  of  the  port, 
organized  the  district  as  if  an  American  province,  and  marched 
homeward,  leaving  the  American  administration  with  a  problem 
of  the  utmost  difficulty  and  danger  to  adjust  with  England,  whose 
subjects  had  been  so  harshly  dealt  with,  and  with  Spain  against 
whom  actual  operations  of  war  had  thus  been  undertaken. 

Nor  had  Jackson  proposed  to  end  with  the  seizure  of  Pensacola. 
On  August  7,  1818,  he  wrote  General  Gaines,  directing  him  that 
if  there  was  evidence  that  the  Indians  had  been  excited  to  war,  and 
furnished  with  supplies  by  the  Governor  of  St.  Augustine,  and 
"should  you  deem  your  force  sufficient,  you  will  proceed  to  take 
and  garrison  Fort  St.  Augustine  with  American  troops  and  hold 
the  garrison  prisoners  until  you  hear  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  or  transport  them  to  Cuba  as  ...  you  may  think 
best."  2 

The  Spanish  minister  promptly  demanded  reparation.  On 
July  18,  1818,  he  wrote  Adams:  "General  Jackson,  with  the 
American  forces  under  his  command,  has  not  only  violated  the 
Spanish  territory  under  the  pretext  of  pursuing  and  chastising  the 
Seminole  Indians,  but  has  taken  possession  by  force  of  arms  of  the 
fort  and  bay  of  St.  Mark,  driven  the  Spanish  garrison  from  these 
places,  and  sent  them  as  prisoners  to  Pensacola,  the  capital  of 
West  Florida.  Not  satisfied  with  this  enormous  outrage,  he 
marched  against  the  latter  place,  and  has  by  open  rupture  and 
bloodshed  violated  the  peace  existing  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States.  He  demanded  the  surrender  of  Pensacola  as  if 
war  had  been  declared  between  the  two  nations,  and  on  the  refusal 
of  the  Spanish  governor  to  surrender  or  deliver  up  the  place  the 
American  commander,  availing  himself  of  his  superior  force, 
attacked  it,  and  bombarded  the  castle  of  Barrancas,  whither  the 

1  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  719,  720. 
3  Ibid.,  Military  Affairs,  I,  744. 


^Rl 


DE  ONIS  TO  ADAMS  133 


governor  had  retired  with  his  small  garrison  and  such  of  the  in 
habitants  as  chose  to  follow  him.  Having  surrounded  that  fortress, 
he  gave  orders  for  the  assault  and  carried  it.  The  governor  with 
all  his  people  were  made  prisoners  of  war,  and  were  sent  off,  as 
it  appears,  by  the  American  general,  to  Havana,  who  proceeded  to 
extend  his  authority  over  the  whole  of  West  Florida  by  hoisting  on 
its  forts  the  flag  of  the  United  States."  Proceeding  to  exonerate 
the  Spanish  governor  from  blame,  he  said,  "Neither  he  nor  the 
Governor  of  East  Florida  was  notified  of  the  war  against  the 
Seminole  Indians,  .  .  .  nor  was  any  call  made  upon  them  to  seek 
and  punish  those  Indians"  in  case  of  aggression.  "Notwith 
standing  the  total  omission  of  all  this,  which  was  to  have  been  ex 
pected  as  a  regular  and  necessary  consequence  of  the  stipulations 
of  the  existing  treaty,  the  aforesaid  governor  granted  no  favor  to 
the  Indians,  but  forbade  them  to  enter  the  Spanish  territory;  and 
when  a  small  number  came  to  Pensacola  to  receive  the  annual 
presents,  the  governor  allowed  only  a  few  of  them  to  enter  the  place 
without  their  arms.  .  .  .  He  further  took  every  necessary  precau 
tion  to  prevent  their  being  supplied  with  arms  and  ammunition 
within  his  Majesty's  territories.  ...  It  would  be  inferred  that  the 
war  .  .  .  has  been  merely  a  pretext  for  General  Jackson  to  fall, 
as  a  conqueror,  upon  the  Spanish  provinces,  unprovided  as  they 
now  are,  and  reposing  in  perfect  security,  for  the  purpose  of  es 
tablishing  therein  the  dominion  of  this  republic  upon  the  odious 
basis  of  violence  and  bloodshed.  ...  I  am  persuaded  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  cannot  have  authorized  this 
hostile,  bloody,  and  ferocious  invasion  of  the  dominions  of  Spain." 
Seiior  de  Onis  concluded:  "It  is  therefore  my  duty  to  protest,  and  I 
do  hereby  solemnly  protest,  in  the  name  of  the  king,  my  master, 
against  these  public  acts  of  hostility  and  invasion,  and  I  demand, 
through  you,  of  the  President,  in  the  name  of  my  sovereign,  the 
prompt  restitution  of  the  fort  and  bay  of  St.  Mark,  also  of  Pensacola, 
BarTancas,  and  other  places  in  Florida.  ...  In  like  manner,  I  de 
mand  the  faithful  delivery  of  all  the  artillery,  warlike  stores,  and 
property,  both  public  and  private,  taken  at  Pensacola  and  other 
forts  and  places,  by  the  American  commander,  indemnity  for 
all  the  injuries  and  losses  sustained  by  the  Crown  of  Spain  and 
the  subjects  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  in  consequence  of  this  act  of 


134  ADAMS'S  REPLY 

invasion,  and  a  satisfaction  proportioned  to  the  enormity  of  these 
offences,  together  with  the  lawful  punishment  of  the  general  and 
the  officers  of  this  republic  by  whom  they  were  committed."  l 

There  was  no  question  of  the  strength  of  Spain's  case  as  thus 
stated,  nor  was  it  exaggerated.  The  administration  was  deeply 
embarrassed.  The  President  and  all  the  cabinet,  except  Adams, 
were  of  the  opinion  that  Jackson  acted  not  only  without  but  against 
his  instructions;  that  he  had  committed  war  against  Spain,  which 
could  not  be  justified  and  in  which  if  not  disavowed  the  administra 
tion  would  be  disavowed  by  the  country.2  "I  insisted,"  said 
Adams,  "  that  the  character  of  Jackson's  measures  was  decided  by 
the  intention  with  which  they  were  taken,  which  was  not  hostility 
to  Spain  but  self-defence  against  the  hostility  of  Spanish  officers. 
I  admitted  that  it  was  necessary  to  carry  the  reasoning  upon  my 
principles  to  the  utmost  extent  it  would  bear  to  come  to  this  con 
clusion.  But  if  the  question  was  dubious  it  was  better  to  err  on 
the  side  of  vigor  than  of  weakness — on  the  side  of  our  own  officer, 
who  had  rendered  the  most  eminent  services  to  the  nation,  than 
on  the  side  of  our  bitterest  enemies  and  against  him.  .  .  .  Calhoun 
[secretary  of  war]  bore  the  principal  argument  against  me."  3 

Adams  overbore  opposition,  and,  July  23,  1818,  replied  to  the 
Spanish  minister  in  the  President's  name,  not  only  upholding  Jack 
son's  action,  but,  analyzing  the  attitude  of  the  Spanish  officials  in 
Florida,  declared  that  "a  conduct  not  only  so  contrary  to  the  ex 
press  engagements  of  Spain,  but  so  unequivocally  hostile  to  the 
United  States,  justly  authorizes  him  to  call  upon  his  Catholic 
Majesty  for  the  punishment  of  those  officers  who,  the  President  is 
persuaded,  have  acted  contrary  to  the  express  orders  of  their 
sovereign."  The  despatch  ended:  "I  am  instructed  by  the 
President  to  inform  you  that  Pensacola  will  be  restored  to  the  pos 
session  of  any  person  duly  authorized  on  the  part  of  Spain  to  re 
ceive  it;  that  the  fort  of  St.  Mark,  being  in  the  heart  of  the  Indian 
country  and  remote  from  any  Spanish  settlement,  can  be  surren 
dered  only  to  a  force  sufficiently  strong  to  hold  it  against  the  attack 
of  the  hostile  Indians,  upon  the  appearance  of  which  force  it 
will  also  be  restored.  In  communicating  to  you  this  decision  I  am 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  496,  497.  '  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  108. 

3  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  113. 


1818]  ADAMS  VINDICATES  JACKSON  135 


undei^^kullest 
overM  H,  that 
ndisj^Hfoly  re 


also  directed  to  assure  you  that  it  has  been  made 
conviction,  which  he  trusts  will  be  felt  by  your  gover  ,  that 

the  preservation  of  peace  between  the  two  nations  indisj^Hfoly  re 
quires  that  henceforth  the  stipulations  of  Spain  to  restrain  by  force 
her  Indians  from  all  hostilities  against  the  United  States  should  be 
faithfully  and  effectually  fulfilled."  » 

The  receipt  from  De  Onis  of  this  note  at  Madrid  brought  a  note 
from  Senor  Pizarro,  the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs  to  Mr. 
Erving,  declaring  that  his  Majesty  was  convinced  that  it  was  in 
compatible  with  the  honor  of  the  crown  to  pursue  further  negoti 
ations  until  proper  amends  were  made  for  Jackson's  action  and  that 
the  incident  was  of  primary  importance  "  capable  of  producing  an 
essential  and  thorough  change  in  the  political  relations  of  the  two 
countries,"2  words  which  could  only  mean  a  threat  of  war,  a  threat, 
however,  soon  practically  withdrawn  by  a  note  from  De  Onis, 
October  18,  1818,  informing  Adams  that  he  had  received  new 
instructions  to  resume  negotiations,  and  also  that  the  king  had,  on 
July  9,  1818,  ratified  the  long-pending  convention  of  August  11, 
1802.  Jackson's  aggressive  action  had  been  taken  to  heart,  and 
instead  of  retarding  was  to  be  "  among  the  most  immediate  and 
prominent  causes"  producing  the  treaty.  3 

Adams  replied  to  Pizarro  in  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  effective 
state  papers  ever  issued  from  the  department  of  state.  He 
showed  that  Colonel  Nichols  did  not  consider  the  peace  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  as  having  put  an  end  to  his 
military  occupations  or  negotiations  with  the  Indians  in  Florida; 
that  on  his  departure  for  England  he  had  left  the  fort,  which  he 
called  the  British  post  on  the  Appalachicola,  amply  supplied 
with  military  stores  and  ammunitions,  to  the  negro  department 
of  his  allies  ;  that  this  fort  was  a  post  "whence  to  commit  depre 
dations,  outrages,  and  murders,  and  as  a  receptacle  for  fugitive 
slaves  and  malefactors";  that  the  Spanish  governor  explicitly  ad 
mitted,  in  answer  to  General  Jackson,  in  April,  1816,  that  he  "  had 
neither  sufficient  force  nor  authority  without  orders  from  the  gov 
ernor-general  of  the  Havana  to  destroy  it";  that  the  intrusion  of 
Arbuthnot  as  an  Indian  trader,  was  contrary  to  the  policy  observed 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  497-499. 

3  Pizarro  to  Erving,  August  29,  1818,  Ibid.,  IV,  523. 

3  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  278. 


136  ADAMS  VINDICATES   JACKSON  [1818 


n  powers  in  this  hemisphere,  and  by  none  more 
ian  by  Spain,  of  excluding  all  foreigners  from  inter- 
the  Indians;  that  it  was  for  Spain  to  explain  how, 
consistently  with  her  engagements  to  the  United  States,  she  could 
grant  such  a  license  to  a  foreign  incendiary  whose  principal,  if  not 
only,  object  appeared  to  have  been  to  stimulate  hostilities  which 
Spain  had  expressly  stipulated,  by  force,  to  restrain;  that  Jackson 
had,  on  his  approach  to  St.  Marks,  been  informed  direct  from  the 
Spanish  governor  that  the  hostile  Indians  had  threatened  to  seize  the 
fort  and  that  he  feared  he  had  not  strength  to  defend  it;  that  Arbuth- 
not  "the  British  Indian  trader  from  beyond  the  seas,  the  firebrand 
by  whose  touch  this  negro-Indian  war  had  been  rekindled,  was 
found  an  inmate  of  the  commandant's  family";  that  the  comman 
dant  had  permitted  councils  of  war  to  be  held  by  the  savages;  that 
Spanish  storehouses  had  been  appropriated  to  their  use;  that  the 
fort  was  an  open  market  for  cattle  known  to  have  been  robbed 
from  citizens  of  the  United  States;  that  information  had  been 
afforded  from  the  fort  by  Arbuthnot  of  the  strength  and  movements 
of  the  American  army;  and  that  ammunition  and  all  necessary 
supplies  had  been  furnished  the  Indians.  The  governor  of  Pensa- 
cola  was  declared  to  have  been  equally  disregardless  of  the  obliga 
tions  of  the  treaty.  Adams  declared  that  the  President  would 
neither  inflict  punishment  nor  pass  censure  upon  Jackson  for 
conduct  the  motives  of  which  "were  founded  in  purest  patriotism, 
of  the  necessity  for  which  he  had  the  most  immediate  and  effectual 
means  of  forming  a  judgment,  and  the  vindication  of  which  is 
written  in  every  page  of  the  law  of  nations  as  well  as  in  the  first 
law  of  nature — self-defence."  He  demanded  an  inquiry  into  the] 
conduct  of  the  Spanish  Governor  of  Pensacola  and  the  comman-i 
dant  at  St.  Marks,  and  the  infliction  of  a  suitable  punishment  "foil 
having,  in  defiance  and  violation  of  the  engagements  of  Spain  with 
the  United  States,  aided  and  assisted  these  hordes  of  savages  .  .  . 
which  it  was  their  official  duty  to  restrain."  He  asked  most  perti 
nently,  "What  .  .  .  was  the  character  of  Nichols's  invasion  of  his 
Majesty's  territory,  and  where  was  his  Majesty's  profound  indig 
nation  at  that?  Mr.  Pizarro  says  his  Majesty's  forts  and  places 
have  been  violently  seized  on  by  General  Jackson.  Had  they  not 
been  seized  on,  nay,  had  not  the  principal  of  his  forts  been  blown 


1818]  ADAMS  VINDICATES  JACKSON  137 

up  by  Nichols  and  a  British  fort  on  the  same  SpanjpJi;  territory 
been  erected  during  the  war,  and  left  standing  as  a  n^gro  fort,  in 
defiance  of  Spanish  authority,  after  the  peace?  Where  was  his 
Majesty's  profound  indignation  at  that?  Has  his  Majesty  sus-/ 
pended  formally  all  negotiation  with  the  sovereign  of  Colonel 
Nichols  for  this  shameful  invasion  of  his  territory,  without  color  or 
provocation,  without  pretence  of  necessity,  without  shadow  or  even 
avowal  of  a  pretext?  Has  his  Majesty  given  solemn  warning 
to  the  British  government  that  these  were  incidents  of  tran 
scendent  moment,  capable  of  producing  an  essential  and  thorough 
change  in  the  political  relations  of  the  two  countries  ?  .  .  .  Against 
the  shameful  invasion  of  the  territory;  against  the  violent  seizure 
of  forts  and  places;  against  the  blowing  up  of  the  Barrancas  and 
the  erection  and  maintenance,  under  British  banners,  of  the  negro 
fort  on  Spanish  soil;  against  the  negotiation  by  a  British  officer,  in 
the  midst  of  peace,  of  pretended  treaties,  offensive  and  defensive, 
and  of  navigation  and  commerce,  upon  Spanish  territory,  between 
Great  Britain  and  Spanish  Indians,  whom  Spain  was  bound  to 
control  and  restrain — if  a  whisper  of  expostulation  was  ever  wafted 
from  Madrid  to  London,  it  was  not  loud  enough  to  be  heard 
across  the  Atlantic  nor  energetic  enough  to  transpire  beyond  the 
walls  of  the  palaces  from  which  it  issued  and  to  which  it  was 
borne."  He  declared  the  connection  between  Nichols  and  Ar- 
buthnot  "established  beyond  all  question,"  as  also,  as  shown  by 
documents,  that  between  Ambrister,  Woodbine,  and  McGregor, 
whose  object  "was  the  conquest  of  Florida  from  Spain  by  the  use 
of  those  very  Indians  and  negroes  whom  the  commandant  of 
St.  Marks  was  so  ready  to  aid  and  support  in  war  against  the 
United  States."  The  Spanish  minister  of  state  was  to  be  informed 
that  if  necessity  should  again  compel  the  United  States  to  take  pos^ 
session  of  the  Spanish  forts  and  places  in  Florida  that  another 
unconditional  restoration  of  them  must  not  be  expected.1 

This  paper,  accompanied  by  documents,  copies  of  which  were 
sent  to  all  American  legations  abroad,  "  silenced  European  com 
ment  and  convinced  Spain  herself." 

Before  Adams  had  completed  his  despatch,  Congress  had  met, 
and  the  question  was  taken  up  with  extreme  bitterness  against 
1  Adams  to  Erving,  November  28,  1818,  State  Papers,  IV,  539-545. 


138  NEGOTIATIONS  RESUMED  [1818 

Jackson  and  particularly  by  Clay,  the  outcome  of  whose  action 
was  a  mortal  enmity  between  the  two  which  was  to  have  later 
deep  effect  upon  American  domestic  politics.  But  public  feeling 
was  with  Jackson,  and  though  the  majority  of  the  House  com 
mittee  and  the  committee  of  the  Senate  made  strongly  adverse 
reports,  commenting  with  great  severity  upon  Jackson's  acts,  the 
majority  of  the  House,  after  a  debate  of  twenty-seven  days  which 
occupied  the  attention  of  the  country,  was  against  the  finding  and 
that  in  the  Senate  was  never  brought  to  a  vote. 

The  negotiations  of  the  treaty  with  Spain  being,  as  mentioned, 
renewed,  De  Onis,  in  his  note  of  October  24,  1818,  proposed  &\ 
line  beginning  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  between  the  rivers  Mermentoj 
and  Calcasia,  crossing  Red  River  in  latitude  32°,  thence  north  to 
the  Missouri,  thence  to  the  source  of  this  river.1 

Adams  replied,  October  31,  with  what  was  "to  be  considered  as 
the  final  offer  upon  the  part  of  the  United  States,"  which  was  a 
line  beginning  at  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine,  to  follow  that  river  to 
latitude  32°;  thence  north  to  the  Red  River;  thence  following  this 
river  to  its  source,  "touching  the  chain  of  the  Snow  Mountains  in 
latitude  37°  25';  thence  to  the  summit  of  these,  following  the  chain 
to  latitude  41°;  thence  west  to  the  "South  Sea."  All  claims  pro 
vided  for  in  the  convention  of  1802;  all  condemnations  by  French 
consuls  in  Spanish  ports  of  captures  by  French  privateers;  all 
indemnities  for  suspension  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans;  all  claims 
of  citizens  against  Spain  which  had  been  presented  to  the  notice  of 
the  United  States  government  from  1802  to  the  date  of  the  treaty 
were  to  be  renounced,  the  United  States  undertaking  to  satisfy  all 
these  classes  of  claims  to  an  extent  not  exceeding  five  millions  of 
dollars.2  De  Onis's  proposition  to  abrogate  Article  15  of  the  treaty 
of  1796,  which  stipulated  that  the  flag  should  cover  the  property, 
was  accepted  with  the  modification  that  (as  it  appears  in  the  final 
draught)  "if  either  of  the  two  contracting  parties  shall  be  at  war 
with  a  third  party,  and  the  other  neutral,  the  flag  of  the  neutral 
shall  cover  the  property  of  enemies  whose  government  acknow 
ledges  this  principle,  and  not  of  others.3 

»  State  Papers,  IV,  526.  *  Ibid.,  530. 

3  Art.  12  of  treaty,  Ibid.,  IV,  623-625. 


1819]  THE  SPANISH  LAND   GRANTS  139 

The  treaty  followed  the  foregoing  outline  with  the  exception  that 
the  line  should  follow  the  Red  River  to  longitude  100°  and  should 
then  go  due  north  to  the  Arkansas  and  follow  the  south  bank  of 
that  river  to  latitude  42°,  and  thence  on  that  parallel  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  or,  in  Adams's  old-fashioned  phrase,  to  the  "South  Sea,"  a 
concession  due  wholly  to  Adams's  initiative  and  pressure  which 
preserved  to  the  United  States  the  great  Northwest  beyond  what 
was  then  called  the  "Stony  Mountains." 

On  February  22,  1819,  the  treaty  was  signed,  but  the  signature 
was  but  the  forerunner  of  other  difficulties,  the  first,  but  least, 
being  an  opposition  led  by  Clay  to  giving  up  the  Rio  Grande  as  a 
boundary.  Monroe's  nervous  anxiety  to  come  to  an  understand 
ing  regarding  Florida  would,  but  for  Adams,  have  given  an  even 
less  satisfactory  result;  had  he  not  been  so  pressing,  and  have 
allowed  the  matter  to  rest  yet  awhile  in  abeyance,  Spain  shortly, 
almost  beyond  question,  in  view  of  the  insurgency  of  Mexico, 
would  have  yielded  to  the  full  limit  claimed  by  the  United  States. 
As  it  was,  however,  Texas,  thus  surrendered,  passed  to  Mexico 
and  became  the  subject  of  war  a  quarter  of  a  century  later. 

The  more  vexing  question  to  the  administration  was  that  of 
late  grants  of  lands  by  the  King  of  Spain  covering  nearly  the  whole 
of  Florida,  lands  the  sale  of  which,  by  express  understanding  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  of  Spain,  were  to  be  used  to 
extinguish  the  claims  against  the  latter.  Adams  had  proposed  the 
date  of  1802  as  that  after  which  all  grants  should  be  void.  To 
this  De  Onis  very  reasonably  demurred  and  suggested  the  date  of 
January  24,  1818,  as  being  that  upon  which  Spain  had  first  ex 
pressed  her  willingness  to  yield  Florida.  This  was  accepted  by 
Adams  with  the  distinct  understanding  on  the  part  of  both  nego 
tiators  that  three  immense  grants  made  after  this  date  were  void. 
The  unworthy  character  of  these  acts  is  well  shown  in  the  cedula 
of  February  6,  1818,  signed  by  the  king  after  the  date  mentioned, 
and  with  the  full  understanding  that  Florida  was  about  to  pass  from 
his  possession.  The  cedula  cited  the  petition  of  Count  of  Punon 
Rostro,  "My  governor  of  the  Floridas,"  submitted  November 
3,  1817,  who,  "prompted  by  the  desire  of  promoting  by  all  possible 
means  the  improvement  of  the  extensive  waste  and  unsettled  lands 
possessed  by  your  Majesty  in  the  Americas,"  humbly  requested 


140  THE  SPANISH  LAND   GRANTS  [1819 

the  grant  of  a  region  which  comprised  several  million  acres.  The 
king,  taking  the  premises  Into  consideration,  antedated  the  de 
cree  to  December  17,  1817,  and  "judged  fit  to  grant  to  him  the 
same  ...  to  the  end  that  the  said  Count  of  Punon  Rostro  may 
forthwith  carry  his  plans  into  execution  in  conformity  with  my 
beneficent  desires  in  favor  of  the  agriculture  and  commerce  of  the 
said  territories  which  require  a  population  proportioned  to  the 
fertility  of  the  soil  and  the  defence  and  security  of  the  coast."  l 
One  grant,  dated  March  10,  1818,  was  of  land  in  West  Florida, 
west  of  the  Perdido  and  already  in  possession  of  the  United  States.2 

Mr.  Forsyth,  newly  appointed  minister  to  Spain,  sailed  in 
March  from  Boston  for  Cadiz  in  the  sloop  of  war  Hornet,  carrying 
with  him  the  treaty  ratified  by  the  Senate,  February  24.  His 
instructions  included  a  reference  to  the  grants  which  were  giving 
such  disturbance  of  mind  to  Mr.  Adams,  who  severely  blamed  him 
self  for  his  failure  to  examine  more  closely  Mr.  Erving's  report 
enclosing  the  copy  of  the  decree  just  quoted,  which  would  perhaps 
have  caused  him  to  take  greater  precautions.3  Mr.  Forsyth  carried 
with  him  a  form  of  declaration  stating  that  both  plenipotentiaries 
had  agreed  upon  the  date  of  January  24, 1818,  as  the  date  subse 
quent  to  which  all  grants  of  land  made  by  his  Majesty  should  be 
null  and  void,  and  that  the  ratifications  were  exchanged  under  the 
explicit  declaration  and  understanding  that  the  three  mentioned 
were  so  included  and  would  be  so  held  by  the  United  States.  He 
was  also  instructed  that  "it  is  not  anticipated  that  any  objection 
will  be  made  to  receiving  the  declaration;  if,  however,  there  should 
be,  you  will  nevertheless  exchange  the  ratifications." 

The  President  had  directed  the  insertion  of  this  last  in  Mr. 
Forsyth's  instructions,  "for  he  considered  the  treaty  of  such  tran 
scendent  importance  to  this  country  that  if  we  should  not  get  an 
inch  of  land  in  Florida  the  bargain  would  still  be  inexpressibly  ad 
vantageous  to  us.  The  removal  of  all  apprehension  of  a  war  with 
Spain,  the  consolidation  of  our  territorial  possessions,  the  com 
mand  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  recognized  extension  to  the  South 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  525. 

*  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  291.     For  details  of  these  grants,  see  Forsyth  to 
Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  October  18,  1819,  State  Papers,  IV,  668. 
3  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  287  et  seq.  4  State  Papers,  IV,  652. 


1819]  SPAIN  WITHHOLDS  RATIFICATION  141 

Sea,  and  the  satisfaction  of  so  large  an  amount  of  the  claims  of  our 
citizens  upon  Spain  were  objects  of  paramount  consideration,  and 
the  attainment  of  them  would  raise  our  standing  and  character  so 
high  in  the  estimate  of  the  European  powers  that  the  land  was  of 
very  trifling  comparative  consequence.  Besides,  as  Onis  admits  j 
that  he  signed  the  treaty  with  the  understanding  that  the  grants! 
were  annulled,  and  De  Neuville  [the  French  minister,  who  seems 
to  have  acted  throughout  as  amicus  curice]  certifies  that  such 
was  the  mutual  understanding,  if  the  fact  be  that  they  were  made 
before  the  24th  of  January,  the  fraud  will  be  so  palpable  that  when 
we  have  got  possession  of  the  country  we  shall  have  the  means  of 
doing  ourselves  justice  in  our  own  hands."  1 

On  May  18,  1819,  Mr.  Forsyth  notified  the  Spanish  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  of  his  readiness  to  exchange  ratifications. 2  Receiving 
no  reply,  he  addressed  him  again  June  4,  recalling  that  the  sloop 
of  war  Hornet  was  awaiting  the  treaty  at  Cadiz  and  that  her  return 
without  it  would  produce  "the  most  unfavorable  impressions."8 
It  was  not  until  June  19  that  the  American  minister  received  an 
answer  stating  that  his  Majesty,  "reflecting  on  the  great  impor 
tance  and  interest  of  the  treaty,  he  is  under  the  indispensable  neces 
sity  of  examining  it  with  the  greatest  caution  and  deliberation  before 
he  proceeds  to  ratify  it."  4  The  animated  reply  of  Forsyth  two 
days  later  was  the  first  of  a  series  which  went  much  beyond  the 
usual  bounds  of  diplomatic  language.  On  August  10,  in  a  com 
munication  largely  given  to  a  criticism  of  Forsyth's  manner,  he 
was  informed  that  the  king  "is  of  opinion  that  a  final  decision  can 
not  be  taken  thereupon  without  previously  entering  into  several 
explanations  with  the  government  of  the  United  States,  to  some 
of  which  your  government  has  given  rise,"  and  that  he  had  selected 
a  person  to  go  to  the  United  States  "possessing  the  qualifications 
necessary  for  bringing  this  interesting  trust  to  a  happy  conclusion."5  / 

The  Hornet,  meanwhile,  had  reached  the  United  States.     The 
treaty  fell  by  limitation  unless  ratified  within  six  months  from  Feb 
ruary  22,  but  in  a  despatch  from  Adams  of  August  18, 1819,  Forsyth  1 
was  authorized  to  extend  the  time  "in  case  the  exchange  shall  be  \ 
immediate"  and  the  ratified  treaty  arrive  in  Washington  "before 

1  Adams,  March  9,  1819,  Memoirs,  IV,  290. 

3  State  Papers,  IV,  654.          3  Ibid.,  654.          4  Ibid.,  654.          5  Ibid.,  656. 


142  ADAMS'S  THREATENING  DESPATCH  [1819 

the  meeting  of  Congress  on  the  first  Monday  in  December";  that 
if  it  should  not  so  arrive  "a  full  communication  will  be  made  by 
the  President  to  Congress  of  all  the  transactions  relating  to  the 
treaty,  and  such  measures  be  adopted  by  that  body  as  they  shall 
think  required  by  the  exigency  of  the  case;  that  whatever  their 
determination  may  be,  the  Spanish  government  will  be  respon 
sible  to  the  United  States  for  all  damages  and  expenses  which 
may  arise  from  the  delay  or  refusal  of  Spain  to  ratify,  and  from 
the  measures  to  which  the  United  States  may  resort  to  give  efficacy 
to  their  rights;  and  that,  for  the  indemnities  to  which  they  will 
be  justly  entitled  for  this  violation  of  faith  by  Spain,  the  United 
States  will  look  to  the  territory  west  of  the  Sabine  River."  * 

Adams  rightly  held  that  the  delay  of  Spain  was  wholly  unjustified. 
A  distinguished  authority  has  stated:  "Had  the  Spanish  govern 
ment,  no  matter  for  what  motives,  promptly  disavowed  the  treaty  as 
made  in  excess  of  instructions,  the  United  States  would  have  had  no 
ground  for  substantial  complaint  no  matter  what  might  have  been 
the  reasons  for  such  disavowal."  2  But  the  word  of  the  king  had 
been  given,  "Obliging  ourselves,  as  we  do  hereby  oblige  ourselves 
and  promise  on  the  faith  and  word  of  a  king,  to  approve,  ratify, 
and  fulfil,  and  to  cause  to  be  immediately  observed  and  fulfilled 
whatsoever  may  be  stipulated  and  signed  by  you,  to  which  intent 
and  purpose  I  grant  you  all  authority  and  full  power,  in  the  most 
ample  form,  thereby  as  of  right  required."  In  Adams's  view,  it 
was-  thus  the  duty  of  the  Spanish  government  to  ratify  the  treaty  at 
once,  quoting  in  support  Vattel  and  Martens:  "Whatever  he  [the 
plenipotentiary]  promises  within  the  terms  of  his  commission  and 
according  to  the  extent  of  his  powers  is  binding  upon  his  constituent." ' 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  657. 

a  Wharton,  Inter.  Law  Digest,  II,  par.  161-a. 

3  State  Papers,  IV,  657-660.  The  measures  referred  to  by  Adams  involved 
taking  possession  of  Florida.  At  the  cabinet  meeting,  August  10,  1819,  it  was 
unanimously  agreed  that  in  case  the  ratification  should  be  withheld  it  would 
be  proper  to  recommend  such  action  to  Congress. — Adams,  Memoirs,  IV, 
406.  The  President  thus  in  his  annual  message,  December  7,  1819,  "sub 
mitted  to  the  consideration  of  Congress  whether  it  will  not  be  proper  for  the 
United  States  to  carry  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  into  effect  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  it  had  been  ratified  by  Spain."  This,  however,  was  qualified 
by  a  suggestion  that  if  a  law  for  carrying  the  treaty  into  effect  be  adopted,  it 
should  be  contingent,  leaving  the  responsibility  for  action  upon  the  executive. 
—State  Papers,  IV,  627. 


1819]  SERIOUS  ASPECT  OF  AFFAIRS  143 

The  Hornet,  carrying  the  declaration  of  proposed  action  in 
Adams's  despatch,  arrived  again  at  Cadiz  September  17,  1819, 
but  left  there  after  a  stay  of  but  three  hours  for  Gibraltar,  as 
Cadiz  was  at  this  time  desolated  by  yellow  fever.  The  captain, 
bearing  the  despatch,  did  not  reach  Madrid  until  September  30, 
and  October  2  its  tenor  was  laid  before  the  Spanish  foreign 
minister,  requesting  an  "immediate,  explicit,  and  unequivocal 
reply.  Should  this  reply  not  be  made  before  the  10th  of  the  current 
month,  I  give  formal  notice  to  your  excellency  that  the  proposal 
will  be  considered  as  rejected  and  the  proper  communication  will 
be  made  to  the  President."  1 

The  answer  was  made  October  8,  the  only  noteworthy  remark 
being  that  the  king  regarded  it  indispensable  to  send  to  the 
United  States  a  person  possessing  his  confidence  who,  "by  smooth 
ing  the  obstacles  or  removing  the  difficulties  which  have  hitherto 
opposed  the  accomplishment  of  his  beneficent  intentions,  may 
fully  convince  the  federal  government  of  the  frankness  and  loyalty, 
as  well  as  the  honor  and  dignity  which  it  is  his  Majesty's  desire  to 
maintain  in  his  relations  of  amity  and  union  with  that  govern 
ment."2  While  considering  the  business  of  the  treaty  thus  "at 
rest,"  Forsyth  continued  his  correspondence  by  a  note,  October  10, 
requesting  authenticated  copies  of  the  Spanish  grants,  which,  being 
peremptorily  refused,  he  followed,  October  18,  by  a  lengthy  and 
threatening  note  respecting  the  grants  which,  on  November  10, 
was  returned  to  him  as  not  "conceived  in  fit  and  becoming 
terms."  3 

The  Hornet  sailed  from  Malaga,  October  20,  1819,  for  the 
United  States  bearing  news  of  the  continued  unsatisfactory  state  of 
the  treaty.  Her  arrival  in  Spain  had  already  produced  great 
anxiety  at  Madrid,4  which  the  correspondence  just  mentioned 
did  nothing  to  allay.  So  serious  was  the  aspect  that  the  Spanish 
minister  called  upon  Count  Bulgary,  the  Russian  charge*  d'affaires, 
requesting  him  to  visit  Mr.  Forsyth  and  ask  that  he  might  not 
insist  upon  sending  in  again  the  returned  note,  and  explaining 
that  General  Vives  had  been  selected  as  minister  to  the  United 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  663.  2  Ibid.,  IV,  664. 

» Ibid.,  IV,  668-672. 

4  Forsyth  to  secretary  of  state,  October  10, 1819,  Ibid.,  IV,  666. 


144       SOUTH  AMERICA  THE  STUMBLING  BLOCK    [1819 

• 

States,  with  competent  powers,  and  that  everything  would  be 
amicably  arranged,  the  future  discussions  to  be  transferred  entirely 
to  Washington.1 

The  cause  of  the  Spanish  minister's  reference  to  the  Russian 
representative  at  Madrid  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Russian  emperor, 
Alexander,  the  foremost  spirit  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  particularly 
concerned  with  the  affairs  of  Spain,  feared  lest  the  peace  be  broken 
with  the  United  States  and  the  aims  of  the  alliance  now  incubating 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle  be  thwarted.  A  note  to  Poletica,  the  Russian 
minister  at  Washington,  after  expressing  the  supposition  that  he 
was  doubtless  informed  how  far  the  President's  last  instructions 
to  Mr.  Forsyth  were  positive,  said,  "The  emperor  will  not  now 
take  upon  him  to  justify  Spain;  but  he  charges  you  to  plead 
with  the  government  at  Washington  the  cause  of  peace  and 
concord."  2 

Not  only  was  Russia  concerned,  but  France  had  made  the 
strongest  remonstrances  to  the  Spanish  cabinet.  De  Neuville,j 
the  French  minister  at  Washington,  informed  Adams  that  the 
French  government  was  assured  that  it  was  the  king's  "most 
earnest  desire  and  settled  determination  to  finish  this  trans 
action  with  the  United  States;  that  the  real  obstacle  was  not 
*  the  affair  of  the  grants.'  The  great  stumbling  block  was 
South  America.  The  proposition  which  we  had  made  to  Eng 
land  and  were  ready  to  make  to  France  and  Russia,  for  a  joint 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  Buenos  Ayres,  had  been  made 
use  of  to  persuade  the  King  of  Spain  that  if  he  should  ratify 
the  treaty  the  next  day  we  should  recognize  the  South  Amer 
icans  and  make  common  cause  with  them.  His  jealousy,  be- 
'jg  thus  excited,  had  been  much  strengthened  by  exaggerated 
representations  from  this  country  of  a  miserable  plundering  ex- 

Jition  into  the  province  of  Texas  which  had  been  carried  on 
l?vj  summer  by  people  from  the  United  States.  De  Neuville's 
instructions  are,  therefore,  to  use  all  his  influence  with  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  to  prevail  upon  them  to  take  no 
precipitate  measure  which  might  produce  war,  but  to  wait  until 
the  Spanish  minister  shall  come,  with  the  perfect  assurance  that 

1  Forsyth  to  Adams,  January  3,  1820,  State  Papers,  IV,  674. 
2Nesselrode  to  Poletica,  November  27,  1819,  Ibid.,  IV,  676. 


1820]  NEW  NEGOTIATION  DECLINED  145 

we  shall  obtain  the  ratification  without  needing  the  application  of 
force."  l 

Vives  left  Madrid  January  25, 1820,  and  presented  his  credentials 
in  Washington  April  12.  A  month  earlier  (March  9)  the  House 
committee  on  foreign  affairs  had  submitted  a  bill  to  authorize  the 
President  to  take  possession  of  the  whole  of  Florida  and  establish 
a  temporary  government.2  On  April  14  Vives  presented  a  note 
"opening  and  almost  closing  the  negotiation,"3  in  which,  while 
dwelling  upon  "the  system  of  hostility  which  appears  to  be  pur 
sued  in  so  many  parts  of  the  Union  against  theSpanish  do 
minions,"  he  proposed,  by  command  of  the  king,  as  a  subject  "to 
be  taken  into  full  consideration,"  besides  "the  scandalous  system 
of  piracy  established  in  and  carried  on  from  several  of  their 
ports,"  that  the  United  States  should  give  a  pledge  that  the  in 
tegrity  of  his  Catholic  Majesty's  possessions  should  be  respected. 
"And,  finally,  that  they  will  form  no  relations  with  the  pretended 
governments  of  the  revolted  provinces  of  Spain."  4 

Adams  replied,  in  a  short  and  sharp  note,  that  "  it  is  indispens 
able  that  before  entering  into  any  new  negotiation  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  that  relating  to  the  treaty  already  signed 
should  be  closed.  If  upon  receiving  the  explanations  which  your 
government  has  asked,  and  which  I  am  prepared  to  give,  you  are 
authorized  to  issue  orders  to  the  Spanish  officers  commanding  in 
Florida,  to  deliver  up  to  those  of  the  United  States  who  may  be  au 
thorized  to  receive  it  immediate  possession  of  the  province  accord 
ing  to  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty,  the  President,  if  such  shall  be 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  will  wait  (with  such  possession 
given)  for  the  ratification  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  till  your  messenger 
shall  have  time  to  proceed  to  Madrid;  but  if  you  have  no  such  au 
thority,  the  President  considers  it  will  be  at  once  an  unprofitable 
waste  of  time,  and  a  course  incompatible  with  the  dignity  of  this 
nation,  to  give  explanations  which  are  to  lead  to  no  satisfactory  re 
sult  and  to  resume  a  negotiation  the  conclusion  of  which  can  no 
longer  be  deferred."  5 

Vives  in  reply  assured  Adams  that  he  was  not  authorized  to  de- 

1  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  453.  2  State  Papers,  IV,  690. 

3  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  70.  4  State  Papers,  IV,  680. 

6  Adams  to  Vives,  April  21,  1820,  Ibid.,  682. 


146  TREATY  RATIFIED.  [1821 

liver  Florida,  despite  his  statement  of  authority  to  Gallatin,  the 
American  minister  in  France,  whom  he  met  in  Paris  on  his  way  to 
America.1     The  fact  was  that  he  was  so  authorized  should  he  be  I 
satisfied  as  to  conditions.     The  whole  question  hinged  in  reality, 
not  upon  the  question  of  grants,  but  upon  the  attitude  of  the  United  \ 
States  toward  the   revolted   South  American  provinces.     It  was] 
attempted  to  make  clear  to  Vives  that  acceptance  of  the  Spanish 
proposal  meant  departure  from  the  attitude  of  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  to  which  the  government  had  steadily  held  despite 
certain  clamor  in  and  out  of  Congress. 

But  events  in  Spain  were  hastening  a  settlement  independently 
of  the  Washington  negotiations.  A  revolution  begun  in  January, 
1820,  ended  in  the  unwilling  acceptance  by  Fernando,  March  7i 
of  the  Cadiz  constitution  of  1812.  The  determination  of  the 
United  States  government  to  occupy  Florida  was  of  course  known, 
and  the  new  government  was  reconciled  to  such  an  event.2  The 
question  of  imminency,  however,  was  soon  removed  by  the  re 
ception  of  President  Monroe's  special  message  of  May  9,  1820, 
forwarding  the  Spanish  correspondence.  Recognizing  in  this  the 
difficulties  of  the  new  Spanish  government,  he  declared  that  "the 
United  States  would  not  be  justified  in  their  own  estimation  should 
they  take  any  steps  to  disturb  its  harmony.  When  the  Spanish 
government  is  completely  organized  .  .  .  there  is  just  ground  to 
presume  that  our  differences  with  Spain  will  be  speedily  and  satis 
factorily  settled."  3 

Monroe's  forecast  was  correct.  The  Cortes  met  July  6.  On 
October  5,  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote,  it  advised  the  king  to 
cede  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States,  and  declared  null  and  void 
the  cessions  of  land  of  which  the  United  States  had  made  complaint.4 
On  October  24,  1820,  the  king  signed  the  order  of  transfer,  and 
February  19,  1821,  the  Senate  a  second  time  consented  to  the  rati 
fication  of  the  treaty,  and  on  February  22,  1821,  after  a  struggle  of 
two  years,  the  ratifications  were  exchanged.  The  formal  act  of 
transfer  was  signed  July  10, 1821,  by  Governor  Don  Jose*  Coppinger 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  679. 

2  Forsyth  to  Adams,  May  20,  1820,  Ibid.,  IV,  690. 

3  Message,  Ibid.,  IV,  676,  677. 

4  Forsyth  to  Adams,  October  5  and  12,  1820,  Ibid.,  IV,  694-701. 


1821]  JACKSON  GOVERNOR  OF  FLORIDA  147 

on  the  part  of  Spain  and  Mr.  Robert  Butler,  commissioner,  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States.  General  Andrew  Jackson  was  ap 
pointed  governor,  an  office  in  which  he  quickly  showed  his  more 
unfortunate  and  unhappy  characteristics. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    RECOGNITION    OF    SOUTH    AMERICAN    INDEPENDENCE 

WHILE  the  greatest  cause  of  difficulty  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  had  thus  been  removed  by  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty,  there  yet  remained  the  question  of  the  revolted  Spanish- 
American  provinces;  one  which  was  not  finally  to  be  at  rest  for 
three-quarters  of  a  century  to  come. 

In  1810,  when  the  victory  of  Napoleon  appeared  to  be  com 
plete,  the  principal  inhabitants  of  Caracas,  in  the  name  of  Fer 
nando  VII,  deposed  the  Spanish  colonial  officials  and  elected 
a  supreme  junta.  On  April  25,  1810,  the  president  and  vice- 
president  of  this  junta  addressed  to  the  secretary  of  state  of  the 
United  States  a  letter  accrediting  Don  Juan  Vicente  Bolivar  and 
Don  Telesforo  Ozea  as  bearers  of  the  intelligence  that  Venezuela 
had  severed  her  allegiance  to  Spain.  Several  papers  were  later 
presented,  the  first  recorded  acknowledgment  of  which  is  in  a 
letter  of  Monroe,  secretary  of  state,  of  December  19, 1811,  mention 
ing  the  reception  of  a  copy  of  the  declaration  of  independence, 
"and  that  the  President  had  received  it  with  the  interest  the  mat 
ter  deserved."  l 

President  Madison  mentioned  the  subject  in  his  message,  No 
vember  5,  1811,  with  an  expression  of  general  interest  in  the  events 
now  developing  in  South  America,  and  the  select  committee  to  which 
this  part  of  the  message  was  referred  reported  a  joint  resolution 
December  10,  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  beheld  "with 
friendly  interest  the  establishment  of  independent  sovereignty  by 
the  Spanish  provinces  in  America  .  .  .  and  that  when  these  prov 
inces  shall  have  attained  the  condition  of  nations  .  .  .  the  Sen 
ate  and  House  of  Representatives  will  unite  with  the  executive 
1  Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  1,  75. 
148 


1817]  COMMISSION  TO  SOUTH  AMERICA  149 

in  establishing  with  them  .  .  .  such  amicable  relations  and  com 
mercial  intercourse  as  may  require  their  legislative  authority." 
No  action  was  taken  upon  the  resolution,  which  in  the  circum 
stances  was  nowise  unfriendly  to  Spain,  which  was,  at  the  moment, 
practically  a  French  province. 

The  destruction  of  Caracas  and  20,000  of  the  inhabitants  in 
1812  by  an  earthquake  caused  the  temporary  failure  of  the  revo 
lution,2  and  Miranda,  who  had  reappeared  from  England  as  a 
leader,  submitted,  July  26,  1812,  on  a  basis  of  a  general  amnesty 
which  was  not  regarded  by  the  Spanish  general.  Miranda  a 
little  later,  through  the  inactivity  of  Bolivar,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Spaniards,  was  sent  to  Spain,  and  died  in  imprisonment  July 
14,  1816;  his  fate  a  sad  blot  upon  the  latter's  reputation.  The 
Spanish  forces,  under  General  Morillo  thenceforward  until  1819, 
were  in  the  ascendancy. 

On  June  28,  1810,  Mr.  Joel  Poinsett  was  appointed  agent  to 
Buenos  Ayres,  where  a  junta  on  the  call  of  the  viceroy  May  25, 
1810,  had  organized  a  government  declaring  the  country  inde 
pendent  of  the  French  government  in  Spain,  but  still  subject  to 
the  authority  of  Fernando  VII.  Full  independence  of  Spain  was 
not  declared  until  July  9,  1816.  Poinsett's  instructions  stated 
that  "the  real  as  well  as  ostensible  object  of  your  mission  is  to 
explain  the  mutual  advantages  of  commerce  with  the  United 
States,  to  promote  liberal  and  stable  regulations,  and  to  transmit 
seasonable  information  on  the  subject."  3 

The  revolution  in  Chile  also  began  in  1810.  The  whole  of 
South  America  was  thus,  with  the  exception  of  the  viceroyalty 
of  Peru,  thenceforward  in  a  revolutionary  state.  No  movement 
toward  revolt  took  place  in  the  latter  until  1819,  or  in  Mexico  until 
1821. 

In  1817  a  commission,  composed  of  Csesar  A.  Rodney,  John 
Graham,  and  Theodoric  Bland,  was  appointed  to  go  to  South 
America  to  report  upon  the  general  situation,  but  more  particularly 

1  Resolution  in  State  Papers,  III,  508. 

2  On  May  8,  1812,  the  United  States  Congress  voted  $50,000  to  purchase 
provisions  for  relief  of  citizens  who  had  suffered  by  the  earthquake  in  Venezuela, 
an  act  which  was  carried  into  effect,  Mr.  Alexander  Scott  being  designated 
as  the  agent  of  distribution. 

»  House  Rep.  72,  20  Cong.,  2  Sess.;  Moore,  Digest,  1,  215. 


150  THE  AMERICAN  ATTITUDE  [1818 

that  in  Buenos  Ayres  and  Chile.  The  commission  sailed  from 
Hampton  Roads  in  the  frigate  Congress,  December  4,  1817,  and 
on  arriving  at  Montevideo,  found  it  in  possession  of  a  Portuguese 
army,  Uruguay  being  claimed  as  part  of  Brazil  which  was  then  an 
integral  part  of  the  Portuguese  dominions.  Mr.  Bland  was  the 
only  one  to  cross  the  Andes  and  visit  Chile.  Separate  reports  were 
made  by  these  gentlemen,  November,  1818,  as  also  by  Mr.  Poin- 
sett,  the  special  agent  to  Buenos  Ayres.1 

The  result  was  the  determination  not  as  yet  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  provinces  visited,  President  Monroe's  an 
nual  message  November  16,  1818,  stating  that  "there  is  good 
cause  to  be  satisfied  with  the  course  heretofore  pursued  by  the 
United  States  in  regard  to  this  contest,  and  to  conclude  that  it 
is  proper  to  adhere  to  it,  especially  in  the  present  state  of  affairs." 
The  fact  that  the  treaty  with  Spain  was  then  pending  would 
appear,  despite  many  assertions  to  the  contrary,  to  have  had  but 
little  weight  in  this  determination.  Long  before  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty,  the  views  of  the  United  States  government  were 
known  to  Spain,  as  Adams,  the  secretary  of  state,  on  December 
12,  1818,  desired  the  French  minister  de  Neuville  "to  write  to 
the  Duke  of  Richelieu  and  state  to  him  that  we  hope  France  will 
soon  be  prepared  to  move  with  us  in  the  formal  acknowledgment 
of  the  government  of  Buenos  Ayres;  that  we  have  given  the  same 
notice  to  Great  Britain;  that  we  have  patiently  waited  without 
interfering  in  the  policy  of  the  allies  2  on  the  subject,  and  as  they 
have  not  agreed  upon  anything,  and  the  fact  of  the  independence 
of  Buenos  Ayres  appears  established,  we  think  it  necessary  that 
it  should  be  recognized."  "The  French  minister,"  says  Adams, 
"appeared  to  be  startled."  3 

There  was  good  reason  that  the  French  minister  should  appear 
as  Mr.  Adams  mentioned,  for  there  was  then  incubating  the  scheme 
of  establishing  a  Bourbon  prince  as  king  of  the  southern  part  of 
South  America,  which  culminated  in  an  express  offer  of  support 
from  France.  On  June  18,  1819,  the  French  minister  for  foreign 
affairs  wrote:  "With  a  view  to  the  attainment  of  an  object  so 
desirable  to  the  South  Americans  as  their  independence  of  the 

1  For  these  interesting  papers  see  State  Papers,  IV,  348. 

3  The  .Holy  Alliance.  3  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  190. 


1819]    FRENCH  EFFORT  TO  ESTABLISH  ROYALTY      151 

crown  of  Spain  .  .  .  the  French  government  offers  to  undertake 
the  task  of  obtaining  the  assent  of  all  the  courts  thereto,  upon  the 
elevation  of  the  Prince  of  Lucca  and  Etruria  l  to  the  throne  of 
South  America;  for  the  accomplishment  of  which  latter  object 
all  the  requisite  aid  should  be  offered,  both  in  naval  and  military 
forces,  so  as  to  enable  him  not  only  to  command  respect,  but  even 
to  repel  any  power  that  might  oppose  itself  to  his  elevation.  .  .  . 
The  French  government  agrees  to  take  charge  of  the  diplomatic 
relations  upon  the  subject;  and  promises  to  grant  to  the  Prince 
of  Lucca  all  the  support,  assistance,  and  protection  which  would 
be  granted  even  to  a  French  prince."  2 

This  proposal  was  accepted  November  12,  1819,  by  the  oli 
garchy  at  Buenos  Ayres,  calling  itself  a  congress,  but  with  a  most 
important  reservation — its  acceptance  should  be  provisional  upon 
the  friendly  attitude  of  Great  Britain;  a  proviso  fatal  to  the  proj 
ect,  as  the  latter  emphatically  dissented,  seeing  in  such  a  scheme 
the  destruction  of  her  rapidly  increasing  South  American  commerce. 
How  large  a  part  this  intrigue  on  the  part  of  France  was  to  play  in 
her  motives  for  the  occupancy  of  Spain  by  her  armies  six  years 
later  has  not  come  to  light,  but  that  it  was  an  element  in  the  de 
signs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  as  to  the  future  of  the  South  American 
provinces  there  can  be  little  doubt.  It  was,  however,  never  to 
emerge  from  the  early  eclipse  caused  by  British  policy. 

Mr.  Clay,  a  warm  advocate  of  the  South  American  cause,  partly 
from  genuine  sympathy,  partly  as  an  opponent  to  the  adminis 
tration,  had  already,  March  24,  1818,  in  order  to  force  the  ad 
ministration's  hands,  moved  in  the  House  and  supported  by  an 
impassioned  speech  an  amendment  appropriating  $18,000  for  an 
outfit  and  a  year's  salary  for  a  minister  to  the  government  of  Rio 
de  la  Plata.  This  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  115  to  45.3  Along 
with  the  very  natural  and  proper  sympathy  for  the  South  Ameri 
cans,  which  had  been  throughout  exhibited  by  the  people  of  the 

1  Then  eighteen  years  old,  and  nephew  of  the  King  of  Spain. 

'Memorandum  of  Baron  de  Reyneval  in  reply  to  a  note  from  Don  Jose" 
Valentin  Gomez,  the  Argentine  commissioner  in  Paris,  to  the  French  minister 
of  foreign  affairs  (British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  VI,  1091).  The  new 
kingdom  was  to  include  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Entre  Rios,  Corrientes,  and 
Paraguay. 

*  Debates  in  Congress,  VI,  136-169. 


152        PRESIDENT  RECOGNIZES  INDEPENDENCE      [1822 

United  States,  there  was  influence  of  a  more  sinister  sort  which 
was  used  to  promote  the  feeling  that  independence  should  be 
granted;  the  influence  of  the  profits  of  privateering  and  of  the  pros 
pective  exclusive  privileges  hoped  for  by  certain  men  of  stand 
ing  and  political  influence.1 

Two  years  later,  Clay  moved  in  the  House,  April  4,  1820,  an 
appropriation  for  such  minister  or  ministers  as  the  President  might, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate,  send  to  any  of  the  South 
American  governments  that  had  established  and  were  maintaining 
their  independence  against  Spain.  This  motion  was  carried  by  a 
vote  of  80  to  75,  but  had  no  result.  A  motion  for  an  appropriation 
made  February  5,  1821,  in  the  next  session  of  Congress,  was  de 
feated,  but  a  motion  was  carried  declaring  that  the  House  "par 
ticipates  with  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  the  deep  interest 
which  they  feel  for  the  success  of  the  Spanish  provinces  of  South 
America,  which  are  struggling  to  establish  their  liberty  and  inde 
pendence,  and  that  it  will  give  its  constitutional  support  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  whenever  he  may  deem  it  expedient 
to  recognize  the  sovereignty  and  independency  of  any  of  the  said 
provinces."2 

On  January  30,  1822,  the  House  requested  the  President  to  lay 
before  it  the  reports  of  the  agents  sent  to  the  revolted  states.  In 
doing  this,  the  President  sent  a  message  to  both  houses  of  Congress, 
March  8,  in  which,  while  stating  tersely  the  situation  in  the  several 
continental  provinces,  he  said:  "When  we  regard,  then,  the  great 
length  of  time  which  this  war  has  been  prosecuted,  the  complete 
success  which  has  attended  it  in  favor  of  the  provinces,  the  present 
condition  of  the  parties,  and  the  utter  inability  of  Spain  to  produce 
any  change  in  it,  we  are  compelled  to  conclude  that  its  fate  is 
settled,  and  that  the  provinces  which  have  declared  their  indepen 
dence  and  are  in  enjoyment  of  it  ought  to  be  recognized.  .  .  .  Should 
Congress  concur  in  the  view  herein  presented  they  will  doubtless 
see  the  propriety  of  making  the  necessary  appropriations  for  carry 
ing  it  into  effect."3 

1  See  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  56. 

2  Davis,  Treaty  Notes,  Treaty  Vol.  1776-1887.     Moore,  International  Law 
Digest,  I,  84.     Debates  in  Congress,  VII,  93-95. 

3  State  Papers,  IV,  819. 


1822]  SPANISH  PROTEST  153 

On  March  9,  1822,  the  day  after  the  President's  message  was 
sent,  Sefior  Don  Joaquin  de  Anduaga,  now  the  Spanish  minister, 
sent  a  vigorous  protest,  asking:  "What  is  the  present  state  of  South 
America,  and  what  are  its  governments,  to  entitle  them  to  recog 
nition  ?  Buenos  Ayres  is  sunk  in  the  most  complete  anarchy,  and 
each  day  sees  new  despots  produced,  who  disappear  the  next. 
Peru,  conquered  by  a  rebel  army,  has  near  the  gates  of  its  capital 
another  Spanish  army  aided  by  part  of  its  inhabitants.  In  Chile, 
an  individual  suppresses  the  sentiments  of  its  inhabitants,  and 
his  violence  presages  a  sudden  change.  On  the  coast  of  Firma 
[Venezuela]  also  the  Spanish  banners  wave,  and  the  insurgent 
generals  are  occupied  in  quarrelling  with  their  own  compatriots. 
In  Mexico,  too,  there  is  no  government.  .  .  .  Where  then  are  those 
governments  which  ought  to  be  recognized  ?  Where  the  pledges  of 
their  stability?  Where  the  proof  that  those  provinces  will  not 
return  to  a  union  with  Spain,  when  so  many  of  their  inhabitants 
desire  it?  and,  in  fine,  where  the  right  of  the  United  States  to 
sanction  and  declare  legitimate  a  rebellion  without  cause,  and  the 
event  of  which  is  even  not  decided?  ...  I  think  it  my  duty  to  1 
protest,  as  I  do  solemnly  protest,  against  the  recognition  of  the  gov-  { 
ernments  mentioned  of  the  insurgent  Spanish  provinces  of  Amer 
ica,  by  the  United  States,  declaring  that  it  can  in  no  way  now,  or 
at  any  time,  lessen  or  invalidate  in  the  least  the  rights  of  Spain  to 
said  provinces,  or  to  employ  whatever  means  may  be  in  her  power  / 
to  reunite  them  to  the  rest  of  her  dominions."  1  — 4. 

The  Spanish  minister's  statement  as  to  interior  anarchic  con 
ditions  was  not  far  from  the  truth,  but  they  were  conditions  which 
were  to  obtain  yet  for  a  generation  and  more.  But  exteriorly  the 
case  was  hopeless.  On  April  6,  1822,  Adams  replied:  "In  every 
question  relating  to  the  independence  of  a  nation,  two  principles 
are  involved:  one  of  right,  and  the  other  of  fact;  the  former  ex 
clusively  depending  upon  the  determination  of  the  nation  itself,  and 
the  latter  resulting  from  the  successful  execution  of  that  determina 
tion.  The  right  has  recently  been  exercised,  as  well  by  the  Spanish 
nation  in  Europe,  as  by  several  of  those  countries  in  the  American 
hemisphere  which  had  for  two  or  three  centuries  been  connected  as 
colonies  with  Spain.  In  the  conflicts  which  have  attended  these 
1  State  Papers,  IV,  845-846.  The  italics  are  Senor  Anduaga 's. 


154  PRINCIPLES  OF  RECOGNITION  [1822 

revolutions,  the  United  States  have  carefully  abstained  from  taking 
any  part  respecting  the  right  of  the  nations  concerned  in  them  to 
maintain  or  newly  organize  their  own  political  constitutions,  and 
observing,  wherever  it  was  a  contest  by  arms,  the  most  impartial 
neutrality.  But  the  civil  war  in  which  Spain  was  for  some  years 
involved  with  the  inhabitants  of  her  colonies  in  America  has,  in 
substance,  ceased  to  exist.  Treaties  equivalent  to  an  acknowledg 
ment  of  independence  have  been  concluded  by  the  commanders  and 
viceroys  of  Spain  herself  with  the  republic  of  Colombia,  with 
Mexico,  and  with  Peru;  while  in  the  provinces  of  La  Plata  and 
Chile,  no  Spanish  force  has  for  several  years  existed  to  dispute  the 
independence  which  the  inhabitants  of  those  countries  had  de 
clared. 

"Under  these  circumstances,  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  far  from  consulting  the  dictates  of  a  policy  questionable  in 
its  morality,  has  yielded  to  an  obligation  of  duty  of  the  highest  order, 
by  recognizing  as  independent  states,  nations  which,  after  deliber 
ately  asserting  their  right  to  that  character,  had  maintained  and 
established  it  against  all  the  resistance  which  had  been  or  could 
be  brought  to  oppose  it.  This  recognition  is  neither  intended  to 
invalidate  any  right  of  Spain,  nor  to  affect  the  employment  of  any 
means  which  she  may  yet  be  disposed  or  enabled  to  use,  with  a 
view  of  reuniting  those  provinces  to  the  rest  of  her  dominions.  It 
is  the  mere  acknowledgment  of  existing  facts,  with  a  view  to  the 
regular  establishment  with  the  nations  newly  formed  of  those  re 
lations,  political  and  commercial,  which  it  is  the  moral  obligation 
of  civilized  and  Christian  nations  to  entertain  reciprocally  with  one 
another."  * 

Adams's  note  of  April  6  was  in  accord  with  Jefferson's  pronounce 
ment,  as  secretary  of  state,  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  minister  to 
France:  "We  surely  cannot  deny  to  any  nation  that  right  whereon 
our  own  government  is  founded,  that  every  one  may  govern  itself 
according  to  whatever  form  it  pleases,  and  change  these  forms  at 
its  own  will;  and  that  it  may  transact  its  business  with  foreign 
nations  through  whatever  organ  it  thinks  proper,  whether  king, 

1  State  Papers,  IV,  846.  For  an  extended  and  interesting  resume"  of  the 
question  of  the  Spanish-American  provinces,  see  Adams's  instructions,  May  27, 
1823,  to  Anderson,  minister  to  Colombia,  State  Papers,  V,  888-890. 


1822]       UNIFORM  ATTITUDE  OF  UNITED  STATES      155 

convention,  assembly,  committee,  president,  or  anything  else  it 
may  choose.  The  will  of  the  nation  is  the  only  thing  essential  to 
be  regarded."  * 

We  shall  see  in  how  small  regard  this  principle,  now  universally 
accepted,  was  held  at  the  moment  with  which  we  are  dealing  by 
the  powers  of  continental  Europe,  which  had  taken  upon  them 
selves  the  general  superintendence  of  the  world's  affairs. 

Nor  as  already  mentioned  was  there,  throughout  the  Florida 
negotiations,  any  deception  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  or 
concealment  of  its  attitude.  "During  the  negotiation,  .  .  ."  says 
Adams,  "repeated  and  very  earnest  efforts  were  made,  both  by 
Mr.  Pizarro  at  Madrid,  and  by  Mr.  Onis  here,  to  obtain  from  the 
government  of  the  United  States  either  a  positive  stipulation  or  a 
tacit  promise  that  the  United  States  would  not  recognize  any  of 
the  South  American  revolutionary  governments;  .  .  .  the  Spanish 
negotiators  were  distinctly  and  explicitly  informed  that  this  govern 
ment  would  not  assent  to  any  such  engagement,  either  express  or 
implied."  2 

On  May  4,  1822,  an  act  was  approved  appropriating  $100,000 
"for  such  missions  to  the  independent  nations  of  the  American 
continent  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  may  deem  proper." 

More  than  a  year  passed  before,  in  accord  with  this  action, 
R.  C.  Anderson,  of  Kentucky,  was  appointed  minister  to  Colom 
bia  and  C.  A.  Rodney,  of  New  Jersey,  to  Argentina.  H.  Allen, 
of  Vermont,  was  appointed  to  Chile  in  1824,  and  Joel  R.  Poinsett, 
of  South  Carolina,  to  Mexico  in  1826. 

Jefferson  to  Morris,  March  12,  1793;  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  143. 
3  Adams  to  Lowndes,  Chairman  House  Com.  on  Foreign  Relations,  Decem 
ber  21,  1819,  State  Papers,  IV,  674. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE   AND    THE  INVASION    OF    SPAIN 

IN  the  period  just  discussed  there  was,  besides  the  difficulties 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  a  second  potent  element  of 
danger  which,  in  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  political  combina 
tions  in  history,  threatened,  through  Spain,  the  peace  not  only  of 
Europe  but  of  both  Americas.  The  movement  was  absolutism 
t  gone  mad. 

~  The  treaty  of  alliance  between  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
England  signed  at  Chaumont,  France,  March  1,  1814,  confirmed 
and  made  permanent  at  Vienna,  March  25,  1815,  reaffirmed  and 
added  to  at  Paris,  November  20,  1815,  dealt  chiefly  with  the 
relations  of  the  allies  with  France;  it  gave  little  hint  of  the  extraor 
dinary  document  signed  September  14,  1815,  by  the  emperors  of 
Austria  and  Russia  and  the  King  of  Prussia  themselves,  and 
not,  as  is  usual,  by  their  ministers  of  state.  To  this  latter  paper 
was  given  the  name,  written  in  the  document  itself,  of  the  Holy 
Alliance,  suggested  by  Madame  Krudener,  a  religious  enthusiast 
and  a  friend  and  guide  of  the  Emperor  Alexander's,' himself  at  this 
time  a  religious  exalte  with  very  advanced  liberalistic  views.  In 
iteelf  it  can  be  regarded  as  but  a  religious  rhapsody,  a  foolish  effer 
vescence  in  its  author  of  altruism  worked  to  fever  heat  by  the  im 
mense  success  of  the  allied  armies. 

This  convention,  apparently  so  harmless,  solemnly  declared  the 
conviction  of  the  monarchs  of  the  necessity  of  founding  their  con 
duct  upon  the  sublime  truths  of  the  Christian  religion;  and  their 
fixed  resolution,  "both  in  the  administration  of  their  respective 
states  and  in  their  political  relations  with  every  other  government, 
to  take  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  that  holy  religion:  viz., 
the  precepts  of  justice,  Christian  charity,  and  peace";  that  they 

156 


1815]  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  157 

should  consider  each  other  as  fellow  countrymen,  regarding  them 
selves  toward  their  subjects  and  armies  as  "fathers  of  families," 
"as  merely  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern  three  branches  of 
one  family/'  exhorting  their  people  "to  strengthen  themselves 
every  day  more  and  more  in  the  principles  and  exercise  of  the  duties 
which  the  Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  mankind";  finally  stating 
that  all  powers  "who  shall  choose  solemnly  to  avow  the  sacred 
principles  which  have  dictated  the  present  act  .  .  .  will  be  re 
ceived  with  equal  ardor  and  affection  into  this  holy  alliance."  * 

1  The  full  text  of  the  convention  was  as  follows: 

"  In  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Indivisible  Trinity. 

"  Their  Majesties  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  Emperor 
of  Russia,  having,  in  consequence  of  the  great  events  which  have  marked  the 
course  of  the  last  three  years  in  Europe,  and  especially  of  the  blessings  which 
it  has  pleased  Divine  Providence  to  shower  down  upon  those  states  which 
place  their  confidence  and  their  hope  on  it  alone,  acquired  the  intimate  con 
viction  of  the  necessity  of  founding  the  conduct  to  be  observed  by  the  powers 
in  their  reciprocal  relations  upon  the  sublime  truths  which  the  holy  religion 
of  our  Saviour  teaches. 

"  They  solemnly  declare  that  the  present  act  has  no  other  object  than  to 
publish,  in  the  face  of  the  whole  world,  their  fixed  resolution,  both  in  the 
administration  of  their  respective  states  and  in  their  political  relations  with 
every  other  government,  to  take  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  that  holy 
religion;  namely,  the  precepts  of  justice,  Christian  charity,  and  peace,  which, 
far  from  being  applicable  only  to  private  concerns,  must  have  an  intimate 
influence  on  the  councils  of  princes,  and  guide  all  their  steps,  as  being  the  only 
means  of  consolidating  human  institutions  and  remedying  their  imperfections. 
In  consequence  their  Majesties  have  agreed  upon  the  following  articles: 

"Art.  1.  Conformably  to  the  words  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  com 
mand  all  men  to  consider  each  other  as  brethren,  the  three  contracting  mon- 
archs  will  remain  united  by  the  bonds  of  a  true  and  indissoluble  fraternity, 
and  considering  each  other  as  fellow  countrymen,  they  will,  on  all  occasions 
and  in  all  places,  lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance;  and  regarding  themselves 
toward  their  subjects  and  armies  as  fathers  of  families,  they  will  lead  them 
in  the  same  spirit  of  fraternity  with  which  they  are  animated,  to  protect  re 
ligion,  peace,  and  justice. 

"  Art.  2.  In  consequence,  the  sole  principle  in  force,  whether  between  said 
governments  or  between  their  subjects,  shall  be  that  of  doing  each  other 
reciprocal  service,  and  of  testifying,  by  unalterable  good-will,  the  mutual 
affection  with  which  they  ought  to  be  animated,  to  consider  themselves  all 
as  members  of  one  and  the  same  Christian  nation,  the  three  allied  princes 
looking  on  themselves  as  merely  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern  three 
branches  of  the  one  family,  namely,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia;  thus  con 
fessing  that  the  Christian  world,  of  which  they  and  their  people  form  a  part, 
has  in  reality  no  other  sovereign  than  Him  to  whom  alone  power  really  be 
longs,  because  in  Him  alone  are  found  all  the  treasures  of  love,  science,  and 


158  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  [1815 

There  is  no  need  to  impute  to  Alexander,  the  author  and  moving 
spirit  of  the  document  of  the  14th  of  September,  any  but  the  best 
of  motives.  Master  "of  the  unbroken  might  of  Russia,"  the  semi- 
Asiatic  empire  which  now  for  the  first  time  felt  itself  really  a  Euro 
pean  power,  he  was  enthusiastically  moved  by  the  idea  of  a  personal 
mission  to  dominate  Europe  for  Europe's  good,  the  mechanism 
being  autocracy  tempered  by  a  compound  of  the  teachings  of 
Rousseau  and  of  the  Christian  religion. 

All  powers  were  requested  to  join  the  alliance,  two  excepted: 
Turkey,  naturally,  as  not  Christian,  and  Spain,  the  conduct  of 
whose  king  at  this  time  was  regarded  by  the  monarchs  as  deroga 
tory  to  kingship.  All  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  but  the  two  ex 
cluded  ones,  and  the  pope  and  the  Prince  Regent  of  Great  Britain, 
became  signers;  the  last  named,  though  a  fervent  supporter  of  a 

infinite  wisdom,  that  is  to  say,  God,  our  Divine  Saviour,  the  Word  of  the  Most 
High,  the  Word  of  Life.  Their  Majesties  consequently  recommend  to  their 
people,  with  the  most  tender  solicitude,  as  the  sole  means  of  enjoying  that 
peace  which  arises  from  a  good  conscience,  and  which  alone  is  durable,  to 
strengthen  themselves  every  day  more  and  more  in  the  principles  and  exercise 
of  the  duties  which  the  Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  mankind. 

"Art.  3.  All  the  powers  who  shall  choose  solemnly  to  avow  the  sacred 
principles  which  have  dictated  the  present  act,  and  shall  acknowledge  how 
important  it  is  for  the  happiness  of  nations,  too  long  agitated,  that  these 
truths  should  henceforth  exercise  over  the  destinies  of  mankind  all  the  in 
fluence  which  belongs  to  them,  will  be  received  with  equal  ardor  and  affection 
into  this  Holy  Alliance. 

"  Done  in  triplicate  and  signed  at  Paris,  in  the  year  of  grace,  1815, 14th  (26th) 
September. 

"[L.  S.]  Francis. 

"  [L.  S.]  Frederick  William. 

"[L.  S.]  Alexander." 

(Annual  Register,  1816,  381-382;  also  Hansard,  First  Series,  XXXII,  355.) 
The  original,  says  Capefigue,  was  entirely  in  the  handwriting  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  with  corrections  by  Madame  Krudener.  Strangely  enough  the 
fundamental  idea,  thus  expressed,  had  come  from  the  British  foreign  minister, 
Lord  Castlereagh,  one  of  the  British  representatives  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
many  treaties  of  the  period.  Writing  Lord  Liverpool,  the  prime  minister, 
he  said:  "Although  the  Emperor  of  Austria  is  the  ostensible  organ,  the  measure 
has  entirely  originated  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  whose  mind  has  latterly 
taken  a  deep  religious  tinge.  Since  he  came  to  Paris  he  has  passed  a  part  of 
every  evening  with  a  Madame  de  Krudener,  an  old  fanatic,  who  has  consider 
able  reputation  amongst  the  few  highflyers  in  religion  that  are  to  be  found  at 
Paris.  The  first  intimation  I  had  of  this  extraordinary  act  was  from  the 
emperor  himself,  and  I  was  rather  surprised  to  find  it  traced  back  to  a  con- 


1815]  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  159 

general  idea  of  the  union,  being  prevented  by  the  constitutional  ob 
jection  to  the  British  monarch  becoming  a  personal  signatory. 

Notwithstanding  its  apparent  harmlessness,  however,  the  first 
article  stating  that  the  monarchs  "will  on  all  occasions,  and  in  all 
places,  lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance"  came  to  have  in  the 
light  of  later  years  a  deep  significance.  This,  combined  with  the 
statement  that  the  three  sovereigns  looked  upon  themselves  as 
"merely  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern  three  branches  of  one 
family";  that  these  branches  were  the  most  important  of  the  Eu 
ropean  continent;  that  they  had  just  settled  the  affairs  of  Europe 
to  their  satisfaction,  was  to  mean  later,  whatever  the  first  intent, 
more  than  was  first  understood  by  the  rest  of  mankind,  and  more, 
no  doubt,  than  the  imperial  author  himself  foresaw. 

But  what  became  known  as  the  Holy  Alliance,  its  soul,  in  fact, 
was  not  the  rhapsodic  document  of  Alexander  and  Madame 

versation  with  which  I  was  honored  with  the  emperor  when  leaving  Vienna. 
You  may  remember  my  sending  home  a  project  of  declaration  with  which 
I  proposed  the  congress  should  close,  in  which  the  sovereigns  were  solemnly 
to  pledge  themselves  in  the  face  of  the  world  to  preserve  to  their  people  the 
peace  they  had  conquered,  and  to  treat  as  a  common  enemy  whatever  power 
should  violate  it.  The  emperor  told  me  that  this  idea,  with  which  he  seemed 
much  pleased  at  the  time,  had  never  passed  from  his  mind,  but  that  he  thought 
it  ought  to  assume  more  formal  shape  and  one  directly  personal  to  the  sover 
eigns.  .  .  .  Prince  Metternich  came  to  me  the  following  day  with  the  project 
of  the  treaty  since  signed.  He  communicated  to  me  in  great  confidence  the 
difficulty  in  which  the  Emperor  of  Austria  felt  himself  placed;  that  he  felt 
great  repugnance  to  be  a  party  to  such  an  act,  and  yet  was  more  apprehensive 
of  refusing  himself  to  the  emperor's  application;  that  it  was  quite  clear  his 
mind  was  affected  .  .  .  the  King  of  Prussia  .  .  .  felt  in  the  same  manner. 
...  As  soon  as  the  instrument  was  executed  between  the  sovereigns,  without 
the  intervention  of  their  ministers,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  brought  it  to  me, 
developed  his  whole  plan  of  universal  peace,  and  told  me  the  three  sovereigns 
had  agreed  to  address  a  letter  to  the  prince  regent  to  invite  him  to  accede,  of 
which  intended  letter  his  Imperial  Majesty  delivered  to  me  the  enclosed  copy. 
The  Duke  of  Wellington  happened  to  be  with  me  .  .  .  and  it  was  not  without 
difficulty  that  we[went  through  the  interview  with  becoming  gravity.  .  .  .  The 
fact  is  that  the  emperor's  mind  is  not  completely  sound." — Lord  Castlereagh 
to  Lord  Liverpool,  September  28,  1815.  Wellington,  Supplementary  De 
spatches,  etc.,  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  XI,  175. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  published,  on  Christmas  Day,  1815,  a  manifesto  of 
much  the  same  character,  which,  accompanied  by  a  copy  of  the  treaty,  was 
read  in  all  the  Russian  churches.  The  manifesto  ended:  "May  this  sacred 
union  be  confirmed  between  all  the  powers  for  their  general  good;  and  (de 
terred  by  the  union  of  all  the  rest)  may  no  one  dare  to  fall  off  from  it." — Han 
sard,  XXXII,  358. 


160  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  [1818 

Krudener,  but  the  sixth  article  of  the  treaties  of  November  20, 
1815,  made  by  England  with  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  severally. 
These  while,  as  a  whole,  concerned  with  the  questions  of  France, 
now  to  be  occupied  for  three  years  longer  as  a  conquered  territory, 
said,  in  the  article  mentioned:  "to  consolidate  the  connections 
which  at  the  present  moment  so  closely  unite  the  four  sovereigns 
for  the  happiness  of  the  world,  the  high  contracting  parties  have 
agreed  to  renew  their  meetings  at  fixed  periods,  either  under  the  im 
mediate  auspices  of  the  sovereigns  themselves,  or  by  their  respective 
ministers,  for  the  purpose  of  consulting  upon  their  common  interests 
and  for  the  consideration  of  the  measures  which  at  each  of  those 
periods  shall  be  considered  the  most  salutary  for  the  repose  and 
prosperity  of  nations,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of 
Europe."  1 

It  was  this  agreement  which  became  the  real  basis  of  the  attempt 
to  rule  Europe, and  even  America, by  a  series  of  "congresses "of  the 
allied  sovereigns,  from  the  logical  effect  of  which  the  world  was  to 
be  saved  by  the  revolt  of  Great  Britain  from  their  demands,  and 
by  the  decisive  pronouncement  of  the  American  government  in 
1823,  known  as  the  "Monroe  doctrine." 

As  agreed  in  1815,  under  this  article,  the  four  allied  powers  met 
October  1,  1818,  at  Aix-la-Chapelle;  present,  the  sovereigns  of 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria  in  person.  The  Government  of 
Great  Britain  was  represented  by  Lord  Castlereagh  (still  foreign 
minister)  and  the  Duke  of  Wellington;  that  of  Austria  by  Metter- 
nich;  the  Russian,  by  Capo  dTstria  and  Nesselrode;  the  Prus 
sian,  by  Hardening  and  Bernstorff.  As  the  meeting  was  to 
arrange  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  armies  of  occupation,  which 
during  this  period  had  remained  in  France  at  that  unhappy  coun 
try's  expense,  the  Duke  of  Richelieu  was  allowed  to  be  present  on 
its  behalf.  Though  the  affairs  of  France  were  foremost,  appeals 
came  to  this  "court  extraordinary"  from  all  Europe:  from  Den 
mark;  from  Bernadotte  of  Sweden,  whom  the  congress  forced  to 
fulfil  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  Kiel,  and  from  the  host  of 
German  rulers  on  questions  left  undetermined  by  the  congress 
of  Vienna. 

1.  The  question  of  the  evacuation  of  France  settled,  the  French 
Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  First  Series,  vol.  XXXII,  272. 


1818]  MEETING  AT  AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  161 

king  was  now  a  free  sovereign,  and  he  demanded  admittance  to 
the  quadruple  alliance;  Ibut  this  was  so  especially  directed  to 
arranging  the  affairs  of  France,  that  matters  were  compromised  by 
the  signing,  November  15,  1818,  of  two  protocols.  The  first,  a 
secret  document,  renewing  the  quadruple  alliance  for  the  purpose 
of  watching  over  France,  was  communicated  in  confidence  to 
Richelieu.  It  stated:  "1.  That  the  subscribing  courts  are  firmly 
resolved  never  to  depart,  neither  in  their  mutual  relations,  nor  in 
those  which  bind  them  to  other  states,  from  the  principle  of  intimate 
union  which  has  hitherto  presided  over  all  their  common  relations 
and  interests,  a  union  rendered  more  strong  and  indissoluble  by 
the  bond  of  Christian  fraternity  which  the  sovereigns  have  formed 
among  themselves.  2.  That  this  union  .  .  .  can  only  have  for 
its  object  the  maintenance  of  the  general  peace,  founded  on  a 
religious  respect  for  the  engagements  contained  in  the  treaties  and 
for  the  whole  of  the  rights  resulting  therefrom.  3.  That  France, 
associated  with  other  powers  by  the  restoration  of  the  legitimate 
monarchical  and  constitutional  powers,  engages,  henceforth,  to 
concur  in  the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of  a  system  which 
has  given  peace  to  Europe,  and  which  can  alone  insure  its  dura 
tion."  The  fourth  section  arranged  for  future  meetings  of  the 
representatives  of  the  alliance,  "and  in  the  case  of  these  meetings 
having  for  their  object  affairs  specially  connected  with  the  interests 
of  the  other  states  of  Europe,  they  shall  only  take  place  in  pur 
suance  of  a  formal  invitation  on  the  part  of  such  of  those  states  as 
the  said  affairs  may  concern,  and  under  the  express  reservation  of 
the  right  of  direct  participation  therein,  either  directly  or  by  their 
plenipotentiaries/'  This  important  reservation  was,  as  will  be 
seen,  soon  to  be  thrown  to  the  winds,  as  was  also  "the  religious  re 
spect"  for  the  engagements  in  treaties. 

The  second  protocol  to  which  France  was  made  a  party  was  a 
declaration  of  the  same  date,  explanatory  of  the  high  principles 
governing  the  self-appointed  keepers  of  the  world's  peace.  It  de 
clared  that  "  the  convention  of  the  9th  of  October,  which  definitely 
regulated  the  execution  of  the  engagements  agreed  to  in  the  treaty 
of  peace  of  November  20,  1815,  is  considered  by  the  sovereigns 
who  concurred  therein  as  the  accomplishment  of  the  work  of  peace, 
and  as  the  completion  of  the  political  system  destined  to  insure 


162  MEETING  AT  AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  [1818 

its  stability.  The  intimate  union  established  among  the  monarchs 
who  are  joint  parties  to  this  system  by  their  own  principles,  no  less 
than  by  the  interest  of  their  people,  offers  to  Europe  the  most  sacred 
pledge  of  its  future  tranquillity.  The  object  of  this  union  is  as 
simple  as  it  is  great  and  salutary.  It  does  not  tend  to  any  new 
political  combination — to  any  change  in  the  relations  sanctioned  by 
existing  treaties.  Calm  and  consistent  in  its  proceedings,  it  has  no 
other  object  than  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the  guarantee  of  those 
transactions  on  which  the  peace  was  founded  and  consolidated/' 

Promising  "the  strictest  observation  of  the  principles  of  the 
right  of  nations  .  .  .  the  repose  of  the  world  will  be  constantly 
their  motive  and  their  end.  .  .  .  They  solemnly  acknowledge  that 
their  duties  toward  God  and  the  people  whom  they  govern  make 
it  peremptory  upon  them  to  give  to  the  world,  as  far  as  in  their 
power,  an  example  of  justice,  of  concord,  and  of  moderation;  happy 
in  the  power  of  concentrating  from  henceforth  all  their  efforts 
to  protect  the  arts  of  peace,  to  increase  the  internal  prosperity  of 
states,  and  to  awaken  those  sentiments  of  religion  and  morality, 
whose  influence  has  been  but  too  much  enfeebled  by  the  misfortune 
of  the  times."  l 

To  these  documents  were  appended,  among  others,  the  names 
of  Castlereagh  and  Wellington,  the  British  representatives.  Great 
Britain  was  thus  still  a  party  to  the  union. 

The  association  was,  in  fact,  the  first  great  peace  society,  but  it 
had  its  own  special  views  as  to  what  constituted  peace,  and  reck 
oned  not  at  all  with  the  aspirations  of  the  millions  of  whom  they 
declared  themselves  the  Heaven-appointed  directors.  With  the 
conjunction  of  France  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  British  rep 
resentatives,  it  thought  itself  secure  in  the  re-establishment  of  the 
ancient  despotisms  which  made  the  sovereign  the  only  source  of  law. 

The  deus  ex  machina  in  the  alliance  was  now,  as  in  fact  always, 
Metternich,  the  impersonation  of  the  idea  of  autocratic  power, 
and  whose  vast  and  overpowering  self-esteem  was  such  as  banished 
from  his  mind  the  thought  that  he  could  be  mistaken  and  made  him 
blind  to  the  possibility  that  there  should  be  any  aspirations  in  the 
mass  of  men  which  needed  to  be  regarded.  His  dominant  idea 
and  whole  principle  of  action  was  that  all  concession  in  the  direc- 
1  Annual  Register,  1819,  135. 


1818]        METTERNICH  THE  ARCH-REACTIONIST          163 

tion  of  constitutional  or  popular  government  must  come  from  the 
fountain  head  of  power  and  authority,  the  monarch.  Ruling 
completely  the  mind  of  his  own  emperor,  he  became  equally  the 
master  of  the  thoughts  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  and  the  King  of 
Prussia.  He  was  the  mover  of  the  conference  of  the  German 
states  at  Carlsbad  in  1819,  and  the  author  of  the  despotic  "Carls 
bad"  decrees,  the  outcome  of  this  conference,  which  "are  held  to 
have  fettered  opinion  and  postponed  constitutional  liberty  in  Ger 
many  for  a  generation."  1  Metternich  soon,  by  holding  before 
Alexander  the  enormity  of  the  German  agitation  for  greater  freedom 
and  taking  advantage  of  the  assassination,  March  23,  1819,  of  the 
reactionist  journalist  Kotzebue,  by  Karl  Sand,  as  a  text,  completely 
subordinated  the  emperor's  mind  to  his  own  and  turned  him  from 
liberalism  to  completest  despotism. 

Few  in  history  have  lived  lives  of,  at  the  time,  apparently,  so  great 
personal  success,  only  to  dwindle  in  the  estimate  of  posterity  to  a 
character  fraught  with  evil,  with  a  want  of  judgment  and  foresight, 
and  with  the  narrowness,  ever  an  accompaniment  of  a  despotic 
mind,  which  should  class  him  among  the  flails  of  mankind.  It  was 
due  to  his  influence,  as  he  himself  so  well  depicts  in  his  correspond 
ence,  that  the  three  monarchs  upon  whom  the  well-being  of  Europe 
so  largely  turned,  stepped  back  into  the  despotism  which  the  French 
revolution  and  Napoleon,  who  though  a  despot  was  a  democrat, 
had  done  so  much  to  overturn.  Germany  has  reason  to  remem 
ber  much;  but  to  Italy  his  memory  and  the  memory  of  his  policy, 
which  bound  her  so  long  in  chains  during  the  years  of  dawning 
liberty  in  Europe,  must  ever  be  her  darkest  thought.2 

Before  adjournment  of  the  meeting  at  Aix,  in  1818,  it  was 
known  at  Washington  that  the  mediation  of  the  allies  had  been 
solicited  by  Spain,  and  agreed  to  be  given  by  them  for  the  purpose 

1  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  367. 

2  It  is  not  surprising  that  two  such  antipodal  minds  as  Metternich  and  Can 
ning  should  not  think  well  of  one  another;    that  Metternich,  who  was  to  see 
his  ideals  overthrown  by  Canning,  should  speak  of  the  latter  as  "  the  malevo 
lent  meteor  hurled  by  an  angry  Providence  upon  Europe,"  and  that  Canning 
should  say  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Granville,  British  ambassador  at  Paris:    "You 
ask  me  what  you  shall  say  to  Metternich  [then  expected  at  Paris].     In  the  first 
place  you  shall  hear  what  I  think  of  him — that  he  is  the  greatest  r[ascal]  and 
l[iar]  on  the  continent,  perhaps  in  the  civilized  world." — Canning  to  Gran 
ville,  March  11,  1825.     Stapleton,  Canning  and  His  Times,  427. 


164  UNITED  STATES  DECLINES  ALLIANCE         [1819 

of  restoring  Spanish  dominion  in  South  America,  under  certain 
conditions  of  commercial  privileges  to  be  guaranteed  to  the  in 
habitants.  Spain  now  offered  a  general  amnesty  to  the  insurgents 
on  their  submission;  the  admission  of  native  Americans,  "en 
dowed  with  the  requisite  qualifications,"  to  office  in  common  with 
European  Spaniards,  and  "regulation  of  the  commerce  of  the 
provinces  .with  foreign  states  according  to  free  principles  and  con 
formably  to  the  present  political  situation  of  these  countries  and 
Europe,"  l  the  offer  being  dependent  upon  the  support  of  the 
alliance.  She  had  until  this  refused  to  open  the  Spanish-Ameri 
can  ports  to  trade,  though  in  great  degree  powerless  to  prevent 
their  rapidly  growing  commercial  intercourse  with  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States. 

It  was  proposed  by  some  of  the  powers  that  the  United  States 
should  be  invited  to  join  in  this  mediation.  The  ministers  of  the 
United  States  to  France,  England,  and  Russia  were  immediately 
instructed  to  make  known  that  the  United  States  would  not  take 
part  in  any  plan  not  founded  on  a  basis  of  total  independence 
of  the  colonies.  Great  Britain,  while  concurring  at  this  moment  in 
the  plan  of  restoring  Spanish  authority,  declared  as  a  condition  of 
her  participation  that  there  should  be  no  resort  to  force.  To  this 
France  and  Russia,  after  some  hesitation,  assented.  A  proposition 
to  prohibit  commercial  intercourse,  in  case  mediation  should  not 
be  accepted  by  the  South  Americans,  was  negatived  by  England, 
as  transferring,  of  course,  the  whole  trade  to  the  United  States.  As 
a  last  expedient  it  was  proposed  that  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
should  go  to  Madrid  with  the  joint  powers  of  all  the  allied  sover 
eigns  to  arrange  terms,  but  this  failed,  as  the  duke  insisted  that,  if 
he  should  go,  a  previous  entry  should  be  made  upon  the  protocol 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle  that  no  force,  in  any  result  of  his  embassy,  should 
be  used  against  the  South  Americans.  Spain  declined  any  media 
tion  which  would  not  guarantee  the  restoration  of  her  authority.2 

The  Emperor  Alexander,  ever  since  1815  much  concerned  with 
the  affairs  of  Spain  and  her  insurgent  provinces,  moved  particularly 
by  this  blot  upon  the  universal  peace  of  which  he  now  regarded 

1  Annual  Register,  1818,  161. 

2  Adams,  secretary  of  state,  to  Thompson,  secretary  of  the  navy,  May  20, 
1819,  17,  MS.,  Dom.  Let.  304,  Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  VI,  375-376. 


1820]         UNITED  STATES  DECLINES  ALLIANCE  165 

himself  the  great  supporter,  was  personally  desirous  of  securing  the 
United  States  as  a  member  of  the  alliance;  and  Poletica,  the  Rus 
sian  minister  at  Washington,  was  instructed  to  approach  the  Amer 
ican  government.  The  attitude  of  the  latter  is  defined  in  a  despatch 
to  the  American  minister  at  St.  Petersburg.  "It  has  been  sug 
gested,"  says  Mr.  Adams,  "as  an  inducement  to  obtain  their  com 
pliance,  that  this  compact  bound  the  parties  to  no  specific  engage 
ment  of  anything.  That  it  was  a  pledge  of  mere  principles — that 
its  real  as  well  as  professed  purpose  was  merely  the  general  preser 
vation  of  peace — and  it  was  intimated  that  if  any  question  should 
arise  between  the  United  States  and  other  governments  of  Europe, 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  desirous  of  using  his  influence  in  their 
favor,  would  have  a  substantial  motive  and  justification  for  inter 
posing  if  he  could  regard  them  as  his  allies,  which,  as  parties  to  the 
Holy  Alliance,  he  would.  .  .  .  No  direct  refusal  has  been  signified 
to  Mr.  Poletica.  It  is  presumed  that  none  will  be  necessary.  His 
instructions  are  not  to  make  the  proposal  in  form  unless  with  a  pros 
pect  that  it  will  be  successful.  ...  As  a  general  declaration  of 
principles  .  .  .  the  United  States  not  only  give  their  hearty  assent 
to  the  articles  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  but  will  be  among  the  most 
earnest  and  conscientious  in  observing  them.  But  ...  for  the 
repose  of  Europe  as  well  as  of  America,  the  European  and  Amer 
ican  political  systems  should  be  kept  as  separate  and  distinct  from 
each  other  as  possible.  If  the  United  States  as  members  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  could  acquire  the  right  to  ask  the  influence  of  its 
most  powerful  member  in  their  controversies  with  other  states,  the 
other  members  must  be  entitled  in  return  to  ask  the  influence  of 
the  United  States,  for  themselves  or  against  their  opponents;  in  the 
deliberations  of  the  league  they  would  be  entitled  to  a  voice,  and  in 
exercising  their  right  must  occasionally  appeal  to  principles  which 
might  not  harmonize  with  those  of  any  European  members  of  the 
bond.  This  consideration  alone  would  be  decisive  for  declining  a 
participation  in  that  league,  which  is  the  President's  absolute  and 
irrevocable  determination,  although  he  trusts  that  no  occasion  will 
present  itself  rendering  it  necessary  to  make  that  determination 
known  by  an  explicit  refusal."  * 

1  Adams  to  Middleton,  minister  to  Russia,  July  5,  1820,  MS.      Instructions 
to  Ministers,  IX,  18,  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  376-379. 


166  SPAIN'S  ATTEMPTED  EXPEDITION  [1819 

The  foregoing  sufficiently  defines  the  attitude  of  the  American 
and  British  governmental  mind  during  the  years  1818  to  1820. 
During  this  period  an  expedition  was  attempted  to  be  organized 
in  Spain  for  the  reconquest  of  the  South  American  provinces, 
independently  of  aid  from  the  alliance.  This  "continued  to  be 
postponed  from  time  to  time,  for  the  equipment  of  a  single  squad 
ron  was  now  an  effort  which  exhausted  all  the  resources  of  this 
great  kingdom — once  by  its  powers  and  riches  the  tyrant  or  the 
terror  of  Europe.  The  Spanish  marine,  since  the  fatal  alliance 
formed  with  France  in  the  year  1796,  and  the  long  series  of  national 
misfortunes  which  had  resulted  from  this  step,  had  sunk  into  the 
last  stages  of  decay.  The  navy  had  been  annihilated,  the  arsenals 
emptied,  and  the  forests  of  the  kingdom  destroyed.  In  the  present 
emergency  therefore  the  government  had  found  it  necessary  to 
make  application  to  Russia  to  furnish  vessels  for  the  South  Amer 
ican  expedition,  and  a  considerable  number  had  arrived  at  Cadiz. 
But  these  ships,  which  were  built  only  of  pine,  and  had  already 
seen  much  service,  were  soon  discovered  to  be  in  so  bad  a  state 
that  considerable  repairs  were  requisite  to  fit  them  for  the  voy 
age";1  one  which,  it  should  be  said,  never  came  to  pass.  The 
yellow  fever  broke  out,  the  troops  became  mutinous,  and  the  coun 
try,  in  an  inconceivable  state  of  destitution  and  misrule,  broke 
into  the  revolution  of  January,  1820,  which,  as  mentioned,  forced 
the  king  to  accept  the  constitution  of  1812  and  a  Cortes. 

A  note,  April  19,  1820,  from  Senor  Zea  Bermudez,  the  Spanish 
minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  informing  the  Russian  government  of 
the  adoption  of  a  constitution  in  Spain,  and  expressing  a  desire  to 
know  how  the  emperor  viewed  this,  caused  the  immediate  issu 
ance  of  a  Russian  circular  note  stating  that  "the  revolution  of 
the  Peninsula  fixes  the  attention  of  two  hemispheres;  the  interests 
which  it  is  about  to  decide  are  the  interests  of  the  universe.  . 
In  the  course  of  long  conferences,  relative  to  the  differences  with 
Rio  de  la  Plata,  and  to  the  participation  of  the  colonies,  they  [the 

1  Annual  Register,  1819,  page  179.  Five  ships  of  the  line  and  three  frigates 
were  purchased  for  which  the  enormous  sura  of  54,000,400  pesetas  (about 
$10,500,000)  was  paid.  The  chief  persons  involved  in  the  transaction  were 
the  king,  Ugarte,  Taticheff,  the  Russian  minister,  and  Equia,  the  minister  of 
war.  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  209. 


1820]  THE  EMPEROR  ALEXANDER  167 

allied  sovereigns]  let  it  be  sufficiently  understood  that  these  in 
stitutions  would  cease  to  be  a  means  of  peace  and  happiness  if, 
instead  of  being  granted  by  kindness,  as  a  voluntary  concession, 
they  should  be  adopted  by  weakness  as  a  last  resource  of  salvation. 
...  In  unison,  therefore,  with  his  allies,  his  majesty  cannot  but 
desire  to  see  granted  to  the  Peninsula,  as  to  its  trans-marine 
provinces,  a  government  which  he  considers  as  the  only  one  that 
can  yet  justify  some  hope  in  this  stage  of  calamities.  But  in  virtue 
of  his  engagements  of  the  3d-15th  of  November,  1818,  his  majesty 
is  bound  to  mark,  with  the  most  forcible  reprobation,  the  revolu 
tionary  measures  set  in  action  to  give  new  institutions  to  Spain 
.  .  .  [the  powers]  have  doubtless  deplored,  as  he  has,  the  outrage 
which  has  recently  tarnished  the  annals  of  Spain.  We  repeat  it, 
this  outrage  is  deplorable.  It  is  deplorable  for  the  Peninsula; 
it  is  deplorable  for  Europe;  and  the  Spanish  nation  now  owes  the 
example  of  an  expiatory  deed  to  the  people  of  two  hemispheres. 
Till  this  be  done  the  unhappy  object  of  their  disquietude  can  only 
make  them  fear  the  contagion  of  their  calamities." 

He  proposed  that  the  plenipotentiary  of  Spain  at  each  of  the  five 
courts  be  informed  that  these  courts  "have  desired  that  in  Europe, 
as  in  America,  institutions  conformable  to  the  progress  of  civiliza 
tion,  and  to  the  wants  of  the  age,  might  procure  to  all  Spaniards 
long  years  of  peace  and  happiness.  .  .  .  They  have  wished  that 
all  institutions  should  become  a  real  blessing  by  the  legal  man 
ner  in  which  they  should  be  introduced.  They  now  wish  the 
same. 

"This  last  consideration  will  convey  to  the  ministers  of  his 
Catholic  Majesty  with  what  sentiments  of  affliction  and  grief  they 
have  learned  of  the  events  of  the  8th  of  March,  and  those  which 
preceded  it.  According  to  their  opinion  the  salvation  of  Spain, 
as  well  as  the  welfare  of  Europe,  will  require  that  this  crime  should 
be  disavowed,  this  stain  effaced,  this  bad  example  exterminated. 
...  If  these  salutary  counsels  be  listened  to;  if  the  Cortes  offer 
to  their  king,  in  the  name  of  the  nation,  a  pledge  of  obedience;  if 
they  succeed  in  establishing,  upon  durable  bases,  the  tranquillity 
of  Spain  and  the  peace  of  Southern  America,  the  revolution  will 
have  been  defeated  at  the  very  moment  when  it  thought  to  obtain 
a  triumph." 


168  CANNING'S  REVOLT  [1820 

This  long  document,  of  which  but  portions  have  been  given, 
ended  with  an  ominous  warning:  "If,  on  the  contrary,  alarms, 
perhaps  too  reasonable,  be  realized,  at  least  the  five  courts  will 
have  discharged  a  sacred  duty;  at  least  a  new  occurrence  will  have 
developed  the  principles,  indicated  the  object,  and  displayed  the 
scope  of  the  European  alliance." 

Spain's  example  was  followed  by  Naples,  July  2,  and  Portugal, 
August  12,  each  of  which,  as  the  result  of  revolutionary  procedures, 
adopted  the  Spanish  constitution;  the  autocratic  cabal  thus  saw 
itself  faced  by  a  widespread  movement  subversive  of  the  recon 
structed  feudalism  which  they  thought  secured  by  the  overthrow 
and  imprisonment  of  Napoleon. 

The  Russian  note,  however,  brought  from  the  British  cabinet 
in  May,  1820,  a  circular  note  to  the  other  four  powers  which  boded 
ill  for  the  Metternich  system.  Although  the  great  majority  of  the 
thirteen  then  composing  the  cabinet  were  Tories,  the  ultra-Toryism 
of  seven  of  them,  including  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  the  lord 
chancellor,  and  Lord  Bathurst,  being  "unqualified  by  liberal  opin 
ions  upon  any  subject  whatever  of  external  or  internal  policy,"  2 
one  member,  George  Canning,  now  about  to  leave  it,  was  of  very 
different  mind,  and  his  powerful  and  liberal  character  was  the 
saving  leaven  in  this  community  of  reaction. 

Canning,  two  years  before,  had  taken  exception  to  the  proposal 
of  the  congress  at  Aix  for  "continued  meetings  at  fixed  points." 
At  a  cabinet  meeting  where  there  were  but  six,  Castlereagh  and 
Wellington  being  of  the  absent  members  and,  as  members  of  the 
congress,  supporting  the  proposition,  Canning  announced  his  oppo 
sition.  "He  thinks,"  said  Lord  Bathurst  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Castle 
reagh,  "the  system  of  periodical  meetings  of  the  four  great  pow 
ers,  with  a  view  to  the  general  concerns  of  Europe,  new  and  of 

1  Annual  Register,  1820,  725.  It  was  this  document  which,  judging  by  its 
form  and  style  almost  certainly  emanated  from  Metternich,  gave  the  new  and 
dangerous  tone  to  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  new  compact  of  1818  did  not  in 
clude  any  such  principle  as  that  now  enunciated  by  the  Emperor  Alexander. 
In  fact  it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  meetings  affecting  either  states  should 
"only  take  place  in  pursuance  of  a  formal  invitation  on  the  part  of  such  of 
those  states  as  the  said  affairs  may  concern,"  and  expressly  arrange  for  their 
participation.  (See  page  161.) 

8  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  I,  127. 


1820]  ENGLAND'S  TWIN  NOTE  169 

very  questionable  policy;  that  it  will  necessarily  involve  us  deeply 
in  all  the  politics  of  the  continent,  whereas  our  true  policy  has 
always  been  not  to  interfere  except  in  great  emergencies,  and  then 
with  a  commanding  force.  He  thinks  that  all  other  states  must 
protest  against  such  an  attempt  to  place  them  under  subjection; 
that  the  meetings  may  become  a  scene  of  cabal  and  intrigue;  and 
that  the  people  of  this  country  may  be  taught  to  look  with  great 
jealousy  for  their  liberties  if  our  court  is  engaged  in  meeting  with 
great  despotic  monarchs,  deliberating  upon  what  degree  of  revolu 
tionary  spirit  may  endanger  the  public  security  and  therefore  re 
quire  the  interference  of  the  alliance.  ...  I  do  not  subscribe  to 
Canning's  opinions,  nor  did  any  of  the  cabinet  who  attended,  but 
if  this  is  felt  by  him,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  apprehend  it  may  be 
felt  by  many  other  persons,  as  well  as  by  our  decided  opponents."  l 
There  can  thus  be  little  doubt  that  the  note  of  May,  which  sounded 
so  discordantly  in  the  concert  in  which  all  had  heretofore  gone  so 
smoothly,  was,  while  over  the  signature  of  Castlereagh,  the  work  of 
Canning.  Every  phrase  of  strength  has  the  ring  of  his  decided 
and  liberal  temper.  Beginning  with  the  milder  view  that  it  ap 
peared  "  advisable  studiously  to  avoid  any  reunion  of  the  sovereigns 
— to  abstain,  at  least  in  the  present  stage  of  the  question,  from 
charging  any  ostensible  conference  with  commission  to  deliberate 
on  the  affairs  of  Spain," — it  proceeded,  after  a  general  considera 
tion  of  the  Spanish  situation  and  of  that  of  Portugal,  for  the  pro 
tection  of  whose  European  dominions  Great  Britain  was  bound  by 
treaty,  to  announce  publicly  certain  fundamental  principles  which 
must  govern  British  conduct,  declaring  that  "  the  notion  of  revising, 
limiting,  or  regulating  the  course  of  such  experiments,  either  by 
foreign  council  or  by  foreign  force,  would  be  as  dangerous  to  avow 
as  it  would  be  impossible  to  execute,"  that  "in  this  alliance,  as  in 
all  other  human  arrangements,  nothing  is  more  likely  to  impair,  or 
even  to  destroy,  its  real  utility,  than  any  attempt  to  push  its  duties 
and  its  obligations  beyond  the  sphere  which  its  original  and  under 
stood  principles  will  warrant.  It  was  a  union  for  the  reconquest 
and  liberation  of  a  great  portion  of  the  continent  of  Europe  from 
the  military  dominion  of  France,  and  having  subdued  the  conqueror 

1  Bathurst   to   Castlereagh,    October   20,    1818.     Stapleton,    Canning,   I, 
55-58. 


170  THE  CONGRESS  AT  TROPPAU  [1820 

it  took  the  state  of  possession,  as  established  by  the  peace,  under 
the  protection  of  the  alliance.  It  never  was,  however,  intended 
as  a  union  for  the  government  of  the  world,  or  for  the  superin 
tendence  of  the  internal  affairs  of  other  states.  .  .  .  We  shall 
be  found  in  our  place  when  actual  danger  menaces  the  system 
of  Europe;  but  this  country  cannot,  and  will  not,  act  upon  ab 
stract  and  speculative  principles  of  precaution.  The  alliance  which 
exists  had  no  such  purpose  in  view  in  its  original  formation.  .  .  . 
It  was  never  so  explained  to  Parliament;  if  it  had,  most  assuredly 
the  sanction  of  Parliament  could  never  have  been  given  to  it; 
and  it  would  now  be  a  breach  of  faith  were  the  ministers  of  the 
crown  to  acquiesce  in  a  construction  being  put  upon  it,  or  were 
they  to  suffer  themselves  to  be  betrayed  into  a  course  of  measures, 
inconsistent  with  those  principles  which  they  avowed  at  the  time, 
and  which  they  have  since  uniformly  maintained  both  at  home  and 
abroad."  *  It  was  this  stand,  undoubtedly  due  to  Canning's  influ 
ence,  which  determined  the  British  attitude  at  Troppau  and  Lay- 
bach,  and  later  at  Verona.2 

The  domination  by  Austria  of  a  large  part  of  Italy,  and  the 
treaty  of  the  former  with  Naples,  of  June  12,  1815,  by  which  the 
latter  had  bound  itself  not  to  introduce  changes  "irreconcilable 
either  with  ancient  monarchial  institutions,  or  with  the  principles 
adopted  by  his  Imperial  and  Apostolic  Majesty  for  the  interior 
government  of  his  Italian  provinces,"  3  caused,  however,  through 
the  dominating  influence  of  Metternich,  a  putting  aside  of  Spanish 
affairs  for  the  moment  in  favor  of  immediate  attention  to  those  of 
Naples.  The  allies  thus  met,  October  9,  1820,  at  Troppau  in 
Austrian  Silesia;  the  sovereigns  of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia 
being  present  as  well  as  their  ministers.  Sir  Charles  Stewart, 

1  Laid  before  Parliament,  April  21,  1823,  Hansard,  VIII,  N.  S.  1136-1139. 

3  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  12,  remarks:  "  It  was  only  in  1822,  on 
the  eve  of  the  Congress  of  Verona,  that  the  long  process  of  [Castlereagh's]  dis 
illusionment  culminated  in  the  determination  to  make  that  open  breach  with 
the  system  by  which,  in  his  untimely  death,  the  credit  fell  to  George  Canning." 

There  is  nothing  to  show  in  Castlereagh's  private  correspondence  such  a 
change  of  mind  as  the  above  would  indicate,  and  much  to  show  that  Can 
ning  was  throughout  the  moving  spirit  of  discontent.  Everything  points  to 
Castlereagh's  disappointment  in  the  trend  taken  by  the  various  conferences 
as  the  cause  of  the  unsettlement  of  his  mind. 

3  Annual  Register,  1820,  732. 


1820]  CIRCULAR  OF  THE  ALLIES  171 

brother  of  Lord  Castlereagh  and  British  ambassador  at  Vienna, 
was  present,  but  with  instructions  to  observe  only  and  do  nothing. 

In  the  first  days  of  the  meeting  Metternich  succeeded  so  com 
pletely  in  bringing  to  his  own  views  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  that 
there  was  not  now  a  vestige  left  of  the  liberalism  which  in  its 
uncertainty  had  been  Metternich's  nightmare.  "To-day,"  said 
Alexander,  speaking  at  Troppau,  "I  deplore  all  I  said  and  did 
between  the  years  1815  and  1818.  .  .  .  You  have  correctly  judged 
the  condition  of  things.  Tell  me  what  you  want,  and  what  you 
want  of  me,  and  I  will  do  it."  *  Austria  thus  had  a  free  hand.  The 
representatives  of  France  and  England  were  not  admitted  to  the 
conferences,  as  they  were  only  empowered  "to  report,"  not  "to 
decide,"  and  the  three  powers  on  November  19,  1820,  signed  a 
protocol,  binding  themselves  "by  peaceful  means,  or  if  need  be 
by  arms,  to  bring  back  the  guilty  state  into  the  bosom  of  the  great 
alliance,"  in  case  of  a  change  of  government  by  revolution  which 
threatened  "immediate  danger"  to  other  states.  To  this  France 
later  gave  a  qualified  adhesion. 

This  protocol  was  followed,  December  8,  1820,  by  a  circular 
note  giving  a  "Short  View  of  the  First  Results  of  the  Conferences," 
which  stated  that  the  "monarchs  assembled  at  Troppau  resolved 
to  invite  the  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies  to  an  interview  at  Laybach; 
a  step  the  sole  object  of  which  was  to  free  the  will  of  the  king 
from  all  external  constraints,  and  to  place  his  Majesty  in  the  situa 
tion  of  a  mediator  between  his  misled  people  and  the  states  whose 
tranquillity  was  threatened.  As  the  monarchs  are  resolved  not  to 
recognize  governments  which  had  been  produced  by  open  rebellion, 
they  could  not  enter  into  negotiations  except  with  the  king  alone."  2 
All  this  was  in  accord  with  the  principles  announced  in  the  Berlin 
Gazette,  that  "there  cannot  be  a  thought  of  bringing  a  constitu 
tion  which  is  the  product  of  unlawful  power  more  or  less  near  to 
the  monarchial  principles.  The  monarchial  principle  rejects 
every  institution  which  is  not  determined  upon  and  accomplished 
by  the  monarch  himself  of  his  own  free  will"; 3  a  principle  which, 
denying  the  right  of  revolution,  was  the  basis  of  the  action  of  the 
allies  during  the  next  three  years. 

1  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  28. 

3  Annual  Register,  1820,  736  •  Ibid.,  1820,  734. 


172  NAPLES  SUPPRESSED  [1821 

Great  Britain,  however,  in  a  lengthy  instruction  of  December 
16, 1820,  to  her  ambassador  at  Vienna,  opposed  in  toto  such  claims, 
declaring  that  the  country  could  not  "charge  itself  as  a  member 
of  the  alliance  with  the  moral  responsibility  of  administering  a 
general  European  police  of  this  description." 

The  congress  moved  in  January,  1821,  to  Laybach,  where 
it  sat  in  utmost  secrecy,  not  even  a  secretary  being  allowed  at  the 
meetings,  nor  a  stranger  permitted  in  the  town.  The  first  result 
was  a  manifesto  from  Austria  which  stated  the  "firm  determi 
nation"  of  the  sovereigns  announced  to  the  King  of  Naples,  now 
present,  "not  to  allow  the  continuance  of  a  system  which  had 
been  forced  upon  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies  by  a  faction 
without  a  name  and  without  authority";  and  "that  if  this  state 
of  things  did  not  end  ...  by  a  spontaneous  disavowal  of  those 
who  exercised  the  power  at  Naples,  it  would  be  necessary  to  have 
recourse  to  arms."  It  declared  that  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 
"convinced  of  the  necessity  of  struggling  against  an  evil  so  serious, 
would  lose  no  time  in  joining  his  forces  to  those  of  Austria.  In  the 
whole  of  the  transactions  which  have  taken  place,  the  monarchs 
have  only  had  in  view  the  safety  of  the  states  they  are  called  upon 
to  govern  and  the  tranquillity  of  the  world.  .  .  .  The  inviolability 
of  all  established  rights,  the  independence  of  all  legitimate  govern 
ments,  the  integrity  of  all  their  possessions,  these  are  the  bases  from 
which  their  resolutions  will  never  deviate." 

The  paper  ended  with  a  phrase  such  as  flowed  so  smoothly 
from  the  pen  of  Metternich,  and  which  marked  in  him  a  faculty 
which  made  him  so  easily  the  master  mind  of  the  Pecksniff  family: 
"They  [the  monarchs]  will  bless  the  period  when,  set  free  from  all 
other  causes  of  anxiety,  they  can  devote  exclusively  to  the  happi 
ness  of  their  subjects  all  the  means  and  the  power  which  have  been 
conferred  on  them  by  Heaven."  2 

The  result  was  the  movement  into  Italy,  begun  February  4, 
1821,  of  an  Austrian  army  of  85,000  men.  The  quick  defeat  of 
the  Neapolitan  army,  and  the  restoration  in  Naples  of  absolutism, 
was  followed  soon  by  a  like  suppression  of  revolution  in  Piedmont, 
which,  March  10,  1821,  had  also  declared  for  the  Spanish  constitu- 

1  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  29. 

8  Annual  Register,  1820,  739-745;   Frankfort  Gazette,  February  19,  1821. 


1821]  CANNING'S  FIRM  STAND  173 

tion.  For  forty-five  years  longer  Italy  was  to  seethe  with  discon 
tent,  her  sons  to  undergo  imprisonment  and  death,  and  to  suf 
fer  a  tyranny  as  ruthless  and  vindictive  as  that  which  later  stirred 
America  to  sympathy  for  Cuba.  The  Austrian  action  in  Italy  was 
but  a  prelude  to  like  designs  as  to  Spain  and  the  revolted  provinces 
in  America. 

The  Neapolitan  question  had  continued  to  arouse  British 
feeling,  which  found  strong  and  earnest  expression  in  Parliament, 
Canning  himself,  in  a  speech  of  March  20,  1821,  qualifying  the 
congress  of  the  allies  as  "the  self-constituted,  usurping,  ty 
rannical  and  insolent  tribunal  at  Laybach."  1  On  January  19,  the 
foreign  office  issued  a  circular  despatch  to  its  missions  abroad, 
declaring  that  it  had  acted  with  all  possible  explicitness,  even 
before  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1815.  The 
note  continues:  "It  should  be  clearly  understood  that  no  gov 
ernment  can  be  more  prepared  than  the  British  government  to 
uphold  the  right  of  any  state  or  states  to  interfere  where  their  own 
immediate  security  or  essential  interests  are  seriously  endangered 
by  the  internal  transactions  of  another  state.  But  as  they  regard 
the  assumption  of  such  right  as  only  to  be  justified  by  the  strongest 
necessity,  and  to  be  limited  and  regulated  thereby,  they  cannot 
admit  that  this  right  can  receive  a  general  and  indiscriminate 
application  to  all  revolutionary  movements,  without  reference  to 
their  immediate  bearing  upon  some  particular  state  or  states,  or 
to  be  made  prospectively  the  basis  of  an  alliance.  They  regard 
its  exercise  as  an  exception  of  the  greatest  value  and  importance, 
and  as  one  that  can  only  properly  grow  out  of  the  circumstances  of 
the  special  case;  but  at  the  same  time  consider  that  exceptions 
of  this  description  never  can,  without  the  utmost  danger,  be  so 
far  incorporated  into  the  ordinary  diplomacy  of  states  or  into  the 
institutes  of  the  law  of  nations."  2 

Before  the  breaking  up  of  the  congress  at  Laybach,  May  13, 
1821,  it  was  resolved  to  meet  again  at  Verona,  in  the  fall  of  the  next 

1  Hansard,  IV  (1821),  1378. 

s  Ibid.,  IV  (1821),  286.  The  mild  character  of  this  note,  compared  with 
that  of  January,  1820,  shows  the  absence  of  the  master  mind  of  Canning,  who 
had  now  resigned  from  the  cabinet,  as  not  wishing  to  take  part  in  the  action 
against  Queen  Caroline. 


174  TUMULT  IN  SPAIN  [1822 

year.  In  the  meantime  Greece  had  revolted,  and  Russia  was 
eager  for  war  with  Turkey.  The  new  congress  thus  found  itself 
faced  with  a  new  question  which  threatened  the  destruction  of 
the  compact  which  governed  it;  a  danger  which  was  overcome  by 
the  influence  of  Metternich  with  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who 
yielded  to  Metternich's  arguments  and  appeals,  backed  as  they 
were  by  those  of  Castlereagh,  to  hold  to  the  principles  of  the  al 
liance  and  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  main  question 
thereafter  was  the  status  of  Spain,  and  of  her  revolted  American 
dependencies. 

On  October  25,  1820,  Fernando  VII  had  appealed  by  letter  to 
Louis  XVIII  for  help  in  what  he  termed  his  captivity,  and  begged 
the  French  king  to  obtain  for  him  the  aid  of  the  allied  powers.1 
A  French  army  had  already  been  moved  to  the  Pyrenees,  estab 
lishing  what  was  termed  a  cordon  sanitaire,  nominally  as  a  pro 
tection  against  the  introduction  of  the  yellow  fever  then  so  preva 
lent  in  Spain;  the  force,  however,  was  gradually  increased  to 
100,000  men,  and  when  there  was  no  longer  the  pretext  of  the  pre 
vention  of  contagion,  the  name  was  changed  to  that  of  the  army 
of  observation;  French  money  assisted  Fernando  in  secretly  pro 
moting  a  counter  revolution.2  An  "army  of  the  faith,"  an  out 
come  of  the  suppression  of  the  religious  communities,  and  the  forces 
of  the  "regency"  set  up  at  Seo  de  Urgel  on  the  theory  that  Fer 
nando  was  a  captive,  ravaged  the  north  of  Spain.  They  were,  how 
ever,  but  two  of  the  many  bands  which,  with  the  aid  of  discord 
in  the  Cortes,  made  anarchy  throughout  the  Peninsula,  until  in 
December,  1822,  the  liberal  forces  dispersed  the  army  of  the 
faith  and  drove  those  of  the  Urgel  regency  to  take  refuge  in 
France.  The  situation  now,  though  serious,  might,  with  the  ad 
vice  and  moral  support  of  the  British  government,  and  the  aid, 
both  sentimental  and  real,  of  the  English  people,  have  brought  a 
permanent  reconstruction  of  Spain  on  more  sensible  lines  than  those 
of  the  Cadiz  constitution,  but  the  action  of  the  allies  forestalled 
such  a  possibility. 

Canning  had  succeeded  Lord  Castlereagh  as  foreign  minister, 
on  the  latter 's  suicide,  which  had  occurred  August  12,  1822. 
Wellington  thus  alone  represented  Great  Britain,  at  the  conference 

1  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  222.  2  Ibid.,  225. 


1822]  CONGRESS  OF  VERONA  175 

which  met  at  Verona  in  October,  though  the  British  ambassa 
dor  at  Vienna  was  at  hand  as  an  observer.  Neither,  however, 
under  the  changed  conditions  in  the  British  foreign  office,  would 
have  been  present  had  not  Spanish  interests  been  too  deeply  in 
volved  for  England  to  ignore  the  proceedings.  No  stranger  was 
allowed  to  remain  in  Verona,  "without  a  most  satisfactory  ex 
planation  to  the  Austrian  authorities  .  .  .  nor  was  permission 
to  pass  through  the  town  easily  obtained." 

Wellington  carried  with  him  the  instructions  which  Castle- 
reagh  had  drawn  up  for  himself,  and  which  included  a  rigid 
abstinence  from  any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Spain.2 
One  of  Canning's  first  acts  was  to  supplement  this  by  a  note  which 
involved  a  threatening  warning,  saying:  "If  there  be  a  determined 
project  to  interfere  by  force  or  by  menace  in  the  present  struggle 
in  Spain,  so  convinced  are  his  Majesty's  government  of  the  use- 
lessness  and  danger  of  any  such  interference,  so  objectionable  does 
it  appear  to  them  in  principle,  as  well  as  utterly  impracticable  in 
execution,  that,  when  the  necessity  arises  (I  would  rather  say), 
when  the  opportunity  offers,  I  am  to  instruct  your  Grace  at  once 
frankly  and  peremptorily  to  declare  that,  to  any  such  interference, 
come  what  may,  his  Majesty  will  not  be  a  party."  3 

On  October  20  the  Duke  of  Montmorency,  the  French  repre 
sentative,  addressed  three  questions  to  the  conference:  1.  Would  the 
powers  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Spain  should  France 
find  herself  obliged  to  do  so?  2.  If  war  should  occur  between 
France  and  Spain,  under  what  form  and  by  what  acts  would  the 
powers  give  France  the  moral  support  which  would  give  her  meas 
ures  the  weight  and  authority  of  the  alliance  and  inspire  a  salutary 
dread  in  the  revolutionists  of  all  countries?  3.  What  effective 
assistance  would  be  given  by  the  powers  in  case  France  should  de 
mand  it? 

The  Emperor  Alexander  was  only  too  eager  to  move  150,000 
Russians  wherever  needed;  an  offer  which,  however,  apart  from 
the  effect  which  it  would  have  had  upon  England,  suited  at  the 
moment  neither  Austria  nor  France.  The  continental  allies 

1  Annual  Register,  1822,  218. 

2  Correspondence  presented  to  Parliament,  April,  1823,  Hansard,  N.  S.  VIII 
(1823),  904  et  seq.     In  the  writer's  view  such  instructions  were  due  to  feeling 
in  Parliament  rather  than  to  Castlereagh's  convictions.  3  Ibid.,  905. 


176  INTERVENTION  BY  THE  ALLIES  [1822 

thus  answered,  on  October  30,  that  they  would  act  as  should 
France  in  regard  to  their  ministers  in  Spain;  but  the  British  repre 
sentative  protested  at  length  against  such  action,  and  refused  an 
answer  to  the  hypothetical  questions  of  France,  of  the  grounds 
for  which  the  British  government  was  wholly  ignorant.  Nor 
indeed  were  they  ever  discoverable,  if  ever  they  existed.  The 
movement  was  in  fact,  though  France  was  now  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  one  of  absolutism  face  to  face  with  liberalism  in  a 
struggle  for  supremacy  which  if  successful  would  have  left  England 
and  the  United  States  alone  as  constitutional  governments. 

On  December  14,  1822,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  Russia  (Metternich,  Bernstorff,  and  Nesselrode)  addressed 
instructions  to  the  representatives  of  these  powers  at  Madrid, 
the  general  tenor  of  which  appears  in  the  following  from  Count 
Nesselrode:  "In  vain,"  he  says,  "will  malevolence  endeavor  to 
represent  [the  intentions  of  the  allies]  in  the  light  of  foreign  inter 
ference  which  seeks  to  dictate  laws  to  Spain.  To  express  desire 
of  seeing  a  protracted  misery  terminate,  to  snatch  from  the  same 
yoke  an  unhappy  monarch  and  one  of  the  first  among  European 
nations,  to  stop  the  effusion  of  blood,  and  to  facilitate  the 
re-establishment  of  an  order  of  things  at  once  wise  and  natural, 
is  certainly  not  attacking  the  independence  of  a  country,  nor 
establishing  a  right  of  intervention  against  which  any  power  what 
ever  would  have  reason  to  protest." 

The  French  government,  now  deeply  concerned  by  the  attitude 
of  England,and  brought  to  a  wavering  state  of  mind  which  might 
have  arrested  the  movement  had  the  other  continental  powers 
consented,  did  not  send  its  instructions  until  December  25,  de 
claring  that  "his  Majesty's  government  is  intimately  united  with 
the  allies  in  the  firm  resolution  to  repel  by  every  means  revolu 
tionary  principles  and  movements."  l 

On  January  5,  1823,  the  French  minister,  followed  next  day  by 
the  representatives  of  the  other  continental  allies,  presented  notes, 
in  accord  with  their  instructions,  demanding  the  abrogation  of  the 
constitution  of  1812,  and  the  release  of  the  king,  whom  it  suited 
them  to  regard  as  a  prisoner;  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish 
government  was  to  cause  the  withdrawal  of  the  several  ministers. 
1  For  these  documents,  see  The  Annual  Register,  1822,  565  et  seq. 


1823]  FRANCE  INVADES  SPAIN  177 

It  was  but  natural  that  such  demands  should  be  received  with  deep 
indignation  by  Spain's  new  government,  and  on  January  14,  1823, 
the  Russian  minister  withdrew,  followed  on  the  15th  by  the  Prus 
sian  minister  and  on  the  16th  by  the  minister  of  Austria.  The 
French  minister  left  a  few  days  after. 

On  January  28,  1823,  Chateaubriand,  the  French  minister  for 
foreign  affairs,  and  who  fitly  impersonated  its  light-headed  policy, 
addressed  Mr.  Canning  a  note  setting  forth  voluminously  the  weak 
reasons  for  the  action  of  France.  The  character  of  the  note  may  be 
judged  by  the  declaration  that  the  question  "was  at  once  wholly 
French  and  wholly  European,"  thus  combining  the  opinions  of  two 
other  of  the  French  ministers,  one  of  whom  had  declared  it  wholly 
the  former,  and  one  wholly  the  latter.  Canning  immediately  an 
swered  in  noble  words,  such  as  were  to  be  expected  from  the  leader 
of  the  government  of  liberty-loving  England:  "We  disclaim  for 
ourselves  and  deny  for  other  powers  the  right  of  requiring  any 
changes  in  the  internal  institutions  of  independent  states,  with  the 
menace  of  hostile  attack  in  case  of  refusal."  l 

The  same  day  that  this  despatch  was  written  the  French  Cham 
bers  opened  with  the  king's  speech,  in  which  he  said : 

"I  have  made  every  endeavor  to  guaranty  the  security  of  my 
people,  and  preserve  Spain  herself  from  these  extreme  misfor 
tunes.  The  blindness  with  which  the  representations  made  at 
Madrid  have  been  rejected  leaves  little  hope  of  preserving  peace. 
I  have  ordered  the  recall  of  my  minister.  One  hundred  thousand 
Frenchmen,  commanded  by  a  prince  of  my  family,  by  him  whom 
my  heart  delights  to  call  my  son,  are  ready  to  march,  invoking  the 
God  of  St.  Louis  for  the  sake  of  preserving  the  throne  of  Spain 
to  a  descendant  of  Henry  IV,  of  saving  that  fine  kingdom  from 
its  ruin  and  of  reconciling  it  with  Europe.  If  war  is  inevitable,  I 
shall  use  all  my  endeavors  to  confine  its  circle,  to  limit  its  duration : 
it  will  be  undertaken  only  to  conquer  the  peace  which  the  state  of 
Spain  would  render  impossible.  Let  Fernando  VII  be  free  to  give 
to  his  people  the  institutions  which  they  cannot  hold  but  from  him, 
and  which,  in  insuring  their  tranquillity,  would  dissipate  the  just 
inquietudes  of  France."  The  British  ambassador  was  not  present. 

1  Canning  to  Sir  Charles  Stuart,  ambassador  at  Paris,  January  28,  1823, 
Hansard,  VIII  (1823),  923. 


178  CANNING  WARNS  FRANCE  [1823 

On  May  23, 1823,  the  French  army,  under  the  Due  d'Angouleme, 
entered  Madrid,  and  by  September  the  occupation  of  Spain  was 
complete  from  the  Pyrenees  to  Cadiz,  meeting  with  an  opposition 
so  slight  that  any  action  by  England  in  aid  of  Spain,  which  prob 
ably  would  have  been  forthcoming  had  Spain  been  as  strong  in 
deeds  as  she  was  in  protests,  was  made  impossible. 

On  March  23,  1823,  however,  a  note  was  sent  by  Canning  to 
the  British  ambassador  at  Paris  which  forewarned  France  that 
England  considered  the  question  of  the  separation  of  the  colonies 
from  Spain  as  substantially  decided  by  the  course  of  events,  al 
though  the  formal  recognition  of  their  independence  by  England 
might  be  hastened  or  retarded  by  external  causes,  as  well  as  by 
the  internal  condition  of  the  colonies  themselves;  and  that  as 
England  disclaimed  all  intention  of  appropriating  to  herself  the 
smallest  portion  of  the  late  Spanish  possessions  in  America,  she 
also  felt  satisfied  that  no  attempt  would  be  made  by  France  to 
bring  any  of  them  under  her  dominion,  either  by  conquest  or  by 
cession  from  Spain.1 

1  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  362. 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    DEVELOPMENT    OF   THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

CIRCUMSTANCES  had  made  the  relations  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  with  Spain  curiously  similar.  They  were  the 
two  great  commercial  powers,  and  the  ships  of  both  had  now  been 
coming  and  going  in  the  Spanish-American  ports  for  a  dozen  years 
with,  in  general,  but  limited  hindrance  from  Spain  herself,  who 
in  this  long  period  had  been  practically jpowerless  to  prevent  the 
great  trade  which  had  naturally  developed  under  freedom  and 
which  England  also  claimed  as  her  right  by  a  treaty  of  1810. 

The  commerce  of  both  countries  had,  however,  suffered  severely 
by  the  declaration  of  the  blockade  of  the  ports  of  the  Spanish 
main.  By  a  formal  treaty  between  Bolivar  and  Marshal  Morillo  in 
the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  1820,  it  had  been  stipulated  that,  if 
the  war  should  be  renewed,  it  should  be  conducted  on  the  principles 
applicable  to  wars  between  independent  nations.  On  the  renewal 
of  hostilities  in  1821  a  blockade  of  1,200  miles  of  coast  had  been 
declared  June  6,  the  only  Spanish  force  available  being  a  frigate, 
a  brig,  and  a  schooner,  used  chiefly  in  transporting  supplies  from 
Cura9ao  to  Puerto  Cabello,  which  latter  was  still  in  Spanish  hands. 
Not  only  did  Spain  reclaim  the  right  of  colonial  monopoly  and  pro 
hibitions  which  had  excluded  foreigners  from  all  trading,  but  on 
September  15,  1822,  Marshal  Morales,  now  Spanish  commander- 
in-chief,  issued  a  decree  of  most  brutal  and  sanguinary  character, 
condemning  to  death,  after  undergoing  summary  trial,  all  foreign 
ers  in  the  service,  military  or  civil,  of  the  enemy;  those  "having  a 
sha  e  in  any  printing  office;  or  being  editors  or  compilers  of  any 
jcr  j/nal,  pamphlet,  or  work  relative  to  the  present  war,  the  affairs 
^0  Revolted  America,  the  Roman  Catholic  religion,  or  that  shall 
in  any  manner  offensive  to  the  nation,  its  government,  or 

179 


180  PIRATICAL  DEPREDATIONS  [1823 

subjects.  .  .  .  Whatever  property  they  possess,  whether  real  or 
personal  or  in  movables,  shall  be  forfeited  to  the  use  of  the 
public  treasury."  Any  other  foreigners  found  in  the  country 
"shall  be  condemned  to  labor  at  the  public  works  for  three 
years,  and  all  their  property  .  .  .  confiscated."  l 

The  protests  of  the  American  and  British  naval  command 
ers  on  the  coast  were  of  course  immediate  and  energetic,  as  they 
had  been  also  against  the  pretended  blockade. 

Even  more  serious  were  the  depredations  of  the  privateers,  which, 
said  the  American  secretary  of  state,  "have  been  by  their  conduct 
distinguishable  from  pirates  only  by  commissions  of  the  most 
equivocal  character  from  Spanish  officers  .  .  .  swarms  of  pirates 
and  of  piratical  vessels,  without  pretence  or  color  of  commission, 
have  issued  from  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  the  immediate  neighbor 
hood  of  Havana.  .  .  .  These  piracies  have  now  been  for  years  con 
tinued  under  the  immediate  observation  of  the  government  of  the 
island  of  Cuba,  which,  as  well  as  the  Spanish  government,  has  been 
repeatedly  and  ineffectually  required  to  suppress  them  .  .  .  when 
pursued  by  a  superior  force  the  pirates  have  escaped  to  the  shores, 
and  twelve  months  have  elapsed  since  the  late  Captain  General 
Mahy  refused  to  Captain  Biddle  the  permission  to  land  even  upon 
the  desert  and  uninhabited  parts  of  the  island  where  they  should 
seek  refuge  from  his  pursuit.2  .  .  .  From  the  most  respectable 
testimony  we  are  informed  that  these  atrocious  robberies  are  com 
mitted  by  persons  well  known,  and  that  the  traffic  in  their  plunder 
is  carried  on  with  the  utmost  notoriety.  They  are  sometimes 
committed  by  vessels  equipped  as  merchant  vessels,  and  which 
clear  out  as  such  from  the  Havana.  It  has  also  been  remarked 
that  they  cautiously  avoid  molesting  Spanish  merchant  vessels,  but 
attack  without  discrimination  the  defenceless  vessels  of  all  other 
nations."  3 

This  is  a  severe  arraignment,  but  not  more  severe  than  was  war 
ranted.  While,  however,  the  action  of  the  United  States  for  a 
time  was  confined  to  protests,  Great  Britain,  despite  the  fact 

1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  X,  938. 

3  Nevertheless  they  were  so  pursued  into  the  tortuous  and  deep  bays  of 
Cuba  which  afforded  so  admirable  a  refuge. 

3  Adams  to  Nelson.     Instructions,  April  28,  1823,  State  Papers,  V,  408. 


1822]  ENGLAND  AND  SPAIN  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES    181 

that  she  was  at  the  time  Spain's  earnest  supporter,  in  the  press,  in 
Parliament,  and  in  diplomacy,  against  the  aggressions  of  France 
and  the  allies,  was  taking  vigorous  action  as  to  reprisals  in 
the  West  Indies,  re-enforcing  her  fleet  in  those  waters,  and  de 
manding  compensation  for  losses  already  suffered.  Canning  was 
at  the  same  moment  instructing  the  British  minister  at  Madrid, 
Sir  William  a  Court,  to  give  to  the  Spanish  government  all  aid 
possible  short  of  a  promise  of  warlike  support  in  her  affairs  with 
France,  and  pressing  her  vigorously  and  effectively  as  to  her  pro 
cedure  in  South  America.  "Our  difficulty,"  he  said  in  a  private 
and  confidential  letter  to  the  minister,  December  3,  1822,  "arises 
from  the  double  character  in  which  Spain  presents  herself  in  Europe 
and  America;  fighting  for  her  independence  in  the  former,  and 
in  the  latter  exercising  a  tyranny  and  assuming  a  tone  of  arrogance 
not  to  be  endured;  proposing  new  ties  of  friendship  here,  and 
there  prohibiting  our  accustomed  intercourse;  holding  out  her 
European  hand  for  charity,  and  with  her  American  one  picking 
our  pockets." 

Canning  admitted  in  this  letter  that  an  attack  by  France  "coin 
ciding  in  point  of  time  with  our  operations  in  the  West  Indies 
would  produce  an  appearance  of  concert,  utterly  remote  from  the 
truth,  indeed,  but  likely  to  impose  upon  Europe;  and  sure  to  be 
felt  most  deeply  and  resentfully  by  Spain.  To  avoid  this  appear 
ance  would  be  a  great  object;  but  seriously  and  sincerely  (you 
may  assure  the  Spanish  minister)  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  avoid  it 
unless  Spain  will  speedily,  instantly,  do  us  justice.  Let  the  Span 
ish  government  send  off  orders  without  delay  to  her  governors  of 
Puerto  Rico  and  Puerto  Cabello  (to  Cuba,  I  trust,  strict  orders 
will  already  have  been  sent),  and  to  her  naval  officers  in  the  West 
Indies,  to  execute  the  projects  for  which  our  armament  is  destined. 
Let  these  orders  (or  duplicates  of  them)  be  sent  hither,  to  be  for 
warded  to  our  officers  in  those  seas,  and  to  be  then  delivered  to 
their  several  destinations,  and  they  may,  perhaps,  yet  be  in  time  to 
prevent  a  blow  being  struck  in  anger;  but  there  is  no  time  to  spare, 
and  I  assure  you,  and  beg  you  to  impress  upon  M.  San  Miguel, 
that  the  patience  of  our  mercantile  interests  here  is  exhausted  by 
the  long  series  of  injuries  which  they  have  endured.  .  .  .  Let  Spain 
do  us  justice  fully  and  handsomely,  and  so  enable  us  to  behave 


182  THE  FUTURE  OF  CUBA  [1824 

toward  her  with  that  singleness  of  conduct  which  it  is  as  much  our 
desire,  as  it  is  her  interest,  that  we  should  pursue."  1 

Spain's  concession  to  the  British  demands  was  immediate.  The 
decree  of  January  27,  1822,  opening  the  trade  of  Cuba  to  the  world, 
was  on  January  9,  1823,  extended  by  the  Cortes  for  the  term  of  ten 
months,  "in  favor  of  all  those  nations  which  the  government  may 
think  proper  to  include  therein,"  and  a  sum  of  40,000,000  reals 
(about  $2,000,000)  assigned  in  the  "Great  Book"  for  the  indemni 
fication  of  such  British  claims  as  should  be  established  by  a  mixed 
board  of  British  and  Spanish  arbitrators,  setting  against  such 
claims  reclamations  of  Spanish  subjects  against  Great  Britain.2 
Finally  by  decree  of  February  9,  1824,  (absurd  in  the  situation) 
freedom  of  commerce  was  extended  to  all  Spanish  America. 

The  future  of  Cuba  was  at  this  time  regarded  by  the  American 
government  as  in  the  balance.  The  situation  was  anomalous  and 
threatening  in  high  degree.  France  a  month  after  the  compact 
with  England  just  mentioned  had  entered  Spain  with  a  great  army. 
What  was  to  be  the  end?  Was  she  again  to  attempt  to  reduce 
Spain  to  a  French  overlordship  ?  Having  done  this  was  she  to 
extend  her  conquests  to  South  America,  and  establish  there  new 
kingdoms  under  her  influence?  Would  she  occupy  Cuba  as  a 
part  of  the  Spanish  territory  ?  These  were  all  questions,  and  very 
vital  questions,  in  which  Great  Britain  was  almost  as  deeply 
interested  as  was  the  United  States.  Already  by  1823  French 
consuls  were  established  in  Spanish  West  Indian  ports,  whereas 
formal  recognition  of  the  British  and  American  commercial  agents 
employed  by  these  countries  was  denied.3 

1  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  385-387. 

2  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  X,  867.     The  American  claims  of  like 
nature  were  not  settled  until  February  17,  1834.     By  a  convention  of  that 
period  $500,000  were  allowed,  interest  to  be  paid,  at  five  per  cent.,  by  Spain, 
on  any  unpaid  sum  until  the  full  payment  should  be  completed.     (Senate 
Doc.  147,  23  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1835.)     The  final  payment  was  not  made  until 
October,  1908. 

3  Two  years  later  the  American  minister,  pressing  the  Spanish  minister  of 
state  on  this  subject,  reports,  as  the  result,  "  that  although  Spain  was  willing 
as  far  as  possible  to  overlook  and  keep  out  of  sight,  in  all  her  relations 
with  us,  the  unpleasant  circumstance  of  our  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  the  colonies,  yet  that  she  did  not  think  it  politic  to  admit  into  any  of  the 
American  possessions  an  authorized  public  agent  of  a  power  which  openly 
avowed  the  policy  of  encouraging  the  separation  of  these  possessions  from 


1823]  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  ON  CUBA  183 

Writing  April  28,  1823,  the  French  army  now  in  Spain  with 
scarcely  a  show  of  resistance,  Mr.  Adams  said:  "In  the  war  be 
tween  France  and  Spain  now  commencing,  other  interests,  pecul 
iarly  ours,  will,  in  all  probability,  be  deeply  involved.  Whatever 
may  be  the  issue  of  this  war,  as  between  these  two  European  pow 
ers,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  dominion  of  Spain  upon 
the  American  continents,  north  and  south,  is  irrecoverably  gone. 
But  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  still  remain  nominally, 
and  so  far  really,  dependent  upon  her,  that  she  yet  possesses  the 
power  of  transferring  her  dominion  over  them,  together  with  the 
possession  of  them  to  others.  .  .  .  Cuba,  almost  in  sight  of  our 
shores,  from  a  multitude  of  considerations  has  become  an  object 
of  transcendent  importance  to  the  commercial  and  political  interests 
of  our  Union  A  Its  commanding  position  with  reference  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  and  the  West  Indian  seas;  the  character  of  its  popu 
lation;  its  situation  midway  between  our  southern  coast  and  the 
island  of  St.  Domingo;  its  safe  and  capacious  harbor  of  the  Havana 
fronting  a  long  line  of  our  shore  destitute  of  the  same  advantage; 
the  nature  of  its  productions  and  of  its  wants,  furnishing  the  sup 
plies  and  needing  the  returns  of  a  commerce  immensely  profitable 
and  mutually  beneficial, — give  it  an  importance  in  the  sum  of  our 
national  interests  with  which  that  of  no  other  foreign  country  can 
be  compared,  and  little  inferior  to  that  which  binds  the  different 
members  of  this  Union  together.  Such  indeed  are,  between  the 
interests  of  that  island  and  of  this  country,  the  geographical,  com 
mercial,  moral,  and  political  relations,  formed  by  nature,  gathering 
in  the  process  of  time,  and  even  now  verging  to  maturity,  that,  in 
looking  forward  to  the  probable  course  of  events  for  the  short  period 
of  half  a  century,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that 
the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  our  federal  republic  will  be  indispen 
sable  to  the  continuance  and  integrity  of  the  Union  itself.  It  is 

the  mother  country;  that  our  ministers  and  consuls  on  the  continent  were 
constantly  holding  a  language  favorable  to  the  insurgents;  that  our  consuls 
in  the  islands  would  no  doubt  do  the  same,  and  that  if  they  were  formally 
recognized  there  would  be  no  means  of  preventing  them;  but  that  at  present 
the  authorities  would  have  the  right,  if  the  consuls  conducted  themselves  im 
prudently,  to  proceed  against  them  in  the  usual  forms  of  law." — Mr.  Alexander 
H.  Everett  to  the  Department  of  State,  September  25,  1825,  House  Ex.  Doc., 
121,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  p.  24. 


184  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  ON  CUBA  [1823 

obvious,  however,  that  for  this  event  we  are  not  yet  prepared. 
Numerous  and  formidable  objections  to  the  extension  of  our  terri 
torial  dominions  beyond  sea  present  themselves  to  the  first  con 
templation  of  the  subject;  obstacles  to  the  system  of  policy  by 
which  alone  that  result  can  be  compassed  and  maintained  are  to 
be  foreseen  and  surmounted  both  at  home  and  abroad;  but  there 
are  laws  of  political  as  well  as  of  physical  gravitation,  and  if  an 
apple,  severed  by  the  tempest  from  its  native  tree,  cannot  choose 
but  fall  to  the  ground,  Cuba,  forcibly  disjoined  from  its  own  un 
natural  connection  with  Spain,  and  incapable  of  self-support,  can 
gravitate  only  toward  the  North  American  Union,  which,  by  the 
same  law  of  nature,  cannot  cast  her  off  from  its  bosom. 

"In  any  other  state  of  things  than  that  which  springs  from  this 
incipient  war  between  France  and  Spain,  these  considerations 
would  be  premature.  .  .  .  Whether  the  purposes  of  France  or  of 
her  continental  allies  extend  to  the  subjugation  of  the  remaining 
ultra-marine  possessions  of  Spain  or  not  has  not  yet  been  suf 
ficiently  disclosed.  But  to  confine  ourselves  to  that  which  im 
mediately  concerns  us — the  condition  of  the  island  of  Cuba — we 
know  that  the  republican  spirit  of  freedom  prevails  among  its  in 
habitants.  The  liberties  of  the  constitution  are  to  them  rights  in 
possession;  nor  is  it  to  be  presumed  that  they  will  be  willing  to 
surrender  them  because  they  may  be  extinguished  by  foreign  vio 
lence  in  the  parent  country.  A  Spanish  territory,  the  island  will 
be  liable  to  invasion  from  France  during  the  war,  and  the  only 
reasons  for  doubting  whether  the  attempt  will  be  made  are  the 
probable  incompetency  of  the  French  maritime  force  to  effect  the 
conquest  and  the  probability  that  its  accomplishment  would  be 
resisted  by  Great  Britain.  In  the  meantime,  and  at  all  events,  the 
condition  of  the  island,  in  regard  to  that  of  its  inhabitants,  is  a 
condition  of  great  imminent  and  complicated  danger.  .  .  .  Were 
the  population  of  that  island  of  one  blood  and  color,  there  could  be 
no  doubt  or  hesitation  with  regard  to  the  course  which  they  would 
pursue  as  dictated  by  their  interests  and  their  rights;  the  invasion 
of  Spain  by  France  would  be  the  signal  for  their  declaration  of  in 
dependence.  That  even  in  their  present  state  it  will  be  imposed 
upon  them  as  a  necessity  is  not  unlikely;  but  among  all  reflecting 
men  it  is  admitted  .  .  .  that  they  are  not  competent  to  a  system  of 


1823]  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  ON  CUBA  185 

permanent  self-dependence  ...  in  the  event  of  the  overthrow  of 
the  Spanish  constitution,  that  support  can  no  longer  be  expected 
from  Spain — their  only  alternative  of  dependence  must  be  upon 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States." 

Mr.  Adams  mentioned  the  hope  of  the  United  States  govern 
ment  that  the  connection  with  Spain  should  continue  for  the  time 
being  if  possible,  an  expression  of  which  had  already  been  con 
veyed  to  the  Spanish  government;  but  the  withdrawal  of  Great 
Britain  from  the  Holy  Alliance;  her  disapproval  of  the  war  under 
taken  by  France;  her  determination  to  defend  Portugal  from  a  like 
invasion;  the  certainty  of  the  revival  of  natural  resentments  and 
jealousies  made  her  entry  into  the  conflict  very  probable.  "The 
prospect  is  that  she  will  soon  be  engaged  on  the  side  of  Spain;  but 
in  making  common  cause  with  her,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  she 
will  yield  her  assistance  upon  principles  altogether  disinterested  and 
gratuitous.  As  the  price  of  her  alliance,  the  two  remaining  islands 
of  Spain  in  the  West  Indies  present  objects  no  longer  of  much 
possible  value  or  benefit  to  Spain,  but  of  such  importance  to  Great 
Britain  that  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  her  indifferent  to  them." 

The  independence  of  Mexico  and  the  annexation  of  the  Floridas, 
the  internal  condition  of  Cuba,  the  precariousness  of  its  depend 
ence  on  Spain,  and  the  need  of  Spain  to  secure  by  some  equivalent 
the  support  of  Great  Britain  seemed  to  Adams  to  form  a  remark 
able  concurrence  of  reasons  to  predispose  the  latter  to  annex  the 
island.  He  acknowledged  that  an  indirect  communication  from 
the  French  government  mentioning  that,  some  two  years  before, 
Great  Britain  had  offered  Gibraltar  in  exchange,  was  probably  a 
mistake;  but  he  did  not  wholly  rely  upon  Canning's  late  declara 
tion  to  the  French  government,  confidentially  communicated  to 
the  American  government,  that  Great  Britain  would  hold  it  dis 
graceful  to  avail  herself  of  the  distressed  situation  of  Spain  to  ob 
tain  possession  of  any  of  her  American  colonies.  They  did  not  for 
bear  to  avail  themselves  of  Spain's  distress  by  sending  two  suc 
cessive  squadrons  to  the  West  Indies  to  make  reprisals.  They 
obtained  an  immediate  revocation  of  the  fictitious  blockade  pro 
claimed  on  the  Venezuelan  coast  and  pledges  of  reparation  for 
captures  so  made;  also  an  acknowledgment  of  many  long-stand 
ing  claims  of  British  subjects  and  promises  of  payment  as  part 


186  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  ON  CUBA  [1823 

of  the  national  debt.  For  the  payment  of  these,  said  Adams,  "  the 
island  of  Cuba  may  be  the  only  indemnity  in  the  power  of  Spain  to 
grant,  as  it  will  undoubtedly  be  to  Great  Britain  the  most  satisfac 
tory  indemnity  which  she  could  receive.  The  war  between  France 
and  Spain  changes  so  totally  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
declaration  above  mentioned  was  made,  that  it  may,  at  the  very 
outset,  produce  events  under  which  the  possession  of  Cuba  may 
be  obtained  by  Great  Britain  without  ever  raising  a  reproach  of 
intended  deception  against  the  British  government  for  making  it. 
.  .  .  The  question  both  of  our  right,  and  our  power  to  prevent  it 
if  necessary  by  force,  already  obtrudes  itself  upon  our  councils." 
He  closed  with:  "It  will  be  among  the  primary  objects  requiring 
your  most  earnest  and  unremitting  attention  to  ascertain  and  re 
port  to  us  every  movement  of  negotiation  between  Spain  and  Great 
Britain  upon  this  subject.  .  .  .  We  scarcely  know  where  you  will 
find  the  government  of  Spain  upon  your  arrival  in  the  country,  nor 
can  we  foresee  with  certainty  by  whom  it  will  be  administered. 
Your  credentials  are  addressed  to  Ferdinand,  the  King  of  Spain, 
under  the  constitution.  You  may  find  him  under  the  guardian 
ship  of  a  Cortes,  in  the  custody  of  an  army  of  [the]  faith,  or 
under  the  protection  of  the  invaders  of  his  country.  So  long  as 
the  constitutional  government  may  continue  to  be  administered 
in  his  name,  your  official  intercourse  will  be  with  his  ministers, 
and  to  them  you  will  repeat  what  Mr.  Forsyth  has  been  instructed 
to  say,  that  the  wishes  of  your  government  are  that  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico,  may  continue  in  connection  with  independent  and 
constitutional  Spain."1 

While  the  American  government  was  thus  nervous  as  to  the 
intentions  of  that  of  Great  Britain,  the  latter  was  equally  so  as  to 
those  of  the  former.  The  hastening  of  the  powerful  British  naval 
force  to  the  Caribbean  was  not  alone  to  repress  Spanish  aggression 
against  British  commerce;  it  was  also  to  prevent  American  action 
against  Cuba.  Said  Canning,  "whatever  they  might  do  in  the 
absence  of  a  British  squadron,  they  would  hardly  venture  in  the 
face  of  one  to  assume  the  military  occupation  of  the  island."2  A 

1  Instructions  to  Mr.  Nelson,  newly  appointed  minister  to  Spain,  April  28, 
1823,  House  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

2  Stapleton,  Official  Correspondence  of  Canning,  I,  48. 


1823]  CANNING'S  PROPOSALS  TO  RUSH  187 

little  later,  in  May,  1824,  Great  Britain  even  went  so  far,  though 
this  action  was  directed  mainly  against  the  Holy  Alliance,  and 
thus  for  the  moment  in  support  of  the  United  States,  as  to  offer 
to  Spain  "to  guarantee  to  her  the  secure  possession  of  Cuba." 

So  long  as  the  action  of  the  allies  was  confined  to  Spain  the 
United  States  had  only  an  abstract  interest,  but  it  soon  became 
clear  that  the  designs  of  the  alliance  went  far  beyond  and  touched 
the  deepest  interests  of  America,  North  and  South,  and  in  the  most 
concrete  manner,  by  their  intention  to  call  a  congress  to  consider 
the  return  of  the  late  Spanish-American  colonies  to  their  allegiance. 
The  secrecy  of  the  movement  had  withheld  this  knowledge  from 
the  government  of  the  United  States;  the  first  note  of  warning 
came  from  England,  and  the  first  step  toward  a  correspondence 
which  led  to  the  momentous  declaration  in  the  annual  message  of 
President  Monroe  to  Congress,  December  2,  1823,  was  in  a  con 
versation  of  August  16,  1823,  between  Mr.  Richard  Rush,  the 
United  States  minister  in  London,  and  Mr.  George  Canning,  the 
British  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  in  which  Canning  introduced 
the  subject.  In  a  note  to  Rush,  on  August  20,  Canning  asked: 
"Is  not  the  moment  come  when  our  governments  might  understand 
each  other  as  to  the  Spanish-American  colonies  ?  And  if  we  can 
arrive  at  such  an  understanding,  would  it  not  be  expedient  for  our 
selves,  and  beneficial  for  all  the  world,  that  the  principles  of  it 
should  be  clearly  settled  and  plainly  avowed  ? 

"  For  ourselves  we  have  no  disguise. 

"1.  We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be 
hopeless. 

"2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  them,  as 
independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and  circumstances. 

"3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to  throw  any  im 
pediment  in  the  way  of  arrangement  between  them  and  the  mother 
country  by  amicable  negotiations. 

"4.  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of  them  by  our 
selves. 

"5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred  to  any 
other  power  with  indifference. 

'Canning,  in  letter  to  George  IV,  February  1,  1825,  Stapleton,  George 
Canning  and  His  Times,  424. 


188  CANNING  AND  RUSH  [1823 

"If  these  opinions  and  feelings  are  as  I  firmly  believe  them  to 
be,  common  to  your  government  with  ours,  why  should  we  hesitate 
to  mutually  confide  them  to  each  other  and  to  declare  them  in 
the  face  of  the  world  ? 

"...  Such  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  your  government  and 
ours  would  be  at  once1  the  most  effectual  and  the  least  offensive 
mode  of  intimating  our  joint  disapprobation  of  such  projects. 

"...  Do  you  conceive  that  under  the  power  which  you  have 
recently  received  you  are  authorized  to  enter  into  negotiation  and 
to  sign  any  convention  on  the. subject?  Do  you  conceive,  if  that 
be  not  within  your  competence,  you  could  exchange  with  me 
ministerial  notes  upon  it? 

"Nothing  could  be  more  gratifying  t^  me  than  to  join  with 
you  in  such  a  work,  and,  I  am  persuaded,  there  has  seldom  in  the 
history  of  the  world  occurred  an  opportunity  when  so  small  an 
effort  pf  two  friendly  governments  might  produce  so  unequivocal 
a  good  and  prevent  such  extensive  calamities." 

Here  was  a  long  step  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  though 
preceded,  by  a  month,  as  will  be  seen,  by  Adams's  announcement 
to  the  Russian  minister  at  Washington,  went  far  to  justifying 
Canning's  boast  later  of  calling  a  new  world  into  existence  to 
redress  the  balance  of  the  old. 

Three  days  later,  August  23,  1823,  Canning  wrote  Rush: 
"I  have  received  notice  but  not  such  notice  as  imposes  upon  me 
the  necessity  of  any  immediate  answer  or  proceeding; — that  as 
soon  as  the  military  objects  in  Spain  are  achieved  ...  a  proposal 
will  be  made  for  a  congress,  or  some  less  formal  concert  and 
consultation,  specially  upon  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America.  I 
need  not  point  out  to  you  all  the  complications  to  which  this  pro 
posal,  however  dealt  with  by  us,  may  lead." 

On  September  18,  in  an  interview  with  Rush,  Canning  said  that 
events  "were  hourly  assuming  new  importance  and  urgency, 
under  aspects  to  which  neither  of  our  governments  could  be  in 
sensible.  .  .  .  He  had  the  strongest  reasons  for  believing  that 

1  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  389,  390  ;  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  January, 
1902,  415,  416. 

a  Enclosed  with  Mr.  Rush's  No.  326,  August  28,  1823;  Ford,  Mass.  Hist. 
Soc.  Proceedings,  January,  1902,  (XV)  416. 


1823]  RUSH'S  OFFER  189 

the  cooperation  of  the  United  States  with  England,  through  my 
[Rush's]  instrumentality,  afforded  with  promptitude,  would  ward 
off  altogether  the  meditated  jurisdiction  of  the  European  powers 
over  the  new  world." 

Rush,  with  an  exhibition  of  initiative  rare  in  any  public  servant, 
declared  himself  ready  to  stand  upon  his  general  powers  as  a 
minister  plenipotentiary.  "I  would  put  forth,  with  Great  Britain, 
the  declaration  to  which  he  had  invited  me,"  but  it  must  be  with 
the  understanding  that  England  would  immediately  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  revolted  provinces.  This  Canning  was  not 
prepared  to  do,  among  the  objections  being  "still  that  of  the  un 
certain  condition,  internally  of  these  new  states,  or  at  any  rate  of 
some  of  them."  * 

Rush's  views  of  British  altruism  at  the  moment  were  not  com 
plimentary.  "Since  the  present  year  set  in,  she  has  proclaimed 
and  until  now  cautiously  maintained  her  neutrality  under  an  at 
tack  by  France  on  the  independence  of  Spain,  as  unjust,  as  ne 
farious,  and  as  cruel,  as  the  annals  of  mankind  can  recount 2  .  .  . 
Britain  has  been  from  the  very  beginning,  positively  or  negatively, 
auxiliary  to  the  evils  with  which  this  Alliance  under  the  mark  of 
Christianity,  has  already  affected  the  old,  and  is  now  menacing  the 
new  world.  It  is  under  this  last  stretch  of  ambition  that  she  seems 
to  be  roused,  not,  as  we  seem  forced  to  infer  after  all  we  have  seen, 
from  any  objections  to  the  arbitrary  principles  of  the  combination, 
for  the  same  men  are  still  substantially  at  the  head  of  her  affairs; 
but  rather  from  the  apprehensions,  which  are  now  probably  coming 
upon  her,  touching  her  own  influence  and  standing  through  the 
formidable  and  encroaching  career  of  these  Continental  potentates. 
She  at  last  perceives  a  crisis  likely  to  come  on,  bringing  with  it 
peril  to  her  own  commercial  prospects  on  the  other  side  of  the  At 
lantic,  and  to  her  political  sway  in  both  hemispheres."  3 

This,  as  has  been  shown,  is  but  partially  just.     While  England's 

1  Rush  to  Adams,  September  19,  1823,  Court  of  London,  388-403. 

*  Mr.  Rush  did  not  overdraw  the  iniquity  of  French  action,  which  in  effect 
was  that  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  also.  Any  strictures  from  either  of 
these  governments  upon  future  American  action  in  regard  to  Cuba  lose  all 
force  in  face  of  the  enormity  of  this  invasion. 

1  Rush  to  President  Monroe,  September  15,  1823,  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proceedings,  XV,  421. 


190         MONROE  TO   JEFFERSON  AND  MADISON      [1823 

commercial  interests  in  South  America,  now  equalling  a  fourth  of 
her  trade  with  continental  Europe,1  were  at  stake  and  she  was  ruled, 
as  nations  always  have  been,  by  self-interest,  enough  has  been 
quoted  to  show  that  the  despotic  character  of  the  alliance  was 
deeply  resented  on  principle  alone.  Canning's  defence  in  Parlia 
ment  of  abstention  from  a  more  warlike  attitude  was  sound.  He 
had  already  gone  far.  The  reason  for  caution  was  clear  enough 
also  to  Rush,  who,  in  the  same  despatch  and  with  more  justice,  said, 
"The  former  war  of  twenty  years  more  than  once  shook  her  pros 
perity  and  brought  hazards  to  her  existence,  though  for  the  most 
part  she  was  surrounded  by  allies.  A  second  war  of  like  duration 
with  no  ally  in  Europe  might  not  have  a  second  field  of  Waterloo 
for  its  termination."  She  thus  sought  an  ally  in  the  United  States 
and  found,  if  not  an  ally,  a  power  willing  to  relieve  her  of  the  whole 
burden. 

The  despatches  of  Mr.  Rush  naturally  created  deep  interest  and 
even  alarm  in  the  mind  of  the  President.  Adams  was  absent 
from  Washington,  and  Monroe  wrote  Jefferson,  October  17, 1823: 

"I  transmit  to  you  two  despatches  which  were  received  from  Mr. 
Rush,  while  I  was  lately  in  Washington,  which  involve  interests 
of  the  highest  importance.  They  contain  two  letters  from  Mr. 
Canning  suggesting  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  against  the  inde 
pendence  of  South  America,  and  proposing  a  co-operation  be 
tween  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  support  of  it  against 
the  members  of  that  alliance.  The  project  aims,  in  the  first  in 
stance,  at  a  mere  expression  of  opinion,  somewhat  in  the  abstract, 
but  which  it  is  expected  by  Mr.  Canning  will  have  a  great  political 
effect  by  defeating  the  combination.  By  Mr.  Rush's  answers, 
which  are  also  enclosed,  you  will  see  the  light  in  which  he  views 
the  subject  and  the  extent  to  which  he  may  have  gone.  Many 
important  considerations  are  involved  in  this  proposition.  1. 
Shall  we  entangle  ourselves  at  all  in  European  politics  and  wars, 
on  the  side  of  any  power,  against  others,  presuming  that  a  concert 
by  agreement,  of  the  kind  proposed,  may  lead  to  that  result?  2. 
If  a  case  can  exist  in  which  a  sound  maxim  may  and  ought  to  be 
departed  from,  is  not  the  present  instance  precisely  that  case  ?  3. 

1  Lord  Lansdowne's  and  the  Earl  of  Liverpool's  speeches,  March  15,  1824, 
Hansard,  N.  S.,  X,  970-1003. 


1823]  VIEWS  OF  JEFFERSON  191 

Has  not  the  epoch  arrived  when  Great  Britain  must  take  her 
stand  either  on  the  side  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe  or  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  consequence  either  in  favor  of  despotism  or  of 
liberty,  and  may  it  not  be  presumed  that,  aware  of  that  necessity, 
her  government  has  seized  on  the  present  occurrence  as  that 
which  it  deems  the  most  suitable  to  announce  and  mark  the  com 
mencement  of  that  career  ? 

"My  own  impression  is  that  we  ought  to  meet  the  proposal  of 
the  British  government,  and  to  make  it  known,  that  we  would 
view  an  interference  on  the  part  of  the  European  powers,  and  es 
pecially  an  attack  on  the  colonies  by  them,  as  an  attack  on  our 
selves,  presuming  that  if  they  succeeded  with  them  they  would 
extend  it  to  us.  I  am  sensible,  however,  of  the  extent  and  diffi 
culty  of  the  question,  and  shall  be  happy  to  have  your  and  Mr. 
Madison's  opinions  on  it.  I  do  not  wish  to  trouble  either  of  you 
with  small  objects,  but  the  present  one  is  vital,  involving  the  high 
interests  for  which  we  have  so  long  and  so  faithfully  and  har 
moniously  contended  together.  Be  so  kind  as  to  enclose  to  him 
the  despatches  with  an  intimation  of  the  motive."  1 

Both  Jefferson  and  Madison  favored  co-operation  with  England. 
Jefferson  said : 

"The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have  sent  me  is  the 
most  momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my  contemplation 
since  that  of  independence.  That  made  us  a  nation;  this  sets  our 
compass  and  points  the  course  which  we  are  to  steer  through  the 
ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  And  never  could  we  embark  upon 
it  under  circumstances  more  auspicious.  Our  first  and  funda 
mental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils 
of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle 
with  cisatlantic  affairs.  America,  North  and  South,  has  a  set 
of  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and  particularly  her 
own.  She  should  therefore  have  a  system  of  her  own,  separate 
and  apart  from  that  of  Europe.  While  the  last  is  laboring  to  be 
come  the  domicile  of  despotism,  our  endeavor  should  surely  be 
to  make  our  hemisphere  that  of  freedom. 

"One  nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this  pursuit;  she 

1  Monroe  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  17,  1823,  received  Oct.  23,  Ford,  Maes.  Hist. 
Soc.  Proceedings,  January,  1902,  375;  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  393. 


192  VIEWS  OF  JEFFERSON  [1823 

now  offers  to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in  it.  By  acceding  to 
her  proposition,  we  detach  her  from  the  bands,  bring  her  mighty 
weight  into  the  scale  of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  con 
tinent  at  one  stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger  long  in  doubt 
and  difficulty.  Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the 
most  harm  of  any  one,  or  all  on  earth;  and  with  her  on  our  side  we 
need  not  fear  the  whole  world.  With  her,  then,  we  should  most 
sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friendship  and  nothing  would  tend 
more  to  knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once  more,  side  by 
side,  in  the  same  cause.  Not  that  I  would  purchase  even  her 
amity  at  the  price  of  taking  part  in  her  wars. 

''But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might  engage  us, 
should  that  be  its  consequences,  is  not  her  war,  but  ours.  Its 
object  is  to  introduce  and  establish  the  American  system  of  keep 
ing  out  of  our  land  all  foreign  powers — of  never  permitting  those 
of  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is 
to  maintain  our  own  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  And  if,  to 
facilitate  this,  we  can  effect  a  division  in  the  body  of  the  European 
powers,  and  draw  over  to  our  side  its  most  powerful  member, 
surely  we  should  do  it.  But  I  am  clearly  of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion, 
that  it  will  prevent  instead  of  provoking  war.  With  Great  Britain 
withdrawn  from  their  scale  and  shifted  into  that  of  our  two  conti 
nents,  all  Europe  combined  would  not  undertake  such  a  war,  for 
how  would  they  propose  to  get  at  either  enemy  without  superior 
fleets  ? l  Nor  is  the  occasion  to  be  slighted  which  this  proposition 
offers  of  declaring  our  protest  against  the  atrocious  violations  of 
the  rights  of  nations  by  the  interference  of  any  one  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another,  so  flagitiously  begun  by  Bonaparte,  and  now 
continued  by  the  equally  lawless  alliance  calling  itself  holy. 

"But  we  have  first  to  ask  ourselves  a  question.  Do  we  wish 
to  acquire  to  our  own  confederacy  any  one  or  more  of  the  Spanish 
provinces?  I  candidly  confess  that  I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba 
as  the  most  interesting  addition  which  could  ever  be  made  to  our 
system  of  states.  The  control  which,  with  Florida  Point,  this 
island  would  give  us  over  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  countries 
and  isthmus  bordering  on  it,  as  well  as  all  those  whose  waters  flow 
into  it,  would  fill  up  the  measure  of  our  political  well-being.  Yet, 
1  Jefferson  here  recognizes  for  once  the  meaning  of  a  navy. 


1823]      LETTERS  OF  JEFFERSON  AND  MADISON        193 

as  I  am  sensible  that  this  can  never  be  obtained,  even  with  her  own 
consent,  but  by  war,  and  its  independence,  which  is  our  second 
interest  (and  especially  its  independence  of  England),  can  be  se 
cured  without  it,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  abandoning  my  first  wish 
to  future  chances,  and  accepting  its  independence,  with  peace  and 
the  friendship  of  England,  rather  than  its  association  at  the  ex 
pense  of  war  and  her  enmity. 

"I  could  honestly,  therefore,  join  in  the  declaration  proposed, 
that  we  aim  not  at  the  acquisition  of  any  of  those  possessions,  that 
we  will  not  stand  in  the  way  of  any  amicable  arrangement  between 
them  and  the  mother  country,  but  that  we  will  oppose,  with  all 
our  means,  the  forcible  interposition  of  any  other  power,  as  aux 
iliary,  stipendiary,  or  under  any  other  form  or  pretext,  and  most 
especially  their  transfer  to  any  power  by  conquest,  cession,  or  ac 
quisition  in  any  other  way.  I  should  think  it  therefore  advisable 
that  the  executive  should  encourage  the  British  government  to  a 
continuance  in  the  dispositions  expressed  in  these  letters  by  an  as 
surance  of  his  concurrence  with  them  as  far  as  his  authority  goes; 
and  that  as  it  may  lead  to  war,  the  declaration  of  which  requires 
an  act  of  Congress,  the  case  shall  be  laid  before  them  for  con 
sideration  at  their  first  meeting,  and  under  the  reasonable  aspect 
in  which  it  is  seen  by  himself.  .  .  .* 

Madison  wrote:  "I  have  just  received  from  Mr.  Jefferson  your 
letter  to  him,  with  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Canning  and 
Mr.  Rush,  sent  for  his  and  my  perusal,  and  our  opinions  on  the 
subject  of  it. 

"  From  the  disclosures  of  Mr.  Canning  it  appears,  as  was  other 
wise  to  be  inferred,  that  the  success  of  France  against  Spain  would 
be  followed  by  an  attempt  of  the  holy  allies  to  reduce  the  revolu 
tionized  colonies  of  the  latter  to  their  former  dependence. 

"The  professions  we  have  made  to  these  neighbors,  our  sym 
pathies  with  their  liberties  and  independence,  the  deep  interest 
we  have  in  the  most  friendly  relations  with  them,  and  the  conse 
quences  threatened  by  a  command  of  their  resources  by  the  great 
powers,  confederated  against  the  rights  and  reforms  of  which  we 
have  given  so  conspicuous  and  persuasive  an  example,  all  unite 

1  Jefferson,  Writings,  X,  315,  Sen.  Doc.  26,  57  Cong.,  1  Sess.;  Moore,  Digest, 
VI,  394 


194  MADISON'S  LETTER  [1823 

in  calling  for  our  efforts  to  defeat  the  meditated  crusade.  It  is  par 
ticularly  fortunate  that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  though  guided 
by  calculations  different  from  ours,  has  presented  a  co-operation 
for  an  object  the  same  with  ours.  With  that  co-operation  we  have 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  with  it  the  best  as 
surance  of  success  to  our  laudable  views.  There  ought  not,  there 
fore,  to  be  any  backwardness,  I  think,  in  meeting  her  in  the  way 
she  has  proposed,  keeping  in  view,  of  course,  the  spirit  and  forms 
of  the  constitution  in  every  step  taken  in  the  road  to  war,  which 
must  be  the  last  step  if  those  short  of  war  should  be  without  avail. 

"It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Mr.  Canning's  proposal,  though 
made  with  the  air  of  consultation  as  well  as  concert,  was  founded 
on  a  predetermination  to  take  the  course  marked  out  whatever 
might  be  the  reception  given  here  to  his  invitation.  But  this  con 
sideration  ought  not  to  divert  us  from  what  is  just  and  proper  in 
itself.  Our  co-operation  is  due  to  ourselves  and  to  the  world; 
and  while  it  must  insure  success  in  the  event  of  an  appeal  to  force, 
it  doubles  the  chance  of  success  without  that  appeal.  It  is  not 
improbable  that  Great  Britain  would  like  best  to  have  the  merit  of 
being  the  sole  champion  of  her  new  friends,  notwithstanding  the 
greater  difficulty  to  be  encountered,  but  for  the  dilemma  in  which 
she  would  be  placed.  She  must,  in  that  case,  either  leave  us,  as 
neutrals,  to  extend  our  commerce  and  navigation  at  the  expense 
of  hers,  or  make  us  enemies,  by  renewing  her  paper  blockades  and 
other  arbitrary  proceedings  on  the  ocean.  It  may  be  hoped  that 
such  a  dilemma  will  not  be  without  a  permanent  tendency  to  check 
her  proneness  to  unnecessary  wars. 

"Why  the  British  cabinet  should  have  scrupled  to  arrest  the 
calamity  it  now  apprehends,  by  applying  to  the  threats  of  France 
against  Spain  the  small  effort  which  it  scruples  not  to  employ  in 
behalf  of  Spanish  America  is  best  known  to  itself.  It  is  difficult 
to  find  any  other  explanation  than  that  interest  in  the  one  case  has 
more  weight  in  its  casuistry  than  principle  had  in  the  other." 

Mr.  Madison's  suggestions  now  went  far  beyond  the  bounds 
laid  down  in  the  rules  of  American  statesmanship,  saying:  "Will 
it  not  be  honorable  to  our  country,  and  possibly  not  altogether 
in  vain,  to  invite  the  British  government  to  extend  the  'avowed 
disapprobation'  of  the  project  against  the  Spanish  colonies  to 


1823]  MONROE'S  ALARM  195 

the  enterprise  of  France  against  Spain  herself,  and  even  to  join 
in  some  declaratory  act  in  behalf  of  the  Greeks?  On  the  sup 
position  that  no  form  could  be  given  to  the  act  clearing  it  of  a 
pledge  to  follow  it  up  by  war,  we  ought  to  compare  the  good  to  be 
done  with  the  little  injury  to  be  apprehended  to  the  United  States, 
shielded  as  their  interests  would  be  by  the  power  and  the  fleets  of 
Great  Britain  united  with  their  own.  These  are  questions,  how 
ever,  which  may  require  more  information  than  I  possess  and  more 
reflection  than  I  can  now  give  them. 

"What  is  the  extent  of  Mr.  Canning's  disclaimer  as  to  'the 
remaining  possessions  of  Spain  in  America?'  Does  it  exclude 
future  views  of  acquiring  Puerto  Rico,  etc.,  as  well  as  Cuba?  It 
leaves  Great  Britain  free,  as  I  understand  it,  in  relation  to  other 
quarters  of  the  globe."  1 

Beginning  August  19, 1823,  Rush  wrote  six  despatches  and  letters 
which,  in  the  time  preceding  the  President's  annual  message,  could 
have  influenced  the  declaration.  His  first  was  received  October  9; 
the  last,  from  London,  October  10,  was  received  November  19. 
Adams,  on  November  13,  found  Monroe  "altogether  unsettled  in 
his  own  mind  as  to  the  answer  to  be  given  Mr.  Canning's  proposals, 
and  alarmed  far  beyond  anything  I  could  have  conceived  possible, 
with  the  fear  that  the  Holy  Alliance  are  about  to  restore  imme 
diately  all  South  America  to  Spain,  Calhoun  stimulates  the  panic, 
and  the  news  that  Cadiz  has  surrendered  to  the  French  has  so 
affected  the  President  that  he  appeared  entirely  to  despair  of  the 
cause  of  South  America."  Two  days  later  the  subject  was  re 
sumed.  "Calhoun  is  perfectly  moon-struck  by  the  surrender  of 
Cadiz,  and  says  the  holy  allies,  with  ten  thousand  men,  will  re 
store  all  Mexico  and  all  South  America  to  the  Spanish  dominion. 
I  did  not  deny  that  they  might  make  a  temporary  impression  for 
three,  four,  or  five  years,  but  I  no  more  believe  that  the  holy  allies 
will  restore  the  Spanish  dominion  upon  the  American  continent 
than  that  Chimborazo  will  sink  beneath  the  ocean."  2 

Rush's  despatch  of  October  10,  received  November  16,3  ex- 

1  Madison  to  Monroe,  Oct.  30,  1823,  Works,  III,  339;    Digest,  VI,  396. 
3  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  185,  186. 

3  For  this  see  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  Proceedings,  January  1902,  (XV,)  424. 
Ford  gives  date  of  reception  as  November  19,  Adams  as  the  16th,  VI,  187. 


196  THE  FRENCH  DISCLAIMER  [1823 

pressed  deep  disappointment  in  an  apparent  change  in  Canning, 
inasmuch  as  the  latter  now  said  nothing  on  the  South  American 
subject  beyond  remarking  that  consuls  were  about  to  be  sent. 
"Not  another  word,"  said  Rush,  October  22,  "has  he  said  to  me 
on  it  since  the  26th  of  last  month.  .  .  .  and  he  has  gone  now  out  of 
town  to  spend  the  remainder  of  this  and  part  of  the  next  month."1 

Canning's  conduct  which  thus  left  to  Adams  and  Monroe  full 
initiative,  was  to  be  explained  later.  It  was  not,  however,  until 
November  24  that  he  stated  to  Rush  that  as  the  latter  had  been 
unable  to  act  "he  had  deemed  it  indispensable,  as  no  more  time 
was  to  be  lost,  that  Great  Britain  herself  should  come  to  an  ex 
planation  with  France."  This  explanation  had  been  made, 
October  9, 1823,  when  Prince  Polignac,  the  French  ambassador,  was 
informed  with  great  plainness  that  Great  Britain  would  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  South  American  colonies  "in  case  France 
should  employ  force  in  aid  of  their  resubjugation,"  or  if  "Spain 
herself,  reverting  to  her  old  colonial  system,  should  attempt  to  put 
a  stop  to  the  trade  of  Britain  with  those  colonies,"  this  right  to 
trade  having  been  established  by  a  convention  so  far  back  as  1810 
as  an  equivalent  for  British  mediation  offered  at  that  time. 

Canning  had  disclaimed  to  Polignac  any  desire  of  appropri 
ating  any  portion  of  the  Spanish  possessions,  or  of  taking  part  in 
any  conflict  between  these  and  Spain,  but  stated  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  wait  indefinitely  for  an  accommodation. 

The  attitude  of  Canning,  of  which,  in  fact,  the  French  govern 
ment  had  had  full  knowledge  since  March,  1823,  brought  from 
her  ambassador  the  declaration  "that  this  government  believed 
it  to  be  utterly  hopeless  to  reduce  Spanish  America  to  the  state 
of  its  former  relations  with  Spain; 

"That  France  disclaimed  on  her  part  any  intention  or  desire 
to  avail  herself  of  the  present  state  of  the  colonies,  or  of  the 
present  situation  of  France  toward  Spain,  to  appropriate  to  herself 
any  part  of  the  Spanish  possessions  in  America,  or  to  obtain  for 
herself  any  exclusive  advantages; 

"And  that  like  England,  she  would  willingly  see  the  mother 
country  in  possession  of  superior  commercial  advantages  by  amic- 

1  Rush  to  Monroe,  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  January,  1902  (XV), 
428. 


1823]    POLIGNAC  PROPOSES  CONCERTED  ACTION      197 

able  arrangements,  and  would  be  contented,  like  her,  to  rank,  after 
the  mother  country,  among  the  most  favored  nations; 

" Lastly,  that  she  abjured  in  any  case  any  design  of  acting  against 
the  colonies  by  force  of  arms." 

Polignac  proceeded,  however,  to  say  that  as  soon  as  "the  King 
of  Spain  should  be  at  liberty"  they  would  be  ready  to  enter  upon 
the  question  of  the  best  arrangement  between  Spain  and  her  col 
onies,  "in  concert  with  their  allies  and  with  Great  Britain  among 
the  number."  He  "could  not  conceive"  the  meaning  of  an  ac 
knowledgment  of  simple  independence  so  long  as  there  existed  no 
government  offering  any  appearance  of  solidity,  and  that  such 
acknowledgment  in  such  a  state  of  things  appeared  "  nothing  less 
than  a  real  sanction  of  anarchy."  He  ended  by  saying  that  "it 
would  be  worthy  of  the  European  governments  to  concert  together 
the  means  of  calming  in  those  distant  and  scarcely  civilized  re 
gions  passions  blinded  by  party  spirit,  and  to  endeavor  to  bring 
back  to  a  principle  of  union  in  government,  whether  monarchial 
or  aristocratical,  people  among  whom  absurd  and  dangerous 
theories  were  now  keeping  up  agitation  and  disunion."  Mr. 
Canning  contented  himself  with  saying  that,  however  desirable 
"a  monarchial  form  of  government,  in  any  of  these  provinces 
might  be,  ...  his  government  could  not  take  upon  itself  to  put 
it  forward  as  a  condition  of  their  recognition."  1 

The  day  after  Canning's  interview  with  the  French  ambassador, 
British  consuls  to  the  ports  of  Spanish  South  America  were  in 
structed  and  commissions  to  report  upon  conditions  in  Columbia 
and  Mexico  were  ordered. 

All  this,  however,  was  unknown  at  Washington,  but  both 
Britain  and  America  were  at  this  juncture  fortunate  in  having  as 
ministers  for  foreign  affairs  men  of  absolute  courage  and  firmness 
and  of  highest  quality  of  statesmanship.  Both  had  the  same  end 
in  view;  the  overthrow  of  the  assumption  of  despotic  rule  by  a 
congress  of  monarchs  who  claimed  the  right  to  allow  no  change 
of  form  of  government  unless  the  change  should  come  from  the 
head  of  the  state,  and  who  demanded  the  right  to  arrange  the  af 
fairs  of  other  states  as  seemed  to  them  best.  Meanwhile,  thus  in 
ignorance  of  what  was  transpiring  in  London,  Adams  held  firm 

1  Rush  to  Adams,  November  26,  1823,  The  Court  of  London,  409  et  seq. 


198  ADAMS'S   DECLARATION  TO  RUSSIA  [1823 

for  no  concert  of  action  with  Great  Britain  except  upon  the  basis 
of  recognition  of  independence  of  the  South  American  states.1 

The  note  of  the  coming  action  of  the  United  States  had,  however, 
been  sounded  by  Adams  more  than  a  month  before  Canning  had 
acted.  On  July  17,  1823,  he  informed  Baron  Tuyll,  the  Rus 
sian  minister,  "that  we  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any 
territorial  establishment  on  this  continent  and  that  we  should 
assume  distinctly  the  principle  that  the  American  continents  are 
no  longer  subjects  for  any  new  colonial  establishments."  3 

A  communication  from  Baron  Tuyll,  October  4,  declaring  the 
intention  of  the  Russian  government  "faithful  to  the  political 
principles  which  it  follows  in  concert  with  its  allies,  "not  to  receive 
any  agent  of  the  revolted  provinces;  and  another,  October  15, 
enclosing  a  copy  of  a  despatch  from  Count  Nesselrode,  stating 
the  intention  of  the  allies  "to  insist  with  energy  on  the  necessity 
of  [Spain's]  preventing  the  future  from  reproducing  the  errors  of 
the  past,  of  confiding  the  destinies  of  Spain  to  strong,  monarchical 
and  wholly  national  institutions,"3  afforded,  Adams  thought,  "a 
convenient  opportunity  for  us  to  take  our  stand  against  the  Holy 
Alliance,  and  at  the  same  time  to  decline  the  overture  of  Great 
Britain.  It  would  be  more  candid  as  well  as  more  dignified  to 
avow  our  principles  explicitly  to  Russia  and  France  than  to  come 
in  as  a  cockboat  in  the  wake  of  the  British  man-of-war."  4 

The  "political  principles"  mentioned  in  the  Russian  note  of 
October  4  had  reference,  said  Baron  Tuyll,  later,  in  a  conversation 
with  Adams,  November  8,  "to  the  right  of  supremacy  of  Spain 
over  her  colonies." 

In  the  cabinet  meeting  of  November  21  Adams  expressed  his 
desire  to  reply  to  the  Russian  notes  declaring  "our  dissent  from  the 
principles  avowed  in  these  communications;  to  assert  those  upon 
which  our  own  government  is  founded,  and,  while  disclaiming  all 
intention  of  attempting  to  propagate  them  by  force,  and  all  inter- 

1  Conversations  with  Addington,  British  minister,  November  17  and  19, 
Adams,  Memoirs,  188,  191. 

3  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  163.     Whatever  the  expressions  of  like  character 
from  Americans  of  prominence,  this  was  the  first  official  declaration.     It 
covered  in  a  few  words  the  later  pronouncement  fathered  by  Monroe. 

8  For  these,  see  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  January,  1902  (XV),  400,  404. 

4  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  179. 


1823]  ADAMS'S  DECLARATION  TO  RUSSIA  199 

ference  with  the  political  affairs  of  Europe,  to  declare  our  expec 
tation  and  hope  that  European  powers  will  equally  abstain  from 
the  attempt  to  spread  their  principles  in  the  American  hemisphere, 
or  to  subjugate  by  force  any  part  of  these  continents  to  their 
will."  1 

Adams's  draught  of  the  reply  to  Baron  Tuyll  was  objected  to  by 
the  President  and  all  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet  as  perhaps 
in  some  of  its  phrases  offensive  and  therefore  dangerous  in  what  was 
by  all  regarded  so  critical  a  moment;  how  critical,  in  the  minds 
of  the  men  of  the  period,  is  shown  by  the  thoughts  passing  in 
Adams's  own  mind  when  he  wrote  in  his  diary:  "If.  .  .  .  the  Holy 
Alliance  should  subdue  South  America,  however,  they  might  set 
up  the  standard  of  Spain,  the  ultimate  result  of  their  undertaking 
would  be  to  recolonize  them,  partitioned  out  among  themselves. 
Russia  might  take  California,  Peru,  Chile;  France,  Mexico — 
where  we  know  she  has  been  intriguing  to  get  a  monarchy  under 
a  prince  of  the  house  of  Bourbon  as  well  as  at  Buenos  Ay  res. 
And  Great  Britain  as  a  last  resort,  if  she  could  not  resist  this  course 
of  things,  would  take  at  least  the  island  of  Cuba  for  her  share  of 
the  scramble.  Then  what  would  be  our  situation — England 
holding  Cuba;  France,  Mexico?"2 

But  discussed  and  amended  as  the  draught  was,  Adams's  force 
and  courage  carried  the  day,  and  when,  on  November  27,  it  was  read 
to  Baron  Tuyll  it  was  a  full  exposition  of  the  policy  of  the  United 
States.  It  declared  that  their  neutrality  would  be  maintained  "  as 
long  as  that  of  Europe,  apart  from  Spain,  shall  continue,"  and  gave 
as  a  conclusion  the  declaration  "That  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  their  government,  could  not  see  with  indifference 
the  forcible  interposition  of  any  European  power,  other  than  Spain, 
either  to  restore  the  dominion  of  Spain  over  her  emancipated 
colonies  in  America,  or  to  establish  monarchical  governments  in 
those  countries,  or  to  transfer  any  of  the  possessions  heretofore  or 
yet  subject  to  Spain  in  the  American  hemisphere  to  any  other 
European  power."  3 

1  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  194.  2  Adams,  Ibid.,  VI,  207. 

'For  this  paper,  showing  the  omitted  paragraphs,  see  Mr.  Ford's  paper  in 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  January,  1902  (XV),  405-408.  For  the  long 
and  interesting  discussion  in  the  cabinet,  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  199-212. 


200  MONROE'S  MESSAGE  [1823 

It  is  remarkable  in  view  of  the  anxiety  which  he  had  expressed 
in  his  letter  to  Jefferson,  and  the  character  of  the  replies  of  Jefferson 
and  Madison,  that  Monroe,  when  he  read,  November  21,  the  sketch 
of  his  annual  message  to  Congress,  now  so  soon  to  meet,  laid  much 
more  stress  upon  the  situation  in  Europe  itself,  and  spoke  "in  terms 
of  the  most  pointed  reprobation  of  the  late  invasion  of  Spain  by 
France  and  of  the  principles  upon  which  it  was  undertaken  by  the 
open  avowal  of  the  King  of  France. "  Monroe  was  carried  away, 
too,  by  the  strong  popular  sympathy  for  the  Greeks  in  their  strug 
gle  for  independence  and  the  draught  "also  contained  a  broad 
acknowledgment  of  the  Greeks  as  an  independent  nation  and  a 
recommendation  to  Congress  to  make  an  appropriation  for  send 
ing  a  minister  to  them."  l  Such  a  message,  declared  Adams,  would 
be  a  summons  to  arms  against  all  Europe  and  for  objects  exclu 
sively  European.  "It  would  have  the  air  of  open  defiance  of  all 
Europe.  .  .  .  The  aspect  of  things  was  portentous,  but  if  we  must 
come  to  an  issue  with  Europe  let  us  keep  it  off  as  long  as  possible."  2 

The  message  of  the  President  on  December  2  dealt  finally 
with  two  phases  of  the  question  of  European  action  in  the  Americas. 
The  first  had  reference  to  the  gradual  advance  of  Russia  on  the 
north-west  coast  of  North  America;  the  second  to  the  affairs  of 
the  now  independent  Spanish-American  provinces.  The  two 
declarations  are  as  follows : 

"At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  imperial  government,  made 
through  the  minister  of  the  emperor  residing  here,  a  full  power  and 
instructions  have  been  transmitted  to  the  minister  of  the  United 
States  at  St.  Petersburg  to  arrange,  by  amicable  negotiation,  the 
respective  rights  and  interests  of  the  two  nations  on  the  north-west 
coast  of  this  continent.  A  similar  proposal  has  been  made  by  his 
Imperial  Majesty  to  the  government  of  Great  Britain,  which  has 
likewise  been  acceded  to.  The  government  of  the  United  States 
has  been  desirous,  by  this  friendly  proceeding,  of  manifesting  the 
great  value  which  they  have  invariably  attached  to  the  friendship 
of  the  emperor  and  their  solicitude  to  cultivate  the  best  under 
standing  with  his  government.  In  the  discussions  to  which  this 
interest  has  given  rise,  and  in  the  arrangements  by  which  they  may 
terminate,  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting  as  a 

1  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  194.  3  Ibid.,  195. 


1823]  MONROE'S  MESSAGE  201 

principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  indepen 
dent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  hence 
forth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by 
any  European  powers.1  .  .  . 

"  In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in  matters  relating  to  them 
selves  we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our 
policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded  or  seriously 
menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make  preparation  for  our  de 
fence.  With  the  movements  in  this  hemisphere  we  are,  of  neces 
sity,  more  immediately  connected,  and  by  causes  which  must  be 
obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers.  The  political 
system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect 
from  that  of  America.  This  difference  proceeds  from  that  which 
exists  in  their  respective  governments.  And  to  the  defence  of 
our  own,  which  had  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much  blood 
and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened 
citizens,  and  under  which  we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity, 
this  whole  nation  is  devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor, 
and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  those  powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or 
dependencies  of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and 
shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  governments  who  have  declared 
their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we 
have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged, 
we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an 
unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States.  In  the  war  be 
tween  these  new  governments  and  Spain  we  declared  our  neutrality 
at  the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this  we  have  adhered  and 
shall  continue  to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall  occur  which, 
in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this  government, 
shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
indispensable  to  their  security. 

1  Paragraph  7,  message  of  December  2,  1823. 


202  MONROE'S  MESSAGE  [1823 

"The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that  Europe  is  still 
unsettled.  Of  this  important  fact  no  stronger  proof  can  be  ad 
duced  than  that  the  allied  powers  should  have  thought  it  proper 
on  any  principle  satisfactory  to  themselves,  to  have  interposed, 
by  force,  in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain.  To  what  extent  such 
interposition  may  be  carried,  on  the  same  principle,  is  a  question 
in  which  all  independent  powers  whose  governments  differ  from 
theirs  are  interested,  even  those  most  remote,  and  surely  none  more 
so  than  the  United  States.  Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which 
was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars  which  have  so  long 
agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same, 
which  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its 
powers;  to  consider  the  government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate 
government  for  us;  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it,  and  to 
preserve  those  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy,  meet 
ing,  in  all  instances,  the  just  claims  of  every  power,  submitting  to 
injuries  from  none.  But  in  regard  to  these  continents,  circum 
stances  are  eminently  and  conspicuously  different.  It  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political  system  to  any 
portion  of  either  continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and 
happiness;  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our  southern  brethren,  if 
left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is 
equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interposi 
tion,  in  any  form,  with  indifference.  If  we  look  to  the  compara 
tive  strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new  governments, 
and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must  be  obvious  that  she 
can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still  the  true  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  leave  the  parties  to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other 
powers  will  pursue  the  same  course."1 

The  message  was  received  in  England  with  great  and  general 
satisfaction.  "That  event,"  said  Brougham,  "which  is  decisive 
of  the  subject  in  respect  to  South  America,  is  the  message  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  Congress*"  The  French  ad 
ministration  journal,  L'&toile,  denounced  the  message  and  called 
Monroe  a  dictator,  but  the  London  Times  hastened  to  defend  him. 

"We  shall  hear  no  more,"  said  the  London  Courier  of  December 
24,  "of  a  congress  to  settle  the  fate  of  the  South  American  states. 
1  Paragraphs  48  and  49,  message  of  December  2,  1823. 


1823]  RECEPTION  OF  MESSAGE  ABROAD  203 

Protected  by  the  two  nations  that  possess  the  institutions  and 
speak  the  language  of  freedom — by  Great  Britain  on  one  side  and 
the  United  States  on  the  other — their  independence  is  placed 
beyond  the  reach  of  danger."  l 

Rush  wrote:  "The  most  decisive  blow  to  all  despotic  inter 
ference  with  the  new  states  is  that  which  it  has  received  in  the 
President's  message.  ...  It  was  looked  for  here  with  extraordinary 
interest,  .  .  .  and  I  have  heard  that  the  British  packet  which  left 
New  York  at  the  beginning  of  this  month  was  instructed  to  wait 
for  it  and  bring  it  over  with  all  speed.  It  is  certain  that  this  ves 
sel  first  brought  it,  having  arrived  at  Falmouth  on  the  24th 
instant.  On  its  publicity  in  London  .  .  .  the  credit  of  all  the 
Spanish-American  securities  immediately  rose,  and  the  question  of 
the  final  and  complete  safety  of  the  new  states  from  all  European 
coercion  is  now  considered  as  at  rest."  2 

There  was  one  dissentient  in  England,  however,  to  the  extreme 
ground  taken  in  the  message,  that  "unoccupied  parts  of  America 
are  no  longer  open  to  colonization  from  Europe."  Canning, 
while  pleased  with  the  demand  of  non-interference  which  was  in 
accord  with  what  he  had  so  vigorously  maintained — "  that  foreign 
powers  had  no  right,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere 
forcibly  between  Spain  and  her  American  colonies,  and  that  they 
had  consequently  no  right  to  aid  Spain  in  her  attempt  to  recover 
them" — held  that  "the  United  States  has  no  right  to  take  umbrage 
at  the  establishment  of  new  colonies  from  Europe  on  any  such  un 
occupied  parts  of  the  American  continent."  3  The  Pacific  North 
west,  which  was  about  to  become  the  subject  of  negotiation 
between  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States,  was  in 
Canning's  mind.  The  matter  at  stake  was  the  great  region  west 
of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  which,  north  of  the  parallel  of  49°, 
to  Alaska,  was  to  be  lost  to  the  United  States  by  the  compromise 
of  1848.4  But  Canning's  main  object  was  gained.  The  pro- 

1  Quoted  by  McMaster,  United  States,  V,  48. 

3  Rush  to  Adams,  December  27,  1823,  Ford,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings, 
XV,  436. 

8  Stapleton,  Canning  and  His  Times,  396. 

*  For  a  discussion  of  the  situation,  see  Adams  to  Rush,  July  22,  1823, 
State  Papers,  V,  447.  Prominent  men  of  the  period  were,  so  late  as  1829, 
curiously  wanting  in  prescience  respecting  this  subject.  It  was  to  some  "  the 


204  EFFECT  OF  MESSAGE  DECISIVE  [1823 

posal  to  hold  a  conference  at  Paris  to  advise  Spain  in  re 
gard  to  her  late  South  American  possessions  sank  to  inanition 
through  the  American  pronouncement  and  the  attitude  of  England; 
to  Spanish  continental  dominion  in  America  it  was  a  death-blow. 
It  was  impossible  for  the  continental  European  powers  to  think  of 
oversea  military  action  in  the  face  of  the  British  and  American 
fleets.  Such  hopes  were  sunk  in  the  waters  of  Trafalgar  beyond 
the  possibility  of  resurrection. 

decree  of  nature  herself  that  the  Rocky  Mountains  shall  be  the  western 
boundary  of  this  republic." — Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  V,  1828-29,  pp. 
134-137. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    PANAMA    CONGRESS 

THE  recognition  by  the  United  States  of  South  American  and 
Mexican  independence;  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe 
and  the  friendly  attitude  of  Great  Britain  toward  the  new  states 
which  led  to  complete  recognition  in  1825,  despite  the  opposition 
of  George  IV,  who  himself  favored  the  Holy  Alliance,1  brought 
an  increased  political  activity  in  Spanish  America,  and  the  project 
of  what  to-day  would  be  termed  a  pan-American  congress  took 
form  in  a  circular  addressed  to  the  Spanish  American  states  by 
Bolivar  in  December,  1824,  in  which  the  concurrence  and  repre 
sentation  of  the  United  States  was  earnestly  desired. 

The  ministers  of  Mexico,  Central  America,  and  Colombia,  in 
the  spring  of  1825,  requested  interviews  with  Mr.  Clay,  who  had 
become  secretary  of  state  upon  the  accession  of  Mr.  John  Quincy 
Adams  to  the  presidency,  to  ask  if  such  concurrence  could  not  be 
had.  They  were  received  separately  on  the  same  day,  and  asked 
to  state  later,  more  explicitly  and  more  officially  than  they  were 
then  able  to  do,  the  objects  of  the  congress  and  the  powers  to  be 
given  the  representatives  composing  it.  They  were  informed  "  that 
of  course"  the  United  States  could  not  make  themselves  a  party  to 
the  existing  war  with  Spain  nor  to  councils  for  deliberating  on 
the  means  of  its  further  prosecution."  2 

Mexico  and  the  South  American  states  were  now  bound  to 
gether  by  treaties  of  "perpetual  union,  league,  and  confederation,"  3 
and  it  was  understood  that  one  of  their  aims  was  the  wresting  from 
Spain  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  the  continued  occupancy  of 

1  See  the  king's  memorandum  to  Lord  Liverpool,  January  27,  1825,  Staple- 
ton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  416-419. 

2  Clay  to  President  Adams,  December  20,  1825,  State  Papers,  V,  835. 
8  For  these  treaties,  see  State  Papers,  V,  840-846. 

205 


206  CLAY'S  ADVICE  TO  SPAIN  [1825 

which  afforded  a  base  for  military  and  naval  action  by  Spain  or 
her  supporters  against  themselves.  Already,  however,  the  United 
States  had  begun  to  look  askant  at  the  idea  of  the  independence  of 
these  islands  or  their  possession  by  any  power  other  than  Spain. 
Two,  and  certainly  powerful,  reasons  were  that  the  character  of 
the  population  rendered  "extremely  problematical  their  capacity 
to  maintain  independence,"  and  that  a  premature  declaration 
would  probably  result  only  in  the  afflicting  repetition  of  the  dis 
astrous  scenes  of  St.  Domingo."  l  A  third  reason  not  yet  acknowl 
edged,  and  to  be  of  overpowering  influence,  was  the  possible  effect 
upon  our  Southern  states  of  the  declaration  of  negro  freedom  in 
Cuba,  which  would  certainly  follow  independence  gained  by  the 
aid  of  the  new  nations,  all  of  which  had  abolished  slavery. 

Vera  Cruz  had  fallen  to  the  Mexican  forces  November  18,  1825, 
and  so  great  had  been  the  sensation  in  Havana  that  a  fast  ship  was 
sent  to  Spain  to  make  known  the  news,  and  "  implore  the  king 
immediately  to  terminate  the  war  and  acknowledge  the  new  re 
public  as  the  only  means  left  of  preserving  Cuba  to  the  monarchy."  2 

The  good  offices  of  the  United  States  were  now  earnestly  turned 
to  inducing  Spain  to  accept  the  actualities  of  the  situation.  "  True 
wisdom,"  said  Clay,  "dictates  that  Spain,  without  indulging  in 
unavailing  regrets  on  account  of  what  she  has  irretrievably  lost, 
should  employ  the  means  of  retaining  what  she  may  yet  preserve 
from  the  wreck  of  her  former  possessions.  .  .  .  Not  a  solitary  foot 
of  land  from  the  western  limits  of  the  United  States  to  Cape 
Horn  owns  her  sway;  not  a  bayonet  in  all  that  vast  extent  remains 
to  sustain  her  cause.  ...  If  she  can  entertain  no  rational  hope 
to  recover  what  has  been  forced  from  her  grasp,  is  there  not  great 
danger  of  her  losing  what  she  yet  but  feebly  holds  ?  .  .  .  The  armies 
of  the  new  states,  flushed  with  victory,  have  no  longer  employment 
on  the  continent,  and  yet  while  the  war  continues,  if  it  be  only  in 
name,  they  cannot  be  disbanded  without  a  disregard  of  all  the 
maxims  of  just  precaution.  .  .  .  Will  they  not  strike  wherever  they 
can  reach  ?  And  from  the  proximity  and  great  value  of  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico,  is  it  not  to  be  anticipated  that  they  will  aim,  and  aim 

1  Middleton,  minister  to  Russia,  to  Count  Nesselrode,  January  2,   1825, 
State  Papers,  V,  917. 

2  Clay  to  Middleton,  December  26,  1825,  Ibid.,  V,  850. 


1825]  CLAY'S  ADVICE  TO  SPAIN  207 

a  successful  blow,  too,  at  those  Spanish  islands?  .  .  .  It  is  not,  then, 
for  the  new  republics  that  the  President  wishes  you  to  urge  upon 
Spain  the  expediency  of  closing  the  war.  ...  It  is  for  Spain  itself, 
for  the  cause  of  humanity,  for  the  repose  of  the  world  that  you  are 
required,  with  all  the  delicacy  which  belongs  to  the  subject,  to  use 
every  topic  of  persuasion  to  impress  upon  the  councils  of  Spain 
the  propriety  by  a  formal  pacification  of  terminating  the  war.  .  .  . 
The  United  States  are  satisfied  with  the  present  condition  of  those 
islands  in  the  hands  of  Spain  with  their  ports  open  to  our  com 
merce,  as  they  are  now  open.  This  government  desires  no 
political  change  of  that  condition.  The  population  itself  of  those 
islands  is  incompetent  at  present,  from  its  composition  and  amount, 
to  maintain  self-government.  The  maritime  force  of  the  neighbor 
ing  republics  of  Mexico  and  Colombia  is  not  now,  nor  is  it  likely 
shortly  to  be,  adequate  to  the  protection  of  those  islands,  if  the  con 
quest  of  them  were  effected.  The  United  States  would  entertain 
constant  apprehension  of  their  passing  from  their  possession  to 
that  of  some  less  friendly  sovereignty;  and  of  all  the  European 
powers  this  country  prefers  that  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  should  re 
main  dependent  on  Spain.  If  the  war  should  continue  .  .  .  and 
those  islands  should  become  the  object  and  theatre  of  it,  their  fort 
unes  have  such  a  connection  with  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
States  that  they  could  not  be  indifferent  spectators;  and  the  pos 
sible  contingencies  might  bring  upon  the  government  of  the  United 
States  duties  and  obligations,  the  performance  of  which,  however 
painful  it  should  be,  they  might  not  be  at  liberty  to  decline.  A  sub 
sidiary  consideration,"  continued  Clay,  ".  .  .  is  that  as  the  war 
has  been  the  parent  cause  of  the  shocking  piracies  in  the  West 
Indies,  its  termination  would  be,  probably,  followed  by  their  ces 
sation."  l  A  despatch  of  the  same  tenor  was  sent  to  the  American 
minister  in  Russia  instructing  him  to  endeavor  "to  engage  the 
Russian  government  to  contribute  its  best  exertions  toward  ter 
minating  the  contest."  2 

Neither  appeal,  however  strongly  backed  by  reason,  met  with 
acceptance.  The  Spanish  minister  said  that  "the  king  would 
never  abandon  his  claim  to  those  his  ancient  and  rightful  possea- 

1  Clay  to  Everett,  minister  to  Spain,  April  27,  1825,  State  Papers,  V,  866. 
a  Clay  to  Middleton,  May  10,  1825,  Ibid.,  V,  846. 


208  EUROPE  WARNED  OFF  CUBA  [1825 

sions."  l  The  reply  of  Russia  was  almost  equally  unsatisfactory;  no 
separate  negotiation  could  be  instituted  until  the  ulterior  views  of 
Spain  were  known.2 

An  agreement  made  at  the  end  of  1824,  on  request  of  Fernando, 
for  35,000  of  the  French  troops  to  remain  in  Spain,  had  been  fol 
lowed  in  the  summer  of  1825  by  the  presence  in  West  Indian 
waters  of  a  powerful  French  squadron.  Mexico,  believing  that 
it  portended  an  invasion  and  seizure  of  Cuba,  "promptly  called 
upon  the  government  of  the  United  States  ...  to  fulfil  the 
memorable  pledge  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his 
message  to  Congress  of  December,  1823." 3  The  American 
minister  to  France  was  at  once  directed  "in  the  most  conciliatory 
and  friendly  manner"  to  request  an  explanation  of  the  presence 
of  so  powerful  an  armament  at  such  a  time,  and  as  rumors  of 
designs  by  France  upon  Cuba  had  reached  the  United  States,  to 
say  "that  we  could  not  consent  to  the  occupation  of  [Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico]  by  any  other  European  power  than  Spain  under  any 
contingency  whatever." 

It  was  not  until  November  that  the  explanations  requested  of 
the  Spanish-American  republics  were  received.  While  it  ap 
peared  from  these  that  the  United  States  were  not  expected  to  violate 
any  of  their  neutral  obligations  toward  Spain,  it  is  clear  that  the 
views  expressed  and  the  attitude  taken  by  the  United  States 
were  well  known  to  the  newly  appointed  Spanish-American 
envoys  and  to  their  governments,  and  raised  hopes  in  some  at 
least,  as  expressed  by  the  "explanations,"  that  "one  of  the  sub 
jects  which  will  occupy  the  attention  of  the  congress  will  be  the 
resistance  or  opposition  to  the  interference  of  any  neutral  nation 
in  the  questions  and  war  between  the  new  powers  of  the  continent 
and  Spain,"  and  "  that  as  the  powers  of  America  are  of  accord  as  to 
resistance,  it  behooves  them  to  discuss  the  means  of  giving  to  that 
resistance  all  possible  force  that  the  evil  may  be  met  if  it  cannot  be 
avoided;  and  the  only  means  of  accomplishing  this  object  is  by 
a  previous  concert  as  to  the  mode  in  which  each  shall  lend  its  co- 

1  Everett  to  Clay,  September  25,  1825,  State  Papers,  V,  867. 

2  Nesselrode  to  Middleton,  August  20,  1825,  Ibid.,  V,  850. 

3  Clay  to  Poinsett,  minister  to  Mexico,  November  9,  1825,  Ibid.,  V,  854. 

4  Clay  to  Brown,  minister  to  France,  October  25,  1825,  Ibid.,  V,  855. 


1825]  PANAMA  CONGRESS  209 

operation."  It  was  hoped  that  upon  this  and  upon  the  question 
of  colonization  in  America  by  European  powers  the  United  States 
representatives  would  be  specially  instructed.1 

Mr.  Clay,  in  reply  to  the  Mexican  and  Colombian  ministers,  said : 
"In  your  note  there  is  not  recognized  so  exact  a  compliance  with 
the  conditions  on  which  the  President  expressed  his  willingness  that 
the  United  States  should  be  represented  at  Panamd  as  could  have 
been  desired,"  but  that  though  there  had  not  been  the  full  under 
standing  desirable  as  to  the  precise  questions  to  be  discussed,  and  as 
the  want  of  adjustment  of  these  preliminaries  could  only  cause  de 
lay,  "the  President  was  determined  at  once  to  manifest  the  sen 
sibility  of  the  United  States  to  whatever  concerns  the  prosperity  of 
the  American  hemisphere,  and  the  friendly  motives  which  have 
actuated  your  government  in  transmitting  the  invitation"  to  send 
commissioners  to  the  Congress.  "While  they  will  not  be  author 
ized  to  enter  upon  any  deliberations,  or  to  concur  in  any  acts  in 
consistent  with  the  present  neutral  position  of  the  United  States, 
and  its  obligations,  they  will  be  fully  empowered  and  instructed 
upon  all  questions  likely  to  arise  in  the  congress  on  subjects  in 
which  the  nations  of  America  have  a  common  interest." 

President  Adams  thus  notified  Congress  in  his  first  annual  mes 
sage,  December  6,  1825,  that  "the  invitation  has  been  accepted, 
and  ministers  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  will  be  commis 
sioned  to  attend  at  these  deliberations,  and  to  take  part  in  them 
so  far  as  may  be  compatible  with  that  neutrality  from  which  it  is 
neither  our  intention  nor  the  desire  of  the  other  American  states 
that  we  should  depart."  This  was  followed  by  a  special  message  to 
the  Senate,  nominating  R.  C.  Anderson,  of  Kentucky,  and  John 
Sergeant,  of  Pennsylvania,  envoys  extraordinary  and  ministers 
plenipotentiary  "  to  the  assembly  of  American  nations  at  Panama, 
and  William  B.  Rochester,  of  New  York,  to  be  secretary  to  the  mis 
sion."  The  question  of  commercial  relations;  the  "consen 
taneous  adoption  of  principles  of  maritime  neutrality";  the  hope 
that  "the  doctrine  that  free  ships  make  free  goods,  and  the  re 
strictions  of  reason  upon  the  extent  of  blockade  may  be  estab 
lished  by  general  agreement  with  far  more  ease  .  .  .  than  by 

1  Senor  Olregon,  minister  from  Mexico,  and  Senor  Salazor,  minister  from 
Colombia,  to  Mr.  Clay,  Nov.  3  and  Nov.  2,  1825,  State  Papers,  V,  836. 


210          BOLIVAR'S   DECLARATION  OF  OBJECTS       [1825 

partial  treaties  or  conventions  with  each  of  the  nations  separately. 
An  agreement  between  all  the  parties  represented  at  the  meeting 
that  each  will  guard,  by  its  own  means,  against  the  establishment 
of  any  European  colony  within  its  borders,"  were  the  first  men 
tioned  reasons  for  action.  As  additional  motives  were  suggested  the 
moral  influence  of  the  United  States  in  advancing  religious  liberty 
and  "the  indirect  influence  which  the  United  States  may  exercise 
upon  any  projects  or  purposes  originating  in  the  war  in  which  the 
Southern  republics  are  still  engaged  and  which  might  seriously 
effect  the  interests  of  this  Union,  and  the  good  offices  by  which 
the  United  States  may  ultimately  contribute  to  bring  that  war  to  a 
speedier  termination";  and  finally,  in  a  general  way  to  show  interest 
and  good-will. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  President's  action  was  sound 
statesmanship.  If  the  congress  was  to  take  place,  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  were  so  involved  in  its  possible  action  that  it 
was  necessary  that  it  should  appear  if  but  as  a  moderator.  Though 
no  hint  appeared  in  the  presidential  papers,  congressional  op 
position  hinged  almost  wholly  upon  the  question  of  slavery.  It 
was  known  that  whatever  the  other  results  expected  of  the  congress 
by  the  Spanish-American  states,  an  agreement  to  invade  Cuba 
and  Puerto  Rico  was  a  certainty.  Bolivar's  organ,  the  Official 
Gazette  of  Colombia,  for  February,  1825,  stating  in  detail  the  ob 
jects  of  the  congress,  had  made  this  clear.  These  were  as  follows: 

"1.  To  form  a  solemn  compact  or  league  by  which  the  states  whose  repre 
sentatives  are  present  will  be  bound  to  unite  in  prosecuting  the  war  against 
their  common  enemy,  Old  Spain,  or  against  any  other  power  which  shall  assist 
Spain  in  her  hostile  designs,  or  may  otherwise  assume  the  attitude  of  an  enemy. 

"2.  To  draw  up  and  publish  a  manifesto  setting  forth  to  the  world  the 
justice  of  their  cause,  and  the  relations  they  desire  to  hold  with  other  Christian 
powers. 

"3.  To  form  a  convention  of  navigation  and  commerce  applicable  both 
to  the  confederated  states  and  to  their  allies. 

"4.  To  consider  the  expediency  of  combining  the  forces  of  the  republics, 
to  free  the  islands  of  Puerto  Rico  and  Cuba  from  the  yoke  of  Spain,  and  in 
such  case  what  contingent  each  ought  to  contribute  for  this  end. 

"5.  To  take  measures  for  joining  in  a  prosecution  of  the  war  at  sea  and 
on  the  coasts  of  Spain. 

"6.  To  determine  whether  these  measures  shall  be  extended  to  the  Canary 
and  the  Philippine  Islands. 


1826]  OBJECTIONS  BY  THE  SOUTH  211 

"  7.  To  take  into  consideration  the  means  of  making  effectual  the  declara 
tion  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  respecting  any  ulterior  design  of  a 
foreign  power  to  colonize  any  portion  of  this  continent,  and,  also,  the  means 
of  resisting  all  interference  from  abroad  with  the  domestic  concerns  of  the 
American  governments. 

"8.  To  settle,  by  common  consent,  the  principles  of  those  rights  of  nations, 
which  are  in  their  nature  controvertible. 

"9.  To  determine  on  what  footing  shall  be  placed  the  political  and  com 
mercial  relations  of  those  portions  of  our  hemisphere  which  have  obtained,  or 
shall  obtain,  their  independence,  but  whose  independence  has  not  been  recog 
nized  by  any  American  or  European  power,  as  was  for  many  years  the  case  with 
Hayti." » 

But,  it  must  be  said  again,  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was 
now  dominated  by  a  question  of  transcendent  importance,  both 
ethically  and  practically,  to  the  peace  of  the  country.  To  touch 
the  question  of  slavery  politically  was  to  set  the  South  afire.  The 
new  republics  had  all  abolished  slavery;  if  they  freed  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico  they  would  also  free  me  blacks  in  these  islands.  The 
likelihood  of  such  a  situation  was  regarded  as  unendurable,  and  a 
storm  of  protest  broke  from  the  Southern  members  in  the  Senate 
against  the  proposed  meeting  and  the  possibilities  which  the  con 
currence  of  the  United  States  at  Panama  might  open. 

The  Senate  committee  on  foreign  affairs,  to  which  the  message 
had  been  referred,  made,  on  January  16,  1826,  an  adverse  report 
of  great  length,  which,  while  carefully  refraining  from  touching 
on  the  question  of  slavery  and  abstaining  "  from  any  remark  as  to 
the  nominations,"  recommended  a  resolution  that  it  was  not 
"expedient  at  this  time  for  the  United  States  to  send  any  ministers 
to  the  congress  of  American  nations  assembled  at  Panama."  : 

The  true  reasons  were,  however,  brought  forward  in  a  debate  of 
great  bitterness  opened  February  1.  "When,"  said  Berrien,  of 
Georgia,  "we  look  to  the  situation  of  those  islands,  to  the  com 
manding  position  they  occupy  with  reference  to  the  commerce  of 
the  West  Indies,  we  cannot  be  indifferent  to  a  change  in  their  con 
dition.  But  when  we  reflect  that  they  are  in  juxtaposition  to  a 
portion  of  the  Union  where  slavery  exists;  that  the  proposed 
change  is  to  be  effected  by  a  people  whose  fundamental  maxim  it 
is  that  he  who  would  tolerate  slavery  is  unworthy  to  be  free;  that  the 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  VII,  p.  422.  '  State  Papers,  V,  857-865. 


212  OBJECTIONS  BY  THE  SOUTH  [1826 

principle  of  universal  emancipation  must  march  in  the  van  of  the 
invading  force;  and  that  all  the  horrors  of  a  servile  war  will  too 
surely  follow  in  its  train — these  merely  commercial  considerations 
sink  into  insignificance — they  are  swallowed  up  in  the  magnitude 
of  the  dangers  with  which  we  are  menaced.  Sir,  under  such  cir 
cumstances  the  question  to  be  determined  is  this:  With  a  due  re 
gard  to  the  safety  of  the  Southern  states,  can  you  suffer  these  islands 
to  pass  into  the  hands  of  buccaneers  drunk  with  their  new-born 
liberty?  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  must  remain  as  they  are.  To 
Europe  the  President  had  distinctly  said:  'We  cannot  allow  a 
transfer  of  Cuba  to  any  European  power.'  We  must  hold  a 
language  equally  decisive  to  the  South  American  states.  We 
cannot  allow  their  principle  of  universal  emancipation  to  be 
called  into  activity  in  a  situation  where  its  contagion  'from  our 
neighborhood  would  be  dangerous  to  our  quiet  and  safety/  "  * 

Said  Benton:  "The  relations^of  Hayti  with  the  American  states 
(these  United  States  inclusive),  and  the  right  of  Africans  in  this 
hemisphere,  are  two  other  questions  to  be  'determined.1  .  .  . 
Our  policy  toward  Hayti,  the  Old  San  Domingo,  has  been  fixed, 
Mr.  President,  for  three  and  thirty  years.  We  trade  with  her,  but 
no  diplomatic  relations  have  been  established  between  us.  We 
purchase  coffee  from  her  and  pay  her  for  it,  but  we  interchange 
no  consuls  or  ministers.  We  receive  no  mulatto  consuls  or  black 
ambassadors  from  her.  And  why  ?  Because  the  peace  of  eleven 
states  in  this  Union  will  not  permit  the  fruits  of  a  successful 
negro  insurrection  to  be  exhibited  among  them.  It  will  not  per 
mit  black  consuls  and  ambassadors  to  establish  themselves  in 
our  cities  and  parade  through  our  country  and  give  their  fellow- 
blacks  in  the  United  States  proof  in  hand  of  the  honors  which 
await  them  for  a  like  successful  effort  on  their  part.  It  will  not 
permit  the  fact  to  be  seen  and  told  that  for  the  murder  of  their 
masters  and  mistresses  they  are  to  find  friends  among  the  white 
people  of  the  United  States.  No,  Mr.  President,  this  is  a  question 
which  has  been  determined  here  for  three  and  thirty  years.  ...  It 
is  one  which  cannot  be  discussed  in  this  chamber  this  day;  and 
shall  we  go  to  Panamd  to  discuss  it ?"  3 

1  Benton,  Abridgment  of  Debates,  VIII,  421  et  seq. 
1  Ibid.,  VIII,  469. 


1826]  ADAMS'S  MESSAGE  213 

These  speeches  can  stand  for  all  those  from  men  of  the  South. 
There  was  but  the  one  note,  whether  from  Hayne  of  South 
Carolina,  from  Benton  of  Missouri,  or  White  of  Tennessee.  All 
dreaded  the  influence  of  freedom  to  the  blacks,  at  our  doors,  in 
Cuba. 

The  situation  was  thus  a  delicate  one,  whether  from  the  stand 
point  of  home  or  foreign  policy.  In  case  the  islands  were  invaded 
by  the  allied  Spanish- American  republics  we  were  faced  by  the  dan 
ger  of  foreign  intervention,  which  we  had  declared  we  should  resist; 
if,  in  the  face  of  this  declaration,  intervention  should  be  withheld 
and  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  freed  from  Spain,  their  freedom  would 
be  accompanied  by  the  freedom  of  the  blacks,  which  the  Southern 
senators  declared  could  not  be  endured. 

Notwithstanding,  the  Southern  opposition  in  the  Senate  was 
overborne,  and,  on  March  14,  1826,  the  nominations  of  the  Presi 
dent  were  confirmed.  The  debafe  was  now  transferred  to  the 
House  on  the  question  of  the  necessary  appropriations.  On 
March  17,  1826,  Adams  sent  a  message.  Every  consideration  of 
good  statesmanship  upheld  the  President  in  the  views  which  he 
set  forth  at  much  length.  His  altruistic  spirit  shone  out  in  advice 
which  was  both  sound  sense  and  sound  policy.  He  declared  that 
the  republics  "had  given  us  notice  that  in  the  novelty  of  their  situ 
ation,  and  in  the  spirit  of  deference  to  our  experience,  they  would 
be  pleased  to  have  the  benefit  of  our  friendly  counsel.  To  meet 
the  temper  with  which  this  proposal  was  made  with  a  cold  repulse, 
was  not  thought  congenial  to  that  warm  interest  in  their  welfare 
with  which  the  people  and  government  of  the  Union  had  hitherto 
gone  hand  in  hand  through  the  whole  progress  of  their  revolution. 
To  insult  them  by  a  refusal  of  their  overture,  and  then  invite  them 
to  a  similar  assembly  to  be  called  by  ourselves,  was  an  expedient 
which  never  presented  itself  to  the  mind.  I  would  have  sent 
ministers  to  the  meeting  had  it  been  merely  to  give  them  such  ad 
vice  as  they  might  have  desired,  even  with  reference  to  their  own 
interests,  not  involving  ours.  I  would  have  sent  them  had  it 
been  merely  to  explain  and  set  forth  to  them  our  reasons  for  de 
clining  any  proposal  of  specific  measures  to  which  they  might 
desire  our  concurrence,  but  which  we  might  deem  incompatible 
with  our  interests  or  our  duties.  In  the  intercourse  between  na- 


214.  PANAMA  CONGRESS  MEETS  [1S2G 

tions,  temper  is  a  missionary  more  powerful  than  talent.  Nothing 
was  ever  lost  by  kind  treatment;  nothing  can  be  gained  by  sullen 
repulse  and  aspiring  pretensions." 

He  referred  to  the  Monroe  declaration  and  the  proposition  to 
consider  at  Panama  the  measures  to  make  it  effectual,  but  "the 
purpose  of  this  government  is  to  concur  in  nothing  which  would 
import  hostility  to  Europe  or  justly  excite  resentment  in  any  of  her 
states."  As  to  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico:  "The  invasion  of  both 
these  islands  by  the  united  forces  of  Mexico  and  Colombia  is 
avowedly  among  the  objects  to  be  matured  by  the  belligerent  states 
at  Panama.  The  convulsions  to  which,  from  the  peculiar  com 
position  of  their  population,  they  would  be  liable  in  the  event  of 
such  an  invasion,  and  the  danger  therefrom  resulting  of  their 
falling  ultimately  into  the  hands  of  some  European  power  other 
than  Spain,  will  not  admit  of  our  looking  at  the  consequences  to 
which  the  congress  at  Panama  may  lead  with  indifference.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  enlarge  upon  this  topic,  or  to  say  more  than  that 
all  our  efforts  in  reference  to  this  interest  will  be  to  preserve  the 
existing  state  of  things,  the  tranquillity  of  the  islands,  and  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  inhabitants.  And  lastly,  the  congress 
at  Panama  is  believed  to  present  a  fair  occasion  for  urging  upon 
all  the  new  nations  of  the  South  the  just  and  liberal  principles  of 
religious  liberty.  .  .  .  "  l 

It  was  not  until  April,  and  after  long  debate,  that  the  appro 
priation  was  passed.  The  congress  met  at  Panama  June  22,  1826. 
But  there  were  present  only  the  representatives  of  Colombia, 
Mexico,  Central  America,  and  Peru.  Mr.  Anderson  died  at  Car 
tagena  on  his  way  from  Bogota,  and  Mr.  Sergeant  never  set  out 
from  the  United  States.  On  July  15  was  signed  a  treaty  of  "  union, 
league,  and  perpetual  confederation "  between  the  four  states  rep 
resented,  to  which  any  other  might  accede  within  a  year;  the  re 
newal  of  the  congress  annually  in  time  of  war,  and  biennially  in 
time  of  peace,  was  agreed  upon;  a  convention  was  made  fixing 
the  contingent  of  each  for  the  common  defence,  and  an  agreement 
was  established  regarding  the  employment  of  these  contingents, 
and  certain  declarations  made  regarding  the  treaties  which  had 
been  made  by  Colombia  with  the  states  represented  and  the  United 
1  State  Papers,  V,  882-886. 


1826]       AMERICAN  SLAVERY  SPAIN'S  BULWARK         215 

States.  The  congress  was  then  adjourned  to  Tucubaya,  a  short 
distance  from  the  city  of  Mexico,  but  it  never  again  met.  The 
league  naturally  fell  apart  as  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  it  was 
no  longer  in  the  power  of  Spain  to  continue  the  contest  against  the 
continental  provinces,  and  that  the  United  States  was  determined 
to  discountenance  action  against  the  islands. 

American  slavery  was  thus  the  bulwark  of  what  remained  of 
Spanish  dominion  in  the  Americas.  Whatever  of  self-interest  there 
was  in  this  attitude  of  the  United  States  government,  there  can  be 
no  question  that  its  action  throughout  worked  for  the  good  of 
Spain,  or  what  Spain  supposed  was  such.  The  advice  given  to 
this  now  beggared  and  distracted  country  was  thoroughly  sound, 
and  saved  the  islands  yet  many  years  to  the  Peninsula,  but  the 
doing  so  was  the  establishment  of  what  was  to  become  a  sore 
"  thorn  in  the  flesh"  to  both  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

While  there  was  this  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
to  have  Cuba  remain  Spanish,  there  was  a  general  consensus 
among  American  statesmen  of  the  period  as  to  the  desirability 
of  acquiring  the  island  for  the  Union.  Adams,  as  already  seen, 
expressed  this  view  as  a  necessity  and  as  being  "indispensable  to 
the  continuance  and  integrity  of  the  Union  itself,"  l  a  forecast 
which,  of  course,  though  Adams  himself  was  strongly  adverse  to 
slavery,  had  reference  to  the  necessity  of  the  retention  of  slavery 
in  the  island  on  account  of  the  South.  Jefferson,  in  his  letter  to 
Monroe  respecting  Canning's  proposals  as  to  the  Holy  Alliance, 
was,  as  mentioned,  almost  equally  emphatic.2 

Jefferson  had,  however,  at  a  much  earlier  date,  expressed  such 
views,  in  which  he  gave  free  rein  to  an  imagination  which  went  far 
beyond  that  of  to-day,  and  to  views  of  strategy  such  as  only  the 
author  of  the  gunboat  system  of  defence  could  have  held.  Napoleon 
at  the  moment  held  Spain ;  in  Jefferson's  mind  this  meant  also  the 
over-lordship  of  the  Spanish-American  provinces.  He  thus,  in  a 
letter  to  Madison,  of  April  27,  1809,  said:  "[Napoleon]  ought  the 
more  to  conciliate  our  good- will,  as  we  can  be  such  an  obstacle  to 
the  new  career  opening  on  him  in  the  Spanish  colonies.  That  he 
would  give  us  the  Floridas  to  withhold  intercourse  with  the  residue 
of  those  colonies  cannot  be  doubted,  but  that  is  no  price,  because 

1  Adams  to  Nelson,  April  28,  1823.     Supra.  183.  *  Supra.  192. 


216  JEFFERSON'S  WISH  TO  ANNEX  CUBA          [1827 

they  are  ours  in  the  first  moment  of  the  first  war,  and  until  a  war 
they  are  of  no  particular  necessity  to  us.  But,  although  with  dif 
ficulty,  he  will  consent  to  our  receiving  Cuba  into  our  Union  to  pre 
vent  our  aid  to  Mexico  and  the  other  provinces.  That  would  be  a 
price,  and  I  would  immediately  erect  a  column  on  the  southern 
most  limit  of  Cuba  and  inscribe  on  it  ne  plus  ultra  as  to  us  in  that 
direction.  We  should  then  have  only  to  include  the  North  in  our 
confederacy,  which  would  be,  of  course,  in  the  first  war,  and  we 
should  have  such  an  empire  for  liberty  as  she  has  never  surveyed 
since  the  Creation;  and  I  am  persuaded  no  constitution  was  ever 
before  so  well  calculated  as  ours  for  extensive  empire  and  self- 
government.  ...  It  will  be  objected  to  our  receiving  Cuba  that 
no  limit  can  be  drawn  to  our  future  acquisitions.  Cuba  can  be 
defended  by  us  without  a  navy,  and  this  develops  a  principle 
which  ought  to  limit  our  views.  Nothing  should  ever  be  accepted 
which  requires  a  navy  to  defend  it."  l 

Notwithstanding  such  views,  all  the  efforts  of  the  American  gov 
ernment  were  turned  for  many  years  to  the  preservation  of  the 
status  quo,  as  stated  so  explicitly  in  the  despatches  of  Clay  to  the 
American  minister  in  France.2  Great  Britain  equally  had  been 
made  aware  that  a  seizure  of  Cuba  would  mean  war.3 

In  1827  suspicions  were  again  aroused  in  Washington  by  the 
reception  from  the  American  minister  at  Madrid  of  a  translation 
of  a  confidential  despatch  from  the  Count  de  la  Alcudia,  the  Span 
ish  minister  at  London,  to  the  minister  of  state  saying: 

"I  deem  it  my  duty  to  give  you  notice,  for  the  information  of  the 
king,  our  lord,  that  this  government  despatched  a  frigate  some 
time  ago  to  the  Canary  Islands  with  commissioners  on  board  who 
were  instructed  to  ascertain  whether  any  preparations  were  mak 
ing  there  for  an  expedition  to  America,  and  also  the  state  of  those 

1  Jefferson  to  President  Madison,  April  27,  1809,  Works,  V,  443.     No  docu 
ment  can  illustrate  more  fully  Jefferson's  inconsistency  of  character.     Doubt 
ing  but  a  few  short  years  before  the  constitutionality  of  the  acquirement 
of  Louisiana,  he  was  now  coveting  the  possession  of  a  great  island;    op 
posed  to  a  navy,  he  was  reaching  for  territory  which  only  a  navy  could 
defend;  a  lover  of  peace,  he  was  looking  to  war  to  secure  British  America. 

2  Supra.  208. 

3  Clay  to  A.  H.  Everett  at  Madrid,  April  13,  1826.     House  Ex.  Doc.,  121, 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess. 


1827]  FEARS  OF  BRITISH  DESIGNS  217 

islands  and  the  dispositions  of  the  inhabitants.  The  result  of 
these  inquiries  was  that  the  said  islands  were  in  a  wholly  defenceless 
situation,  provided  with  few  troops,  and  those  disaffected  and 
ready  for  any  innovation. 

"The  frigate  then  proceeded  to  the  Havana,  where  the  com 
missioners  found  many  persons  disposed  to  revolt;  but  in  conse 
quence  of  the  large  military  force  there,  and  the  strength  of  the 
fortifications,  they  considered  it  impossible  to  take  possession  of 
the  island  without  the  co-operation  of  the  authorities  and  the  army. 
In  consequence  of  the  information  thus  obtained,  measures  have 
been  taken  in  both  these  islands  to  prepare  the  public  opinion, 
by  means  of  emissaries,  in  favor  of  England,  to  the  end  that  the 
inhabitants  may  be  brought  to  declare  themselves  independent, 
and  to  solicit  the  protection  of  the  British.  The  latter  are  pre 
pared  to  assist  them,  and  will  in  this  way  avoid  collision  with  the 
United  States.  The  whole  operation  is  to  be  undertaken  and  is  to 
be  conducted  in  concert  with  the  revolutionists  here  [at  London] 
and  in  the  islands,  who  have  designated  a  Spanish  general,  now  at 
this  place,  to  take  command  of  the  Havana  when  the  occasion 
shall  require  it. 

"The  Duke  of  Wellington  communicated  to  me  the  above  in 
formation,  which  is  also  confirmed  by  an  intimation  which  he 
gave  to  Brigadier-General  Don  Francisco  Armenteros  when  this 
officer  took  leave  of  him  to  go  to  the  Havana.  The  duke  then 
advised  him,  if  he  should  discover  any  symptoms  of  disaffection  in 
the  authorities,  to  give  immediate  notice  to  the  king,  as  it  would 
be  a  grievous  thing  for  his  majesty  to  lose  the  Havana. 

"  I  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  make  these  circumstances  known 
to  your  excellency.  .  .  ."  l 

In  conveying  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  the  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  such  information,  the  American  minister  declared 
again  "the  settled  principle"  of  his  government,  "that  the  island 
of  Cuba  must  in  no  event  and  under  no  pretext  pass  into  the  pos 
session  of,  or  under  the  protection  of,  any  European  power  other 
than  Spain."  The  American  minister  at  the  same  time  recalled 
that  while  France  "had  for  three  or  four  years  past  a  consul  at 

1  Enclosure  from  A.  H.  Everett,  minister  at  Madrid,  August  17,  1827. 
House  Ex.  Doc.,  121,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  p.  20. 


218  SPAIN'S  UNFAIR  ATTITUDE  [1827 

Havana,"  and  that  Spain  was  "bound  by  treaty  to  admit  a  consul 
for  the  United  States  in  all"  ports  in  Spanish  dominions  "where 
such  agent  is  admitted  for  any  foreign  power,"  the  United  States 
had  been  for  more  than  two  years  soliciting  in  vain  the  fulfilment 
of  this  contract.  "In  the  meantime,  the  British  government  have, 
under  the  name  of  commissioners  for  attending  to  the  execution 
of  the  slave-trade  convention,  two  acknowledged  political  agents 
at  the  Havana.  One  of  them  (Mr.  Kirby)  was  a  particular 
friend  of  the  late  Mr.  Canning,  .  .  .  and  is  doubtless  the  mana 
ger  of  the  present  intrigue  for  revolutionizing  the  island." 

Mr.  Everett  also  recalled  that  while  there  had  been  an  imme 
diate  arrangement  with  Great  Britain,  for  the  reclamations  of 
the  British  government  for  depredations  committed,  "under  pre 
cisely  the  same  circumstances,  upon  the  rights  and  property  of 
British  subjects  and  citizens  of  the  United  States,"  there  had  not 
even  been  a  formal  reply  to  the  American  demand  for  a  simi 
lar  arrangement.  American  ships,  too,  said  the  minister,  pay  a 
tonnage  duty  in  the  peninsular  ports  of  twenty  reals  against  the 
one  real  paid  by  all  others.  "A  proposition  made  ...  in  the 
name  of  the  government  nearly  two  years  ago,  to  treat  on  this 
subject,  remains  unanswered,"  and  the  minister  had  been  privately 
informed  that  it  was  even  determined  to  raise,  instead  of  diminish 
ing,  the  tonnage  duty  on  American  ships,  the  result  being  to  drive 
them  to  Gibraltar,  which  thus  became  a  base  for  smuggling  car 
goes  into  Spain.  He  also  complained  of  the  enormous  tonnage 
duties  in  Cuba,  which,  as  nine-tenths  of  Cuban  commerce  was  with 
the  United  States,  was  practically  a  discrimination  against  the 
commerce  of  the  latter.1 

The  communication,  however,  which  so  aroused  American  sus 
picions  may  be  taken  to  have  had  as  a  basis  the  French  occupa 
tion  of  Spain,  which  was  to  continue  yet  two  years  at  the  request 
of  Fernando  himself,  whose  murderous  activity  against  the  liberals 
needed  such  support.2  The  mere  fact  that  the  revelation  had  been 

1  Memorandum  from  Mr.  A.  H.  Everett,  American  minister,  to  Spanish 
minister  of  state,  Madrid,  December  10,  1827.     House  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32 
Cong.,  1  Sess.,  p.  22. 

2  The  cost,  of  course,  was  borne  by  Spain.     On  December  30,  1828,  a  treaty 
was  signed  at  Madrid  by  which  she  acknowledged  for  this  a  debt  of  80,000,000 


1827]  AMERICAN  ANXIETY  219 

made  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  himself  a  member  of  the  British 
cabinet,  but  as  a  grandee  of  Spain,  and  the  chief  instrument  of 
her  release  from  the  Napoleonic  dominion,  naturally  friendly 
to  the  Spanish  nation,  goes  far  to  show  that  the  action  of  the 
British  government  was  merely  precautionary  against  the  results 
to  the  islands  which  would  come  from  a  long-continued  French 
occupation.  The  scheme  had  no  further  development. 

The  complaints  of  the  American  minister  in  his  memorandum 
as  to  the  non-reception  of  consuls  were  but  the  repetition  of  those 
of  two  years  before,  when  the  recognition  by  the  United  States  of 
the  Spanish-American  republics,  and  the  danger  of  admitting  the 
authorized  agents  of  a  power  friendly  to  independence,  were  made 
the  grounds  of  refusal.  "Spain,"  it  was  said,  "would  perhaps  be 
disposed  to  concede  this  point  if  the  United  States  would  furnish 
any  pledges  or  guarantees,  by  way  of  security,  respecting  their 
future  relation  with  the  islands,"  which  was  enlarged  into  meaning 
a  guarantee  by  treaty  of  Spain's  continued  possession,  a  pro 
posal  which  naturally  was  declined.1 

For  the  next  twenty-five  years,  the  government  of  the  United 
States  was  haunted  by  the  idea  that  Cuba  would  be  seized  by 
Great  Britain  or  France,  and  the  reiteration  of  American  antago 
nism  to  such  action,  brought  about  by  this  impression,  went  far 
toward  preserving  the  island  to  a  country  now  racked  throughout 
its  length  and  breadth  by  insurrection,  brigandage,  and  misrule, 
and  one  whose  incapacity  to  govern  itself  so  clearly  demonstrated 
its  unworthiness,  at  the  time,  to  govern  any  other.  The  heavy 
financial  responsibilities  of  Spain  to  both  France  and  England, 
caused  by  the  support  of  the  French  army  and  by  the  engagement 
to  pay  the  indemnities  for  injuries  to  British  commerce,  and  for 
which  the  possession  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  seemed  the  only 
secure  guarantee,  made  the  fears  of  the  United  States  not  at  all 

francs  to  France.  Spain  was  to  pay  annually  2,400,000  francs  (3  per  cent.) 
in  interest  and  1,600,000  francs  annually  until  the  debt  should  be  redeemed. 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XVI,  989. 

1  A.  H.  Everett  to  Clay,  September  25,  1825.  House  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32  Cong., 
1  Sess.,  p.  25.  See  also  Senor  Bermudez  to  Mr.  Nelson,  July  12,  1825,  who  in 
addition  declared  that  the  thought  of  ceding  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  to  any 
power  had  never  been  entertained,  and  that  it  was  firmly  determined  to  keep 
them  under  Spanish  sovereignty.  Ibid.,  14. 


220     SPAIN  AGAIN  ASSURED  BY  UNITED  STATES  [1840 

unreasonable.  Not  only  did  the  United  States  stand  between 
any  such  possible  demands  of  the  two  powers  mentioned,  but  her 
interposition  with  the  new  American  republics  had  undoubtedly 
saved  the  islands  from  invasion  and  capture.  The  American 
government  thus  continued  to  press  Spain,  in  her  own  interest 
and  that  of  general  peace,  not  to  persevere  in  the  assertion  of  her 
claims  over  her  former  colonies,1  and  when  this  danger  was  past, 
to  reiterate  from  time  to  time  its  general  attitude  in  the  Cuban 
question. 

Thus  on  July  15,  1840,  the  American  minister  was  directed: 
"Should  you  have  reason  to  suspect  any  design  on  the  part  of 
Spain  to  transfer  voluntarily  her  title  to  [Cuba],  whether  of  owner 
ship  or  possession,  and  whether  permanent  or  temporary,  to  Great 
Britain  or  any  other  power,  you  will  distinctly  state  that  the  United 
States  will  prevent  it  at  all  hazards,  as  they  will  any  foreign  mili 
tary  occupation  for  any  pretext  whatsoever;  and  you  are  author 
ized  to  assure  the  Spanish  government  that,  in  case  of  any  attempt, 
from  whatever  quarter,  to  wrest  from  her  this  portion  of  her 
territory,  she  may  securely  depend  upon  the  military  and  naval 
resources  of  the  United  States  to  aid  her  in  preserving  or  recover 
ing  it."2 

Slavery  was  again  an  element  of  the  question,  for  Great  Britain 
had,  in  1830,  abolished  slavery  in  all  her  possessions.  The  slave- 
trade  in  Cuba  had  remained,  however,  in  full  vigor,  despite  the 
nominal  concurrence  of  Spain  in  the  efforts  toward  its  destruction 
by  a  treaty  which  agreed  to  a  complete  closure  of  the  trade  by  May, 
1820,  a  concurrence  for  which  she  received  from  England  £400,000 
as  compensation  for  loss  to  the  crown.  The  trade  flourished  in 
Havana,  despite  the  efforts  at  capture  by  British  ships;  and  the 
presence  there  of  numerous  men-of-war  whose  duty  was  largely 
the  prevention  of  the  trade,  the  irritation  of  the  British  govern 
ment  with  Spain  on  the  subject,  and  the  pressure  upon  it  of  the 
British  abolition  societies,  was  a  principal  element  in  again  caus 
ing  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  In  1843  Web- 

1  Van  Buren,  secretary  of  state,  to  Van  Ness,  minister  at  Madrid,  October  2, 
1829,  and  October  13,  1830.     House  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  26,  28. 

2  Mr.  Forsyth,  secretary  of  state,  to  Mr.  Vail,  minister  to  Spain,  July  15, 
1840.     MSS.  Inst.  Spain,  XIV,  111.     Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  VI,  450. 


1848]  FOLK'S  OFFER  TO  PURCHASE   CUBA  221 

ster,  moved  by  rumors  of  British  action,  wrote  in  almost  the  same 
words  as  those  just  quoted.1  Though  Webster  became  satisfied 
that  reports  had  been  greatly  exaggerated,  he  was  convinced 
that  "enough,  however,  of  danger  and  alarm  still  exists  in  that 
quarter  to  render  caution  and  vigilance  on  the  part  of  this  govern 
ment  indispensably  necessary."2  Webster's  successor,  Mr.  Upshur, 
was  of  like  opinion,  and  he  sent,  a  little  later,  the  same  warning.3 

Four  years  later  the  successful  war  with  Mexico,  with  the  an 
nexation  of  Texas  and  California,  despite  the  opposition  of  those 
who  feared  the  slave  power,  caused  the  pro-slavery  administra 
tion  in  1848  to  reach  out  for  Cuba.  "If  Cuba  were  annexed 
to  the  United  States,"  said  Buchanan,  secretary  of  state,  Polk 
being  President,  "we  should  not  only  be  relieved  from  the  ap 
prehensions  which  we  can  never  cease  to  feel  for  our  own  safety 
and  the  security  of  our  commerce  while  it  shall  remain  in  its 
present  condition,  but  human  foresight  cannot  anticipate  the 
beneficial  consequences  which  would  result  to  every  portion  of 
our  Union.  This  can  never  become  a  local  question.  .  .  . 

"Desirable,  however,  as  the  possession  of  the  island  may  be  to 
the  United  States,  we  would  not  acquire  it  except  by  the  free  con 
sent  of  Spain  ...  it  is  supposed  that  the  present  relations  between 
Cuba  and  Spain  might  incline  the  Spanish  government  to  cede 
the  island  .  .  .  upon  the  payment  of  a  fair  and  full  consideration. 
We  have  received  information  from  various  sources,  both  official 
and  unofficial,  that  among  the  Creoles  of  Cuba  there  has  long  ex 
isted  a  deep-rooted  hostility  to  Spanish  dominion.  The  revolutions 
which  are  rapidly  succeeding  each  other  throughout  the  world 
have  inspired  the  Cubans  with  an  ardent  and  irrepressible  desire 
to  achieve  their  independence.  Indeed  we  are  informed  by  the 
consul  of  the  United  States  at  Havana  that  *  there  appears  every 
probability  that  the  island  will  soon  be  in  a  state  of  civil  war/  He 
also  states  that '  efforts  are  now  being  made  to  raise  money  for  that 
purpose  in  the  United  States,  and  there  will  be  attempts  to  induce 

1  Daniel   Webster,  secretary  of  state,  to   Robert  C.  Campbell,  consul  at 
Havana,  January  14,  1843;  copy  furnished  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washing 
ton  and  to  Washington  Irving,  American  minister  at  Madrid,  January  17, 
1843.     Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  VI,  37-40. 

2  Webster  to  Irving,  March  14,  1843.     Ibid.,  41.  J  Ibid.,  41. 


222  FOLK'S  OFFER  TO  PURCHASE  CUBA  [1848 

a  few  of  the  volunteer  regiments  now  in  Mexico  to  obtain  their 
discharge  and  join  the  revolution/  I  need  scarcely  inform  you  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  has  no  agency  whatever  in 
exciting  the  spirit  of  disaffection  among  the  Cubans.  ...  I  have 
warned  [the  consul]  to  keep  a  watchful  guard  both  upon  his  words 
and  actions,  so  as  to  avoid  even  the  least  suspicion  that  he  had  en 
couraged  the  Cubans  to  rise.  ...  I  stated  also  that  the  relations 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States  had  long  been  of  the  most 
friendly  character;  and  both  honor  and  duty  required  that  we 
should  take  no  part  in  the  struggle  which  he  seemed  to  think  was 
impending.  I  informed  him  that  it  would  certainly  become  the 
duty  of  this  government  to  use  all  proper  means  to  prevent  any  of 
our  volunteer  regiments  now  in  Mexico  from  violating  the  neutral 
ity  of  the  country  by  joining  in  the  proposed  civil  war.  .  .  ." 
Orders,  says  Buchanan,  were  given  June  10,  directing  that  the 
transports  carrying  troops  from  Mexico  should  proceed  directly 
home,  and  "  in  no  event  to  touch  at  any  place  in  Cuba." 

After  dealing  at  length  with  the  advantages  to  Spain,  Cuba, 
and  the  United  States,  of  annexation,  Buchanan  continued: 

"Cuba,  justly  appreciating  the  advantages  of  annexation,  is  now 
ready  to  rush  into  our  arms.  .  .  .  The  President  believes  that  the 
crisis  has  arrived  when  an  effort  should  be  made  to  purchase 
the  island.  ...  At  your  interview  with  the  minister  for  foreign 
affairs  you  might  introduce  the  subject  by  referring  to  the  present 
distracted  condition  of  Cuba,  and  the  danger  which  exists  that  the 
population  will  make  an  attempt  to  accomplish  a  revolution. 
This  must  be  well  known  to  the  Spanish  government.  ...  In 
order  to  convince  him  of  the  good  faith  and  friendship  toward 
Spain  with  which  this  government  has  acted,  you  might  read  to 
him  the  first  part  of  my  despatch  to  General  Campbell  [consul  at 
Havana]  and  the  order  issued  by  the  secretary  of  war.  .  .  .  You 
may  then  touch  delicately  upon  the  danger  that  Spain  may  lose 
Cuba  by  a  revolution  in  the  island,  or  that  it  may  be  wrested  from 
her  by  Great  Britain,  should  a  rupture  take  place  between  the  two 
countries,  arising  out  of  the  dismissal  of  Sir  Henry  Bulwer,  and 
be  retained  to  pay  the  Spanish  debt  due  to  the  British  bondholders. 
You  might  assure  him  that  whilst  this  government  is  entirely 
satisfied  that  Cuba  shall  remain  under  the  dominion  of  Spain,  we 


1848]  FAILURE  OF  FOLK'S  EFFORT  223 

should  in  any  event  resist  its  acquisition  by  any  other  nation.  And, 
finally,  you  might  inform  him  that,  under  all  these  circumstances, 
the  President  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  Spain  might  be 
willing  to  transfer  the  island  to  the  United  States  for  a  fair  and 
full  consideration."  *  A  hundred  million  dollars  was  named  as 
the  limit  of  the  sum  which  might  be  offered. 

The  proposal,  whatever  consideration  it  might  have  been  given 
by  the  government  had  it  been  free  to  act,  was  rejected,  the  Span 
ish  minister  for  foreign  affairs  finally  declaring  "that  it  was  more 
than  any  minister  dare,  to  entertain  such  a  proposition;  that  he 
believed  such  to  be  the  feeling  of  the  country  that,  sooner  than  see 
the  island  transferred  to  any  power,  they  would  prefer  seeing  it 
sunk  in  the  ocean";2  to  this  attitude  Spain,  unfortunately  for 
herself,  held  to  the  end.  The  next  American  administration  de 
clared,  less  than  a  year  after  President  Folk's  offer,  that  any  pro 
posal  for  the  transfer  of  Cuba  must  come  from  Spain.3 

Though  successive  later  administrations  pushed  the  project  of 
purchase  to  the  very  eve  of  the  civil  war,  Buchanan,  a  Northern 
man  himself,  being  its  most  prominent  advocate,  the  question 
of  the  extension  of  territory  southward  which  was,  or  might  be 
come,  slave — advocated  so  strongly  by  Southern  statesmen,  and 
by  some  of  the  North,  there  being  no  more  prominent  advocate 
than  the  Pennsylvanian  Buchanan — could  now  and  thenceforward 
only  arouse  bitter  antagonism  from  the  rapidly  growing  antislavery 
sentiment  in  the  North.  There  was  no  time  between  1848  and 
1861  when  the  annexation  of  Cuba  could  have  assumed  probability 
without  fierce  resistance  from  the  now  rapidly  increasing  opponents 
of  the  extension  of  slave  territory.  The  question,  in  fact,  never 
assumed  a  serious  form,  nor,  despite  the  efforts  in  the  next  decade, 
1850-1860,  could  it  have  done  so. 

1  Mr.  Buchanan  to  Mr.  Saunders,  minister  to  Spain,  June  17,  1848.     House 
Ex.  Doc.  121,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.     Moore,  Digest,  I,  584,  and  VII,  921. 

2  Saunders  to  Buchanan,  December  14,  1848.     House  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32 
Cong.,  1  Sess.     Moore,  Digest,  I,  588. 

3  Clayton,  secretary  of  state,  to  Barrington,  minister  to  Spain,  August  2, 
1849.    MS.  Inst.  Moore,  Digest,  I,  587. 


CHAPTER  XII 

CUBAN  CONDITIONS:  THE  LOPEZ  EXPEDITIONS:  BRITISH  AND 
FRENCH  INTERFERENCE 

IN  May,  1825,  the  French  army  occupying  Spain  in  the  inter 
est  and  at  the  request  of  Fernando  VII,  the  imperious  and  savage 
edicts  relating  to  Spain  herself  and  the  revolted  South  American 
colonies,  were  followed  by  a  decree  with  reference  to  the  authority 
of  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba: 

4 'His  majesty  being  formally  persuaded  that  at  no  time  and 
under  no  circumstances  will  the  principle  of  rectitude  and  love 
to  his  royal  person,  which  characterizes  your  excellency,  ever  be 
weakened;  and  his  majesty,  desiring  to  obviate  any  difficulties 
which  might  arise  in  extraordinary  cases  from  a  division  of  au 
thority  and  the  complication  of  command  and  control  by  the  re 
spective  officers,  and  to  the  important  end  of  preserving  in  that 
precious  island  his  legitimate  sovereign  rule  and  the  public  peace, 
has  been  pleased,  in  accordance  with  the  judgment  of  his  council 
of  ministers,  to  invest  your  excellency  with  full  authority,  con 
ferring  all  the  powers  which  by  royal  decree  are  conceded  to  the 
governors  of  cities  in  a  state  of  siege.  His  majesty  consequently 
invests  your  excellency  with  full  and  unlimited  authority  to  detach 
from  that  island,  and  to  send  to  this  Peninsula,  all  officials  and  per 
sons  employed  in  whatsoever  capacity,  and  of  whatsoever  rank  and 
class  or  condition,  whose  presence  may  appear  prejudicial,  or 
whose  public  or  private  conduct  may  inspire  you  with  suspicion, 
replacing  them  in  the  interim  with  faithful  servants  of  his  majesty 
who  are  deserving  of  the  confidence  of  your  excellency,  and  f urther- 
1  more  to  suspend  the  execution  of  any  orders  or  general  regulations 
issued  in  whatever  branch  of  the  administration  to  whatever  ex 
tent  your  excellency  may  consider  convenient  to  the  royal  service; 
such  measures  to  be  always  provisional,  and  a  report  thereof  to  be 

224 


1825]  THE  DECREE  GOVERNING  CUBA  225 

sent  by  your  excellency  for  the  sovereign  approval  of  his  majesty. 
In  dispensing  to  your  excellency  this  signal  proof  of  his  royal  favor 
and  the  high  confidence  which  his  majesty  places  in  your  perfect 
loyalty,  he  hopes  that,  worthily  co-operating,  you  will  use  the 
greatest  prudence  and  circumspection  together  with  indefatigable 
activity,  and  trusts  that  your  excellency  will  be  endowed  through 
this  same  favor  of  his  royal  goodness  with  a  greater  responsibility, 
redouble  your  vigilance  in  seeing  that  the  laws  are  observed,  that 
justice  is  administered,  and  that  the  faithful  subjects  of  his  majesty 
be  rewarded;  at  the  same  time  punishing  without  delay  or  hesita 
tion  the  misdeeds  of  those  who,  forgetting  their  obligations  and 
what  they  owe  to  the  best  and  most  beneficent  of  sovereigns, 
violate  the  laws  and  give  vent  to  sinister  machinations  by  the 
infraction  of  said  laws  and  of  the  administrative  ordinances  re 
lating  thereto. " 

This  decree,  which  was  to  remain  the  constitution  under  which 
Cuba  was  governed  for  a  large  part  of  the  century,  was  the  natural 
outcome  of  the  despotism  which  had  returned  to  Spain;  but  its 
immediate  cause  was  the  discontent  between  insulars  and  peninsu 
lars,  which  began  to  show  itself  prominently  as  early  as  1821  in 
connection  with  the  elections  for  the  Cortes,  under  the  short-lived 
revival  of  the  constitution,  and  brought  the  island  to  the  verge 
of  insurrection,  through  a  conspiracy  more  serious  than  the  space 
generally  allotted  to  it  in  Cuban  history  would  lead  one  to  suppose. 
That  in  1826  there  were  11,000  troops  in  the  island  illustrates  this 
fact. 

All  this  time  Spain  was  continuing  the  downward  course  of  the 
earlier  part  of  the  century,  the  question  of  a  successor  to  Fernando 
VII  coming  to  rack  the  country  with  insurrection  and  civil  war. 
The  Cortes,  in  1789,  on  request  of  Charles  IV,  had  secretly  agreed 
to  the  abolition  of  the  Salic  law  established  by  Philip  V  in  1713, 
but  the  agreement,  had  never  been  published  as  legalization  re 
quired.  Fernando  had  no  heir.  In  1829  he  married  as  his  fourth 
wife  his  niece,  Maria  Cristina  of  Naples,  and  on  March  31,  1830, 
the  queen  being  pregnant,  he  published  a  decree  restoring  the  an 
cient  law  of  succession  in  either  male  or  female  line,  in  accordance 
with  the  secret  petition  of  the  Cortes  mentioned.  It  was  a  signal 
for  revolt  even  before  the  birth  of  the  expected  child.  On  October 


226  DEATH   OF   FERNANDO   VII  [1833 

10,  1830,  a  princess,  to  become  known  as  Isabella  II,  was  born. 
In  January,  1832,  there  came  still  another  princess;  by  this  time 
the  King  was  sinking  to  his  end  and  no  more  children  could  be 
expected.  On  September  18,  1832,  Fernando,  now  on  his  death 
bed,  under  pressure  of  the  president  of  the  council  of  Castile, 
Calomarde,  signed  the  revocation  of  the  decree  of  1789  which  he 
had  sanctioned  two  and  a  half  years  before,  and  his  daughter  was 
legally  no  longer  heir.  Dona  Carlota,  sister  of  the  queen,  and 
wife  of  the  king's  youngest  brother  (reputed  a  son  of  Godoy's), 
extorted  the  revocation  from  Calomarde  and  destroyed  it;  caused 
the  dying  king  privately  to  sign  a  cancellation  of  the  revocation, 
and  on  October  6,  1832,  to  sign  a  decree  appointing  his  wife,  Maria 
Cristina,  sole  regent.  Fernando  revived  sufficiently  to  return  from 
La  Granja  to  Madrid,  and  on  the  last  day  of  1832  the  revocation 
was  "publicly  withdrawn  by  the  king  with  every  solemnity  and 
formality."  His  brother,  Don  Carlos,  was  sent  to  Portugal,  and 
later  when  sent  for  to  swear  allegiance  to  the  baby  princess  who, 
as  heir,  received  the  oath  of  allegiance  of  the  Cortes  June  20, 
1833,  refused  to  come,  claiming  the  heirship  for  himself.  On 
September  29,  1833,  Fernando  died,  leaving  his  widow  guardian 
of  his  two  children  and  Queen -Governess  of  Spain;  and,  through 
this  action,  leaving  also  a  long  heritage  of  civil  war  which  was  to 
devastate  his  country  and  retard  its  progress  toward  light. 

The  government  of  the  Regent  Maria  Cristina,  in  its  manifesto 
of  October  4,  1833,  made  no  concessions  to  freedom  or  to  the  de 
mands  of  modern  progress.  But  there  was  liberalism  enough 
in  Spain  to  force  a  half-hearted  step  toward  constitutionalism, 
and  an  edict  put  forth  in  April,  1834,  established  a  parliament; 
but  it  was  one  which  could  only  discuss  subjects  submitted  by  the 
queen's  ministers.  In  two  and  one-half  years  a  third  of  Spain  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  Carlists,  and  the  rest  in  the  throes  of  a  revo 
lution.  On  August  13,  1836,  under  the  threat  of  the  insurrec 
tionary  troops,  the  constitution  of  1812  was  re-established  "pending 
the  manifestation  by  the  Cortes  of  the  will  of  the  nation,"  and 
Spain,  or  so  much  of  the  distracted  country  as  was  not  overrun 
by  the  Carlist  forces,  was  once  more  under  a  constitutional  regimen. 

Under  the  letter  of  the  constitution  Cuban  representation  in 
the  Spanish  Cortes  was  again  possible,  and  the  members  allowed  to 


1837]  CUBAN   REPRESENTATION  DENIED  227 

the  island,  and  who  were  elected  under  pressing  orders  from  the 
home  government,  presented  themselves  for  admission  to  the 
Cortes,  which  began  its  sittings  October  24,  1836.  The  Cortes 
had  sat  three  months,  with  the  demands  of  the  Cuban  and  Puerto 
Rican  representatives  for  admission  before  it,  when  finally  the 
following  law  was  passed  in  secret  session,  January  16,  1837,  and 
promulgated  April  18: 

"The  Cortes,  under  the  power  conceded  by  the  constitution,  has 
decreed :  It  not  being  possible  to  apply  the  constitution  which  has 
been  adapted  for  the  Peninsula  and  the  adjacent  islands,  to  the 
ultramarine  provinces  of  America  and  Asia :  these  will  be  ruled 
and  administered  by  special  laws  fitted  for  their  respective  situa 
tions  and  circumstances  and  calculated  to  secure  their  happiness; 
consequently  the  deputies  of  the  said  provinces  will  not  be  seated 
in  the  Cortes." 1 

The  cause  of  the  denial  was  laid  mainly  at  the  door  of  the 
Captain-General  Tacon,  who,  "despot  by  instinct,  by  education, 
and  interest,  hated  liberty."  This  is  the  true  beginning  of  Cuban 
revolt.  The  island  remained  under  the  despotic  rule  of  men 
sometimes  good,  more  frequently  bad,  who  built  an  absolute  and 
despotic  power  upon  a  foundation  which  had  its  beginning  in  the 
earliest  days  of  Spanish  colonization  and,  despite  appearances,  was 
never  really  changed  until  the  final  year  of  Spain's  dominion. 

While  of  such  great  importance  in  the  relations  of  Cuba  and 
Spain,  the  benefits  proposed  to  themselves  by  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Antilles  through  representation  were,  viewed  in  their  true  light, 
really  illusionary.  This  was  clearly  seen  by  Saco,  who  of  Cuban 
publicists  has  shown  the  highest  qualities  of  statesmanship.  The 
small  proportion  of  representatives  which  could  have  been  allowed 
on  any  basis  proposed  would  have  been  then,  as  they  were  later, 
powerless  to  effect  reform  in  Cuban  laws  or  administration.  The 
only  real  panacea  for  Cuban  feelings  and  for  Cuban  misgovernment 
was  in  local  self-government,  in  the  autonomy  which  fifty  years  later 
they  were  to  spurn,  though  at  this  period  it  was  not  even  thought  of. 
For  the  moment,  at  least,  they  would  have  been  satisfied  with  the 
representation  allowed  by  the  constitution  which  the  Cortes  vio 
lated,  combined  with  an  opening,  to  even  a  moderate  degree,  of 
1  Sedano,  Estudios  Politicos,  162. 


228  CHARACTER  OF  CUBAN  RULE  [1842 

administrative  career  to  the  natives  of  the  island.  One  at  least 
of  the  later  captains-general,  Concha,  in  his  Memorias,  advocated 
such  reform,  and  it  was  to  his  initiative  that,  in  1863,  the  establish 
ment  of  the  "Ministerio  de  Ultramar"  was  due;  but  though  he 
afterward  filled  the  post,  he  made  no  endeavor  to  bring  into  active 
being  his  just  and  excellent  views  of  the  burning  question.  Cuba 
remained  what  it  always  had  been,  less  the  recognition  of  the 
rights  which  in  theory  had  been  theirs  ever  since  the  formulation 
of  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  and  which  for  two  short  intervals  (in  1810 
and  in  1821)  they  had  momentarily  enjoyed. 

The  government  remained  a  despotism  pure  and  simple;  its 
code,  the  bando  of  1842  of  Captain-General  Geronimo  Valdes, 
whose  "spirit"  for  many  years  to  come  "walked  abroad  through 
this  old  body  of  laws,  customs,  regulations,  edicts,  bandos,  decrees, 
circulars,  orders,  and  injunctions  which  he  gathered  together  and 
vitalized.  The  titles  of  the  bandos  relate  to  religion  and  public 
morality,  order,  health,  security,  theatres,  cleanliness,  and  decora 
tion.  It  required  two  hundred  and  sixty-one  articles  to  define  the 
relation  of  the  citizen  to  the  government,  or  the  municipality,  with 
respect  to  these  headings.  A  special  chapter  is  devoted  to  the 
pedaneos  or  petty  law  officers.  The  instructions  give  an  insight 
into  the  entire  lack  of  personal  or  civil  liberty  reserved  to  the  in 
dividual.  The  pedaneos  and  their  assistants,  the  cabos  de  rondos, 
or  roundsmen,  were  real  Paul  Prys  of  the  state.  The  list  of  cases 
in  which  they  could  acquire  fees  was  a  long  one,  and  they  could 
impose  fines  in  compliance  with  specific  articles  of  the  bando. 
They  were  practically  charged  with  the  regulation  of  both  the  pub 
lic  and  private  morals  of  the  community.  The  regulations  are 
wearisome  in  their  minuteness,  from  their  prohibition  of  the  picador 
at  the  bull-fight  pricking  the  animal  when  in  the  centre  of  the 
ring,  to  the  requirement  that  the  bodega  keepers  should  have  a  basin 
of  water  standing  in  front  of  their  shops  so  that  the  dogs  which 
ran  through  the  streets  might  drink  as  they  listed,  and  thus  avoid 
the  danger  of  hydrophobia.  But  through  them  all  runs  the  author 
ity  from  above  and  iu  is  the  very  highest  authority."  l 

Cuba  in  1850  had  a  population  of  about  1,200,000,  half  of  whom 
were  whites,  a  sixth  free  colored,  the  remainder,  about  450,000, 
1  Pepper,  Tomorrow  in  Cuba,  110. 


1850]  CONDITIONS   IN   CUBA  229 

slaves.  There  were  in  the  island  35,000  Spaniards  and  23,000 
Spanish  troops.  The  Creole  whites  were  thus  ten  to  one  of  the 
Spanish  population.  The  island  sent  large  sums  to  the  Madrid 
government.  Besides,  it  supported  all  the  Spanish  officials  in  the 
country  from  the  captain-general  down;  it  paid  the  army  and 
the  navy  in  the  island;  paid  the  interest  on  the  debt  incurred; 
paid  largely,  if  not  all,  the  expenses  of  Spanish  consuls  and  the 
Spanish  minister  in  the  United  States,  and  also  provided  the  secret- 
service  fund  of  the  legation.  Naturally  with  such  a  bank  to  draw 
upon  Spain  paid  large  salaries.  In  the  latter  years  of  her  rule 
the  captain-general  (later  called  governor-general)  received  $50,000 
a  year  with  a  palace  in  Havana,  a  country  house,  servants,  and  a 
secret-service  fund;  the  director-general  of  the  treasury,  $18,500; 
the  archbishop  of  Santiago  and  the  bishop  of  Havana,  $18,000 
each;  the  admiral  commanding  the  naval  station,  $16,392;  the 
general  second  in  command  of  the  island,  and  the  president  of 
the  "audiencia,"  $15,000  each.  Major-generals  received  $7,500, 
brigadier-generals  $4,500,  capitan  de  navio  (corresponding  to 
captains  in  our  navy)  $6,300,  commanders  $4,560,  lieutenant- 
commanders  (teniente  de  navio,  la  class)  $3,370.  The  ministry  of 
the  colonies  received  $96,800  a  year  from  Cuba.  The  island  was 
filled  with  officials  from  Spain  who  made  their  careers  a  saturnalia 
of  plunder.  For  the  whole  population  of  over  600,000  whites  in 
1850  there  were  fewer  than  250  schools,  and  less  than  9,000  white 
and  colored  children  in  attendance,  nor  was  the  proportion  ever 
materially  changed. 

The  imports  in  1847  were  over  $30,000,000  in  value;  the  ex 
ports  nearly  $28,000,000;  the  revenue  nearly  $13,000,000.  The 
chief  trader  with  the  island  was  the  United  States,  notwithstand 
ing  the  heavy  discriminating  duties  in  favor  of  Spain.  The  duty 
on  foreign  flour  was  $10  per  barrel,  though  its  value  in  the  United 
States  was  but  $4.50;  facts  which  caused  American  flour  to  go 
by  way  of  Spain  and  enter  Cuba  as  Spanish  flour  in  Spanish 
ships. 

The*rratural  outcome  of  the  situation,  combined  with  the  civil 
strife  of  Spain  and  the  volcanic  condition  of  Europe  in  1848,  was 
the  beginning  of  the  long  era  of  revolt  which  was  to  run  through 
the  next  half  of  the  century.  The  first  actor  of  importance  was 


230          PRESIDENT  TAYLOR'S  PROCLAMATION        [1849 

Narciso  Lopez,  of  Venezuela,  who  had  been  a  major-general  in  the 
first  Carlist  war,  a  senator  of  Spain,  governor  of  Valencia,  and 
governor  of  Madrid;  he  had  also  held  high  office  in  Cuba.  At 
tempting  to  organize  a  revolt  of  the  island  in  1848,  he  was  sen 
tenced  to  death  by  the  authorities,  but  escaped  to  the  United 
States.1 

In  1849  he  began  in  New  York  the  preparation  of  an  expedition. 
This  was  promptly  suppressed  by  the  American  authorities,  and  a 
proclamation  issued  by  President  Taylor,  August  11,  1849,  warn 
ing  "all  citizens  of  the  United  States  who  shall  connect  themselves 
with  an  enterprise  so  grossly  in  violation  of  our  laws  and  treaty 
obligations,  that  they  will  thereby  subject  themselves  to  the  heavy 
penalties  denounced  against  them  by  our  acts  of  Congress,  and  will 
forfeit  their  claim  to  the  protection  of  their  country.  No  such  per 
sons  must  expect  the  influence  of  this  government,  in  any  form,  on 
their  behalf,  no  matter  to  what  extremities  they  may  be  reduced 
in  consequence  of  their  conduct."  2  These  extreme  expressions 
were  later  to  be  used  with  effect  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  de 
fence  of  high-handed  action  which  was  wholly  in  disaccord  with 
international  rules  of  law  as  generally  understood.  If  taken 
literally,  they  took  from  American  citizens  the  protections  guaran 
teed  by  the  treaty  of  1795. 

Lopez,  early  in  1850,  attempted  to  organize  another  expedition 
with  Savannah  as  a  base,  but  finding  himself  closely  observed  by  the 
federal  authorities,  he  transferred  his  endeavors  to  the  more  con 
genial  field  of  New  Orleans,  where  were  many  fresh  from  the  war 
with  Mexico  who  favored  his  cause.  Prominent  among  them  was 
General  Quitman,  of  Mississippi,  to  whom  was  offered  the  leader 
ship,  declined  by  him  only  because  of  the  secessionist  movement 
of  1850,  of  which  he  was  a  vehement  advocate.3  He  assisted 
Lopez,  however,  financially  and  advised  his  having,  at  the  first,  at 
least  2,000  men  to  maintain  a  footing  pending  re-enforcement. 
Lopez,  over-optimistic  as  to  Cuban  readiness  to  join,  gathered  at 
New  Orleans,  chiefly  from  Cincinnati  and  its  vicinity,  some  750 


Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  547.     De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit 
International  Public,  tome  IV  (1897),  586. 
a  House  Ex.  Doc.  5,  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  p.  17. 
'Claiborne,  Life  of  Quitman,  II,  56-58. 


1850]  FIRST  LOPEZ  EXPEDITION  231 

men.  On  April  25,  1850,  250  of  these,  under  Col.  Theodore 
O'Hara,  the  second  in  command  to  Lopez,  left  New  Orleans  in  the 
bark  Georgiana,  followed,  May  2,  by  the  brig  Susan  Loud  with  170, 
the  men  being  furnished  with  tickets  for  Chagres  (on  the  isthmus 
of  Panama),  the  vessels  being  chartered,  advertised,  and  cleared 
for  that  port.  Ostensibly  the  men  were  bound  for  California  (as 
in  fact  a  number  of  them  were),  to  which  at  this  moment  there 
was  an  exodus  from  the  East,  through  the  furor,  then  at  its  height, 
on  account  of  the  lately  discovered  gold.  Lopez  followed,  May  7, 
in  the  small  steamer  Creole,  with  the  remainder  of  the  men.  Three- 
fourths  of  the  force  were  ex-volunteers  of  the  Mexican  war,  in 
stigated  to  adventure  by  their  late  experiences.  However  well 
known  that  a  gathering  for  such  a  purpose  was  in  progress,  the 
actual  expedition  seems  to  have  left,  unsuspected  for  the  moment, 
and  a  man-of-war  sent  later  in  pursuit  was  unsuccessful  in  find 
ing  it.1 

Rendezvous  was  made  off  the  coast  of  Yucatan,  where  the  whole 
of  the  invading  force  was  taken  aboard  the  Creole,  the  other  two 
vessels,  with  the  passengers  for  California,  being  left  in  charge  of 
their  ordinary  non-combatant  crews.  The  first  intention  was  to 
land  at  Matanzas,  but  fearing  that  knowledge  of  this  had  got 
abroad,  Cardenas  was  selected  instead,  and  landing  was  made  there 
at  midnight  of  May  19.  The  small  Spanish  garrison  was  surprised 
and  the  town  easily  occupied.  Lopez  called  upon  the  natives  for 
volunteers,  without  a  single  response  except  from  the  Spanish 
soldiers,  of  whom  thirty-four  joined  him.  There  was,  however, 
some  show  of  friendly  feeling  in  the  bringing  of  some  arms  and 
horses.  The  evident  general  fear  prevented,  however,  any  vol 
unteering  of  the  people. 

After  twelve  hours  of  disappointment  and  rumors  of  powerful 
Spanish  re-enforcements,  the  men  were  re-embarked.  Lopez 
desired  to  make  another  effort  elsewhere,  but  the  men  were  now 
unruly  and  mutinous.  A  consultation  of  officers  ended  in  sub 
mitting  the  question  to  a  vote  of  the  men,  who  refused  further 
effort  by  a  large  majority.  The  ship  then  left  about  9  P.  M.  (May 
20)  for  Key  West,  the  nearest  American  port,  about  a  hundred 

1  The  sending  of  this  ship  caused  a  question  and  debate  in  the  Senate  as  to 
the  President's  action.  See  Curtis,  Webster,  II,  441. 


232  FIRST  LOPEZ  EXPEDITION  [1850 

miles  distant,  and  the  only  one  which  could  be  reached  with  the 
coal  aboard.  Before  clearing  the  intricate  approaches  to  Cardenas, 
she  ran  ashore  some  five  miles  from  the  town  and  remained 
aground  until  dawn,  when  after  throwing  overboard  all  stores  and 
ammunition  she  was  floated.  The  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Carde 
nas,  the  commander  of  the  garrison,  and  several  other  Spanish 
officials  who  had  been  seized  were  put  ashore  in  a  small  boat,  the 
lieutenant-governor  on  leaving  "waving  adieu  with  his  handker 
chief  in  handsome  style,"1  and  the  steamer  proceeded  with,  "as 
is  notoriously  the  case  with  volunteer  forces  making  a  retrograde 
movement,"  a  completely  demoralized  command.2 

Anchoring  some  forty  miles  from  Key  West  during  the  night, 
the  ship,  shortly  after  getting  under  way,  was  discovered  by  the 
Spanish  war  steamer,  Pizarro,  which  had  been  into  Key  West 
the  day  previous  in  search  of  her.  The  Pizarro  started  in  pur 
suit,  but  the  Creole  entered  Key  West  some  six  miles  ahead, 
with  fuel  completely  exhausted.  The  Pizarro  also  came  into  the 
port,  and  her  captain  demanded  the  arrest  of  the  men  of  the  ex 
pedition.3 

The  Creole  was  at  once  seized  by  the  port  authorities,  but  the 
men  aboard  were  allowed  to  disperse,  apparently  without  any  effort 
at  detention.  Key  West  was,  however,  at  this  time  but  a  small 
village,  the  resort  of  a  lawless  class  of  wreckers,  and  it  may  well 
be  that  any  effort  to  seize  the  leader  or  any  portion  of  the  force  of 
more  than  four  hundred  well-armed  men  was  regarded  impracti 
cable.  The  Spanish  naval  commander  offered  his  services  to 

1  Lieutenant  Hardy  of  the  Kentucky  battalion,  An  Authentic  History  of  the 
Cuban  Expedition,  45. 

a  Report  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pickett,  Kentucky  Regiment,  Ibid.,  70. 

3  The  commandant-general  of  the  naval  forces  of  Spain  in  the  Antilles, 
Francisco  Avenero,  to  the  Spanish  consul  at  Key  West  (House  Ex.  Doc.  83, 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  p.  45.).  The  loose  views  of  the  Spanish  commander  regarding 
international  law  are  shown  by  a  remark  in  his  letter  to  the  consul:  "  You,  and 
the  people  of  Key  West,  have  been  witnesses  of  the  high  consideration  I  have 
shown  to  the  American  flag,  since,  after  coming  alongside  of  the  aforesaid 
vessel  in  the  vicinity  of  the  port,  I  did  not  capture  it,  being  well  assured  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  which  is  as  much  interested  in  the 
punishment  of  every  act  of  piracy  as  that  of  the  country  most  concerned  in  it, 
would  have  taken  all  the  necessary  steps  in  order  to  have  that  punishment 
administered."  The  words  "vicinity  of  the  port"  necessarily  implied  within 
the  port,  as  the  Pizarro  entered  a  considerable  interval  after  the  Creole. 


1850]  SEIZURE  OF  VESSELS  233 

assist,  but  they  were  declined.1  The  men  gradually  found  their 
way  elsewhere  from  this,  then,  out-of-the-way  point,  which  offered 
but  little  means  of  transportation  beyond  the  small  craft  of  wreckers 
and  spongers.  Lopez,  arrested  at  Savannah,  was  brought  before 
the  courts,  but  was  finally  released  through  a  failure  of  evidence  that 
he  had  violated  the  neutrality  laws.  The  Creole  was  confiscated. 

The  Pizarro  and  the  brig  Habanero,  acting  upon  intelligence 
brought  by  Havana  fishing  vessels  which  had  been  at  the  island 
of  Contoy,  had  seized  the  Georgiana  and  Susan  Loud  on  May  18. 
All  the  fifty-two  people  on  board,  forty-two  of  whom  were  bona 
fide  passengers  for  California,  and  the  other  ten  the  crews  of  the 
two  vessels,  were  removed  to  the  Spanish  ships  and  taken  to  Ha 
vana  May  20,  the  vessels  themselves,  with  prize  crews,  reaching 
there  June  5.  The  master  of  the  Susan  Loud,  who  had  called 
aboard  the  Creole  before  her  departure,  and  three  men  of  his  boat's 
crew  had  been  forcibly  detained  there  and  thus  escaped  the  im 
prisonment  and  trial  for  "piracy"  to  which  the  others  were  at  once 
subjected.  A  demand  for  their  release,  on  the  ground  of  capture 
in  neutral  waters,  made  by  the  American  consul  and  by  Captain 
Randolph  of  the  sloop  of  war  Albany,  to  the  Spanish  naval  com- 
mander-in-chief,  in  whose  hands  the  affair  rested,  was  refused.  The 
case  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  was  cited  as  a  parallel,  but  the  ad 
miral  held  that  it  was  not  so;  "that  the  duke  was  a  gentleman." 

Commodore  Charles  Morris,  acting  as  a  special  commissioner 
under  the  department  of  state,  was  directed  to  go  to  Havana,  in 
the  steamer  Vixen,  to  demand  of  the  governor-general  an  immediate 
release  of  all  the  prisoners  taken  at  Contoy,  and  to  inform  him 
that  the  President  would  "view  their  punishment  by  the  authori 
ties  of  Cuba  as  an  outrage  upon  the  rights  of  this  country."  He 
was  also  directed  to  inform  the  governor-general  that  the  return  of 
the  vessels  with  damages  for  their  capture  and  detention  was  ex 
pected.  If  the  demand  for  release  of  the  prisoners  was  refused, 
the  commodore  was  to  inquire  fully  into  their  treatment  and  con 
dition,  and  into  the  evidence  upon  which  the  Spanish  authorities 
relied  to  establish  their  guilt.2 

1  Admiral  Avenero  to  Senor  Calderon  de  la  Barca,  Spanish  minister  at 
Washington,  Ibid.,  44. 
3  Ibid.,  5-7. 


234  AMERICAN  PROTEST  [1850 

A  copy  of  Commodore  Morris's  instructions  was  sent  to  the 
American  minister  at  Madrid  for  his  guidance.  The  latter  at  once 
had  a  conference  with  the  Marquis  of  Pidal,  minister  of  state, 
who  took  the  position  that  "  the  right  of  Spain,  under  the  circum 
stances,  thus  to  capture  them,  to  take  them  into  her  own  ports,  and 
to  try  them  before  her  own  tribunals,  was  undoubted  by  the  law  of 
nations,  and  Spain  insisted  on  that  right."  Mr.  Barringer  said 
that,  apart  from  certain  facts,  the  more  important  of  which  was 
that  the  prisoners  taken  at  Contoy  were  bona  fide  passengers  for 
California,  that  the  island  of  Contoy,  near  Yucatan,  was  sub 
ject  to  the  sovereignty  of  Mexico;  that  such  seizure  on  the  ter 
ritory  of  a  third  and  friendly  power  was  in  derogation  of  the 
rights  of  the  United  States:  "The  United  States  could  not  recog 
nize  such  a  right  or  pretension,  and  protested  in  the  most  firm 
and  solemn  manner  against  all  proceedings  and  consequences 
which  had  [followed]  or  might  follow  from  such  unlawful 
capture." 

Senor  Pidal  "argued  at  some  length  and  with  much  animation" 
that  the  pretension  of  the  United  States  would  deprive  "Spain  of 
her  right  to  combat  invaders  of  her  territory,  except  upon  that 
territory  itself;  ...  it  denied  her  the  right  to  pursue  their  ships, 
to  beat  up  their  rendezvous,  to  capture  or  destroy  them  in  their 
stronghold  .  .  .  that  if,  instead  of  three,  fifty  vessels  (as  you  say 
this  expedition  might  have  been,  but  for  the  action  of  your  govern 
ment)  should  go  out  of  your  ports  to-morrow  filled  with  the  armed 
enemies  of  Spain,  and  rendezvous  at  the  desert  spot  of  Contoy, 
and  twenty  of  the  fifty  should  actually  make  a  descent  upon  the 
coast  of  Cuba,  Spain  might  combat  the  twenty  after  they  had 
arrived,  but  she  could  not  send  her  cruisers  to  molest  the  thirty, 
not  yet  quite  ready  to  follow — to  combat,  to  capture,  if  possible, 
and  conduct  them  into  her  own  ports  for  trial  before  her  own 
tribunals.  Such  a  pretension  could  not  be  admitted  by  Spain  for 
a  moment.  .  .  .  Spain  could  not  make  a  reclamation  or  claim 
indemnity  from  Mexico  for  the  violation  of  her  supposed  territory, 
which  was  nothing  but  a  desert,  and  a  capture  on  it  was  equivalent 
to  a  capture  on  the  high  seas.  The  right  to  seize,  imprison,  judge, 
and  punish  those  found  guilty  in  such  cases  was  indispensable  for 
the  defence  and  safety  of  nations.  .  .  .  [Spain]  could  never  sur- 


1850]  SPANISH  VIEWS  OF  LAW  235 

render  this  right,  or  yield  to  such  a  demand.  It  was  impossible 
for  her  to  do  so."1 

The  American  minister,  in  making  the  more  formal  demand, 
did  so  in  the  terms  of  the  instructions  to  Commodore  Morris,  re 
iterating  that  the  United  States  cannot  recognize  the  right  of 
Spain  to  seize  American  vessels  at  anchor  on  the  coast  and  within 
the  territory  and  jurisdiction  of  a  friendly  power;  that,  even  if 
guilty  of  an  intention  to  join  the  expedition  of  Lopez,  this  was  a 
crime  punishable  only  by  and  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

Senor  Pidal  "insisted  "  in  his  reply,  in  "qualifying  the  expedi- 
tionaries  as  pirates";  that  when  captured,  "I  could  not  regard  the 
said  vessels  as  Anglo-American,  nor  those  who  manned  them  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  because  having  undertaken  an  ex 
pedition  of  piracy,  declared  such  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  by 
the  government  of  the  confederacy  itself,  and  having  put  them 
selves  on  their  own  account,  in  war  with  Spain,  they  had  lost  by 
that  sole  act  their  nationality  and  the  right  to  be  regarded  and 
protected  as  citizens  of  the  Union."  From  the  moment  that  the 
conspirators  placed  themselves  beyond  American  jurisdiction  and 
"in  the  territory  of  another  power  .  .  .  the  pursuit  and  punish 
ment  of  those  who  can  no  longer  be  considered  but  as  pirates,  per 
tains  very  specially  to  the  nation  against  whom  they  direct  them 
selves."  2  The  mind  which  declared  such  views  as  to  inter 
national  law,  and  established  such  a  definition  of  piracy,  made 
negotiation  very  difficult. 

The  forty-two  California  passengers  and  the  "foremast  hands" 
of  the  two  vessels  were  released,  but  the  master  of  the  Georgiana  and 
the  two  mates  of  the  vessels  were  sentenced  to  ten,  eight,  and  four 
years  of  hard  labor.  They  were  sent  from  Havana  to  Spain  Septem 
ber  10,  en  route  to  Ceuta,  but  the  American  demands  caused  their 
pardon,  and  November  16,  1850,  they  were  sent  home  from  Cadiz. 

Both  vessels  were  confiscated  by  what  was  termed,  though  there 
was  no  pretension  of  a  state  of  war,  a  prize  court.  The  department 
of  state  seems  to  have  treated  the  cases  with  an  extraordinary 
apathy,  due  largely,  no  doubt,  to  the  ill  health  of  Mr.  Webster,  so 
soon  to  end  in  death.  The  last  official  word  at  the  time  is  in  a 

1  Mr.  Barringer,  minister  at  Madrid  to  Mr.  Clayton,  secretary  of  state, 
August  7,  1850.  House  Ex.  Doc.  83,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.  a  Ibid. 


236  AMERICAN  INACTION  [1851 

letter  from  him  to  the  President,  January  27,  1852,  answering 
the  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives  calling  for  infor 
mation  in  the  matter.  He  says:  "It  does  not  appear  that  a  copy 
of  the  judicial  proceedings,  which  resulted  in  the  condemnation  of 
the  vessels  referred  to,  has  been  communicated  by  the  parties  in 
terested,  or  from  any  other  quarter.  When  a  transcript  of  those 
proceedings  will  have  been  received,  the  cases  shall  be  examined; 
and  if  the  result  of  the  examination  shall  show  that  the  vessels 
when  captured  were  engaged  in  a  commerce  sanctioned  by  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  a  claim  for  indemnification  will  be 
presented  to  her  Catholic  Majesty's  government."  l 

Such  a  result  gave  good  ground  for  Spanish  action  later.  If 
an  American  ship  could  be  seized  in  neutral  waters  and  confiscated; 
if  the  claims  by  the  Spanish  government  in  this  case  could  be 
carried  to  a  successful  conclusion,  later  Spanish  governments  could 
feel  justified  in  seizing  upon  the  high  seas,  or  in  American  juris 
diction  itself,  any  vessel  carrying  an  expedition  like  that  of  the 
Creole.  The  case  of  the  Virginius  was  much  less  flagrant.2 

Later  the  United  States  put  itself  upon  unmistakable  ground  and 
declared  "That  American  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  in  time  of 
peace,  bearing  the  American  flag,  remain  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  country  to  which  they  belong,  and  therefore,  any  visitation, 
molestation,  or  detention  of  such  vessel  by  force,  or  by  the  exhibi 
tion  of  force,  on  the  part  of  a  foreign  power,  is  in  derogation  of 
the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States."  3 

The  next  year  Lopez  led  a  third  expedition  in  the  steamer 
Pampero,  which  left  New  Orleans,  without  clearance,  August  3, 
1851,  with  480  men,  mostly  Americans.  His  second  and  third 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  83,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

2  Some  publicists  hold  that  Spain's  position  in  the  latter  case,  based  upon  the 
theory  of  self-defence,  has  much  to  be  said  for  it,  so  far  as  the  mere  seizure 
of  the  ship  is  concerned.     In  the  present  case,  however,  there  was  no  in 
vading  party  aboard  either  ship.     If  the  seizure  was  justifiable  at  Contoy,  it 
would  have  been  so  anywhere  and  at  any  time  later;  an  impossible  supposition. 

3  Senate  resolution,  adopted  June  16,  1858.     This  action  was  the  result  of 
the  examination  of  vessels  under  the  American  flag,  by  British  cruisers  in 
search  of  slavers.     See  also  note  of  Mr.  Cass,  secretary  of  state,  to  Lord  Napier, 
British  minister,  April  10,  1858,  and  Lord  Malmesbury,  British  foreign  secre 
tary  to  Mr.  Dallas,  American  minister,  June  8,  1858  (Foreign  Relations,  1875, 
Part  II,  1191),  all  being  in  agreement  as  to  the  principle  of  the  Senate  resolution. 


1851]  SECOND  LOPEZ  EXPEDITION  237 

in  command  were  an  exiled  Hungarian,  Pragay,  and  Colonel  W.  S. 
Crittenden,  a  member  of  a  distinguished  family  in  Kentucky,  and 
who  had  served  with  distinction  in  the  Mexican  war.  Besides 
Pragay,  there  were  eight  other  Hungarians  and  nine  Germans, 
nearly  all  of  whom  occupied  leading  positions;  forty-nine  of  the 
expedition  were  Cubans. 

After  touching  at  Key  West  a  landing  was  made  on  the  night 
of  August  11,  1851,  at  Playtas,  some  sixty  miles  west  of  Havana, 
and  Lopez,  with  about  300  men,  advanced  some  six  miles  to  Las 
Pozas,  leaving  Colonel  Crittenden  with  the  remainder  of  the  force 
in  charge  of  the  baggage.  The  ship  was  sent  to  Florida.  Crit 
tenden  determining  to  join  Lopez,  was  attacked  on  his  way, 
August  13.  He  retreated  to  the  landing  place,  whence  fifty-two 
embarked  in  four  boats  found  in  the  vicinity,  with  a  vague 
idea  of  reaching  the  Florida  coast.  They  were,  however,  picked 
up  by  a  Spanish  cruiser  and  carried  to  Havana.  They  were  tried 
by  a  military  court  and  executed  as  "pirates"  August  16.  Among 
these  was  Colonel  Crittenden. 

The  main  body,  after  an  action  August  21  with  overwhelming 
Spanish  forces,  in  which  the  latter  lost  heavily  (among  them 
a  General  Enna),  was  scattered  in  the  forest.  Many  were  killed  by 
the  troops,  despite  a  proclamation  by  Captain-General  Jose  de  la 
Concha  offering  quarter  to  those  surrendering.  Lopez  was  taken 
by  the  treachery  of  a  Cuban  countryman  who  had  given  him 
shelter,  and  was  garroted  at  Havana,  September  1.  There  remained 
but  226  of  the  480  who  had  landed.  Of  these  135  were  sent  to 
Spain,  September  8,  under  sentence  of  hard  labor,  leaving  under 
like  sentence  25  in  hospital  and  16  in  prison  for  whom  the  transport 
had  no  room.  All  those  left  in  Havana  were  finally  released 
through  the  action  of  Commodore  Parker,  American  commander- 
in-chief  in  the  West  Indies,  who  had  been  named  by  the  Presi 
dent  a  special  commissioner  under  the  department  of  state  to  con 
fer  with  the  captain-general  of  Cuba.  Parker  reported:  "My 
opinion  is  that  the  Creoles  are  not  in  a  situation  to  throw  off  the 
Spanish  yoke,  even  if  they  wished  it,  and  that  no  invading  force 
coming  to  this  island  can  expect  aid  from  them." 1 

1  Commodore  Parker  to  secretary  of  state,  Flagship  Saranac,  Havana, 
September  12,  1851.  Senate  Doc.,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Vol.  I,  p.  33. 


238        PRESIDENT  FILLMORE'S  PROCLAMATION      [1851 

An  earnest  plea  for  the  pardon  of  those  sent  to  Spain  was  made 
through  the  American  minister,  at  Madrid,1  which  the  Spanish 
government  wisely  heeded,  as  removing  what  otherwise  would 
have  been  an  unending  source  of  irritation;  and  early  in  1852 
word  was  conveyed  by  the  Spanish  minister  to  the  department 
of  state  of  their  release. 

The  criminality  of  the  expedition  was  condemned  in  strongest 
terms  by  the  American  government.  "No  individuals,"  said 
President  Fillmore,  in  his  annual  message, December  2, 1851, "have 
a  right  to  hazard  the  peace  of  the  country,  or  to  violate  its  laws, 
upon  vague  notions  of  altering,  or  reforming,  governments  in 
other  states.  .  .  .  The  government  of  the  United  States,  at  all 
times  .  .  .  has  abstained,  and  has  sought  to  restrain  the  citizens 
of  the  country,  from  entering  into  controversies  between  other 
powers,  and  to  observe  all  the  duties  of  neutrality.  ...  In  the 
administration  of  Washington,  several  laws  were  passed  for  this 
purpose."  .  .  .  These,  as  re-ennacted  and  strengthened  in  1818, 
with  the  specific  understanding  that  the  action  was  mainly  for 
the  benefit  of  Spain,  were  quoted  by  the  President  with  an  ex 
pression  of  laudable  pride  in  the  fact  that  in  this  subject  the 
United  States  had  not  followed  but  led.2 

1  Mr.  Webster,  secretary  of  state,  to  Mr.  Barringer,  minister,  November  25, 
1851.  Webster,  Works,  VI,  513-517. 

a  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  such  expeditions  were  not  entirely  new 
elsewhere.  Six  expeditions  are  said  to  have  been  sent  from  London  to  the 
assistance  of  Venezuela  at  the  end  of  1817.  All  efforts  to  check  illegal  prep 
arations  for  South  American  service  in  British  ports  "  could  not  prevent  an 
Irish  and  English  brigade  of  two  thousand,  under  one  Colonel  English,  from 
sailing  in  June  (1818)  to  reach  the  insurgent  ports  before  August.  And 
other  expeditions  sailed  for  South  America  at  will."  (Recollections  of  a 
Service  of  Three  Years  ...  in  the  Republics  of  Venezuela  and  Colombia.  By 
an  Officer  of  the  Colombian  Navy.  2  vols.  London,  1828, 1,  6-19;  and  G. 
L.  Chesterton,  Narrative  of  Proceedings  in  Venezuela  .  .  .  1819  and  1820. 
London,  1820.  Quoted  by  Paxson,  Independence  of  South  American  Repub 
lics,  185.)  The  British  foreign  enlistment  bill,  introduced  May  13,  1819, 
"avowedly  based  on  the  recent  neutrality  act  of  the  United  States,"  was 
bitterly  opposed  in  Parliament,  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  one  of  the  leading 
members,  saying  that  he  considered  it  "  in  no  other  light  than  as  an  enact 
ment  to  repress  the  rising  liberty  of  the  South  Americans,  and  to  enable 
Spain  to  reimpose  the  yoke  of  tyranny  which  they  were  unable  to  bear,  and 
which  they  had  nobly  shaken  off  and  from  which  he  trusted  God  they  would 
finally  be  enabled  to  free  themselves,  whatever  attempts  were  made  by  the 
ministers  of  this  or  any  other  country  to  countenance  or  assist  their  oppres- 


1851]  MOB  ACTION  AT  NEW  ORLEANS  239 

The  arrival  at  New  Orleans  of  the  Crescent  City,  August  21, 
with  the  news  of  the  executions,  created  there,  where  there  was 
so  strong  a  sympathy  with  the  movement,  an  intense  excitement, 
with  the  result  that  a  mob  attacked  the  Spanish  consulate,  de 
stroying  the  archives  and  the  furniture,  defacing  the  portrait  of 
the  Queen  of  Spain,  and  tearing  to  pieces  the  Spanish  flag.  The 
printing  office  of  the  Spanish  newspaper,  La  Union,  was  com 
pletely  destroyed,  and  ten  Spanish  coffee  houses  and  cigar  shops 
wholly  or  partially  demolished.  The  riot  was  only  suppressed  by 
calling  out  the  militia.  The  Spanish  consul  placed  himself  and  the 
business  of  his  office  in  the  care  of  the  British  and  French  consuls. 

The  situation,  following  so  immediately  upon  the  difficulties 
caused  by  the  expedition  itself,  was  of  course  very  serious.  The 
Spanish  minister  called  upon  the  American  government  for  pro 
tection  to  Spanish  citizens,  and  for  satisfaction  and  indemnification 
to  the  sufferers. l 

The  absence  from  Washington  through  illness  of  Mr.  Webster, 
the  secretary  of  state,  caused  a  delay  in  reply  until  November  13, 
when  Webster  characterized  the  outrages  as  "disgraceful  acts,  and 
a  flagrant  breach  of  duty  and  propriety,"  stating  that  the  govern 
ment  "disapproves  of  them  as  seriously,  and  regrets  them  as 
deeply,  as  either  Mr.  Calderon  or  his  government  can  possibly 
do;  ...  but  the  outrage,  nevertheless,  was  one  perpetrated  by  a 
mob  composed  of  irresponsible  persons."  All  officials,  whether 
national,  state,  or  municipal,  "did  all  which  the  suddenness  of 
the  occasion  would  allow  to  prevent  it.  The  assembling  of  mobs 
happens  in  all  countries;  popular  violences  occasionally  break 
out  everywhere,  .  .  .  trampling  on  the  rights  of  citizens  and 

sors."  [Loud  cheers.]  (Hansard,  First  Series,  XL,  367-368.)  Strong  peti 
tions  were  sent  to  Parliament  against  the  passage  of  the  act.  One  was 
"subscribed  by  1,700  of  the  most  respectable  individuals  connected  with 
the  trade  of  London  "  (Ibid.,  858),  a  fact  which  shows  how  largely  the  South 
American  question  was,  in  Great  Britain,  a  question  of  commerce.  The  resist 
ance  to  the  bill  was  only  overborne  by  the  energy  of  Canning,  who,  later, 
April  26,  1823,  when  there  was  a  question  of  its  repeal,  paid  the  high  com 
pliment  to  the  United  States  of  saying:  "  If  I  wished  for  a  guide  in  a  system 
of  neutrality,  I  should  take  that  laid  down  by  America  in  the  days  of  the 
presidency  of  Washington  and  the  secretaryship  of  Jefferson."  (Hansard, 
New  Series,  VIII,  1056.) 

1  Senor  Calderon  de  la  Barca  to  department  of  state,  September  5,  1851. 
Senate  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Vol.  I,  p.  44.  — 


240  WEBSTER  TO  SPANISH  MINISTER  [1851 

private  men;  and  sometimes  on  those  of  public  officers  and  private 
governments,  especially  entitled  to  protection.  In  these  cases  the 
public  faith  and  national  honor  require,  not  only  that  such  out 
rages  should  be  disavowed,  but  also  that  the  perpetrators  of  them 
should  be  punished,  .  .  .  and  further  that  full  satisfaction  should 
be  made  in  cases  in  which  a  duty  to  that  effect  rests  with  the  govern 
ment.  .  .  .  The  government  of  the  United  States  would  earnestly 
deprecate  any  indignity  offered  in  this  country,  in  time  of  peace, 
to  the  flag  of  a  nation  so  ancient,  so  respectable,  so  renowned  as 
Spain.  .  .  .  Mr.  Calderon  expresses  the  opinion  that  not  only 
ought  indemnification  to  be  made  to  Mr.  Laborde,  her  Catholic 
Majesty's  consul,  for  injury  and  loss  of  property,  but  that  repara 
tion  is  due  ...  to  those  Spaniards  .  .  .  whose  property  was 
injured  or  destroyed  by  the  mob;  and  intimates  that  such  repara 
tion  had  been  verbally  promised  to  him;  .  .  .  but  while  this  govern 
ment  has  manifested  a  willingness  and  determination  to  perform 
every  duty  which  one  friendly  nation  has  a  right  to  expect  from 
another,  in  cases  of  this  kind  it  supposes  that  the  rights  of  the 
Spanish  consul,  a  public  officer  residing  here  under  the  protection 
of  the  United  States  government,  are  quite  different  from  those 
of  the  Spanish  subjects  who  have  come  into  the  country  to  mingle 
with  our  own  citizens,  and  here  to  pursue  their  private  business 
and  objects.  The  former  may  claim  special  indemnity;  the  latter 
are  entitled  to  such  protection  as  is  afforded  to  our  own  citizens. 
...  In  conclusion  ...  if  Mr.  Laborde  shall  return  to  his  post, 
or  any  other  consul  for  New  Orleans  shall  be  appointed  .  .  .  the 
officers  of  this  government,  resident  in  that  city,  will  be  instructed 
to  receive  and  treat  him  with  courtesy,  and  with  a  national  salute 
to  the  flag  of  his  ship,  if  he  shall  arrive  in  a  Spanish  vessel,  as  a 
demonstration  of  respect,  such  as  may  signify  to  him  and  to  his 
government,  the  sense  entertained  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States  of  the  gross  injustice  done  his  predecessor  by  a  lawless  mob 
as  well  as  the  indignity  and  insult  offered  by  it  to  a  foreign  state, 
with  which  the  United  States  are,  and  wish  ever  to  remain,  on  terms 
of  the  most  respectful  and  pacific  intercourse."  l 

1  Daniel  Webster,  secretary  of  state,  to  the  Spanish  minister,  November  13, 
1851.  (Senate  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Vol.  I,  62-65.  Webster,  Works,  VI, 
507-512.)  This  despatch  drew  a  compliment  even  from  Palmerston,  at  the 
time  British  foreign  minister.  See  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  556. 


1851]  FRENCH  AND  BRITISH  ACTION  241 

An  immediate  result  of  the  Lopez  expeditions  was  concurrent 
action  by  France  and  England;  announcement  being  made  to  the 
department  of  state,  September  27,  1851,  by  Mr.  Crampton,  the 
British  charge*  d'affaires,  that  orders  had  been  given  to  the  British 
squadron  in  the  West  Indies  "to  prevent  by  force  any  adven 
turers  of  any  nation  from  landing  with  hostile  intent  upon  the 
island  of  Cuba,"  followed,  October  8,  by  information  from  the 
French  minister  that  like  action  had  been  taken  by  France. 

That  such  surveillance  should  be  submitted  to  by  the  United 
States  was  impossible.  President  Fillmore  at  once  wrote  Mr. 
Webster,  who  was  at  this  time  at  Marshfield:  "Any  attempt  to 
prevent  such  expeditions  by  British  cruisers  must  necessarily 
involve  a  right  of  search  into  our  whole  mercantile  marine  in 
those  seas  .  .  .  and  [is]  well  calculated  to  disturb  the  friendly  re 
lations  now  existing."  Webster  replied  that  "this  could  never 
be  submitted  to."  l  The  French  minister,  the  Count  de  Sartiges, 
was  informed  by  the  department  of  state  of  the  gravity  with  which 
such  action  was  viewed.2 

Acting  upon  the  "anxious  desire"  of  the  Spanish  government 
that,  "  through  the  friendly  interest  and  influence  of  England,  an 
abnegatory  declaration  on  the  part  of  France  and  the  United 
States,  and  England  of  course,  might  be  made  with  regard  to 
Cuba," 3  the  British  and  French  ministers  at  Washington  pre 
sented  identic  notes,  April  23,  1852,  enclosing  the  draft  of  a  triple 
agreement  which  declared  that  "  the  high  contracting  parties  here 
by  severally  and  collectively  disclaim,  both  now  and  for  hereafter, 
all  intention  to  obtain  possession  of  the  island  of  Cuba;  and 
they  respectively  bind  themselves  to  discountenance  all  attempt 
to  that  effect  on  the  part  of  any  power  or  individuals  whatever. 

"The  high  contracting  parties  declare,  severally  and  collectively, 
that  they  will  not  obtain  or  maintain  for  themselves,  or  for  any  one 
of  themselves,  any  exclusive  control  over  the  said  island,  nor  as 
sume  nor  exercise  any  dominion  over  the  same."  4 

1  Mr.  Fillmore  to  Mr.  Webster,  October  2;  Webster  to  Fillmore,  October  4, 
1851.     Curtis^  Webster,  II,  551. 

2  Crittenden  to  De  Sartiges,  October  22, 1851,  Senate  Docs.,  32  Cong.,  1  Seas., 
1,76. 

3  Lord  Howden  to  Earl  Granville,  January  9,  1852,  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XLIV.  4  Senate  Doc.  13,  32  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


242  FRENCH  AND  BRITISH  NOTES  [1852 

Mr.  Webster's  note  in  reply  was  but  little  more  than  an  acknowl 
edgment  of  the  reception  of  the  proposal,  in  which  he  took  pains 
to  restate  the  position  of  the  United  States  government  in  the 
words:  "It  has  been  stated,  and  often  repeated,  to  the  government 
of  Spain  by  this  government  and  under  various  administrations, 
not  only  that  the  United  States  have  no  design  upon  Cuba  them 
selves,  but  that  if  Spain  should  refrain  from  a  voluntary  cession  of 
the  island  to  any  other  European  power,  she  might  rely  on  the 
countenance  and  friendship  of  the  United  States  to  assist  her  in 
the  defence  and  preservation  of  that  island."  While  stating  that 
the  President  would  take  the  communications  into  consideration 
and  give  them  "  his  best  reflections,"  he  recalled  that  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  "has  been  uniformly  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible, 
alliances  or  agreements  with  other  states,  and  to  keep  itself  free 
from  national  obligations,  except  such  as  affect  directly  the  in 
terests  of  the  United  States  themselves." 

After  waiting  two  months,  the  subject  was  again  brought  for 
ward  by  the  British  and  French  representatives  in  identic  notes, 
July  8,  1852,  which  laid  stress  upon  the  indefeasibility  of  the 
Spanish  title  and  the  importance  of  the  island  with  reference  to 
the  proposed  isthmian  canals  and  its  permanent  neutrality,  which 
would  be  assured  by  the  agreement  proposed.  The  notes  dwelt 
also  upon  the  existing  Spanish  obligations  to  both  countries,  saying : 
"You  are  no  doubt  aware  that  British  and  French  subjects,  as 
well  as  the  French  government,  are,  on  different  accounts,  creditors 
of  Spain  for  large  sums  of  money.  The  expense  of  keeping  up 
an  armed  force  in  the  island  of  Cuba  of  twenty-five  thousand  men 
is  heavy,  and  obstructs  the  government  of  Spain  in  the  efforts  which 
they  make  to  fulfil  their  pecuniary  engagements.  By  putting  an  end 
to  the  state  of  apprehension  which  is  the  cause  of  those  armaments, 
we  should  increase  to  Spain  the  means  of  meeting  those  engage 
ments.  This  consideration  is,  no  doubt,  applicable  more  particu 
larly  to  Spain,  to  England,  and  to  France;  but  there  are  others 
which  apply  more  generally  to  the  commercial  interests  of  all 
nations,  and  especially  to  the  commercial  interests  of  the  United 
States,  which  are  greater  than  those  of  any  other  nation  in  Cuba. 

1  Webster  to  British  and  French  ministers,  April  29,  1852.  Ibid.  Also 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  44,  122.  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  460. 


1852]  EVERETT'S  REPLY  243 

One  of  these  considerations  is  that,  in  the  present  state  of  things, 
we  cannot  reasonably  expect  Spain  to  take  any  measure  toward 
lowering  her  tariff  at  Havana.  .  .  .  But  if,  by  the  guarantee  of  quiet 
possession  which  the  proposed  declaration  of  the  great  maritime 
powers  would  confer,  Spain  should  be  enabled  to  diminish  her 
military  force  in  Cuba,  she  might  probably  be  induced  to  relieve 
foreign  commerce  there  from  the  charges  which  now  press  upon  it ; 
and  of  this  foreign  commerce,  as  I  have  observed,  the  United  States 
have  by  far  the  largest  share."  l 

Before  these  could  be  answered  Webster  had  become  very  ill; 
he  died  October  24,  1852,  and  the  duty  devolved  upon  Mr.  Edward 
Everett  who  became  the  new  secretary  of  state,  and  who,  December 
1,  sent  a  note  dealing  with  the  subject  at  great  length  and  with  a 
completeness  which  ended  the  proposal.  He  recalled  the  large  ex 
tensions  of  French  dominion  in  the  previous  twenty  years  on  the 
northern  coast  of  Africa,  and  of  England  throughout  the  world  in 
the  previous  fifty  years,  which  had  created  no  uneasiness  [on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  and  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  the 
last,  which  had  done  nothing  to  disturb  tl  -f  Europe. 

"But  the  case  would  be  different  in  reference  to  the  transfer  of 
Cuba  from  Spain  to  any  other  European  power.  That  event 
.  .  .  could  not  but  awaken  alarm  in  the  United  States.  .  .  .  M.  de 
Turgot2  states  that  France  could  never  see  with  indifference  the 
possession  of  Cuba  by  any  power  but  Spain,  and  explicitly  de 
clares  that  she  has  no  wish  or  intention  of  appropriating  the  island 
to  herself;  and  the  English  minister  makes  the  same  avowal  on 
behalf  of  his  government.  M.  de  Turgot  and  Lord  Malmesbury 
do  the  government  of  the  United  States  no  more  than  justice  in  re 
marking,  that  they  have  often  pronounced  themselves  substan 
tially  in  the  same  sense.  The  President  does  not  covet  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Cuba  for  the  United  States;  at  the  same  time  he  considers 
the  condition  of  Cuba  mainly  an  American  question.  The  pro 
posed  convention  proceeds  on  a  different  principle.  It  assumes  that 
the  United  States  have  no  other  or  greater  interest  in  the  question 
than  France  or  England.  .  .  .  No  such  convention  would  be 
viewed  with  favor  by  the  Senate.  Its  certain  rejection  .  .  .  would 
leave  the  question  of  Cuba  in  a  more  unsettled  condition  than 

1  Senate  Doc.  13,  32  Cong.,  2  Sess  3  French  foreign  minister. 


244  EVERETT'S  REPLY  [1852 

it  is  now,  ...  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  constitution 
.  .  .  would  allow  the  treaty-making  power  to  impose  a  permanent 
disability  upon  the  .  .  .  government  for  all  coming  time,  and 
[referring  to  previous  purchases  of  territory]  prevent  it  ...  from 
doing  what  has  been  often  done  in  times  past.  .  .  .  The  President 
.  .  .  has  no  wish  to  disguise  the  feeling  that  the  compact,  though 
equal  in  terms,  would  be  very  unequal  in  substance.  .  .  .  The 
island  of  Cuba  lies  at  our  doors.  It  commands  the  approach  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  which  washes  the  shores  of  five  of  our  states.  It 
bars  the  entrance  of  that  great  river  which  drains  half  the  North 
American  continent.  ...  It  keeps  watch  at  the  doorway  of  our 
intercourse  with  California  by  the  isthmus  route.  If  an  island  like 
Cuba,  belonging  to  the  Spanish  crown,  guarded  the  entrance 
of  the  Thames  and  the  Seine,  and  the  United  States  should  propose 
a  convention  like  this  to  France  and  England,  those  powers  would 
assuredly  feel  that  the  disability  assumed  by  ourselves  was  far 
less  serious  than  that  which  we  asked  them  to  assume.  .  .  . 

T?or  <^~n-  of'>  roaoon*  .  .  .  the  President  thinks  that  the  incor- 
porabo"  of  tb'  1r>rid  into  the  Union  at  the  present  time,  although 
effected  with  the  consent  of  Spain,  would  be  a  hazardous  measure, 
and  IK  ider  its  acquisition  by  force,  except  in  a  just  war 

with  Spain,  .  .  .  as  a  disgrace  to  the  civilization  of  the  age.  .  .  . 
He  has  thrown  the  whole  force  of  his  constitutional  powers  against 
all  illegal  attacks  upon  the  island.  It  would  have  been  perfectly  easy 
...  to  allow  projects  of  a  formidable  character  to  gather  strength 
by  connivance.  No  amount  of  obloquy  at  home,  no  embarrass 
ments  caused  by  the  indiscretion  of  the  colonial  government  of 
Cuba,  have  moved  him  from  the  path  of  duty  in  this  respect.  The 
captain-general  of  that  island  .  .  .  has,  on  a  punctilio  in  reference 
to  the  purser  of  a  private  steamship  (who  seems  to  have  been  entirely 
innocent  of  the  matters  laid  to  his  charge),  refused  to  allow  the 
passengers  and  mails  of  the  United  States  to  be  landed  from  a 
vessel  having  him  on  board.  .  .  .  The  captain-general  is  not  per 
mitted  by  his  government,  three  thousand  miles  off,  to  hold  any 
diplomatic  intercourse  with  the  United  States.  He  is  subject  in  no 
degree  to  the  direction  of  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington;  and 
the  President  has  to  choose  between  a  resort  to  force,  to  compel  the 
abandonment  of  this  gratuitous  interruption  of  commercial  inter- 


1852]  EVERETT'S  REPLY  245 

course  (which  would  result  in  war),  and  a  delay  of  weeks  and 
months,  necessary  for  a  negotiation  with  Madrid.  .  .  . 

That  a  convention  such  as  is  proposed  \vould  be  a  transitory 
arrangement,  sure  to  be  swept  away  by  the  irresistible  tide  of  affairs 
in  a  new  country,  is  ...  too  obvious  to  require  a  labored  argu 
ment.  .  .  .  Can  it  be  for  the  interest  of  Spain  to  cling  to  a  pos 
session  that  can  only  be  maintained  by  a  garrison  of  twenty-five  or 
thirty  thousand  troops,  a  powerful  naval  force,  and  an  annual 
expenditure  for  both  arms  of  the  service  of  at  least  twelve  millions 
of  dollars?  Cuba,  at  this  moment,  costs  more  to  Spain  than  the 
entire  naval  and  military  establishment  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

"  I  will  but  allude  to  an  evil  of  the  first  magnitude:  I  mean  the 
African  slave-trade  ...  for  which  it  is  feared  there  is  no  hope  of 
a  complete  remedy  while  Cuba  remains  a  Spanish  colony.  .  .  . 

"  The  President  is  convinced  that  the  conclusion  of  such  a  treaty 
.  .  .  would  strike  a  death-blow  to  the  conservative  policy  hith 
erto  pursued  in  this  country  toward  Cuba.  No  administration 
of  this  government  .  .  .  could  stand  a  day  under  the  odium 
of  having  stipulated  with  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  that  in  no 
future  time,  under  no  change  of  circumstances,  by  no  amicable 
arrangement  with  Spain,  by  no  act  of  lawful  war  (should  that 
calamity  unfortunately  occur),  by  no  consent  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  island,  should  they,  like  the  possessions  of  Spain  on  the  Ameri 
can  continent,  succeed  in  rendering  themselves  independent;  in 
fine,  by  no  overruling  necessity  of  self-preservation,  should  the 
United  States  ever  make  the  acquisition  of  Cuba."  1 

This  paper,  somewhat  over-rhetorical  and  of  much  length,  is 
distinguished  for  the  frankness  and  completeness  of  its  exposition 
of  American  policy.  The  fact  that  Cuba,  more  than  half  a  century 
later,  is  still  not  a  part  of  the  Union,  is  standing  and  forcible  evi 
dence  of  the  honesty  of  its  statements. 

Lord  John  Russell,  who  had  succeeded  Lord  Malmesbury  as 
British  foreign  minister,  replied,  February  16,  1853.  He  indulged 
in  some  weak  and  unbecoming  sarcasm  as  to  its  length  and  its 
historic  detail.  He  closed:  "While  fully  admitting  the  right  of 
the  United  States  to  reject  the  proposal,  .  .  .  Great  Britain  must 
at  once  resume  her  entire  liberty;  and  upon  any  occasion  that 
1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  13,  32  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  460-470. 


246  THE  "CRESCENT  CITY"  [1852 

may  call  for  it,  be  free  to  act,  either  singly  or  in  conjunction  with 
other  powers,  as  to  her  may  seem  fit." 

His  reply,  as  also  a  similar  one  from  the  French  government, 
was  presented  by  Mr.  Crampton,  April  18, 1853,  to  Mr.  Marcy,  now 
secretary  of  state.  The  incident  was  mutually  regarded  as  closed.1 

±  secondary  result  of  the  Lopez  enterprise  was  an  increased 
tyranny  of  conduct  in  Cuban  affairs,  and  an  exasperating  inter 
ference  with  American  shipping  which  was  to  last,  in  many  phases, 
to  the  end  of  Spanish  rule.  The  case  recalled  by  Mr.  Everett  in  his 
notes  to  the  British  and  French  ministers  was  that  of  the  Crescent 
City,  one  of  a  line  of  mail  steamers  between  New  York  and  New 
Orleans,  touching  at  Havana.  The  ships  were  commanded  by 
officers  of  the  navy,  allowed  leave  for  the  purpose,  the  captain  of 
the  Crescent  City  being  Lieutenant  David  D.  Porter,  later  the  dis 
tinguished  admiral. 

The  captain-general,  moved  by  an  offensive  article  against  the 
government  of  the  island  which  he  stated  had  appeared  in  one  of 
the  New  York  papers,  though  neither  the  article  itself  nor  its 
character  was  ever  specified  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  on  Septem 
ber  21, 1852,  ordered  that  the  purser,  William  Smith,  of  the  Crescent 
City,  whom  he  accused  as  the  author,  should  not  be  allowed  to 
land  in  Cuba,  and  "if,  in  future,  said  individual  should  return  in 
any  of  the  steamers  of  the  company,  or  any  other  person  employed 
on  them  should  take  the  liberty  to  abuse  in  a  similar  manner  the 

1  Mr.  Everett,  now  in  private  life,  felt  called  upon  to  make  a  personal  reply 
of  great  length  to  Lord  John  Russell,  which  might  as  well  have  been  left 
unmade.  The  principal  point,  beyond  the  iteration  of  much  he  had  said 
in  the  previous  paper,  was  to  recall,  in  answer  to  certain  banalities  in 
Lord  John's  paper  regarding  "duty  to  our  neighbors,"  the  expedition  of 
General  Torrijos,  in  1831,  "fitted  out  in  the  Thames,  without  interruption 
till  the  last  moment,  and  though  it  then  fell  under  the  grasp  of  the  police, 
its  members  succeeded  in  escaping  to  Spain,  where,  for  some  time,  they  found 
shelter  at  Gibraltar.  It  is  declared,"  said  Everett,  "in  the  last  number 
of  the  Quarterly  Review  to  be  '  notorious  that  associations  have  been  formed 
in  London  for  the  subversion  of  dynasties  with  which  England  is  at  peace; 
that  arms  have  been  purchased  and  loans  proposed;  that  "Central  Commit 
tees  "  issue  orders  from  England,  and  that  Messrs.  Mazzini  and  Kossuth  have 
established  and  preside  over  boards  of  regency  for  the  Roman  States  and 
Hungary,  and  for  the  promotion  of  revolution  in  every  part  of  the  world.'  " 
(Everett's  pamphlet,  Correspondence  on  the  Proposed  Tripartite  Convention 
Relative  to  Cuba,  Little,  Brown  and  Company,  1853,  in  which  appears  the 
whole  correspondence). 


1852]  THE  " CRESCENT  CITY"  247 

privileges  that  the  Spanish  authorities  offer  him  in  the  ports  of  this 
island,  this  sole  act  will  be  sufficient  not  to  allow  entry  to  the 
vessel  conveying  him,  whatsoever  the  losses  may  be  that  such  a 
measure  may  accrue  to  the  company;  for  although  the  company 
may  not  have  it  in  their  power  to  prevent  their  subordinates  from 
committing  such  excesses,  their  honor  and  interest  must  im 
mediately  oblige  them  to  immediately  withdraw  their  trust  from 
any  one  that  should  attempt  to  compromit  them  foolishly."  1 

It  would  be  difficult  to  cite  a  more  childish  exhibition  of  auto 
cratic  and  irresponsible  power  than  this  order  afforded.  On  Octo 
ber  3  the  Crescent  City,  on  her  arrival  at  Havana,  was  peremp 
torily  ordered  to  leave  the  port,  and  was  not  allowed  to  land 
either  her  mails  or  the  sixty-five  passengers  she  had  aboard  from 
New  York  for  Cuba.  On  her  return  from  New  Orleans,  October 
14,  she  entered  the  port,  but  was  again  obliged  to  leave  without  com 
municating. 

The  order  was  suspended  on  the  ship's  arrival,  November  16, 
from  New  Orleans,  but  the  captain  was  informed  that  she  would 
be  positively  excluded  on  her  return  from  New  York,  should  Purser 
Smith  be  aboard.2 

The  reception  of  an  affidavit  from  Smith,  an  old  and  respected 
officer  of  the  company,  that  he  was  entirely  innocent  of  the  offence 
charged,  a  copy  of  which  the  American  secretary  of  state  weakly 
sent  to  the  Spanish  minister,3  caused  a  revocation  of  the  order. 

The  remonstrance  made  to  Spain  by  the  American  govern 
ment  before  this  could  be  known  had  brought  from  the  former 
an  emphatic  approval  of  the  course  of  the  captain-general,  as 
necessary  in  the  situation  of  the  island,  "  constantly  menaced  with 
invasion  by  bands  of  adventurers,  who  collect  in  the  United  States, 
who  there  conspire,  who  there  distribute  arms  and  money,  who 
there  print  incendiary  libels,  and  who,  united  with  some  Cubans 
proscribed  by  the  laws  as  traitors  to  the  laws  of  their  country, 
exert  themselves  to  light  up  the  fire  of  sedition."  4 

The  American  minister  correctly  measured  the  situation  when 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  86,  33  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  7.  2  Ibid.,  14. 

3  Everett  to  Calderon  de  la  Barca,  November  15,  1852,  Ibid.,  36. 

4  Sefior  Manuel  Bertran  de  Lis,  Spanish  secretary  of  state,  to  Mr.  Barringer, 
American  minister,  December  8,  1852,  Ibid.,  54. 


OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY 


248  AMERICAN  PROTESTS  [1852 

he  said:  "The  policy  of  the  Spanish  government,  as  far  as  the 
same  can  be  carried  out  without  an  actual  interruption  of  peaceful 
relations,  will  be  that  of  non-intercourse  between  our  people  and 
the  island  of  Cuba.  .  .  .  The  difficulties  of  adjusting  all  commer 
cial  questions  with  a  people  and  government  so  wedded  to  anti 
quated  and  obsolete  ideas,  may  well  be  inferred  from  the  recent 
correspondence  ...  on  the  subject  of  the  refusal  of  [Spain]  to  ... 
place  American  shipping  in  the  Peninsula  and  adjacent  islands 
on  a  footing  with  that  of  other  nations.  The  tone  assumed,  and 
the  policy  pursued,  toward  the  United  States,  .  .  .  may  be  fairly 
attributed  not  only  to  their  devotion  to  ancient  prejudices  and 
notions  of  government  and  their  want  of  a  true  knowledge  of  our 
people  and  institutions,  but  to  expectations  of  foreign  aid  for  the 
security  of  the  island  of  Cuba  to  the  Spanish  crown,  in  the  event 
of  a  rupture  with  the  United  States."  1 

The  American  minister  energetically  protested  against  the  ex 
clusion  of  "any  American  vessel  from  the  ports  of  Cuba  because 
she  may  have  one  objectionable  person  on  board  .  .  .  more  es 
pecially  when  that  vessel  partakes  of  a  public  character,  by  being 
employed  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  for  the  trans 
portation  and  delivery  of  the  public  mail,  and  is  commanded  by 
an  officer  of  the  war  marine  for  that  purpose.  .  .  .  Such  a  course 
is  a  gross  violation  of  that  international  comity  on  which  is  founded 
almost  all  commercial  intercourse."  2 

The  United  States  executive  was  directing  its  efforts,  however, 
against  a  practically  irresponsible  authority.  Its  weakness  in  not 
pressing  the  Spanish  government  to  a  disclaimer  of  the  captain- 
general's  conduct  in  the  case  of  the  Crescent  City  had  its  natural 
effect  in  a  continuance  of  like  unjustifiable  interference  with  the 
ordinary  and  necessary  movements  of  shipping,  the  mail  steamer 
Ohio,  for  example,  from  Colon  to  New  York,  belonging  to  a  line 
which  at  this  period  was  almost  the  only  means  of  communication 
with  California,  being  detained  nearly  three  days  on  putting  into 
Havana  for  coal,  on  April  10,  1853,  without  being  able  to  com 
municate  with  the  shore.  The  ship  carried  the  mails,  had  on  board 

1  Mr.  Barringer  to  Mr.  Everett,  December  14,  1852,  House  Ex.  Doc.  86,  33 
Cong.,  1  Sess.,  54. 

2  Mr.  Barringer  to  Spanish  minister  of  state,  December  12,  1852,  Ibid.,  57. 


1853]  THE  CASE  OF  THE   "OHIO"  249 

four  hundred  and  fifty-six  passengers,  some  fifty  of  whom  were 
expecting  to  land  at  Havana  to  proceed  thence  to  New  Orleans, 
and  two  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars  in  gold.  She  had  a  clean  bill 
of  health,  and  the  health  officers  who  came  alongside,  but  not 
aboard,  were  informed  that  the  only  sick  were  some  few  cases  of 
the  ordinary  Panama  malarial  fever. 

Without  making  .any  further  investigation,  the  captain  was 
ordered  to  remain  where  he  was,  not  to  approach  the  coal  wharf, 
and  not  to  communicate  in  any  way  with  the  shore.  An  armed 
guard  was  stationed  to  prevent  any  passengers  from  leaving  the 
ship,  and  the  captain  was  refused  permission  even  to  send  a  letter 
to  the  consul.  Permission  was  given  to  coal  from  lighters,  the 
small  force  of  the  ship  only  to  be  employed.  The  ship,  however, 
was  finally  set  at  liberty  by  the  volunteering  of  a  Spanish  naval 
surgeon  to  come  aboard  and  make  a  personal  examination  and 
assure  the  authorities  as  to  the  safety  of  the  conditions.1 

The  procedure  of  the  authorities  in  this  instance,  though  show 
ing  a  high-handed  disregard  of  the  ordinary  comity  which  should 
facilitate  the  movements  of  the  ships  of  a  friendly  power,  was 
evidently  the  outcome  of  unreasoning  fear,  as  shown  in  the  failure 
of  the  health  officers  to  examine  the  ship.  The  protest  of  the 
American  government,  however,  but  brought  a  statement  from 
the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  who,  referring  to  a  phrase  used  by 
the  American  minister,  said  that "  the  only  analogy  which,  for  my 
part,  I  encounter  between  these  two  cases  [of  the  Crescent  City  and 
the  Ohio]  is,  that  in  the  case  of  the  Crescent  City  the  government 
of  your  excellency  recognized  explicitly,  as  I  flatter  myself  it  will 
on  this  occasion,  the  right  of  the  captain-general  of  the  island  of 
Cuba  to  take,  by  virtue  of  the  powers  with  which  he  is  invested, 
whatsoever  measure,  however  restrictive  may  be  its  character,  which 
he  may  consider  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  island  whose 
government  is  given  him  in  charge."  2  The  captain-general  was 
thus  declared  above  the  law,  either  municipal  or  international. 
It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  with  such  powers,  and  in  face 
of  the  weakness  which  had  been  exhibited  by  the  American 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  86,  33  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  87. 

*  General  Lersundi,  minister  of  state,  to  Mr.  Barringer,  June  15,  1853, 
Ibid.,  89.  (  Italics  in  original. ) 


250  CAPTAIN-GENERAL  ABOVE  LAW  [1853 

'government  in  the  cases  of  the  Georgiana  and  Susan  Loud  and 
in  that  of  the  Crescent  City,  American  vessels  should  be  con 
tinued  to  be  fired  upon,  boarded,  and  sometimes  searched  on  the 
high  seas,  as  had  already  occurred  in  the  case  of  the  mail  steamer 
Falcon,  August  16,  1851,1  and  was  to  occur,  March  31,  1853,  in  the 
case  of  the  ship  Harriet.  Ignorance,  despotic  authority,  and  a  total 
disregard  of  international  usage  and  right,  seem  at  this  time  to 
have  characterized  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  government  toward 
the  United  States,  both  in  the  Peninsula  and  in  Cuba. 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  86,  33  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  129. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    CASE    OF    THE    BLACK     WARRIOR:      THE    OSTEND    MANIFESTO 

PIERRE  SOULE,  French  in  birth  and  rearing;  an  exiled  revolu 
tionist  who  had  come  to  New  Orleans;  who  had  thriven  in  its 
Gallic  atmosphere,  and  had  become  United  States  senator  from 
Louisiana,  was  now  appointed  minister  to  Spain.  His  attitude 
toward  the  French  government,  not  only  in  earlier  days,  but  later, 
when  he  was  accused  of  holding  communication  with  the  new 
emperor's  adversaries;1  his  avowed  sympathy  with  the  filibusters 
shown  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate  just  before  his  appointment;2  the 
speeches  made  in  Washington  in  reply  to  felicitations,  and  in  New 
York  when,  cheered  and  serenaded  just  before  sailing  by  a  vast 
crowd  in  which  were  several  Cuban  revolutionary  associations,8 
made  his  appointment  a  wholly  improper  one,  and  one  to  which 
the  Spanish  government  could  most  justly  have  objected. 

At  no  time  in  American  history  did  the  pro-slavery  leaders  feel 
themselves  more  firmly  seated;  the  Mexican  war,  a  distinctively 
Southern  war,  had  been  brought  to  a  triumphant  conclusion; 
Texas  had  been  secured,  and  there  was  now  a  distinct  policy  of 
further  territorial  extension  to  increase  slave  territory,  and  this 
French  "fire-eater,"  with  as  little  of  the  American  in  his  mental 
and  psychic  make-up  as  could  well  be  found,  was  sent  to  represent 
the  United  States  at  a  point  where  he  could  only  arouse  distrust 
and  antagonism,  with  the  hope,  on  the  part  of  those  who  caused 
his  appointment  by  the  President,  that  the  threatening  bluster 
which  was  part  of  his  character  would  succeed  in  carrying  out 
their  views  as  to  Cuba.  An  indication  of  what  was  to  come  was 
given  in  the  speech  prepared  for  his  audience  on  presentation  of 
his  credentials,  which  contained  such  allusions  to  other  powers 

1  Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  IV,  558. 

2  The  speech  was  made  January  25,  1853. 
8  Sedano,  Estudios  Politicos,  119. 

251 


252  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  SOULE  [1853 

that  he  was  requested  by  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  to  modify  it. 
He  thus  delivered,  on  his  presentation  at  the  end  of  October, 
1853,  a  short,  and  what  he  called  in  his  despatch  communicating 
the  event,  an  "emasculated  and  insipid  harangue,"  well  satisfied, 
however,  to  have  been  received  at  all,  as  he  remarks  of  his  pres 
entation  that  "the  strange,  though  altogether  unaccountable, 
emotion  created  by  my  appearance  here  in  the  official  character 
which  I  hold,  has  happily  subsided,  and  I  may  now  address  you, 
free  from  the  anxiety  which  I  had  been,  for  some  time  past,  labor 
ing  under,  in  anticipation  of  the  obstacles  which  it  was  supposed 
my  admittance  at  this  court  would  have  to  encounter."  l 

While  Soule"s  appointment  was  of  this  objectionable  character, 
the  instructions  from  Mr.  Marcy,  July  23,  1853,  differed  but  little 
in  tenor  from  those  of  so  many  of  his  predecessors  in  the  office  of 
secretary  of  state.  "Nothing  will  be  done,"  said  Mr.  Marcy,  as  to 
Cuba,  "on  our  part  to  disturb  its  present  connection  with  Spain, 
unless  the  character  of  that  connection  should  be  so  changed  as  to 
affect  our  present  or  prospective  security.  While  the  United  States 
would  resist  at  every  hazard  the  transference  of  Cuba  to  any 
European  nation,  they  would  exceedingly  regret  to  see  Spain  re 
sorting  to  any  power  for  assistance  to  uphold  her  rule  over  it.  ... 
While  Spain  remains,  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name,  the  sovereign  of 
Cuba,  she  can  depend  upon  our  maintaining  our  duty  as  a 
neutral  nation  toward  her,  however  difficult  it  may  be.  ... 
Under  certain  conditions  the  United  States  might  be  willing  to 
purchase  [Cuba];  but  it  is  scarcely  expected  that  you  will  find 
Spain,  should  you  attempt  to  ascertain  her  views  upon  the  subject, 
at  all  inclined  to  enter  into  such  a  negotiation.  There  is  reason 
to  believe  that  she  is  under  obligations  to  Great  Britain  and  France 
not  to  transfer  the  island  to  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The  sort  of 
joint  protest  by  England  and  France  against  some  of  the  views 
presented  in  Mr.  Everett's  letter  of  the  2d  of  December  would 
alone  be  satisfactory  proof  of  such  an  arrangement.  ...  In  the 
present  aspect  of  the  case,  the  President  does  not  deem  it  proper 
to  authorize  you  to  make  any  proposition  for  the  purchase  of  that 
island.  .  .  .  The  United  States  would  cordially  favor  ...  a  vol- 

1  For  both  addresses,  see  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.  (Vol.  X),  p. 
12. 


1853]  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  MINISTERS  253 

untary  separation  and,  if  necessary  to  effect  it,  would  be  willing 
to  contribute  something  more  substantial  than  their  good-will 
toward  an  object  so  desirable  to  them.  .  .  .  On  this  interesting 
subject  this  department  is  very  desirous  of  obtaining  early  and  full 
information.  .  .  .  On  the  supposition  that  no  change  is  to  take 
place  in  the  relations  between  Spain  and  Cuba — that  arbitrary 
power  by  the  former  is  for  some  time  to  repress  discontent  in  the 
latter — this  government  has  a  right  to  demand  exemption  from 
the  annoyances  which  are  likely  to  result  from  such  a  condition 
of  things.  Our  flag  must  be  respected,  and  our  commerce  relieved 
from  embarrassment  by  the  Cuban  authorities.  The  United 
States  will  not  submit  to  have  their  merchant  vessels,  though  in 
the  vicinity  of  that  island,  searched  or  detained  on  their  lawful 
voyages.  ...  If  the  unquiet  condition  of  Cuba  has  rendered  it 
necessary,  in  the  judgment  of  Spain,  to  adopt  harsh  and  stringent 
measures,  .  .  .  she  is  bound  to  take  every  precaution  to  prevent 
the  evils  of  such  a  policy  from  reaching  the  citizens  of  other  govern 
ments.  Our  past  experience  shows  that  when  such  is  the  case, 
these  evils  are  aggravated  by  the  embarrassments  thrown  in  the 
way  of  obtaining  redress.  The  captain-general  is  not  vested  with 
the  power  of  holding  political  intercourse  with  the  governments 
or  consuls  of  the  injured  or  complaining  party  ...  it  seems  to  be 
almost  necessary  that  there  should  be  allowed  a  qualified  diplo 
matic  intercourse  between  the  captain-general  of  that  island  and 
our  consul  at  Havana  in  order  to  prevent  difficulties,  and  preserve 
a  good  understanding  between  the  two  countries." 

In  the  same  month  Mr.  Buchanan,  now  the  American  minister  to 
Great  Britain,  was  instructed  "  to  ascertain  as  fully  as  possible  the 
views  of  the  British  government  in  regard  to  Cuba,  and  what  ar 
rangement,  if  any,  she  has  entered  into  or  contemplates  with  Spain, 
either  by  herself  or  conjointly  with  France,  relative  to  that  island." 
He  was  also  directed  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  British  government 
the  continuance  of  the  slave-trade.  He  was  told  that  "  in  spite  of  all 
that  has  been  promised  by  Spain,  and  all  that  has  been  done  by 
other  powers  to  suppress  [it],  the  possession  of  Cuba  by  Spain 
favors  its  continuance,  and  is  a  formidable  obstacle  to  its  sup 
pression."  2 

1  In  full,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.  a  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


254  GREAT  BRITAIN'S  ATTITUDE  [1853 

The  apprehensions  of  the  American  government  were  natural 
in  view  of  the  sympathetic  relations  of  France  and  Great  Britain, 
not  only  in  the  subject  of  Cuba,  but  in  general  policy,  as  soon  to  be 
shown  by  allied  action  in  war.  The  pressure  of  England  upon 
Spain  for  a  guarantee  to  long-outstanding  Spanish  bonds  held 
by  British  subjects  was  ominous,  and  it  was  known  that  the 
interest  of  the  British  government  in  suppressing  the  continued 
traffic  in  Cuba  in  African  slaves  and  in  freeing  those  already  there 
was  not  wholly  altruistic,  such  suppression  and  freedom  being 
considered  as  "a  most  powerful  element  of  resistance  to  any 
scheme  for  annexing  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  where  slavery 
exists."  * 

In  1853,  however,  the  British  government  took  a  higher  plane, 
and  the  question  of  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade  was  treated 
apart  from  that  of  freeing  the  slaves  already  in  Cuba,  the  British 
ambassador  in  Spain  being  informed  that  "whatever  may  be 
the  interests  of  this  country  [England]  not  to  see  Cuba  in  the 
hands  of  any  other  power  than  Spain;  yet  in  the  eyes  of  the  people 
of  this  country  the  destruction  of  a  trade  which  conveys  the 
natives  of  Africa  to  become  slaves  in  Cuba  will  furnish  a  large 
compensation  for  such  a  transfer.  For  such  an  exhibition  of 
public  feeling  the  government  of  Spain  should  be  prepared."  2 

Soule*  found  the  Spanish  government  "ill  inclined  to  favor 
any  policy  which  might  tend  to  bring  Spain  to  a  closer  connection 
with  the  United  States."  The  much-desired  commercial  treaty 
was  impossible.  The  foreign  minister,  Calderon,  was  "no  less 
opposed"  to  any  alteration  in  the  relations  between  the  captain- 
general  of  Cuba  and  the  American  consul  at  Havana.3  Soule* 
struck,  however,  upon  at  least  one  truth.  "France,  for  reasons 
unknown  to  me,  is  as  much  opposed  as  England  herself  to  Cuba 
becoming  ours.  She  may  dissemble  for  a  time  and  hush  down  her 
antipathies;  but  as  long  as  she  bends  her  neck  under  the  yoke 
of  the  man  who  now  holds  the  rod  over  her,  she  will  be  our  enemy 

1  Lord   Palmerston,   British  foreign  minister,  to  British  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  May,  1851,   British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,   XLII,  quoted  by 
Latane",  Diplom.  ReL  U.  S.  and  Span.  America,  125. 

2  Lord  John  Russell  to  Lord  Howden,  January  31,  1853,  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XLII,  335. 

3  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  15. 


1854]  THE   "BLACK  WARRIOR"  255 

and  join  in  any  crusade  which  may  be  set  on  foot  against  us."  * 
He  scented  the  schemes  of  the  second  empire  which  had  now  just 
been  established,  and  which  were  to  culminate  in  Mexico,  though 
he  was  ignorant  of  their  form. 

Soule*'s  opportunity  for  treating  the  Spanish  government  forci 
bly  was,  however,  soon  to  come  in  the  seizure  of  the  Black  Warrior, 
one  of  a  line  of  mail  steamers  between  New  York  and  Mobile, 
of  which  Havana  was  a  port  of  call  for  landing  and  taking  passen 
gers  and  mails,  but  no  cargo.  It  was  an  act  even  more  unaccount 
able  and  foolish  than  any  of  those,  so  rasping  and  unnecessary, 
which  had  preceded  it. 

It  is  clear,  from  a  sifting  of  all  the  evidence,  that  these  ships 
were  accustomed  to  enter  the  cargo  in  transit  as  "ballast,"  by 
direction  of  the  collector,2  and  this  had  been  done  through  the 
entire  period  of  the  Black  Warrior's  eighteen  months'  service  on  the 
line,  during  which  she  had  touched  thirty-six  times  at  Havana. 
On  the  morning  of  February  27,  1854,  on  arrival  of  the  ship 
from  Mobile,  the  crew  list,  bill  of  health,  separate  lists  of  the 
passengers  for  Havana  and  those  in  transit,  together  with  a  mani 
fest,  upon  which  was  specified  all  the  ship's  stores,  the  cargo  of 
cotton  in  transit  being  entered  as  "ballast,"  was  handed  to  the 
boarding  officer,  and  the  ship  hauled  alongside  the  coal  wharf 
to  coal.  Later  in  the  day,  on  applying  to  the  custom-house  for  the 
usual  pass  obtained  for  leaving  port,  the  clerk  sent  by  the  agent 
was  informed  that  the  ship  would  not  be  allowed  to  sail,  as  she  was 
entered  as  "in  ballast,"  whereas  the  authorities  knew  that  she 
had  cotton  on  board.  Application,  made  well  within  the  hours 
allowed  for  permission  to  make  the  proper  alteration  in  the  mani 
fest,  was  refused,  though  the  law  was  explicit  as  to  this  privilege,3 
and  the  captain  and  agent  were  informed  that  the  cargo  of  the 
ship  was  confiscated  and  must  be  discharged.  On  the  morning 
of  February  28  lighters  were  brought  alongside  by  the  chief  of 
the  custom-house  officers  afloat,  and  the  captain  directed  to  dis- 

1  Soule"  to  Marcy,  December  23,  1853,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  16. 

2  Marcy  to  Soule",  June  22,  1854,  Ibid.,  110  . 

8  Affidavit  of  Chas.  Tyng  (agent)  and  James  D.  Bullock  (commander), 
Ibid.,  p.  47.  See  also  Rules  for  captains  and  supercargoes  in  full,  Ibid.,  pp. 
42-44. 


256  PIERCE'S  SPECIAL  MESSAGE  [1854 

charge  his  cargo,  which  the  latter  refused  to  do.  He  was  informed 
by  the  Spanish  official  in  charge  that  he  would  himself  discharge 
the  cargo,  whereupon  Captain  Bullock,  hauling  down  his  flag,  left 
the  ship,  the  property  on  board,  her  officers,  crew,  and  passengers, 
in  the  hands  of  the  Spanish  authorities  and  went  aboard  the 
United  States  steamer  Fulton,  Bullock  himself  being  an  officer  of 
the  navy,1  as  were,  as  already  mentioned,  several  other  command 
ing  officers  of  the  line. 

It  is  impossible  to  find  in  any  part  of  the  voluminous  correspond 
ence  of  either  side,  in  this  remarkable  case,  an  excuse  or  an  im 
pelling  motive  for  the  Spanish  action,  except  mere  whim.  The 
usage  of  a  year  and  a  half,  during  all  which  time  it  was  impossible 
to  think  that  the  authorities  should  suppose  that  the  steamer  was 
really  in  ballast  only,  was  suddenly  and  rudely  set  aside,  with 
great  loss  to  her  owners  and  inconvenience  and  injury  to  the 
passengers.  The  news  was  received  with  natural  and  just  indig 
nation  in  the  United  States,  and  the  case  immediately  and  neces 
sarily  became  one  of  first  importance. 

In  compliance  with  a  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  March  10,  1854,  President  Pierce  transmitted,  March  15, 
all  the  information  in  the  department  of  state  with  reference  to  the 
Black  Warrior,  with  a  message  saying:  "There  have  been,  in 
the  course  of  a  few  years  past,  many  other  instances  of  aggression 
upon  our  commerce,  violations  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens, 
and  insults  to  the  national  flag  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba, 
and  all  attempts  to  obtain  redress  have  led  to  protracted  and,  as 
yet,  fruitless  negotiations.  .  .  .  The  offending  party  is  at  our  doors 
with  large  powers  for  aggression,  but  none,  it  is  alleged,  for  rep 
aration.  The  source  of  redress  is  in  another  hemisphere;  and 
the  answers  to  our  just  complaints,  made  to  the  home  govern 
ment,  are  but  the  repetition  of  excuses  rendered  by  inferior 
officials  to  their  superiors  in  reply  to  representations  of  mis- 
--  conduct.  .  .  .  Spain  does  not  seem  to  appreciate,  to  its  full 
extent,  her  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  these  authorities. 
In  giving  very  extraordinary  powers  to  them,  she  owes  it  to  justice 
and  to  her  friendly  relations  with  this  government  to  guard  with 

1  Captain  Bullock  was  later  to  become  notable  as  the  chief  agent  in  England 
of  the  Southern  confederacy. 


1854]  THE  "BLACK  WARRIOR"  257 

great  vigilance  against  the  exorbitant  exercise  of  these  powers,  and, 
in  case  of  injuries,  to  provide  for  prompt  redress.  ...  It  is  vain 
to  expect  that  a  series  of  unfriendly  acts  infringing  our  com 
mercial  rights,  and  the  adoption  of  a  policy  threatening  the  honor 
and  security  of  these  states,  can  long  consist  with  friendly  rela 
tions.  In  case  the  measures  taken  for  amicable  adjustment  of  our 
difficulties  with  Spain  shall  unfortunately  fail,  I  shall  not  hesitate 
to  use  the  authority  and  means  which  Congress  may  grant  to 
insure  the  observance  of  our  just  rights,  to  obtain  redress  for  in 
juries  received  and  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  our  flag.  In  an 
ticipation  of  that  contingency,  which  I  earnestly  hope  may  not 
arise,  I  suggest  to  Congress  the  propriety  of  adopting  such  pro 
visional  measures  as  the  exigency  may  seem  to  demand."  * 

It  is,  as  the  message  expresses,  extraordinary  that  the  Cuban 
authorities  should  have  been  allowed  by  the  home  government 
to  bring  the  two  countries  to  the  verge  of  war  by  conduct  so 
unnecessary  and  so  unfriendly,  and  which  could  result  in  good  to 
neither.  In  all  the  long  category  of  causes  for  complaint  there 
is  none  in  which  the  offending  party  showed  so  little  of  that  blessed 
quality,  common-sense;  it  was  but  playing  into  the  hands  of  the 
now  powerful  and  dominant  slavery  party  of  the  South. 

For  want  of  time  an  intimation  only  of  this  serious  difficulty 
was  sent  Mr.  Soule*  in  a  despatch  of  March  11,  1854,  followed  on 
March  17  by  the  full  statement  carried  to  Madrid  by  a  special 
messenger.  This  latter  said:  "Neither  the  views  of  this  govern 
ment  nor  the  sentiments  of  this  country  will  brook  any  evasion  or 
delay  on  the  part  of  her  Catholic  Majesty,  in  a  case  of  such  flagrant 
wrong.  .  .  .  The  damages  to  the  owners  of  the  Black  Warrior 
and  the  cargo  are  estimated  at  three  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and 
this  amount  you  will  demand  as  the  indemnity  .  .  .  you  will  ob 
tain  as  early  a  reply  as  practicable  to  your  demand.  The  mes 
senger  .  .  .  has  instructions  to  remain  a  reasonable  time  at 
Madrid  in  order  that  he  may  be  the  bearer  of  the  reply  you  may 
receive.  .  .  .  The  course  hitherto  pursued  by  the  Spanish  govern 
ment,  in  regard  to  our  complaints,  .  .  .  will  not  meet  the  exigency 
of  this  case.  That  course  has,  in  effect,  been  an  evasion  of  our 
claims  for  redress,  and  resulted  in  a  practical  denial  of  justice.  .  .  . 
1  Message,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  33-34. 


258  SOULE'S  SHARP  NOTE  [1854 

It  is  expected  that  Spain  will  be  prepared,  when  you  shall  present 
the  demand,  to  apprise  this  government  of  the  course  she  intends 
to  pursue  in  this  matter;  and  that  course  will  be  either  a  disavowal 
of  the  acts  of  her  officials  at  [in]  Cuba,  and  an  immediate  tender  of 
satisfaction,  or  the  assumption  of  the  responsibility  of  upholding 
their  conduct.  In  a  matter  of  such  high  import,  involving  her 
amicable  relations  with  this  country,  it  is  not  to  be  assumed  that 
she  has  not  a  full  knowledge  of  the  acts  of  her  subordinate  officers 
at  Havana."  1 

Such  expectancy  was  not  realized.  The  course  of  Spanish 
officialdom  was  of  Oriental  slowness,  a  policy  of  delay;  and  when 
Mr.  Soule*,  on  April  8,  1854,  the  day  after  the  arrival  of  the  bearer 
of  the  despatch,  placed  the  subject  before  the  Spanish  minister, 
the  latter  had  not  yet  received  any  information  in  the  matter  from 
the  Marquis  de  Polavieja,  the  new  Captain-General  of  Cuba. 
While  Mr.  Soule^s  note  was  sharp  in  tone,  it  was  not  unjustifia 
bly  so.2 

Waiting  three  days  without  a  reply,  Mr.  Soule*,  April  11,  struck 
a  higher  note.  He  repeated  what  he  had  orally  stated,  that  the 
wrong  "bearing  upon  its  face  the  most  glaring  evidences  of  a 
preconcerted  purpose  on  the  part  of  its  perpetrators  to  harass  and 
offend  legitimate  interests  and  high  susceptibilities,  the  United 
States  cannot  brook  that  the  reparation  due  them  for  the  insult 
offered  to  their  flag  and  the  injury  done  to  the  property  of  their 
citizens,  be  in  any  way  evaded  or  unnecessarily  delayed."  He  then 
continued,  "I  must,  therefore,  insist  that  those  who  have  been 
wronged  receive  an  indemnity  equal  to  their  losses,  namely,  three 
hundred  thousand  dollars;  and  that  all  persons,  whatever  be  their 
official  rank  or  importance,  who  have,  in  any  responsible  manner, 
been  concerned  in  the  perpetration  of  the  wrong,  be  dismissed 
from  her  majesty's  service  in  the  offices  they  now  hold.  The  non- 
compliance  with  these  just  demands  within  forty-eight  hours  after 
the  delivery  of  this  communication  into  the  hanSsTrf  your  excel 
lency,  will  be  considered  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  as 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  that  her  majesty's  government  is  de 
termined  to  uphold  the  conduct  of  its  officers." ; 

lMr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Soule",  March  17,  1854,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2 

Sess.,  32.  2Ib!d.,W.  3  Ibid.,  70. 


1854]  SPAIN'S  DELAY  259 

On  the  day  this  was  written  came  a  reply  to  the  first  note,  stating 
that  the  government  was  not  in  possession  of  the  "authentic  and 
complete  data,  which  in  good  law  are  indispensable  in  order 
to  form  a  correct  and  equitable  judgment  of  the  case."  Soule* 
replied  by  practically  accusing  the  minister  of  duplicity.  He  said 
that  "it  is  known  that  letters  have  been  received  in  Madrid,  more 
than  three  days  since,  with  Havana  dates  up  to  the  13th "of  March.1 

On  April  12  the  Spanish  minister  replied  again  that  "  whenever 
the  government  shall  have  before  it  the  authentic  and  complete 
data,  which  it  lacks  at  present,  it  will  propose  to  her  majesty  a 
resolution  conformable  to  justice."  Sefior  Calderon  went  on  to  say 
that  it  would  not  be  surprising  "  that  a  manner  so  peremptory  of 
exacting  satisfaction,  without  listening  to  the  defence  of  the  accused, 
should  suggest  to  the  government  of  her  majesty  a  suspicion  that  it 
is  not  so  much  the  manifestation  of  a  lively  interest  in  the  defence 
of  pretended  injuries,  as  an  incomprehensible  pretext  for  exciting 
estrangement,  if  not  a  quarrel,  between  two  friendly  powers. 
.  .  .  Permit  me,  in  conclusion,  to  impress  upon  the  mind  of  your 
excellency  that  the  government  of  her  majesty,  jealous  also  of  its 
decorum,  is  not  accustomed  to  the  harsh  and  imperious  manner 
with  which  it  has  been  pressed;  which,  furthermore,  is  not  the 
most  adequate  for  attaining  to  the  amicable  settlement  which  is 
wished  for."  2 

Soule*,  though  perhaps  somewhat  more  precipitate  than  policy 
called  for,  wras  justified  in  pressing  the  matter  forcibly  by  the  in 
structions  he  had  but  just  received  from  the  secretary  of  state;  but 
the  justification  for  further  pressure  for  the  indemnity  was  almost 
at  once  removed  by  the  action  of  the  owners  themselves  in  sub 
mitting  to  a  fine,  from  which  they  were  later  released,  and  by  their 
taking  over  the  ship,  thus  enabling  the  Spanish  minister  to  reply 
rather  exultingly  that  "the  delay  .  .  .  has  been  very  quickly 
justified  by  events,  if  the  recently  received  accounts  are  certain, 
although  unofficial,  that  the  Black  Warrior  had  already  been  de 
livered  to  her  captain,  and  thus  the  principal  difficulty  was  ar 
ranged."3 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  72. 

2  Senor  Calderon  de  la  Barca  to  Mr.  Soul6,  April  12,  1854,  Ibid.,  73-74. 

3  Sefior  Calderon  de  la  Barca  to  Mr.  Soule",  April  18,  1854,  Ibid.,  75. 


260  SPAIN'S  REPLY  [1854 

The  Cuban  authorities  had  negotiated  directly  with  the  steam 
ship  company,  conceding  privileges  theretofore  denied,  and  of 
more  value,  perhaps,  than  their  estimate  of  losses  by  the  de 
tention  of  the  ship;1  but  that  such  an  arrangement  removed 
"the  principal  difficulty"  was,  and  correctly,  far  from  Mr. 
Soule"s  view.  He  replied,  April  20,  "However  grievous  the  out 
rage  perpetrated  on  the  captain  and  owners  of  the  Black  War 
rior  may  be,  it  sinks  into  insignificance  when  compared  with 
the  insult  offered  to  the  dignity  of  the  nation  whose  colors  it 
bore."  2 

It  was  not  until  May  7  that  the  subject  was  dealt  with  at  length 
by  the  Spanish  foreign  office  by  citation  of  law  already  well  known 
to  all  concerned,  the  letter  of  which  condemned  the  ship;  by  a 
statement,  impossible  to  uphold,  that  neither  the  captain  "nor 
the  consignee  sought  to  make  additions  to  the  false  manifest  within 
the  legal  period  of  time,"  and  by  the  rather  childlike  statement 
that  the  fact  "that  the  Black  Warrior  had  been  several  times 
[thirty-six]  permitted  to  arrive  with  cargo  and  to  declare  herself 
in  ballast,  would  only  seem  to  prove  the  credence  which  was 
given  to  her  declaration,  or  the  condescension  of  some  of  the 
subordinate  officers,  which  cannot  be  adduced  as  an  evidence 
that  the  regulations  had  become  extinct." 

But  the  tempest  had  already  been  swallowed  by  designs  held 
more  important  by  the  American  administration  than  this  very 
gross  outrage.  The  Crimean  war  had  come  to  remove  any  appre 
hension  of  serious  intervention  in  Cuba,  by  Great  Britain  or 
France,  and  the  American  government  felt  free  to  act.  The  secre 
tary  of  state  thus  sent,  in  April,  by  a  special  messenger,  a  confi 
dential  despatch  dwelling  upon  the  fears  of  the  United  States  that 
certain  new  regulations  introducing  laborers  under  a  system  of 
apprenticeship,  would  result  in  Africanizing  Cuba,  and  empower 
ing  the  American  minister  to  open  anew  the  question  of  its  sale 
to  the  United  States,  or,  if  "  the  pride  of  Spain  might  revolt  at  the 
proposition  to  sell  the  island  ...  to  a  foreign  power,  it  has  been 

1  Mr.  Soute  to  Mr.  Marcy,  May  10,  1854,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  84.  8  Ibid.,  77. 

8  Ibid.,  87.  For  a  complete  reply  to  this  document,  see  Mr.  Marcy's  despatch 
No.  16,  June  22,  1854,  to  Mr.  Soule,  Ibid.,  108-117. 


1854]  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  261 

suggested  that  she  might  be  induced  to  consent  to  its  indepen 
dence,  and  that  the  United  States  might  essentially  contribute  to 
such  a  result." 

No  step,  however,  could  be  taken  in  Madrid  at  the  moment, 
and  Mr.  Soule*  was  much  concerned  as  to  the  silence  of  the  ad 
ministration  in  the  affair  of  the  Black  Warrior.  His  complaints 
of  its  position  had  much  justification.  " Spain,"  he  said,  "doubts 
no  longer  but  that  she  has  little  to  fear  from  our  resentment."  2 
Soule*  wrote  of  the  strange  and  discrepant  impressions  produced 
...  by  the  President's  proclamation  of  May  31,  1854,  against 
filibusters,  and  by  the  announced  departure  from  the  United 
States  of  commissioners  having  charge  to  reconcile  the  dif 
ferences  between  the  Spanish  and  American  governments.8  The 
rumor  of  the  commission  had  a  good  base,  though  Soule*  was  only 
informed  of  the  fact  by  a  despatch  from  Washington  of  the  same 
date  as  the  letter  just  quoted.4 

The  project  of  a  commission  to  Madrid  was  abandoned,  but  Mr. 
Marcy  was  perplexed  by  the  differing  reports  made  to  him  by  the 
American  representatives  in  Madrid,  Paris,  and  London,  regard 
ing  the  purposes  of  Spain,  France,  and  Great  Britain  concerning 
Cuba.  Therefore  the  President  suggested,  and  it  was  arranged, 
that  the  American  ministers  to  those  nations  should  meet  elsewhere 
in  conference  and  give  their  combined  views.5  The  result  was  the 
extraordinary  document  which  has  come  down  in  history  as  the 
"  Ostend  manifesto." 

The  American  minister  to  Great  Britain  at  this  period  was, 
as  mentioned,  Mr.  Buchanan,  of  Pennsylvania;  to  France,  Mr. 
John  *T.  Mason,  of  Virginia.  The  former  was  already  fully  com 
mitted  to  the  support  of  the  proposal  to  purchase;6  the  latter, 
as  a  strong  pro-slavery  advocate,  was  naturally  of  like  mind. 
The  three  ministers  met,  as  finally  agreed  upon,  at  Ostend,  Belgium, 

1  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Soul<§,  April  3, 1854,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess., 
80-82. 

2  Mr.  Soule"  to  Mr.  Marcy,  June  19,  1854,  Ibid.,  106. 

3  Mr.  Soule  to  Mr.  Marcy,  June  24,  1854,  Ibid.,  107. 

4  Ibid.,  117. 

6  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Soule",  August  16,  1854,  Ibid.,  124. 
6  See  Mr.  Buchanan's  despatch,  when  secretary  of  state,  to  Mr.  Saunders, 
June  17,  1848,  Supra,  221-223. 


262  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  [1854 

October  9,  1854,  remained  there  until  October  11,  and  then  went 
to  Aix-la-Chapelle,  whence,  October  18,  their  report  was  sent. 
It  is  in  full  as  follows : 

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE,  October  15,  1854. 
SIR:— 

The  undersigned,  in  compliance  with  the  wish  expressed  by  the  President 
in  the  several  confidential  despatches  you  have  addressed  to  us,  respectively, 
to  that  effect,  have  met  in  conference,  first  at  Ostend,  in  Belgium,  on  the  9th, 
10th,  and  llth  instants,  and  then  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  in  Prussia,  on  the  days 
next  following,  up  to  the  date  hereof. 

There  has  been  a  full  and  unreserved  interchange  of  views  and  sentiments 
between  us,  which  we  are  most  happy  to  inform  you  has  resulted  in  a  cordial 
coincidence  of  opinion  on  the  grave  and  important  subjects  submitted  to  our 
consideration. 

We  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion,  and  are  thoroughly  convinced,  that 
an  immediate  and  earnest  effort  ought  to  be  made  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  purchase  Cuba  from  Spain  at  any  price  for  which  it  can  be 
obtained,  not  exceeding  the  sum  of  $  .* 

The  proposal  should,  in  our  opinion,  be  made  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be 
presented  through  the  necessary  diplomatic  forms  to  the  Supreme  Constituent 
Cortes  about  to  assemble.  On  this  momentous  question,  in  which  the  peo 
ple  both  of  Spain  and  the  United  States  are  so  deeply  interested,  all  our  pro 
ceedings  ought  to  be  open,  frank,  and  public.  They  should  be  of  such 
a  character  as  to  challenge  the  approbation  of  the  world. 

We  firmly  believe  that,  in  the  progress  of  human  events,  the  time  has  arrived 
when  the  vital  interests  of  Spain  are  as  seriously  involved  in  the  sale,  as  those 
of  the  United  States  in  the  purchase  of  the  island,  and  that  the  transaction 
will  prove  equally  honorable  to  both  nations. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  cannot  anticipate  a  failure,  unless  possibly 
through  the  malign  influence  of  foreign  powers  who  possess  no  right  whatever 
to  interfere  in  the  matter. 

We  proceed  to  state  some  of  the  reasons  which  have  brought  us  to  this 
conclusion,  and,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  we  shall  specify  them  under  two 
distinct  heads: — 

1.  The  United  States  ought,  if  practicable,  to  purchase  Cuba  with  as 
little  delay  as  possible. 

2.  The  probability  is  great  that  the  government  and  Cortes  of  Spain  will 
prove  willing  to  sell  it,  because  this  would  essentially  promote  the  highest 
and  best  interests  of  the  Spanish  people. 

Then  1.  It  must  be  clear  to  every  reflecting  mind  that,  from  the  peculiarity 
of  its  geographical  position,  and  the  considerations  attendant  on  it,  Cuba 
is  as  necessary  to  the  North  American  republic  as  any  of  its  present  members, 
and  that  it  belongs  naturally  to  that  great  family  of  states  of  which  the  Union 
is  the  providential  nursery. 

1  Left  blank. 


1854]  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  263 

From  its  locality  it  commands  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  im 
mense  and  annually  increasing  trade  which  must  seek  this  avenue  to  the 
ocean. 

On  the  numerous  navigable  streams,  measuring  an  aggregate  course  of  some 
thirty  thousand  miles,  which  disembogue  themselves  through  this  river  into 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  increase  of  the  population  within  the  last  ten  years 
amounts  to  more  than  that  of  the  entire  Union  at  the  time  Louisiana  was  an 
nexed  to  it. 

The  natural  and  main  outlet  to  the  products  of  this  entire  population,  the 
highway  of  their  direct  intercourse  with  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  states,  can 
never  be  secure,  but  must  ever  be  endangered  whilst  Cuba  is  a  dependency 
of  a  distant  power  in  whose  possession  it  has  proved  to  be  a  source  of  con 
stant  annoyance  and  embarrassment  to  their  interests. 

Indeed  the  Union  can  never  enjoy  repose,  nor  possess  reliable  security,  as 
long  as  Cuba  is  not  embraced  within  its  boundaries. 

Its  immediate  acquisition  by  our  government  is  of  paramount  importance, 
and  we  cannot  doubt  but  that  it  is  a  consummation  devoutly  wished  for  by 
its  inhabitants. 

The  intercourse  which  its  proximity  to  our  coasts  begets  and  encourages  be 
tween  them  and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  has,  in  the  progress  of  time, 
so  united  their  interests  and  blended  their  fortunes  that  they  now  look  upon 
each  other  as  if  they  were  one  people  and  had  but  one  destiny. 

Considerations  exist  which  render  delay  in  the  acquisition  of  this  island 
exceedingly  dangerous  to  the  United  States. 

The  system  of  immigration  and  labor,  lately  organized  within  its  limits,  and 
the  tyranny  and  oppression  which  characterize  its  immediate  rulers,  threaten 
an  insurrection  at  every  moment  which  may  result  in  direful  consequences 
to  the  American  people. 

Cuba  has  thus  become  to  us  an  unceasing  danger,  and  a  permanent  cause  of 
anxiety  and  alarm. 

But  we  need  not  enlarge  on  these  topics.  It  can  scarcely  be  apprehended 
that  foreign  powers,  in  violation  of  international  law,  would  interpose  their 
influence  with  Spain  to  prevent  our  acquisition  of  the  island.  Its  inhabitants 
are  now  suffering  under  the  worst  of  all  possible  governments — that  of  ab-  , 
solute  despotism  delegated  by  a  distant  power  to  irresponsible  agents,  who 
are  changed  at  short  intervals,  and  who  are  tempted  to  improve  the  brief 
opportunity  thus  afforded  to  accumulate  fortunes  by  the  basest  means. 

As  long  as  this  system  shall  endure,  humanity  may  in  vain  demand  the 
suppression  of  the  African  slave-trade  in  the  island.  This  is  rendered  impos 
sible  whilst  that  infamous  traffic  remains  an  irresistible  temptation  and  a 
source  of  immense  profit  to  needy  and  avaricious  officials,  who,  to  attain  their 
ends,  scruple  not  to  trample  the  most  sacred  principles  under  foot. 

The  Spanish  government,  at  home,  may  be  well  disposed,  but  experience 
has  proved  that  it  cannot  control  these  remote  depositaries  of  its  power. 

Besides,  the  commercial  nations  of  the  world  cannot  fail  to  perceive  and 
appreciate  the  great  advantages  which  would  result  to  their  people  from  a 


264  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  [1854 

dissolution  of  the  forced  and  unnatural  connection  between  Spain  and  Cuba, 
and  the  annexation  of  the  latter  to  the  United  States.  The  trade  of  England 
and  France  with  Cuba  would,  in  that  event,  assume  at  once  an  important  and 
profitable  character,  and  rapidly  extend  with  the  increasing  population  and 
prosperity  of  the  island. 

2.  But  if  the  United  States  and  every  commercial  nation  would  be  bene 
fited  by  this  transfer,  the  interests  of  Spain  would  also  be  greatly  and  essen 
tially  promoted. 

She  cannot  but  see  what  such  a  sum  of  money  as  we  are  willing  to  pay  for 
the  island  would  effect  in  the  development  of  her  vast  natural  resources. 

Two-thirds  of  this  sum,  if  employed  in  the  construction  of  a  system  of  rail 
roads,  would  ultimately  prove  a  source  of  greater  wealth  to  the  Spanish  peo 
ple  than  that  opened  to  their  vision  by  Cortes.  Their  prosperity  would  date 
from  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  cession. 

France  has  already  constructed  continuous  lines  of  railway  from  Havre, 
Marseilles,  Valenciennes,  and  Strasbourg  via  Paris,  to  the  Spanish  frontier, 
and  anxiously  awaits  the  day  when  Spain  shall  find  herself  in  a  condition  to 
extend  these  roads  through  her  northern  provinces  to  Madrid,  Seville,  Cadiz, 
Malaga,  and  the  frontiers  of  Portugal. 

This  object  once  accomplished,  Spain  would  become  a  centre  of  attraction 
for  the  travelling  world,  and  secure  a  permanent  and  profitable  market  for  her 
various  productions.  Her  fields,  under  the  stimulus  given  to  industry  by 
remunerative  prices,  would  teem  with  cereal  grain,  and  her  vineyards  would 
bring  forth  a  vastly  increased  quantity  of  choice  wines.  Spain  would  speedily 
become  what  a  bountiful  Providence  intended  she  should  be — one  of  the  first 
nations  of  continental  Europe — rich,  powerful,  and  contented. 

Whilst  two-thirds  of  the  price  of  the  island  would  be  ample  for  the  com 
pletion  of  her  most  important  public  improvements,  she  might,  with  the  re 
maining  forty  millions,  satisfy  the  demands  pressing  so  heavily  upon  her  credit, 
and  create  a  sinking-fund  which  would  gradually  relieve  her  from  the  over 
whelming  debt  now  paralyzing  her  energies. 

Such  is  her  present  wretched  financial  condition  that  her  best  bonds  are 
sold  upon  her  own  Bourse  at  about  one-third  of  their  par  value;  whilst  another 
class,  on  which  she  pays  no  interest,  have  but  a  nominal  value,  and  are  quoted 
at  about  one-sixth  of  the  amount  for  which  they  were  issued.  Besides,  these 
are  held  principally  by  British  creditors,  who  may,  from  day  to  day,  obtain 
the  effective  interposition  of  their  government  for  the  purpose  of  coercing 
payment.  Intimations  to  that  effect  have  already  been  thrown  out  from  high 
quarters,  and  unless  some  new  source  of  revenue  shall  enable  Spain  to  pro 
vide  for  such  exigencies,  it  is  not  improbable  that  they  may  be  realized. 

Should  Spain  reject  the  present  golden  opportunity  for  developing  her  re 
sources,  and  removing  her  financial  embarrassments,  it  may  never  again 
return. 

Cuba,  in  its  palmiest  days,  never  yielded  her  exchequer,  after  deducting  the 
expenses  of  its  government,  a  clear  annual  income  of  more  than  a  million  and 
a  half  of  dollars.  These  expenses  have  increased  to  such  a  degree  as  to  leave 


1854]  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  265 

a  deficit  chargeable  on  the  treasury  of  Spain  to  the  amount  of  six  hundred 
thousand  dollars. 

In  a  pecuniary  point  of  view,  therefore,  the  island  is  an  incumbrance,  instead 
of  a  source  of  profit  to  the  mother  country. 

Under  no  probable  circumstances  can  Cuba  ever  yield  to  Spain  one  per 
cent,  on  the  large  amount  which  the  United  States  are  willing  to  pay  for  its 
acquisition.  But  Spain  is  in  danger  of  losing  Cuba  without  remuneration. 

Extreme  oppression,  it  is  now  admitted,  justifies  any  people  in  endeavoring 
to  relieve  themselves  from  the  yoke  of  their  oppressors.  The  sufferings  which 
the  corrupt,  arbitrary,  and  unrelenting  local  administration  necessarily  entails 
upon  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba,  cannot  fail  to  stimulate  and  keep  alive  that 
spirit  of  resistance  and  revolution  against  Spain  which  has,  of  late  years,  been 
so  often  manifested.  In  this  condition  of  affairs  it  is  in  vain  to  expect  that 
the  sympathies  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  not  be  warmly  enlisted 
in  favor  of  their  oppressed  neighbors. 

We  know  that  the  President  is  justly  inflexible  in  his  determination  to  exe 
cute  the  neutrality  laws;  but  should  the  Cubans  themselves  rise  in  revolt  against 
the  oppression  which  they  suffer,  no  human  power  could  prevent  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  and  liberal-minded  men  of  other  countries  from  rushing 
to  their  assistance.  Besides,  the  present  is  an  age  of  adventure,  in  which  rest 
less  and  daring  spirits  abound  in  every  portion  of  the  world. 

It  is  not  improbable,  therefore,  that  Cuba  may  be  wrested  from  Spain  by  a 
successful  revolution;  and,  in  that  event,  she  will  lose  both  the  island  and 
the  price  we  are  willing  now  to  pay  for  it — a  price  far  beyond  what  was  ever 
paid  by  one  people  to  another  for  any  province. 

It  may  also  be  remarked  that  the  settlement  of  this  vexed  question,  by  the 
cession  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  would  forever  prevent  the  dangerous  com 
plications  between  nations,  to  which  it  may  otherwise  give  birth. 

It  is  certain  that,  should  the  Cubans  themselves  organize  an  insurrection 
against  the  Spanish  government,  and  should  other  independent  nations  come 
to  the  aid  of  Spain  in  the  contest,  no  human  power  could,  in  our  opinion, 
prevent  the  people  and  the  government  of  the  United  States  from  taking  part 
in  such  a  civil  war,  in  support  of  their  neighbors  and  friends. 

But  if  Spain,  dead  to  the  voice  of  her  own  interests,  and  actuated  by  stub 
born  pride  and  a  false  sense  of  honor,  should  refuse  to  sell  Cuba  to  the  United 
States,  then  the  question  will  arise:  What  ought  to  be  the  course  of  the  Ameri 
can  government  under  such  circumstances  ? 

Self-preservation  is  the  law  of  states  as  well  as  with  individuals.  All  nations 
have,  at  different  periods,  acted  upon  this  maxim.  Although  it  has  been  made 
the  pretext  for  committing  flagrant  injustice,  as  in  the  partition  of  Poland 
and  other  similar  cases  which  history  records,  yet  the  principle  itself,  though 
often  abused,  has  always  been  recognized 

The  United  States  have  never  acquired  a  foot  of  territory  except  by  fair 
purchase,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Texas,  upon  the  free  and  voluntary  application 
of  the  people  of  that  independent  state,  who  desired  to  blend  their  destinies 
with  our  own. 


266  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  [1854 

Even  our  acquisitions  from  Mexico  are  no  exception  to  this  rule,  because, 
although  we  might  have  claimed  them  by  right  of  conquest  in  a  just  war,  yet 
we  purchased  them  for  what  was  then  considered  by  both  parties  a  full  and 
ample  equivalent. 

Our  past  history  forbids  that  we  should  acquire  the  island  of  Cuba  without 
the  consent  of  Spain,  unless  justified  by  the  great  law  of  self-preservation. 
We  must,  in  any  event,  preserve  our  conscious  rectitude  and  our  own  self- 
respect. 

Whilst  pursuing  this  course  we  can  afford  to  disregard  the  censures  of  the 
world,  to  which  we  have  been  so  often  and  so  unjustly  exposed. 

After  we  shall  have  offered  Spain  a  price  for  Cuba  far  beyond  its  present 
value,  and  this  shall  have  been  refused,  it  will  then  be  time  to  consider  the 
question;  does  Cuba,  in  the  possession  of  Spain,  seriously  endanger  our  in 
ternal  peace  and  the  existence  of  our  cherished  Union? 

Should  this  question  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  then,  by  every  law, 
human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified  in  wresting  it  from  Spain,  if  we  possess 
the  power;  and  this  upon  the  very  same  principle  that  would  justify  an  in 
dividual  in  tearing  down  the  burning  house  of  his  neighbor  if  there  were  no 
other  means  of  preventing  the  flames  from  destroying  his  own  home. 

Under  such  circumstances  we  ought  neither  to  count  the  cost  nor  regard 
the  odds  which  Spain  might  enlist  against  us.  We  forbear  to  enter  into  the 
question  whether  the  present  condition  of  the  island  would  justify  such  a 
measure.  We  should,  however,  be  recreant  to  our  duty,  be  unworthy  of  our 
gallant  forefathers,  and  commit  base  treason  against  our  posterity,  should  we 
permit  Cuba  to  be  Africanized  and  become  a  second  St.  Domingo,  with  all  its 
attendant  horrors  to  the  white  race,  and  suffer  the  flames  to  extend  to  our  own 
neighboring  shores,  seriously  to  endanger  or  actually  to  consume  the  fair 
fabric  of  our  Union. 

We  fear  that  the  course  and  current  of  events  are  rapidly  tending  toward 
such  a  catastrophe.  We,  however,  hope  for  the  best,  though  we  ought  certainly 
to  be  prepared  for  the  worst. 

We  also  forbear  to  investigate  the  present  condition  of  the  questions  at  issue 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  A  long  series  of  injuries  to  our 
people  have  been  committed  in  Cuba  by  Spanish  officials,  and  are  unre- 
dressed.  But  recently  a  most  flagrant  outrage  on  the  rights  of  American 
citizens  and  on  the  flag  of  the  United  States  was  perpetrated  in  the  harbor 
of  Havana  under  circumstances  which,  without  immediate  redress,  would 
have  justified  a  resort  to  measures  of  war  in  vindication  of  national  honor. 
That  outrage  is  not  only  unatoned,  but  the  Spanish  government  has  de 
liberately  sanctioned  the  acts  of  its  subordinates  and  assumed  the  responsi 
bility  attaching  to  them. 

Nothing  could  more  impressively  teach  us  the  danger  to  which  the  peaceful 
relations  it  has  ever  been  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  cherish  with  foreign 
nations  are  constantly  exposed,  than  the  circumstances  of  that  case.  Situated 
as  Spain  and  the  United  States  are,  the  latter  have  forborne  to  resort  to  ex 
treme  measures. 


1854]  THE  OSTEND  MANIFESTO  267 

But  this  course  cannot,  with  due  regard  to  their  own  dignity  as  an  inde 
pendent  nation,  continue;  and  our  recommendations,  now  submitted,  are 
dictated  by  the  firm  belief  that  the  cession  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  with 
stipulations  as  beneficial  to  Spain  as  those  suggested,  is  the  only  effective  mode 
of  settling  all  past  differences,  and  of  the  securing  the  two  countries  against 
future  collisions. 

We  have  already  witnessed  the  happy  results  for  both  countries  which  fol 
lowed  a  similar  arrangement  in  regard  to  Florida. 

Yours  very  respectfully, 

JAMES  BUCHANAN, 
J.  Y.  MASON, 
PIERRE  SOULE*.  * 
HON.  WM.  L.  MARCY,  Secretary  of  State. 

While  the  signatures  to  this  extraordinary  document,  which  told 
Mr.  Marcy  nothing  new,  were  those  of  Buchanan,  Mason,  and 
Soule*,  we  should  know  the  pen  to  be  the  pen  of  Soule",  whose  fervid 
diction  would  be  unmistakable,  even  had  we  not  his  intimation  of 
authorship  in  his  despatch  No.  35,  of  October  15,  1854,  to  Mr. 
Marcy.  Two  of  the  signers  were  Southerners  and  slave-owners; 
the  first,  though  a  Pennsylvanian,  was  almost  more  Southern  than 
the  Southerners.  The  fact  of  Europe's  being  in  the  throes  of  the 
Crimean  war  made  the  confer rees  particularly  eager  for  action. 
"Now  is  the  moment,"  said  Soule",  "to  be  done  with  it;  for  if 
we  delay  its  solution  we  will  certainly  repent  that  we  let  escape 
the  fairest  opportunity  we  could  ever  be  furnished  with  of  bring 
ing  it  to  a  decisive  test." 2 

But  the  cooler  temperaments  of  Pierce's  administration  were 
not  affected  by  the  perfervid  oratory  of  the  assembled  ministers, 
and  the  question  of  the  purchase  of  Cuba  was  dropped  as  im 
practicable  at  the  time,  to  be  taken  up  by  Mr.  Buchanan  when 
he  succeeded  Mr.  Pierce  as  President,  only,  however,  to  be  iterated 
and  reiterated  through  three  annual  messages  to  audiences  which 
were  deaf  to  his  appeals. 

It  is  particularly  remarkable  that  such  a  document  should  have 
been  signed  by  James  Buchanan,  a  cautious  lawyer,  an  experi 
enced  statesman  and  diplomat,  and  one  reared  in  the  antislavery 
atmosphere  of  Pennsylvania  Quakerdom.  It  was  the  era  of  the 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  127-132. 

8  Mr.  Soule  to  Mr.  Marcy,  October  20,  1854,  Ibid.,  126. 


268  ADMINISTRATION  DISAPPROVES  [1854 

Kansas-Nebraska  act;  of  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin;  of  the  development 
of  civil  war  in  Kansas;  and  of  the  ferment  which  resulted  in  the 
formation  of  the  Republican  party.  Neither  the  administration 
nor  the  man  who  two  years  later  was  to  be  elected  President,  and 
who  was  one  of  the  signers  of  this  report,  could  read  these  porten 
tous  signs.  However  galling  the  Spanish  situation  was  to  the 
United  States,  neither  purchase  nor  war  was  possible  with  the 
consent  of  the  people  of  the  North,  who  were  determined  upon 
no  further  extension  of  slave  territory. 

Mr.  Marcy  told  Mr.  Soul£  in  reply,  "  to  enter  upon  negotiations 
in  relation  to  [the  transfer  of  Cuba]  whenever  a  favorable  oppor 
tunity  occurs,"  but,  "  should  you  have  reason  to  believe  that  the 
men  in  power  are  averse  to  entertaining  such  a  proposition — that 
the  offer  of  it  would  be  offensive  to  the  national  pride  of  Spain, 
and  that  it  would  find  no  favor  in  any  considerable  class  of  the 
people,  then  it  will  be  but  too  evident  that  the  time  for  opening,  or 
attempting  to  open,  such  a  negotiation  has  not  arrived."  .  .  . 
Soule*  was  also  told  by  Mr.  Marcy  that  "to  conclude  that,  on  re 
jection  of  a  proposition  to  cede,  seizure  should  ensue,  would  be  to 
assume  that  self-preservation  necessitates  the  acquisition  of  Cuba 
by  the  United  States;  that  Spain  has  refused,  and  will  persist  in 
refusing,  our  reclamations  for  injuries  and  wrongs  inflicted,  and 
that  she  will  make  no  arrangement  for  our  future  security  against 
the  recurrence  of  similar  injuries  and  wrongs." 

Soule*  was  also  told  that  the  door  to  the  adjustment  of  the  case 
of  the  Black  Warrior  should  not  be  regarded  as  closed,  particularly 
as  Seiior  de  Luzuriaga,  the  new  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  "  has 
distinctly  indicated  a  willingness  to  recede  from  the  position  of  his 
predecessor."  As  the  minister  had  declared  that  Captain-General 
Pezuela  and  the  intendant  of  customs  had  not  been  removed  [as 
lately  had  occurred]  "for  the  purpose  of  evading  or  defeating  any 
part  of  our  demand  for  redress,  .  .  .  should  the  government  of 
Spain  recede  from  the  ground  taken  in  Mr.  Calderon's  note  .  .  . 
of  the  7th  of  May  last,  disapprove  of  the  conduct  of  her  authorities 
at  Havana,  in  the  case  of  the  Black  Warrior,  disavow  their  acts, 
show  in  an  appropriate  manner  its  displeasure  toward  them  on 
that  account,  and  offer  full  indemnity  for  the  losses  and  injuries 
which  our  citizens  sustained  in  that  affair,  you  will  entertain  these 


1854]  MANIFESTO  REPUDIATED  269 

propositions  and  signify  the  willingness  of  your  government  to 
adjust  the  case  on  such  terms.  ...  It  is  not  expected  that  Spain 
will  stop  at  the  adjustment  of  the  case  of  the  Black  Warrior.  Our 
citizens  have  many  other  claims,  originating  from  the  conduct  of 
her  officials  in  Cuba,  which  in  justice  and  honor  she  is  bound  to 
adjust."  If,  however,  the  cession  of  the  island  had  "  to  be  hope 
lessly  abandoned  for  the  present,"  Soule*  was  informed  that  the 
United  States  "will  most  pertinaciously  insist  upon  some  security 
against  the  future  misconduct  of  the  authorities  at  Cuba,"  the  rem 
edy  in  Mr.  Marcy's  view  being  in  the  enlargement  of  the  powers 
of  the  captain-general  to  enable  him  to  redress  wrongs,  instead  of 
merely  receiving  complaints  from  the  consul  at  Havana.  "  If,"  he 
said,  "  the  feelings  of  Spain  toward  this  country  are  such  as  she 
proposes — if  she  desires  to  perpetuate  the  relations  of  peace  with 
the  United  States — she  will  yield  to  our  just  demands  on  this 
subject." 

The  note  from  Mr.  Marcy  closed  by  saying:  "In  resuming 
negotiations  with  Spain  you  will,  in  a  firm  but  respectful  manner, 
impress  upon  her  ministry  that  it  is  the  determination  of  the  Presi 
dent  to  have  all  the  matters  in  controversy  between  her  and  the 
United  States  speedily  adjusted.  He  is  desirous  to  have  it  done  by 
negotiation,  and  would  exceedingly  regret  that  a  failure  to  reach 
the  end  he  has  in  view  in  this  peaceful  way  should  devolve  upon 
him  the  duty  of  recommending  a  resort  to  coercive  measures  to 
vindicate  our  national  rights  and  redress  the  wrongs  of  our 
citizens."1 

This  despatch  repudiated  the  "Ostend  manifesto"  and  ended 
the  purposes  for  which  Mr.  Soule*  regarded  himself  to  be  in  Spain, 
and  left  him,  he  said,  "no  alternative  but  that  of  continuing  to 
linger  here  in  languid  impotence,  or  of  surrendering  a  trust  which, 
with  the  difficulties  thrown  in  the  way  of  its  execution,  I  would 
strive  in  vain  to  discharge  either  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  govern 
ment  or  my  own  credit.  ...  I  resign  my  commission  .  .  .  and 
beg  ...  to  be  relieved  from  duty,  if  at  all  possible,  by  the  end  of 
next  January."  2  In  the  Cortes,  the  day  after  this  was  written,  the 

1  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Soule",  November,  13,  1854.  In  full,  House  Ex.  Doc.  93, 
33  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  pp.  134-139. 

»Mr  Soul<§  to  Mr.  Marcy,  December  17,  1854,  Ibid.,  140. 


270  SOULfi  RESIGNS  [1855 

Spanish  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  "with  an  emphasis  full  of 
significancy,  repelled  the  suspicion  that  the  government  might  be 
disposed  to  part  with  [the  island],  by  declaring  that  in  its  judgment 
'to  part  with  Cuba  would  be  to  part  with  the  national  honor/ 
The  declaration  was  covered  with  the  frantic  applause  of  the  as 
sistance  in  the  galleries,  and  received  the  spontaneous  and  undi 
vided  sanction  of  the  House."  l 

On  February  1,  1855,  Mr.  Soule*,  in  audience  with  the  queen, 
ended  his  mission,  leaving  the  American  legation  in  charge  of  the 
secretary.  The  momentous  questions  with  which  it  had  been  his 
province  to  deal  were  still  all  in  the  air.  On  September  16,  the 
Spanish  minister  of  state  had  tendered  the  establishment  at  Madrid 
of  a  mixed  commission,  on  the  basis  of  the  convention  entered 
into  by  the  United'States  with  Great  Britain,  on  February  3,  1853, 
for  the  adjustment  of  all  claims  for  reparation  and  indemnity  for 
injuries  suffered  by  private  individuals,  now  pending  between  the 
two  governments;  but  this  was  declined,  as  "some  of  these  claims 
are  of  such  a  character  as  self-respect  would  not  permit  us  to 
submit  to  arbitrament  in  any  form."  2 

J  Mr.  Souls  to  Mr.  Marcy,  December  23,  1854,  Ibid.,  141. 

2  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Soule",  November  13,  1854,  Ibid.,  136;  Mr.  Soule"  to 
Sefior  Luzuriaga,  December  15,  1854,  Ibid.,  140. 

It  was  not  until  1860  that  a  joint  convention  was  agreed  upon  and  the 
American  demands,  amounting  to  $128,635.54  were  acknowledged.  Spain 
agreed  to  pay  $100,000  of  this  within  three  months  after  exchange  of  ratifi 
cation,  withholding  the  remainder,  however,  to  await  a  decision  in  the  Am- 
istad  case,  which  had  been  pending  since  1839,  stipulating  that  it  be  submitted 
to  arbitration.  The  Senate  thus  rejected  the  convention. 

The  very  extraordinary  case  of  the  Amistad  was  as  follows:  She  cleared 
in  June,  1839,  from  Havana  for  the  eastern  part  of  Cuba,  two  whites  being  in 
charge  of  fifty-four  recently  imported  negro  slaves.  The  latter  mutinied, 
murdered  the  captain  and  crew,  and  ordered  the  two  owners  to  steer  toward 
Africa;  this  they  did  during  the  day  when  the  negroes  could  observe  the  sun, 
but  at  night  they  steered  for  the  American  coast.  On  August  26,  the  schooner 
was  discovered  near  Montauk  Point  by  Lieutenant  Gedney  commanding  the 
coast  survey  vessel,  Washington,  and  taken  into  New  London.  The  Spanish 
minister  demanded  the  return  of  the  vessel  and  negroes  under  Art.  IX  of 
the  treaty  of  1795,  which  declared  that  all  ships  and  merchandise,  "of  what 
nature  soever,"  rescued  from  pirates  or  robbers  should,  if  brought  into  the 
port  of  either  state,  be  restored  entire  to  the  true  proprietor.  The  attorney- 
general  advised  restoration,  but  in  the  meantime  complications  arose  through 
various  libels;  the  negroes  claimed  that  they  had  been  unlawfully  kidnapped 
in  Africa,  and  brought  to  Cuba  in  violation  of  Spanish  law.  The  vessel  and 


1856]          SENTIMENT  AGAINST  ANNEXATION  271 

The  question  of  Cuban  annexation,  though  it  was  not  yet  so 
recognized  by  all  persons,  was  now  practically  dead.  The  Demo 
cratic  platform  of  1856,  the  year  of  the  election  of  Buchanan  to  the 
presidency,  pronounced  strongly  in  favor  of  the  acquirement  of 
the  island;  that  of  the  newly  born  Republican  party  denounced, 
as  strongly,  the  Ostend  manifesto,  of  which  the  Democratic  can 
didate  was  a  signer.  But  Mr.  Buchanan's  interest  did  not  cease; 
in  each  of  his  annual  messages,  except  the  first,  with,  from  our 
present  stand-point,  an  incomprehensible  blindness  to  an  irresisti 
ble  trend  of  sentiment,  he  made  a  recommendation  for  its  pur 
chase.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  by  this  period  even  the  free  gift  of 
Cuba  to  the  United  States  would  have  been  met,  on  the  part  of  the 
North,  by  a  refusal  which  could  not  have  been  overcome.  The 
day  had  passed  when  annexation  was  possible.^  The  passage  of 
half  a  century  has  not  seen  its  realization,  or  even  the  expression 
of  a  wish  by  the  American  government  or  people  in  its  favor. 

The  statesmanship  of  the  period  in  both  countries  was  sadly 
astray.  That  of  Spain  refused  a  great  benefit  in  a  royal  gift,  and  in 
relief  from  conditions  which,  for  more  than  a  generation,  were  to 
waste  fearfully  the  resources  of  a  people  already  poverty  stricken, 
and  prevent  Spain's  natural  development.  The  statesmanship  of 
the  party  in  power  in  the  United  States  was  reaching  out  for  what 
the  American  people  were,  by  1856,  almost  sure,  and  by  1860, 
certain,  to  reject.  The  last  action  in  Congress,  looking  to  nego- 

cargo  were  awarded  to  the  owners,  by  the  district  court,  subject  to  claims  of 
salvage  to  one-third  the  value;  the  negroes,  with  one  exception,  were  to  be 
delivered  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  to  be  sent  to  Africa,  in  con 
formity  with  an  act  of  Congress  of  March  3,  1819.  Carried  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  was  upheld,  excepting  that  the  act  of 
1819  had  not  been  contravened,  and  the  negroes  were  ordered  set  at  liberty. 
The  vessel  was  sold,  apparently  to  satisfy  claims  of  salvage.  The  demand  of 
the  Spanish  minister  for  indemnity  for  vessel,  cargo,  and  negroes  was  refused 
by  Mr.  Webster,  secretary  of  state.  The  Spanish  minister  then  demanded 
the  surrender  of  the  negroes  as  criminals;  this  was  also  refused.  President 
Tyler,  Buchanan,  as  secretary  of  state,  President  Polk,  Fillmore,  Pierce,  and 
Buchanan,  all  recommended  favorable  consideration  of  the  Spanish  claims. 
(See  Moore,  V,  852-854,  for  a  statement  of  the  case,  and  for  references  to  the 
very  voluminous  literature  of  the  subject.) 

The  Spanish  claim  appears,  to  the  writer,  just.  In  the  circumstances,  it 
was  not  for  the  United  States  to  decide  whether  the  negroes  were  legally  held 
as  slaves,  any  more  than  it  was  the  province  of  Spain  thirty-five  years  later 
to  decide  upon  the  right  of  the  Virginius  to  an  American  register. 


272  SLIDELL'S  BILL  [1859 

tiations  for  the  purchase  of  the  island  was  in  a  bill  introduced 
in  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Slidell,  of  Louisiana.  The  report  in  its  favor 
from  the  committee  on  foreign  relations,  ordered  printed  January 
24,  1859,1  received  no  further  notice.  Mr.  Buchanan  reiterated 
his  recommendation  for  an  appropriation  for  the  purpose,  in  his 
annual  message  in  1860;  a  painful  demonstration  of  his  inability 
to  understand  the  angry  mutterings  which  in  a  few  short  months 
were  to  burst  into  the  thunder  of  the  civil  war. 


1  Senate  Report,  351,  35  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   EFFORT    OF    1865    TOWARD    REFORM    IN    CUBAN   ADMINISTRA 
TION:    CUBAN  REVOLT 

THE  interval  of  thirteen  years,  1855  to  1868,  was  one  of  com 
parative  quiet  in  Spanish-American  relations.  Spain,  on  June  17, 
1861,  had  declared  her  neutrality  in  the  contest  between  the  North 
and  South,  thus  conceding  belligerent  rights  to  the  Southern  con 
federacy.  She  was  a  signatory  to  the  convention  concluded  in 
London  between  Great  Britain,  France,  and  herself,  October  31, 
1861,  for  combined  action  for  the  redress  of  grievances  against 
Mexico,  which  resulted  the  same  year  in  the  expedition  so  fatal 
to  France,  and  in  which,  in  the  beginning,  a  Spanish  force  under 
Marshal  Prim,  took  part.  In  April,  1862,  an  agreement  with 
Mexico  having  been  reached  as  to  the  claims  of  Great  Britain  and 
Spain,  Prim  followed  the  example  of  the  latter  power,  and  with 
drew  the  Spanish  force,  though  this  action  was  not  in  accord  with 
the  views  of  the  Spanish  ministry.1 

Spain  was  now  wasting  her  strength  in  useless  adventures  in 
Cochin  China,  in  Santo  Domingo  (a  party  in  the  Spanish  half  of 
which  desired  reannexation  to  Spain),  and  in  a  war,  in  1866, 
against  Peru  and  Chile,  in  which,  May  2,  her  squadron  was  bitterly 
worsted  in  an  attack  on  Callao.  The  whole  of  such  inconsiderate 
action  was  due  to  the  desire  of  Marshal  O'Donnell,  at  the  head  of 
the  ministry,  to  give  employment  to  possible  rivals,2  of  whom 
Narvaez,  Serrano,  and  Prim  were  the  chief. 

Entire  deprivation  of  political  rights  and  emoluments  would  be 
serious  enough  in  the  present  age,  even  were  the  autocratic  govern 
ment  an  ideal  one  in  its  administration  of  justice  and  finance. 
But  when  such  a  government,  furnished  by  a  distant  authority, 
is  radically  corrupt  in  all  its  details,  when  it  exists  wholly  for  the 

1  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  446.  2  Ibid.,  446. 

273 


274  CUBAN  SLAVE-TRADE  [1863 

benefit  of  such  distant  authority  and  of  the  officials  it  supplies,  the 
governed  would  be  worthy  of  their  slavery  were  there  not  dis 
content  and  effort  at  revolution.  Cuba,  naturally,  under  such 
circumstances,  so  long  as  slavery  continued  among  us,  desired  and 
labored  for  annexation  to  the  United  States  whence  came  her 
prosperity.  With  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  United  States, 
there  developed  an  antagonism  to  annexation  among  many  of 
the  Cuban  planters  themselves,  as  fearing  the  economic  result 
of  manumission  in  Cuba.  Particularly  was  this  so  among  Spanish 
owners  of  slaves,  who  became  known  as  "negreros"  or  slave- 
dealers.  Not  that  there  were  not  many  planters  who  joined  with 
the  abolitionist  party,  which  had  existed  in  the  island  since  1830, 
in  deprecating  slavery  and  desiring  its  discontinuance;  but  the 
change  wrought  by  the  civil  war  had  a  distinct  effect  in  causing 
Cuba  to  turn  to  Spain  in  an  endeavor  to  establish  relations  which, 
being  bearable,  would  bind  the  island  more  closely  to  the  mother 
country. 

At  this  epoch  the  slave-trade  to  Cuba  still  continued.  In  1863 
and  1864  the  attention  of  the  captain-general  had  been  called,  by 
the  British  consul,  to  eleven  disembarkations  of  slaves,  one  from 
a  steamer  at  Cardenas  and  Sagua  amounting  to  1,500,  and  during 
these  years  3,565  imported  negroes  were  seized;  chiefly,  of  course, 
on  the  motion  of  British  and  American  authorities:  statements 
which  speak  for  the  magnitude  of  the  traffic.1 

The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  United  States  and  the  unsettle- 
ment  of  the  labor  conditions  of  the  South  had  given  a  great  im 
petus  to  the  sugar  industry  of  Cuba,  and  caused  the  formation  of  a 
Spanish  party  "for  whom  the  cause  of  slavery  and  that  of  Spanish 
domination  were  identical  and  synonymous."  2  It  could  not  be 

1  A  despatch  of  Lord  Lyons,  February  4,  1864,  to  Mr.  Seward,  secretary  of 
state,  enclosed  a  memorandum  which  was  a  copy  of  a  despatch  from  the 
British  minister  in  Madrid,  who,  discussing  the  means  of  prevention,  mentions 
the  number  of  Africans  introduced  into  Cuba  in  the  twelve  months  ending 
September  30,  1863,  as  estimated  at  between  7,000  and  8,000,  as  against 
11,254  in  the  twelve  months  preceding.    He  credited  the  diminution  to  the 
efforts  of  the  new  governor-general,  Dulce,  who  undoubtedly  did  his  utmost 
to  suppress  the  traffic.    Under  the  existing  laws,  the  seizure  of  newly  imported 
slaves  by  the  authorities  was  prohibited  after  they  had  been  received  on  an 
estate. 

2  Gallenga,  The  Pearl  of  the  Antilles,  12. 


1865]  VOLUNTEER  MOVEMENT  IN  CUBA  275 

otherwise,  as  severance  from  Spain,  followed  by  annexation  to 
the  United  States,  now  meant  death  to  slavery.  Two  great  par 
ties  were  thus  formed,  the  one  fanatically  loyal  to  Spain  and  con 
sisting  chiefly  of  Spanish  immigrants  favoring  slavery  and  the 
status  quo;  the  other,  separatist,  to  which  belonged  most  of  the 
native-born  element. 

Notwithstanding  the  facts  of  the  slave-trade  so  fully  established, 
the  anti-reformist  party,  in  a  memorial  addressed  to  the  crown, 
June  28,  1865,  claimed  that  the  traffic  no  longer  existed.  They 
were  unable  to  see  that  the  question  of  slavery  in  Cuba  itself  had 
been  decided  by  the  outcome  of  the  civil  war  in  the  United  States. 

In  the  agitation  following  the  expeditions  of  Lopez,  the  Spanish 
element  had  strengthened  itself  with  the  home  government  by 
claiming  to  stand  for  Spanish  dominion  and  had  re-enforced  its 
political  position  by  forming  an  organization  of  volunteers  which 
became  important  by  numbers,  which  rose  to  some  70,000  or 
80,000;  and  by  membership  in  the  clubs  throughout  the  island 
which,  patterned  after  the  Casino  Espanol,  of  Havana,  became 
points  of  great  political  influence  and  a  power  which  no  gover 
nor-general  could  resist,  their  power  extending  even,  as  will 
appear  later,  to  forcing  General  Dulce,  one  of  the  best-meaning 
and  most  able  governors  of  the  island  during  the  century,  to  re 
sign  his  post  and  leave  for  Spain. 

On  May  12,  1865,  there  was  sent  to  Marshal  Serrano,  Duke 
de  la  Torre,  at  that  time  in  the  cabinet,  a  letter  signed  by  over 
24,000  residents  of  the  island,  among  whom  were  all  the  most 
distinguished  and  important  natives,  calling  for  his  aid  in  the 
Cortes,  and  detailing  the  difficulties  under  which  Cuba  labored. 
Serrano  had  been  captain-general;  he  had  left  Cuba  with  the 
reputation  of  a  kindly  and  beneficent  master,  and  the  appeal  was 
not  in  vain.  He  spoke  in  the  senate  and  answered  in  terms  which 
gave  hope  of  a  change.  The  enemies  of  reform  appealed  to  the 
crown  for  the  retention  of  the  status  quo,  but  the  outcome  was  a 
decree  appointing  a  commission  which,  in  the  words  of  Marshal 
Serrano  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  signers  of  the  reformist  petition, 
"could  inform  the  government  concerning  the  reforms  which,  de 
manded  by  opinion,  it  is  urgent  to  establish  in  that  island."  He 
continues:  "This  decree,  recognizing  and  sanctioning  in  a  solemn 


276  COMMISSION  ON  CUBAN  REFORM  [1865 

manner  the  right  of  the  American  provinces  to  take  part  in  the 
formation  of  the  political  and  economical  laws  by  which  they  shall 
be  governed,  is  a  very  advanced  step  in  the  reforms  for  which  the 
island  calls."  * 

It  is  clear  that  representation  was  still  looked  upon  as  a  panacea 
which  was  to  bring  justice  and  content  to  the  Antilles,  and  the 
sentiment  of  the  many  overpowered  the  wise  judgment  of  Senor 
Saco,  who  saw  no  practical  good  in  the  presence  of  a  small  knot 
of  representatives,  who  could  not  have  the  numbers  or  influence 
in  the  Spanish  Cortes  to  effect  their  wishes  over  those  of  a  great 
majority  formed  of  peninsular  representatives. 

The  royal  decree,  authorizing  the  ministry  of  ultramar  to  open 
an  inquiry  respecting  reforms  in  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  was 
signed  the  25th  of  November,  1865,  the  inquiry  extending  to 
principles  on  which  the  special  laws  governing  Cuba  and  Puerto 
Rico  should  be  based;  the  manner  of  regulating  colored  and 
Asiatic  labor,  and  the  means  of  facilitating  the  importation  of 
such  labor;  the  treaties  of  navigation  and  commerce  which  should 
be  made  with  other  nations,  and  the  reform  in  the  tariff  and  in  the 
administration  of  the  customs. 

Twenty  representatives  of  the  government,  councilors  of  state, 
were  to  be  named  from  the  various  departments  of  the  government: 
sixteen  members  were  to  be  elected  from  the  fifteen  most  important 
ayuntamientos  of  Cuba,  and  six  from  Puerto  Rico.  Notwithstand 
ing  a  change  in  the  electoral  law  in  the  interest  of  the  party  of 
antireform  while  the  election  was  pending,  the  whole  representa 
tion  sent  from  the  Antilles  belonged  to  the  reform  party.  The 
following 2  were  regarded  as  the  bases  of  their  demands : 

1.  That  the  exceptional  status  of  the  islands  cease,  and  also 
the  discretional  powers  of  the  governor-general. 

2.  Separation  of  the  political  and  civil  power  from  the  military. 

3.  That  the  stipulated  guaranties  be  rigorously  applied,  and 
that  the  rights  recognized  in  the  constitution  of  the  kingdom  be 
extended  to  all  Spanish  subjects. 

4.  A  governor-general  to  be  nominated  by  the  crown,  repre 
senting  the  executive  power  with  all  its  associated  faculties. 

1  Sedano,  Estudios  Politicos,  260. 

3  From  Sedano.  Estudios  Politicos,  300  et  seq. 


1866]  COMMISSION  ON  CUBAN  REFORM  277 

5.  A  captain-general  also  to   be  nominated   by  the  crown  to 
command  the  army. 

6.  A  naval  commander-in-chief  also  to  be  named  by  the  crown, 
to  command  the  department. 

7.  A   provincial   junta  and   an  insular   committee   for  affairs 
peculiar  to  the  island. 

8.  Representation  in  the  Cortes  in  conformity  with  the  law  in 
force  in  the  Peninsula. 

9.  Division  of  the  province  of  Cuba  into  six  districts,  with  their 
respective  governors,  councilors,  and  provincial  committees  with 
the  same  faculties  as  those  of  the  Peninsula,  saving  the  variations 
due  to  special  conditions  in  the  two  countries. 

10.  Municipal  governments  to  be  elected   and  to  have  such 
enlargement  of  attributes  as  differing  circumstances  in  the  two 
countries  demand. 

11.  That  the  creation  of  new  municipalities  be  facilitated  when 
desired. 

The  abolition  of  the  slave-trade  was  to  be  demanded,  as  also 
steps  toward  the  abolition  of  slavery  itself.  And  finally  the  vicious 
and  complicated  financial  system  was  to  be  one  of  the  main  ques 
tions  considered,  and  action  taken  toward  seeking  to  reduce  the 
enormous  charges  of  the  customs  administration  and  its  personnel, 
and  to  adopt  a  freer  regimen  which  would  augment  the  trade  be 
tween  Cuba  and  the  United  States.  It  was  recognized  and  stated 
that  it  was  Cuba's  relations  with  this  country  which  chiefly  affected 
her  commercial  importance;  the  United  States  taking  sixty-two 
per  cent,  of  her  sugar,  England,  France,  and  other  powers  twenty- 
two  per  cent.,  and  Spain  but  three  per  cent. 

The  commission  began  its  sittings  October  30,  1866,  under  the 
presidency  of  Senor  Canovas  del  Castillo,  minister  of  ultramar. 
In  opening  the  conference  Senor  Canovas  stated  that  he  had  not 
been  the  author  of  the  decree  of  inquiry,  but  that  he  had  accepted 
and  would  accept  it  in  good  faith;  that  the  government  declared 
solemnly  that  it  had  no  preconceived  idea,  that  it  gave  preference 
to  no  system,  and  that  it  was  disposed  to  extract  from  the  inquiry 
all  the  benefit  which  could  be  afforded  through  the  knowledge  and 
true  patriotism  of  the  commissioners  sent  by  the  islands  of  Cuba 
and  Puerto  Rico,  and  from  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  those 


278  COMMISSION  ON   CUBAN  REFORM  [1867 

who  had  been  called  together  with  them  to  consult;  that  they 
were  authorized  to  discuss  everything  which  might  touch  the 
prosperity  of  the  ultramarine  provinces  without  any  limitations 
other  than  in  the  three  points  which  were  the  bases  of  the  Spanish 
social  organization,  viz.:  National  unity,  religious  unity,  and 
monarchical  unity,  which  it  was  not  supposed  they  would  wish  to 
discuss.  Otherwise  they  were  to  have  the  fullest  liberty  of  dis 
cussion  and  expression. 

The  studies  of  the  several  committees  upon  the  important  sub 
jects  before  the  conference  were  submitted  to  the  minister  of 
ultramar,  January  30,  1867. 

The  commission  was  inclined  to  the  suppression  of  custom 
houses,  demonstrating  the  possibility  of  the  scheme  without  bur 
dening  the  producing  classes^proving  by  official  data  that  five 
per  cent,  on  the  income  or  net  production  would  suffice  to  meet  the 
charges  of  the  island,  and  this  with  scarcely  making  in  the 
estimate  the  numerous  deductions  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
commissioners,  justice  demanded.  They  were  also  of  the  opinion 
that  within  the  limits  of  six  per  cent,  there  would  be  had  a  surplus 
of  about  $2,000,000,  and  which,  at  the  same  time  that  taxable  wealth 
would  increase,  would  facilitate  a  progressive  reduction  of  the  rate. 

The  commission  recommended  also  the  reduction  of  duties 
and  the  simplification  of  the  tariff,  an  indispensable  point  in  order 
that  the  productive  capacity  of  the  provinces  should  not  decline, 
demonstrating  that  the  one  and  the  other,  far  from  diminishing  the 
public  income,  would  increase  it,  the  resulting  commercial  move 
ment  compensating  the  higher  tariff.  It  also  called  for  the  sup 
pression  of  the  differential  duties  and  for  the  removal  of  all 
unnecessary  obstacles,  which  restrained  the  development  of  com 
merce.  The  question  of  cereals  was  treated  from  the  point  of  view 
of  justice  to  Cuba  and  of  profit  to  the  Castiles,  showing  that  these 
could  obtain  greater  or  less  advantages  without  obliging  Cuba  to 
eat  bad  and  dear  bread,  and  saying  that  the  profits  which  the  small 
number  of  traffickers  attained  in  this  monopoly  did  not,  in  the 
most  remote  manner,  compensate  for  the  sacrifice  imposed  on  the 
island,  if  it  is  possible  to  have  compensation  for  an  injustice. 

The  commission  also  petitioned  that  commerce  between  the 
Antilles  and  the  Peninsula  should  be  declared  coasting  trade. 


1867]  FAILURE  OF  COMMISSION  279 

But  the  commission  did  not  propose,  nor  indicate,  nor  even 
imagine,  the  possibility  that  there  would  be  an  amalgamation  of 
the  two  systems,  and  that  the  custom-houses  should,  be  left  with 
all  their  immoralities  and  other  shortcomings,  and  the  dicect  tax 
should  be  laid  without  previous  political  oy  economic  organization; 
that  these  .contributions  should  be"  established  along  with  others, 
and  much  less  that,  by  this  subsiitutidn,  a  ten^per-cent.  tax  should 
be  established,  leaving  in  force  the  greater  part  of  the  old  imposts, 
when  six  per  cent,  had  been  considered,  and  was  considered,  a 
sufficient  substitute  for  everything  and  leave  a  surplus. 

The  result,  fatal  in  its  influence  to  Spain,  was  a  decree  signed 
February  12,  merely  changing  the  system  of  imposts  in  Cuba 
"in  such  form  that,  of  itself,  it  sufficed  to  bring  disturbance  and  , 
discontent  to  the  mind  of  every  inhabitant,  and  produce  the  revo 
lutionary  sentiment  which  has  brought  such  woes  to  the  previously 
peaceful  isle  of  Cuba."  * 

In  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  the  commission  presented 
a  petition  that  the  publication  of  the  decree  should  be  suspended 
in  the  Antilles,  at  least  until  it  would  be  possible  to  publish  with  it 
others  which  might  explain  the  intention  of  the  attempted  reform 
and  the  advantages  to  be  hoped,  and  though  promises  were  made, 
"neither  were  other  decrees  made  nor  other  reforms  attempted  as 
a  compensation  for  the  direct  impost,  nor  did  the  Official  Gazette 
publish  the  reply  to  the  economic  interrogatory.  The  royal  decree 
of  February  12  was  carried  into  execution,  and,  as  it  caused  such 
perturbation  in  Cuba,  the  commissioners  received,  as  was  to  be 
expected,  bitter  denunciations." 

Following  this  failure  in  fiscal  reform,  the  question  of  political 
reforms  was  taken  up,  formulated  under  ten  heads,2  the  whole  being 
based  upon  the  supposition  that  it  was  conceded  that  all  political 
rights,  established  by  law  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  Peninsula  and 
adjacent  islands,  should  have  extension  to  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico. 
Freedom  of  the  press;  right  of  petition;  no  restriction  of  rights 
to  public  posts  or  employments;  right  of  exercising  any  legal  in 
dustry  or  profession;  right  of  acquiring  or  disposing  of  property; 
right  of  public  meeting;  no  detention  or  separation  from  domicile 
except  as  the  law  prescribes;  declaring  perpetual  proscription  an 
1  Sedano,  306.  2  Sedano,  p.  295,  et  seq. 


280  SERRANO'S  OPINION  [1867 

outrage;  that  no  contract  shall  reduce  any  one  in  possession  of  free 
dom  to  perpetual  or  temporary  servitude;  that  there  should  be  no 
confiscation  of  property  without  compensation,  were  the  reasonable 
demands  which  were  brought  forward  by  the  reformists  and  re 
ported  upon  by  a  special  committee  of  the  commission.  Though 
there  was  a  division  of  opinion  in  the  committee  as  to  the  form 
which  the  Antilles  representation  should  take,  there  was  none  as  to 
general  principles,  except  that  Sefiores  Saco  and  Bernal  wisely 
favored  insular  legislatures  as  opposed  to  representation  in  the 
national  Cortes. 

That  there  were  Spaniards  of  standing  and  authority  who 
favored  the  desired  reforms  is  shown  by  the  remarks  of  Marshal 
Serrano  in  a  report  to  the  government  on  May  10,  1867,  saying: 
"The  result  of  the  deliberation  of  the  Cortes  of  1836,  and  the  con 
stitutional  precept  of  1837,  misinterpreted,  in  fact,  by  the  nega 
tion  of  all  political  rights  of  the  natives  of  the  Antilles;  the  repres 
sive  measures  which  the  local  governor  of  Cuba  made  excessive, 
and  the  real  administrative  chaos  which  succeeded  this  epoch,  and 
which  my  predecessor,  the  Marquis  of  Havana,  has  described 
in  such  lively  colors  in  the  two  memorials  which  he  has  printed, 
raised  to  the  highest  pitch  the  discontent  and  desperation,  if  I  may 
say  so,  of  almost  all  the  natives  of  Cuba." 

Touching  the  subject  of  the  danger  occasioned  by  the  expedi 
tions  which  had  had  their  birth  in  the  United  States,  he  added: 

"This  danger  cleared  away,  and  the  passions  calmed,  the  Cuban 
mind  began  to  prepare  itself  for  the  establishment  of  a  great 
national  party  in  which,  under  the  name  of  the  party  of  reform,  all 
are  grouped  to-day,  animated  with  hopes  which  I  and  many 
others,  on  the  faith  of  good  Spaniards,  have  believed  we  ought  to 
encourage,  and  which,  in  my  judgment,  the  patriotism  of  the 
government  ought  not  disregard.  ...  I  flatter  myself  that  I 
know  the  tendencies  of  the  Cubans  well;  I  have  tried  to  make 
friends  with  them  and  hear,  without  prejudice,  their  complaints 
and  aspirations.  I  succeeded — I  say  it  with  satisfaction;  and 
after  my  departure  from  Havana  have  been  in  constant  communi 
cation  with  many  of  their  most  important  men;  have  had  sent  me 
a  letter  which  belongs  to  the  whole  public,  in  which  are  expressed 
their  wishes  and  which  is  subscribed  by  all  the  most  notable 


1867]  THE  CUBAN  TURNING  POINT  281 

Cubans  of  all  parts  of  the  island.  I  cannot  do  otherwise  than  « 
recognize,  nor  do  less  than  say  to-day  to  the  government  of  her 
majesty  with  all  the  loyalty  of  my  character  and  with  the  impulse 
of  the  most  intimate  conviction,  that  the  complaints  of  the  Cubans 
are  just,  that  their  aspirations  are  legitimate,  that  there  is  no 
reason  why  they,  Spanish  as  we  ourselves,  should  have  no  press, 
nor  any  representation  in  their  government,  nor  a  single  one  of 
the  guarantees  to  which  we  in  the  Peninsula  have  right;  that  there 
is  no  reason  why  a  military  and  absolute  government,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest  grades,  should  be  the  sole  regimen  of  the 
Antilles ;  and  that  now  is  the  precise  moment — let  the  government 
not  forget  it — to  take  advantage  of  the  internal  and  external 
circumstances  which  favor  the  political  reform  demanded  with 
insistency  by  the  Spanish  of  the  Antilles,  and  which  it  is  just  and 
proper  to  grant  them  without  delay." 

Plans  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  both  islands  were  presented 
at  the  last  session  of  the  commission,  April  27,  1867,  but  there 
was  nothing  to  come  of  the  eager  anticipation  and  the  severe 
labors  but  the  increased  taxation  ordered  by  the  decree  of  Febru 
ary  12.  The  elaborate  reports  to  the  government  slumbered  in  for- 
getfulness,  the  fateful  fruit  of  which  was  to  be  war  and  the  ruin 
of  Spanish  oversea  dominion. l 

This  was  the  turning-point  in  the  relations  of  Cuba  and  Spain.\ 
Until  now  Cuba  had  been  loyal,  at  least  in  such  degree  as  never 
to  really  endanger  the  political  union  between  the  two  countries. 
Whatever  minds  were  turned  to  independence  or  to  annexation  to 
the  United  States,  the  great  majority  were  loath  to  part  the  bonds 
of  the  mother  country,  and  sought  within  the  law  an  alleviation 
of  their  conditions.  But  the  absolute  failure  of  the  commission, 
the  more  than  failure,  in  fact,  as  the  burdens  of  the  Antilles  were 

1  The  foregoing  is  chiefly  transcript  or  paraphrase  from  Senor  Don  Carlos 
de  Sedano's  E studios  Politicos  Sobre  Cuba,  295-320.  Senor  Sedano  was  an 
ex-deputy  of  the  Cortes,  strongly  opposed  to  annexation  to  the  United  States, 
and  to  the  insurrection,  which  developed  into  the  ten  years'  war,  and  which 
was  the  direct  outcome  of  the  treatment  of  the  commissions  and  of  the  pro 
crastination,  so  fatal  an  element  of  Spanish  character,  when  the  road  was 
opened  by  the  establishment  of  the  republic.  No  one  has  treated  the  subject 
of  Cuba  in  a  more  upright,  sober,  dispassionate,  and  patriotic  way.  He  was 
firmly  convinced  that  Cuba  should  remain  Spanish,  but  was  equally  convinced 
of  the  necessity  of  reform. 


282  CHAOTIC  STATE  OF  SPAIN  [1867 

increased,  meant  war  and  separation,  and  the  war  soon  came. 
Spain  was,  herself,  but  a  volcano  in  unrest.  By  1867  she  was  in 
chaos,  "the  government  was  irresistibly  swept  along  the  current 
of  reaction  until  its  decrees  became  such  as  would  have  shamed 
Fernando  VII.  All  loyalty  was  trampled  under  foot,  all  guarantees 
forgotten,  all  liberty  crushed.  Taxes  were  extorted  in  advance, 
municipalities  dissolved,  the  electoral  laws  altered  by  decrees,  the 
press  and  speech,  public  and  private,  suppressed.  Dismay, 
almost  panic,  reigned  supreme;  ruined  shopkeepers  put  up  their 
shutters  in  every  town,  merchants  closed  their  country  houses, 
money  well-nigh  disappeared  from  circulation."  *  Prim  was  an 
exile  in  France;  in  April,  1868,  an  attempt  of  the  Cortes  to  meet 
was  violently  repressed,  and  all  leaders  not  favorable  to  the  re 
actionary  ministry  were  arrested  and  banished,  among  them 
Generals  Serrano,  Dulce,  Cordoba,  Zabala,  Serrano-Bedoya, 
Caballero  de  Rodas,  Hoyas,  Letona,  and  Rios  Rosas,  the  presi 
dent  of  the  Cortes,  September  19,  1868,  Admiral  Topete's  squad 
ron,  at  Cadiz,  raised  the  flag  of  revolt,  and  the  revolution  be 
gan  which  resulted  in  the  dethronement  and,  ten  days  later, 
the  deportation  of  Isabella  II,  and  the  installation  of  Serrano, 
Prim,  Topete,  and  Sagasta,  as  the  chiefs  of  a  new  provisional 
government. 

The  call  of  Amadeo,  Duke  of  Aosta,  to  the  throne,  in  November, 
1870;  the  death,  by  assassination,  of  Prim,  December  30  (the  very 
day  Amadeo  landed  on  Spanish  soil),  and  Amadeo's  abdication, 
February  11,  1873,  are  but  stations  in  the  sea  of  discord  through 
which  unhappy  Spain  was  passing  in  these  years,  and  evidences 
of  her  unfitness  to  deal  with  such  questions  as  the  earnest  Cubans 
and  their  few  Spanish  friends  had  endeavored  to  bring  before  an 
ever  transitory  government. 

On  May  30,  1866,  General  Lersundi,  a  strong  supporter  of  the 
reactionary  government  with  which  the  reign  of  Isabella  ended, 
had  replaced  the  liberal  General  Dulce  as  captain-general,  and 
when  the  pronunciamiento  of  Yara  came,  October  10,  1868,  and 
D.  Manuel  Cespedes,  wearied  as  were  so  many  by  an  insupport 
able  situation,  raised  the  cry  of  independence,  it  found  at  the 
head  of  the  affairs  of  the  island  one  of  those  least  fitted  to  deal 
1  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  455. 


1868]  BEGINNING  OF  REVOLT  283 

with  so  difficult  a  situation;  one,  too,  which  might  not  have  been 
had  a  ruler  more  sympathetic  with  Cuban  hopes  been  at  hand. 

The  time  of  revolt  was  sadly  ill-chosen.  Had  it  been  delayed 
it  is  more  than  probable  that  Cuban  aspirations  would  have  been 
met  by  the  new  government,  at  the  head  of  which  was  Cuba's 
strong  friend,  Serrano.  With  him  was  Prim,  a  landmark  of  wisdom 
and  intelligence  in  Spanish  statesmanship;  Topete,  an  honest 
and  liberal-minded  sailor;  Mateo  Sagasta,  who  was  to  be  the 
head  of  Spain's  ministry  in  the  disastrous  epoch  of  thirty  years 
later,  and  Lopez  de  Ayala,  the  last  as  minister  of  ultramar. 

Lersundi,  who  steadily  reported  the  failure  of  the  insurrection,  re 
ceived  notice  in  November  of  his  relief  by  General  Dulce,  but  the 
latter  did  not  arrive  until  January  4,  1869.  His  reception  by  the 
Spanish  element  "was  as  cold  as  the  air  which  was  then  blowing 
from  the  north,  and  only  a  few,  but  loyal  and  sincere  friends 
associated  with  the  ideas  of  reform  to  which  he  aspired,  were 
present  to  visit  him  aboard."  The  powers  of  Havana,  the  army, 
the  volunteers,  the  clubs, — all,  in  fact,  which  represented  the  pen 
insular  element,  were  against  him. 

General  Dulce  had  returned  with  extraordinary  discretionary 
powers,  and  one  of  his  first  acts,  within  a  week  of  his  landing,  was 
to  declare  liberty  of  press  and  speech,  except  that  the  Catholic 
dogma  and  slavery  should  not  be  discussed  until  allowed  by  the 
Spanish  Cortes.1  His  efforts  were  sincerely  conciliatory,  and  these, 
combined  with  the  good-will  of  the  new  and  liberal  ministry,  might 
have  succeeded  in  the  endeavors  to  bring  peace,  but  the  fates 
were  against  it.  While  negotiations  were  favorably  progressing 
between  the  insurgent  leaders  and  the  commissioners  of  concilia-  •»•- 
tion,  who  were  cordially  received  in  the  insurgent  camp,  both 
at  El  Turias  and  at  Ojo  de  Agua  de  los  Melones,  "and  when,  in 
the  judgment  of  Peninsulars  and  Cubans  of  highest  character, 
the  preliminaries  of  pacification  appeared  already  certain,  a  most 
unhappy  and  never-to-be-sufficiently-lamented  deed  disarranged 
all,  and  made  conciliation  impossible.  The  insurrectionist  chief, 
D.  Augusto  Arango,  who  incautiously  presented  himself  at  the 
gates  of  Puerto  Principe,  alone,  unarmed,  with  two  safe-conducts, 
to  hold  an  interview  with  the  military  governor  of  this  city,  an- 
1  Decree  January  7,  1869,  Sedano,  Estudios  Politico*,  367. 


284  UNWARRANTED   DECREES  [1869 

nouncing  the  immediate  presentation  and  submission  to  the  govern 
ment  of  600  or  700  men  of  the  800  or  1,000  who,  for  the  moment, 
were  in  arms  in  that  department,  and  with  which  act  the  insur 
rection  still  localized  there  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Bayamo,  would 
have  ended,  was  assassinated  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  (comisario 
de  barrio),  a  lieutenant,  and  four  armed  peasants." 

"This  unfortunate  occurrence  ended  attempts  at  conciliation 
and  aroused  a  sentiment  of  exasperation  amongst  the  insurgents. 
Threats,  insults,  and  provocations  followed  everywhere;  the  best 
and  wealthiest  families  of  the  island  sought  refuge  in  Europe  and 
the  United  States,  and  civil  war  spread  throughout  all  the  eastern 
half  of  the  island  with  all  its  horrors."  The  pacific  captain-general 
was  powerless  in  the  hands  of  the  ungovernable  organization  of 
the  volunteers  composed  almost  wholly  of  Peninsulars,  and  who, 
never  taking  the  field,  became  an  armed  political  party  dominat 
ing  the  towns  and  all  Cuba  not  in  control  of  the  insurrectionists, 
representing  in  their  views  and  acts  a  retrogressive  and  absolutist 
policy,  before  which  all  reform  became  mute. 

Though  the  captain-general  was  nominally  the  governor  of  Cuba, 
the  real  power  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the  volunteers,  who  were 
in  the  end,  the  de  facto  rulers.  Dulce  had  been  constrained  by 
them  within  three  months  to  wholly  change  his  liberal  policy  for 
one  of  inhuman  severity.  On  March  24,  1869,  but  three  weeks 
after  the  advent  of  the  new  administration  at  Washington,  the 
following  decree  was  issued: 

"  Vessels  which  may  be  captured  in  Spanish  waters  or  on  the 
high  seas  near  to  the  island,  having  on  board  men,  arms,  and 
munitions,  or  effects  that  can  in  any  manner  contribute,  promote, 
or  foment  the  insurrection  in  this  province,  whatsoever  their  de 
rivation  or  destination,  after  examination  of  their  papers  and  re 
gister  shall  be  de  facto  considered  as  enemies  of  the  integrity  of  our 
territory,  and  treated  as  pirates,  in  accordance  with  the  ordinances 
of  the  navy.  All  persons  captured  in  such  vessels,  without  regard 
to  their  number,  will  be  immediately  executed."  * 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  12.  Almost  coincidently  with  this 
decree,  the  brig  Mary  Lowell,  with  a  cargo  of  arms  and  supplies,  had  been 
seized,  March  15,  1869,  at  Ragged  Island,  one  of  the  Bahamas,  in  what  was 
claimed  to  be  British  waters. 


1869]  YALMASEDA'S   SAVAGE   ORDER  285 

On  April  4,  1869,  the  Count  of  Valmaseda,  commanding  at 
Bayamo,  issued  a  proclamation  declaring: 

"1st.  Every  man  from  the  age  of  fifteen  years  upward  found 
away  from  his  habitation  (finca),  and  who  does  not  prove  a 
justified  motive  therefor,  will  be  shot. 

"  2d.     Every  habitation  unoccupied  will  be  burned  by  the  troops. 

"3d.  Every  habitation  from  which  does  not  float  a  white  flag, 
as  a  signal  that  its  inhabitants  desire  peace,  will  be  reduced  to 
ashes. 

"Women  that  are  not  living  at  their  own  homes,  or  at  the  house 
of  their  relatives,  will  collect  in  the  town  of  Jiguani  or  Bayamo, 
where  maintenance  will  be  provided.  Those  who  do  not  present 
themselves  will  be  conducted  forcibly."  l 

On  April  1  a  decree  was  issued  which  practically  forbade  the 
alienation  of  property  in  the  island,  except  with  the  revision  and 
assent  of  certain  officials,  and  which  declared  void  all  sales  made 
without  such  assent.2  This  was  followed  shortly  by  decrees  creat 
ing  an  administrative  council  for  the  custody  and  management  of 
embargoed  property,  which  was  extended  to  the  property  of  all 
persons,  either  within  or  without  the  island,  who  might  take  part 
in  the  insurrection  by  aiding  it  in  any  way. 

These  decrees,  issued  at  the  bidding  of  the  volunteers,  and  all 
of  which  went  full  in  the  face  of  the  treaty  of  1795,  in  so  far  as 
American  citizens  were  involved,  drove  out  of  the  island,  as  men 
tioned,  many  persons  of  property  who  fled  to  the  United  States. 
The  men  of  the  escaping  families  became  active  members  of  the 
Cuban  juntas  formed  in  the  Union.  Although  their  estates  and 
properties  in  Cuba  were  confiscated,  many  of  them  had  very  large 
resources  from  investments  out  of  the  country,  and  these  were 
poured  into  the  insurgent  exchequer  with  a  lavishness  which  was 
highest  proof  of  their  earnestness  in  the  cause  for  which  they  had 
given  up  so  much.  Of  the  lofty  spirit  of  these  early  revolutionists 
there  can  be  no  question. 

A  Cuban  junta  wasjppganized  in  New  York  that  issued,  sold,  or 

gave  away  Cuban  bonds  payable  on  the  independence   of   the 

island.    The  money  thus  obtained,  and  that  from  other  sources, 

was  used  to  fit  out  and  send  expeditions  to  Cuba  carrying  arms 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  20.  a  Ibid.,  19. 


286  THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  [1869 

and  men,  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  Although 
the  vessels  used  were,  in  the  main,  ordinary  tug-boats,  and  none 
of  them  were  vessels  able  to  cruise  and  commit  hostilities,  as  were 
those  built  and  fitted  out  in  England  against  the  United  States 
1  during  the  war  of  secession,  and  there  was  not  recognized 
war  between  Spain  and  her  Cuban  subjects,  in  which  the  United 
States  was  a  professed  neutral,  yet  the  use  by  Cuban  rebels  of 
the  United  States  as  treasury  and  arsenal  presented  much  the 
same  principles  of  law.  The  Cuban  junta  and  a  large  body  of 
public  opinion  demanded  from  President  Grant  a  recognition  of 
the  belligerency  of  the  Cubans  in  arms,  such  as  Great  Britain 
had  given  to  the  Confederate  government. 


V 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  EARLIER  DIPLOMACY  OF  THE  TEN  YEARS'  WAR 

THE  President  of  the  United  States  was  now,  since  March  4, 
1869,  General  Grant;  the  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish; 
the  minister  to  Spain,  General  Sickles,  a  prominent  officer  in  the 
civil  war.  Mr.  John  Hay  was  secretary  of  legation,  than  whom 
the  minister  could  not  have  had  a  better  right  hand.  The  Cuban 
insurrection  had,  by  early  spring  of  1869,  taken  on  so  virulent  a 
character,  on  both  sides,  that  it  became  a  matter  of  deep  concern 
to  the  United  States  government,  so  many  of  whose  citizens  were 
large  proprietors  in  the  island,  and  so  much  of  whose  commercial 
well-being  was  involved.  The  country  was  fortunate  in  having  in 
the  head  of  the  department  of  state  an  official  of  great  ability, 
of  highest  character,  and  of  conservative  instincts.  It  was  certain 
that  Cuban  affairs  would  be  managed  with  the  justice  and  high- 
mindedness  which  were  part  of  Mr.  Fish's  character. 

When  Mr.  Fish  entered  the  department  of  state  he  was  con 
fronted  by  two  controversies  threatening  the  peace  of  the  United 
States.  One  was  the  Alabama  difficulty;  the  other  the  questions  of 
Cuba.  Each  presented  belligerent  recognition  at  the  threshold. 
"  The  secretary  was  in  a  dilemma.  The  rule  of  action  he  was  about 
to  lay  down  as  that  which  should  have  guided  the  British  govern 
ment  in  1861  must  control  the  United  States  in  1869.  That  ^ 


obvious.  But  in  1869  the  United  States  was  itself  the  interested 
observer  of  an  insurrection  on  the  neighboring  island  of  Cuba,  and, 
moreover,  the  new  President  was  not  backward  in  expressing  the 
warm  sympathy  he  felt  for  the  insurgents  against  Spanish  colonial 
misrule."  l  Mr.  Fish  had  to  formulate  for  his  guidance  a  rule 
applicable  to  both  situations.  This  he  did,  and  adhered  to,  and, 
what  was  of  greatest  moment,  held  President  Grant  to  the  same. 

1  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Treaty  of  Washington,  108. 
287 


288  AMERICAN  PROTEST  [1869 

Mr.  Fish  at  once  protested  to  the  Spanish  minister  against  Gen 
eral  Dulce's  decree  of  March  24,  saying:  "It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
so  high  a  functionary  as  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba  should,  as 
this  paper  seems  to  indicate,  have  overlooked  the  obligations  of 
his  government  pursuant  to  the  law  of  nations,  and  especially  its 
promises  in  the  treaty  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  in 
JJJ3§r  Under  that  law  and  treaty,  the  United  States  expect  for 
their  citizens  and  vessels  the  privilege  of  carrying  to  the  enemies  of 
y/  Spain,  whether  those  enemies  be  claimed  as  Spanish  subjects  or 
citizens  of  other  countries,  subject  only  to  the  requirement  of  a 
legal  blockade,  all  merchandise  not  contraband  of  war.  Articles 
contraband  of  war,  when  destined  for  the  enemies  of  Spain,  are 
liable  to  seizure  on  the  high  seas,  but  the  right  of  seizure  is  limited 
to  such  articles  only,  and  no  claim  for  its  extension  to  other  mer 
chandise  or  to  persons  not  in  the  civil,  military,  or  naval  service 
of  the  enemies  of  Spain,  will  be  acquiesced  in  by  the  United  States. 
This  government  certainly  cannot  assent  to  the  punishment  by 
Spanish  authorities  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  for  the 
exercise  of  a  privilege  to  which  he  may  be  entitled,  under  the  public 
law  and  treaties."  He  hoped  that  the  proclamation  would  be  re 
called,  or  that  orders  preventing  its  illegal  application  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States  would  be  given.  "A  contrary  course  might 
endanger  those  friendly  and  cordial  relations  between  the  two  gov 
ernments,  which  it  is  the  hearty  desire  of  the  President  should  be 
maintained."  1 

This  was  quickly  followed  by  an  energetic  note  concerning 
Count  Valmaseda's  proclamation  of  massacre.  "In  the  interest 
of  civilization  and  common  humanity,  I  hope  that  this  document 
is  a  forgery.  If  it  be  indeed  genuine,  the  President  instructs  me 
in  the  most  forcible  manner  to  protest  against  such  a  mode  of  war 
fare,  and  to  ask  you  to  request  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  to 
take  such  steps  that  no  person,  having  the  right  to  claim  the  pro 
tection  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  sacrificed  or 
injured  in  the  conduct  of  hostilities  upon  this  basis."  3 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Roberts,  April  3,  1869,  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  12. 

3  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Lopez  Roberts,  May  10, 1869,  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong., 
2  Seas.,  21. 


1869]         MURDER  OF  SPEAKMAN  AND  WYETH  289 

In  June,  1869,  two  Americans  were  summarily  shot  at  San 
tiago.  One,  Charles  Speakman  of  Indiana,  had  shipped  in  good 
faith  as  a  seaman  aboard  the  schooner  Grapeshot,  ostensibly 
bound  for  Falmouth,  Jamaica;  the  other,  Albert  Wyeth,  of  Penn 
sylvania,  was  a  passenger  going  to  Jamaica  for  his  health.  Some 
fifty  Cubans  with  arms  were  put  aboard  the  Grapeshot  in  the  lower 
bay  of  New  York,  whereupon  Speakman  had  requested  to  leave 
the  schooner,  but  was  assured  there  was  no  intention  of  touching 
Cuba,  but  that  the  Cubans  were  to  be  landed  at  Falmouth.  The 
latter  took  possession  of  the  schooner  off  Cape  Maysi,  ran  her 
ashore,  and  disembarked,  the  two  Americans  being  forced  to  go 
with  them.  The  force  was  attacked  by  the  Spaniards  and  dispersed. 
The  Americans  surrendered  themselves  on  the  first  opportunity, 
were  carried  to  Santiago,  and  shot,  Speakman  on  June  16;  Wyeth 
five  days  later.  No  attention  was  paid  to  protests  of  the  acting 
consul  of  the  United  States,1  such  action,  apart  from  the  brutal, 
circumstances,  being  in  distinct  contravention  of  the  treaty  of  1795, 
in  full  force,  which  assured  to  American  citizens  a  fair  trial  and 
the  right  to  the  assistance  of  counsel. 

The  consul  at  Santiago  in  reporting  these  cases  said:  "The 
country  is  in  a  complete  state  of  anarchy;  the  Catalonian  volun 
teers  do  not  allow  the  governor  to  render  justice,  and  he  cannot 
publicly  resist  them."  He  pleaded  for  the  presence  of  an  Ameri 
can  man-of-war,2  and  Rear-Admiral  Hoff,  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  American  naval  forces  in  the  West  Indies,  was  himself  sent 
to  investigate.  He  reported:  "These  men  were  cruelly  murdered 
owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  official  at  this  city  in  yielding 
to  the  demands  of  the  Catalan  volunteers,  and  in  misconstruing  or 
acting  upon  the  cruel  decree  of  the  24th  of  March."  "In  this 
opinion,"  said  Mr.  Fish,  "and  in  the  forcible  language  in  which  it 
is  expressed,  the  President  fully  concurs."  The  minister  was 
directed  to  demand  full  reparation,  and  finally  to  "solemnly  pro 
test  against  any  longer  carrying  on  the  war  in  Cuba  in  this  bar 
barous  way.  .  .  .  Our  relations  with  Cuba  are  so  many  and  so 
intimate  that  we  cannot  regard  this  struggle  in  all  its  details  with 

1  General  Sickles  to  Spanish  minister  of  state,  September  6,  1869,  House 
Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  104-106. 

1  Consul  Phillips  to  Mr.  Fish,  June  19,  1869,  Ibid,  98. 


290       GENERAL  DULCE  AND  THE  VOLUNTEERS     [1869 

anything  but  intense  interest.  Our  earnest  wish  has  been,  and  is, 
to  do  our  whole  duty  as  a  neutral  nation  to  Spain  in  this  emergency. 
Feeling  that  we  have  done  so  ...  we  think  we  have  a  right  on  our 
part  to  insist  that  Spain  shall  carry  on  this  war  hereafter  in  a  man 
ner  more  in  accordance  with  the  humane  and  Christian  sentiment 
of  the  age."  * 

The  result  was  a  reply  from  Sefior  Silvela,  the  Spanish  minister 
of  state,  supporting  for  the  moment  the  conduct  of  the  Santiago 
officials,  but  declaring  that  the  captain-general  had  ordered 
that  reports  should  be  made  to  himself  of  such  cases,  and  that 
mercy  and  humanity  had  been  enjoined  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,2 
a  somewhat  different  view  to  that  which  had  been  taken  a  fort 
night  before  by  the  acting  minister  Becerra,  who  promised  that 
"if  the  facts  were  as  alleged,  full  reparation  would  be  made  to 
the  families  of  the  deceased";  adding,  as  did  Sefior  Silvela, 
"  that  orders  have  been  given  to  prevent  such  scenes  of  cruelty  in 
the  future  conduct  of  the  war." 

On  June  2  General  Dulce,  with  every  insult  possible  to  one  in 
his  position,  was  forced  by  the  volunteers  to  resign  and  leave  for 
Spain.  This  organization  now  controlled  the  political  situation, 
and  was  violently  opposed  to  any  treatment  of  the  insurrectionists 
which  leaned  toward  humanity,  such  as  General  Dulce  in  several 
instances  had  shown.  General  Caballero  de  Rosas  came  to  take 
over  the  duties  of  a  now  most  difficult  and  trying  office.  On 
July  7,  1869,  he  issued  a  decree  closing  to  trade,  whether  foreign 
or  coasting,  all  but  the  more  important  ports  of  the  island,  from 
Key  Bahia  de  Cadiz  eastward,  on  the  north,  and  from  Cienfuegos 
eastward,  on  the  south.  The  second  article  directed  that  vessels 
carrying  powder,  arms,  or  military  supplies  should  be  seized  and 
confiscated.  The  sixth  and  last  article,  referring  to  supposed  rights 
under  treaties  with  the  United  States  and  other  nations,  declared 
the  right  of  search  of  suspicious  vessels  on  the  high  seas  adjacent 
to  the  island.4 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  August  10,  1869,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  40. 

2  Sefior  Silvela  to  General  Sickles,  October  11,  1869,  Ibid.,  44-45.     See 
Sickles's  reply,  October  30,  Ibid.,  pp.  46-49. 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  September  14,  1869,  Ibid.,  43 
«  In  full,  Ibid.,  61. 


1869]  THE  CAPTAIN-GENERAL'S  DECREES  291 

On  July  16  Mr.  Fish,  in  a  note  to  the  Spanish  minister,  said: 
"[The  decree  mentioned]  purports  to  be  issued  in  order  to  put  an 
end  to  an  insurrection  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  which  the  United 
States  have  hitherto  treated  only  as  a  civil  commotion  within  the 
dominions  of  Spain,  that  did  not  give  rise  to  what  we  understood 
as  belligerent  rights  on  the  part  of  either  party  to  the  conflict.  But 
the  decree  of  Captain-General  de  Rosas  assumes  powers  and  rights 
over  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other  peoples  inconsistent  with  a 
state  of  peace,  and  which  the  United  States  can  be  expected  to. 
allow  their  vessels  to  be  subjected  to  when  Spain  avows  herself  to 
be  in  a  state  of  war,  or  shall  be  manifestly  exercising  the  rights 
conceded  only  to  belligerents  in  the  time  of  war.  ...  In  case  the 
success  of  the  revolutionary  party  should  put  any  of  the  ports  de 
clared  to  be  closed  in  their  possession,  the"  United  States,  as  a 
maritime  nation,  will  regard  an  effective  blockade  to  be  necessary 
to  the  exclusion  of  their  commerce."  Respecting  the  second 
article,  he  said:  "The  transportation  on  the  high  seas,  in  time  of 
peace,  of  articles  commonly  known  as  contraband  of  war,  is  a 
legitimate  traffic  and  commerce,  which  cannot  be  interfered  with 
unless  by  a  power  at  war  with  a  third  party,  in  the  admitted  exercise 
of  the  recognized  rights  of  a  belligerent.  .  .  .  The  United  States 
cannot  ...  be  indifferent  or  silent  under  a  decree  which,  by  the 
vagueness  of  its  terms,  may  be  construed  to  allow  their  vessels  on 
the  high  seas,  whatever  may  be  their  cargo,  to  be  embarrassed  or 
interfered  with.  If  Spain  be  at  war  with  Cuba,  the  United  States 
will  submit  to  those  rights  which  public  law  concedes  to  belliger 
ents,"  otherwise  the  enforcement  of  the  decree  "cannot  but  be  re 
garded  as  a  violation  of  their  rights  that  may  lead  to  serious  com 
plications."  Mr.  Fish  showed  that  there  was  no  tceaty_nght,  such 
as  the  captain-general  declared  to  exist,  except  in  time  of  war. 
The  treaty  "limits  and  prescribes  the  manner  of  exercising  a  bel 
ligerent  right  when  such  exists?'  He  requested  to  be  informed 
"at  the  earliest  practicable  moment"  if  Spain,  by  the  issuance  of 
this  decree,  claimed  the  right  of  a  belligerent.  Its  continuance,  he 
declared,  involved  "  the  logical  conclusion  of  a  recognition  by  Spain 
of  a  state  of  war  with  Cuba."  Attention  was  called  to  the  grave 
consequences  which  might  ensue  from  interference  with  a  vessel 
of  the  United  States  on  a  lawful  voyage,  and  the  hope  expressed  that 


292  EFFECT  OF  MR.   FISH'S  PROTEST  [1869 

Mr.  Roberts  would  "speedily  be  at  liberty  to  announce  the  formal 
abrogation  of  a  decree  which  causes  so  much  serious  apprehension 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  against  which  this 
government  feels  bound  most  earnestly  to  remonstrate."  l 

On  July  18  the  particularly  offensive  sixth  article  was  with 
drawn  by  the  captain-general,  and  on  July  6  a  humane  decree 
was  issued,  ordering  respect  for  the  lives,  houses,  and  property  of 
all  persons,  without  distinction;  no  one  was  to  be  imprisoned  on 
mere  suspicion,  and  in  case  of  arrest  there  was  to  be  an  immediate 
examination.  "The  greatest  care,"  said  the  decree  "shall  be 
taken  that  in  proceeding  in  any  manner  against  foreigners,  no 
legal  requisite  shall  be  omitted."  2 

Mr.  Fish's  note  became  the  basis  of  American  action  through 
out  the  revolt,  and  was  among  the  most  forcible  in  argument  of  his 
papers  against  the  recognition  of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents. 
Such  recognition  would  at  once  have  given  Spain  the  right  which 
the  captain-general  had  so  improperly  assumed.  The  sympathy  of 
the  American  public  was  naturally  almost  wholly  with  the  Cubans, 
as,  by  long  tradition,  it  was  with  any  people  struggling  for  polit 
ical  freedom;  accentuated  in  this  case,  however,  by  the  inhuman 
and  ruthless  decrees  which  had  been  issued  by  the  Spanish  authori 
ties.  The  United  States,  however,  held  rigidly  to  its  duties,  the 
President  issuing,  in  July,  1869,  to  the  district  attorney  and  marshal 
for  the  southern  district  of  New  York,  a  commission  empowering 
them,  or  either  of  them,  "  to  employ  such  part  of  the  land  or  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the  militia  thereof,  for  the  purpose 
indicated  in  the  eighth  section  of  the  act  of  April  20,  1818,  com 
monly  known  as  the  neutrality  act."  Orders  were  at  the  same 
time  given  for  the  capture  of  all  concerned  in  expeditions  violating 
such  law.3 

The  instructions  to  General  Sickles,  when  newly  appointed  min 
ister  to  Spain,  directed  him,  as  soon  as  opportunity  should  occur,  to 
proffer  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  for  the  establishment 
of  peace.  "  On  either  side,"  said  Mr.  Fish,  "  the  war  has  been  one 
of  desolation,  and  if  continued,  must  result  in  the  entire  destruc- 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  51-53.  2  Ibid.,  54-55. 

8  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Pierrepont,  July  13,  1869,  81  MS.,  Dom.  Let.  385,  Moore, 
Digest,  VII,  1032. 


1869]      INSTRUCTIONS  TO  AMERICAN  MINISTER       293 

tion  of  a  large  part  of  the  productive  capacity  of  the  island,  as  well 
as  of  an  immense  amount  of  property  and  of  human  life.  It  is 
not  impossible  that  the  Cubans  may  be  conquered,  if  Spain  de 
votes  her  whole  energies  to  the  work;  but  they  can  never  again 
be  contented,  happy,  fruitful,  or  quiet  subjects  of  that  power. 
Assuming  that  Spain  may  eventually  subdue  the  present  insurrec 
tion,  she  will  find  herself  in  possession  of  a  devastated  and  ruined 
territory,  inhabited  by  a  discontented  people.  The  enlightened 
statesmen  of  Spain  cannot  fail  to  appreciate  that  the  feelings  and 
affections  of  the  entire  native  population  of  the  island  are  not  only 
estranged,  but  that  they  are  deeply  hostile  to  the  continuance  of 
Spanish  rule.  Nor  can  they  fail  to  recognize  the  advancing  growth 
of  that  sentiment  which  claims  for  every  part  of  the  American 
hemisphere  the  right  of  self-government  and  freedom  from  trans 
atlantic  dependence.  .  .  .  After  much  consideration,  and  a  care 
ful  survey  of  the  question  in  all  its  relations,  this  government  has 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  its  duty  to  exert  its  influence 
to  bring  this  unhappy  strife  to  a  close.  Duty  to  its  own  citizens, 
and  large  property  interests,  jeoparded  by  the  continuance  of  the 
war — the  necessity  of  maintaining  quiet  within  its  borders,  now 
seriously  disturbed  by  the  continual  strife  carried  on  so  near  its 
borders — our  friendship  for  Spain  .  .  .  our  sympathy  for  the 
Cubans,  who  are  our  neighbors,  alike  impel  the  government  to 
.this  course. 

"The  President  therefore  directs  you  to  offer  to  the  cabinet  at 
Madrid,  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States,  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  to  a  close  the  civil  war  now  ravaging  the  island  of  Cuba, 
on  the  following  bases: 

"  1.  The  independence  of  Cuba  to  be  acknowledged  by  Spain. 

"  2.  Cuba  to  pay  to  Spain  a  sum,  within  a  time,  and  in  a  manner 
to  be  agreed  upon  by  them,  as  an  equivalent  for  the  entire  and 
definite  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  all  her  rights  in  the  island, 
including  the  public  property  of  every  description.  If  Cuba 
should  not  be  able  to  pay  the  whole  sum  at  once  in  cash,  the  future 
payments  by  instalments  are  to  be  adequately  secured  by  a  pledge 
of  the  export  and  import  customs  duties,  under  an  arrangement 
to  be  agreed  upon.  .  .  . 

"  3.  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  island  of  Cuba. 


294  GOOD  OFFICES  OFFERED 

"4.  An  armistice,  pending  the  negotiations  for  the  settlement 
above  referred  to." 

The  minister  was  directed  to  telegraph  in  case  the  good  offices 
of  the  United  States  should  be  accepted;  to  ask  that  communica 
tion  should  be  allowed  between  Cubans  in  the  United  States  and 
those  in  the  field,  and  that  a  conference  be  held  in  Washington 
between  the  representatives  of  each  party,  clothed  with  full  powers 
to  arrange  all  details.1 

This  despatch  was  accompanied  by  a  confidential  note,  in 
which  the  minister  was  informed  that  while  the  proposal  was 
"expressed  to  be  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  to  a  close  the  civil 
war  now  ravaging  the  island,"  and  "  is  not  designed  to  grant  any 
public  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  to  the  insurgents,  it  is, 
nevertheless,  used  advisedly,  and  in  recognition  of  a  state  and  con 
dition  of  the  contest  which  may  not  justify  a  much  longer  with 
holding  of  the  concession  to  the  revolutionary  party  of  the  recog 
nized  rights  of  belligerency.  Should  the  expression,  therefore,  be 
commented  upon,  you  will  admit  what  is  above  stated  with  reference 
to  it,  and  may  add,  in  case  of  a  protracted  discussion,  or  the  pros 
pect  of  a  refusal  by  Spain  to  accept  the  proposed  offer  of  the  United 
States,  that  an  early  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  is  the  logical 
deduction  from  the  present  proposal,  and  will  probably  be  deemed 
a  necessity  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  unless  the  condition 
of  the  parties  to  the  contest  shall  have  changed  very  materially." 

If  the  Spanish  cabinet  should  insist,  the  President  was  ready  to 
advise  to  Congress  the  guarantee  of  the  payment  of  the  sum  that 
Cuba  should  pay  to  Spain.  Mention  was  also  made  of  the  desir 
ability  of  arranging  a  severance  also  of  Puerto  Rico  from  Spain, 
should  the  subject  be  brought  forward  by  the  Spanish  minister. 
Mr.  Paul  S.  Forbes,  who  had  personal  relations  with  General  Prim 
and  many  other  influential  Spaniards,  was  named  as  a  special 
and  confidential  agent,  with,  however,  advisory  powers  only.2 

The  American  minister  confined  his  action,  for  the  time,  to 
making  informally,  in  his  conversation  with  Marshal  Prim,  the 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  June  29,  1869,  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  13-16. 

2  Ibid.,  16-17.     Mr.  Forbes  arrived  before  General  Sickles,  but  awaited  the 
latter;  he  left  Spain  about  August  20,  1869. 


1869]  SPANISH  TERMS  OF  ACCEPTANCE  295 

president  of  the  council  of  state,  and  Senor  Silvela,  the  foreign 
minister,  a  general  tender  of  the  good  offices  of  his  government. 

"It  was,"  said  Senor  Silvela,  "the  intention  of  the  Spanish 
liberals,  who  planned  and  executed  the  revolutionary  movements 
which  had  given  to  Spain  its  new  political  life,  to  make  at  the  earliest 
moment  provision  for  granting  self-government  to  Cuba.  But  this 
fatal  insurrection  broke  out  at  the  very  moment  when  it  was  becom 
ing  possible  to  give  Cuba  all  the  rights  she  desired.  .  .  .  The 
liberal  party  in  Spain  finds  itself,  to  its  own  infinite  regret,  forced 
into  seeming  sympathy  with  the  reactionary  party  in  Cuba;  and 
the  liberals  of  Cuba,  who  ought  to  be  its  firm  friends,  are  converted 
by  the  fatality  of  the  situation  into  its  bitterest  enemies.  .  .  .  He 
considered  the  insurrection  as  a  most  deplorable  misfortune  and 
mistake,  both  for  Cuba  and  for  Spain.  ...  It  has  been  [the] 
constant  hope  and  wish  of  the  liberals  to  grant  to  the  Cubans  the 
administration  of  their  own  affairs,  and  the  full  fruits  of  their  own 
labor,  preserving  their  commercial  connections  and  some  shadow 
of  their  political  relations."  * 

Prim  was  more  emphatic:  "For  his  part,  if  he  were  alone  con 
cerned,  he  would  say  to  the  Cubans,  'Go  if  you  will;  make  good 
the  treasure  you  have  lost  us,  and  let  me  bring  home  our  army 
and  fleet,  and  consolidate  the  liberties  and  resources  of  Spain.'"  2 
,  But  in  the  view  of  the  Spanish  ministry  the  constitution  intervened 
to  prevent  any  definite  arrangement  until  Cuban  representatives 
should  have  taken  their  seats  in  the  Cortes. 

The  Spanish  government  thus  intimated  its  willingness  to  accept 
the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  on  the  following  bases : 

1.  The  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

2.  Spain  to  grant  simultaneously  a  full  and  complete  amnesty. 

3.  The  people  of  Cuba  to  vote  by  universal  suffrage  upon  the 
question  of  their  independence. 

4.  The  majority  having  declared  for  independence,  Spain  to 
grant  it,  the  Cortes  consenting;   Cuba  paying  satisfactory  equiva 
lent,  guaranteed  by  the  United  States.3 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  August  12,  1869,  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  19. 

2  Prim  to  Sickles;  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  August  16,  1869,  Ibid.,  25. 

3  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish  (telegram),  August  13,  1869,  Ibid.,  27. 


296  SPANISH  TERMS  OF  ACCEPTANCE  [1869 

On  the  reception  of  the  telegram  stating  these  terms,  Mr.  Fish 
telegraphed  that  the  first  proposition  of  Spain,  that  the  insurgents 
should  lay  down  their  arms,  was  incapable  of  attainment,  and  that 
to  ascertain  the  will  of  the  Cubans  by  a  vote  was  impracticable, 
because  of  the  disorganization  of  society,  the  terrorism  which  pre 
vails,  and  the  violence  and  insubordination  of  the  volunteers. 
"There  can  be  no  question,"  he  said,  "as  to  the  will  of  the  majority; 
it  has  been  recognized  and  admitted.  An  armistice  should  imme 
diately  be  agreed  upon  to  arrest  the  carnage  and  destruction  of 
property,  and  opportunity  be  granted  to  communicate  with  the 
insurgents,  and  emancipation  of  slaves  be  determined."  * 

Of  the  good  intentions  of  the  Spanish  government  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  In  answer  to  the  American  minister's  argument,  "that 
Austria  had  transferred  Venice  to  France,  and  assented  to  its 
immediate  transfer  to  Italy,  before  peace  was  declared;  that  the 
independence  of  all  the  [South]  American  states  had  been  recog 
nized  at  one  time  and  another  during  the  progress  of  hostilities," 
Prim,  the  president  of  the  council,  said:  "The  Cuban  insurgents 
hold  no  city  or  fortress;  they  have  no  ports,  no  ships;  they  have 
no  army  that  presumes  to  offer  or  accept  battle;  and  now,  before 
the  period  of  active  operations,  when  Spain  will  send  the  ample 
re-enforcements  she  holds  in  readiness,  it  is  only  necessary  for  the 
Cubans  to  accept  the  assurance  of  the  United  States,  given  on  the 
faith  of  Spain,  that  they  may  have  their  independence  by  laying 
down  their  arms,  electing  their  deputies,  and  declaring  their  wish 
to  be  free  by  a  vote  of  the  people." 

Next  day  Prim  explained  to  the  American  minister  that  "the 
first  proposition  of  Spain  was  not  a  preliminary  to  an  agreement 
with  the  United  States,  but  was  a  condition  of  concessions  to  the 
insurgents;  and  that  the  third  proposition  was  a  condition  of  the 
independence  of  Cuba."  "I  again,"  said  Sickles,  "urged  accep 
tance  on  the  basis  proposed  by  the  United  States."  Prim  said: 
"Spain  desired  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States,  and  was  pre 
pared  to  set  Cuba  free,  but  that  the  consent  of  Spain  must  be  given 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  her  self-respect."  He  repeated,  "that 
an  armistice  with  the  insurgents  was  impossible;  that  the  eman 
cipation  of  slaves  could  not  be  separated  from  the  other  questions 
1  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  25. 


1869]  PRIM'S  PROPOSALS  297 

now  paramount,  and  that  communication  with  the  insurgents 
would  be  permitted  after  agreement  with  the  United  States."  1 

The  American  minister  justly  regarded  the  report  of  the  con 
versation  as  (using  his  own  words)  essential  to  a  correct  apprecia 
tion  of  the  views  of  Spain.  We  here  see  the  outcrop  of  one  of  the 
great  obstacles  to  Spain's  happiness,  the  exaggeration  of  the  senti 
ment  known  as  pundonor,  forever  a  stumbling-block,  and  which 
in  this  instance  was  to  stand  fo^ears  of  bloodshed,  for  millions  of 
wasted  treasure,  for  misdirected  energies  which,  rightly  directed, 
would  have  made  Spain  prosperous  and  powerful.  "It  is  impos 
sible,"  said  Prim,  "to  treat  with  the  Cubans  now,  but  the  United 
States,  once  convinced  of  the  good  intentions  and  good  faith  of 
the  Spanish  government,  can  then  assure  the  Cubans  that,  by 
following  the  programme  I  have  indicated,  they  can  have  their 
liberty  without  firing  another  shot.  .  .  .  Here,  then,  are  the  suc 
cessive  steps: 

"1.  A  settlement  of  a  basis  of  agreement  which  shall  assure  the 
government  of  the  United  States  of  the  good  intentions  and  good 
faith  of  the  Spanish  government; 

"2.  The  United  States  to  counsel  the  Cubans  to  accept  this 
agreement; 

"3.  Cessation  of  hostilities  and  amnesty; 

"4.  The  election  of  deputies; 

"5.  Action  of  the  Cortes; 

"6.  Plebiscit  and  independence. 

"This  being  all  arranged  in  advance  between  the  two  govern 
ments,  if  the  United  States  could  be  satisfied  of  the  sincerity  of 
these  proposals,  and  would  persuade  the  Cubans  to  accept  them, 
the  object  we  both  desire  could  be  accomplished.  There  will,  of 
course,  be  difficulties  in  the  execution  of  the  plan,  but  they  must 
be  met  and  overcome."  2 

On  August  24,  1869,  Mr.  Fish  telegraphed  General  Sickles: 
"The  propositions  of  Spain  are  incompatible  with  any  practicable 
negotiation.  The  representatives  of  the  insurrectionary  govern 
ment  are  necessary  parties  to  a  negotiation.  Free  communication 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish  (telegram),  August  20,  1869,  House  Ex.  Doc. 
160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  28. 

2  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  August  21,  1869,  Ibid.,  30. 


298  AMERICAN  TERMS  OF  MEDIATION  [1869 

through  the  Spanish  lines  is  immediately  necessary.  The  United 
States  cannot  ask  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms  unless  the 
volunteers  are  simultaneously  effectually  disarmed  and  in  good 
faith  disbanded.  This,  if  practicable,  would  require  time.  We 
want  to  arrest  the  destruction  of  life  and  property  and  to  stop  the 
outrages  and  annoyances  of  our  citizens.  An  armistice  would 
effect  this  immediately,  and  the  terms  of  the  emancipation  to  be 
made  to  Spain  by  Cuba  could  Wen  be  arranged  between  them, 
under  the  mediation  of  the  United  States.  You  may  say  that  we 
deem  an  armistice  indispensable  to  the  success  of  any  negotiation. 
Spain  may  in  honor  grant  this*  at  the  request  of  the  United  States 
and  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  a  friendly  power  whose  good 
offices  she  is  willing  to  accept.  This  being  done,  negotiations  can 
immediately  be  opened  that  will  probably  result  in  peace  and  her 
receiving  a  fair  compensation. "  l 

A  week  later,  September  1,  Mr.  Fish  telegraphed: "  United  States 
willing  to  mediate  on  these  terms:  First,  immediate  armistice;  sec 
ond,  Cuba  to  recompense  Spain  for  public  property  taken;  United 
States  not  to  guarantee  unless  Congress  approve  .  .  .  ;  third, 
persons  and  property  of  Spaniards  remaining  on  island  pro 
tected,  but  they  may  at  option  withdraw.  To  prevent  difficulties 
as  well  as  stop  bloodshed  and  devastation,  we  must  have  early 
decision.  These  offers  withdrawn  unless  accepted  before  October 
1.  Say  that  anarchy  prevails  over  much  of  island.  Murders  of 
American  citizens  are  committed  by  volunteers.  Confiscation  of 
their  property  attempted  by  Spanish  authorities."  2 

On  September  3, 1869,  the  American  minister,  thus  pressed,  sent 
a  note  to  Senor  Becerra,  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  ad  interim, 
which  embodied  his  instructions  of  June  29,  with  the  addition  of 
remarks  upon  the  developments  in  the  interval.  Senor  Becerra  was 
assured  that  "the  good  offices  of  the  President  will  be  quite  unavail 
ing  unless  both  the  antagonists  are  disposed  to  listen  to  friendly 
counsels.  This  consideration  increased  the  regret  ...  in  having 
to  communicate  .  .  .  the  declaration  of  ...  the  minister  of  state, 
that  Spain  '  can  come  to  no  definite  decision  in  regard  to  the  politi 
cal  situation  and  future  government  of  the  island  of  Cuba  until 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  31. 
3  Ibid.,  32. 


1869]  SPAIN'S  REFUSAL  299 

the  insurgents  lay  down  their  arms  and  cease  the  struggle/  The 
undersigned  is  instructed  to  state  that  these  conditions  are  deemed 
by  the  President  incompatible  with  any  practicable  negotiation. 
It  is  not  reasonable  to  hope  that  either  party  to  a  long  and  san 
guinary  contest  will  voluntarily  abandon  it  without  guarantees 
for  the  future  in  some  measure  equivalent  to  the  sacrifices  it  has 
made.  The  United  States  cannot  ask  the  insurgents  to  lay  down 
their  arms  unless  the  volunteers  are  simultaneously  and  effectively 
disarmed  and  in  good  faith  disbanded.  .  .  .  The  excesses  which 
have  followed  the  domination  of  the  volunteers  in  some  parts  of 
the  island,  sparing  neither  combatants  nor  prisoners  of  war  nor 
unoffending  citizens  of  the  United  States,  have  aroused  feelings  of 
indignation  and  horror,  which  the  refinement  and  sensibility  of  the 
Spanish  nation  will  be  the  first  to  appreciate."  * 

It  was  very  unfortunate  that  General  Sickles  was  required  by  his 
instructions  to  hand  in  his  note  without  delay.  Both  Prim,  presi 
dent  of  the  council,  and  Silvela,  minister  of  state,  were,  at  the  mo 
ment,  absent  at  Vichy.  What  followed  illustrates  to  the  full  the 
ever-present  discordance  of  opinion  in  Spanish  cabinets.  Senor 
Becerra  was  bitterly  opposed  to  the  separation  of  Cuba  from  Spain 
and,  besides,  was  not  in  the  secret  of  what  had  gone  before.  Alarmed 
and  indignant,  he  published  the  substance  of  General  Sickles's  note 
and  threw  Spain  into  a  ferment  of  excitement.  Prim  hastened 
from  Vichy,  but  the  attitude  of  the  Cortes  had  been  taken  from 
which  there  was  no  withdrawal.  This  attitude  was  well  expressed 
in  a  statement  from  Sefior  Becerra  to  the  American  minister  re 
specting  a  rumor  that  Spain  had  entered  upon  negotiations  with 
other  powers  upon  the  subject  of  the  note.  "As  Spain,"  he  said, 
"  will  not  negotiate  with  the  United  States  upon  a  subject  like  that 
of  Cuba,  which  relates  to  its  internal  policy  and  government, 
neither  will  she  negotiate  with  any  other  power."  2  Said  Prim  to 
Sickles:  " Nothing  remains  to  be  done  but  to  wait  for  a  year  or 
two  until  public  opinion  in  Spain  becomes  calm." 

The  situation,  too,  was  unfortunately  complicated  at  this  mo 
ment  by  the  detention  of  several  small  gun-boats,  orders  for  thirty 
of  which  for  services  in  Cuban  waters  had  been  given  in  the 

1  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  34-36.  2  Ibid.,  40. 

1  General  Sickles  in  note  to  author. 


300  PERUVIAN  PROTEST 

United  States  by  Spain.  On  July  1,  1869,  an  energetic  protest 
had  been  made  by  the  Peruvian  minister  at  Washington  against 
their  delivery.  Spain  was  still  technically  at  war  with  Peru,  and 
the  latter's  minister  claimed  that  even  if  these  boats  were  for  act 
ual  use  in  Cuba,  they  would  thereby  release  all  Spain's  other 
naval  forces  against  the  republics  on  the  Pacific  coast,  in  case  hos 
tilities  should  be  renewed.1  However  much  it  was  made  in  the 
interest  of  Cuba,  as  may  well  have  been  the  case,  the  President 
had  no  option  but  to  comply  with  the  request,  which  was  precisely 
similar  in  character  to  one  made  by  the  Spanish  minister  the  year 
before  respecting  two  monitors  sold  to  Peru,  which  were  detained 
until  released  by  consent  of  the  Spanish  minister,  on  the  assurance 
that  they  would  not  attempt  to  commit  any  act  offensive  to  Spanish 
interests  during  their  voyage  to  the  Pacific.2 

Despite  the  views  expressed  by  the  president  of  the  council 
and  the  minister  of  state,  an  irritating  situation  which  was  suscep 
tible  of  immediate  arrangement  was  allowed  to  continue,  appar 
ently  through  the  inertia  of  diplomacy.  "The  war  between  Spain 
and  Peru  was,"  said  Prim,  "an  absurd  and  foolish  war,  left  by  the 
late  government  of  Spain,  and  which  the  present  government  was 
determined  to  close  at  once.  Not  another  shot  will  be  fired  in  it, 
and  that  the  Peruvians  know  as  well  as  we.  We  cannot  be  induced 
to  recommence  that  war."  3  Though  apparently  a  mere  sugges 
tion  of  action  from  Spain  to  the  American  government  was  all  that 
was  necessary  to  dissipate  the  cloud,  it  was  not  until  December  that 
assurance  from  Spain  was  given  through  the  secretary  of  state  at 
Washington  to  the  Peruvian  minister,  who  withdrew  his  objection, 
and  the  gun-boats  were  released;  there  had  been,  however,  the  long 
interval  for  the  incubation  of  ill  feeling,  full  advantage  of  which  was 
taken  by  the  Spanish  monarchical  press,  with  the  result  of  making 
it  increasingly  difficult  for  the  Spanish  government  to  act  in  accord 
with  the  proposals  from  Washington  for  the  pacification  of  Cuba. 

The  acting  minister  of  state  requested  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  minister's  note  of  September  3.  While  accepting  the 

1  Senor  Freyre,  Peruvian  minister,  to  Mr.  Fish,  secretary  of  state,  House 
Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  55. 

2  Senor  Goni,  Spanish  minister,  to  Mr.  Seward,  secretary  of  state,  May 
23,  1868,  and  November  24,  1868,  Ibid.,  55. 

3  Mr.  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  September  25,  1869,  Ibid.,  51. 


1869]  EFFORTS  TOWARD  MEDIATION  301 

good  offices  of  Washington,  the  bases  proposed  were  rejected. 
The  permanent  commission  of  the  Cortes  on  transmarine  affairs 
opposed  treating  with  any  foreign  power  respecting  Cuba,  and 
unanimously  assured  the  government  that  all  means  would  be  at 
the  disposal  of  the  government  for  putting  down  the  rebellion.  An 
armistice  would  be  agreed  to,  if  necessary,  for  peace,  though  such  a 
measure  must  be  left  to  the  discre^jon  of  the  captain-general  in  Cuba. 
It  was  declared  that  Spain  was  ready  to  give  Cuba  ample  reforms 
and  the  widest  liberties  enjoyed  in  the  Peninsula,  with  a  general 
amnesty  and  gradual  emancipation  of  slaves.  If  these  proposals 
should  be  rejected,  the  war  would  be  prosecuted  with  energy  and 
activity,  pardoning,  however,  the  vanquished  and  prisoners,  and 
striving  to  prevent  all  shedding  of  blood  through  revenge,  and  all 
reprisals,  whatever  the  provocation,  from  insurgents.  Reparation 
was  promised  in  the  cases  of  Speakman  and  Wyeth,  the  cruelty  of 
which  had  been  spoken  of  by  every  member  of  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  with  indignation,  and  orders  were  given  to  prevent  such 
cruelties  thereafter.1 

On  September  15,  1869,  Mr.  Fish  sent  the  following  telegram : 

If  a  negotiation  were  made  on  the  basis  of  the  six  successive  steps  men 
tioned  in  your  despatch  No.  10,  August  21,  omitting  the  plebiscit,  can  the 
president  of  the  council  give  assurance  that  if  the  United  States  induced  the 
insurgents  to  lay  down  arms,  and  deputies  to  the  Cortes  be  elected  by  Cuba, 
that  the  Cortes  will  grant  independence  ?  The  plebiscit  is  impracticable,  be 
cause,  in  the  present  circumstances  and  conditions  of  the  island,  a  popular 
vote  can  be  no  indication  of  the  popular  will,  and  this  must  be  borne  in  mind 
with  reference  to  any  election  to  be  held  for  deputies.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  in 
surgents  will  consent  to  lay  down  their  arms,  but  if  their  early  independence  can 
be  assured  thereby,  the  United  States  will  make  every  effort  to  induce  them 
to  do  so.3 

As  seen,  the  views  of  the  two  most  influential  of  the  men  at 
the  moment  in  power  in  Spain  were  not  in  disaccord  with  the 
suggestions  from  Washington,  and  they  were  now  receiving  some 
support  from  public  opinion.  "Six  months  ago/'  said  Prim,  in  an 
interview,  September  23,  with  the  American  minister,  "the  question 

1  Senor  Becerra  to  General  Sickles,  September  16,  1869,  House  Ex.  Doc. 
160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  39-41.  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish  (telegram),  Sep 
tember  16,  1869,  Ibid.,  41-42.  'Ibid.,  41. 


302  OFFERS  OF  MEDIATION  WITHDRAWN         [1869 

could  not  be  discussed  in  Spain,  now  it  is  a  general  topic  of  dis 
cussion.  At  first  there  was  but  one  side,  now  there  are  evidently 
two;  a  decided  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  emancipation  of  Cuba  is 
growing  up;  let  the  national  honor  be  saved,"  and  he  thought  there 
would  be  no  serious  difficulty  in  accomplishing  the  emancipation  of 
the  island.  His  news  from  the  captain-general  was  very  good ;  he 
expected  with  the  assistance  of  a  few  additional  battalions  to 
break  the  military  power  of  the  insurrection;  in  the  course  of  the 
autumn  the  government  expected  to  be  able  to  begin  the  work  of 
political  reform.  The  one  thing  necessary  is  to  bring  about  as  soon 
as  possible  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  He  regarded  the  election  of 
delegates  to  the  Cortes  an  absolutely  necessary  preliminary  to  the 
action  of  the  Cortes;  no  other  course  was  possible  without  a  viola 
tion  of  the  constitution;  the  disarmament  of  the  volunteers  would 
be  simultaneous  with  the  cessation  of  hostilities;  he  had  already 
taken  his  measures  and  given  orders  to  the  captain-general  for  that 
purpose.  Severe  and  positive  orders  had  been  given  to  prevent  the 
barbarous  and  cruel  executions  which  had  hitherto  marked  the 
progress  of  the  war.1  Captain-General  de  Rodas,  in  answering, 
had  avowed  his  intention  of  putting  a  stop  to  such  occurrences,  re 
sorting  to  the  punishment  of  death,  if  necessary.2 

General  Sickles  had  declined  to  withdraw  his  note  of  September  3, 
but  now,  under  the  discretion  allowed  him  by  a  telegram  from  the 
department  of  state,  September  23,  and  with  the  assurance  of  Prim 
that  at  the  moment  it  embarrassed  the  Spanish  government,  Sickles 
stated  that  he  would  withdraw  the  bases  of  action  proposed  from 
Washington  and  the  tender  of  good  offices  from  the  United  States. 
"We  can  better  proceed  in  the  present  situation  of  things,"  said 
Prim,  "without  even  the  friendly  intervention." 

The  one  step  forward  was  an  understanding  that  a  plebiscit 
would  not  be  insisted  upon.  But  practically,  however  strong  the 
good-will  of  the  head  of  the  government,  nothing  happened; 

1  A  marked  instance  of  the  cruelty  shown  is  to  be  found  in  a  letter  of  the 
American   consul   at  Matanzas,  August  18,  1869,  giving  an  account  of  the 
shooting,  by  order  of  a  Colonel  Palacios,  of  over  twenty  persons,  near  Bayamo, 
most  of  whom  belonged  to  the  most  prominent  families  of  Santiago.    The  affair 
was  a  cold-blooded  massacre.     (House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  122.) 

2  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  September  25,  1869,  Ibid.,  50. 

3  Ibid.,  52. 


1869]  REFORMS  IN  PUERTO  RICO  303 

"although,"  wrote  the  American  minister,  "  the  Cortes  have  been  in 
session  for  a  month,  the  Cuban  question  has  not  been  considered, 
nor  even  mentioned,  otherwise  than  incidentally  in  the  public  sit 
tings.  With  every  mail  from  Havana  the  announcement  is  repeated 
that  the  insurrection  is  suppressed,  yet  the  embarkation  of  re-en 
forcements  continues.  The  consul  at  Cadiz  reports  the  departure  of 
1,428  troops  since  the  middle  of  October."  l  On  November  8  the 
colonial  minister  declared  in  the  Cortes  "that  the  government 
would  not  bring  forward  any  measure  of  reform  for  Cuba  until 
the  last  hostile  band  was  dispersed  and  the  insurgents  had  lost  all 
hope."  Spain,  he  said  again,  "is  in  the  position  of  a  man  of 
honor  who  does  not  yield  what  is  asked  of  him  by  an  armed  ad 
versary.  The  first  thing  is  to  conquer;  if  possible,  bloodlessly; 
but  if  this  be  impossible,  the  right  of  force  and  the  force  of  right 
will  decide."3 

On  November  21,  however,  a  project  for  reforms  in  Puerto 
Rico  was  brought  forward,  indicating  what  might  be  done  for 
Cuba.  This  included  local  self-government,  modified  liberty  of 
the  press  and  of  public  discussion  and  association,  the  establish 
ment  of  public  schools,  impartial  suffrage,  gradual  but  speedy 
abolition  of  slavery,  civil  and  political  rights  without  distinction  of 
color,  and  right  of  domiciled  foreigners  to  vote  for  town  officials 
after  six  months'  and  for  members  of  the  provisional  council  after 
one  year's  residence.  The  American  minister  was  assured  that 
these  reforms  would  be  extended  to  Cuba  when  hostilities  should 
cease  and  deputies  should  be  chosen  in  compliance  with  the  con 
stitution.4  A  marked  sign  of  the  changed  attitude  in  Spain  was 
the  appearance  in  the  Diario,  of  Barcelona,  of  its  conclusion  that 
"  in  our  judgment  no  other  resource  remains  to  us  but  to  open  nego 
tiations  with  the  United  States  for  the  cession  to  them  of  our  An 
tilles,"  a  remark  copied  into  the  popular  organ  in  Havana  of  the 
volunteers,  the  Voz  de  Cuba,  of  September  20,  1869,  the  latter  a 
fact  in  itself  indicative  of  the  new  possibilities. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  adjustment  was  almost  within 
reach.  The  action  of  the  British  government  in  directing  its 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  November  3,  1869,  House  Ex.  Doc.,  160,  41 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  60. 

*  Ibid.,  60.  » Ibid.,  162.  '  Ibid.,  162-164. 


304  A  GREAT  OPPORTUNITY  LOST  [1869 

ambassador  at  Madrid,  Mr.  Layard,  to  second  the  American 
minister  in  his  suggestions  to  the  Spanish  government  in  regard  to 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  came  to  add  weight  to  the  American  pro 
posals.1 

In  reply  to  General  Sickles's  announcement  of  this  support,  Mr. 
Fish  wrote:  "It  becomes  more  apparent  every  day  that  this  con 
test  cannot  terminate  without  the  abolition  of  slavery.  This  gov 
ernment  regards  the  government  at  Madrid  as  committed  to 
that  result,"  and  the  American  minister  was  directed  to  state  that 
it  was  expected,  if  it  should  appear  that  the  insurrection  was  re 
garded  as  suppressed,  as  had  been  frequently  stated,  that  such 
steps  would  be  taken.2 

.  But  the  great  opportunity  which  promised  so  fair  was  lost;  the 
Spanish  proviso  of  antecedent  peace  called  for  the  impossible. 
Had  the  acceptance  of  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  been 
continued,  had  the  government  of  the  latter  been  given  at  this 
moment  opportunity  to  act  as  a  mediator,  there  would  have  been 
possibility  of  the  accomplishment  of  what  the  more  influential  of 
the  men  in  power  in  Spain  were  undoubtedly  desirous  of  bringing 
about.  Had  the  insurgents  refused  such  mediation,  they  would 
have  lost  the  American  sympathy,  which  was  so  strong  an  element 
in  heartening  the  insurgent  party  in  continuing  the  struggle.  Had 
Spain  been  willing  to  proceed  upon  the  basis  of  an  armistice,  and 
had  such  offer  been  accepted  by  the  insurgents,  and  had  Spain 
thereupon  not  carried  out  the  intentions  which  were  to  serve  as 
the  base  of  American  action,  such  failure  would  have  been  just 
cause  for  the  United  States  to  intervene  forcibly  in  the  contest. 
The  resolution,  announced  November  8  by  the  colonial  minister, 
to  first  conquer  a  peace  was  fatal.  It  was  a  declaration  of  war 
for  nine  more  years. 

-  The  fundamental  difficulty  was  in  the  state  of  Spain  itself.  At 
the  end  of  1869  the  country  "found  itself  a  kingdom  without  a 
king,  with  a  nerveless  regency,  an  effete  Cortes,  a  constitution  dis 
regarded,  a  ministry  divided  against  itself,  an  empty  treasury,  and 
a  population  irritated  to  the  point  of  fury.  .  .  .  More  conscripts 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  December  29, 1869,  House  Doc.  160,  41  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  67. 

3  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  January  26,  1870,  Ibid.,  69. 


1870]  SPAIN'S  SAD  STATE  305 

were  needed,  and  fresh  risings  took  place  against  the  blood  tax; 
powers  of  suppression  were  hurriedly  granted  by  the  Cortes  which 
practically  suspended  the  constitution;  murder,  pillage,  anarchy, 
and  national  decay  had  reached  their  apogee  in  the  spring  of  1870, 
when  the  question  of  the  monarch  had  to  be  settled,"  *  as  it  was 
soon  to  be  by  the  choice  of  the  Italian  Prince  Amadeo;  a  choice 
for  which  Prim's  life  was  to  be  the  forfeit.2 

1  Hume,  480. 

2  Amadeo  was  elected  king  November  16,  1870,  by  a  vote  of  191  out  of 
311,  a  majority  of  71  of  the  members  present.    The  whole  number  of  deputies 
was  344.    Besides  the  33  absent,  19,  of  whom  12  were  Carlists,  voted  blank, 
63  voted  for  a  republic,  27  for  the  Duke  of  Montpensier,  and  the  rest  scattering. 
It  appears,  therefore,  that  of  the  229  votes  cast  for  candidates  for  the  throne, 
the  Italian  prince  received  84  per  cent.    (General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  Novem 
ber  19,  1870,  Foreign  Relations,  1871,  731.) 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE    FIRM   AND    CORRECT   STAND    OF    GENERAL    GRANT'S    ADMINIS 
TRATION.     THE   "VIRGINIUS" 

BY  this  time  Spain  had  available  in  Cuba,  if  the  40,000  volun 
teers  doing  garrison  duty  be  included,  over  100,000  men;  34,000 
had  been  sent  from  Spain  since  the  beginning  of  November,  1868. 
Of  the  total  force  but  7,500  were  cavalry,  the  only  arm  which 
could  be  of  real  value  in  such  warfare. 

Throughout  this  and  the  final  contest,  Spain's  great  error  was  in 
sending  to  the  island  vast  bodies  of  infantry,  which  were  wholly 
ineffective  against  a  mounted  enemy  such  as  the  Cubans  were. 
Amazing  as  was  her  energy  in  the  transport  and  support  of  such 
great  masses  of  troops,  equally  amazing  was  its  misdirection. 
There  were  fourteen  men-of-war  on  the  station,  including  two 
iron-clads,  besides  the  small  gun-boats  built  and  building  in  the 
United  States.  The  whole  was  an  astonishing  exhibition  of  effort 
on  the  part  of  a  country  torn  by  internal  dissensions  and  with 
credit  at  the  lowest  ebb. 

The  brutal  conduct  of  officials  in  Cuba,  their  disregard  of  the 
treaty  of  1795,  the  refusal  of  Mr.  Fish  to  consent  to  the  issue  of  a 
proclamation  of  recognition  of  the  Cuban  rebels  as  constituting  a 
belligerent  government,  and  the  arrest  of  military  enterprises  des 
tined  for  Cuba,  created  great  emotion  in  Congress  and  throughout 
the  country.  Mr.  Fish  wrote  to  General  Sickles  mentioning  the 
manner  in  which  hostile  action  against  Spanish  sovereignty  over 
Cuba  had  been  resisted  by  the  administration,  "against  a  strong 
sympathetic  pressure  from  without,"  a  pressure  so  strong  that 
there  was  a  brief  time  in  August,  1870,  when  the  President  con 
templated  the  granting  of  belligerent  rights,  and  had  even  caused  a 

306 


1870]  PRESIDENT  GRANT'S  SYMPATHIES  307 

proclamation  to  be  prepared  which  he  signed  and  left  with  Mr. 
Fish,  but  which  the  latter  did  not  issue.1 

If  one  may  make  a  safe  inference  from  the  notes  of  Mr.  Fish 
that  have  been  published  by  Congress,  it  was  his  desire  and  pur 
pose  to  keep  the  Alabama  negotiation  and  the  Cuban  difficulties 
out  of  the  hands  of  Congress  and  in  his  own  control,  subject,  of 
course,  to  the  orders  of  the  President.  In  that  he  was  successful, 
but  the  emotions  in  Congress  and  in  the  country  over  the  coming 
seizure  of  the  Virginius,  and  the  massacre  of  many  of  her  crew 
and  passengers,  nearly  forced  his  hand. 

The  President's  first  annual  message,  December,  1869,  had 
dealt  very  shortly  with  Cuban  affairs.  Though  himself  in  strong 
personal  sympathy  with  the  aspirations  of  the  insurgents,  so  much 
so,  in  fact,  that  but  for  the  determined  attitude  of  Mr.  Fish  he 
would  have  yielded  to  the  pressure  of  those  in  Congress  who  had 
his  confidence,  and  who  were  eager  for  action  against  Spain,  he  had 
said  in  his  message,  "the  contest  has  at  no  time  assumed  the  con 
ditions  which  amount  to  war  in  the  sense  of  international  law, 
or  which  would  show  the  existence  of  a  de  facto  political  organiza 
tion  of  the  insurgents  sufficient  to  justify  a  recognition  of  belliger 
ency."  Notwithstanding,  on  January  31,  1870,  a  joint  resolution, 
granting  the  insurgents  belligerent  rights,  was  introduced  in  the 
House  by  Mr.  Fitch,  and  on  February  11  in  the  Senate  by  Mr. 
John  Sherman.2 

The  President's  sympathies  were  well  known,  and  the  character 
of  the  special  message  on  the  subject  sent  to  Congress  June  13, 
1870,  must  have  come  with  a  certain  shock  of  surprise  to  the 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.,  108,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  245;  Foreign  Relations,  1871,  697; 
Moore,    International  Arbitrations,    II,    1033    (note);    The  Atlantic  Monthly, 
February,    1894;    Adams,   Lee  at  Appomattox,  and  Other  Papers,   117-123; 
Rhodes,  United  States,  VI,  345. 

2  Mr.  Sherman's  move  was  taken  with  an  inconsiderateness  unhappily  not 
unusual  in  our  congressional  action,  and  was  a  forecast  of  his  attitude  twenty- 
seven  years  later.    He  was  not,  in  1870,  even  aware  of  the  existence  of  the 
treaty  with  Spain,  of  1795,  and  under  it,  of  the  necessary  consequences  of  his 
action  if  carried  through.    He  admitted  that  he  had  not  examined  the  subject 
closely,  and  was  advised  by  Mr.  Fish,  "  in  connection  with  the  passing  of  his 
resolution,  to  prepare  bills  for  the  increase  of  the  public  debt  and  to  meet  the 
increased  appropriation  which  [would]  be  necessary  for  the  army,  navy,  etc. 
(Mr.  Fish's  Private  Journal,  February  19,  1870;    John  Bassett  Moore,  in  the 
Forum,  May,  1896,  295.) 


308  THE  MESSAGE  OF  JUNE   13,   1870  [1870 

promoters  of  the  resolution.  Recalling  his  previous  statement 
of  December,  1869,  and  mentioning  that  no  signs  of  advance 
had  been  shown,  either  by  the  insurgents  or  the  Spanish  authorities 
in  Cuba,  the  President  said:  "The  torch  of  Spaniard  and  Cuban 
is  alike  busy  in  carrying  devastation  over  fertile  regions;  murder 
ous  and  vengeful  decrees  are  issued  and  executed  by  both  parties. 
Count  Valmaseda  and  Colonel  Boet,  on  the  part  of  Spain,  have 
each  startled  humanity  and  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  civilized 
world  by  the  execution,  each,  of  a  score  of  prisoners  at  a  time; 
while  General  Quesada,  the  Cuban  chief,  coolly  and  with  appar 
ent  unconsciousness  of  aught  else  than  a  proper  act,  has  admitted 
the  slaughter,  by  his  own  deliberate  order,  in  one  day  of  upward 
of  six  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  of  war.  A  summary  trial, 
with  few,  if  any,  escapes  from  conviction,  followed  by  immediate 
execution,  is  the  fate  of  those  arrested  on  either  side  on  suspicion 
of  infidelity  to  the  cause  of  the  party  making  the  arrest.  What 
ever  may  be  the  sympathies  of  the  people  or  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States  for  the  cause  or  objects  for  which  a  part 
of  the  people  of  Cuba  are  understood  to  have  put  themselves 
in  armed  resistance  to  the  government  of  Spain,  there  can  be 
no  just  sympathy  in  a  conflict  carried  on  by  both  parties  alike 
in  such  barbarous  violation  of  the  rules  of  civilized  nations,  and 
with  such  continued  outrage  upon  the  plainest  principles  of 
humanity." 

The  President  continued  in  a  remark  which  it  would  have  been 
well  to  have  kept  in  mind  in  later  days,  saying  with  justice:  "We 
cannot  discriminate  in  our  censure  of  their  mode  of  conducting 
their  contest  between  the  Spaniards  and  the  Cubans.  Each  com 
mit  the  same  atrocities  and  outrage  alike  the  established  rules  of 
war." 

Mr.  Fish  had  already  declared  in  a  despatch  to  General  Sickles 
in  January,  1870,  that  the  flagrant  violations  of  law  by  the  agents 
of  the  insurrectionists  had  decreased  public  interest  in  the  United 
States,  and  had  alienated  popular  sympathy;  that  if,  instead  of 
employing  persons  to  go  in  armed  bands  to  Cuba,  they  had  gone 
thither  to  take  personal  part  in  the  struggle,  "it  is  certain  that 
there  would  have  been  a  more  ardent  feeling  ...  in  favor  of 
their  course,  and  more  respect  for  their  own  sincerity  and  per- 


1870]  THE  MESSAGE  OF  JUNE   13,   1870  309 

sonal  courage."  l  The  President  dwelt  upon  this  phase,  saying: 
"During  the  whole  contest  the  remarkable  exhibition  has  been 
made  of  large  numbers  of  Cubans  escaping  from  the  island  and 
avoiding  the  risks  of  war,  congregating  in  this  country  at  a  safe 
distance  from  the  scene  of  danger,  and  endeavoring  to  make  war 
from  our  shores,  to  urge  our  people  into  the  fight,  which  they  avoid, 
and  to  embroil  this  government  in  complications  and  possible 
hostilities  with  Spain.  It  can  scarce  be  doubted  that  this  last 
result  is  the  real  object  of  these  parties,  although  carefully  covered 
under  the  deceptive  and  apparently  plausible  demand  for  a  mere 
recognition  of  belligerency. 

"It  is  stated,  on  what  I  have  reason  to  regard  as  good  authority, 
that  Cuban  bonds  have  been  prepared  to  a  large  amount,  whose 
payment  is  made  contingent  upon  the  recognition  by  the  United 
States  of  either  Cuban  belligerency  or  independence.  The  object 
of  making  their  value  thus  contingent  upon  the  action  of  this 
government  is  a  subject  for  serious  reflection." 

Citing  the  action  of  all  previous  administrations  and  recalling 
the  strict  rule  of  public  policy  expressed  by  Mr.  Monroe,  with  ref 
erence  to  the  Spanish-American  revolted  provinces,  that  "as  soon  as 
the  movement  assumed  such  a  steady  and  consistent  form  as  to 
make  the  success  of  the  provinces  probable,  the  rights  to  which 
they  were  entitled  by  the  laws  of  nations  as  equal  parties  to  a  civil 
war  were  extended  to  them,"  the  President  proceeded: 

"The  question  of  belligerency  is  one  of  fact,  not  to  be  decided 
by  sympathies  for,  or  prejudices  against,  either  party.  The  re 
lations  between  the  parent  state  and  the  insurgents  must  amount, 
in  fact,  to  war,  in  the  sense  of  international  law.  Fighting,  though 
fierce  and  protracted,  does  not  constitute  war;  there  must  be 
military  forces  acting  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  customs 
of  war,  flags  of  truce,  cartels,  exchange  of  prisoners,  etc.,  and,  to 
justify  a  recognition  of  belligerency,  there  must  be,  above  all,  a 
de  facto  political  organization  of  the  insurgents  sufficient  in  char 
acter  and  resources  to  constitute  it,  if  left  to  itself,  a  state  among 
nations,  capable  of  discharging  the  duties  of  a  state,  and  of  meeting 
the  just  responsibilities  it  may  incur  as  such  toward  other  powers 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  January  26,  1870,  House  Ex.  Doc.  160,  41 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  69. 


310  THE  MESSAGE  OF  JUNE   13,   1870  [1870 

in  the  discharge  of  its  national  duties.  .  .  .  The  insurgents  hold 
no  town  or  city;  have  no  established  seat  of  government;  they 
have  no  prize  courts;  no  organization  for  the  receiving  and  col 
lecting  of  revenue;  no  seaport  to  which  a  prize  may  be  carried, 
or  through  which  access  may  be  had  by  a  foreign  power  to  the 
limited  interior  territory  and  mountain  fastnesses  which  they 
occupy.  The  existence  of  a  legislature  representing  any  popular 
constituency  is  more  than  doubtful.  In  the  uncertainty  which 
hangs  about  the  entire  insurrection,  there  is  no  palpable  evidence 
of  an  election,  of  any  delegated  authority,  or  of  any  government 
outside  the  limits  of  the  camps  occupied  from  day  to  day,  by 
the  roving  companies  of  insurgent  troops;  there  is  no  commerce, 
no  trade,  either  internal  or  foreign,  no  manufactures.  The  late 
commander-in-chief  of  the  insurgents,  having  recently  come  to 
the  United  States,  publicly  declared  that  'all  commercial  inter 
course  or  trade  with  the  exterior  world  has  been  utterly  cut  off/ 
and  he  further  added,  '  To-day  we  have  not  ten  thousand  arms 
in  Cuba/ 

"It  is  a  well-established  principle  of  public  law  that  a  recog 
nition  by  a  foreign  state  of  belligerent  rights  to  insurgents  under 
circumstances  such  as  now  exist  in  Cuba,  if  not  justified  by  neces 
sity,  is  a  gratuitous  demonstration  of  moral  support  to  the  rebellion. 
Such  necessity  may  hereafter  arrive,  but  it  has  not  yet  arrived, 
nor  is  its  probability  clearly  to  be  seen.  If  it  be  war  between 
Spain  and  Cuba,  and  be  so  recognized,  it  is  our  duty  to  provide 
for  the  consequences  which  may  ensue  in  the  embarrassment  to 
our  commerce  and  the  interference  with  our  revenue.  If  belliger 
ency  be  recognized,  the  commercial  marine  of  the  United  States 
becomes  liable  to  search  and  to  seizure  by  the  commissioned 
cruisers  of  both  parties — they  become  subject  to  the  adjudication 
of  prize  courts.  Our  large  coastwise  trade  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Gulf  states  and  between  both  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
and  the  states  of  South  America  (engaging  the  larger  part  of  our 
commercial  marine)  passes,  of  necessity,  almost  in  sight  of  the 
island  of  Cuba.  Under  the  treaty  of  1795,  as  well  as  by  the  law 
of  nations,  our  vessels  will  be  liable  to  visit  on  the  high  seas.  In 
case  of  belligerency,  the  carrying  of  contraband  which  is  now  law 
ful,  becomes  liable  to  the  risks  of  seizure  and  condemnation.  The 


1870]  AMERICAN  RECLAMATIONS  311 

parent  government  becomes  relieved  from  responsibility  for  acts 
done  in  the  insurgent  territory,  and  acquires  the  right  to  exercise 
against  neutral  commerce  all  the  powers  of  a  party  to  a  maritime 
war.  To  what  consequences  the  exercise  of  those  powers  may  lead 
is  a  question  which  I  desire  to  commend  to  the  serious  considera 
tion  of  Congress."  l 

On  June  16  the  resolution  to  recognize  insurgent  belligerency 
passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  80  to  68;  but  after  much  discus 
sion  and  amendment  was  lost  in  the  Senate.2 

On  June  9  Mr.  Fish,  in  a  note  to  the  Spanish  minister,  sum 
marized  the  complaints  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the  sav 
agery  of  the  orders  issued  by  Spanish  commanders  in  Cuba;  to  the 
proclamations  forbidding  the  alienation  of  American  property, 
and  the  custody  and  management  of  such  property  which  had  been 
embargoed;  and  to  the  violations  of  the  seventh  article  of  the 
treaty  of  1795  which  forbade  such  embargo  and  assured  freedom 
from  arrest  of  citizens  of  either  party  to  the  treaty  except  by  order 
and  authority  of  law,  and  likewise  assured  to  persons  so  arrested 
the  assistance  of  such  counsel  and  agents  as  they  should  judge 
proper.3 

Extraordinary  powers  as  to  affairs  in  Cuba  had  been  conferred 
upon  the  Spanish  minister  in  August,  1869,  to  arrest  the  infractions 
of  the  rights  secured  by  the  treaty  and  to  obtain  the  restoration 
of  the  properties.  Mr.  Fish  asked,  in  the  same  despatch,  if  these 
powers  were  continued,  and  being  informed  by  the  Spanish  min- 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  99,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1-5. 

2  General  Grant,   in  combating  later   Mr.    Fish's   desire   to   retire,   said: 
"On  two  important  occasions,  at  least,  your  steadiness  and  wisdom  have 
kept  me  from  mistakes  into  which  I  should  have  fallen.     On  one  of  these 
occasions  you  led,  too,  against  my  judgment  at  the  time — you  almost  forced 
me — in  the  matter  of  signing  the  late  Cuban  message.    I  see  now  how  right  it 
was,  and  I  desire  most  sincerely  to  thank  you.    The  measure  was  right,  and 
the  whole  country  acquiesces  in  it."     He  repeated  that  he  wished  to  thank 
me  especially  for  those  two  occasions.    They  were,  one,  preventing  the  issuing, 
last  August  and  September,  [1869]  of  the  proclamation  of  Cuban  belligerency 
which  he  had  signed,  and  which  he  wrote  me  a  note  instructing  me  to  sign 
(which  I  did)  and  to  issue  (which  I  did  not);    and,  second,  the  Cuban  message 
of  June  13  [1870].     (Mr.  Fish's  Private  Journal,  quoted  by  John  Bassett 
Moore  in  The  Forum,  May,  1896,  295.) 

'Foreign  Relations,  1871,  698-700;  also  Senate  Doc.  108,  41  Cong.,  2 Sees., 
239-242. 


312  AMERICAN  RECLAMATIONS  [1870 

ister,  June  24,  that  in  view  of  the  favorable  situation  in  Cuba 
they  had  been  deemed  no  longer  necessary  and  had  been  with 
drawn,1  General  Sickles  was  instructed  to  present  the  subject  to 
the  Spanish  government  combined  with  an  extended  series  of  rec 
lamations  for  offences  such  as  were  complained  of  in  Mr.  Fish's 
note  of  June  9  to  Senor  Roberts.  This  General  Sickles  did  in  a 
lengthy  note,  July  26,  1870,  ending:  "The  treaty  of  1795,  nego 
tiated  on  the  part  of  Spain  by  the  Prince  of  [the]  Peace  and  ratified 
during  the  administration  of  George  Washington,  recalls  some  of  the 
earliest  traditions  of  the  cordial  and  uninterrupted  friendship  which 
has  been  so  long  preserved  between  the  United  States  and  Spain. 
In  the  name  of  these  traditions  and  for  the  sake  of  that  friendship, 
I  appeal  to  your  excellency  to  cause  such  instructions  to  be  given 
to  the  authorities  in  Cuba  as  will  prevent  further  injuries  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States  who  may  be  bound  within  that  jurisdiction 
or  who  may  have  property  there.  .  .  ."  2 

A  long  and  intricate  series  of  communications  passed  before 
an  understanding  could  be  effected,  February  12,  1871,  one  of 
the  chief  difficulties  on  the  Spanish  side  being  that  of  arrang 
ing  satisfactorily  concerning  those  of  Cuban  birth  who,  many  in 
good  faith,  many  otherwise,  had  become  citizens  of  the  United 
States.3 

On  May  5,  1870,  the  new  law  had  been  presented  to  the  Cortes, 
making  Puerto  Rico  a  province  of  Spain  with  proportional  repre 
sentation  in  the  Cortes,  and  establishing  a  provincial  chamber 
of  deputies  with,  however,  very  limited  powers,  subject  to  approval 
by  the  Cortes.  The  power  of  the  captain-general  remained  practi 
cally  the  same.  No  public  discussion  was  allowed  as  to  separation 
of  the  island  from  Spain  or  as  to  slavery.  A  very  ineffective  and 
insufficient  bill  for  the  emancipation  of  slaves  both  in  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico  was,  however,  offered  on  May  28,  1870,  by  the  min 
ister  of  the  colonies,  Senor  Moret  y  Prendergast,  which  became  a 
law  on  June  23,  the  last  day  of  the  sitting  of  the  Cortes.  All  chil- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1871,  243.  *  Ibid.,  705. 

3  See  Ibid.,  697-775.  The  commission,  finally  organized,  sat  at  Washing 
ton.  Its  labors  did  not  end  until  January  1,  1883.  There  were  130  claims 
presented  amounting  to  $29,946,183.32.  Awards  were  given  in  favor  of  35 
claims  amounting  to  $1,293,450.55.  See  on  this  subject  Moore,  Digest,VI, 
907-913. 


1870]  ANARCHIC  SPAIN  313 

dren  born  after  the  decree,  and  all  slaves  on  reaching  the  age  of 
sixty-five,  were  to  be  free.1 

Though  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba  on  his  own  authority 
had,  on  May  14,  1870,  issued  a  bando  declaring  the  emancipation 
of  slaves  of  the  insurgents,  and  slavery  had  been  declared  abol 
ished  by  the  insurgents,  February  26,  1869,  theMoret  law  was  a 
dead  letter  so  far  as  Cuba  was  concerned,  and  was  not  even 
allowed  by  the  volunteers  to  be  published  for  nearly  two  years 
after  the  world  supposed  it  to  have  been  in  action.2 

Much,  in  these  months,  had  happened  in  the  Peninsula.  The 
country  by  1870  was  anarchic.  There  was  a  powerless  regency 
of  which  Serrano  was  the  nominal  but  Prim  the  real  head. 
The  question  of  the  year  was  a  new  monarch  to  replace  the 
imitation  of  government.  "Carlist  bands  sprang  up  in  all  parts 
of  Spain;  socialist  and  separatist  risings  took  place  in  Cataluna, 
Aragon,  Andalusia,  and  Valencia.  Again  the  blood  of  Spaniards 
was  shed  by  Spaniards  in  almost  every  great  town  before  com 
parative  order  could  be  restored;  and,  in  the  meanwhile, 
intrigues  without  end,  secret  combinations,  and  active  propa 
ganda  at  home  and  abroad  pushed  the  interests  of  rival  candi 
dates  for  the  throne."  3  The  result  was  the  acceptance,  as  king, 
November  3,  1870,  by  a  vote  of  191  in  a  house  of  311  members 
present,  of  Amadeo,  Duke  of  Aosta,  the  second  son  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  of  Italy.  While  on  his  way  to  Spain  in  the  iron-clad 
Numancia,  his  chief  supporter  Prim  was  shot  in  Madrid,  December 
27,  and  died  the  day  Amadeo  landed  in  Spain,  three  days  later. 

Amadeo  entered  Madrid  January  2,  1871,  to  reign  over  a  dis 
tracted  government  a  little  more  than  two  years.  He  resigned 
his  kingship  February  11,  1873,  and  a  republic  was  proclaimed, 
with  Pi  y  Margall,  Salmeron,  and  Castelar,  successively,  as  presi 
dents.  The  whole  north  rose  in  favor  of  Don  Carlos,  and  a  civil 
war  began  which  brought  anarchy  to  every  part  of  the  Penin 
sula.  The  coast,  January  31,  1874,  was  declared  blockaded  from 
Cape  de  Penas  to  Fuenterrabia,  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
in  extent;  and  on  July  18,  1874,  the  whole  of  Spain  and  the  ad- 

1  Senate  Doc.  113,  41  Cong.,  2  Sees.,  8-12. 
1  Gallenga,  The  Pearl  of  the  Antilles,  17. 
1  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  476. 


314  THE   CAPTURE  OF  THE  "VIRGINIUS"          [1873 

joining  islands  was  declared  in  a  state  of  siege.  The  credit  of  the 
country  naturally  sank  until  it  was  "lower  than  that  of  any  other 
nation."  l 

In  November,  1873,  General  Jovellar,  taking  over  the  governor- 
generalship,  at  once  announced  to  the  "Inhabitants  of  the  Ever 
Faithful  Island  of  Cuba,"  in  the  name  of  the  government 
of  President  Castelar,  that,  after  an  experience  of  five  years 
without  any  definite  results,  "it  is  expedient  and  even  neces 
sary  to  subordinate  all  other  questions  to  one  alone — to  that 
of  war,"2  a  pronouncement  which  left  no  hope  for  a  cessation 
of  the  ruin  and  desolation  which  had  been  so  long  the  island's 
fate. 

The  Cubans  in  the  United  States,  many  of  whom  were  of  great 
wealth,  had  been  continuously  active  in  equipping  expeditions  and 
in  endeavoring  to  send  men  and  arms.  Some  of  these  efforts  were 
successful  despite  the  earnest  and  best-intentioned  efforts  of  the 
American  authorities.  On  October  31,  1873,  the  steamer  Vir- 
ginius,  commanded  by  Captain  Joseph  Fry,  formerly  of  the  United 
States  and  later  of  the  Confederate  navy,  carrying  a  crew  of  fifty- 
two,  chiefly  of  American  and  British  nationality,  and  one  hundred 
and  three  Cubans  as  passengers,  and  with  a  considerable  cargo 
of  arms  and  equipments,  was,  after  a  long  chase,  captured  some 
twenty  miles  from  the  Jamaican  coast  by  the  Spanish  steamer 
Tornado. 

The  Virginius  and  her  captor  had  both  been  built  in  Scotland 
as  blockade-runners  in  the  civil  war;  the  former,  known  as  the 
Virgin,  being  in  Mobile  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  became  prize 
to  the  Federal  government.  Sold  once  and  taken  back  by  the 
government  for  a  debt,  she  was  sold  again  in  1870,  at  Washington, 
to  one  John  F.  Patterson,  of  New  York,  for  $9,800.s  As  appeared 
later,  Patterson  was  but  the  nominal  owner,  the  real  owners  being 
a  number  of  Cubans,  of  whom  General  Quesada  and  Jose*  Mora 
were  the  representatives.4  The  ship  was  registered  in  the  New 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  October  27,  1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1874, 
845. 

•  Ibid.,  850.  Jovellar's  career  was  for  the  moment  short.  He  resigned 
March  10,  1874,  and  General  Jos6  de  la  Concha,  who  later  had  the  title  of 
Marquis  of  Havana,  was  appointed  governor-general  in  his  stead. 

»  Bill  of  sale,  Ibid.,  1874,  1001.  4  Ibid.,  1009. 


1870]          THE  HISTORY  OF  THE   "VIRGINIUS"  315 

York  Custom-House,  September  26,  1870,  Patterson  making  oath 
that  he  was  the  "true  and  only  owner,"  and  that  "no  subject  or 
citizen  of  any  foreign  prince  or  state  [was]  directly  or  indirectly,  by 
way  of  trust,  confidence,  or  otherwise,  interested  therein,  or  in  the 
profits  or  issues  thereof."  1  She  cleared  in  due  form  for  Curacao 
October  4,  1870,  her  manifest  showing  a  cargo  of  one  hundred  and 
seventy  barrels  of  bread,  two  boxes  of  saddlery,  and  four  trunks 
of  clothing.  She  was  not  only  to  all  outward  form  an  American 
merchant  vessel,  "but  she  sailed  unsuspected  alike  by  the  Spanish 
minister,  the  Spanish  consul,  and  their  detectives — unsuspected 
also  by  the  United  States."  2  She  carried  a  crew  of  thirty  men, 
with  one,  F.  E.  Shepperd,  formerly  of  the  United  States  and  later 
of  the  Confederate  navy,  in  command. 

After  leaving  New  York  she  took  aboard,  some  four  miles 
at  sea,  twenty  Cubans,  several  of  them  of  especial  prominence. 
After  lying  at  Cura9ao  several  days,  she  left  there  October  19, 
1870,  accompanied  by  the  American  schooner  Billy  Butts,  which 
had  arrived  the  previous  day  from  New  York.  Off  the  island  of 
Buen  Ayre,  not  far  from  Curafao,  the  Virginius  took  from  the 
schooner  a  considerable  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition  and 
four  brass  field-pieces.3 

Her  career  thenceforward  was  one  of  desultory  wandering  in 
the  waters  of  the  Spanish  main;  at  one  time  in  November,  1870, 
assisting  in  the  capture  of  a  flotilla  of  armed  schooners  on  the 
Venezuelan  coast,  belonging  to  the  party  then  contending  against 
Guzman  Blanco,  with,  it  would  appear,  the  understanding  that 
Blanco  would  give  assistance  to  the  Cuban  cause,  in  men  and  other 
wise,  as  soon  as  the  Venezuelan  revolution  should  be  put  down.4 
To  some  degree  at  least  this  contract  was  carried  out,  thirty-nine 
Venezuelans  being  among  those  aboard  the  Virginius  when,  June 
21,  1871,  she  landed  men,  arms,  and  other  war  material  at  Boca  de 
Cabello,  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba.5 

The  ship's  status  became  a  trying  question  to  the  American 
representatives  in  Venezuela  and  Colombia,  her  papers  being 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1003. 

8  Mr.  Fish  to  Admiral  Polo  de  BernabS,  Spanish  minister,  April  18,  1874, 
Ibid.,  1875,  part  2,  1207.  « Ibid.,  1874,  1105. 

*  Testimony  of  F.  E.  Shepperd,  Ibid.,  1010.  8  Ibid.,  1109. 


316  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE   "VIRGINIUS"  [1873 

perfectly  regular,  but  her  occupation  notoriously  offensive  to 
Spain,  though  within  the  limits  of  international  law,  in  so  far  as 
carrying  what  would,  in  time  of  war,  be  considered  contraband. 
The  demands  for  her  forcible  retention  made  by  Spanish  authori 
ties  upon  these  national  governments  (both  of  which  had  recog 
nized  Cuban  belligerency)  were  resisted  by  the  American  minis 
ters  upon  these  grounds.1 

There  were  many  changes  of  commanders  and  such  financial 
difficulties  that  a  bottomry  bond  was  executed,  in  1872,  by  her 
then  captain,  Bowen,  at  Aspinwall  (Colon),  to  pay  the  ship's  in 
debtedness.  Later,  at  Puerto  Cabello,  Venezuela,  she  was  adver 
tised  for  sale  and  bid  in  for  $17,500.  The  sale,  however,  which 
was  to  an  Englishman,  was  not  completed,  as,  by  the  statement  of 
her  then  captain,  Charles  Smith,  he  was  informed  by  the  British 
consul  that  the  British  minister  telegraphed  that  she  would  be 
seized  as  a  pirate  if  she  hoisted  the  British  flag.2  The  American 
consuls  also  did  not  believe  the  ship  morally  entitled  to  protection, 
though  legally  so.3 

On  July  1,  1873,  the  Virginius  was  at  Colon,  where  also  at  the 
time  were  lying  the  United  States  steamship  Kansas  and  the 
Spanish  steamer  Pizarro.  The  captain  of  the  latter  had  declared 
his  intention  of  seizing  the  Virginius  as  soon  as  she  should  put  to 
sea.  She  was  flying  the  American  flag,  her  papers  were  declared 
correct  by  the  American  consul,  and  Commander  White,  of  the 
Kansas,  decided  to  protect  her.  She  was  accompanied  by  the 
Kansas,  cleared  for  action,  until  the  Virginius  showed  that  she 
clearly  had  the  better  of  the  Pizarro  in  speed  and  was  safe  from  the 
latter's  threat.4  She  later  made  a  second  landing  on  the  Cuban  coast 
and  put  into  Kingston,  Jamaica,  July  10,  1873,  where  she  re 
mained  until  October  23.  She  then  cleared  for  Port  Limon,  Costa 
Rica,  her  actual  destination  being  to  make  a  landing  of  men  and 
arms  in  Cuba.  She  sprang  a  leak  soon  after  leaving  Kingston,  and 
Captain  Fry,  who  had  served  twenty  years  in  the  Federal  and 
later  in  the  Confederate  navy,  and  had  joined  her  but  a  short  time 
before,  put  into  an  obscure  Haitian  port  for  repairs.  The  ship  left 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1872,  140,  156-158,  715-716. 

3  Ibid.,  1874,  1022.  •  Ibid.,  1024,  1027. 

4  Commander  White's  action  was  fully  upheld  by  the  navy  department. 


1873]  THE  "VIRGINIUS"  EXECUTIONS  317 

Hayti,  October  30,  with  a  crew  of  fifty-two,  including  the  captain, 
and  with  one  hundred  and  three  passengers,  most  of  whom  were 
Cubans.  Among  these  were  a  brother  and  a  son  of  Cespedes,  the 
insurgent  president.  Twenty-six  of  the  crew,  including  the  second 
mate  and  twelve  of  the  passengers,  were  British  subjects,  one  of 
these  being  a  "  General "  Ryan,  a  Canadian.1  The  ship  had  aboard 
some  five  hundred  rifles,  a  large  number  of  revolvers,  and  a  quantity 
of  ammunition,  clothing,  medicines,  and  provisions. 

When  about  twenty  miles  from  the  Cuban  coast  the  Virginius 
was  sighted  in  the  afternoon  of  October  31  by  the  Tornado,  which, 
on  information  from  the  Spanish  consul  at  Kingston,  had  gone 
to  sea  in  search  of  her.  After  a  chase  of  about  seven  hours  she 
was  captured  at  10  p.  M.,  some  eighteen  miles  from  Morant  Bay, 
Jamaica.2  She  was  carried  into  Santiago  de  Cuba,  where  she 
arrived  at  5  P.  M.,  November  1. 

A  summary  court-martial  was  convened  aboard  the  Francisco 
de  Borja  the  next  day,  and  on  November  4  Ryan  and  three  Cubans 
were  shot  as  "pirates."  On  the  7th,  with  circumstances  of  the 
utmost  barbarity,  Captain  Fry  and  thirty-six  others  were  executed, 
and  on  the  8th  twelve  more,  a  total  of  fifty-three,  despite  the  strong 
est  protests  from  the  American  and  British  consuls  and  in  total  dis 
regard  of  treaty  stipulations  with  the  United  States  regarding  coun 
sel  and  trial  before  a  proper  court.  It  was  justly  characterized  as 
"a  dreadful,  a  savage  act."  s 

The  transmittal  to  Jamaica  by  the  American  vice-consul  of  a 
telegram  asking  the  actual  status  of  the  Virginius  had  even  been 
insultingly  refused,  and  a  long  delay  in  replying  to  the  vice-consul's 
protest  was  put  down  by  the  governor,  Burriel,  "  to  important  and 
peremptory  affairs  to  which  I  had  to  devote  myself  exclusively; 
further,  the  past  two  days  were  holidays,  upon  which  the  officials 
do  not  come  to  their  offices,  being  engaged,  as  every  one  else,  in 
the  meditation  of  the  divine  mysteries  of  All  Saints',  and  the  com 
memoration  of  All  Souls'  day,  as  prescribed  by  our  holy  religion; 
consequently  it  was  impossible  for  me  until  early  this  morning  to 

1  For  lists  of  crew  and  passengers,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1060,  1082, 
1092,  1095.  » Ibid.,  1076. 

*  Mr.  Caleb  Gushing,  American  minister,  to  Senor  Ulloa,  Spanish  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  July  21,  1874,  Ibid.,  1876,  499. 


318          PROTEST  OF  THE   "NIOBE'S"   CAPTAIN        [1873 

comply  with  your  wishes,  as  well  as  my  own,  to  answer  your  com 
munications."  * 

The  British  man-of-war  Niobe,  Captain  Sir  Lambton  Lorraine, 
was  hurried  from  Jamaica,  and  arrived  at  Santiago  November  7. 
The  second  execution  took  place  the  day  of  the  Niobe's  arrival. 
On  November  8  Captain  Lorraine  had  an  interview  with  the 
governor  and  protested  against  the  execution.  He  followed  this, 
next  day,  November  9,  with  a  written  protest  in  which  (under 
the  British  ruling  in  the  case  of  the  British  yacht  Deerhound,  seized 
in  June ,  1873,  under  very  similar  circumstances)  he  declared  that 
Great  Britain  refused  to  recognize  the  right  of  Spain  to  pursue  and 
capture  a  vessel  outside  of  territorial  limits  even  if  it  had  violated 
Spanish  regulations;  that  the  right  to  treat  as  prisoners  of  war 
the  crews  of  vessels  carrying  contraband  or  persons  in  military 
service  was  not  recognized  in  international  law;  that  the  views  of 
his  government  in  such  a  question  applied  to  the  Virginius,  as 
British  subjects  were  among  the  crew.  He  ended  saying:  "lam 
instructed  to  appeal  in  behalf  of  these  last— the  dead  must  now 
be  omitted— soliciting,  as  I  do,  with  all  the  force  which  such  a 
situation  demands,  that  although  there  may  be  no  doubt  that  most 
of  these  British  subjects  have  committed  offences  against  the 
Spanish  nation,  they  have,  nevertheless,  not  offended  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  merit  the  punishment  of  death  by  any  law.  Even  if 
legally  captured  they  could  not  in  the  view  of  the  British  govern 
ment  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  still  less  as  pirates,  any  Span 
ish  decree  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  But  the  capture  of 
the  Virginius  on  the  high  seas  is  a  proceeding  which  .  .  .  her 
Britannic  Majesty  cannot  regard  as  justifiable." 2 

On  November  11  General  Burriel  replied  to  Captain  Lorraine: 
"  If  by  legal  proceedings  the  death  sentence  be  decreed  against  any 
one  of  the  prisoners  of  the  Virginius,  be  he  of  whatever  nationality 
he  may,  he  will  be  executed  without  fail.  I  am  not  in  the  habit  of 
allowing  myself  to  be  overawed  by  any  one,  and  I  will  not  take 
notice  of  any  petition,  unless  his  excellency,  the  governor,  captain- 
general  of  the  island,  orders  me  to  do  otherwise." 3  General  Bur- 
rieFs  attitude  was,  in  fact,  a  case,  in  officialdom,  of  running  amuck. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1065. 

2  House  Rep.  781,  43  Cong.,  1  Seas.  (1874).  *Ibid. 


1873]  COMMANDER  CUSHING'S  PROTEST  319 

The  Wyoming,  Captain  Gushing,  hurried  from  Colon,  arrived 
the  night  of  November  15.  Cushing  immediately  addressed  the 
governor  in  forcible  terms.  "So  far,"  he  said,  "from  being  a 
pirate  as  defined  by  international  law,  the  Virginius,  if  offending 
at  all,  was  simply  a  neutral  vessel  carrying  contraband  of  war,  'a 
blockade  runner/  or  at  most  a  smuggler.  She  was  unarmed,  and 
was  lawfully  furnished  with  sea  papers  entitling  her  to  navigate 
the  high  seas  in  safety  from  all  men  ...  a  vessel  of  a  neutral 
country  might,  under  the  laws  and  agreements  of  nations,  attempt 
to  carry  in  arms  and  any  contraband  of  war,  subject  only  to  the 
penalty  of  capture  in  transportation  and  confiscation  of  ship  and 
cargo.  No  other  punishment  is  permitted  by  the  law  of  nations, 
to  which  each  individual  state  must  consent.  ...  In  the  eye  of 
the  nations  of  the  earth  and  their  well-defined  laws  .  .  .  such 
trial  and  execution  is  simply  murder.  ...  I  solemnly  protest 
against  the  imprisonment  or  other  punishment  of  any  of  the  liv 
ing  members  of  the  crew  or  passengers  who  are  either  born  or  nat 
uralized  citizens  of  the  United  States.  .  .  ."  * 

Not  only  had  the  protests  of  the  American,  British,  and  French 
consuls  (there  being  a  French  citizen  aboard)  been  flouted  in  the 
most  unmannerly  way,  but  a  telegram  from  Madrid  had  been 
equally  ineffective,  through,  as  reported  back  from  Cuba,  the  cutting 
of  the  telegraph  lines  by  the  insurgents.  This  had  been  sent  by 
President  Castelar,  November  6,  before  any  knowledge  of  any 
execution,2  "at  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  as  soon  as  he  read  the 
telegram  from  Cuba  [announcing  only  the  capture],  and  without 
reference  to  any  international  question,  for  that  indeed  had  not 
occurred  to  him  ...  to  the  captain-general  admonishing  him  that 
the  death  penalty  must  not  be  imposed  upon  any  non-combatant 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1099. 

2  The  first  information  regarding  the  Virginius  received  by  the  Spanish 
government  waa  published  in  the  official  gazette  November  6,  and  appeared 
as  follows: 

"  Island  of  Cuba. — The  captain-general,  in  a  telegram  of  yesterday,  the 
5th,  reports  that  the  steamer  Tornado  captured  the  pirate  Virginius,  six  miles 
from  the  coast  of  Jamaica,  having  made  Bembeta,  Hernando  Ce"spedes  (son) 
Quesada,  Jesus  del  Sol,  and  others  to  the  number  of  165,  prisoners,  some  of 
them  being  of  importance.  The  horses,  arms,  and  provisions  of  the  Virginius 
were  thrown  overboard  during  the  chase.  The  captain-general  attaches 
importance  to  the  occurrence."  (Ibid.,  922. ) 


320  AMERICAN  ACTION  [1873 

without  the  previous  approval  of  the  Cortes,  nor  upon  any  person 
taken  in  arms  against  the  government  without  the  sanction  of 
the  executive." 

Mr.  Fish  had  at  once,  on  receiving  the  news  of  the  first  execu 
tion,  telegraphed  the  American  minister  at  Madrid,  November  7: 
"The  capture  on  the  high  seas  of  a  vessel  bearing  the  American 
flag  presents  a  very  grave  question,  which  will  need  investigation, 
and  the  summary  proceedings  resulting  in  the  punishment  of  death, 
with  such  rapid  haste,  will  attract  attention  as  inhuman  and  in 
violation  of  the  civilization  of  the  age.  And  if  it  prove  that  an 
American  citizen  has  been  wrongfully  executed,  this  government 
will  require  most  ample  reparation."  2 

Already,  before  the  reception  of  this  telegram,  General  Sickles, 
also  in  ignorance  of  the  executions,  but  recognizing  the  gravity  of 
the  capture  in  such  circumstances,  had  called  upon  the  minister 
of  state  to  suggest  directing  the  captain-general  in  Cuba  to  await 
orders  from  the  government  before  taking  any  further  steps  in  the 
case.3  As  seen  above,  this  had  already  been  done.  "I  learn 
to-day,"  said  General  Sickles  in  his  despatch  of  November  7, 
"  that  many  deputies  have  united  in  an  address  to  President  Cas- 
telar,  praying  him  to  interpose  his  authority  to  prohibit  the  inflic 
tion  of  the  death  penalty  on  any  of  the  persons  captured  in  the  Vir- 
ginius.  A  similar  petition  has  been  laid  before  the  parliamentary 
committee  sitting  during  the  recess,  and  which  is  invested  with 
certain  extraordinary  powers.  This  proceeding  is  passionately 
assailed  by  the  reactionary  press,  which  loudly  demands  the  blood 
of  the  prisoners."  4 

Having  received  Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  November  7,  General 
Sickles  called  upon  the  minister  of  state,  and  stated  his  hope  that 
the  Spanish  government,  without  waiting  for  a  formal  reclamation, 
would  take  immediate  steps  to  make  the  reparation  which  public 
law  and  the  recognized  usage  of  nations  might  require.  "On  the 
case  as  it  now  appeared,"  he  said,  "  the  proceeding  of  the  Tornado 
was  as  indefensible  as  if  a  Spanish  commander  in  the  north  pursued 
Don  Carlos  to  Bayonne,  seizing  him  and  taking  him  to  Pamplona 
to  be  shot.  Spanish  vessels  had  no  more  right  to  lay  hands  on  an 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  November  7, 1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  922. 
a  lUd.,  922.  » Ibid.,  922.  *  Ibid.,  923. 


1873]  SPANISH  GOVERNMENTS  REGRET  321 

American  vessel  at  sea  than  we  would  have  to  enter  the  port  of 
Cadiz  and  arrest  an  offender  against  our  laws."  l 

Senor  Carvajal  was  still  in  ignorance  of  any  executions.  He  was 
very  glad  the  American  minister  had  made  no  formal  demand. 
"It  was,"  he  said,  "unnecessary.  The  government  would  take 
up  the  question  at  once,  and  decide  it  on  principles  of  public  law, 
and  according  to  its  international  obligations,  uninfluenced  by 
political  opinions  or  passions  in  any  quarter."  2 

Later  on  the  day  of  this  interview  Senor  Carvajal  called  upon 
General  Sickles  to  state  that  the  colonial  minister  had  received  in 
formation  of  the  shooting  of  four  of  the  passengers  of  the  Virginius. 
He  expressed  his  extreme  regret,  and  was  confident  the  act  took 
place  before  the  orders  sent  by  President  Castelar  on  the  6th  had 
been  received.3 

That  the  Spanish  government  deeply  regretted  the  action  at  the  - 
moment  is  beyond  doubt.     It  would,  in  Spain's  situation  at  home, 
have  required  more  than  such  a  madness  as  that  so  frequently  shown 
by  its  officials  in  Cuba  to  have  brought  the  government  to  a  con 
gratulatory  state  of  mind,  however  much  it  may  have  approved,  and  ' 
finally  did  approve,  in  words,  the  action  at  Santiago.    It  was  not 
in  reason  that  it  should  wish  to  add  a  foreign  war  to  the  civil  strifes 
now  so  serious  both  in  the  Peninsula  and  the  insurgent  island. 

The  minister  of  state  called  upon  the  American  minister,  Novem 
ber  8,  to  express  the  government's  extreme  regret  in  the  news  of 
the  first  execution,  and  to  say  that  he  was  confident  the  act  took 
place  before  the  reception  of  the  orders  by  President  Castelar,  of 
November  6,  and  that  further  orders  to  stay  proceedings  had  been 
sent.4  The  minister,  calling  again  on  November  13,  communicated 
the  report  of  the  shooting  of  the  7th  and  8th,  "with,"  says  Gen 
eral  Sickles's  telegram,  "profound  regret.  .  .  .  General  Jovelar, 
the  captain-general  in  Cuba,  says  he  will  stop  any  more  slaughter."  5 
President  Castelar  was  himself  greatly  moved.  "  How  deeply,"  he 
said  to  the  American  minister,  "I  deplore  the  execution  of  the  four 
prisoners  at  Santiago  de  Cuba!  What  a  misfortune  that  my 
order  was  not  received  in  time  to  prevent  such  an  act  I  .  .  .  Such 
scandals  must  cease.  A  conservative  deputation  was  here  this 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874. 

a  Ibid.,  923.  •  Ibid.,  924.  «  Ibid.t  924.  '  Ibid.t  935. 


322  BURRIEL'S  DEFENCE  [1873 

morning,  and  I  told  them  frankly  that  we  must  put  an  end  to 
slavery  in  Cuba;  it  brutalizes  all  it  touches."  l  He  received  the 
later  news  of  further  slaughter  with  "deepest  feeling."2  The 
foreign  minister  said  in  extenuation  that  the  legislation  of  Sep 
tember,  1873,  which  forbade  death  penalties  without  the  approval 
of  the  Cortes,  in  the  case  of  civilians,  and  of  the  executive,  in 
military  sentences,  had  failed  to  become  operative  in  Cuba,  and 
that  the  authorities  had  thus  followed  the  prescriptions  of  the  old 
colonial  code.  "General  Jovellar  now  held  himself  responsible 
for  the  due  observance  of  this  law,  which  had  been  extended  to 
Cuba  by  an  executive  order,  and  it  was  at  least  certain  that  the 
slaughter  had  ceased."  s 

The  sentiments  of  the  members  of  the  government,  whether 
real  or,  as  would  seem  from  later  events,  assumed,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  minister  of  state  at  least,  went  for  little,  whether  in  the  Penin 
sula  or  in  Cuba.  In  the  latter  the  decrees  from  home  were,  to  a 
great  extent,  nullified  by  the  will  of  the  volunteers,  and  later,  Bur- 
riel  himself,  as  a  defence  of  his  action,  cited  as  still  existent  the 
decree  of  March  14,  1869,  ordering  the  immediate  execution  of  all 
persons  captured  in  Spanish  waters  or  on  the  high  seas  under 
such  circumstances  as  those  of  the  Virginius*  There  was,  in  truth, 
but  little  at  the  moment  which  could  be  called  government  in  either 
Spain  or  Cuba,  in  both  of  which  was  civil  war  with  every  horror 
common  to  Spanish  usage  in  such  a  strife. 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  November  12,  1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1874, 
931.  '  Ibid.,  935. 

3  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  November  13,  1873,  Ibid.,  933. 

4  Letter  of  General  Burriel  to  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  in  La  Epoca, 
Madrid,  April  21,  1874,  and  in  Foreign  Relations,  1876,  490. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    "VIRGINIUS" 

ON  November  12,  1873,  Mr.  Fish  sent  a  note  to  Admiral 
Polo  de  Bernabe*,  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  mention 
ing  that  he  had  information  of  the  shooting,  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba,  of  fifty-two  of  the  crew  and  passengers  of  the  Virginius. 
He  added:  "This  information  relates  to  an  act  apparently  too 
shocking  and  cruel  to  be  credible.  I  am  in  hopes  that  more  authen 
tic  intelligence  may  have  reached  you,  which  would  tend  to  dis 
credit  the  statement  referred  to.  I  will  consequently  thank  you  to 
relieve,  as  soon  as  you  conveniently  can,  our  natural  anxiety  upon 
the  subject."1  The  admiral  replied  at  once  that  he  had  no  infor 
mation.  On  the  same  day  Mr.  Fish  sent  a  telegram  to  General 
Sickles,  instructing  him  as  follows:  "If  the  report  be  confirmed, 
you  will  protest,  in  the  name  of  this  government  and  of  civilization 
and  humanity,  against  the  act  as  brutal,  barbarous,  and  an  out 
rage  upon  the  age,  and  will  declare  that  this  government  will  de 
mand  the  most  ample  reparation  of  any  wrong  which  may  have 
been  committed  upon  any  of  its  citizens,  or  upon  its  flag.  You  are 
confidentially  informed  that  grave  suspicions  exist  as  to  the  right  of 
the  Virginius  to  carry  the  American  flag,  as  also  with  regard  to  her 
right  to  the  American  papers  which  she  is  said  to  have  carried. 
Investigation  is  being  made.  You  will  bear  this  in  mind  in  what 
you  say  to  the  ministry."  2 

On  the  same  day  Mr.  Fish  wrote  to  General  Sickles  more  at 
length.  He  advised  him :  "The  executions  would  seem  to  have  been 
precipitated  in  cold  blood  and  vindictiveness  to  anticipate  and 
prevent  the  interposition  of  any  humane  restraints  upon  the  feroc 
ity  of  the  local  authorities  from  the  government  at  Madrid,  or  its 
representative  in  Havana.  This  is  but  another  instance  in  the 
long  catalogue  of  the  defiance  of  the  home  government  by  those 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  977.     The  number  was  53.  a  Ibid.,  927. 

323 


324  MR.   FISH'S  NOTE  [1873 

intrusted  with  authority  in  Cuba.  .  .  .  The  promptness  with 
which  the  Madrid  government  responded  to  your  suggestion  and 
forwarded  instructions  to  the  captain-general  to  await  orders  be 
fore  inflicting  any  penalties  ...  is  accepted  as  evidence  of  their 
readiness  to  administer  justice,  and  gives  promise  of  the  prompt 
ness  with  which  they  will  condemn  and  punish  the  hot  thirst  for 
blood  and  vengeance  which  was  exhibited  at  Santiago  de  Cuba. 
Condemnation,  disavowal,  and  deprecation  of  the  act  will  not 
be  accepted  by  the  world  as  sufficient  to  relieve  the  govern 
ment  of  Spain  from  participation  in  the  just  responsibility  for  the 
outrage.  There  must  be  a  signal  mark  of  displeasure  and  punish 
ment  to  which  the  civilized  world  can  point.  .  .  .  You  will  .  .  . 
represent  that  the  failure  of  some  speedy  and  signal  visitation  of 
punishment  on  those  engaged  in  this  dark  deed  cannot  fail  to  be 
regarded  as  approval  of  the  act.  .  .  .  The  omission  to  punish  the 
acts  of  the  4th  of  November  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  will  be  a  virtual 
abandonment  of  the  control  of  the  island,  and  cannot  be  regarded 
otherwise  than  a  recognition  that  some  power  more  potent  than 
that  of  Spain  exists  within  that  colony.  .  .  .  With  regard  to  the 
Virginius  we  are  still  without  information  as  to  the  particulars  of 
her  capture.  There  are  conflicting  representations  as  to  the  precise 
place  .  .  .  whether  within  British  waters  or  on  the  high  seas  .  .  . 
as  to  whether  she  was  first  sighted  within  Spanish  waters  and  the 
chase  commenced  there,  or  whether  it  was  altogether  in  neutral 
waters.  There  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  right  of  the  Virginius  to 
carry  the  American  flag,  or  of  her  right  to  the  papers  which  she 
unquestionably  carried.  This  is  being  investigated,  and,  of  course, 
no  admission  of  doubt  as  to  the  character  of  the  vessel  can  be  al 
lowed  until  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  government  cannot  sus 
tain  the  nationality  of  the  vessel.  .  .  .  While  writing  this,  a  tele 
gram  from  Mr.  Hall  mentions  .  .  .  that  the  captain  and  thirty-six 
of  the  crew  of  the  Virginius  and  sixteen  others  were  shot  on  the  7th 
and  8th  instants.  Such  wholesale  butchery  and  murder  are  almost 
incredible.  .  .  .  No  government  deserves  to  exist  which  can  tolerate 
such  crimes.  .  .  ."* 

Three  days  after  the  date  of  the  note  sent  to  him  by  Mr.  Fish, 
the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  presented  two  telegrams — 
1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  928. 


1873]  FEELING  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  325 

one  from  Cuba,  the  other  from  Madrid.  The  contents  of  the  for 
mer  read  as  follows:  "The  Virginius  had  no  crew's  roll,  and  was 
wanting  in  the  usual  papers  required  of  merchant  vessels.1  The  or 
ders  from  the  government  could  not  reach  Santiago  de  Cuba  in 
time,  owing  to  the  destruction  of  the  telegraph  wires  by  the  insur 
gents.  On  the  12th  the  captain-general  received  a  telegram  from 
Santiago  de  Cuba  dated  the  6th,  and  this  was  the  date  of  the  first  in 
structions  from  the  government.  On  the  14th  the  admiral  [at  Ha 
vana]  received  the  news  of  the  executions  of  the  9th  [8th],  Ordinary 
communications  have  been  quicker  than  those  sent  by  telegraph. 
The  case  of  the  Virginius  is  equal,  or  similar,  to  those  of  the  Guan- 
aham  and  Margaret  Jersey,  and  the  admiral  assures  that  in  the 
record  of  the  proceedings,  of  which  he  already  has  possession,  the 
act  of  piracy  is  fully  proved,  and  that  the  crew  made  no  secret  of 
the  truth  of  their  hostile  intent  and  purpose." 

The  telegram  from  Madrid  said:  "The  government  is  not  in 
receipt  of  sufficient  particulars  in  reference  to  the  case  of  the  Vir- 
ginius.  It  will  act  in  strict  conformity  with  international  law."  2 

Two  days  after  the  peremptory  instructions  to  General  Sickles, 
the  contents  of  which  were  unknown  to  the  country,  great  meetings 
were  held  in  New  York  and  elsewhere,  denouncing  the  seizure  of 
the  Virginius,  the  massacre  of  Americans,  and  demanding  violent 
action  against  Spain.  Mr.  Evarts,  who  was  later  to  succeed  Mr. 
Fish  as  secretary  of  state,  spoke  at  a  meeting  in  New  York,  and 
expressed  the  popular  indignation.  A  vast  assemblage  in  Tam 
many  Hall  greeted  with  hisses  the  mention  of  the  name  of  the 
secretary  of  state,  and  cried,  "Down  with  Fish."  Orders  were 
given  in  Washington  to  put  the  navy  on  a  war  footing.  War 
seemed  to  be  in  sight.  Mr.  Sumner  pleaded  against  it  because 
Spain  was  now  a  republic,  and  Castelar  its  virtual  ruler.3 

The  vague  and  inaccurate  information  regarding  the  deplorable 
events  in  Santiago,  shown  in  the  Spanish  minister's  two  telegrams, 
not  received  until  two  weeks  after  the  occurrence,  exhibits  the  un 
satisfactory  conditions  which  prevented  the  reception  by  the 
Washington  government  of  news  from  Cuba,  of  official  acts  on  the 

1  This  was  incorrect;  the  ship's  papers  were,  on  their  face,  entirely  regular. 
See  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1073.  » Ibid.,  978. 

3  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  VII,  31. 


326  THE   GOVERNOR-CAPTAIN-GENERAL  [1873 

island,  and  the  official  reasons  therefor.  There  is  also  needed,  in 
order  that  the  reader  may  perceive  the  significance  of  some  of  the 
sentences  of  the  note  sent,  November  12,  by  Mr.  Fish  to  General 
Sickles,  that  a  brief  exhibition  be  made  of  the  government  relations 
at  that  time  between  Cuba  and  Spain,  hereinbefore  only  touched 
upon,  and  which  affected  the  transaction  of  diplomatic  business 
between  Washington  and  Madrid,  growing  out  of  events  on  the 
island. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  power  which  Spain  conferred,  in 
international  affairs,  on  her  governor-captain-general,  in  Cuba, 
and  especially  over  American  citizens.  A  learned  opinion  by 
Attorney-General  Gushing,  given  to  Secretary  Marcy  in  1855,  in 
reply  to  his  inquiry  regarding  official  communications  between 
agents  of  the  United  States  and  the  governor-captain-general,  is 
very  instructive.  As  mentioned  earlier,1  difficulties  of  the  same 
character  existed  at  that  period  as  in  1873.  "At  the  present  time," 
says  Mr.  Gushing,  "  the  authority  of  the  governor-captain-general 
in  the  island  of  Cuba,  as  also  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  appears  to 
be  co-extensive  with  that  of  the  old  viceroys  and  presidents  by  the 
laws  of  the  Indies  (Zamora,  Legislation  Ultramarina,  s.  voc.  Cap. 
Gen.).  Nothing  can  be  more  comprehensive  than  the  language 
of  the  organic  law,  of  Philip  II,"  which  said,  "They  who  shall 
be  appointed  viceroys  of  Peru  and  New  Spain  ...  in  all  things, 
cases,  and  affairs  which  occur,  are  to  do  whatever  appears  to  them, 
and  they  see  to  be  fit,  and  shall  provide,  in  the  provinces  of  their 
charge,  all  which  we  might  do  and  provide,  of  whatever  quality 
and  condition  it  may  be,  were  they  governed  by  us  in  our  proper 
person,  save  such  things  as  may  be  specially  prohibited."  (Leyes 
de  las  Indias,  Lib.  Ill,  tit.  3,  ley  I.)2  The  decree  of  Fernando 
VII,  in  1825,  it  may  be  added,  was  equally  comprehensive.3  As 
the  captain-general  of  Cuba  and  that  of  Puerto  Rico  were,  in  1829, 
given  power  "  to  suspend,  in  their  discretion,  the  functions  of  all 
foreign  consuls,  and  even  to  compel  them  to  leave  the  islands," 
Mr.  Gushing  was  of  opinion  that  the  United  States  had  a  right 
to  expect  that  the  captain-general  should  have  a  corresponding 

1  Supra,  242,  253,  256,  269. 

3  Attorney-General  Caleb  Gushing,  Official  Opinions  of  Attorneys-General, 
VII,  559.  3  Supra,  224. 


1873]  SICKLES  AND  CARVAJAL  327 

beneficial  power,  in  the  same  relation,  to  quickly  respond  to  our 
just  requirements.1 

Mr.  Cushing's  expectations  were  not  realized  in  1855,  nor  were 
they  later.    For  one  short  interval  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash 
ington  was  authorized,  in  1869,  by  his  government  to  consider  and, 
if  possible,  satisfy  complaints  presented  to  him  by  the  American 
government  of  injuries  to  American  citizens  by  Spanish  officials 
in  Cuba,  but  the  authority  was  soon  withdrawn,2  and  affairs  neces 
sarily  reverted  to  the  ancient  system  of  demand  by  the  American 
minister  upon  the  government  at  Madrid,  the  usual  reply  of  which  . 
was  that  inquiry  would  be  made  of  the  captain-general  as  to  the  • 
facts.    It  was  the  vicious  circle  of  procrastination  so  dear  to  the  ' 
Oriental  mind,  and  one  in  which  Spain  was  as  adept  as  Turkey. 

On  the  same  day  (November  12)  that  Mr.  Fish  communicated 
with  Admiral  Polo  de  Bernabe*  in  Washington,  and  despatched  his 
telegram  to  General  Sickles  at  Madrid,  Senor  Carvajal,  the  Spanish 
minister  of  state,  accompanied  by  the  under  secretary  of  state, 
called  on  the  American  minister.  Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  the  12th 
had  not  yet  reached  the  latter.  Dates  are  important  here,  as 
throughout  the  narrative  in  this  chapter. 

On  November  13  General  Sickles  wrote  Mr.  Fish  that  the  minis 
ter  of  state  had  said  at  their  interview  that  a  partial  report  of  the  in 
cidents  attending  the  capture  of  the  Virginius  had  been  received, 
but  it  appeared  therefrom  "  that  the  vessel  was  seen  on  the  coast  of 
Cuba,  attempting  to  land  her  passengers  and  cargo; 3  that  the  pur 
suit  began  in  Spanish  waters,4  and,  somewhere  about  twenty-three 
miles  from  Jamaica,  she  was  overtaken  and  captured.  It  was  also 
alleged  that  the  Virginius  exhibited  no  papers;  but  this  was  sub 
sequently  qualified  by  the  statement  that  her  documents  were  not 
authenticated  by  the  visa,  or  certificate,  of  any  consul,  and  were, 
besides,  irregular  in  other  particulars;  and  although  the  report 
was  incomplete,  yet  enough  was  known  to  indicate  that  the  case 
would  be  less  difficult  of  adjustment  than  was  apprehended  at  the 

1  Official  Opinions  of  Attorneys-General,  VII,  561.  For  the  political  relations 
between  Spain  and  her  American  provinces,  see  the  arguments  in  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference  of  1898  regarding  the  Cuban  debt.  (Moore,  International 
Law  Digest,  I,  351-384.) 

3  Supra,  311.  3  This  was  an  error.  *  This  was  an  error. 


328  SICKLES  AND  CARVAJAL  [1873 

outset,  and  this  was  a  matter  for  sincere  congratulation."  Gen 
eral  Sickles  remarked  to  the  minister  of  state  that  he  had  received 
a  further  communication  from  Washington  containing  additional 
particulars  of  the  capture  and  its  consequences,  of  which  he  would 
speak  in  the  afternoon,  when  he  would  meet  Senor  Carvajal  at  the 
ministry.  "It  was,  however,"  he  said,  "quite  certain  that  no  de 
mand  would  be  made  by  the  President  until  trustworthy  informa 
tion  was  received  of  the  whole  case.  Meanwhile,  it  would  be  satis 
factory  to  know  that  this  government  had  spontaneously  taken 
such  action  in  the  matter  as  would  facilitate  a  prompt  solution 
of  any  question  that  might  arise."  1 

Meeting  at  the  ministry  in  the  afternoon,  as  arranged,  Senor 
Carvajal  announced,  "with  deep  regret,"  the  reception  of  the 
news  of  the  shooting  of  forty-nine  of  the  prisoners  on  the  7th  and 
8th.  He  said  that  he  had  asked  by  cable,  sent  at  2  A.  M.,  how  many 
were  American  citizens.  General  Sickles,  in  pursuance  of  instruc 
tions,  asked  "  whether  the  executive  authority  of  Spain  exercised 
any  jurisdiction  over  the  island,  and  if  so,  what  powers  belonged 
to  it."  He  was  answered  that  the  minister  had,  heretofore,  "  merely 
expressed  an  opinion  in  saying  the  ordinary  laws  were  inappli 
cable.  There  could  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  executive  juris 
diction  was  ample;  and  now  that  the  revocation  of  the  royal  order 
of  1825 2  had  deprived  the  captain-general  of  the  faculty  of  sus 
pending  the  dispositions  of  the  supreme  government,  there  was 
no  reason  to  apprehend  a  repetition  of  the  irregularities  that 
had  hitherto  occurred  in  the  administration  of  Cuban  affairs." 
General  Sickles  said  to  the  minister  of  state  "  that  in  June  last, 
I  had  invited  the  attention  of  Mr.  Castelar,  then  minister  of  state, 
to  the  ground  taken  by  the  authorities  in  Cuba,  in  asserting  that 
war  existed  in  the  island,  and  that  no  other  than  martial  law 
was  recognized.  His  excellency,  having  replied  that  this  govern 
ment  rejected  any  such  assertion,  authorizing  me  to  convey  to  you 
that  Spain  did  not  so  regard  the  conflict  in  Cuba,  I  begged  that 
instructions  be  sent  'to  the  captain-general  not  to  withhold  from 
any  citizen  of  the  United  States,  within  his  jurisdiction,  the  pro 
tection  and  securities  of  the  ordinary  tribunals  of  justice  in  due 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr,  Fish,  November  13,  1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1874, 
932.  3  Supra,  224. 


1873]  AMERICAN  ULTIMATUM  329 

course  of  law,  as  provided  by  the  seventh  article  of  the  treaty  of 
1795.  I  was  assured  that  such  orders  would  be  given."  General 
Sickles  also  reported  to  Mr.  Fish  that  he  "  referred  to  a  series  of 
instances  in  which  the  Cuban  authorities  had  exercised  powers  in 
derogation  of  the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  of  their  citizens/' 
and  restated  the  responsibility  which  rested  upon  the  executive 
government  of  Spain  in  the  present  case. 

Mr.  Carvajal,  in  closing  the  interview,  said  that  he  had  hoped 
to  have  then  settled  the  preliminaries  of  an  adjustment,  but  the 
intelligence  received  "had  so  modified  the  case,  as  it  had  been 
considered  in  the  council  of  ministers,  that  he  must  adjourn  our 
conference  until  another  day."  General  Sickles,  mentioning  the 
"profound  impression"  which  the  publication  of  the  events  of  the 
7th  and  8th  would  everywhere  produce,  said:  "The  President 
could  not  be  unmoved  by  incidents  of  such  gravity  occurring  on  our 
borders.  .  .  .  He  had  so  far  withheld  any  demand,  believing  and 
expecting  that  Spain  would  spontaneously  hasten  to  offer  com 
plete  reparation  for  what  had  occurred  respecting  the  Virginius 
and  her  passengers.  ...  I  trusted  not  a  moment  would  be  lost 
in  arriving  at  a  resolution  which  I  might  convey  to  you  [Mr.  Fish] 
with  satisfaction."  1 

On  the  same  day  (November  13)  General  Sickles  telegraphed 
to  Mr.  Fish  a  short  resume'  of  the  foregoing  conference  with  Sefior 
Carvajal  and  its  results.2  On  the  reception,  November  14,  of  this 
telegram,  Mr.  Fish  replied  to  General  Sickles:  "Unless  abundant 
reparation  shall  have  been  voluntarily  tendered,  you  will  demand 
the  restoration  of  the  Virginius,  the  release  and  delivery  to  the 
United  States  of  the  persons  captured  on  her  wrho  have  not  already 
been  massacred,  and  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  be  saluted 
in  the  port  of  Santiago,  and  the  signal  punishment  of  the  officials 
who  were  concerned  in  the  capture  of  the  vessel  and  the  execution 
of  the  passengers  and  crew.  In  case  of  refusal  of  satisfactory  repa 
ration  within  twelve  days  from  this  date,  you  will,  at  the  expira 
tion  of  that  time,  close  your  legation,  and  will,  together  with  your 
secretary,  leave  Madrid,  bringing  with  you  the  archives  of  the 
legation.  .  .  ." 3 

1  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  November  13,  1873  (the  second  despatch  of 
this  date),  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  933.  2  Ibid.,  935. 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  November  14,  1873,  Ibid.,  936. 


330         GENERAL  SICKLES  PRESENTS  DEMAND        [1873 

Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  November  12  l  did  not,  unhappily,  reach 
General  Sickles  until  November  14,  the  day  after  his  friendly 
interview  with  the  minister  of  state.  Obeying  its  instructions, 
General  Sickles  thus,  at  once,  passed  a  note  to  the  minister  of 
state  making  the  demand  directed.  He  said  among  other  things: 

"The  verbal  communication  made  to  the  undersigned  last 
evening  by  Mr.  Carvajal,  at  the  ministry  of  state,  coinciding 
in  substance  with  the  information  received  at  Washington,  must 
be  regarded  as  a  confirmation  of  the  report  published  in  Havana 
and  Madrid  on  the  day  before  yesterday.  The  undersigned  is, 
therefore,  directed  to  protest  against  the  said  act  of  the  authorities 
in  Cuba  as  barbarous  and  brutal,  and  an  outrage  upon  this  epoch 
of  civilization;  and  the  undersigned  is  likewise  ordered  to  declare 
to  his  excellency,  the  minister  of  state,  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  will  demand  the  most  ample  reparation  of  any  wrong 
which  may  have  been  thereby  committed  upon  any  of  its  citizens 
or  upon  its  flag."  2 

The  reception  of  this  note  changed  completely  the  attitude  of 
the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  who  regarded  its  phrases  as  insulting 
to  the  dignity  of  Spain,  and  in  whom  it  aroused  the  deepest  feeling. 
It  produced  an  unhappy  tension  which  heretofore  had  apparently 
been  absent.  An  intimation  of  the  increased  gravity  of  the 
situation  might  possibly  have  been  conveyed  verbally,  and  at  first 
confidentially,  though  it  is  doubtful  if  the  feeling  would  have  been 
different. 

Thus,  on  November  14,  the  minister  of  state  wrote  to  General 
Sickles:  "The  government  of  the  Spanish  republic  cannot  recog 
nize  your  competency  to  make  [the  protest],  even  as  Spain  would 
have  had  no  such  right  with  respect  to  the  sanguinary  acts  which 
have  happened  in  our  own  day,  as  well  in  the  United  States  as  in 
other  nations  of  the  old  and  new  continents.  The  protest  being  thus 
rejected  with  serene  energy,  I  have  to  fix  my  attention  upon  the 
harshness  of  style,  and  upon  the  heated  and  improper  words  you 
used  to  qualify  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  authorities.  ...  I 
would  touch  lightly  upon  this  matter  if  I  had  only  to  occupy  my 
self  with  the  sting  of  the  insult  (ofensa),  but,  comprehending  its 
intent,  the  government  cannot  consent  that  in  anticipation  of  its 

1  Supra,  323.  2  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  937. 


1873]  THE  SPANISH  REPLY  331 

own  judgment  the  representative  of  a  foreign  nation,  even  though 
friendly,  should  characterize  the  Spanish  authorities  in  other  terms 
than  those  which  the  government  itself  deems  just,  an  interfer 
ence  always  inadmissible,  but  still  more  strange  when  neither  the 
cabinet  at  Washington,  nor  this  of  Madrid,  nor  yourself  have  at 
the  present  hour  sufficient  data  upon  which  to  ground  a  complaint, 
whether  concerning  the  seizure  of  the  Virginius  or  in  relation  to 
the  subsequent  occurrences.  .  .  .  You  will  note  that,  without  a 
knowledge  of  the  facts,  it  would  have  been  at  all  times  an  act  of 
temerity  to  pass  judgment  upon  the  authorities,  and  that  until 
such  knowledge  is  acquired  it  befits  the  elevation  of  character  you 
have  attained  to  consider  those  as  guardians  and  representatives 
of  the  law,  while  the  persons  shot  were  rebels  seeking  to  trample 
the  law  under  foot,  enemies  of  the  country,  and  disturbers  of  the 
peace  and  of  the  rule  of  a  sister  republic.  .  .  .  You  conclude  by 
declaring,  also  by  order  of  your  government,  that  it  will  demand 
ample  reparation  for  any  offence  committed  upon  American 
citizens  or  upon  its  flag.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  you  have  not 
maintained  under  this  point  of  view  of  problematical  reality  the 
attitude  adopted  in  the  verbal  conferences  to  which  you  make 
direct  reference.  In  them  you  confided  to  the  spontaneity  and 
the  cordial  sentiments  of  the  Spanish  government  the  solution  to 
be  given  to  this  incident,  which  you  now,  and  with  querulous  an 
ticipation,  bring  to  the  official  arena,  wherein  I  shall  not  fail  to 
maintain  steadfastly  that  the  government  of  the  republic  is  resolved 
that  the  law  shall  be  complied  with,  as  well  in  Spanish  territory  as 
in  our  international  relations,  and  that  no  disparagement  of  any 
right  will  be  tolerated."  l 

Senor  Carvajal's  violence  seems  to  have  been  based  upon  the 
view  that  the  American  minister  had,  in  the  supposed  haste  which 
he  had  shown  and  in  the  terms  he  had  used,  gone  beyond  his  in 
structions.  In  this,  as  already  shown  by  Mr.  Fish's  communica 
tion  preceding  the  date  of  General  Sickles's  note,  he  was  mistaken, 
and  the  latter,  in  a  reply  the  next  day,  "hastens  to  remove  a  mis 
apprehension  which  seems  to  have  led  his  excellency  to  suppose 
that  the  language  of  the  protest,  and  especially  the  words  used  to 

1  Senor  Carvajai  to  General  Sickles,  November  14,  1873,  Foreign  Relations, 
1874,  940. 


332  THE  SPANISH  REPLY  [1873 

characterize  the  conduct  of  the  authorities  at  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
were  chosen  by  the  undersigned  in  the  expression  of  his  own  appre 
ciation  of  the  acts  in  question.  ...  It  may  ...  be  interesting  to 
his  excellency,  Mr.  Carvajal,  to  know  that  the  language  of  the  pro 
test  to  which  he  takes  exception  is  a  precise  transcript  from  the 
instructions  received  by  the  undersigned  from  his  government." 
General  Sickles's  note  criticised  sharply  the  Spanish  minister's  re 
marks  as  to  want  of  data.    It  said:    "When  Mr.  Carvajal  asserts 
that  this  government  is  not  in  possession  of  sufficient  information 
respecting  the  capture  of  the  Virginius  by  a  Spanish  cruiser,  and 
the  execution  of  more  than  fifty  of  the  persons  comprising  the  crew 
and  passengers  on  board  the  vessel,  it  must  be  admitted  that  his 
authority  for  the  statement  is  indisputable.  .  .  .  But  when  his 
excellency  proceeds  to  affirm  that  neither  the  government  of  the 
United  States  nor  the  undersigned  are  sufficiently  informed  of  the 
nationality  of  the  Virginius,  or  of  the  circumstances  attending  her 
capture  and  the  punishment  inflicted  on  her  officers,  crew,  and 
passengers  by  the  authorities  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  to  warrant  a 
reclamation  or  protest  against  those  acts,  the  undersigned  can  do 
no  less  than  point  out  to  the  minister  of  state  that  he  thus  assumes 
to  speak  of  matters  not  within  his  cognizance  and  beyond  his 
means  of  knowledge.     It  is  not,  therefore,  surprising  that  his  excel 
lency,  while  declaring  that  this  government  is  without  the  necessary 
data  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  Spanish  naval  and  military 
authorities  have  acted  within  the  line  of  their  duty  and  of  public 
and  municipal  law,  at  the  same  moment  denounces  the  unfortunate 
victims  of  a  cruel  and  sanguinary  administration  as  criminals, 
deserving  instant  death,  and  applauds  the  chief  actors  in  the 
bloody  tragedy.     In  conclusion,   the  undersigned  must  observe 
that  his  excellency  is  also  singularly  unfortunate  in  misapprehend 
ing  the  forbearance  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  in  for 
bearing  the  presentation  of  a  formal  demand  for  reparation  in  this 
transaction.     It  was  not,  as  Mr.  Carvajal  seems  to  suppose,  be 
cause  the  government  of  the  undersigned  was  unable  to  measure 
the  atonement  due  to  it,  but  rather  for  the  reason  twice  stated  to 
his  excellency,  that  the  President  wished  to  afford  an  opportunity 
to  the  government  of  the  republic,  unembarrassed  by  any  exigency 
save  its  own  sense  of  duty,  and  moved  only  by  a  noble  sentiment  of 


1873]  BUT  ONE  ALTERNATIVE  333 

justice,  to  make  ample  reparation  to  a  friendly  power,  as  the  laws 
and  usages  of  nations  required."  * 

Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  the  14th  had  now  arrived,  and  on  the 
same  day  with  the  reply  just  quoted  the  demand  which  it  called 
for  was  made  in  firm  and  unambiguous  terms.2  Following  this, 
the  same  day,  the  American  minister  addressed  a  note  to  the  min 
ister  of  state,  calling  attention  to  the  refusal  of  General  Burriel  to 
allow  the  American  consul  at  Santiago  to  use  the  telegraph  to 
communicate  with  his  colleague  at  Kingston,  Jamaica,  to  obtain 
information  "material  and  pertinent  to  the  defence  of  the  persons 
captured,"  and  also  to  the  fact  that  when  the  consul-general  of  the 
United  States,  directed  by  the  secretary  of  state  to  use  his  good 
offices  in  obtaining  for  American  citizens  aboard  the  Virginius 
the  privileges  and  protection  guaranteed  by  the  treaty  of  1~95,  had 
communicated  his  instructions  to  the  captain-general,  requesting 
his  sanction  and  aid,  he  had  received  "a  curt  refusal." 

General  Sickles,  on  November  15,  telegraphed  Mr.  Fish  that 
he  had  received  an  "  ill-tempered  note  to-day  from  [the]  minister  of 
state,  rejecting  [the]  protest,  and  saying  Spain  would,  nevertheless, 
consider  and  decide  [the]  question  according  to  law  and  her  dig 
nity."  4  It  brought  from  Mr.  Fish  a  reply  which,  after  giving  the 
unconfirmed  report  that  fifty-seven  others  had  been  executed,  and 
that  but  eighteen  of  the  people  of  the  Virginius  would  escape  death, 
said :  "  These  repeated  violations  of  assurances  of  good-will,  and  of 
the  prohibition  of  murder  by  the  authorities  in  Santiago,  increase 
the  necessity  of  full  and  speedy  reparation.  There  is  but  one  alter 
native  if  denied  or  long  deferred.  If  Spain  cannot  redress  the  out 
rages  perpetrated  in  her  name  in  Cuba,  the  United  States  will.  If 
Spain  should  regard  this  act  of  self-defence  and  justification  and  of 
the  vindication  of  long-continued  wrongs  as  necessitating  her  in 
terference,  the  United  States,  while  regretting  it,  cannot  avoid  the 
result.  You  will  use  this  instruction  cautiously  and  discreetly, 
avoiding  unnecessarily  exciting  any  proper  sensibilities,  and  avoid 
ing  all  appearance  of  menace;  but  the  gravity  of  the  case  admits 
no  doubt,  and  must  be  fairly  and  frankly  met." 

1  General  Sickles  to  Sefior  Carvajal,  November  15,  1873,  Foreign  Relations, 
1874,  941. 

8  Ibid.,  939.     Telegram,  supra,  329.  3  Ibid.,  944.  *  Ibid.,  938. 

5  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  November  15,  1873,  Ibid.,  938. 


334  CARVAJAL'S  REPLY  [1873 

On  November  16  General  Sickles  informed  the  minister  of  state 
of  the  reception  of  the  news  (happily  false)  of  the  execution  of  fifty- 
seven  others  belonging  to  the  Virginius,  leaving  but  eighteen  of 
the  whole  number  alive.  The  note  ended  with  this  admonition: 
"The  undersigned  would  fail  to  discharge  an  impressive  and 
solemn  duty  ...  if  he  concealed  the  grave  peril  to  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  President,  the  friendly  relations  of  the  two  countries 
may  be  exposed  unless  the  undersigned  is  enabled  without  delay 
to  convey  to  his  government  a  satisfactory  reply  to  the  reclama 
tions  he  has  addressed  to  his  excellency  the  minister  of  state."  1 

On  November  17  Seiior  Carvajal  replied:  "Your  communica 
tion,  dated  yesterday,2  .  .  .  contains  certain  deficient  or  erroneous 
preliminaries  which  it  is  proper  to  set  right  in  all  their  integrity, 
so  that  due  appreciation  may  be  had  of  the  attitude  of  the  Spanish 
government  from  the  time  those  occurrences  came  to  its  notice. 
On  the  6th  instant  the  capture  of  the  vessel  was  known  in  Madrid; 
and  at  once  (en  el  acto)  the  government  sent  a  telegram  .  .  .  en 
joining  that  no  sentence  of  death  should  be  carried  into  execution 
without  the  approval  of  said  government.  This  order  implied  no 
doubt  concerning  the  justice  of  the  proceeding  and  the  punish 
ment;  3  it  was  the  expression  of  the  desire  which  animated  the 
executive  power  to  examine  whether  in  any  of  these  extreme  cases 
it  was  possible  to  harmonize  with  the  action  of  the  law  and  with 
public  safety  the  exercise  of  clemency,  which  prerogative  is  usually 
delegated  by  our  colonial  legislation  to  the  captain-general.  The 
spontaneousness  of  this  step,  anterior  to  any  action  and  even  to 
any  knowledge  of  the  matter  so  far  as  you  were  concerned,  was 
recognized  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  and  by  your 
self,  as  I  had  the  honor  to  hear  from  your  own  lips  on  the  8th 
instant,  in  the  conference  which  you  call  official,  and  which  was 
held  after  you  and  this  government  had  received  information  of 
the  shootings  of  the  4th,  which  unfortunately  took  place  two  days 
before  the  said  telegram,  and  of  which  the  news  did  not  reach  Ma 
drid  until  the  day  succeeding  the  despatch  of  the  same. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  945. 

*  This  is  an  error.  General  Sickles's  note  dealt  with  here  by  Senor  Carvajal 
was  dated  the  15th.  Senor  Carvajal's  note  did  not  take  cognizance  of  that 
given  immediately  above. 

3  There  had  been  on  the  6th  no  information  at  Madrid  of  punishment. 


1873]  CARVAJAL'S  REPLY  335 

"You  certainly  declared  in  that  conference  that  your  govern 
ment  did  not  take  the  initiative  in  any  reclamation,  and  awaited 
until  that  of  the  Spanish  republic,  animated  by  the  cordiality 
of  the  relations  which  exist  between  the  two  nations,  and  by 
elevated  sentiments  of  justice,  should  come  to  a  decision  respect 
ing  any  wrong  which  may  have  been  committed  against  the 
citizens  or  the  flag  of  the  United  States;  and  certainly  I  stated 
unreservedly,  but  without  prejudice  to  any  point  of  fact  or  of 
right,  that  the  Spanish  government,  by  its  own  dignity,  by  the 
estimation  in  which  it  holds  the  friendship  of  the  American  people, 
and  by  the  respect  it  owes  to  special  treaties  and  the  rules  univer 
sally  admitted  among  cultured  nations,  would  not  await  the  presen 
tation  of  any  justified  complaint,  but  rather,  had  those  compacts 
or  international  laws  been  violated,  it  would  declare  the  fact, 
loyally  and  frankly,  for  right  and  honor  are  never  to  be  crushed 
down,  nor  is  reason  to  be  subordinated  to  dignity;  but  it  is  like 
wise  certain  that  you  agreed  with  me  that  the  Spanish  government, 
which  only  knew  the  facts  generally,  in  order  to  appreciate  the  in 
ternational  question,  the  only  one  which  might  have  authorized 
your  intervention,  needed  to  acquire  a  certitude  as  to  the  events 
and  details  both  of  the  seizure  and  the  subsequent  acts;  an 
agreement  which  meant  neither  more  nor  less  than  that  the  Vir- 
ginius  might  be  seized,  and  her  crew  and  passengers  condemned 
by  Spanish  tribunals  (those  being  the  facts  then  known),  without 
any  violation  of  international  law  or  treaties;  and  that,  on  the  part 
of  the  American  government  and  on  your  own,  there  only  existed 
a  presumption  that  those  occurrences  were  surrounded  by  circum 
stances  capable  of  inflicting  injury  on  the  persons  or  on  the  dignity 
of  your  flag,  by  reason  of  not  being  in  conformity  with  the  pro 
ceedings  of  said  laws  and  treaties;  an  evident  sign  that  you  ought 
not  to  have  cherished  the  confidence,  to  which  you  refer  in  the  first 
paragraph  of  your  note,  that  forthwith  there  would  be  given  to  the 
government  you  represent  complete  reparation  for  the  offence  com 
mitted  against  its  dignity  and  the  inviolability  of  its  flag. 

"You  may  have  nursed  this  mental  confidence,  which  was  never 
expressed,  because  you  had  a  conviction  that  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  did  not,  and  does  not  yet,  share  therein;  but  I  appeal  to  your 
loyalty  to  establish,  as  the  bases  of  these  negotiations,  that,  in  the 


336  CARVAJAL'S  REPLY  [1873 

name  of  the  executive  power  on  my  part,  and  in  that  of  your  govern 
ment  on  yours,  we  agree  to  postpone  all  discussion  until  we  had 
a  knowledge  of  the  facts  which  might  give  rise  to  a  debate,  and 
until  you  were  informed  of  the  solution  which  would  be  sponta 
neously  offered  by  the  government  of  the  Spanish  republic. 

"You  omit  to  mention  the  second  conversation  we  had  on  the 
13th.  .  .  .  In  this  fresh  conference  you  know  what  public  opinion 
had  already  proclaimed — the  act  of  justice  performed  on  other 
prisoners  of  the  steamer  Virginius  on  the  7th  and  8th,  and  the 
assurance  possessed  by  the  executive  power,  in  the  midst  of  the 
regret  which  is  ever  occasioned  by  the  action  of  the  law  in  this  de 
gree,  even  though  justified  by  melancholy  social  exigencies,  that  its 
telegram  of  the  6th  had  not  arrived  in  time  to  prevent  the  fulfilment 
of  the  sentences,  and  that  it  would  suspend  the  execution  of  any 
other  that  might  be  pronounced.  You  neither  added  to  nor  took 
away  from  your  declaration  of  the  8th,  and  I  reiterated  mine,  and 
we  parted  in  the  same  assurances,  continuing  the  question  on  the 
same  bases  established  in  the  preceding  conference.  In  this  situa 
tion,  twenty-four  hours  afterward,  I  received  from  you  the  com 
munication  to  which  I  now  reply.  ...  As  the  mere  seizure  of  the 
Virginius,  and  the  subjection  of  her  crew  and  passengers  to  the 
Spanish  tribunals,  did  not  constitute  an  offence  against  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  this  offence  must  be  sought  in  the  pro 
cedure  and  accessory  circumstances,  of  which  the  executive  powei 
is  yet  ignorant. 

"This  change  of  conduct  and  the  demand  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  cannot  be  interpreted  in  any  other  sense  than 
that,  for  its  part,  it  has  acquired  this  knowledge,  and  considers 
that  the  capture  and  subsequent  occurrences  are  vitiated  by  reason 
of  having  failed  to  conform  to  the  stipulations  (of  the  treaty),  or  to 
international  law.  The  government  of  the  United  States  knew  the 
disposition  of  the  Spanish  government  at  that  time  and  the  senti 
ments  by  which  it  was  animated.  It  appeared  natural  that  on  the 
first  of  these  governments  deciding  to  hasten  the  solution  and  to 
terminate  the  period  of  delay  agreed  upon,  it  should  have  pointed 
out  to  the  second  these  vitiations  and  informalities  under  the  faith 
of  which  the  violation,  being  proven,  would  have  been  condemned; 
and  this  procedure  seemed  more  proper  in  view  of  the  bonds  which 


1873]  CARVAJAL'S  REPLY  337 

unite  the  two  republics,  than  to  demand,  without  ground  of  right, 
and  in  an  imperious  manner,  a  reparation  whose  harsh  and  even 
humiliating  terms  could  only  have  been  justified  by  great  wrongs 
and  a  continued  repugnance  to  satisfy  them.  .  .  . 

"Prudence  counsels  both  nations  to  suspend  judgment.  That 
the  United  States  do  not  possess  at  the  present  time  a  legal  compe 
tency  to  peremptorily  demand  a  reparation  is  evident  in  many 
ways;  but  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  another  power  [England]  has 
presented,  in  a  suitable  manner,  analogous  reclamations,  arising 
from  the  same  affair,  the  grounds  of  which  remain  to  be  investigated; 
and  if  it  were  necessary  to  show  the  confusion  which  still  reigns 
upon  the  essential  facts  of  the  seizure,  we  could  take  as  an  example 
that  while  you  take  it  for  granted  (patent)  that  the  Virginius  was 
a  regularly  documented  American  ship,  his  excellency,  the  captain- 
general  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  asserts  the  contrary. 

"You  will  observe,  moreover,  that  only  ten  days  have  elapsed 
since  we  knew  of  the  capture  of  the  Virginius,  and  three  since  the 
executions  of  the  7th  and  8th  came  to  our  knowledge  and  we  held 
our  last  interview.  The  great  distance,  the  scanty  (or  difficult) 
telegraphic  communication,  and  the  necessity  of  obtaining  clear 
and  precise  data  upon  an  affair  complex  and  minute  in  itself  com 
bine  to  prevent  the  government  of  Spain  from  being  to-day  in 
condition  to  say  a  word  on  the  merits  of  this  question,  it  being  re 
markable  that  the  United  States  should  so  suddenly  overstep  the 
bounds  marked  out,  and  in  spite  of  its  previous  assent,  now  de 
mand  an  arbitrary  reparation,  arbitrary,  at  least,  at  the  present 
moment. 

"  Spain,  in  reply,  limits  herself  to  repeating  her  former  declara 
tions  : 

"1st.  She  will  decide  upon  nothing  to  relieve  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  from  an  offence  till  she  is  certain  the  offence  exists. 

"2d.  As  the  offence  cannot  exist  except  in  the  violation  of  the 
treaties  and  of  international  law,  she  again  declares,  as  much  for 
the  sake  of  quieting  foreign  dignity  as  for  the  relief  of  her  own  con 
science,  that  if  such  a  violation  exists  by  reason  of  the  seizure  of  the 
Virginius,  or  by  reason  of  the  subsequent  acts,  whether  her  con 
viction  of  such  violation  be  acquired  by  her  own  initiative  or  by  a 
specific  statement  made  by  the  government  of  the  United  States, 


338  THE  MISTAKE  OF  SPAIN  [1873 

she  will  be  glad  to  repair  the  wrong  according  to  its  just  impor 
tance,  thus  proving  that  the  reign  of  law,  be  its  judgments  favor 
able  or  adverse,  is  the  first  essential  to  national  honor,  and  that  the 
observance  of  the  law,  and  not  the  obstinacy  born  of  a  false  idea 
of  pride,  gives  the  right  to  assume  a  place  in  the  senate  of  cultured 
nations."  1 

This  note,  written  while  the  Spanish  government  was  republican 
in  form  under  Castelar,  and  given  here  in  almost  its  entirety,  is 
peculiarly  typical  of  Spanish  official  methods  and  of  Spanish  tem 
perament.  It  marks  the  indirectness  of  the  Oriental  mind  and  its 
tendency  to  delay  the  completion  of  any  subject  in  dispute.  The 
seizure  of  the  Virginius  on  the  high  seas  with  American  papers,' 
and  the  shooting  of  some  fifty  of  those  who  had  been  aboard,  of 
whom  a  considerable  number  were  American  citizens  and  British 
subjects,  were  unquestioned.  No  details  could  alter  these  truths. 
To  expect  that  the  American  government,  which  was  moved  by 
the  same  feeling  which  stirred  their  countrymen  to  deep  indigna 
tion,  could  await  details  of  the  courts-martial  and  of  the  executions 
at  Santiago,  in  the  face  of  these  patent  facts,  was  to  expect  the  im 
possible. 

"Nothing,"  says  the  Spanish  publicist  Olivart,  in  a  later  case  of 
firing  by  a  Spanish  man-of-war  upon  an  American  steamer  in  an 
attempt  to  stop  and  search  her,  "is  more  dangerous  to  the  funda 
mental  rights  of  sovereignty  and  of  the  independence  of  states 
than  a  false  and  exaggerated  conception  of  these  rights."  2 

The  Spanish  government  at  this  moment  was  governed  by  such 
total  misconception.  It  denied  a  state  of  war,  but  assumed  the 
rights  of  such  a  condition,  and  placed  above  the  law  of  nations  the 
edicts  of  its  governors-general  in  Cuba,  which  were  of  a  harshness 
unknown  outside  of  Asia  or  Africa.  Senor  Carvajal  not  only 
plainly  intimated  that  the  seizure  was  just,  which  it  is  possible  to 
admit,  but  he  went  far  beyond :  he  stated  that  the  action  of  Gen 
eral  Burriel  in  the  slaughter  of  his  prisoners  was  "justified  by 
melancholy  social  exigencies";  "the  persons  shot,"  he  said,  "were 
rebels  seeking  to  trample  the  law  under  foot,  enemies  of  the  coun- 

1  Senor  Carvajal  to  General  Sickles,  November  17,  1873,  Foreign  Relations, 
1874,  947-949. 

*  Revue  General  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  VII,  1900,  546. 


1873]  THE  MISTAKE  OF  SPAIN  339 

try,  and  disturbers  of  the  peace  and  of  the  rule  of  a  sister  republic." 
Too  many  of  the  Spanish  rulers,  and  almost  all  of  the  Spanish  press, 
were  dominated  by  that  Eastern  cast  of  mind  which  sees  but  one 
really  sufficient  way  of  dealing  with  an  enemy,  and  regards  the 
punishment  by  death  as  natural  and  proper  in  such  circumstances. 
It  was  the  habit  of  ages  which  had  to  be  counted  with.  In  Spain 
itself,  at  that  moment,  executions  were  in  progress,  on  the  part  of 
the  Carlists  at  least,  even  more  atrocious  in  character,  and  with 
even  less  excuse  than  those  at  Santiago.1 

For  nearly  seventy  years,  with  rare  intervals,  Spain  had  been  the 
victim  of  desolating  wars  of  invasion  or  of  civil  strife.  The  govern 
ment  was  at  this  moment  blockading  its  own  coast  and  besieging 
one  of  its  principal  cities,  Cartagena,  by  sea  and  land.  Such  long 
and  bloody  experiences,  covering  two  generations,  following  cen 
turies  of  burnings  by  the  Inquisition;  and  the  temperament  of  a 
race  so  strongly  akin  to  the  Moor  and  Berber,  had  naturally  in  a 
great  degree  prevented  national  drift  toward  the  humaner  senti 
ment  of  the  age.  The  shooting  of  a  few  score  of  men  assisting  in 
carrying  arms  to  the  enemies  of  Spain  seemed  a  small  matter  to 
most  Spaniards.  Thus  in  Spain  the  question  of  the  legality  of  the 
seizure  of  the  Virginius,  and  not  the  killing,  took  precedence  both 
in  the  minds  of  the  government  and  of  the  public.  In  the  United 
States  it  was  the  question  of  the  executions.  This  fact  could 
not  be  seen  by  the  Spanish  minister  of  state.  He  could  not  under 
stand  the  peremptory  attitude  of  the  American  government  on 
what  was  to  him  the  main  question — the  seizure  of  a  ship  whose 
papers  were  possibly  illegally  obtained. 

His  complaint  of  the  want  of  diplomatic  form  in  the  action 
of  the  American  minister  was  perhaps  justified.  He  had  some 
reason  to  expect  from  the  minister  greater  warning  of  such  action 
than  in  the  statements  of  the  previous  conferences,  and  the  apparent 
want  of  such  a  courtesy,  felt  the  more  deeply  by  one  of  a  race  in 
which  ceremony  is  a  religion,  roused  every  sentiment  of  opposition 
which  had  theretofore  been  repressed,  and  forced  the  situation  into 
one  of  much  greater  difficulty  than  might  have  been  had  the  in 
structions  from  Washington  enabled  race  susceptibility  to  have 
been  more  carefully  considered. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  899. 


340  SPAIN  TAKES  LOWER  TONE  [1873 

On  the  reception  of  Sefior  Carvajal's  note  of  November  17  the 
American  minister  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Fish:  "Regarding  this  as  a 
refusal  within  the  sense  of  your  instruction,  I  propose,  unless  other 
wise  ordered,  to  close  this  legation  forthwith  and  leave  Madrid, 
embarking  at  Valencia  for  France,  taking  the  secretary  and  ar 
chives  with  me."  l  Next  day  he  telegraphed :  "  Popular  feeling  runs 
high  here  against  the  United  States  and  this  legation.  Press  violent 
and  abusive,  advising  government  to  order  me  out  of  Spain.  Last 
night  a  mob  was  collected  to  attack  and  sack  the  legation.  The 
authorities  interfered  and  preserved  the  peace."  2  On  the  same 
day  he  also  telegraphed:  "Spain  asked  the  good  offices  of  Eng 
land.  Lord  Granville  declined  unless  on  the  basis  of  ample 
reparation  to  the  United  States."  3  The  sympathies  of  the  British 
government,  nineteen  of  whose  subjects  had  suffered  death,  were 
necessarily,  in  such  case,  with  the  United  States,  and  Mr.  Layard, 
the  British  ambassador,  had  already  been  instructed  to  take  steps 
toward  reparation.4 

Notwithstanding  .the  defiance  in  Sefior  Carvajal's  communica 
tions  to  the  American  minister  in  Madrid,  the  Spanish  government, 
now  convinced  that  the  United  States,  should  not  the  latter's  de 
mands  be  promptly  met,  contemplated  war,  caused  the  transfer 
of  further  negotiations  to  Washington  by  a  telegram  to  Admiral 
Polo  de  Bernabe*,  its  minister  at  Washington,  stating  its  resolution 
"to  abide  by  the  principles  of  justice,  to  observe  international  law, 
to  punish  all  those  who  shall  have  made  themselves  liable  to  pun 
ishment,  regardless  of  their  station;  to  ask  reparation  for  offences 
that  may  have  been  done  against  us,  and  in  our  turn  to  make  due 
reparation,  if  right  and  our  own  conviction  should  so  advise  us. 
But  a  knowledge  of  the  facts  is  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  tact 
and  judgment  required  by  the  gravity  of  the  case,  and  the  news 
which  reaches  the  United  States  must  be  [as]  confused  as  that  we 
receive  here.  .  .  .  The  reparations  we  may  have  to  make,  or  those 
we  may  ask  for,  require  time  and  the  knowledge  of  facts.  Assure, 
therefore,  the  government  of  the  United  States  in  the  most  positive 
manner  that,  resolved  upon  the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  our 
territory  and  the  dignity  of  our  nation,  we  are  also  determined 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  951.  2  Ibid.,  954. 

8  Ibid.,  954.  4  Ibid.,  946. 


1873]   SPAIN'S   OFFER  OF  ARBITRATION  REFUSED     341 

strictly  to  comply  with  the  principles  of  international  law,  the 
letter  of  treaties  with  all  nations,  and  consequently  with  the 
American  republic."  l 

This  telegram  was  regarded  as  a  reconsideration  of  the  refusal 
to  receive  the  protest  of  the  United  States.  The  demand  for  a 
proper  length  of  time  to  learn  the  exact  state  of  the  facts  was 
deemed  reasonable  by  Mr.  Fish.  The  American  minister  was 
then  directed  to  defer  his  immediate  departure  from  Madrid  and 
await  further  instructions.2  The  Spanish  minister  at  Washington 
was  informed  by  Mr.  Fish  that  a  satisfactory  settlement  would  be 
expected  by  November  26.3 

The  personal  attitude  of  the  American  minister  at  Madrid, 
stirred  as  he  had  naturally  been  by  the  later  notes  of  the  Spanish 
secretary  of  state,  and  by  the  attitude  of  the  government  and  the 
press,  was  now  bellicose.  Neither  of  the  three  written  communica 
tions  which  he  had  received  from  the  Spanish  minister  of  state 
contained  any  expression  of  regret  or  disapproval  of  the  capture  of 
the  ship  or  the  slaughter  at  Santiago.  "The  press,"  said  General 
Sickles,  "approves  the  whole  business,  and  denies  that  any  censure 
or  regret  has  been  expressed  by  this  government.  The  ministerial 
journals  acquiesce."  General  Sickles,  moved  by  this  attitude, 
requested  Count  Maffei,  the  Italian  charge*  d'affaires,  to  take 
charge  of  American  interests  and  of  the  property  of  the  legation, 
if  events  should  demand  such  action,  to  which  the  Italian  govern^ 
ment  consented,  should  application  from  Washington  be  made.5 

On  NovemMfc23  the  Spanish  government,  by  a  telegram  through 
its  minister  ^^p"ashington,  proposed  arbitration,  which  was  de 
clined  by  Mir  Fish  on  the  ground  that  the  subject  was  one  of 
national  honor,  "of  which  the  nation  must  be  judge  and  custo 
dian."  Another  telegram  was  received  by  the  minister  of  Spain 
at  Washington  the  next  day,  November  24,  saying:  "First.  Our 
dispositions  being  known,  would  the  United  States  agree  to  wait 
for  our  solution,  which  would  be  immediate  on  receipt  of  the  facts 
in  the  case?  Second.  Would  the  President,  notwithstanding  the 

1  Secretary  of  state,  Madrid,  to  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  Novem 
ber  18,  1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  979. 

2  Mr.  Fish  to  General  Sickles,  November  19,  1873,  Ibid.,  955. 

3  Ibid.,  955.  4  Telegram,  November  20,  1873,  Ibid.,  956. 
5  Ibid.,  956.     It  was  made  by  Mr.  Fish,  November  23,  1873.        6  Ibid.,  958. 


342  SPAIN'S  FALSE  VIEW  OF  QUESTION  [1873 

foregoing,  still  insist  on  submitting  the  question  to  Congress? 
Third.  Could  Mr.  Fish  at  once  designate  the  points  of  offence  in 
view  of  treaty  stipulations  and  international  law?"  l 

Mr.  Fish  answered:  "Past  experience  in  cases  of  reclamation 
for  offences  in  Cuba  will  not  warrant  us  in  entering  into  an  agree 
ment  which  practically  amounts  to  an  indefinite  postponement.  It 
will  be  impossible  for  the  President  to  refrain  from  communicating 
the  facts  to  Congress.  It  is  his  constitutional  duty  to  do  so  .  .  ." 
Mr.  Fish  named  as  the  points  of  offence  the  capture  on  the  high 
seas  in  time  of  peace  of  a  regularly  documented  United  States 
vessel,  under  the  United  States  flag,  and  the  conveyance  of  the 
vessel  with  those  aboard  to  a  port  within  Spanish  jurisdiction,  the 
execution  of  a  large  number  of  the  passengers,  officers,  and  crew, 
and  the  detention  of  the  remainder  and  of  the  vessel.  "  These  acts," 
he  said,  "  are  regarded  as  violations  of  international  law  and  treaty 
stipulations."  2  This,  telegraphed  to  Madrid,  was  replied  to  the 
same  day  in  a  telegram  to  the  minister  at  Washington;  the  gov 
ernment,  unable  to  understand  the  secondary  importance  of  the 
capture,  answering:  "We  cannot  understand  the  precipitancy  of 
the  United  States  in  this  matter.  The  news  is  really  contradictory : 
while  Mr.  Fish  maintains  that  the  vessel  was  an  American,  our 
minister  of  the  colonies  informs  us  that  she  carried  false  papers, 
that  the  captain  declared  that  she  had  been  fitted  out  and  manned 
for  the  exclusive  purpose  of  aiding  the  insurrection  in  the  island  of 
Cuba.  If  this  were  true,  we  would  have  a  right  to  present  reclama 
tions  and  complaints,  and  we  could  affirm  that  tjfcjnited  States 
do  not  observe  toward  the  Spanish  republic  the  rl^Rrocal  friend 
ship  to  which  it  is  entitled.  But  in  the  same  way  thm  we  suspend 
reclamations  on  this  point,  we  would  wish  that  the  United  States 
would  suspend  them  also,  on  what  they  consider  their  complaints 
and  injuries;  and  we  think  that  they  might  consider,  as  an  anticipa 
tion  of  the  redress  that  may  be  due  to  their  flag,  our  fixed  and  firm 
resolve  to  make  reparation  by  salute  and  restitution  of  the  vessel 
and  the  survivors  of  the  crew  for  any  offence  that  may  be  proved 
against  the  flag  by  the  act  of  capture  from  the  proceedings  estab 
lished  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  vessel  had  the  right  or  not 
to  carry  the  American  flag,  independently  of  the  other  questions 
1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  983.  *  Ibid.,  984. 


1873]  MR.  FISH'S  STAND  343 

which,  in  reference  to  these  facts,  the  government  of  the  two  re 
publics  reserve  the  treatment  of  by  diplomatic  negotiations.  You 
are  authorized  to  make  this  declaration,  but  you  will  understand, 
and  endeavor  to  make  Mr.  Fish  understand,  that  no  satisfaction 
would  be  possible  if  we  are  not  first  made  sensible  of  the  right  with 
which  it  is  demanded  on  account  of  the  Virginius"  l 

When  this  was  received  and  read  to  the  American  secretary  of 
state  by  Admiral  Polo  on  November  25,  Mr.  Fish  replied:  "The 
United  States,  in  their  own  interests  as  well  as  in  the  interest  of 
all  maritime  powers,  cannot  admit  the  right  of  any  other  power  to 
capture  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  a  documented  vessel 
bearing  their  flag.  The  flag  which  they  give  to  a  vessel  must  be 
a  protection  on  the  high  seas  against  all  aggression  from  whatever 
quarters,  and  they  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  inquire  whether 
the  protection  of  that  flag  has  been  forfeited.  .  .  .  On  this  ground 
they  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  inquire  into  the  regularity 
of  the  papers  of  the  Virginius,  and  they  are  prepared  to  make  this 
inquiry  on  the  execution  indicated  in  the  telegraphic  despatch 
from  his  government  just  now  read  by  Admiral  Polo  of  the  repara 
tion  of  the  indignity  committed  to  their  flag.  And  should  Spain 
have  complaints  or  reclamations  ...  in  consequence  of  the  acts 
of  the  Virginius,  when  the  injury  to  the  honor  of  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  is  atoned  for,  they  will  be  received  with  every  pur 
pose  to  do  justice  to  Spain.  .  .  .  The  Spanish  cabinet  cannot  fail 
to  see  that  the  United  States  cannot  demand  less  or  could  under 
take  to  do  more,  ..."  Continuing,  and  showing  that  the  papers 
of  the  Virginius  were  in  due  form  and  that  she  had  been  given  the 
right  to  carry  the  flag,  the  memorandum  ended:  "Her  papers, 
therefore,  must  continue  to  give  her  a  national  character,  and  with 
her  flag,  must  be  her  protection."  2 

On  the  day  of  this  interview  between  the  American  secretary  of 
state  and  the  Spanish  minister,  the  former  telegraphed  the  Ameri 
can  minister  at  Madrid: 

"If,  upon  the  close  of  to-morrow,  no  accommodation  shall  have 
been  reached  in  the  case  of  the  Virginius,  you  will  address  to  the 
foreign  office  a  note  expressing  regret  at  the  delay  of  the  reparation 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  984.  This  telegram  was  received  by  Admiral 
Polo  at  9.45  A.  M.,  November  25,  1873.  3  Ibid.,  985. 


344  A  NEW  ULTIMATUM  [1873 

asked  for,  and  stating  that,  in  conformity  with  instructions  from 
your  government,  you  were  under  the  necessity  of  withdrawing 
from  Madrid,  for  which  purpose  you  request  the  usual  passport 
for  yourself,  your  family,  and  suite. 

"If,  however,  the  accommodation  desired  should  be  brought 
about  in  the  course  of  to-morrow,  either  here  or  in  Madrid,  you 
will,  until  otherwise  directed,  abstain  from  addressing  the  note 
adverted  to. 

"Should  a  proposition  be  submitted  to  you  to-morrow,  you  will 
refer  it  here  and  defer  action  until  it  be  decided  upon. 

"A  telegram  has  just  now  been  read  to  me  by  Admiral  Polo, 
which  gives  reason  to  hope  for  a  satisfactory  accommodation. 

"You  will,  therefore,  allow  the  whole  of  to-morrow  to  pass 
before  addressing  your  note."  l 

The  same  day  General  Sickles  telegraphed:  "Layard  says 
Granville  has  expressed  his  sense  of  the  justice  and  moderation 
of  the  reparation  we  have  demanded  and  this  has  been  communi 
cated  to  Castelar.  England  reserves  her  reclamation  for  the  present 
and  endeavors  to  promote  a  settlement  of  the  question  pending 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain."  2 

The  action  of  England  produced  good  results.  At  two  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  November  26  the  American  minister  received  a 
message  from  President  Castelar  that  a  note  would  be  sent  that 
day  recognizing  the  principles  on  which  the  American  demand 
was  based,  and  promising  to  make  the  reparation  required  on  or 
before  December  25,  if  the  facts  elicited  by  the  investigation 
making  by  the  Spanish  government  should  show  that  the  Vir- 
ginius  was  a  regularly  documented  American  ship.3 

Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  the  25th  was  not  received  at  the  legation 
at  Madrid  until  4.30  P.  M.  of  the  26th.  General  Sickles,  thus  act 
ing  upon  his  previous  instructions,  t^nd  with  what  in  view  of 
President  Castelar's  message  might  appear  somewhat  undue 
haste,  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  foreign  minister,  shortly  after 
2  p.  M.,  a  note  borne  by  the  secretary  of  legation,  Mr.  Adee,  asking 
for  his  passports.  Mr.  Carvajal  desired  to  know  if  a  communica 
tion  of  the  same  date  had  reached  the  legation,  and  was  informed 
by  the  secretary  that  none  had  arrived  up  to  the  moment  of  his 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  958.  2  Ibid.,  959.  3  Ibid.,  960. 


1873]  THE  SPANISH   OFFER  345 

leaving.  The  note,  however,  arrived  at  2.30  p.  M.,  and  Mr.  Car- 
vajal  was  then  informed  that  he  might  defer  any  reply  until  it 
should  be  renewed,  if  unhappily  the  negotiation  now  resumed  on 
fresh  bases  failed.1 

The  Spanish  note,  the  points  of  which  were  telegraphed  by 
General  Sickles  November  26,  pledged: 

First.  If  it  should  be  proved  that  the  Virginius  rightfully  car 
ried  the  American  flag  and  that  her  papers  were  in  regular  form, 
her  seizure  would  be  declared  illegal,  the  American  flag  would 
be  saluted  in  the  manner  desired,  and  the  Virginius  with  her  sur 
viving  crew  and  passengers  returned. 

Second.  That  if  it  be  proved  that  in  the  proceedings  or  sentence 
at  Santiago  there  had  been  an  essential  failure  to  comply  with  the 
provisions  of  Spanish  legislation  or  of  treaties,  the  government 
would  bring  the  authorities  before  the  competent  tribunals. 

Third.  Any  other  reclamations  which  may  be  preferred  in  the 
matter  by  either  government  to  be  considered  diplomatically,  and 
if  an  agreement  should  not  be  reached,  they  should  be  submitted 
to  a  third,  named  by  mutual  consent. 

Fourth.  If  the  25th  day  of  December  should  expire  without 
the  Spanish  government's  having  resolved,  in  so  far  as  it  should 
come  within  its  province,  the  question  raised  by  the  demand  for 
reparation,  it  held  itself  bound  to  grant  reparation,  the  same 
as  if  it  had  recognized  the  right  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  exact  it,  and  such  reparation  would  be  given  in  the  form 
prescribed  in  the  first  and  second  bases.3 

The  seriousness  of  the  situation  had  now  come  home  to  the 
Spanish  cabinet,  and  the  minister  of  state  was  using  the  instrumen- 
tali^  of  both  capitals  to  hurry  an  understanding.  He  thus  tele- 
graWed  Admiral  Polo  at  Washington:  "Negotiations  renewed  in 
Mftrid.  Confer  again  with  Mr.  Fish  on  the  basis  of  last  official 
note  [official  telegram?]  and  renew  to  him  the  assurances  of  the 
good  faith  and  rectitude  of  our  proposition,  assuring  him  likewise 
that  our  agreement,  whatever  it  may  be,  shall  be  beyond  all  doubt 
carried  out  in  Cuba."  3 

On  November  27  Admiral  Polo  called  upon  Mr.  Fish,  who  read 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  959-960.  2  Ibid.,   961. 

3  Ibid.,  987.     This  telegram  was  received  November  28, 1873,  at  9.15  A.  M. 


346  THE  ADJUSTMENT  [1873 

to  him  Sickles's  telegram  just  received.  The  admiral  was  informed 
that  the  propositions  just  mentioned  could  not  be  accepted.  Mr. 
Fish  denied  the  right  of  any  other  power  to  visit,  molest,  or  detain  on 
the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  any  American  vessel ;  a  right  claimed 
and  observed  by  all  maritime  powers;  that  the  first  proposition  prac 
tically  asked  the  United  States  to  consent  that  Spain  should  detain 
the  Virginius  while  she  is  seeking  evidence  to  justify  her  act. 

Admiral  Polo  then  stated  that  he  had  received  a  strictly  con 
fidential  and  personal  communication  requesting  to  be  informed 
if  it  be  possible  to  make  an  arrangement  whereby,  if  the  vessel 
and  men  be  given  up,  Mr.  Fish  would  engage  that  inquiry  be  in 
stituted  and,  if  the  result  required,  that  punishment  should  be  in 
flicted  on  those  who  had  violated  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
reserving,  until  further  information,  the  salute  to  the  flag.  Mr. 
Fish,  leaving  the  consultation  for  the  moment,  consulted  the  Presi 
dent.  Returning,  Admiral  Polo  was  informed  that  the  proposals 
transmitted  were  accepted.1 

Next  day  but  one,  November  29,  1873,  a  protocol  was  drawn 
which  stipulated  that  Spain  would  restore  forthwith  the  Virginius, 
her  surviving  passengers  and  crew,  and  on  December  25,  1873, 
salute  the  flag  of  the  United  States  unless,  before  that  date,  Spain 
should  prove  that  the  Virginius  was  not  entitled  to  carry  the  Ameri 
can  flag,  in  which  case  the  salute  would  be  waived,  and  the  United 
States  would  accept  a  disclaimer  of  intent  of  indignity  to  its  flag  in 
the  capture  of  the  ship. 

It  was  agreed,  besides,  if  it  should  thus  be  shown  that  the  Vir 
ginius  was  not  entitled  to  American  papers  and  flag,  the  United 
States  would  take  proceedings  against  the  vessel  and  against  those 
shown  to  be  guilty,  it  being  understood  that  Spain  would  i 
gate,  as  proposed  to  General  Sickles,  the  conduct  of  those 
officials  who  had  infringed  Spanish  laws  or  treaty  obligationsnd 
inflict  punishment  on  those  who  had  offended;  other  reciprocal 
reclamations  to  be  the  subject  of  consideration  and  arrangement, 
and  in  case  of  no  agreement,  to  be  the  subject  of  arbitration 
should  the  United  States  Senate  assent  thereto.2 

An  intimation  from  General  Sickles  that  unless  an  understand 
ing  should  be  reached  by  3  P.  M.  of  November  28,  in  accord  with 

1  Cabinet  Memorandum,  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  986.  3  Ibid.,  987. 


1873]  THE  ADJUSTMENT  347 

the  terms  of  his  note  of  November  15,  he  should  be  obliged  to 
renew  his  request  for  passports,  and  the  eagerness  now  shown  by 
the  Spanish  cabinet  for  an  accommodation,  caused  an  agreement 
to  his  demand  which  was  ratified  by  the  council  of  ministers  at 
3  A.  M.  November  28,  and  a  draft  of  a  protocol  was  prepared. 
At  noon,  however,  Senor  Carvajal,  the  minister  of  state,  sent  to 
General  Sickles  a  copy  of  a  telegram  just  received  from  Admiral 
Polo,  announcing  the  arrangement  made  with  Mr.  Fish,  followed, 
a  few  hours  later,  by  a  note  couched  in  somewhat  effusive  terms  of 
satisfaction  "in  the  happy  termination  of  a  question  which  might 
have  had  grave  consequences."  1 

The  rapidity  with  which  events  had  moved;  the  activity  of 
the  Spanish  minister  in  Washington;  the  information  from  Gen 
eral  Sickles  that  he  had  demanded  his  passports,  though  acceding 
later  to  the  request  of  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  not  to  press  for 
a  reply,  combined  with  the  delays  of  the  telegraph  service,  had 
caused  Mr.  Fish  to  suppose  (though  a  more  careful  following  of 
Sickles's  telegrams  might  have  prevented  the  supposition)  that 
General  Sickles  had  left  Madrid.  The  reception,  November  28,  of 
General  Sickles's  telegram  of  the  26th  removed  this  impression 
and  Mr.  Fish  telegraphed  the  minister  that,  acting  on  the  sup 
position  of  his  absence,  he  had  given  the  reply  of  the  government 
to  Admiral  Polo,  the  substance  of  which  he  gave,  adding:  " Ad 
miral  Polo  informs  me  this  morning  [November  28]  that  his  govern 
ment  says  that  negotiations  are  renewed  at  Madrid.  Since  then  I 
received  at  4  this  afternoon,  your  telegram  of  this  morning  an 
nouncing  that  you  should  request  your  passports  at  3  to-day.  The 
supposed  negotiations  must  therefore,  drop  at  Madrid  and  be 
conducted  hereafter  here."  2 

It  was  not,  however,  until  December  8  that  the  final  arrange 
ments  could  be  made,  and  then  it  was  agreed  that  the  Virginius 
should  be  given  up  December  16  in  the  harbor  of  Bahia  Honda, 
with  the  American  flag  flying,  instead  of  Santiago;  this,  however, 
not  to  be  an  admission  by  either  party  of  her  right  to  carry  the  flag 
at  the  time  of  capture,  nor  to  prejudice  the  right  of  Spain  to  prove 
otherwise  on  or  before  December  25;  that  the  survivors  were  to  be 
delivered  at  Santiago  on  board  a  ship  of  war  of  the  United  States 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  969.  » Ibid.,  966. 


348    "VIRGINIUS"  AND  SURVIVORS  SURRENDERED  [1873 

within  forty-eight  hours  after  notification  to  the  authorities  of  the 
ship's  readiness  to  receive  them,  the  surrender  to  be  between  the 
hours  of  8  A.  M.  and  4  p.  M.  ;  that  on  December  25  a  ship  or  ships 
of  war  of  the  United  States  would  be  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago, 
and  that  at  noon  the  United  States  flag  would  be  raised  on  a  Span 
ish  fort  or  battery,  and  a  salute  of  twenty-one  guns  be  fired,  to 
be  returned  by  the  American  man-of-war  gun  for  gun,  the  salute 
by  Spain,  however,  to  be,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  spon 
taneously  dispensed  with,  should  the  invalidity  of  the  ship's  claim 
to  American  nationality  be  shown  on  or  before  that  date.1 

There  were  serious  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  compliance, 
by  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba,  with  these  conditions.  The  Span 
ish  volunteers  in  Cuba  were  in  a  very  defiant  attitude,  and  the  news 
paper  articles  were  of  a  most  inflammatory  character.  The  gov 
ernment  at  Santiago  had  ordered  all  persons  over  twenty-two  to 
enroll  as  volunteers.2  On  December  12,  however,  the  Virginius 
left  Havana  for  Bahia  Honda,  convoyed  by  the  Spanish  war 
steamer  Isabel  la  Catolica,  a  general  feeling  of  relief  being  ex 
perienced  in  business  circles.  Gold  declined  full  ten  per  cent. 

On  December  16  the  ship  was  delivered  to  Captain  Whiting,  chief 
of  staff  to  the  commander-in-chief,  Admiral  Case,  of  the  North  At 
lantic  fleet,  who  went  to  Bahia  Honda  in  the  Despatch.  Meeting 
heavy  weather  on  her  way  north,  under  convoy  of  the  sloop  of  war 
Ossipee,  her  seams  opened  and  despite  all  efforts  she  foundered  off 
Cape  Hatteras.3 

The  survivors  of  those  aboard  when  captured  were  delivered 
at  Santiago,  December  18,  to  Captain  Braine,  of  the  sloop  of  war 
Jwiiata,  and  were  landed  at  New  York,  December  28. 

As  it  was  fully  shown  by  an  examination  at  New  York,  which 
began  late  in  November,  1873,  of  various  persons  connected  with 
the  ship,  at  which  was  present  the  district  attorney  of  the  United 
States,  that  the  papers  of  the  Virginius  had  been  obtained  fraudu 
lently,  and  that  she  was  not  American-owned,  the  salute  was  omitted. 

The  testimony  secured4  was  laid  before  the  department  of 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  990.  a  Ibid.,  1082-1090. 

8  See  Report  of  Naval  Board  of  Inquiry.  (Foreign  Relations,  1875,  1148- 
1153.)  The  ship,  weakly  built  and  having  had  no  repairs  for  a  number  of 
years,  was  wholly  unseaworthy.  4  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  991-1051. 


1873]  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  OPINION  349 

state,  and  on  December  11  was  submitted  to  the  attorney-general  of 
the  United  States  l  for  an  opinion.  He  found  that  the  Virginius 
belonged  to  General  Quesada  and  other  Cubans,  and  not  to  Pat 
terson,  who  had  sworn  to  his  personal  ownership  when  her  Ameri 
can  register  was  obtained.  This  was  shown  by  testimony  of  her 
first  captain,  Shepperd,  and  by  Senor  Varona,  the  secretary  of  the 
Cuban  Junta  in  New  York  when  the  ship  was  purchased, 
and  who  sailed  in  her  as  Quesada's  chief  of  staff.  The  testimony 
of  many  others  also  who  had  served  aboard  was  taken,  and  it 
was  clear  that  the  ship  had  no  right  to  carry  the  American  flag. 

Notwithstanding  her  illegal  use  of  the  flag,  the  attorney-general 
held  that  the  ship  was  as  much  exempt  from  capture  by  Spain  on 
the  high  seas  as  though  she  had  been  lawfully  registered.  "Spain," 
said  the  attorney-general,  "has  no  jurisdiction  whatever  over  the 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  such  vessel  is  on  the  high  seas  in 
violation  of  any  law  of  the  United  States.  Spain  cannot  rightfully 
raise  that  question  as  to  the  Virginiusy  but  the  United  States 
may.  .  .  ." 2 

The  admission  by  Spain  of  the  illegality  of  the  capture,  "in 
volved  of  necessity  not  only  the  admission  of  the  illegality  of  the 
capture  of  the  crew  and  passengers,  but  admission  also  of  the 
wrongfulness  of  the  summary  execution"  3  carried  out  at  Santiago. 
Spain  thus,  by  an  agreement  concluded  at  Madrid,  February  27, 
1875,  under  the  government  of  King  Alfonso,  paid  an  indemnity 
of  eighty  thousand  dollars,  which  was  distributed  by  the  American 
government  to  those  entitled.4  The  British  government  likewise 
demanded  and  received  compensation  for  the  slaughter  of  nineteen 
of  its  subjects,  holding  that  "there  was  no  charge  either  known  to 
the  law  of  nations  or  to  any  municipal  law,  under  which  persons 
in  the  situation  of  the  British  members  of  the  crew  of  the  Virginius 
could  have  been  justifiably  condemned  to  death.5 

Mr.  Fish  had  at  the  outset  suspicion  of  the  nationality  of  the 
Virginius  and  warned  General  Sickles  in  the  first  telegram  to  him 
to  speak  with  reserve  on  that  branch  of  the  case,  but  Mr.  Fish 

George  H.  Williams.         *  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1113. 

'Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Gushing,  February  10,  1874,  Foreign  Relations,  1875, 
part  II,  1216.  *  See  House  Ex.  Doc.  15,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

6  Hall,  International  Law,  4th  ed.,  278-279.  Moore,  Digest,  II,  903.  Earl 
Granville  to  Mr.  Layard,  House  Ex.  Doc.  89,  44  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  55. 


350  THE  SPANISH  ERROR  [1873 

would  not  have  covered  his  responsibility  to  the  President,  to  Con 
gress,  and  the  country  had  he  omitted  to  demand  reparation  for 
insult  to  the  flag.  Whoever  owned  the  Virginius,  she  was  not  a 
pirate  on  the  high  seas  when  arrested  by  the  Tornado.  No  Spanish 
decree  could  make  her  a  pirate.  Spain  brought  her  passengers 
into  Cuban  jurisdictional  waters  by  force  and  in  violation  of  the 
law  of  nations.  She  had  no  more  right  to  try  and  put  them  to  death 
than  if  she  had  seized  them  in  New  York.  She  certainly  could  not, 
by  that  act  of  seizure,  acquire  lawful  jurisdiction  to  try  by  sum 
mary  court-martial  American  citizens  and  put  them  to  death  with 
out  permitting  them  to  have  counsel  in  their  defence,  and  otherwise 
conforming  to  all  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1795  pertinent 
to  the  situation.  Burriel's  brutal  and,  in  the  light  of  the  treaty, 
most  stupid  act,  fully  justified  the  United  States  in  demanding 
from  Spain  immediate  offer  of  reparation  for  the  executions. 
The  request  for  time  to  consider  documentary  details  could  not  be 
considered  in  the  state  of  feeling  throughout  the  United  States. 
The  crime  was  murder.  There  was  no  excuse  under  any  law, 
international  or  moral.  Says  the  Marquis  de  Olivart,  the  Spanish 
publicist,  so  frequently  mentioned  herein:  "If  American  jurists 
themselves  confess  that  the  visit  and  capture  of  the  Virginius  were 
legitimate  and  justified  by  the  right  of  self-defence,1  the  American 
nationality  of  the  pirate  vessel  being  prima  facie  very  doubtful, 
we  must  recognize  with  an  equal  frankness  that  the  summary  ex 
ecution  of  its  passengers  and  of  a  great  part  of  its  crew,  by  General 
Burriel,  was  a  measure  of  unjustifiable  rigor,  not  authorized  by 
the  needs  of  war,  and  a  striking  violation  of  the  rights  of  American 
citizens  in  Cuba.  The  pretext  invoked  by  our  government,  that 
it  was  a  question  of  pirates,  enemies  of  the  human  race,  was  founded 
on  a  real  misunderstanding.  The  idea  of  piracy,  in  international 
law,  a  crime  the  repression  of  which  is  permitted  and  is  even 
the  duty  of  every  civilized  state,  implies  essentially  the  existence  of 
the  animus  furandi;  certainly  the  men  executed  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba  had  not  this  animus."  2 

1  Such  were  the  views  of  Mr.  George  Ticknor  Curtis  and  Mr.  Theodore 
Woolsey,  Woolsey,  International  Law,  369. 

a  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  IV,  1897,  612.  See 
also  Hall,  International  Law,  4th  ed.,  278,  279. 


1873]  THE  CASE  OF  BURRIEL  351 

The  seizure  of  the  ship  itself  raised  a  diplomatic  question  not 
over  difficult  of  adjustment.  But  there  was  no  calling  back  to  life 
the  men  who  had  suffered  death.  The  temper  of  the  people 
throughout  the  United  States  called  for  action.  Every  available 
ship  was  commissioned  or  recalled  from  foreign  stations,1  and  war 
would  certainly  have  occurred  but  for  Spain's  yielding  to  the  logic 
of  the  situation. 

There  remained  the  question  of  the  punishment  of  the  chief 
offender,  General  Burriel.  "If  the  author  of  such  a  deed,"  said 
the  London  Times,  "  had  been  an  Englishman,  he  would  assuredly 
have  been  hung;  yet  he  is  still  at  liberty,  and  we  believe  has  some 
sort  of  command."  2 

Burriel  had  been  recalled  from  Cuba  at  the  end  of  1873.  In 
April,  1874,  he  published  3  an  elaborate  justification  of  his  acts 
with  reference  to  the  Virginius  in  a  public  letter  addressed  to  the 
director  of  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  which,  in  its  issue  of  March 
2,  1874,  had  severely  criticised  his  conduct.  In  this,  as  already 
mentioned,  he  claimed  as  the  basis  of  his  action,  the  imperative 
orders  of  March  14,  1869,  which  had  been  revoked  by  the  Spanish 
government,4  upon  the  protest  of  that  of  the  United  States.  The 
latter  pressed  for  Burriel's  punishment,5  and  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  replied  that  it  desired  and  was  prepared  "to  fulfil  all  the 
stipulations  contained  in  the  protocol  of  the  29th  of  November, 
1873,"  but  it  proposed  to  bring  the  action  before  a  court  in 
dependent  of  political  or  military  control.8 

The  subject  rested  and  Burriel  retired,  unnoticed,  "into  some 
obscure  corner  of  Galicia  .  .  .  humiliated  by  seeing  that  his 

1  By  January  3,  1874,  there  were  collected  at  Key  West,  under  Rear- 
Admirals  Case  and  Scott,  the  following  ships:  the  frigates  Franklin,  Min 
nesota,  Wabash,  Colorado,  and  Lancaster;  the  corvettes  Brooklyn,  Congress, 
Worcester,  Alaska,  Ticonderoga,  Canandaigua,  Shenandoah,  Juniata,  Ossipee, 
Wachusett,  Powhatan,  Wyoming,  Kansas,  and  Shawmut;  the  monitors  Sangus, 
Mahopac,  Manhattan,  Ajax,  Canonicits,  and  Dictator;  the  despatch  vessel  De 
spatch;  the  armed  tugs  Pinta,  Fortune,  and  Mayflower.  (Report  of  the  secretary 
of  the  navy,  1874.) 

3  Times,  January  26,  1876,  Ibid.,  160. 

'  In  La  Epoca,  Madrid,  April  21,  1874,  Foreign  Relations,  1876,  490. 

4  Senor  Ulloa,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  to  Mr.  Gushing,  American  minister, 
July  8,  1874,  Ibid.,  1876,  498. 

6  Ibid.,  1876,  493.  •  Ibid.,  512. 


352  THE   CASE  OF  BURRIEL  [1873 

government  is  humiliated  on  account  of  his  acts."  *  The  delay 
was  not  surprising  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  after  six  years,  the 
inquiry  into  the  assassination  of  General  Prim  had  but  passed 
the  first  stage,  and  was  only  now  before  the  court.2 

On  August  18,  1875,  however,  the  American  minister,  learning 
through  the  newspapers  that  Burriel  had  been  promoted  from  the 
grade  of  brigadier  to  that  of  mariscal  de  campo  (major-general), 
addressed  a  note  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  saying:  "My 
government  will  of  necessity  presume  that  the  stipulated  investiga 
tion  of  the  conduct  of  D.  Juan  Burriel  and  his  submission  to  the 
' juicio  de  residencies'  have  resulted  in  acquitting  him,  not  only 
of  any  violation  of  the  municipal  law  of  Spain,  but  also  of  any 
infringement  of  treaty  stipulations — a  decision  that  is  in  conflict 
with  the  explicit  stipulations  of  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  .  .  .  the  situation  will  wear  an  aspect  of  still  greater 
gravity  if,  in  the  absence  of  such  acquittal,  .  .  .  the  Spanish 
government  .  .  .  shall  have  selected  that  officer  for  promotion 
on  the  assumption  of  commendableness  of  his  acts  at  Santiago 
de  Cuba."  3 

The  Spanish  minister  of  state  in  reply  gave  the  exceedingly  weak 
reason  that  General  Burriel  had  been  promoted  through  "the 
necessities  of  the  war  [in  Spain]  and  of  army  organization,"  but 
that  the  government  was  resolved  to  fulfil  its  promises.4  These 
assurances  were  repeated,  and  on  April  11,  1876,  Seiior  Calderon 
y  Collantes,  a  new  minister  of  state,  sent  to  the  American  minister 
a  copy  of  a  letter  to  the  minister  of  war  recalling  that  a  report  had 
been  called  for  by  his  predecessor  from  the  supreme  council  of  war, 
and  that  this  in  turn  had  called  for  a  report  from  the  fiscal  tribunal 
of  the  branch  of  service  in  Cuba,  which  thus  far  had  not  been 
rendered.5 

On  April  21,  1876,  the  minister  of  state  informed  the  American 
minister  that  the  supreme  council  of  war  had  declared  itself  com 
petent  to  have  cognizance  of  the  cause,  and  that  steps  had  been 
taken  by  the  appointment  of  a  fiscal  and  secretary  from  their  own 

1  Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  May  17,  1875.     Foreign  Relations,  1876,  512. 

a  Ibid.,  455. 

8  Mr.  Gushing  to  Seiior  Castro,  August  18,  1875,  Ibid.,  515. 

4  Ibid.,  517. 

6  Senor  Calderon  to  the  minister  of  war,  Madrid,  April  11,  1876,  Ibid.,  531. 


1873]  SPANISH  RECLAMATIONS  353 

body.  "With  this,"  said  the  minister,  "remains  fulfilled  on  the 
part  of  the  government  of  his  majesty  the  obligation  which  was 
contracted  toward  the  government  of  the  United  States  by  the 
.  .  .  protocol  of  November,  1873.  The  rest  remains  exclusively 
in  the  charge  of  the  supreme  council  .  .  .  which,  as  a  tribunal  of 
justice,  will  proceed  according  to  its  usages  and  with  absolute 
independence  of  the  executive,  in  the  pursuance  of  the  principle 
universally  recognized  in  countries  governed  by  liberal  institu 
tions."  1 

In  June,  1876,  it  was  announced  that  the  occurrences  on  board 
the  Tornado  after  the  capture  of  the  Virginius  had  been  referred 
for  report  to  the  supreme  tribunal  of  the  navy.2  Two  and  a  half 
years  had  thus  passed  before  a  tribunal  was  even  discovered  before 
which  the  subject  could  be  brought.  It  is  not  surprising  that  Mr. 
Fish  closed  his  acknowledgment  of  the  information  conveyed  him 
with  the  remark  that  "an  initiation  of  an  investigation  cannot  be 
a  performance."  ; 

A  second  aftermath  of  the  Virginius  case  was  a  reclamation  for 
damages  by  Spain  preferred  by  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washing 
ton,  December  30,  1873,  based  upon  the  voluminous  testimony 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1876,  533.  2  Ibid.,  535. 

8  Ibid.,  535.  One  who  would  study  the  details  of  the  case  of  Burriel,  his 
conduct  in  the  massacre  of  the  people  of  the  Virginius,  and  the  refusal  of 
Spain,  during  three  years,  to  punish  him  as  it  promised  the  United  States 
to  do,  together  with  his  letter  of  attempted  vindication  of  himself,  and  Gush 
ing 's  masterly  correspondence  thereon  with  three  ministers  of  state  of  Spain, 
will  find  the  record  in  fifty  octavo  pages  of  Foreign  Relations  for  1876.  The 
records  throw  but  very  little  more  light  on  the  case.  Mr.  Gushing  reported 
on  February  9,  1877,  that  the  trial  was  still  pending,  and  on  the  22d  of  the 
same  month,  that  the  court  was  waiting  for  documents  and  evidence  from 
Cuba;  on  receipt  of  some  remarks  from  the  department  about  the  "slowness  of 
the  proceedings"  he  replied,  April  4,  1877,  that  the  slowness  of  proceedings 
in  so-called  state  trials  is  proverbial  in  Spain,  and  cited  examples.  (See  House 
Ex.  Doc.  72,  45  Cong.,  2  Sess.)  Whether  the  case  was  ever  decided  is  not  of 
state  department  record.  But  if  it  be  remembered  that  a  change  of  ad 
ministration  in  the  United  States  and  the  pacification  of  Cuba  took  place  in 
the  same  and  following  year,  it  may  be  surmised  that  the  "proverbial" 
slowness  of  Spanish  court  was  permitted  to  run  undisturbed  until  Burriel,  or 
his  judges,  died.  Burriel  died  December  24,  1877.  The  Diario  de  la  Marina, 
of  Havana,  in  a  notice,  January  15,  1878,  of  his  death,  spoke  of  "the  proofs  of 
the  firmness  of  his  character"  shown  at  Santiago,  and  ended:  "May  the 
earth  be  light  upon  him."  Such  a  hope  as  to  the  judgment  of  posterity, 
can  scarcely  be  cherished. 


354  SPANISH  RECLAMATIONS  [1873 

taken  in  November  and  December,  1873,1  and  transmitted  to  the 
American  department  of  state  with  a  letter  summarizing  the  same, 
December  10.  The  main  contentions  on  which  the  Spanish  min 
ister  founded  the  claim  were,  that  the  Virginius  sailed  with  false 
papers,  including  registry,  crew  list,  and  manifest;  that  the  ex 
pedition  was  unlawful  by  reason  of  the  imputed  piratical  character 
or  purposes  of  the  voyage,  and  that  she  carried  persons  connected 
with  the  revolutionary  movement  who  were  of  much  more  impor 
tance  to  the  insurrection  than  were  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  to 
the  Confederate  states  when  these  latter  were  taken  from  the  British 
steamer  Trent. 

The  minister  concluded  with  respect  to  all  matters  mentioned 
that  he  could  not  "but  confidently  expect  the  admission  on  the  part 
of  the  secretary  of  state  that  the  obligations  of  one  power  toward 
another  friendly  power,  in  whose  territory  there  exists  an  insur 
rection  to  which  neither  party  has  granted  belligerent  rights  in  an 
international  sense,  are  not  less  than  those  of  a  neutral  during  a 
regular  state  of  war  between  two  other  countries  with  which  the 
neutral  is  on  terms  of  peace  and  friendship.  The  duty  of  effica 
ciously  arresting  beginnings,  as  well  as  preventing  military  expedi 
tions  from  being  conveyed  from  one  country  to  another,  in  which, 
unfortunately,  an  insurrection  exists,  is  equally  obligatory  in  both 
cases,  and  in  order  to  fix  the  measure  of  the  efficacy  referred  to,  the 
undersigned  is  willing,  in  the  case  of  the  Virginius,  to  abide  by  the 
proofs  furnished  and  the  stand  taken  at  Geneva  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States  whereby  was  shown  the  responsibility  incurred  by 
Great  Britain  toward  the  United  States."  2 

Mr.  Fish  in  reply  recalled  that  the  facts  referred  to  him  by 
Admiral  Polo  de  Bernabe*  had  only  come  to  light  in  consequence  of 
the  capture  of  the  Virginius,  and  that  there  was  no  question  of  the 
validity  of  her  papers  from  any  quarter  when  she  sailed  from 
New  York;  that  even  had  it  been  otherwise,  the  falsification  of  the 
papers  would  have  been  a  mere  municipal  offence,  "subject  as  such 
to  punishment  by  the  local  law  of  the  United  States,  and  whether 
so  punished  or  not,  involving  no  possible  question  or  matter  of 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  1008-1112. 

2  Admiral  Polo  de  Bernabe",  Spanish  minister,  to  Mr.  Fish,  December  30, 
1873,  Foreign  Relations,  1875,  1153. 


1874]  MR.  FISH'S  REPLY  355 

controversy  with  any  foreign  government";  that  even  if  this  cause  of 
reclamation  "were  possessed  of  any  force  in  other  relations,"  which 
could  not  be  admitted,  that  there  could  be  no  responsibility  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  "for  want  of  diligence  or  good  faith, 
seeing  that  the  imputed  frauds  were  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  the 
United  States  by  Spain  and  were  otherwise  unknown  and  unsus 
pected  by  the  government." 

As  to  the  imputed  illegal  intentions  of  the  voyage,  there  was  no 
responsibility  in  the  light  of  municipal  law  or  that  of  the  law  of 
nations.  "  It  is  not  pretended, "  says  Mr.  Fish,  "  that  the  Virginius 
was  armed,  equipped,  or  manned  for  war  in  any  part  of  the  United 
States;  that  she  bore  at  the  time,  or  subsequently  received,  any 
armament  as  a  ship  of  war;  that  her  build  or  equipment  had  any 
special  military  character;  or,  indeed,  that  she  was  intended  to 
or  ever  did,  in  fact,  act  as  a  cruiser,  piratical  or  other,  against 
Spain  or  the  subjects  of  Spain."  As  to  the  "inconsiderable  invoice 
of  arms  or  munitions  of  war,"  the  destination  of  the  ship  was  the 
neutral  port  of  Cura£oa  [near,  it  may  be  said,  the  coast  of  Venez 
uela,  then  itself  in  an  insurrectionary  state];  the  voyage  was  on  its 
face  a  perfectly  lawful  one.  "There  was  no  allegation  or  charge  of 
any  improper  intent  or  purpose;  there  was  nothing  in  the  build, 
equipment,  cargo,  or  destination  to  excite  suspicion  or  to  authorize 
proceedings  against  her  at  law,  or  detention  by  the  President. 
There  is  no  doctrine  in  the  law  of  nations  more  universally  ad 
mitted  than  that  a  neutral  or  friendly  government  cannot  be 
rendered  responsible  for  shipments  of  arms,  munitions,  or  material 
of  war  made  by  private  individuals  at  their  own  risk  and  peril,  and 
as  a  private  speculation.  If  a  state  of  war  exists,  the  parties  con 
cerned  are  unquestionably  exposed  to  the  confiscation  of  their 
goods  as  contraband  of  war,  but  in  that  case  their  act  affords  no 
ground  for  reclamation  against  their  government." 

Mr.  Fish  could  not  perceive  "any  analogy  whatever  between  the 
case  of  the  Virginius  and  that  of  the  Alabama  or  other  vessels 
fitted  out  in  the  ports  of  Great  Britain"  during  the  American  civil 
war.  "  If  there  had  been  a  state  of  war  and  the  Virginius  had  been 
armed,  equipped,  and  manned  in  the  port  of  New  York  as  a  regu 
lar  ship  of  war;  if  she  had  then  cruised  as  such  on  the  high  seas, 
and  had  captured  and  destroyed  Spanish  merchantmen,"  such 


356  THE  END  OF  THE   "VIRGINIUS"   CASE         [1874 

analogy  would  have  held.  But  Spain  "does  not  admit  that  there 
is  a  state  of  war,  and  does  not  pretend  to  represent  injuries  of  sub 
jects  of  hers,  preyed  upon  by  the  Virginius  as  a  cruiser,  but  dam 
ages  to  Spain  as  a  nation  or  government  by  reason  of  the  assumed 
relation  of  the  acts  of  the  Virginius  to  the  existing  insurrection 
in  Cuba.  And  it  is  that  very  class  of  claims  which,  presented  by 
the  United  States  against  Great  Britain  mainly  in  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  a  determination  of  the  question,  was  disposed  of  by 
the  arbitrators  in  their  unanimous  formal  declaration  that  claims 
of  this  nature  '  do  not  constitute,  upon  the  principles  of  international 
law  applicable  to  such  cases,  good  foundation  for  an  award  of 
compensation  or  computation  of  damages  between  nations/  In 
appealing  to  the  acts  of  that  tribunal  as  authority,  Spain  must  be 
considered  as  accepting  such  authority,  which  is  conclusive  as 
argument  in  opposition  to  the  present  reclamation  on  the  part  of 
Spain."  * 

The  Spanish  minister  dealt  with  the  question  at  much  greater 
length,  in  a  note  of  February  2,  1874,  which  included,  besides  that 
of  the  Virginius,  the  whole  subject  of  the  filibustering  expeditions 
during  the  war.  This  was  not  answered  until  April  18,  1874,  on 
account  of  the  pressure  of  business  incident  to  the  session  of  Con 
gress  and  a  severe  indisposition  of  the  secretary  of  state.  The  two 
papers  present  a  very  complete  history  of  the  subject.  Too  volumi 
nous  to  quote  in  extenso  or  even  to  summarize,  it  may  be  said  that 
Spain  held  that  action  should  be  taken,  such  as  neither  of  the  two 
countries,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  which  were  so  jealous 
for  freedom  of  speech  and  act  within  the  law,  could  have  tolerated ; 
and  that  the  Spanish  minister's  argument  as  to  the  responsibility  of 
the  United  States  respecting  the  expeditions  prepared  within  their 
jurisdiction,  was  fatally  defective  in  that  it  applied  only  to  a  state 
of  war;  a  state  the  acceptance  of  which,  in  an  international  sense, 
Spain  carefully  avoided.2 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  Admiral  Polo  de  Bernabe",  January  9,  1874,  Foreign  Relations, 
1875,  1156. 

2  "Spain,"  said  Senor  Canovas,  "cannot  recognize  the  belligerency  of  rebels 
and  bandits.    It  would  not  be  desirable  that  she  should  do  so.    Spaniards  who 
demand  this  recognition,  ignore  that  from  the  moment  it  should  exist  the 
insurgents  would  be  able  to  send  to  sea  ships  carrying  the  '  Lone  Star '  flag, 
make  loans  abroad,  and  have  full  liberty  of  movement  such  as  they  could 


1874]         THE  END  OF  THE   "VIRGINIUS"   CASE  357 

Mr.  Fish,  in  closing  his  long  and  very  able  paper,  said: 
"During  these  five  years  this  government  has  watched  events 
in  Cuba,  perhaps  not  always  patiently,  but  certainly  always  im 
partially.  It  has  seen  vessels  sailing  under  its  flag  intercepted  on 
the  high  seas  and  carried  into  Spanish  ports.  It  has  seen  the 
property  of  its  citizens  embargoed  and  their  revenues  sequestrated, 
and  when  it  has  complained,  it  has  met  with  promises  of  restora 
tion;  but  the  official  assurances  of  Spain  in  that  respect  have 
in  most  cases  not  been  complied  with.  It  has  seen  its  citizens 
condemned  to  death  under  the  form  of  military  law,  and  executed 
in  violation  of  the  treaty  obligations  of  Spain.  It  has  seen  other 
citizens  of  the  United  States  mobbed  in  the  streets  of  Havana  for 
no  other  reason  than  that  they  were  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
or  the  accidental  circumstance  of  the  color  of  the  dress.  It  has 
stretched  its  powers  and  interfered  with  the  liberties  of  its  citizens 
in  order  to  fulfil  all  its  duties  as  a  sovereign  nation  toward  the 
power  which  in  Cuba  was  tolerating  the  evil  influences  of  reaction 
and  of  slavery,  and  of  'the  deplorable  and  pertinacious  tradition 
of  despotism'  referred  to  by  the  Spanish  minister  of  transmarine 
affairs,  all  of  which  made  the  things  complained  of  possible.  It 
has  refrained  from  the  assertion  of  its  rights,  under  the  hope, 
derived  from  the  constant  assurances  of  the  government  of  Spain, 
that  liberty  and  self-government  would  be  accorded  to  Cuba,  that 
African  slavery  would  be  driven  out  from  its  last  resting-place  in 
Christendom,  and  that  the  instruments  of  the  Casino  Espanol 
would  be  restrained  in  their  violence  and  be  made  to  obey  law 
and  to  respect  the  treaty  obligations  of  Spain." 

never  have  without  it;    they  would  be  able  then  to  cruise  at  sea."     Inter 
view  in  the  Heraldo,  of  Madrid,  September  9,  1895,  quoted  by  De  Olivart, 
Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  VII,  1900,  345. 
1  Foreign  Relations,  1875,  1178-1213. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE    CARLIST    WAR. THE    ACCESSION    OF    ALFONSO    XII. 

MR.   FISH'S   NUMBER  266 

THE  clash  which  had  taken  place  of  the  two  negotiations,  the 
one  proceeding  in  Washington  and  the  other  at  Madrid,  had  the 
effect  of  bringing  from  General  Sickles  the  resignation  of  his  post. 
Rumors  of  disapproval  of  his  conduct  of  the  case  of  the  Virginius 
had  been  published,  and  though  Mr.  Fish,  in  answer  to  Sickles's 
telegram  of  December  6,  1873,  tendering  his  resignation,  said  "  no 
dissatisfaction  is  expressed  or  intimated,"  and  that  at  the  moment 
his  resignation  would  not  be  accepted  as  interfering  with  the  pros 
pects  of  an  accommodation,  the  general,  on  December  20,  re 
newed  his  request  which  was  now  granted.  He  presented  his  letters 
of  recall  early  in  January,  Mr.  Adee,  the  very  competent  secretary 
of  legation  since  1870,  and  later  the  well-known  assistant  secretary 
of  state,  taking  over  the  legation  as  charge*  d'affaires.1 

General  Sickles  had  discharged  with  marked  ability  and  zeal, 
and  probably  with  as  much  success  as  any  one  could  have  achieved 
under  the  circumstances,  the  difficult  and  trying  duties  of  the  office 
he  had  held  since  May,  1869.  In  January,  1874,  Mr.  Caleb 
Cushing  was  appointed  to  be  his  successor.  The  appointment  of 
Mr.  Cushing,  who  was  now  seventy-four  years  of  age,  was  in 
every  way  fitting  and  one  most  friendly  to  Spain.  He  had  won 
distinction  in  very  many  spheres  of  intellectual  effort.  He  was 
graduated  by  Harvard  College  at  the  young  age  of  seventeen;  was 
a  teacher  there  after  his  graduation;  was  many  times  a  member 
of  the  Massachusetts  legislature;  a  member  of  Congress  during 
four  terms;  was  the  first  American  minister  to  China,  with  which 
he  negotiated  our  first  treaty  with  that  nation;  was  a  general  in 
the  Mexican  war;  a  member  of  the  Massachusetts  supreme  court; 

1  Mr.  Adee  remained  as  secretary  until  1877,  when  he  was  transferred  to  the 
department  of  state  at  Washington.  He  was  made  assistant  secretary  in  1882, 
in  which  post  he  has  ever  since  rendered  invaluable  services. 

358 


1874]         CALEB   GUSHING  MINISTER  TO  SPAIN  359 

attorney-general  of  the  United  States  from  1853  to  1857;  was  fre 
quently  employed  under  President  Lincoln  on  special  diplomatic 
missions,  and  was  chief  counsel  for  the  United  States  in  the  Geneva 
arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  the  Alabama  claims.  He  had  been 
much  in  France  and  Spain  in  early  life,  and  published  as  early  as 
1833  interesting  reminiscences  of  his  travels  in  both  countries.  He 
spoke  a  number  of  languages,  including  Spanish,  with  facility. 
Crowning  his  many  distinguished  qualities,  he  was  on  terms  of 
intimacy  and  friendship  with  many  notable  Spaniards. 

It  is  to  be  inferred  that  Mr.  dishing  would  not  at  his  age  have 
accepted  diplomatic  employment  at  Madrid,  with  its  inhospitable 
climate,  unless  he  felt  that  the  administration  at  Washington  had 
in  mind  an  especially  important  work  to  be  accomplished  there, 
with  which  he  sympathized  and  in  which  he  thought  he  could 
succeed.  He  was  everywhere  recognized  as  a  strong  opponent  of 
filibustering  in  all  its  various  forms.  On  his  return  to  Newburyport 
from  the  office  of  attorney-general,  in  1857,  he  made  an  elaborate 
speech  to  his  fellow  townsmen  in  which  he  said :  "  I  reprobate  not 
war  itself,  but  all  irregular  enterprises  of  war.  I  hold  that  the  great 
issues  of  peace  belong  to  the  sovereign  power  of  the  Union  and 
should  not  be  wantonly  usurped  by  individual  rashness.  I  glory  in 
the  acts  which  it  has  fallen  to  me  to  perform  toward  the  repression 
of  all  such  undertakings  in  the  United  States,  which  require  no  such 
instruments  to  help  them  forward  in  their  destinies  in  America."  * 

Mr.  Gushing  was  known  in  Madrid  as  fiercely  hostile  to  mili 
tary  expeditions  against  Spanish  authority  in  Cuba,  organized  and 
conducted  by  the  Cuban  Junta,  and  it  was  believed  that  he  would 
in  every  way  be,  as  he  was,  persona  grata.  He  did  not  reach  Madrid 
until  the  end  of  May,  1874,  on  the  last  day  of  which  month  he  was 
presented  to  President  Serrano.  Part  of  the  delay  had  arisen  from 
the  necessity  of  going  from  France  by  Bordeaux  and  Lisbon,  the 
northern  part  of  Spain  being  in  control  of  the  Carlists.  His  general 
instructions  from  Mr.  Fish  of  February  6, 1874,  reviewed  at  length 
the  history  and  present  condition  of  the  diplomatic  relations  be 
tween  Washington  and  Madrid.  They  referred  to  several  things  of 
pressing  immediate  importance  in  which  Spain  had  failed  to  make 
good  her  promises;  among  them,  emancipation  of  slaves  and  the  re- 
1  New  York  Times,  April  25,  1857. 


360  CASTELAR'S  WISE  VIEWS  [1874 

lease  of  embargoed  estates  in  Cuba  owned  by  our  citizens.  He  was 
told,  in  effect,  that  the  administration  could  not  much  longer  go  on 
policing  the  ports  of  the  United  States  against  the  efforts  of  the 
Junta  and  holding  back  Congress  and  the  country  from  taking  into 
their  hands  remedies  for  the  intolerable  evils  in  Cuba.  Mr.  Fish 
went  on  to  say:  "  That  the  ultimate  issue  of  events  in  Cuba  will  be 
its  independence,  however  that  issue  may  be  produced  ...  it  is 
impossible  to  doubt.  If  there  be  one  lesson  in  history  more  cogent 
in  its  teachings  than  any  other,  it  is  that  no  part  of  America,  large 
enough  to  constitute  a  self-containing  state,  can  be  permanently 
held  in  forced  colonial  subjection  to  Europe."  He  quoted  Castelar, 
"one  of  the  greatest  and  wisest  of  the  statesmen  of  [Spain]  or  in 
deed  of  Europe,"  as  "of  a  nature  to  command  the  approbation 
I  of  the  United  States."  "  Let  us,"  said  Castelar,  when  President, 
! "  reduce  to  formulas  our  policy  in  America.  First,  the  immediate 
\  abolition  of  slavery.  Secondly,  autonomy  of  the  islands  of  Puerto 
Rico  and  Cuba,  which  shall  have  a  parliamentary  assembly  of 
their  own,  their  own  administration,  their  own  government,  and 
a  federal  tie  to  unite  them  with  Spain  as  Canada  is  united  with 
England.  ...  I  desire  that  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico 
shall  be  our  sisters,  and  I  do  not  desire  that  they  shall  be  trans 
atlantic  Polands."  Mr.  Fish  added:  "  But  of  course  the  United 
States  would  prefer  to  see  all  that  remains  of  colonial  America 
pass  from  [a  colonial]  condition  to  the  condition  of  absolute  inde 
pendence  of  Europe."  1 

Mr.  Gushing  found,  on  arrival  at  Madrid,  affairs  in  Spain  not 
greatly  different  from  those  in  Cuba.  Castelar  had  given  way, 
January  2,  1874,  to  Marshal  Serrano  as  president.  The  latter  had 
been  invested,  by  a  decree  of  February  27,  with  dictatorial  powers. 
Nearly  all  the  troops  of  the  Peninsula  were  concentrated  in  the 
north  to  re-enforce  those  in  Viscaya,  where  the  Carlists  were  besieg 
ing  Bilbao  with  an  army  of  twenty-five  thousand  men.  The  sending 
of  men  to  Cuba  was,  in  this  crisis,  suspended,  and  it  was  even  pro 
posed  to  take  a  thousand  Carlist  prisoners  from  the  Cuban  service 
and  reship  them  to  Spain  for  exchange.2  "  Ports  not  occupied  by 
the  Carlists  or  even  likely  to  be  menaced  by  them  were  blockaded. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  859-863. 

2  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Fish,  March  4,  1874,  Ibid,  1874,  871. 


1874]  THE  TURMOIL   IN  SPAIN  361 

And  the  available  naval  force  of  Spain  was  inadequate  to  maintain  an 
effective  surveillance  over  two  hundred  miles  of  tempestuous  coast/'1 

The  siege  of  Bilbao,  after  immense  effort  by  the  republican  gov 
ernment,  was  raised  in  May.  "At  the  present  time,"  said  Mr. 
Gushing  in  a  despatch  of  June  18,  1874,  "  the  republicans  continue 
to  hold  the  most  important  positions  on  the  seacoast  of  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  including  uninterrupted  communication  by  rail  between 
Madrid  and  Santander.  But  scattered  parties  of  Carlists  are  still 
operating  in  all  parts  of  Viscaya,  as  well  as  of  Guipuzcoa  and  of 
Alava.  The  same  general  state  of  facts  occurs  in  Navarre,  and  are 
also  in  a  considerable  part  of  Catalonia,  Aragon,  and  Valencia. 
From  time  to  time  these  detached  parties  sally  from  their  fast 
nesses  in  the  mountains  to  levy  contributions,  depredate,  kidnap, 
and  murder  in  the  contiguous  regions  of  Old  Castile,  and  in  those 
of  Catalonia,  Aragon,  and  Valencia,  not  permanently  occupied 
by  them.  Meanwhile  the  Carlists  occupy  the  land  frontier  on  the 
side  of  France,  and  the  adjoining  districts  of  France  from  Pau 
to  Bayonne  are  their  place  of  refuge,  their  source  of  supplies,  and 
their  seat  of  military  and  political  conspiracy  against  the  govern 
ment  of  Spain.  Carlists  also  control,  or  interrupt  when  they  please, 
all  the  lines  of  railroad  from  Madrid  to  the  northern  land  frontier 
and  to  the  northeastern  or  eastern  sea  frontier.  The  direct  line 
from  Madrid  to  France,  by  the  way  of  Irun,  is  permanently 
stopped,  and  the  line  from  Barcelona  by  Sargossa  to  Madrid,  has 
been  stopped  repeatedly  during  my  short  residence  at  Madrid, 
as  also  has  been  the  line  from  Valencia  to  Almansa."  2 

Mr.  Gushing  reported  the  existence  of  martial  law  over  wide   > 
districts;  embargoes  of  property;  suppression  of  news  in  the  news 
papers,  and  the  activity  of  Carlist  committees  in  France  and  Eng-  / 
land,  both  of  which  countries  were  bases  of  supplies  and  recruit 
ment  for  the  insurgents  as  well  as  of  refuge.3    There  was  as  yet 
no  official  recognition  by  the  European  powers  except  Switzerland 

1  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Fish,  February  24,  1874,  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  867. 

3  Ibid.,  1874,  887. 

3  For  these  decrees  in  detail,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  894-897;  also 
Ibid.,  1875,  1128-1135.  For  the  complaints  against  France  for  allowing  ship 
ment  of  supplies,  the  enlistment  of  men  for  the  rebel  Carlists  and  the  pub 
lic  activity  of  Carlist  juntas  in  southern  France,  see  Mr.  Cushing's  despatch  of 
December  17,  1874,  in  Foreign  Relations,  1875,  1079. 


362  ALFONSO  XII  PROCLAIMED  [1875 

of  the  republican  or  any  other  government  in  Spain.  Rumors  of 
intervention  were  rife.1 

On  March  14,  1874,  General  Jose*  de  la  Concha  sailed  for 
Havana  as  the  relief  of  General  Jovellar,  with  the  titles  of  governor- 
general,  captain-general,  and  commander-in-chief.  Jovellar  re 
turned  to  Spain  and  on  December  29,  1874,  in  company  with 
Martinez  Campos,  proclaimed  as  king,  at  the  head  of  the  troops 
at  Sagunto,  the  son  of  the  exiled  queen  Isabella,  Alfonso,  who 
at  the  moment  was  a  cadet  at  the  military  college  of  Sandhurst, 
England.  The  next  day  Senor  Prax&les  Mateo  Sagasta,  president 
of  Marshal  Serrano's  cabinet,  issued  a  counter  proclamation  in 
the  absence  of  his  chief,  Serrano,  who  was,  in  the  words  of  the 
proclamation,  "  at  this  very  moment  moving  the  army  of  the  north 
to  give  decisive  battle  against  the  Carlist  hosts."  He  appealed 
"  to  all  parties  which  bear  the  name  of  liberal  to  stifle  in  a  common 
effort  the  aspirations  of  absolutism,"  and  denounced  "a  rebellion 
which  .  .  .  [the  government]  could  not  favor,  if  it  spread,  any 
more  than  it  could  favor  Carlism  and  demagogy."  2 

The  general  infection  of  the  army,  however,  became  at  once  so 
apparent  that  President  Serrano  advised  his  cabinet  to  acquiesce, 
and  next  day,  December  31,  1874,  Senor  Ca" novas  del  Castillo, 
as  president  of  a  regency-ministry,  proclaimed  Alfonso  king.  The 
well-known  names  of  Castro,  Cardenas,  Jovellar,  Romero  Ro- 
bledo,  and  Lopez  de  Ayala,  which  were  to  reappear  at  intervals 
for  many  years,  were  among  those  of  the  new  government.  Cas- 
telar  and  Sagasta  were  in  long  eclipse.  The  republican  govern 
ment,  which  had  been  in  fact  but  a  dictatorship,  had  lasted  two 
years  less  a  month  and  a  half. 

On  January  9,  1875,  Alfonso  reached  Barcelona  and  on  the 
14th  arrived  in  Madrid,  and  the  era,  which  may  be  called  one  of 
stability  in  character  of  government,  began  which  has  continued 
to  this  day.  The  situation  has  been  nowhere  better  described 
than  by  the  American  minister  in  a  note  to  Mr.  Fish.  He  said: 
"The  change  of  government,  it  is  true,  has  been  brought  about 
by  military  pronunciamento;  but  it  is  not  competent  for  any  party 

1  Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  July  31,  1874,  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  898;  also 
despatch  of  August  14,  1874,  Ibid.,  904. 
3  Ibid.,  1875,  1083. 


1875]  SPAIN'S  RAPID   CHANGES  363 

in  Spain  to  find  fault  with  others  in  that  respect.  All  parties, 
one  after  the  other,  have  had  recourse  to  conspiracy,  violence, 
and  usurpation  in  order  to  attain  their  personal  or  party  ends.  It 
was  by  military  violence  that  Prim,  Serrano,  and  Topete  over 
threw  Queen  Isabel.  It  was  by  military  violence  that  Serrano 
became  president  by  the  will  of  Pavia.  And  although,  on  the  ab 
dication  of  Amadeo,  the  proclamation  of  the  republic  was  not  the 
act  of  this  or  that  general,  yet  it  was  brought  about  by  a  not  less 
flagrant  violation  of  order  and  constitutionalism  as  we  under 
stand  it,  a  mere  legislative  assembly  of  two  branches  having 
formed  themselves  into  a  constituent  convention  in  imitation  of  the 
worst  examples  of  the  French  revolution,  and  having  then  pro 
ceeded,  by  mere  usurpation  and  surprise,  to  impose  a  new  govern 
ment  on  Spain.  So  that  neither  the  militarism  nor  the  illegality 
of  the  movement  tends  in  the  least  degree  to  repel  the  acceptance 
of  it  in  any  part  of  the  country.  And  quite  as  little  repulsion  is 
produced  by  the  suddenness  of  the  movement,  or  the  brief  time 
occupied  in  its  consummation.  On  the  night  of  the  llth  of  Feb 
ruary,  1873,  all  Spain  went  to  bed  a  monarchy  and  woke  up,  to  its 
astonishment,  a  republic.  In  like  manner,  on  the  2d  of  January, 
1874,  the  republican  dictatorship  of  Castelar  disappeared  in  a  night, 
to  give  place  to  the  conservative  dictatorship  of  Serrano.  Hence, 
on  the  morning  of  the  31st  of  December,  1874,  it  did  not  appear 
at  all  extraordinary  to  the  Spaniards,  in  waking  up,  to  find  that 
the  republic  had  vanished  and  the  monarchy  returned  with  the 
dramatic  celerity  of  a  change  of  scenery  at  the  opera.  In  truth, 
all  the  great  actors  in  public  affairs  during  the  last  six  years,  Prim, 
Serrano,  Ruiz,  Zorrilla,  Figueras,  Pi  y  Margall,  Salmeran,  Caste 
lar,  have  lost  consideration  as  political  guides,  or  as  governors,  by 
the  absolute  failure  of  each  successively  to  prevent  or  terminate 
civil  war,  to  maintain  domestic  order,  to  regularize  the  public 
finances,  to  promote  industry  and  commerce,  to  protect  private 
persons  and  property,  to  introduce  liberty  without  anarchy  or  con 
servatism  without  despotism,  or  in  any  other  respect  to  establish 
good  government  in  Spain."  * 

Throughout  the  year  1875  the  main  energies  of  Spain  were 
given  to  the  Carlist  insurrection,  which  had  gone  on  six  years. 

1  Mr.  Cashing  to  Mr.  Fish,  January  5,  1875,  Foreign  Relations,  1875,  1084. 


364  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  [1875 

The  period  had  been  one  of  embargoes  and  decrees  against  those 
affiliated  with  the  Carlist  party.  Affairs  in  Cuba  had  been  running 
the  usual  course,  now  long  chronic,  of  petty  skirmishes,  slaughter 
of  prisoners,  and  destruction  of  property. 

On  November  5,  1875,  Secretary  Fish  addressed  a  long  note  to 
Mr.  Gushing  setting  forth,  in  view  of  his  recent  communications, 
the  determination  of  the  President  that  ways  and  means  must  be 
found  to  end  the  devastating  contest. 

This  elaborate  state  paper  which  in  the  sequel,  as  will  hereafter 
appear,  became  known  in  every  European  foreign  office  by  its 
number  as  "266"  was  called  for  by  the  democratic  House  on 
January  17, 1876.  The  chief  part  is  herewith  given.  Mr.  Fish  said : 

"After  the  expiration  of  more  than  eighteen  months,  it  seems 
advisable  to  examine  what  progress  has  been  made,  and  to  con 
sider  our  present  relations  with  Spain. 

"In  reference  to  the  arbitrary  seizure  and  withholding  of  the 
estates  and  property  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba, 
under  proceedings  of  confiscation  or  embargo,  so  called,  a  separate 
instruction  was  addressed  to  you  under  date  of  February  6,  prior 
to  your  departure  for  your  post. 

"  I  referred  therein  to  the  general  facts  surrounding  these  cases, 
to  the  arbitrary  action  of  the  authorities,  by  which  the  property 
of  American  citizens  had  been  seized  in  violation  of  treaty  provis 
ions  in  the  absence  of  judicial  proceedings,  without  hearing,  and 
under  such  circumstances  as  to  call  for  vigorous  protest  and  de 
mands  on  behalf  of  this  government.  The  general  facts  surround 
ing  these  cases  are  well  known. 

"  It  is  not  pretended,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  that  any  legal  justifica 
tion  for  these  wrongs  has  been  attempted  on  the  part  of  the  au 
thorities  of  Spain,  or  that  these  proceedings  in  Cuba  are  defended 
or  upheld.  On  the  contrary,  pursuant  to  the  decree  issued  by  the 
government  on  the  12th  of  July,  1873,  the  illegality  and  indefensi 
ble  character  of  these  acts  were  admitted,  and  the  embargoes  were 
ordered  to  be  removed  and  the  property  to  be  restored. 

"  This  decree  was  at  first  received  in  Cuba  with  calm  indifference, 
not  even  published  or  adverted  to,  and  the  proceedings  of  the 
authorities  were  in  no  notable  respect  changed  thereby. 

"  At  the  time  of  the  visit  of  Senor  Soler  y  Pla,  minister  of  ultramar, 


1875]  MR.  FISH'S  NO.   266  365 

the  decree  was  in  some  instances  recognized,  and  some  insignificant 
steps  taken,  in  individual  cases,  to  comply  therewith.  In  general, 
however,  it  was  claimed,  either  that  encumbrances  existed  mak 
ing  a  compliance  therewith  impossible,  or  the  delivery  was  offered 
burdened  by  leases  or  encumbrances,  and  coupled  with  unfair 
conditions  or  demands,  or  delivery  was  avoided,  on  the  ground  that 
particular  property  was  confiscated,  not  embargoed.  In  fact,  the 
decree  was  treated  in  general  with  supreme  indifference." 

Mr.  Fish  then  entered  upon  a  history  of  the  efforts  of  General 
Sickles  in  the  period  mentioned,  and  exhibited  a  series  of  promises 
and  of  trivial  and  unwarranted  pretexts  for  delay.  The  kindred 
question  of  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  American  citizens  with 
out  trial  was,  he  said,  in  the  same  position  of  constant  evasion  ex 
cept  in  isolated  cases,  "where  the  Spanish  government  has  been 
shown  that  insistence  on  trial  by  courts-martial  implied  a  state  of 
war  in  Cuba  which  might  lead  to  logical  consequences.  .  .  .  '  He 
went  on  to  deliver  a  broadside  against  the  conduct  of  Spain  during 
a  half  dozen  years  toward  the  United  States: 

"  In  the  cases  of  embargo  and  confiscation,  not  only  have  wrongs 
been  long  since  done,  but  continuing  and  repeated  wrongs  are  daily 
inflicted.  The  authorities  of  Spain  in  Cuba,  during  all  this  time, 
have  been  and  are  using  the  revenues  of  the  confiscated  or  em 
bargoed  estates,  appropriating  much  of  the  property  itself,  and  in 
some  cases  executing  long  leases,  or  actually  making  sales,  either  on 
the  allegation  that  taxes  were  due  or  without  any  excuse  whatever. 

"In  the  cases  of  arrest  and  punishment,  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  in  like  manner,  have  undergone  punishment  because  the 
authorities  of  Spain  do  not  meet  the  issue  and  decide  the  question. 

"  Turning  to  the  questions  which  arose  from  the  capture  of  the 
Virginia,  and  the  executions  which  followed,  no  extended  reference 
is  required. 

"The  particulars  of  the  delivery  of  the  vessel  to  this  government, 
and  the  payment  to  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  of  con 
siderable  sums  as  compensation  for  the  acts  of  the  authorities  in 
ordering  the  execution  of  fifty-three  of  the  passengers  and  crew 
under  circumstances  of  peculiar  brutality,  have  passed  into  history. 

"So  far  as  a  payment  of  money  can  atone  for  the  execution  of 
these  unprotected  prisoners  that  has  been  accomplished. 


366  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  11875 

"The  higher  and  more  imperative  duty  which  the  government 
of  Spain  assumed  by  the  protocol  of  November  29,  1873,  namely, 
to  bring  to  justice  General  Burriel  and  the  other  principal  offenders 
in  this  tragedy,  has  been  evaded  and  entirely  neglected. 

"Having  made  this  neglect  the  subject  of  a  separate  instruction, 
under  this  date,  I  abstain  from  further  reference  thereto. 

"While  I  have  no  desire  to  detract  from  the  settlement  which 
was  obtained  or  to  depreciate  the  action  of  Mr.  Castro,  the  minister 
of  state,  in  the  payment  of  the  indemnity,  particularly  as  he  seemed 
from  the  first  presentation  of  the  question  to  be  impressed  with  the 
justice  of  the  complaint,  and  to  regard  with  natural  aversion  the 
acts  which  gave  rise  to  it,  it  is  but  just,  in  considering  the  general 
course  of  the  authorities  in  Spain  toward  this  country,  to  refer  to  the 
long  delay  in  reaching  an  adjustment,  and  principally  to  the  fact 
that  a  basis  of  settlement  was  at  last  reached  only  after  every  delay 
had  apparently  been  exhausted. 

"  As  you  are  aware,  Mr.  Ulloa,  then  minister  of  state,  under  date 
of  August  18,  1874,  and  probably  impelled  by  some  pressing 
necessity,  addressed  the  British  charge  d'affaires  at  Madrid,  sub 
stantially  agreeing  to  settle  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  for  the  exe 
cution  of  the  British  subjects  on  board  that  vessel. 

"The  equally  strong,  if  not  stronger,  claim  of  the  United  States 
continued  to  be  discussed  in  Madrid  after  the  promise  of  settlement 
with  Great  Britain  had  been  made,  and  information  of  this  adjust 
ment  reached  this  government  a  considerable  time  after  its  con 
clusion,  and  not  through  the  authorities  of  Spain.  Our  settlement 
was  only  accomplished  in  the  month  of  March  following.  .  .  . 

"  It  would  be  idle  to  attempt  to  conceal  the  interest  and  sympa 
thy  with  which  Americans  in  the  United  States  regard  any  attempt 
of  a  numerous  people  on  this  continent  to  be  relieved  of  ties  which 
hold  them  in  the  position  of  colonial  subjection  to  a  distant  power, 
and  to  assume  the  independence  and  right  of  self-control  which 
natural  rights  and  the  spirit  of  the  age  accord  to  them. 

"  When,  moreover,  this  struggle,  in  progress  on  our  very  borders, 
from  its  commencement  has  involved  the  property  and  interests  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  has  disturbed  our  tranquillity  and 
commerce,  has  called  upon  us  not  infrequently  to  witness  barbarous 
violations  of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  and  compelled  us,  for 


1875]  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  367 

the  sake  of  humanity,  to  raise  our  voice  by  way  of  protest;  and 
when,  more  than  all,  we  see  in  the  contest  the  final  struggle  in  this 
hemisphere  between  slavery  and  freedom,  it  would  be  strange  in 
deed  if  the  government  and  people  of  this  country  failed  at  any  time 
to  take  peculiar  interest  in  the  termination  of  such  contest. 

"  In  this  early  instruction  was  expressed  the  sincere  and  unselfish^ 
hope  of  the  President  that  the  government  of  Spain  would  seek  some 
honorable  and  satisfactory  adjustment,  based  upon  emancipation 
and  self-government,  which  would  restore  peace  and  afford  a  pros 
pect  of  a  return  of  prosperity  to  Cuba. 

"Almost  two  years  have  passed  since  those  instructions  were 
issued  and  those  strong  hopes  expressed,  and  it  would  appear  that 
the  situation  has  in  no  respect  improved. 

"The  horrors  of  war  have  in  no  perceptible  measure  abated;  the 
inconveniences  and  injuries  which  we  then  suffered  have  remained, 
and  others  have  been  added ;  the  ravages  of  war  have  touched  new 
parts  of  the  island,  and  wellnigh  ruined  its  financial  and  agricultural 
system  and  its  relations  to  the  commerce  of  the  world.  No  effective 
steps  have  been  taken  to  establish  reforms  or  remedy  abuses,  and 
the  effort  to  suppress  the  insurrection  by  force  alone  has  been  a 
complete  failure. 

"In  the  meantime  the  material  interests  of  trade  and  of  com 
merce  are  impaired  to  a  degree  which  calls  for  remonstrance,  if  not 
for  another  line  of  conduct,  on  the  part  of  all  commercial  nations. 

"  Whether  it  be  from  the  severity  and  inhumanity  with  which  the 
effort  has  been  made  to  suppress  the  insurrection,  and  from  a 
supposed  justification  of  retaliation  for  violations  of  the  rules  of 
civilized  warfare  by  other  violations  and  by  acts  of  barbarism,  of 
incendiarism,  and  outrage,  the  world  is  witnessing  on  the  part  of  the 
insurgents,  whom  Spain  still  claims  as  subjects,  and  for  whose  acts, 
if  subjects,  Spain  must  be  held  accountable  in  the  judgment  of  the 
world,  a  warfare,  not  of  the  legitimate  strife  of  relative  force  and 
strength,  but  of  pillage  and  incendiarism,  the  burning  of  estates 
and  of  sugar  mills,  the  destruction  of  the  means  of  production  and 
of  the  wealth  of  the  island. 

"The  United  States  purchases  more  largely  than  any  other  people 
of  the  productions  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  and,  therefore,  more  than 
any  other  for  this  reason,  and  still  more  by  reason  of  its  immediate 


368  MR.  FISH'S  NO.   266  [1875 

neighborhood,  is  interested  in  the  arrest  of  a  system  of  wanton 
destruction  which  disgraces  the  age  and  affects  every  commercial 
people  on  the  face  of  the  globe^ 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Spain 
has  rejected  all  suggestions  of  reform  or  offers  of  mediation  made 
by  this  government,  and  has  refused  all  measures  looking  to  a  recon 
ciliation,  except  on  terms  which  make  reconciliation  an  impossi 
bility,  the  difficulty  of  the  situation  becomes  increased. 

"  When,  however,  in  addition  to  these  general  causes  of  difficulty, 
we  find  the  Spanish  government  neglectful  also  of  the  obligations  of 
treaties  and  solemn  compacts  and  unwilling  to  afford  any  redress 
for  long-continued  and  well-founded  wrongs  suffered  by  our  citi 
zens,  it  becomes  a  serious  question  how  long  such  a  condition  of 
things  can  or  should  be  allowed  to  exist,  and  compels  us  to  inquire 
whether  the  point  has  not  been  reached  where  longer  endurance 
ceases  to  be  possible. 

"  During  all  this  time,  and  under  these  aggravated  circumstances, 
this  government  has  not  failed  to  perform  her  obligations  to  Spain 
as  scrupulously  as  toward  other  nations. 

"  In  fact,  it  might  be  said  that  we  have  not  only  been  long-suffer 
ing,  because  of  the  embarrassments  surrounding  the  Spanish 
government,  but  particularly  careful  to  give  no  occasion  for  com 
plaint  for  the  same  reason. 

"  I  regret  to  say  that  the  authorities  of  Spain  have  not  at  all  times 
appreciated  our  intentions  or  our  purposes  in  these  respects,  and, 
while  insisting  that  a  state  of  war  does  not  exist  in  Cuba  and  that 
no  rights  as  belligerents  should  be  accorded  to  the  insurrectionists, 
have  at  the  same  time  demanded  for  themselves  all  the  rights  and 
privileges  which  flow  from  actual  and  acknowledged  war. 

"  It  will  be  apparent  that  such  a  state  of  things  cannot  continue. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  our  relations  with 
Spain,  even  on  their  present  footing,  that  our  just  demands  for  the 
return  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  their  estates  in  Cuba, 
unencumbered,  and  for  securing  to  them  a  trial  for  offences  ac 
cording  to  treaty  provisions  and  all  other  rights  guaranteed  by 
treaty  and  by  public  law  should  be  complied  with. 

"Whether  the  Spanish  government,  appreciating  the  forbear 
ance  of  this  country,  will  speedily  and  satisfactorily  adjust  the 


1875]  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  369 

pending  questions,  not  by  the  issue  of  empty  orders  or  decrees 
without  force  or  effect  in  Cuba,  but  by  comprehensive  and  firm 
measures  which  shall  everywhere  be  respected,  I  anxiously  await 
further  intelligence. 

"  Moreover,  apart  from  these  particular  questions,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  President  the  time  has  arrived  when  the  interests  of  this 
country,  the  preservation  of  its  commerce,  and  the  instincts  of  hu 
manity  alike  demand  that  some  speedy  and  satisfactory  ending  be 
made  of  the  strife  that  is  devasting  Cuba. 

"A  disastrous  conflict  of  more  than  seven  years*  duration  has 
demonstrated  the  inability  of  Spain  to  maintain  peace  and  order 
in  an  island  lying  at  our  door.  Desolation  and  destruction  of  life 
and  property  have  been  the  only  results  of  this  conflict. 

"The  United  States  sympathizes  in  the  fact  that  this  inability 
results  in  a  large  degree  from  the  unhappy  condition  of  Spain  at 
home,  and  to  some  extent  from  the  distractions  which  are  dividing 
her  people.  But  the  fact  remains.  Added  to  this  are  the  large 
expanse  of  ocean  separating  the  Peninsula  from  the  island,  and 
the  want  of  harmony  and  of  personal  sympathy  between  the  in 
habitants  of  the  territory  of  the  home  government  and  those  of  the 
colony,  the  distinction  of  classes  in  the  latter  between  rulers  and 
subjects,  the  want  of  adaptation  of  the  ancient  colonial  system  of 
Spain  to  the  present  times  and  to  the  ideas  which  the  events  of  the 
past  age  have  impressed  upon  the  peoples  of  every  reading  and 
thinking  country. 

"  Great  Britain,  wisely,  has  relaxed  the  old  system  of  colonial 
dependence,  and  is  reaping  the  benefits  in  the  contentedness 
and  peaceful  prosecution  of  the  arts  of  peace  and  in  the  chan 
nels  of  commerce  and  of  industry,  in  colonies  which,  under  re 
straint,  might  have  questioned  and  resisted  the  power  of  con 
trol  from  a  distant  government  and  might  have  exhibited,  as 
does  Cuba,  a  chronic  condition  of  insurrection,  turbulence,  and 
rebellion. 

"In  addition  to  all  this,  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  con 
tinued  maintenance,  in  the  face  of  decrees  and  enactments  to  the 
contrary,  of  a  compulsory  system  of  slave  labor  is  a  cause  of  dis 
quiet  and  of  excitement  to  a  large  class  in  the  island,  as  also  in  the 
United  States,  which  the  government  of  Spain  has  led  us,  by  very 


370  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  [1875 

distinct  assurances,  to  expect  should  be  removed,  and  which  the 
enlightened  Christianity  of  the  age  condemns. 

"The  contest  and  disorder  in  Cuba  affect  the  United  States  di 
rectly  and  injuriously  by  the  presence  in  this  country  of  partisans  of 
the  revolt  who  have  fled  hither  (in  consequence  of  the  proximitv 
of  territory)  as  to  a  political  asylum,  and  who,  by  their  plottings, 
are  disturbers  of  the  public  peace. 

The  United  States  has  exerted  itself  to  the  utmost,  for  seven 
years,  to  repress  unlawful  acts  on  the  part  of  these  self-exiled 
subjects  of  Spain,  relying  on  the  promise  of  Spain  to  pacify  the 
island.  Seven  years  of  strain  on  the  powers  of  this  government  to 
fulfil  all  that  the  most  exacting  demands  of  one  government  can 
make,  under  any  doctrine  or  claim  of  international  obligation, 
upon  another,  have  not  witnessed  the  much-hoped-for  pacifica 
tion.  The  United  States  feels  itself  entitled  to  be  relieved  of  this 
strain. 

"The  severe  measures,  injurious  to  the  United  States  and  often 
in  conflict  with  public  law,  which  the  colonial  officers  have  taken 
to  subdue  the  insurrection ;  the  indifference,  and  of  times  the  offen 
sive  assaults  upon  the  just  susceptibilities  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  and  their  government,  which  have  characterized  that  portion 
of  the  peninsular  population  of  Havana  which  has  sustained  and 
upheld,  if  it  has  not  controlled,  successive  governors-general,  and 
which  have  led  to  the  disregard  of  orders  and  decrees  which  the 
more  enlarged  wisdom  and  the  more  friendly  councils  of  the  home 
government  had  enacted;  the  cruelty  and  inhumanity  which  have 
characterized  the  contest,  both  on  the  part  of  the  colonial  govern 
ment  and  of  the  revolt,  for  seven  years,  and  the  destruction  of  valu 
able  properties  and  industries  by  arson  and  pillage,  which  Spain 
appears  unable,  however  desirous,  to  prevent  and  stop,  in  an  island 
three  thousand  miles  distant  from  her  shores,  but  lying  within  sight 
of  our  coast,  with  which  trade  and  constant  intercourse  are  unavoid 
able,  are  causes  of  annoyance  and  of  injury  to  the  United  States, 
which  a  people  cannot  be  expected  to  tolerate  without  the  assured 
prospect  of  their  termination. 

"The  United  States  has  more  than  once  been  solicited  by  the  in 
surgents  to  extend  to  them  its  aid,  but  has  for  years  hitherto  re 
sisted  such  solicitation,  and  has  endeavored  by  the  tender  of  its 


1875]  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  371 

good  offices,  in  the  way  of  mediation,  advice,  and  remonstrance, 
to  bring  to  an  end  a  great  evil,  which  has  pressed  sorely  upon  the 
interests  both  of  the  government  and  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  as  also  upon  the  commercial  interests  of  other  nations. 

"A  sincere  friendship  for  Spain,  and  for  her  people,  whether 
peninsular  or  insular,  and  an  equally  sincere  reluctance  to  adopt 
any  measures  which  might  injure  or  humble  the  ancient  ally  *  of  the 
United  States,  has  characterized  the  conduct  of  this  government 
in  every  step  during  these  sad  and  distressing  years,  and  the  Presi 
dent  is  still  animated  by  the  same  feelings,  and  desires  above  all 
things  to  aid  her  and  her  people  to  enter  once  more  upon  the  path 
of  safety  and  repose. 

"It  will  be  remembered  that  the  President,  in  the  year  1869, 
tendered  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  to  a  close  the  civil  war  in  Cuba.  This  offer  was  made 
delicately,  in  good  faith,  and  in  friendship  to  both  parties  to  the 
contest. 

"  General  Prim,  as  the  representative  of  the  Spanish  government, 
while  recognizing  the  good  faith  and  friendship  with  which  this 
offer  was  made,  replied : 

"  'We  can  better  proceed  in  the  present  situation  of  things  with 
out  even  this  friendly  intervention.  A  time  will  come  when  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  will  be  not  only  useful  but  indis 
pensable  in  the  final  arrangements  between  Spain  and  Cuba.  We 
will  ascertain  the  form  in  which  they  can  be  employed  and  confi 
dently  count  upon  your  assistance/ 

"The  United  States  replied  that  its  good  offices  for  that  object 
would  be  at  any  time  at  the  service  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict. 
This  government  has  ever  since  been  ready  thus  to  aid  in  restoring 
peace  and  quiet. 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  has  heretofore  given  ex 
pression  to  no  policy  in  reference  to  the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  be 
cause  it  has  honestly  and  sincerely  hoped  that  no  declaration  of 
policy  on  its  part  would  be  required. 

"The  President  feels  that  longer  reticence  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  interests  of  both  governments. 

1  Mr.  Fish  is  here  in  error:  Spain  was  never  an  ally  to  the  United  States; 
she  was  party  to  a  war  against  a  common  enemy. 


372  MR.   FISH'S  NO.   266  [1875 

"Our  relations  with  Spain  are  in  that  critical  position  that  an 
other  seizure  similar  to  that  of  the  Virginius,  other  executions  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba,  other  wrongs  of  a  less  ob 
jectionable  character  even  than  many  which  have  been  already 
suffered  by  our  citizens  with  simple  remonstrance,  or  possibly  even 
some  new  act  of  exceptional  severity  in  Cuba,  may  suddenly  pro 
duce  a  feeling  and  excitement  which  might  force  events  which  this 
government  anxiously  desires  to  avoid. 

"The  President  hopes  that  Spain  may  spontaneously  adopt 
measures  looking  to  a  reconciliation  and  to  the  speedy  restoration 
of  peace  and  the  organization  of  a  stable  and  satisfactory  system 
of  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba. 

"  In  the  absence  of  any  prospect  of  a  termination  of  the  war,  or 
of  any  change  in  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  conducted  on 
either  side,  he  feels  that  the  time  is  at  hand  when  it  may  be  the  duty 
of  other  governments  to  intervene,  solely  with  a  view  of  bringing 
to  an  end  a  disastrous  and  destructive  conflict,  and  of  restoring 
peace  in  the  island  of  Cuba.  No  government  is  more  deeply  in 
terested  in  the  order  and  peaceful  administration  of  this  island  than 
is  that  of  the  United  States,  and  none  has  suffered  as  has  the  United 
States  from  the  condition  which  has  obtained  there  during  the 
past  six  or  seven  years.  He  will,  therefore,  feel  it  his  duty  at  an 
early  day  to  submit  the  subject  in  this  light,  and  accompanied  by 
an  expression  of  the  views  above  presented,  for  the  consideration 
of  Congress. 

"This  conclusion  is  reached  with  reluctance  and  regret. 

"  It  is  reached  after  every  other  expedient  has  been  attempted 
and  proved  a  failure,  and  in  the  firm  conviction  that  the  period 
has  at  last  arrived  when  no  other  course  remains  for  this  gov 
ernment. 

"  It  is  believed  to  be  a  just  and  friendly  act  to  frankly  communi 
cate  this  conclusion  to  the  Spanish  government. 

"You  will  therefore  take  an  early  occasion  thus  to  inform  that 
government. 

"In  making  the  communication,  it  is  the  earnest  desire  of  the 
President  to  impress  upon  the  authorities  of  Spain  the  continued 
friendly  disposition  of  this  government,  and  that  it  has  no  ulterior 
or  selfish  objects  in  view  and  no  desire  to  become  a  party  in  the 


1875]  MR.  FISH'S  NO.   266  373 

conflict,  but  is  moved  solely  by  the  imperative  necessities  of  a 
proper  regard  to  its  own  protection  and  its  own  interests  and  the 
interests  of  humanity,  and,  as  we  firmly  believe,  in  the  ultimate 
interest  of  Spain  itself. 

"In  informing  the  Spanish  government  of  these  conclusions 
pursuant  hereto,  you  are  authorized  to  read  this  instruction  to  the 
minister  of  state,  or  to  state  the  substance  and  purport  thereof, 
as  you  may  deem  most  advisable." 

Mr.  Gushing  was  told  in  a  despatch  of  the  same  date: 

"It  has  been  deemed  proper  to  send  confidentially  a  copy  of  in 
struction  No.  266  to  General  Schenck,  the  minister  of  the  United 
States  at  London,  with  instructions  to  read  the  same  to  Lord 
Derby,  and  to  suggest  to  the  British  government  that  it  would 
be  agreeable  to  the  United  States,  and  in  our  opinion  tend  to 
the  adjustment  of  the  question  of  the  pacification  of  Cuba,  if  not 
to  the  preservation  of  general  peace,  if  the  British  government 
would  support  by  its  influence  the  position  assumed  by  this 
government. 

"A  copy  of  this  instruction  to  General  Schenck  is  herewith 
enclosed. 

"He  has  been  instructed,  as  you  will  perceive,  to  notify  the 
department  by  telegraph  of  the  result  of  this  communication  to 
Lord  Derby. 

"Should  it  appear  probable  that  the  British  government  will 
enforce  the  position  of  this  government,  it  may  be  wise  to  defer 
your  interview  with  the  minister  of  state  until  joint  action  can  be 
agreed  upon. 

"Should  that  government  hesitate,  or  decline,  you  will  be  at  once 
instructed  to  proceed  to  carry  out  the  instructions  contained  in 
No.  266.  In  case  the  government  of  Great  Britain  shall  deter 
mine  to  support  our  position  by  its  influence,  proper  instructions 
will  doubtless  be  sent  to  its  representative  in  Madrid  to  that 
effect. 

"  As  no  great  delay  will  be  occasioned  thereby,  it  is  deemed  better 
to  postpone  your  action  in  communicating  these  conclusions  until 

1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  Relative  to  Affairs  in  Cuba. 
Report  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  44-52;  also  House  Ex.  Doc.  90,  44  Cong., 
1  Sess. 


374  OBJECT  OF  NO.   266  [1875 

General  Schenck  shall  have  communicated  the  views  of  the  British 
government,  by  telegraph,  to  the  department,  and  telegraphic  in 
structions  can  be  sent  you  based  thereon. 

"  A  copy  of  instruction  No.  266  will  also  shortly  be  sent  to  all  our 
diplomatic  representatives,  in  confidence,  for  their  information,  and 
the  ministers  to  the  principal  European  courts  will  be  instructed  to 
communicate  its  purport  to  the  governments  to  which  they  are 
respectively  accredited."  l 

When  the  contents  of  No.  266  were  known  in  Europe,  it  was 
condemned  by  some  newspapers  as  offensive  in  tone  and  otherwise 
of  a  character  that  a  great  European  power  would  not  venture  to 
address  to  another,  and  that  it  was  also  in  effect  a  warlike  inter 
vention  in  the  affairs  of  an  independent  nation.  The  document, 
however,  was  not  addressed  to  a  foreign  nation.  If  other  powers 
than  Spain  were  permitted  to  see  it,  the  motive  was  to  enable 
them  to  appreciate  correctly  the  conduct  of  the  Washington  govern 
ment.  It  contained  conclusive  evidence  that  the  only  purpose  of 
Mr.  Fish  was  to  suppress  doings  in  Cuba  by  individuals  that  were 
hostile  and  injurious  to  the  United  States.  Mr.  Fish  sought 
nothing  but  security  against  future  wrongs  in  the  island.  He 
did  not  deny  that  Americans  who  remained  in  Cuba  must  obey 
Cuban  laws  fairly  applied  under  the  treaty  of  1795,  but  did  demand 
reparation  for,  and  future  security  against,  maltreatment.  No 
attack  on  the  independence  of  Spain  was  meditated.  The  object 
was  the  avoidance  of  it.  No  forcible  intervention  was  intimated 
unless  Spain  refused  to  restrain  her  officials  and  Spaniards  in  the 
island  from  injuring  and  annoying  the  United  States  in  violation  of 
the  law  of  nations,  or  confessed  inability  to  successfully  apply 
such  restraint.  The  independence  given  then  by  public  law 
to  Spain  in  Cuba,  as  to  the  United  States  in  the  Philippines  now, 
is  conditioned  on  reciprocal  obligation  to  protect  other  states  from 
preventible  and  unlawful  injuries. 

On  the  16th  of  November,  however,  and  before  Mr.  Fish's 
"No.  266,"  of  the  5th  of  that  month,  had  reached  Madrid,  Mr. 

1  Sen.  Rep.  855,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  52.  The  ministers  to  whom  this  was  sent 
were  those  accredited  to  Russia,  Germany,  Austria,  Italy,  France,  and  Port 
ugal.  For  the  identic  despatch  transmitting  No.  266  to  these  several  officials 
see  Ibid..  140;  for  that  to  Mr.  Schenck,  Ibid.  152. 


1875]  SENOR  CALDERON'S  CONCESSIONS  375 

Gushing  received  a  note,  dated  the  day  before,  of  much  length  from 
the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Sefior  Calderon  y  Collantes, 
meeting  in  a  most  friendly  and  cordial  spirit  some  of  the  demands 
of  the  United  States,  and  repeating  assurances  of  the  trial  of  General 
Burriel,  the  main  points  of  which  Mr.  Gushing  sent  in  a  telegram 
to  Mr.  Fish,  on  the  same  day,  as  follows: 

"Spanish  note  has  come  in.  It  is  eminently  amicable  in  spirit. 
It  concedes  everything  in  effect  or  substance;  disavows  all  trials 
of  our  citizens  for  things  done  in  our  country,  and  engages  annul 
ment  of  sentences  with  redress  otherwise  in  any  such  case,  which 
settles  the  confiscation  cases  in  principle;  argues  that  no  proper 
case  for  recognition  of  belligerence  exists  in  Cuba;  denies  that 
the  treaty  necessarily  intended  or  implied  exclusion  of  military 
tribunals,  but  engages  royal  order  either  for  trial  by  civil  magis 
trate,  or  for  special  guaranty  of  required  securities  of  fair  trial  in 
every  case,  including  lay  counsel  and  cross-examination  of  wit 
nesses;  promises  redress  in  any  existing  case  of  trial  in  disregard  of 
such  securities;  repeats  assurance  of  trial  of  Burriel;  drops  the 
Virginius.  As  the  note  contains  alternative  propositions  for 
your  consideration,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  act  in  the  premises 
without  special  instructions.  I  send  it  by  special  messenger  as  far 
as  London*." 

Mr.  Fish's  No.  266  of  November  5,  and  information  that  British 
good  offices  had  been  requested,  reached  Mr.  Cushing  on  Novem 
ber  25.  He  at  once  telegraphed: 

"You  call  for  my  opinion;  I  give  it  according  to  my  best  lights. 
If  Great  Britain  co-operates,  Spain  will  succumb  in  sullen  despair 
to  whatever  terms  the  two  governments  may  jointly  dictate;  but 
if  Great  Britain  refuses  to  co-operate,  Spain  will  conclude  that 
she  has  the  sympathy  of  all  European  powers,  more  especially 
as  she  thinks  she  has  now  gone,  by  her  note  of  the  15th,  to  the  ulti 
mate  point  in  each  of  the  particular  griefs  of  the  United  States. 
In  other  words,  there  will  be  war,  and  a  popular  though  desperate 
one  on  the  part  of  Spain,  unless  she  can  be  convinced  that  the  real 

1  MS.,  State  Department  Archives.  The  text  of  the  note  has  never  been 
printed,  but  the  general  purport  given  herewith  is  sufficiently  supplemented 
by  Senor  Calderon's  note  of  April  16,  1876  (Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  120),  to  make  its  insertion  unnecessary. 


376  MR.  CUSHING'S  VIEWS  [1875 

and  true  object  of  the  contemplated  measure  is  to  prevent  war,  as 
I  understand  it  to  be  intended.  But  to  ward  off  war  will  be  to 
exact  the  steady  exercise  of  my  personal  influence  here  (which 
my  colleagues  tell  me  is  great),  and  will  require  that  influence  to  be 
efficiently  backed  by  my  government  both  here  and  at  Washing 
ton.  I  am  here  to  'obey  orders  though  it  break  owners/  as  the 
shipmasters  say.  I  earnestly  beg  you,  therefore,  in  proportion  as 
you  desire  peace,  to  address  me  specific  and  explicit  replies 
in  regard  to  certain  needful  instructions  which  I  shall  ask 
for  by  telegram,  provided  a  negative  answer  comes  from  Great 
Britain."  l 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Fish:  "Many  of  the  most 
thoughtful  men  in  Spain  really  long  for  a  foreign  war  as  the  only 
efficient  remedy  for  the  domestic  dissensions  which  now  distract 
the  country.  Moreover,  the  statesmen  of  the  country  foresee  that, 
on  the  close  of  the  war  in  the  north,  which  cannot  fail  to  come 
in  the  course  of  the  winter,  or  early  in  the  spring,  there  will  be  an 
army  of  two  or  three  hundred  thousand  men  to  dispose  of,  with 
its  officers,  who  will  be  but  too  much  disposed  to  dominate  in 
public  affairs  and  push  the  civilians  into  the  background.  In 
addition  to  which  there  is  a  multitude  of  unthoughtful  men,  proud, 
angry,  resentful,  who  would  gladly  rush  into  a  war  with  the  United 
States.  Finally,  there  are  the  mercenary,  the  ambitious,  the  de- 
classes  and  the  bad,  to  whom  war  presents  the  usual  attractions. 
Multis  utile  helium,  says  Sallust.  It  is  the  received  opinion  in  Spain 
that  for  the  commencing  period  of  the  war  she  has  a  more  efficient 
navy  than  ours.  In  these  circumstances,  if  Great  Britain  declines 
to  co-operate  with  us,  Spain  will,  at  the  least,  despatch  to  Cuba 
at  once  a  large  fleet,  laden  with  troops,  there  to  await  the  eventual 
ities  of  diplomacy;  and  she  may  break  off  relations  with  a  hostile 
appeal  to  the  European  powers.  ...  I  have  no  wish  to  exaggerate 
the  results  lately  attained  by  me  here;  I  cannot  but  think,  however, 
that  the  contents  of  the  late  Spanish  note,  if  faithfully  carried  out 
in  detail,  as  they  certainly  would  be,  go  far  toward  satisfying  the 
particular  reclamations  of  the  United  States."  2 

The  next  day,  November  26,  1875,  ignorant  of  the  instruction  to 
General  Schenck  in  London  to  withhold  the  note,  Mr.  Gushing 

1  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.  2  Sess.,  53.  3  Ibid.,  53-54. 


1875]  THE  SPIRIT  OF  NO.   266  377 

telegraphed:  "The  response  of  England  lingers.  Time  passes,1 
...  I  cannot  read  your  despatch  to  the  Spanish  minister;  he 
does  not  understand  English.  To  state  its  substance  to  him  orally 
would  be  doing  extreme  injustice  to  the  despatch.  Why  not  give 
a  copy  to  the  Spanish  minister  ?  .  .  .  Will  you  authorize  me,  after 
the  Spanish  minister  is  informed,  in  whatever  way,  of  the  contents 
of  the  document,  to  talk  to  him  as  a  friend  and  well-wisher  re 
garding  what,  in  my  opinion,  Spain  ought  to  do,  may  honorably 
do  in  this  emergency?"  2 

The  reception  of  this  at  Washington  brought  the  following  reply: 
"Schenck  was  instructed  to  delay  presentation  of  266,  in  conse 
quence  of  your  telegram  of  the  16th.  The  President's  message 
will  discountenance  recognition  of  either  belligerency  or  inde 
pendence;  will  refer  to  the  injuries  to  the  United  States  and  its 
citizens  from  the  long-continued  struggle  and  the  absence  of  pros 
pect  of  termination;  will  intimate  intervention  as  an  ultimate 
necessity,  unless  satisfactory  results  be  soon  reached,  but  will  ab 
stain  from  advising  it  at  present;  will  refer  to  pending  proposals 
not  yet  received  here,  with  hope  that  they  may  afford  the  relief  re 
quired  and  lead  to  a  satisfactory  settlement  and  removal  of  causes 
of  grief;  will  intimate  that  a  communication  will  soon  be  made 
to  Congress  as  to  the  result  of  the  proposals  now  on  their  way, 
and  that,  if  it  do  not  satisfactorily  adjust  all  important  questions, 
he  will  before  long  make  a  recommendation  to  Congress  of  the 
course  to  be  pursued.  The  above  is  for  your  guidance  in  your 
interview  with  minister;  be  careful  that  it  be  not  communicated 
by  minister,  or  otherwise,  to  the  press,  or  public,  in  anticipation 
of  what  will  be  done  here.  The  instruction  266  is  not  intended  as 
minatory  in  any  sense  but  in  the  spirit  of  friendship,  as  a  notice  of  a 
necessity  which  may  be  forced  upon  the  President,  but  which  he 
hopes  to  avoid,  and  desires  Spain  to  aid  him  in  escaping.  We  are 
sincerely  desirous  to  preserve  peace  and  to  establish  all  relations 
with  Spain  on  the  most  amicable  and  liberal  basis,  but  we  must 
be  relieved  and  be  secure  as  to  the  future,  and  you  may^ive  posi 
tive  assurances  to  this  effect. 

1  Referring  to  the  need  of  the  President's  placing  in  his  message  the  situa 
tion  before  Congress,  about  to  meet. 

2  Telegram,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  55. 


378  THE  SPIRIT  OF  NO.   266  [1875 

"You  may  give  copy  of  266  to  minister,  and  may  speak  in  the 
sense  indicated  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday,  provided  it  be 
not  to  do  away  the  object  of  the  instruction.  You  will  make  the 
communication  and  present  copy  of  instruction,  without  waiting 
for  presentation  in  London.  Schenck  will  to-day  be  instructed  to 
read  paper  as  soon  as  he  can."  1 

Whatever  exasperation  existed  on  the  part  of  either  country,  and 
whatever  the  attitude  in  general  of  American  or  Spanish  politicians, 
there  can  be  no  question  that,  at  the  moment,  both  governments  were 
fortunate  in  the  men  who  were  in  the  immediate  direction  of  affairs. 
No  statesman  of  any  period  was  moved  by  sincerer  or  loftier  motives 
looking  to  the  general  good  than  was  Mr.  Fish,  the  American  secre 
tary  of  state,  whose  influence  was  all-powerful  with  President  Grant 
and  through  him  with  Congress.  In  Spain,  Sefior  Calderon  had  left 
his  congenial  post  of  minister  of  grace  and  justice  for  that  of  the 
minister  of  state,  trusting  to  co-operate  with  the  American  minis 
ter,  a  personal  friend  of  long  standing,  in  the  hope  of  healing  all 
differences.2 

Mr.  Gushing  himself  had  long  known  Spain,  spoke  its  lan 
guage,  and  was  in  sympathy  with  its  people.  All  these  elements 
combined  for  peace,  and  on  November  30  Mr.  Gushing,  as  in 
structed,  placed  in  the  hands  of  Senor  Calderon  No.  266,  saying: 

"This  despatch  is  not  conceived  in  any  minatory  sense,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  in  the  spirit  of  friendship,  as  a  notice  of  a  pressing 
necessity,  which  may  force  the  hand  of  the  President  in  given 
circumstances  from  which  he  desires  to  save  himself,  and  desires 
Spain  to  aid  him  in  escaping  them.  He  sincerely  desires  to  main 
tain  peace  and  to  establish  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
Spain  upon  the  most  friendly  and  liberal  bases,  provided  they 
contain  satisfaction  for  the  present  and  security  for  the  future; 
and  I  am  authorized,  to  this  end,  to  offer  the  most  positive  as 
surances  to  the  government  of  his  majesty."  Mr.  Gushing  also 
at  the  same  time  gave  the  short  synopsis  of  the  President's  annual 
message  to  Congress,  sent  in  Mr.  Fish's  telegram  of  the  27th.3 

The  paper  was  received  by  Sefior  Calderon  in  the  spirit  for 
which  Mr.  Fish  had  hoped,  and  in  which  Mr.  Gushing  assured 

1  Telegram,  November  27,  1875,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  56. 

2  lbid.t  62.  3  Ibid.,  58. 


1875]  PRESIDENT  GRANT'S  MESSAGE  379 

it  to  be  intended.  "Mr.  Calderon,"  said  Mr.  Gushing,  "has 
carefully  read  your  266;  admits  its  grievances;  is  opposed  in 
principle  to  sequestration  of  property  of  foreigners;  condemns  the 
delays  of  redress;  will  take  up  and  promptly  settle  each  case; 
will  remove  all  cause  of  complaint  as  to  treaty;  reprobates  con 
duct  of  local  authorities  in  Cuba  as  more  injurious  to  Spain  than 
to  the  United  States."  1 

The  annual  message  of  President  Grant  of  December  7,  1875, 
which  became  a  classic  on  the  subject  of  Cuba,  did  much  to  create 
a  not  unfavorable  impression  in  Europe  of  Mr.  Fish's  proposal.  It 
opened  the  question  with  a  statement  of  the  complete  success  of 
the  department  of  state  in  obtaining  all  it  sought  as  pecuniary  rep 
aration  in  the  affair  of  the  Virginius  by  the  prompt  payment  of 
eighty  thousand  dollars,  which  had  been  distributed  among  the 
American  passengers  and  crew,  or  the  families  of  those  who  died. 
It  then  went  on  to  say,  among  other  things : 

"While  conscious  that  the  insurrection  in  Cuba  has  shown  a 
strength  and  endurance  which  make  it  at  least  doubtful  whether 
it  be  in  the  power  of  Spain  to  subdue  it,  it  seems  unquestionable 
that  no  civil  organization  exists  which  may  be  recognized  as  an  in 
dependent  government  capable  of  performing  its  international  ob 
ligations  and  entitled  to  be  treated  as  one  of  the  powers  of  the  earth. 
A  recognition,  under  such  circumstances,  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  facts,  and  would  compel  the  power  granting  it  soon  to 
support  by  force  the  government  to  which  it  had  really  given  its 
only  claim  of  existence.  In  my  judgment,  the  United  States  should 
adhere  to  the  policy  and  principles  which  have  heretofore  been  its 
sure  and  safe  guides  in  like  contests  between  revolted  colonies  and 
their  mother  country." 

The  President  reproduced  the  arguments  of  his  previous  mes 
sages  to  Congress  against  the  recognition  of  belligerency,  .which 
he  still  regarded  "as  unwise  and  premature,"  and  "at  present 
indefensible  as  a  measure  of  right."  He  said:  " Each  party  seems 
quite  capable  of  working  great  injury  and  damage  to  the  other 
.  .  .  but  they  seem  incapable  of  reaching  any  adjustment.  .  .  . 
Under  the  circumstances,  the  agency  of  others,  either  by  mediation 
or  by  intervention,  seems  to  be  the  only  alternative  which  must, 
1  Telegram,  December  4,  1875,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  61. 


380  PRESIDENT  GRANT'S  MESSAGE  [1875 

sooner  or  later,  be  invoked  for  the  termination  of  the  strife.  At  the 
same  time,  while  thus  impressed,  I  do  not,  at  this  time,  recommend 
the  adoption  of  any  measure  of  intervention.  I  shall  be  ready  at 
all  times,  and  as  the  equal  friend  of  both  parties,  to  respond  to  a 
suggestion  that  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  will  be  ac 
ceptable,  to  aid  in  bringing  about  a  peace  honorable  to  both.  It 
is  due  to  Spain,  so  far  as  this  government  is  concerned,  that  the 
agency  of  a  third  power,  to  which  I  have  adverted,  shall  be  adopted 
only  as  a  last  expedient.  Had  it  been  the  desire  of  the  United 
States  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba,  repeated  opportunities 
for  so  doing  have  been  presented  in  the  last  few  years,  but  we  have 
remained  passive,  and  have  performed  our  whole  duty  and  all 
international  obligations  to  Spain  with  friendship,  fairness,  and 
fidelity,  and  with  a  spirit  of  patience  and  forbearance  which 
negatives  every  possible  suggestion  of  desire  to  interfere  or  to  add 
to  the  difficulties  with  which  she  has  been  surrounded." 

He  referred  to  the  Spanish  proposals  of  November  15,1  not  yet 
received  in  their  full  text,  with  the  hope  that  they  would  "lead  to 
a  satisfactory  adjustment,"  and  concluded  with  the  statement  that 
if  disappointed  in  such  a  hope,  he  should  feel  it  his  duty  to  make 
a  further  communication  to  Congress  during  the  pending  session, 
"recommending  what  may  then  seem  to  me  to  be  necessary."  2 

The  President  did  not  make  a  further  communication  on  the 
subject.  The  House  at  this  time  was  controlled  by  the  dem 
ocrats.  The  important  point  was  the  reservation  by  the  Presi 
dent,  in  his  own  hands,  of  action  in  Cuban  affairs.  The  situ 
ation  was  much  akin  to  that  to  come  in  1898.  Had  he  at  this 
moment  yielded  to  Congress  the  determination  of  what  should 
have  been  done,  there  would  almost  certainly  have  been  war. 

The  President  and  his  secretary  of  state  responded  frankly,  as 
Mr.  Gushing  asked,  in  regard  "  to  the  real  and  true  object"  of  No. 
266.  They  gave  the  specific  and  needful  replies  to  Mr.  Cushing's 
inquiries.  He  was  authorized  to  give  a  copy  of  No.  266  to  the 
Spanish  minister  of  state.  He  was  authorized  "to  talk  to  him 
as  a  friend,"  provided  the  object  of  No.  266  be  not  done  away 
with.  Something  was  accomplished  for  the  United  States,  but  not 
that  which  was  essentially  needful.  Spain,  profuse  in  her  promises 

1  Supra,  374,  375.  2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  VII,  332. 


1876]  SPAIN  ASKS  ADVICE  381 

in  October  and  November,  obtained  that  which  she  sought:  a  con 
servative  tone  in  the  President's  message. 

Meanwhile,  on  December  2,  1875,  came  an  intimation  that 
Great  Britain  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  help  Mr.  Gushing. 
Mr.  Layard,  the  British  ambassador  at  Madrid,  called  upon  Mr. 
Gushing  and  expressed  readiness  to  back  him,  but  not  until  "our 
respective  governments  should  have  settled  on  a  line  of  action 
and  instructed  us  to  that  effect.  He  expresses  great  discontent  at 
the  failure  of  Spain  to  pay  attention  to  the  various  claims,  thirteen 
in  number,  presented  by  him  in  behalf  of  his  government,  and  says 
that  the  situation  will  be  untenable  here  without  some  improve 
ment  in  the  conduct  of  the  business  of  the  ministry  of  state.  He 
thinks  Great  Britain  has  abundant  cause  of  her  own  to  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  under  her  slave-trade  treaties  with  Spain."  J 

Madrid  did  not  fail  to  realize  the  meaning  of  that!  It  had  weight 
with  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  who  later  spoke  to  Mr.  Gushing 
"of  the  political  necessity  of  abandoning  the  old  colonial  system 
and  of  promptly  bringing  about  emancipation  of  the  slaves."  He 
added  that  if  it  were  in  his  power  to  speak  directly  to  the  American 
secretary  of  state  he  would  beg  to  ask  him  explicitly,  as  a  friend,  the 
precise  thing  which  he  would  wish  Spain  to  do  under  the  mediation 
of  the  United  States,  with  the  assurance  that,  if  just  or  practicable, 
"Spain  would  be  but  too  glad  to  do  it,  as  well  in  her  own  interest 
as  in  good-will  toward  the  United  States,  and  in  the  consciousness 
that  the  United  States  and  Spain  are  by  commercial  ties  inseparably 
associated  in  the  question  of  the  tranquillity  and  prosperity  of 
Cuba."  2 

A  few  days  after  this  conversation  there  was  a  leader  in  the 
London  Times  on  No.  266,  which  probably  expressed  controlling 
English  opinion.  It  ran  thus: 

"It  will  be  very  difficult  to  answer  an  indictment  so  formidable 
in  itself  and  ending  in  so  mild  a  demand.  The  purists  of  inter 
national  law  may  at  once  be  warned  off  the  field  of  discussion. 
They  may  say  that  the  United  States  has  no  more  right  to  dictate 
how  Spain  shall  govern  Cuba  than  Spain  has  to  order  the  reorgani- 

1  Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  December  3,  1875,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  59. 

2  Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  January  16,  1876,  Ibid.,  78. 


382  BRITISH  OPINION  [1876 

zation  of  the  South.  They  may  say  that  the  American  citizens  who 
live  in  Cuba  went  there  at  their  own  risk,  and  must  bear  the  in 
evitable  penalties  of  civil  war.  Much  the  same  fate,  it  may  be 
pleaded,  would  have  come  to  any  Spaniards  who  had  owned  prop 
erty  in  Virginia  during  the  war  between  the  North  and  the  South, 
and  yet  they  would  have  received  no  redress.  Nor,  it  might  be 
added,  were  either  the  Confederate  or  the  Federal  cruisers  particu 
larly  respectful  of  foreign  rights  in  their  efforts  to  destroy  each 
other.  But  these  arguments  are  fit  merely  for  lecture-rooms.  The 
practical  answer  is  that  the  general  rules  of  international  usage, 
conveniently  called  international  law,  can  be  applied  only  to  ordi 
nary  cases  of  warfare.  Since  there  is  no  international  parliament, 
each  nation  is  justified  in  defending  its  interests  by  exceptional 
measures  when  they  are  attacked  in  an  exceptional  manner.  .  .  . 
America  is  acting  with  at  least  as  much  moderation  as  this  country 
would  display  if  Cuba  were  as  near  to  Cornwall  as  it  is  to  Florida. 
In  such  a  case  we  should  require  Spain  to  protect  the  property  of 
our  countrymen  and  to  take  the  obvious  means  of  restoring  her 
colony  to  a  state  of  peace,  by  abolishing  slavery  and  allowing  the 
Cubans  to  rule  themselves."  l 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Fish  informed  Mr.  Gushing  on 
November  5,  1875,  that  a  copy  of  No.  266  will  "shortly  be  sent  to 
all  our  diplomatic  representatives  in  confidence  for  their  informa 
tion,  and  the  ministers  at  the  principal  European  courts  will  be 
instructed  to  communicate  the  purport  to  the  governments  to  which 
they  are  respectively  accredited."  The  minister  at  London  was 
directed  to  read  it  to  Lord  Derby  and  to  suggest  that  it  would  be 
agreeable  to  the  United  States  "if  the  British  government  would 
support  by  its  influence  the  position  assumed  by  this  govern 
ment."  No.  266  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  continental 
powers,  but  not  in  the  same  terms  as  to  Great  Britain,  the 
suggestion  being  made  "that  should  these  governments  .  .  .  see 
fit  to  urge  upon  Spain  the  necessity  for  abandoning  or  termin 
ating  the  contest  in  Cuba,  such  a  course  would  be  satisfactory  to 
this  government  and  conducive  to  the  interests  of  all  commercial 
nations."  2 

1  London  Times,  January  26,  1876. 

2  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  99.     See  also  note,  Supra,  374. 


18761  WANT  OF  DIPLOMATIC  INSTINCT  383 

But  Great  Britain's  action  finally  was  distinctly  against  giving 
aid  to  Mr.  Gushing,  Lord  Derby  declaring  "that  if  nothing  were 
contemplated  beyond  an  amicable  interposition  having  peace  for 
its  object,  the  time  was  ill-chosen  and  the  move  premature."  1 

At  the  time  of  the  writing  of  the  foregoing  in  the  Times,  and  of 
Lord  Derby's  declaration  to  Mr.  Schenck,  and  of  the  saying  to  Mr. 
Gushing  by  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  that  he  would  like  to  ask 
Mr.  Fish  explicitly  for  "the  precise  thing  which  he  would  wish 
Spain  to  do  under  the  circumstances,"  the  President's  message  of 
December,  1875,  was  in  Europe.  If  by  its  aid  a  reasonably  good 
diplomatic  instinct  had  been  applied  to  the  interpretation  of  No. 
266,  the  result,  with  the  Spanish  government  in  the  frame  of  mind 
expressed  in  Senor  Calderon's  note  of  November  15,2  and  as  soon 
as  the  Carlists  should  be  defeated  as  they  were  soon  to  be,  must  have 
been  that  which  the  administration  at  Washington  sought:  a  full 
amnesty  to  the  rebels  in  Cuba,  a  cessation  of  fighting,  a  release  of 
embargoed  estates,  a  faithful  observance  of  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty  of  1795,  a  liberal  local  government  in  the  island  with  nominal 
sovereignty  retained  by  Spain,  and  gradual  emancipation  of  the 
slaves.  The  Times  may  have  been  correct  in  describing  that  as  a 
"mild  demand,"  but  it  also  should  have  been  intelligent  and  frank 
enough  to  say  that  if  the  property  or  person  of  a  foreigner  was  in 
jured  unlawfully  during  the  war  of  secession  reparation  was  made 
to  him. 

The  real  difficulties  in  Cuba  grew  out  of  two  insurrections,  the 
primary  one  that  of  Yara  in  1868;  the  second  grew  out  of  the 
domination  of  the  captain-general  by  the  Casino  Espanol  and  the 
Spanish  volunteers,  and  the  consequent  disregard  of  the  govern 
ment  at  Madrid.  What  the  President  of  the  United  States  de 
manded  in  No.  266  was  that,  so  far  as  American  citizens  were 
concerned,  Madrid  should  make  its  authority  in  Cuba,  and  quick 
obedience  to  its  orders,  a  reality. 

On  January  21,  1876,  the  President  sent  to  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  on  its  request,  a  copy  of  No.  266  and  cognate  papers. 
On  the  next  day  the  House  asked  for  copies  of  any  correspondence 
with  any  European  government  during  the  year  1875,  other  than 

1  Mr.  Schenck  to  Mr.  Fish,  January  28,  1876,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2 
Seas.,  162.  2  Supra,  375. 


384  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  [1876 

Spain,  relative  to  Cuba.     The  President  replied  that  there  had 
been  none.1 

Meanwhile  and  subsequently  there  was  criticism  of  the  admin 
istration,  for  its  violation  of  the  "Monroe  doctrine"  in  what  it 
had  done.  The  documents  sent  to  Congress  in  1876,  those  fur 
nished  twenty  years  later  in  the  period  of  the  second  Cuban 
rebellion,  and  the  information  of  the  contents  of  notes  from  the 
state  department  to  our  ministers  abroad,  set  forth  in  1906  in  the 
digest  of  international  law  so  ably  edited  by  Mr.  John  Bassett 
Moore,2  give  the  details  of  what  occurred.  They  make  appar 
ent  that  No.  266  had  simply  been  communicated  to  European 
governments  and  conversations  had  taken  place  regarding  it 
between  our  representatives  and  those  governments,  as  well  as 
between  Mr.  Fish  and  the  ministers  of  those  governments  at 
Washington.  This  exhibit  clearly  shows  that  the  only  object  of 
Mr.  Fish  was  that  which  he  had  described  to  Mr.  Gushing  in  the 
note  to  him  of  November  5,  1875.  It  may  possibly  be  now 
thought  that  under  the  present  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  there  was,  in  1875,  a  violation  of  it;  but  certainly  the 
author  of  that  doctrine,  John  Quincy  Adams,  could  not  have  been 
of  that  opinion  in  1826  had  the  facts  been  before  him.  He  was 
then  President,  and  his  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Clay,  on  May  26 
of  that  year,  instructed  the  American  minister  at  St.  Petersburg 
to  ask  the  Russian  government  to  aid  in  bringing  about  peace 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  with  especial  reference  to  safe 
guarding  Cuba  from  attack  by  Colombia  and  Mexico.3 

However  that  may  be,  the  inference  is  that  offering  to  the  great 
European  powers  an  opportunity  to  advise  Spain,  in  the  greatest 
of  her  many  great  difficulties,  was  salutary,  although  nearly  all 
drew  back  from  the  suggestion.  From  the  point  of  view  of  these 
powers,  whose  interests  were  so  much  less  than  those  of  the  United 
States,  there  were  for  the  moment  fair  reasons  for  their  own  in 
action.  The  Duke  De*cazes,  the  French  foreign  minister,  said: 
"The  great  obstacle  to  any  result  lies  in  the  powerlessness  of  the 
government  of  the  young  Alphonso.  That  weakness  as  regards 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  VII,  357.       a  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  92-105. 
3  Supra,  207;  also  Moore,  Digest,  VI,  447,  where  are  many  references  to  the 
subject  at  this  earlier  period. 


1875]  REASONS  FOR  INACTION  385 

this  particular  question  arises  from  a  general  condition  (ensemble) 
of  affairs  in  Spain.  Many  circumstances  together  have  produced 
such  a  situation  that,  although  the  Spanish  government  might  wish 
to  take  such  steps  as  were  proposed — tending  to  self-government  and 
emancipation  in  Cuba — it  does  not  do  it.  It  would  fail  if  it  at 
tempted  a  policy  which  could  be  used  against  it  with  Spanish  people. 
The  northern  provinces  disturbed  by  the  Carlists  and  Cuba  with 
its  insurrection  are  both  held  with  difficulty.  The  young  king's 
government  must  move  with  exceeding  care.  Besides,  there  is 
doubt  of  the  power  of  the  home  government  to  enforce  its  will. 
The  young  king  dare  not  commence  his  reign  with  a  failure  (de- 
failla?ice).  ...  If  the  Spanish  government  allowed  the  Carlists  a 
pretext  to  assume  to  be  the  champions  of  the  preservation  of  the 
colony  of  Spain  it  would  increase  its  embarrassments.  There  is  the 
recent  letter  of  Don  Carlos,  proposing  to  subdue  the  rebellion  in 
Cuba;  the  Spanish  people  (ces  pauvres  diables  Espagnols)  take  it 
for  serious  and  do  not  see  the  ridiculous  side  of  it."  l 

Portugal  feared  for  her  independence  and  the  establishment  of 
an  Iberian  Union  as  compensation  to  Spain  should  the  latter  lose 
Cuba.2  Italy,  only,  of  all  the  powers,  offered  to  instruct  her  min 
ister  to  urge  the  expediency  of  Spain's  fulfilling  duties  to  the  United 
States  and  pacifying  Cuba,  without  specifying  measures.3 

While  the  moment  may  not  have  been  altogether  favorable, 
eastern  Europe,  besides  the  reasons  mentioned,  being  in  the  ferment 
which  in  a  little  more  than  a  year  was  to  develop  into  the  Russian- 
Turkish  war,  it  is  not  wholly  unjust  to  suppose  that  while  the  con 
cert  of  the  powers  was  accustomed  to  act  upon  questions  of  such  a 
character  affecting  Europe,  it  was  not  quite  ready  to  admit  the 
United  States,  a  country  without  dynastic  relations  with  Europe,  to 
its  intimacy  upon  a  question  so  remotely  affecting  them  as  that  of 
Cuba.  There  could  be  seen  in  this  reserve  the  jealousy  of  the  en 
trance  to  its  councils  of  a  comparatively  new  power,  so  recently  out 
of  the  throes  of  a  great  civil  war,  during  which  it  had  the  real  friend 
ship  of  but  one 4  and  the  marked  enmity  of  two  of  the  most  power- 

aMr.  Hitt,  charg6  d'affaires,  to  Mr.  Fish,  December  10,  1875,  Sen.  Rep. 
885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  143. 

2  Mr.  Moran,  minister  to  Portugal,  to  Mr.  Fish,  December  31, 1875,  Ibid.,  171. 

3  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Gushing,  December  20,  1875,  Ibid.,  65.  4  Russia. 


386  REASONS  FOR  INACTION  [1875 

ful.  As  to  England,  the  significant  fact,  alluded  to  in  No.  266,  is 
not  to  be  forgotten  that,  as  early  as  August,  1874,  Spain  consented 
to  make  pecuniary  reparation  (withheld  from  the  knowledge  of 
the  United  States)  for  British  subjects  on  the  Virginius  who  were 
put  to  death,  but  reparation  for  citizens  of  the  United  States,  slain 
under  the  same  circumstances,  was  delayed  and  refused  for  seven 
months  thereafter. 

Nor  would  it  have  been  unnatural  if  recent  incidents  growing  out 
of  the  American  case  and  the  Geneva  award,  checked  at  London 
to  aid  at  Madrid  one,  who  as  Mr.  Gushing,  had  been  so  conspicuous 
in  pursuing  Great  Britain  on  account  of  the  Confederate  cruisers. 
As  events  turned,  the  one  country  to  suffer  from  the  apathy  shown 
by  Europe  was  Spain. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


ON  February  3,  1876,  the  American  minister  received  from 
Sefior  Calderon  a  memorandum  giving  a  review  of  the  Cuban 
situation,  which  had  been  sent,  as  a  reply  to  Mr.  Fish's  No.  266,  to 
the  Spanish  representatives  near  European  governments  as  well 
as  to  the  minister  at  Washington.  It  was  an  able  presentation  of 
the  Spanish  side  of  the  question.  Seiior  Calderon  showed  that  of 
the  leaders  of  the  secession  movement,  all  of  whom  were  Cubans, 
not  one  was  now  living.  Of  those  who  succeeded  them  in  command 
not  one  was  a  Cuban.  Maximo  Gomez,  the  principal,  was  a 
Dominican,  as  was  Modesto  Diaz;  Rulof  was  a  Pole;  the  person 
known  as  El  Inglesito,  an  Englishman.  "Their  forces,"  he  said, 
"now  consist  of  negroes,  mulattoes,  Chinese,  deserters  from  the 
battalions  which  were  formed  provisionally  in  Santo  Domingo 
during  our  brief  rule  there,  and  a  few  independent  bodies  which 
were  formed  in  Spain  during  the  most  disorderly  period  of  the  revo 
lution.  ...  It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  there  are  to-day 
not  more  than  eight  hundred  white  natives  of  Cuba  with  arms  in 
their  hands  in  the  insurgent  ranks.  The  consequence  of  this  radi 
cal  change  in  the  elements  of  the  insurrection  is,  that  what  could  be 
considered,  in  the  beginning,  as  a  struggle  for  independence  has 
now  assumed  a  character  of  ferocity,  and  become  a  war  of  races 
and  of  devastation,  which  it  was  not  before.  Wherever  a  band  of 
insurgents  make  their  appearance  they  steal  and  plunder  every 
thing  that  they  can  lay  their  hands  on  and  set  fire  to  the  crops  and 
buildings.  .  .  .  Not  a  single  instance  can  be  pointed  to  in  which 
such  a  deed  has  been  committed  by  our  troops.  ...  It  is  easy 
to  estimate  what  would  be  the  consequences,  not  only  for  Spain 
but  for  the  world  at  large,  of  the  triumph  (which  is  fortunately 
quite  impossible)  of  such  an  insurrection.  If  such  a  triumph 

387 


388  SPAIN'S  STATEMENT  TO  EUROPE  [1876 

were  once  gained  through  the  efforts  of  the  negroes,  mulattoes, 
and  adventurers,  the  power  would  be  in  their  hands;  they  would 
establish  such  a  government  as  their  capacity  would  permit,  and, 
far  from  being  the  commencement  of  an  era  of  peace  for  the  island 
and  of  security  for  the  interests  of  Europe  and  America,  it  would 
be  the  utter  ruin  of  them  all  and  the  end  of  all  civilization.  .  .  . 
The  triumph  of  Spain  would  soon  be  followed  by  the  judicious  but 
total  abolition  of  slavery,  which  still  exists  in  Cuba  in  spite  of 
the  sincere  wishes  of  his  majesty's  government;  it  would  in 
sure  the  administrative  reforms  which  have  been  offered  to  the 
island;  it  would  open  the  door  to  the  representation  of  the  in 
habitants  in  the  Congress  of  Deputies;  and  finally,  it  would  speed 
ily  bring  to  pass  what  will  in  vain  be  sought  by  other  means." 

He  referred  to  the  measures  already  carried  out  in  Puerto  Rico  as 
a  guarantee  of  Spain's  intentions.  He  mentioned  as  a  surety  of 
putting  down  the  insurrection  the  presence  in  Cuba  of  45  ships 
with  135  guns  and  2,426  seamen ;  and  in  the  army,  a  total  of  273 
general  officers,  3,054  officers,  68,115  soldiers,  8,475  horses,  462 
mules,  and  42  field-pieces,  shortly  to  be  added  to  by  10,370  men 
who  had  embarked  for  the  island,  making  a  total  regular  force 
of  over  78,000  men.  In  addition,  there  was  a  force  of  volunteers 
of  over  50,000. 

He  stated  that  in  the  western  department  the  sugar  estates  had 
increased  in  number  instead  of  diminishing;  there  were  in  the 
west,  which  was  the  great  sugar  district,  1,070,  while  in  the  cen 
tral  department  there  were  but  102,  and  in  the  east  200.  He  showed 
that  the  real  wealth  of  the  island  as  well  as  the  great  mass  of  the 
population  was  in  the  west,  as  yet  but  little  disturbed  by  the 
insurrection;  that  the  receipts  from  duties  were  constantly  in 
creasing,  and  that  the  general  commerce  of  the  island  with  the 
world  had  not  suffered  in  volume.1 

That  the  sympathies  of  the  American  minister  were  with  Senor 
Calderon  is  clear.  "  Spain/'  he  said, "  is  willing  enough  to  confide  in 
us  if  we  will  let  her.  The  proof  of  that  is  found  not  in  profession 
(although  that  we  have),  but  in  the  analysis  of  the  diplomatic  re 
lations  of  Spain  with  other  powers  contained  in  previous  despatches. 
In  fine,  whatever  causes  of  grief  or  jealousy  she  has  against  us,  she 

1  For  this  memorandum  in  full,  see  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  92-96. 


1876]    SENOR  CALDERON'S  SATISFACTORY  WORDS      389 

has  greater  against  others.  Nevertheless,  she  is  now  anxious  and 
suspicious  with  regard  to  the  United  States.  She  knows  that 
thousands  of  bad  Spaniards  (called  Cubans),  having  a  holy  horror 
of  the  smell  of  gunpowder,  have  fled  to  'snug  harbor'  in  New  York, 
Key  West,  and  New  Orleans,  have  been  dedicating  themselves 
there  for  years,  by  distribution  of  bonds,  by  speeches,  newspapers, 
solicitations,  exaggerated  claims,  violations  of  law,  and  in  every 
other  possible  way,  to  the  task  of  embroiling  the  two  governments  in 
war,  and  are  the  efficient  authors  of  all  our  troubles  with  her,  directly 
or  indirectly,  including  the  tragedy  of  the  Virginius.  I  dread  emi 
grant  rebels.  .  .  .  God  forbid  that  these  dishonored  men,  who 
prate  of  the  independence  of  Cuba,  without  manliness  or  courage 
to  fight  for  it,  preferring  the  safer  occupation  of  trading  in  bogus 
bonds  and  calumniating  the  President  and  yourself,  should  succeed 
in  making  our  country  the  instrument  of  their  rancorous  hatred  of 
their  own  country."  1 

The  views  of  Sefior  Calderon  were,  said  Mr.  Fish,  received  with 
" sincere  gratification"  by  President  Grant.  Meeting  the  former's 
invitation  for  a  "frank  statement  concerning  the  precise  thing 
which  the  United  States  would  advise  or  wish  Spain  to  do,"  Mr. 
Fish  continued:  "In  the  first  place  the  President  desires  em 
phatically  to  disabuse  the  mind  of  the  government  and  people  of 
Spain  of  the  existence  of  any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States  for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba.  .  .  .  Whatever 
grounds  may  be  supposed  to  have  existed  in  the  past  evincing 
such  desire,  there  are  at  this  time  no  considerations,  moral,  so 
cial,  political,  or  financial,  which  are  regarded  ...  as  making 
the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  either  desirable  or 
convenient.  The  President,  moreover,  desires  in  an  equally  em 
phatic  manner  to  express  the  desire  of  the  United  States  to  main 
tain  a  firm,  solid,  and  enduring  peace  with  Spain  and  to  remove 
every  disturbing  question  which  embarrasses  or  which  can  threaten 
the  relations  of  the  two  countries.  .  .  .  You  will,  in  the  name  of 
the  President,  state  that  his  earnest  wish  is  : 

"First.  The  mutual  and  reciprocal  observance  of  treaty  obli 
gations,  and  a  full,  friendly,  and  liberal  understanding  and  inter- 

1  Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  February  21,  1876,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  96-99. 


390  PRESIDENT  GRANTS  EARNEST  WISHES         [1876 

pretation  of  all  doubtful  treaty  provisions,  wherever  doubt  or 
question  may  exist. 

"Second.  Peace,  order,  and  good  government  in  Cuba,  which 
involves  prompt  and  effective  measures  to  restore  peace,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  government  suited  to  the  spirit  and  necessities 
of  the  age;  liberal  in  its  provisions,  wherein  justice  can  be  meted 
out  to  all  alike,  according  to  defined  and  well-established  provisions. 

"Third.     Gradual  but  effectual  emancipation  of  the  slaves. 

"Fourth.  Improvement  of  commercial  facilities  and  the  re 
moval  of  the  obstructions  now  existing  in  the  way  of  trade  and 
commerce." 

The  despatch  further  dwelt,  at  length,  upon  the  impossibility 
of  Spain's  conquering  a  peace  by  force  of  arms;  upon  the  example 
of  Great  Britain  toward  her  colonies;  upon  the  contentedness  of 
Puerto  Rico  under  its  new  conditions,  and  "amicably,  sincerely,  and 
earnestly"  suggested  "  the  immediate  adoption  of  measures  founded 
on  a  declaration  of  complete  and  entire  amnesty,  with  an  invitation 
to  all  Cubans  to  return  at  will,  and  to  all  those  in  arms  to  return  to 
peaceful  occupations,  guaranteeing  to  all  immunity  in  person  and 
property  for  acts  of  rebellion,  such  declaration  to  be  accompanied 
by  the  adoption  and  proclamation  of  the  necessary  measures  to 
provide  a  just  and  liberal  government,  with  large  powers  of  lo 
cal  and  self-control,  under  proper  municipal  organizations,  suited 
to  the  colonial  possessions  of  an  enlightened  distant  power  at  the 
present  day." 

The  paper,  which  continued  at  some  length,  was,  while  sym 
pathetic  and  most  friendly  in  tone,  one  of  entire  frankness  and 
plain  speaking,  in  perfect  accord  with  the  character  of  both  Presi 
dent  Grant  and  the  secretary  of  state,  and  an  earnest  endeavor  to 
point  the  way  to  a  settlement  of  a  gloomy  and  desperate  situation.1 

The  President's  message  and  the  general  attitude  of  the  Ameri 
can  government  had  their  effect,  "modifying  and  mollifying  to  a 
very  sensible  degree  the  opinions  and  feelings  as  well  of  the  Cuban 
Spaniards  as  of  the  Peninsula  Spaniards.  As  to  the  former,  it  has 
awakened  them  from  the  dream  of  immediate  independence. 
Moreover,  they  desire  to  put  a  stop  to  the  incendiary  operations 

1  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Gushing,  March  1,  1876,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess., 
102-106. 


1876]  MR.  CUSHING'S  VIEWS  391 

of  the  insurgents  in  Cuba,  which  they  see  tend  to  render  the  island 
as  useless  to  them  as  to  Spain  and  the  United  States."  l 

But  nothing  as  yet  came  of  the  Spanish  promises.  Such  energies 
as  Spain  had,  now  that  the  Carlist  war  was  ended,  went  to  the  re- 
enforcement  of  the  army  in  Cuba.  In  July  15,000  men  were  sent, 
additional  to  the  not  less  than  86,000  already  there.2 

Mr.  Cushing,  in  the  same  month,  summed  up  the  situation  in 
words  of  soundest  sense  in  a  despatch  to  Mr.  Fish,  which  needs  to 
be  quoted  in  full: 

"MADRID,  July  11,  1876. 

"SiR:  Will  you  permit  me  to  make  some  observations  of  a  con 
solatory  tendency  in  reference  to  the  non-success  of  your  earnest 
efforts  to  meliorate  the  condition  of  things  in  Cuba  ? 

"1.  You  encounter,  in  the  first  place,  the  indisposition  of  either 
party  to  the  contest  in  Cuba  to  listen  to  the  counsels  of  wisdom 
and  friendship.  It  is  the  very  predicament  described  by  a  late 
writer  in  the  following  words: 

"'There  are  conjunctures  in  history  in  which  reasoning  and  the 
attempt  at  persuasion  fail.  Where  opposition  is  irreconcilable, 
where  each  party  is  striving  heart  and  soul  for  an  object,  which  the 
other  looks  upon  as  ruin  and  ignominy  to  himself,  there  can  be  no 
arbitrament  but  force.  The  ruler  must  show  his  power  to  rule,  the 
subject  must  show  his  power  to  win  independence/ 

"  Is  not  this  true  ?  Is  there  any  example  in  history  in  which  re 
bellions  have  yielded  to  reason — when  either  the  sovereign  or  the 
rebellious  subjects  could  be  persuaded  to  cease  from  strife,  until 
after  the  one  or  the  other  party  had  been  vanquished  ? 

"  We  in  the  United  States  have  possessed  parliamentary  institu 
tions  for  more  than  three  centuries — not  one  only,  as  might  be  in 
ferred  from  the  rejoicings  of  the  late  Fourth  of  July.  We  think 
we  are — we  are — imbued  with  all  the  instincts  of  order,  peace,  and 
good  government. 

"  Now,  would  we  of  the  North  have  listened  to  any  suggestion 
from  abroad  to  desist  from  the  effort  to  put  down  secession  by  force 
of  arms  ?  Would  our  insurgent  fellow-citizens  in  the  South  have 

1  Mr.  Cushing  to  Mr.  Fish,  March  2,  1876,  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess., 
108. 
8  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Fish,  July  22,  1876,  Foreign  Relations,  1877,  516. 


392  MR.  CUSHING'S  VIEWS  [1876 

been  persuaded  to  lay  down  their  arms  by  any  promises,  assurances, 
or  even  concrete  acts  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  Union  ? 

"Again,  going  back  to  our  own  insurrection  against  Great  Britain, 
would  any  proposition  of  hers,  or  even  enacted  measures  for  better 
administration  of  the  colonies  have  influenced  us  to  make  peace? 
Or  could  Great  Britain  yield  to  us  until  defeated  in  all  quarters, 
and  completely  disheartened,  by  the  combined  forces  of  the  United 
States,  France,  Spain,  and  the  Netherlands  ? 

"  With  enlightened  zeal  you  have  labored  thanklessly  for  the  peace 
and  welfare  of  Cuba  and  of  Spain  herself,  and  if  you  have  not  been 
able  to  effect  all  the  good  you  desire,  it  is  only  because  you  have  had 
to  encounter  impediments  of  moral  impossibility  in  the  nature  of 
things. 

"  2.  In  the  second  place,  my  residence  in  Spain  has  enabled  me  to 
appreciate  the  true  cause  and  character  of  maladministration  in 
Cuba.  It  is  that  the  governors  are  incapable  of  conducting  and  the 
governed  equally  incapable  of  receiving  good  government.  They 
are  all  Spaniards  alike,  as  General  Prim  so  often  said,  whether  you 
call  them  Peninsulars  or  Cubans.  And  (to  say  nothing  of  the  col 
ored  population)  it  is  not  the  best  of  the  Spaniards,  Creole  or  Pe 
ninsular,  which  constitutes  the  population  of  Cuba. 

"  Now,  has  there  been  maladministration  in  Cuba  ?  So  there  has 
been  in  Spain  herself.  Have  there  been  rebellions  in  Cuba,  guerilla 
warfare,  burnings,  sacking  of  towns,  military  executions,  deporta 
tions,  embargo  of  private  property,  banishments,  suspension  of  suf 
frage,  arbitrary  domination  of  captains-general  ?  So  all  these  things 
have  been  occurring  in  Spain.  She  has  had  naught  else  for  more 
than  sixty  years  but  alternations  betwixt  anarchy  and  despotism. 
The  few  periods  of  comparative,  but  transient,  tranquillity  she  has 
enjoyed  during  the  reign  of  Queen  Isabel  were  due  to  the  mere 
usurpation  of  two  great  generals,  Narvaez  and  O'Donnell,  to  whose 
administrations  of  the  sword  men  look  back  now  as  to  the  halcyon 
days  of  Spain.  Since  the  dethronement  of  Queen  Isabel — that  is, 
during  the  very  period  of  the  civil  war  in  Cuba — there  has  not  only 
been  civil  war  in  Spain,  but,  simultaneous  therewith,  a  rapid 
succession  of  provisional  and  experimental  governments,  each  desti 
tute  of  inherent  stability,  and  every  one  of  which  subsisted  only  by 
means  of  irresponsible  dictatorships,  except  that  of  King  Amadeo 


1876]  MR.  CUSHING'S  VIEWS  393 

alone,  who  fell  simply,  as  men  say,  because  he  was  the  only  man 
in  Spain  scrupulously  faithful  to  his  oath  and  obstinately  adhesive 
to  the  constitution  of  the  country. 

"And  yet,  constitutionally  honest  as  he  was,  his  ministers  betrayed 
him  and  assassins  (not  yet  punished)  fired  on  him  on  a  bright  moon 
lit  evening  in  one  of  the  most  frequented  and  brilliantly  lighted 
streets  of  Madrid.  Possibly  if  Prim  had  not  been  assassinated  in 
the  street  (by  men,  they  also  not  yet  punished),  Spain  might  have 
been  saved  from  her  extremest  days  of  misery,  the  cantonal  insur 
rection;  but  that  is  doubtful,  since  the  misfortunes  of  Spain  and  of 
Cuba  are  conditions  of  the  national  character,  as  manifested  alike 
in  Spain  and  in  all  Spanish  America. 

"  For,  let  me  repeat,  the  governors  and  the  governed,  all  the  same 
in  race,  and  with  defects  aggravated  in  the  latter  by  tropical  life 
and  by  association  with  slaves,  are  at  least  equally  to  blame  for  the 
calamities  of  Cuba. 

"  In  fine,  looking  at  the  subject  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  in 
terests  of  the  United  States,  which  alone  is  of  account  in  the  face  of 
a  civil  contest  where  both  parties  are  deaf  to  the  counsels  of  friend 
ship  and  to  considerations  of  sympathy  and  humanity,  it  seems  to 
me  that  we  have  much  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain  by  compromising 
ourselves  in  the  matter  of  Cuba,  it  being  superabundantly  evident 
that,  whether  as  to  Lopez  and  his  companions  laboring  professedly 
to  betray  their  country  to  a  foreign  nation  for  the  promotion  of 
slavery,  or  in  the  case  of  Aldama  and  his  associates,  laboring  to 
betray  it  to  the  same  nation  for  the  gratification  of  personal  resent 
ment  and  ambition,  they  all  have  but  one  thought  as  respects  us, 
namely,  to  make  a  cat's-paw  of  our  government,  while  ready  to 
emulate,  on  the  earliest  possible  opportunity,  the  'sublime  in 
gratitude'  of  Schwartzenberg."1 

The  only  forward  step  for  the  moment  was  the  signing,  January 
12,  1877,  by  Senor  Calderon  and  Mr.  Gushing,  of  a  protocol  which, 
later,  was  to  have  much  weight  in  the  relations  of  Spain  and  the 
United  States.  It  was  declared  to  be  a  "declaration  on  both  sides 
as  to  the  understanding  of  the  two  governments  in  the  premises 
and  respecting  the  true  application  of  [existing  treaties],"  and 
1  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  127. 


394  THE  PROTOCOL  OF  1877  [1877 

thus  was  clearly  understood  as  not  setting  aside  any  part  of  such 
treaties  as  was  claimed  later  by  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba. 
The  distinction  established  by  the  protocol  was  as  follows: 

1.  "No  citizen  of  the  United  States  residing  in  Spain,  her  ad 
jacent  islands,  or  her  ultramarine  possessions  charged  with  acts 
of  sedition,  treason,  or  conspiracy  against  the  institutions,  the  pub 
lic  security,  the  integrity  of  the  territory,  or  against  the  supreme 
government,  or  any  crime  whatsoever,  shall  be  subject  to  trial  by 
any  exceptional  tribunal,  but  exclusively  by  the  ordinary  juris 
diction,  except  in  the  case  of  being  captured  with  arms  in  hand. 

2.  "Those   who,   not   coming  within  this  last  case,   may  be 
arrested  or  imprisoned,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  so  arrested 
or  imprisoned  by  order  of.  the  civil  authority  for  the  effects  of  the 
law  of  April  17,  1821,  even  though  the  arrest  or  imprisonment 
shall  have  been  effected  by  armed  force. 

3.  "Those  who  may  be  taken  with  arms  in  hand  and  who, 
therefore,  are  comprehended  in  the  exception  of  the  first  article, 
shall  be  tried  by  ordinary  council  of  war  in  conformity  with  the 
second  article  of  the  hereinbefore-mentioned  law;  but  even  in  this 
case  the  accused  shall  enjoy  for  their  defence  the  guarantees  em 
bodied  in  the  aforesaid  law  of  April  17,  1821." 

Article  4  recites  these  guarantees  which  thus  gave  the  right  to 
all  such  as  mentioned  in  the  second  and  third  paragraphs  to  name 
attorneys  or  advocates,  who  should  have  access  to  them  at  suitable 
times  (Art.  20  of  the  law  of  1821);  a  right  to  a  copy  of  the  accusa 
tion  and  a  list  of  witnesses  for  the  prosecution  who  should  be  ex 
amined  in  the  presence  of  the  accused,  his  attorney,  and  advocate 
(Art.  23);  the  right  to  compel  such  witnesses  as  they  may  desire  to 
appear  and  testify  in  person  or  by  deposition  (Art.  22) ;  the  right  to 
present  such  evidence  as  they  may  deem  proper  (Art.  26) ;  to  be  pres 
ent  in  open  court  and  make  their  defence  orally  or  in  writing,  by 
themselves  or  by  an  advocate  (Art.  24).  The  sentence  to  be  referred 
to  the  territorial  court  or  to  the  captain-general,  according  as  the 
trial  has  taken  place  before  an  ordinary  judge  or  a  court-martial.1 

1  In  full,  Foreign  Relations,  1877,  496.  For  the  law  of  1821,  see  Cong. 
Record,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  2227. 

For  a  discussion  of  this  very  important  document,  see  Olivart,  Revue 
Generate  de  Droit  Internationale  Public,  vol.  VII,  1900,  article  "Le  Diffe"rend 


1876]  MARTINEZ  CAMPOS  IN  CUBA  395 

General  Jovellar  had  returned  to  Cuba  as  governor-general, 
early  in  1876.  In  October  of  the  same  year  the  appointment  of 
General  Martinez  Campos  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
of  operations  was  made  public;  an  essential  change  from  the 
system  which  had  always  theretofore  obtained  of  combining  this 
command  with  the  duties  of  the  governor-general. 

General  Campos  went  to  Cuba  with  a  prestige  and  popularity, 
both  in  Spain  and  in  the  island,  which  promised  well,  and  with 
a  complete  and  energetic  support  from  the  government  such  as  no 
previous  commander  had  had.  A  loan  of  $15,000,000  was  con 
tracted  on  Cuban  account,  and  24,800  troops  were  despatched  to 
Cuba  during  this  month.  "Another  such  effort/'  said  the  Ameri 
can  charge*  d'affaires,  "as  the  present  one  cannot  reasonably  be  ex 
pected  or  even  hoped  for  from  Spain  in  her  actual  circumstances. 
And  the  result,  it  is  felt,  must  be  commensurate  with  the  effort. 
It  will  not  do  for  Spain  merely  to  hold  her  own  to  the  west  of  the 
trocha  and  on  the  coasts  during  this  campaign;  she  must  win  or 
face  the  consequences."  * 

The  result  was  that  Spain  won.     General  Martinez  Campos 

Hispano-Americain  au  Sujet  de  la  Question  Cubaine."  The  Spanish  negoti 
ators  were  the  Duke  of  Tetuan  and  Senor  Canovas.  The  protocol,  as 
Senor  de  Olivart  well  says,  "was  the  effect  and  not  the  cause  of  the  sit 
uation  in  Cuba;  it  was  the  consequence,"  referring  to  the  "shameful  and 
criminal  massacre  "  of  the  Virginius  prisoners,  "  of  the  faults  (turpitudes)  "  of 
the  Spanish  governors. 

The  words  in  the  protocol  "residing  in  Spain,  her  adjacent  islands,  or  her 
ultramarine  possessions, "  were  later,  as  will  be  seen,  to  give  much  trouble; 
a  difficulty,  from  the  American  point  of  view,  only  avoided  by  the  absence 
of  this  qualification  in  Article  7  of  the  treaty  of  1795,  which  as  a  treaty  held 
as  against  the  protocol.  It  should  be  stated  that  this  protocol  was  never 
officially  promulgated  either  in  Spain  or  Cuba,  a  fact  which  itself  produced 
much  misunderstanding.  This  failure  was  the  more  pronounced  as  the  final 
paragraph  was  a  declaration  from  Senor  Calderon  y  Collantes  that  "  in  order 
to  afford  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  the  completest  security 
of  the  sincerity  and  good  faith  of  his  majesty's  government  in  the  premises, 
command  will  be  given  by  royal  order  for  the  strict  observance  of  the  terms 
of  the  present  protocol  in  all  the  dominions  of  Spain,  and  specifically  in  the 
island  of  Cuba.  The  minister  of  ultramar  assured  a  little  later  the  American 
charge"  d'affaires  of  its  immediate  promulgation  (see  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Evarts, 
June  28,  1877,  Foreign  Relations,  1877,  512),  but  it  seems  not  to  have  been 
known  in  Cuba  or  Spain  until  it  appeared  in  the  American  papers,  after  the 
breaking  out  of  the  insurrection  of  1895. 

1  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Fish,  October  10,  1876,  Foreign  Relations,  1876,  473. 


396  END  OF  THE  WAR  [1878 

and  General  Jovellar  were  both  broad-minded  and  patriotic  men. 
Both,  and  particularly  the  former,  had  much  sympathy  with  the 
Cubans  in  their  causes  of  discontent.  In  October,  1877,  several 
of  the  prominent  Cuban  leaders  surrendered.  These  offering  to 
lay  before  those  still  in  arms  the  question  of  general  pacification, 
were  tried  by  the  order  of  Gomez  as  traitors  and  were  executed. 
The  capture,  however,  in  the  same  month,  of  the  Cuban  president, 
Don  Tomas  Estrada  Palma,  and  of  several  who  constituted  the  main 
part  of  the  so-called  government,  the  mild  and  considerate  treat 
ment  of  these  and  the  evident  success  of  General  Campos  in  his 
campaign,  caused  the  appointment  of  a  committee  of  the  revolu 
tionists  to  make  proposals  for  peace.  On  February  10  an  agree 
ment  was  reached  at  Zanjon,  in  the  Camaguey,  signed  by  Campos 
largely  on  his  own  responsibility  and  by  Vicente  Garcia  and 
Maximo  Gomez  on  the  part  of  the  Cubans,  by  which  were  accorded 
to  Cuba  the  same  political  privileges  as  Puerto  Rico:  oblivion  of 
the  past;  a  general  pardon  to  all  who  had  taken  part  in  the  revo 
lutionary  movement,  including  those  under  trial,  those  suffering 
sentences  in  or  out  of  the  island,  or  who  had  been  deserters  from 
the  Spanish  army.  Any  one  desiring  to  leave  Cuba  could  do  so. 
Slaves  and  Asiatic  colonists,  men  and  women,  with  the  insurrec 
tionary  force,  were  declared  free  who  should  present  themselves 
before  March  31,  1878;  compensation  for  such  slaves  was 
granted  owners  who  had  remained  loyal,  in  conformity  with 
the  law  of  gradual  emancipation  already  applied  to  Puerto 
Rico.1 

The  ten  years'  contest  was  at  an  end.  The  diplomacy  of  the 
United  States  resumed  its  usual  course  of  conflict  over  questions 
of  commerce  and  occasional  complaints  on  the  part  of  Spain, 
mostly  groundless,  of  attempted  filibustering.  The  fiscal  policies 
of  both  were  essentially  equally  vicious,  so  that  whatever  the  com 
plaint  of  one,  it  could  readily  be  offset  by  an  almost  equally  just 
complaint  of  the  other.  Rarely  has  there  been  such  opportunity 
for  the  use  of  in  quoque. 

It  seems  clear  that  in  asking  for  the  political  conditions  of  Puerto 
Rico  the  revolutionary  leaders  were  asking  for  what  they  did  not 
understand.  Nor  did  Campos  know  any  better.  In  the  course  of 
^Senate  Doc.  79,  45  Cong.,  2  Scsa.,  16. 


1878]  LIBERALISM  OF  CAMPOS  397 

the  negotiations  that  preceded  the  agreement,  he  telegraphed 
General  Jovellar:  "...  This  is  the  question:  Neither  they  nor 
I  know  the  difference  between  the  constitution  that  rules  at  pres 
ent  in  Puerto  Rico  and  the  constitution  of  the  Peninsula.  What 
we  wish  is,  that  whenever  the  Spanish  constitution  be  changed 
for  a  more  liberal  or  more  conservative  one,  Cuba  shall  be 
treated  in  the  same  way  as  Spain.  It  is  important,  however, 
to  know  the  differences,  and  I  hope  your  excellency  may  inform 
me  of  them,  if  you  know  them,  or  have  the  means  of  finding 
out." 

General  Jovellar  answered  the  same  day,  February  9:  "I  am 
very  sorry  not  to  be  able  to  give  you  the  details  of  the  existing 
differences  between  the  system  of  government  of  Puerto  Rico  and 
that  of  the  peninsular  provinces,  as  I  have  not  paid  special  attention 
to  the  subject;  but  as  the  essential  things  for  the  prosperity  of  a 
people  are  the  development  of  provincial  and  municipal  life,  the 
representation  in  legislative  bodies,  and  a  fair  administration  of 
justice,  and  whereas  concerning  all  these  points  the  laws  are  the 
same,  we  may  say  that  the  provinces  in  question  are  fundamentally 
assimilated."  The  agreement  was  thus  made  in  the  dark. 

No  one  can  question  the  earnestness  and  wisdom  of  the  views 
of  Martinez  Campos  respecting  Cuba.  He  was,  so  far  as  the 
island  was  concerned,  the  one  effective  Spanish  statesman  of  his 
period.  No  words  could  be  finer  in  spirit  than  those  of  his  report  of 
the  events  leading  to  the  peace.  And  they  were  meant.  They 
breathed  a  lofty  patriotism,  a  kindness  of  character,  an  under 
standing  of  conditions  such  as  were  shown  by  few  other  Spaniards 
of  his  time. 

"Since  the  year  1869,"  he  said,  "when  I  landed  on  the  island 
with  the  first  re-enforcements,  I  was  preoccupied  with  the  idea  that 
the  insurrection  here,  though  acknowledging  as  its  cause  the  hatred 
of  Spain,  yet  that  hatred  was  due  to  the  causes  that  have  separated 
the  colonies  from  the  mother  country,  augmented,  in  the  present 
case,  by  the  promises  made  to  the  Antilles  at  different  times 
(1812-1837  and  1845),  promises  which  have  not  only  not  been 
fulfilled,  but,  as  I  understand,  have  not  been  permitted  to  be  so  by 
the  Cortes,  when  at  different  times  their  execution  has  been  begun. 
...  When  one  day  after  another  passed  without  hopes  being  sat- 


398  LIBERALISM  OF  CAMPOS  [1878 

isfied,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  greater  freedom  permitted  now  and 
then  by  a  governor  were  more  than  cancelled  by  his  successor; 
when  they  were  convinced  that  the  colony  went  on  in  the  same  way; 
when  bad  officials  and  a  worse  administration  of  justice  more  and 
more  aggravated  difficulties;  when  the  provincial  governorships, 
continually  growing  worse,  fell  at  last  into  the  hands  of  men  with 
out  training  or  education,  petty  tyrants  who  could  practise  their 
thefts  and  sometimes  their  oppressions  because  of  the  distance  at 
which  they  resided  from  the  supreme  authority,  public  opinion, 
until  then  restrained,  began  vehemently  to  desire  those  liberties 
which,  if  they  bring  much  good,  contain  also  some  evil,  and  es 
pecially  when  applied  to  countries  that  have  so  peculiar  a  life  of 
their  own,  and  are  without  preparation  for  them.  A  people  some 
times  vehemently  desires  what  is  not  best  for  it — the  unknown — 
and  when  everything  is  denied  aspire  to  everything.  So  it  happened 
here.  .  .  . 

"For  my  own  part,  had  the  responsibility  been  mine,  free  of  the 
Cortes,  and  empowered  to  decide  for  the  government  of  his  majesty, 
on  condition  of  at  once  rendering  an  account,  I  would  have  vent 
ured  everything.  On  the  7th  of  November,  1876,  there  would  have 
appeared  in  the  Havana  Gazette  the  disembargo  of  estates,  a  general 
pardon,  the  assimilation  of  Cuba  with  Spain,  orders  to  treat  pris 
oners  well;  and,  to  show  that  this  was  not  weakness  but  strength, 
there  was  the  argument  of  my  one  hundred  thousand  bayonets. 
Public  opinion  I  should  have  little  regarded.  Perhaps  the  war 
might  have  ended  some  time  ago.  It  was  policy;  but  war  is  made 
with  policy.  It  was  the  flag  with  the  motto  of  liberty.  Or  take 
away  the  flag  and  give,  once  for  all,  the  liberty  which  must  at  last 
be  given.  When  we  are  strong  we  are  able  and  ought  to  be  gen 
erous.  Perhaps  some  will  ask  how  I  offered  the  terms  which  I 
reported  on  the  30th  of  January,  and  will  add  that  better  might 
have  been  obtained.  At  present,  I  suppose  so,  but  I  understand 
by  advantageous  terms  for  the  government  what  contributes  to 
satisfy  the  desires  and  aspirations  of  the  people;  I  proposed  the 
first  condition,  because  I  believe  they  must  fulfil  it.  I  wish  that 
the  municipal  law,  the  law  of  provincial  assemblies,  and  representa 
tion  in  the  Cortes  should  be  established.  .  .  .  The  law  of  labor 
is  to  be  settled,  the  question  of  labor  supply,  the  necessary  changes 


1878J  LIBERALISM  OF  CAMPOS  399 

of  property  are  to  be  studied,  the  fearful  and  unsustainable  problem 
of  slavery  is  to  be  studied  before  foreign  nations  impose  a  solution 
of  it  upon  us,  the  penal  code  is  to  be  studied  and  the  province  of  the 
courts  to  be  defined,  the  form  of  contributions  and  assessment  of 
taxes  determined  and  some  attention  paid  to  schools  and  public 
works.  All  these  problems  whose  solution  concerns  the  people  must 
be  solved  after  hearing  their  representatives,  not  by  the  report  of 
juntas  chosen  through  favoritism  or  for  political  reasons.  They 
cannot  be  left  to  the  will  of  the  captain-general,  the  head  of  a 
department,  or  the  colonial  minister,  who  generally,  however  com 
petent,  do  not  know  the  country. 

"I  do  not  wish  to  make  a  momentary  peace;  I  desire  that  this 
peace  be  the  beginning  of  a  bond  of  common  interests  between 
Spain  and  her  Cuban  provinces,  and  that  this  bond  be  drawn  con 
tinually  closer  by  the  identity  of  aspirations  and  the  good  faith  of 
both.  Let  not  the  Cubans  be  considered  as  pariahs  or  minors,  but 
put  on  an  equality  with  other  Spaniards,  in  everything  not  incon 
sistent  with  their  present  condition."  * 

In  the  non-fulfilment  of  such  aspirations  lies,  as  truly  said  by 
Martinez  Campos,  the  history  of  Cuban  discontent. 

But  Campos  was  in  advance  of  his  country  and  of  the  conserv 
ative  party,  of  which  he  was  a  member.  When  he  returned  to 
Spain  he  laid  before  the  Canovas  cabinet,  May  19,  1878,  his  plan 
of  legislation  in  a  paper  as  frankly  outspoken  as  that  previously 
quoted.  He  said:  "The  promises  never  fulfilled,  the  abuses  of 
all  sorts,  the  neglect  of  public  improvements,  the  exclusion  of  the 
natives  from  all  branches  of  the  administration,  and  many  other 
faults  were  the  causes  of  the  insurrection.  The  belief,  shared  in  by 
all  our  governments,  that  the  people  could  be  terrified  into  sub 
jection  and  that  it  was  a  point  of  dignity  not  to  make  concessions 
until  the  last  shot  had  been  fired — these  factors,  I  believe,  have 
kept  up  the  insurrection.  By  the  continuation  of  such  a  system 
we  never  would  have  come  to  an  end,  even  though  we  had  packed 
the  island  with  soldiers.  It  is  necessary,  if  all  wish  to  avoid  our 
ruin,  to  adopt  frankly  liberal  measures.  I  believe  that  Cuba  cannot 
constitute  an  independent  state;  she  is  more  than  prepared  to  con- 

1  For  this  interesting  report,  made  February  18,  1878,  see  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  1879,  944-951. 


400  CANOVAS  AND  CONSERVATISM  [1879 

stitute  a  Spanish  province.  And  let  there  be  a  stop  to  the  coming  of 
office-holders — all  Spaniards.  Let  the  natives  have  their  share  and 
give  some  stability  to  the  tenure  of  office."  1 

But  the  governing  powers  of  Spain  were  no  more  ready  to  listen 
to  these  words  of  a  wise  soldier  than  they  were  ready,  twenty  years 
later,  to  listen  to  the  wise  seaman  whom  she  forced  to  carry  her 
only  fleet  to  destruction^ 

Canovas,  who  represented  all  the  conservatism  of  Spain,  was 
unwilling  to  accept  such  views.  In  the  spring  of  1879  he  made 
way  for  Campos  as  prime-minister;  but  the  latter  was  illy  sup 
ported  by  his  colleagues,  nor  was  there  any  large  public  sentiment 
in  Spain  which  came  to  his  support.  He  thus  resigned  in  December 
of  the  same  year.  Canovas  again  came  to  power  and  a  bill  was 
pushed  through  in  the  absence  of  the  extremists  of  both  sides,  who 
withdrew  from  the  chamber  in  company  with  the  representatives 
of  Cuba.2  A  new  legislative  regimen  was  declared  and  nominally 
a  new  departure  was  made  in  colonial  administration  by  which, 
in  the  letter  of  the  law,  Cuba  was  given  the  status  of  a  province 
of  the  Peninsula. 

But  the  right  of  representation  in  the  Cortes  was  made  a  mockery 
by  means  thoroughly  effective  both  in  restricting  the  return  of  rep- 
sentative  Cubans  and  in  rousing  their  animosity.  The  franchise 
was  limited  to  those  paying  a  tax  of  twenty-five  dollars,  with  the 
exception  that  all  government  employees  and  all  persons  con 
nected  with  mercantile  companies  were  entitled  to  registration  in 
any  case.  As  practically  all  belonging  to  the  first  of  these  classes 
and  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  second  were  Spaniards,  and  as 
none  but  the  wealthier  Cubans  could  pay  such  a  tax,  the  result 
was  to  throw  the  elections  into  the  hands  of  the  peninsular  party, 
and  thus  nearly  all  the  representatives  were  Spaniards,  who,  in 
some  cases,  had  never  been  in  Cuba.  Of  the  twenty-four  deputies 
and  fifteen  senators  elected  in  1884  but  eight  were  Cubans.  A 
somewhat  similar  disproportion  held  throughout.  In  1896,  of  the 
twenty-eight  aldermen  of  Havana  but  one  was  a  Cuban.  That  the 
Cuban  representatives  in  the  Cortes  in  1897  "were  returned  by  Gen 
eral  Weyler  at  the  dictation  of  Senor  Canovas  can  be  proven,  if 

1  Merchan,  The  Causes  and  Justification  of  the  War,  407. 

2  Hume,  Modern  Spain,  535. 


1880]  PARTIES  IN  CUBA  401 

necessary,  by  the  recorded  testimony  of  Senor  Sagasta,  who  made 
at  the  time  a  sharp  protest  based  upon  that  fact." 

A  liberal  party  had  been  founded  in  Cuba  on  the  conclusion  of 
the  peace  whose  principles  were,  in  general,  those  which  had  been 
advanced  by  the  Cuban  representatives  in  the  abortive  commission 
of  1867,  the  failure  of  which  had  brought  about  the  ten  years'  war. 
A  second  party,  termed  the  union  constitutional,  was  also  formed, 
with  a  programme  differing  but  little  from  that  of  the  liberal,  but 
ending  finally  as  a  party  of  strong  reactionaries,  dominated  wholly 
by  the  peninsular  element,  which,  speaking  in  a  general  sense, 
wanted  no  reform.  The  liberal  party  was  a  Cuban  organization 
and  it  so  remained. 

The  union  constitutionalists  made,  in  the  first  instance,  a  declara 
tion  of  principles  which  all  but  extremists  could  accept.  "It  called 
for  the  liberty  of  the  press,  the  right  of  petition,  of  peaceful  public 
meeting,  of  assimilation  in  political  rights  to  the  other  provinces 
of  Spain,  of  special  laws  with  relation  to  the  particular  interests  of 
Cuba,  for  improved  morality  in  public  administration,  and  for  new 
laws  which  would  be  efficacious  in  securing  judicial  responsibility. 
On  the  economic  question  it  pronounced  for  customs  reforms, 
special  protection  for  the  agricultural  production  of  the  island 
and  for  the  tobacco  industry,  suppression  of  export  duties,  a  ra 
tional  reduction  of  the  imports,  especially  on  the  necessaries  of  life, 
and  a  liberal  commercial  treaty  with  the  United  States  on  the  basis 
of  reciprocity.  It  favored  the  abolition  of  slavery  on  the  terms 
of  Moret,  but  with  modifications  suitable  to  the  condition  of  the 
country.  It  also  favored  immigration  under  the  direction  of  the 
government  as  the  basis  of  free  contract.  .  .  . 

"The  artificial  nature  of  the  two  organizations,  formed  mechan 
ically  as  part  of  a  new  political  regimen,  was  soon  lost.  Their 
growth  was  along  natural  lines.  The  union  constitutionals  modi 
fied  or  ignored  their  original  economic  precepts.  Then  they  became 
jealous  of  the  integrity  of  Spanish  institutions  in  the  Antilles. 
The  control  passed  away  from  the  original  supporters.  The  in- 
transigentes  2  at  first  had  looked  with  contempt  on  the  group  of 

1Mr.  Hannis  Taylor,  minister  to  Spain  1893-1897,  "A  Review   of  the 
Cuban  Question,"  North  American  Review,  November,  1897. 
2  The  ultra-Spanish  party. 


402  SPANISH  PARTIES  [1880-95 

union  constitutionals.  They  began  by  criticising  its  assumptions 
and  combating  its  principles.  They  ended  by  dominating  the 
organization."  1  In  fact  it  was  a  simple  drift  back  to  the  primal 
elements  of  Cuban  and  Spanish,  the  former  of  which  desired  and 
preached  autonomy,  the  latter  opposing  it  nominally  as  a  death 
blow  to  the  national  unity,  but  in  reality  as  an  end  of  bureaucratic 
privilege. 

"How  far  Spanish  statesmen  comprehended  the  Cuban  move 
ment  for  autonomy  must  remain  undetermined.  Emilio  Castelar 
wanted  no  transatlantic  Poland.  Yet  his  republican  principles 
did  not  carry  him  to  the  length  of  advocating  complete  home-rule 
for  Cuba.  Moret,  who  was  to  formulate  the  system  when  it  came 
to  be  proposed  (1897),  at  that  time  was  giving  it  little  support. 
Praxedes  Sagasta,  in  the  regular  changes  of  power  which  made 
him  the  ruler  of  Spain  alternately  with  Canovas  del  Castillo,  never 
suggested  home-rule  for  Cuba.  The  pendulum  swinging  between 
these  two  prime-ministers  sometimes  vibrated  with  hope  of  broader 
and  truer  parliamentary  government  for  Spain  itself,  sometimes 
remained  in  equilibrium,  but  never  swung  loose  from  the  orbit  of 
colonial  subjection.  Sagasta  was  up  and  Canovas  was  down; 
the  liberal  party  had  its  vague  and  hesitating  schemes  for  the  An 
tilles.  Canovas  was  up  and  Sagasta  was  down;  the  conservative 
party  had  liberal  legislation  in  view  and  nothing  came  of  it.  If  in 
the  farcical  election  of  deputies  from  Cuba  to  the  Cortes  the  govern 
ment  in  power  occasionally  permitted  an  autonomist  to  be  chosen, 
it  was  merely  good-natured  tolerance.  If  the  autonomists  at  times 
sent  delegations  to  Madrid  and  were  represented  by  resident 
committees,  this  was  treated  as  a  colonial  chimera  not  worthy  of 
serious  attention.  Canovas  had  his  policy  of  assimilation  by  which 
Spaniards  and  Cubans  were  to  approach  one  another  in  their 
political  rights.  But  he  never  yielded  his  ground  that  autonomy 
meant  separation  of  Cuba  from  the  Peninsula.  And  what  he 
called  the  national  actualities,  the  need  of  supporting  the  bureau 
cratic  classes,  was  always  a  bar  to  the  real  insular  government  of 
Cuba  by  its  own  people." 

Had  Cuba  been  met  at  this  time  in  a  liberal  spirit  in  which  such 

1  Pepper,  Tomorrow  in  Cuba,  7,  8,  11. 

2  Ibid.,  10,  17. 


1880-95]  SPANISH  INACTION  403 

a  term  is  understood  in  England  or  the  United  States,  there  can  be 
little  question  that  the  island  would  have  become  again  faithful 
to  the  mother  country.  The  blood,  the  traditions,  the  literature,  the 
social  affiliations  were  Spanish;  it  only  required  a  reasonable  treat 
ment  to  cause  such  bonds  to  resume  their  natural  influence,  but  it 
cannot  be  repeated  too  often  that  of  this  Spain,  as  Spain,  was  in 
capable.  However  much  it  was  desired  by  certain  broad-minded 
and  advanced  Spaniards,  the  inertia  of  the  conservative  mass  was 
too  great  to  be  moved.  A  reformist  party  was  organized  in  Cuba 
in  1893  to  which  many  Spanish  liberal-minded  residents  of  the 
island  attached  themselves,  but  the  harm  already  worked  in  the 
interval  since  the  peace  of  El  Zanjon  was  too  great  for  such  to  in 
fluence  the  trend  of  events. 

Again  quoting  Mr.  Pepper:  "The  analysis  of  the  legislation 
and  of  the  decrees  of  1878  and  subsequent  years  shows  that  in 
essence  there  was  little  dilution  of  what  had  always  been  the 
cardinal  principle  of  Spanish  colonial  government.  This  was 
military  rule.  The  paths  were  sometimes  crooked,  the  passages 
wound  into  labyrinths  of  cedulas,  decrees,  orders,  edicts,  circulars, 
and  bandos.  They  brought  up  at  the  same  barrier.  The  begin 
ning  and  the  end  was  the  governor-general  exercising  his  military 
functions  as  captain-general.  After  1878  Cuba  had  good,  bad,  and 
indifferent  captains-general.  Their  character  was  reflected  in  the 
administration  of  the  island."  1  The  overtaxation,  the  rapacity, 
national  and  individual,  remained  the  same. 

At  the  very  bottom  of  the  difficulty  was  the  earliest  concept  of 
the  relation  of  the  American  possessions  to  the  Spanish  crown.  In 
theory,  the  Spanish  provinces  of  America  had  been  integral  parts 
of  Spain  and  stood  to  the  crown  as  did  the  provinces  of  the  Pe 
ninsula.  It  was  this  theory  which,  in  large  degree,  stood  in  the 
way  of  a  real  autonomy  such  as  that  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada. 
This  theory,  however,  did  not  prevent  a  financial  treatment  which 
laid  upon  Cuba  the  whole  burden  of  the  war.  The  budget  for  the 
year  1878-79  rose  to  $46,594,000.  It  gradually  decreased,  being 
in  1885-86,  $34,169,000,  and  thereafter  was  about  $26,000,000. 
In  1895  the  debt  of  the  island  was  $295,707,264,  the  interest  on 
which  was  $9.79  for  each  inhabitant.  This  included  a  debt  of  Spain 
1  Pepper,  Tomorrow  in  Cuba,  5. 


404  CUBAN  FINANCE  [1895 

to  the  United  States;  the  expenses  of  the  occupation,  from  1861  to 
1865,  of  Santo  Domingo;  the  cost  of  the  expedition  in  1861  to 
Mexico;  the  cost  of  the  war  with  Peru.  The  cost  of  the  legation 
and  consulates  in  the  United  States  was  borne  by  Cuba,  even  to 
the  secret-service  money  of  the  legation;  $2,192,795  were  paid  in 
pensions,  a  subsidy  of  $471,836  was  paid  to  the  Transatlantic 
Company;  $96,800  a  year  went  to  support  the  ministry  of  the 
colonies  at  Madrid. 

Cuba  in  1894  was  paying  $6,197,135  (or  23.18  per  cent,  of  the 
budget  for  the  year  of  $26,733,219)  for  the  support  of  the  army  em 
ployed  solely  in  Cuba,  and  $1,094,071  for  the  navy;  $12,933,970 
went  chiefly  for  interest  on  the  debt;  $826,922  for  public  improve 
ments,  though  but  eighty-eight  miles  of  highway  had  been  built  in 
twenty-eight  years;  $182,000  were  assigned  to  public  instruction. 

Said  Estrada  Palma,  vouching  for  the  statement  from  which  the 
foregoing  is  taken  and  the  general  truth  of  which  is  incontestable: 
"The  hopes  .  .  .  held  out  [by  the  Spanish  government]  have  never 
been  realized.  The  representation  which  was  to  be  given  the 
Cubans  has  proved  to  be  absolutely  without  character;  taxes  have 
been  levied  anew  on  everything  conceivable ;  the  offices  in  the  island 
have  increased,  but  the  officers  are  all  Spaniards ;  the  native  Cubans 
have  been  left  with  no  public  duties  whatsoever  to  perform  except 
payment  of  taxes  to  the  government  and  blackmail  to  the  officials ; 
without  privilege  even  to  move  from  place  to  place  in  the  island 
except  on  the  permission  of  governmental  authorities. 

"  Spain  has  framed  laws  so  that  the  natives  have  substantially 
been  deprived  of  the  right  of  suffrage.  The  taxes  levied  have  been 
almost  entirely  devoted  to  support  the  army  and  navy  in  Cuba,  to 
pay  interest  on  the  debt  that  Spain  has  saddled  on  the  island,  and 
to  pay  the  salaries  of  the  vast  number  of  Spanish  office-holders, 
devoting  only  $746,000  for  internal  improvements  out  of  the  $26,- 
000,000  collected  by  tax.  No  public  schools  are  within  reach  of 
the  masses  for  their  education.  All  the  principal  industries  of  the 
island  are  hampered  by  excessive  imposts.  Her  commerce  with 
every  country  but  Spain  has  been  crippled  in  every  possible  man 
ner,  as  can  readily  be  seen  by  the  frequent  protests  of  ship-owners 
and  merchants. 

"The  Cubans  have  no  security  of  person  or  property.     The 


1895]  SPANISH  PARTIES  405 

judiciary  are  instruments  of  the  military  authorities.  Trial  by 
military  tribunals  can  be  ordered  at  any  time  at  the  will  of  the 
captain-general.  There  is,  besides,  no  freedom  of  speech,  press, 
or  religion."  1 

The  whole  is  a  monstrous  showing;  whatever  Cuban  deserts, 
Cuban  woes  were  very  real.  With  unfortunate  economic  conditions 
added,  it  is  not  surprising  that  at  the  end  of  seventeen  years  revolt 
was  again  active,  the  outbreak  being  set  for  February  ^4,  1895. 

Again  it  must  be  said  that  one  finds  the  difficulties  of  the  situa 
tion — apparently,  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  mind,  so  easy  of  solution — 
in  the  Spanish  character  itself:  in  its  inability  to  understand  the 
meaning  or  at  least  the  application  of  free  and  representative 
government. 

Using  the  words  of  a  most  qualified  observer  regarding  Spain, 
what  purported  to  be  national  elections  were  always  controlled 
by  the  political  party  holding  the  executive  power,  which  so  ma 
nipulated  the  electoral  machinery  as  to  predetermine  the  result. 
The  people  looked  listlessly  on  while  the  government  officials, 
aided  by  the  caciques,2  employed  all  the  necessary  methods  to 
return  as  many  of  the  government  nominees  as  its  managers 
deemed  necessary;  and  if  any  officious  person  attempted  to  object 
he  was  simply  sent  to  jail.  As  both  parties  employed  the  same 
means  there  was  no  recrimination.  The  natural  result  was  that 
the  national  assemblies  thus  chosen  possessed  no  real  political 
authority;  they  were  simply  dead  bodies  into  which  the  living 
spirit  of  popular  approval  never  entered,  and  as  such,  of  course, 
they  could  not  confer  upon  ministries  the  right  to  rule.  The  fact 
that  a  Spanish  ministry  was  supported  by  overwhelming  majorities 
in  both  branches  of  the  Cortes  was  considered  no  reason  why  it 
should  continue  in  power  if  a  coterie  of  military  officers  or  a  com 
bination  of  newspapers  made  an  adverse  demonstration  at  Madrid. 
The  administration  of  affairs  was  still  carried  on  under  the  old 
bureaucratic  system  by  certain  notables  named  by  the  crown,  who 
called  upon  the  phantom  body  known  as  the  Cortes  to  clothe  their 
acts  in  forms  of  legality.  In  the  light  of  these  incontestable  facts,  it 
is  easy  to  understand  that  Spain  could  not  give  to  her  colonies  what 

1  For  these  documents,  see  Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1-42. 

2  The  local  party  leaders. 


406  CAUSES  OF  NEW  REVOLT  [1895 

she  did  not  herself  enjoy — popular  government  as  it  is  understood 
throughout  the  world.1 

Combined  with  this  general  situation  was  the  powerful  per 
sonality  of  the  minister  who  held  Spain  in  his  hand,  Senor  Canovas, 
"at  heart  a  Spaniard  of  the  past,  an  absolutist,  a  Cardinal  Ximenes 
de  Cisneros,  masquerading  in  the  garb  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
and  yet  ...  he  clearly  understood  that  even  in  Spain  the  ancient 
principles  of  absolutism  must  be  concealed  beneath  the  constitu 
tional  forms  that  prevail  to-day.  ...  I  cannot  doubt  that  it  was 
his  settled  purpose  to  govern  the  remaining  colonies  of  Spain  under 
the  old  paternal  system,  conceding  nothing  in  the  way  of  real 
autonomy  except  a  few  empty  forms,  so  designed  as  to  conceal  his 
real  purpose." 

The  Maura  law  submitted  in  1893  had  failed,  says  the  same 
authority,  through  the  genuineness  of  the  attempt.  That  framed 
by  Senor  Abarzuza  passed  both  houses  of  the  Cortes  unanimously 
in  February,  1895.  Ten  days  later  began  the  Cuban  revolt.  "The 
plain  and  simple  explanation  of  that  event  is  to  be  found  that  the 
passage  of  the  sham  Abarzuza  law  finally  convinced  the  Cuban 
leaders  that  no  real  amelioration  of  their  condition  was  to  be 
expected  from  the  mother  country.  .  .  .  The  only  thing  like  a 
local  legislature  that  it  proposed  to  create  was  a  '  council  of  ad 
ministration/  half  of  whose  members  were  to  be  appointed  by 
the  crown,  the  other  half  elective."  The  governor-general  could 
suspend  the  council  as  a  whole  or  could  suspend  individual  mem 
bers  so  long  as  a  quorum  remained.  In  any  case  the  council  was 
simply  advisory.  "Whatever  it  might  do,  it  was  expressly  declared 
to  be  subject  'to  the  supervision  and  to  the  powers  inherent  in 
the  sovereignty  of  the  nation,  which  are  reserved  by  law  to  the 
supreme  government/  " 3 

But  added  to  the  disappointment  in  the  passage  of  so  futile  an 
effort  at  autonomy  was  the  great  influence  of  the  economic  situation. 
Four-fifths  of  Cuba's  wealth  was  in  sugar,  for  which  the  United 
States  was  practically  her  one  purchaser.  When  the  reciprocity  of 
a  few  years  ended,  in  1894,  the  island,  ground  between  the  mill- 

1  Mr.  Hannis  Taylor,  minister  to  Spain,  1893-97,  "A  Review  of  the  Cuban 
Question,"  North  American  Review,  November,  1897. 
3  Ibid.  >  Ibid. 


1895]  SERIOUSNESS  OF  NEW  REVOLT  407 

stones  of  both  American  and  Spanish  protection,  was  naturally 
deeply  disturbed  by  the  revulsion  from  wealth  to  comparative 
poverty.  It  became  almost  impossible  for  the  cane  sugar  to  com 
pete  with  the  beet;  great  numbers  of  Cuban  laborers  were  deprived 
of  work.  When  revolt  came,  excited  in  great  degree  by  enforced 
idleness,  it  was  natural  that  they  should  join  the  insurgent  ranks. 
The  United  States  are  thus  not  guiltless  of  the  horrors  of  the 
revolt  to  come  in  1895.  The  greed  of  American  and  Spanish  pro 
tectionists  was,  in  fact,  at  the  bottom  of  Cuban  revolt  and  largely 
responsible  for  the  loss  of  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  money  and 
the  many  thousands  of  lives  which  the  war  involved. 

The  declaration  was  the  result  of  a  deliberate  preparation  of 
which  the  soul  was  Jose"  Marti.  More  than  two  hundred  clubs 
were  formed  in  the  United  States,  Mexico,  and  in  Central  and 
South  America,  every  member  of  which  contributed  a  tenth  or 
more  of  his  earnings.  Naturally  the  greater  amount  came  from 
the  Cubans  in  the  United  States,  but  money  came  from  every 
country  where  there  were  Cuban  residents  or  Cuban  sympa 
thizers.  At  the  beginning  of  1895  the  agitators  were  supposed 
to  have  ready  a  million  dollars.1 

The  serious  character  of  the  new  movement  was  at  once  recog 
nized  in  Spain,  and  Martinez  Campos,  as  the  one  best  able  to  meet 
the  situation,  left  Madrid  April  3,  1895,  and  on  April  16  relieved 
General  Calleja  as  governor-general.  Campos  came  with  un 
limited  powers  and  credit,  and  with  the  promise  of  every  support 
from  the  home  government,  an  earnest  of  which  was  in  the  de 
spatch,  before  his  departure,  of  seven  thousand  troops  as  a  first  re- 
enforcement  to  the  thirteen  thousand  (a  third  of  whom  were  in- 
effectives)  in  the  island  when  the  revolt  began.  The  provinces 
of  Santiago,  Santa  Clara,  and  Matanzas  had  already  been  declared, 
March  4,  in  a  state  of  siege  by  his  predecessor. 

The  revolt  he  now  faced,  however,  was  very  different  to  that  of 
twenty  years  before,  in  extent,  in  resources,  and,  above  all,  in  de 
termination.  Spain  herself,  however,  was  changed  from  the  an 
archic  kingdom  of  -the  earlier  period.  While  the  old  abuses  of 
cmpleomania  and  administrative  corruption  were  still  as  active  as 

1  Quesada,  Free  Cuba,  473.  Benton,  International  Law  and  Diplomacy  of 
the  Spanish  American  War,  25.  North  American  Review,  vol.  166,  560. 


408  GOMEZ'S  ORDERS  TO  DESTROY  [1895 

ever,  there  was  permanency  at  the  head  and  a  cessation  of  civil  war. 
Spain  was  thus  free  to  bend  all  her  energies  to  the  suppression  of 
the  new  rising,  and  from  the  moment  of  first  action  showed  an 
amazing  energy  in  the  despatch  of  troops  and  in  the  general  sup 
port  of  the  war,  which,  could  the  energy  and  expense  have  been 
diverted  to  happier  ends,  would  have  transformed  the  face  of  the 
land  of  Spain,  and  have  brought  wealth  and  happiness,  instead  of 
the  reverse,  to  her  people. 

Maximo  Gomez,  who  had  returned  to  Cuba  from  his  native  island 
of  Santo  Domingo,  was  made  the  Cuban  commander-in-chief,  and 
while  the  struggle  was  markedly  different  in  its  greater  humanity 
to  prisoners  from  that  of  the  ten  years'  war,  it  was  to  be  one  of  ruth 
less  devastation  and  destruction  of  property,  as  the  following 
proclamation  so  clearly  shows : 

"GENERAL  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  LIBERATION, 
"NAJASA,  CAMAGUEY,  July  1,  1895. 

"To  THE  PLANTERS  AND  OWNERS  OF  CATTLE  RANCHES: 

"  In  accord  with  the  great  interests  of  the  revolution  for  the  in 
dependence  of  the  country  and  for  which  we  are  in  arms : 

"Whereas,  all  exploitations  of  any  product  whatsoever  are  aids 
and  resources  to  the  government  that  we  are  fighting,  it  is  resolved 
by  the  general-in-chief  to  issue  this  general  order  throughout  the 
island,  that  the  introduction  of  articles  of  commerce,  as  well  as  beef 
and  cattle,  into  the  towns  occupied  by  the  enemy  is  absolutely 
prohibited.  The  sugar  plantations  will  stop  their  labors,  and 
whoever  shall  attempt  to  grind  the  crop,  notwithstanding  this  order, 
will  have  their  cane  burned  and  their  buildings  demolished.  The 
person  who,  disobeying  this  order,  will  try  to  profit  from  the  present 
situation  of  affairs,  will  show  by  his  conduct  little  respect  for  the 
rights  of  the  revolution  of  redemption,  and  therefore  shall  be  con 
sidered  as  an  enemy,  treated  as  a  traitor,  and  tried  as  such  in  case 
of  his  capture. 

"MAXIMO  GOMEZ,  the  General-in-Chief.'** 

1  Nevertheless,  throughout  the  country  preparations  were  made  for  the 
grinding  of  the  crop.  A  peremptory  order,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy, 
was  then  issued  on  November  G: 


1895]  GOMEZ'S  ORDERS  TO  DESTROY  409 

HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  LIBERATION, 

TERRITORY  OF  SANCTI  SPIRITUS,  November  6,  1895. 

Animated  by  the  spirit  of  unchangeable  resolution  in  defence  of  the  rights 
of  the  revolution  of  redemption  of  this  country  of  colonists,  humiliated  and 
despised  by  Spain,  and  in  harmony  with  what  has  been  decreed  concerning 
the  subject  in  the  circular  dated  the  1st  of  July,  I  have  ordered  the  following: 

ARTICLE  I.  That  all  plantations  shall  be  totally  destroyed,  their  cane  and 
out-buildings  burned,  and  railroad  connections  destroyed. 

ART.  II.  All  laborers  who  shall  aid  the  sugar  factories — these  sources  of 
supplies  that  we  must  deprive  the  enemy  of — shall  be  considered  as  traitors 
to  their  country. 

ART.  III.  All  who  are  caught  in  the  act,  or  whose  violation  of  Article  II 
shall  be  proven,  shall  be  shot.  Let  all  chiefs  of  operations  of  the  army  of 
liberty  comply  with  this  order,  determined  to  unfurl  triumphantly,  even  over 
ruin  and  ashes,  the  flag  of  the  republic  of  Cuba. 

In  regard  to  the  manner  of  waging  the  war,  follow  the  private  instructions 
that  I  have  already  given. 

For  the  sake  of  the  honor  of  our  arms  and  your  well-known  courage  and 
patriotism,  it  is  expected  that  you  will  strictly  comply  with  the  above  orders. 

M.  GOMEZ,  General-in-Chief. 

To  the  chiefs  of  operations:  Circulate  this. 

On  the  llth  of  November  the  following  proclamation  was  issued: 

HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  LIBERATION, 

SANCTI  SPIRITUS,  November  11,  1895. 

To  HONEST  MEN,  VICTIMS  OF  THE  TORCH: 

The  painful  measure  made  necessary  by  the  revolution  of  redemption 
drenched  in  innocent  blood  from  Hatuey  to  our  own  times  by  cruel  and  mer 
ciless  Spain  will  plunge  you  in  misery.  As  general-in-chief  of  the  army  of  lib 
eration  it  is  my  duty  to  lead  it  to  victory,  without  permitting  myself  to  be 
restrained  or  terrified,  by  any  means  necessary  to  place  Cuba  in  the  shortest 
time  in  possession  of  her  dearest  ideal.  I  therefore  place  the  responsibility 
for  so  great  a  ruin  on  those  who  look  on  impassively  and  force  us  to  those 
extreme  measures  which  they  then  condemn  like  dolts  and  hypocrites  that 
they  are.  After  so  many  years  of  supplication,  humiliations,  contumely, 
banishment,  and  death,  when  this  people,  of  its  own  will,  has  arisen  in  arms, 
there  remains  no  other  solution  but  to  triumph,  it  matters  not  what  means 
are  employed  to  accomplish  it. 

This  people  cannot  hesitate  between  the  wealth  of  Spain  and  the  liberty 
of  Cuba.  Its  greatest  crime  would  be  to  stain  the  land  with  blood  without 
effecting  its  purposes  because  of  puerile  scruples  and  fears  which  do  not  con 
cur  yith  the  character  of  the  men  who  are  in  the  field,  challenging  the  fury 
of  an  army  which  is  one  of  the  bravest  in  the  world,  but  which  in  this  war  ia 
without  enthusiasm  or  faith,  ill  fed  and  unpaid.  The  war  did  not  begin  Feb- 
urary  24;  it  is  about  to  begin  now. 

The  war  had  to  be  organized ;  it  was  necessary  to  calm  and  lead  into  the 
proper  channels  the  revolutionary  spirit  always  exaggerated  in  the  beginning 
by  wild  enthusiasm.  The  struggle  ought  to  begin  in  obedience  to  a  plan  and 


410  GOMEZ'S  ORDERS  TO  DESTROY  [1895 

method  more  or  less  studied,  as  the  result  of  the  peculiarities  of  this  war. 
This  has  already  been  done.  Let  Spain  now  send  her  soldiers  to  rivet  the 
chains  of  her  slaves;  the  children  of  this  land  are  in  the  field,  armed  with  the 
weapons  of  liberty.  The  struggle  will  be  terrible,  but  success  will  crown  the 
revolution  and  efforts  of  the  oppressed. 

MAXIMO  GOMEZ,  General-in-Chief. 

Senor  Estrada'Palma  adds,  in  his  letter  of  December  7,  1895,  to  Mr.  Olney, 
in  which  these  appear  :  "  The  reasons  underlying  this  measure  are  the  same 
which  caused  this  country  to  destroy  the  cotton  crop  and  the  baled  cotton 
in  the  South  during  the  war  of  secession."  .  .  .  The  action  of  the  insurgents 
is  perfectly  justified  because  it  is  simply  a  blockade,  so  to  speak,  on  land- 
a  prevention  of  the  gathering,  and  hence  the  export  of  the  [sugar  crop]  with, 
naturally,  a  punishment  for  the  violation  thereof.  (Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  14,  15.) 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE    FILIBUSTERING    CASES. — THE 

THE   ANNUAL    MESSAGE    OF    1895 

THE  intimate  commercial  relations  of  Cuba  with  the  United 
States,  in  which  the  former  found  four-fifths  of  its  market,  and  the 
educational  facilities  which  attracted  many  Cuban  youths,  naturally 
caused  the  presence  there  at  all  times  of  great  numbers  of  Cubans. 
Many  of  these  had  taken  up  permanent  residence  and  were  favorite 
and  influential  persons  in  American  society.  This,  with  the  fact 
that  it  was  the  only  large  producer,  in  the  Americas,  of  arms  and 
warlike  stores,  together  with  the  proximity  of  the  intricate  system 
of  Florida  keys  and  waterways,  made  the  United  States  the  natural 
base  of  Cuban  supply  and  Cuban  intrigue.  There  was  thus  at 
once  thrown  upon  the  American  government  the  renewal  of  its 
duty  of  the  preservation  of  its  neutral  obligations  in  circumstances 
of  much  greater  difficulty  than  in  the  previous  insurrection,  through 
the  acquired  experience  of  the  Cubans,  their  much  greater  com 
mand  of  money,  and  an  antecedent  preparation  far  beyond  that  p, 
of  the  previous  revolt.  So  complete  had  been  this  preparation 
that  four  expeditions  were  attempted  at  the  very  outbreak  of  in 
surgency,  all  of  which,  however,  were  thwarted  by  the  action  of 
the  American  government.  The  whole  force  of  cruising  revenue 
vessels  in  the  Atlantic  was  directed  to  this  work,  and  this  was 
later  supported  by  a  large  number  of  ships  of  the  navy,  the  un 
fortunate  Maine  being  of  this  number. 

From  New  York  to  the  Mexican  border  was  a  coast  to  be  guarded 
of  5,470  miles,  more  than  double  that  of  Cuba.  Much  of  this  was 
of  great  intricacy,  the  Florida  keys  in  especial  affording  long  and 
sparsely  settled  stretches  of  this  character. 

On  June  12,  1895,  President  Cleveland  issued  a  proclamation 
which  was,  in  effect,  a  recognition  of  a  state  of  insurgency  tempo 
rarily  beyond  the  control  of  Spain.1  It  gave  warning  that  all  vio- 

1  Wilson,  Lecture  on  Insurgency,  Naval  War  College,  1900,  6.  Benton, 
Int.  Law  and  Diplom.  of  Sp.  Am.  Wary  35. 

411 


412  THE  QUESTION  OF  "MILITARY  EXPEDITIONS"  [1895 

lations  of  the  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States  would  be  rigor 
ously  prosecuted.1 

The  cases  which  came  before  the  courts  turned  chiefly  upon  the 
expression  "within  the  territory  of  the  United  States"  and  the 
construction  of  what  constituted  "any  military  expedition."  The 
latitude  given  to  these  in  some  of  the  earlier  charges  of  the  courts 
gradually  narrowed  until  the  master  and  two  mates  of  the  Danish 
steamer  Horsa  were  indicted  and  convicted  in  the  district  court 
of  the  eastern  district  of  Pennsylvania.  This  case,  with  the  rulings 
of  the  judge  of  the  district  court  and  the  final  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  on  an  appeal  by  the  defendants,  fully  illustrates 
the  attitude  and  action  of  the  American  government. 

The  following  was  shown  in  evidence  before  the  court:  The 
Horsa,  sailing  under  the  Danish  flag,  the  officers  Danish  subjects, 

1  The  law  is  Section  5286  of  the  Revised  Statutes.  "  Every  person  who, 
within  the  territory  or  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  begins  or  sets  on  foot, 
or  provides  or  prepares  the  means  for,  any  military  expedition  or  enterprise 
to  be  carried  on  from  thence  against  the  territory  or  dominions  of  any  foreign 
prince  or  state,  or  of  any  colony,  district,  or  people,  with  whom  the  United 
States  are  at  peace,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  shall  be 
fined  not  exceeding  three  thousand  dollars  and  imprisoned  not  more  than 
three  years."  "Title  LXVII  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  headed  'Neutrality,'  em 
braces  eleven  sections,  from  5281  to  5291  inclusive.  Section  5281  prohibits 
the  acceptance  of  commissions  from  a  foreign  power  by  citizens  of  the  United 
States  within  our  territory  to  serve  against  any  sovereign  with  whom  we  are 
at  peace.  Section  5282  prohibits  any  person  from  enlisting  in  this  country 
as  a  soldier  in  the  service  of  any  foreign  power,  and  from  hiring  or  retaining 
any  other  person  to  enlist  or  go  abroad  for  the  purpose  of  enlistment.  Sec 
tion  5283  deals  with  fitting  out  and  arming  vessels  in  this  country  in  favor 
of  one  foreign'power  as  against  another  foreign  power  with  which  we  are  at 
peace.  Section  5284  prohibits  citizens  from  the  fitting  out  or  arming,  without 
the  United  States,  of  vessels  to  cruise  against  citizens  of  the  United  States; 
and  Section  5285,  the  augmenting  the  force  of  a  foreign  vessel  of  war  serving 
against  a  friendly  sovereign.  Sections  5287  to  5290  provide  for  the  enforce 
ment  of  the  preceding  sections,  and  Section  5291,  that  the  provisions  set  forth 
shall  not  be  construed  to  prevent  the  enlistment  of  certain  foreign  citizens  of 
the  United  States."  (Chief -Justice  Fuller  in  opinion  delivered  in  Wiborg 
et  als.  Plaintiff  in  Error  vs.  the  United  States,  October  term,  1895.)  The 
first  neutrality  laws  date  from  June  5,  1794,  Section  5286  (R.  S.)  being 
section  five  of  the  first  act.  They  were  given  their  final  forms  April  20,  1818, 
when  section  five  of  the  first  act  was  carried  forward  as  section  six  of  the  later 
act.  There  was  a  law,  limited  to  two  years,  passed  in  1838,  of  a  more  strin 
gent  character  which  applied  only  to  countries,  conterminous  with  the  United 
States.  For  this,  the  cause  of  passage  and  suggestion  of  Spain  for  renewal 
and  extension,  see  Infra,  515. 


1895]  THE  "HORSA"  413 

was  engaged  in  the  fruit  business  for  John  D.  Hart  &  Co.,  and 
cleared  at  Philadelphia,  November  9,  1895,  for  Port  Antonio, 
Jamaica.  Just  before  sailing  her  captain  received  a  written  mes 
sage,  the  purport  of  which,  he  later  testified,  was:  "After  I  passed 
the  [Delaware]  breakwater,  to  proceed  north  near  Barnegat  and 
await  further  orders."  He  thus  on  arrival  anchored  off  Barnegat 
Light,  between  three  and  four  miles  off  shore,  a  matter  of  no  diffi 
culty,  in  good  weather  in  the  shallow  sea  of  the  New  Jersey  coast. 
He  was  now  outside  of  United  States  jurisdiction.  On  the  same 
evening  a  steam-lighter,  J.  S.  T.  Stranahan,  left  Brooklyn  carrying 
some  cases  of  goods  and  two  boats  taken  aboard  during  the  evening. 
The  lighter  received  below  Staten  Island  during  the  night  between 
thirty  and  forty  men,  apparently  Cubans  or  Spaniards.  She  ran 
down  to  Barnegat,  saw  the  Horsa,  which  had  hoisted  a  white 
flag,  and  ran  up  a  similar  one.  The  passengers,  cases  of  goods, 
and  life-boats  were  put  aboard  the  Horsa.  The  cases  were  shown 
to  have  contained  rifles,  swords,  machetes,  a  Maxim  gun,  car 
tridge  belts,  medicines,  and  bandages.  Arms  were  divided  among 
the  men,  who  were  drilled  on  the  passage  south  toward  Jamaica,  the 
course  to  which  passes  near  the  eastern  end  of  Cuba.  On  nearing 
this  point  the  passengers  left  the  ship  in  the  two  boats  brought 
from  Brooklyn,  with  all  the  ammunition  and  arms  they  could  carry, 
and  the  Horsa  proceeded  to  Port  Antonio,  throwing  overboard 
some  boxes  of  ammunition  which  had  been  left  by  her  passengers. 
On  her  return  to  the  United  States  the  captain  and  the  two  mates 
were  indicted,  and  tried  as  mentioned  before  the  Federal  court. 
The  government  had  failed  to  convict  in  preceding  cases  which 
differed  in  no  important  principle  from  that  of  the  Horsa.  The 
judge  in  the  latter  case  charged  the  jury,  after  explaining  the  in 
dictment,  as  follows:  "The  evidence  heard  would  not  justify  a 
conviction  of  anything  more  than  providing  the  means  for  or 
aiding  such  military  expedition  by  furnishing  transportation  for 
the  men,  their  arms,  baggage,  etc.  .  .  .  To  convict  them  you  must 
be  fully  satisfied  by  the  evidence  that  a  military  expedition  was 
organized  in  this  country,  to  be  carried  out  as  and  with  the  object 
charged  in  the  indictment,  and  that  the  defendants,  with  the  knowl 
edge  of  this,  provided  means  for  its  assistance  and  assisted  it  as 
before  stated. 


414  THE  DECISIONS  RE  "HORSA"  [1896 

"Thus  you  observe  the  case  presents  two  questions:  First,  was 
such  military  expedition  organized  here  in  the  United  States? 
Secondly,  did  the  defendants  render  the  assistance  stated  here  with 
knowledge  of  the  facts? 

"In  passing  on  the  first  question  it  is  necessary  to  understand 
what  constitutes  a  military  expedition  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute.  For  the  purposes  of  this  case  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  any 
combination  of  men  organized  here  to  go  to  Cuba  to  make  war 
upon  its  government,  provided  with  arms  and  ammunition,  we 
being  at  peace  with  Cuba,  constitutes  a  military  expedition.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  men  shall  be  drilled,  put  in  uniforms,  or 
prepared  for  efficient  service,  nor  that  they  shall  have  been  organ 
ized  as,  or  according  to,  the  tactics  or  rules  which  relate  to  what 
is  known  as  infantry,  artillery,  or  cavalry.  It  is  sufficient  that 
they  shall  have  combined  and  organized  here  to  go  there  and  make 
war  on  the  foreign  government,  and  have  provided  themselves  with 
the  means  of  doing  so.  I  say  '  provided  themselves  with  the  means 
of  doing  so '  because  the  evidence  here  shows  that  the  men  were  so 
provided.  Whether  such  provision,  as  by  arming,  etc.,  is  necessary, 
need  not  be  decided  in  this  case.  I  will  say,  however,  to  counsel, 
that  were  that  question  required  to  be  decided  I  should  hold  that 
it  is  not  necessary. 

"Nor  is  it  important  that  they  intended  to  make  war  as  an 
independent  body  or  in  connection  with  others.  Where  men  go 
without  combination  and  organization  to  enlist  as  individuals  in 
a  foreign  army  they  do  not  constitute  such  military  expedition,  and 
the  fact  that  the  vessel  carrying  them  might  carry  arms  as  mer 
chandise  would  not  be  important. " 

The  Supreme  Court,  on  the  appeal,  held  that  these  views  of  the 
district  judge  were  correct  as  applied  to  the  evidence. 

The  jury  was  also  instructed  by  the  district  judge  that  the  master 
and  mates  were  not  guilty  if  they  were  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
they  were  to  transport  the  men  in  question  until  the  arrival  of  the 
ship  off  Barnegat,  outside  the  three-mile  limit.  In  such  event,  the 
ship  being  a  foreign  vessel  and  beyond  our  jurisdiction  at  such  a 
point,  they  could  not  be  held  to  be  guilty.  "If,  however,  they 
entered  into  an  arrangement  here  to  furnish  and  provide  the  means 
of  transportation,  and  provided  it,  they  are  guilty,  if  this  was  a 


1896]      PRESIDENT  CLEVELAND'S  PROCLAMATION     415 

military  expedition,  although  the  men  were  not  taken  aboard  and 
the  transportation  did  not  commence  until  the  ship  anchored  off 
Barnegat,"  a  view  also  held  by  the  Supreme  Court,  which  also 
concluded  that  -'the  Horsa's  preparation  for  sailing  and  the  taking 
aboard  of  the  two  boats  at  Philadelphia  constituted  a  preparation 
of  means  for  the  expedition  or  enterprise."  1 

The  lower  courts  being  bound  by  the  definitions  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  rigor  of  its  findings  made  Cuban  attempts  thereafter 
much  more  difficult;  and  more  particularly  as  President  Cleveland 
used  the  decision  as  the  basis  of  a  second  proclamation,  July  27, 
1896,  declaring  that  the  "  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States  have 
been  the  subject  of  authoritative  exposition  by  the  tribunal  of  last 
resort,  and  it  has  thus  been  declared  that  any  combination  of  per 
sons  organized  in  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  proceeding 
to  and  making  war  upon  a  foreign  country  with  which  the  United 
States  are  at  peace,  and  provided  with  arms  to  be  used  for  such 
purpose,  constitutes  a  l military  expedition  or  enterprise'  within 
the  meaning  of  said  neutrality  laws,  and  that  the  providing  or 
preparing  of  the  means  for  such  'military  expedition  or  enter 
prise  '  which  is  expressly  prohibited  by  said  laws,  includes  furnish 
ing  or  aiding  in  transportation  for  such  "military  expedition  or 
enterprise/  " 

The  proclamation  also  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  by  ex 
press  enactment,  "if  two  or  more  persons  conspire  to  commit  an 
offence  against  the  United  States  any  act  of  one  conspirator  to 
effect  the  object  of  such  conspiracy  renders  all  the  conspirators 
liable  to  fine  and  imprisonment." 

There  was  no  mistaking  the  tone  and  purpose  of  this  pronounce 
ment,  and  though  the  Cuban  emissaries  were  far  from  abandon 
ment  of  their  efforts,  they  were  driven  to  devices  such  as  were  ex 
emplified  in  the  case  of  the  Laurada,  which,  proceeding  from 
Wilmington,  Del.,  August  5,  1896,  with  clearance  for  Port  An 
tonio,  Jamaica  (the  main  entrepot  of  the  fruit  trade),  took  on 
board  off  Barnegat,  in  the  open  sea,  from  three  tugs  awaiting  her, 

1  House  Doc.,  326,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.  The  judgment  against  the  captain, 
Wiborg,  was  affirmed;  that  against  the  mates,  Petersen  and  Johansen,  was 
reversed  on  the  view  that  there  was  no  adequate  proof  to  show  that  they  had 
knowledge  of  the  ship's  orders  or  movements  when  the  vessel  was  in  Amer 
ican  jurisdiction. 


416  THE  "LAURADA"  [1896 

some  passengers,  among  whom  were  the  well-known  filibusters 
Nunez  and  Roloff,  and  some  cases  of  arms  and  warlike  stores. 
She  went  to  the  small  and  isolated  guano  island  of  Navassa,  about 
thirty-five  miles  off  the  western  end  of  Hayti,  and  which  was  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  She  expected  to  meet  here  the 
tugboats  Three  Friends,  the  Commodore,  and  Dauntless.  Only 
the  latter,  which  had  left  Brunswick,  Ga.,  August  12,  "in  spite," 
as  reported  by  the  collector,  "of  the  closest  surveillance,"  and 
had  taken  aboard  some  hundred  men  at  Woodbine,  appeared. 

The  Dauntless  carried  the  men  and  supplies  from  the  Laurada  to 
Cuba,  distant  ninety  miles,  making  two  trips.  The  Laurada  com 
pleted  her  voyage  and  returned  to  the  United  States.  Hart,  the 
president  and  manager  of  the  fruit  company  to  which  she  be 
longed,  and  Murphy,  her  captain,  were  indicted  for  violation  of  the 
neutrality  law.  Hart  was  condemned  to  two  years'  imprisonment 
and  a  fine  of  five  hundred  dollars.  Murphy  was  acquitted.  An 
appeal  in  the  case  of  Hart  resulted  in  an  affirmation  of  the  judg 
ment,  and  an  opinion  from  the  court  that  went  beyond  any  pre 
vious  decision  in  rigor.  The  judge  held  that  "a  combination  of 
a  number  of  men  in  the  United  States,  with  a  common  intent  to 
proceed  in  a  body  to  a  foreign  country  and  engage  in  hostilities, 
either  by  themselves  or  in  co-operation  with  the  others,  against 
a  power  with  which  the  United  States  is  at  peace,  constitutes  a 
military  expedition  when  they  actually  proceed  from  the  United 
States,  whether  they  are  then  provided  with  arms  or  intend  to  secure 
them  in  transit.  It  is  not  necessary  that  all  the  persons  shall  be 
brought  into  personal  contact  with  each  other  in  the  United  States, 
or  that  they  shall  be  drilled,  uniformed,  or  prepared  for  efficient 
service." 

"The  decision,"  says  Benton,  "clearly  established  the  princi 
ple  that,  to  secure  a  conviction  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
it  would  not  be  necessary  to  show  that  the  defendant  had  provided 
the  means  for  carrying  the  expedition  to  Cuba,  but  that  if  he  pro 
vided  the  means  for  any  part  of  its  journey  with  knowledge  of  its 
ultimate  destination  and  of  its  unlawful  character,  he  was  guilty." 

"Providing  the  means  for  carrying  a  known  military  expedition 
to  an  island  over  which  the  United  States  has  jurisdiction,  as  one 
1  Benton,  54,  55.  Moore,  Digest,  VII,  911-916. 


1895]  DIFFICULTIES  OF  ADMINISTRATION  417 

stage  of  its  journey,  with  knowledge  of  its  final  hostile  destination," 
was  thus  made  an  offence  under  the  statute.1 

Though  the  final  conviction  of  Hart,  March  18,  1898,  came  too 
late  to  affect  filibustering  materially,  it  was  additional  evidence  of 
the  desire  and  intention  of  the  American  government  to  deal 
strictly  with  evasions  of  the  law  in  question,  and  of  its  good-will 
toward  Spain.  The  failures  to  convict  in  the  cases  which  had 
arisen  in  the  first  stage  of  the  conflict,  through  the  narrowness  of 
definitions  by  the  courts,  were,  in  view  of  those  of  the  later  period, 
just  causes  of  Spanish  dissatisfaction;  but  in  any  case  there  was  no 
just  ground  for  complaint  against  the  American  government  itself 
for  want  of  energy,  or  as  to  watchfulness  or  willingness  to  proceed 
against  violators  of  the  law,  whenever  possible.  That  it  was  much 
hampered  by  the  sympathies  of  the  population,  which  extended  to 
all  classes,  and  which  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  caused  too 
lenient  views  to  be  taken  by  many  officials  of  the  customs  and 
affected  the  action  of  the  latter  favorably  to  the  Cubans,  is  unques 
tionable,  and  that  there  were  cases  in  which  Spain  might  justly 
have  demanded  damages  is  scarcely  to .  be  questioned.  The 
leanings  of  a  whole  people,  however,  are  too  strong  to  be  always 
successfully  encountered  by  a  government  in  the  administration 
of  its  laws.  These  leanings  were  the  result  of  Spanish  action  in 
Cuba  itself,  and  not  of  enmity  to  the  Spanish  people.  The  Amer 
ican  people  were  deeply  moved  through  a  sentiment  which,  whether 
well  or  ill  based,  was  in  itself  an  evidence  of  their  humanity  and 
kindliness.  The  action  of  the  national  government  and  its  officers, 
thus  so  strongly  adverse  to  the  drift  of  national  feeling,  was  dis 
tinctly  on  a  high  plane  of  honor  and  disinterestedness. 

Furthermore,  "it  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  principles  governing 
neutral  aid  to  belligerents  to  make  insurrection  impossible  or 
directly  to  aid  governments  in  maintaining  the  status  quo.  No 
more  are  they  formulated  to  throttle  sympathy  and  to  forbid  such 
comfort  and  support  as  individuals  may  desire  to  give.  They 
accomplish  their  purpose  when  they  prevent  what  is  technically 
known  as  'direct  military  aid/  'armed  expeditions/  'ships  of 
war  fitted  out/  or  use  of  sail  for  belligerent  purposes  in  aid  of 
either  one  of  the  belligerents.  The  contention  at  present  is  that 
1  Moore,  Digest,  VII,  915. 


418        INEFFICIENCY  OF  SPANISH  PREVENTION      [1896 

there  is  a  limit  to  the  obligations  of  a  neutral  as  to  the  enforcement 
of  neutrality;  that  its  duty  is  not  one  of  perfect  vigilance." 

Nor  should  the  inertness  of  Spain  herself  in  the  matter  be  over 
looked.  Expeditions  landed  with  scarcely  an  attempt  at  preven 
tion  on  the  part  of  Spanish  cruisers  or  garrisons.  With  proper 
energy,  with  67  vessels  of  all  classes  in  Cuba,  and  with  more  than 
200,000  men  available  on  land,  the  coast  should  have  been  securely 
guarded  and  every  landing-place  made  impossible  to  an  invader. 
Instead,  the  Cuban  authorities  leaned  almost  wholly  upon  the 
American  government  for  prevention,  there  being  but  one  seizure 
afloat  by  the  Spanish,  that  of  the  Competitor,  during  the  three  years 
of  the  insurrection. 

Of  the  71  expeditions  of  which  there  is  report,  but  5  were  stopped 
on  the  coast  of  Cuba  by  the  Spanish.  The  United  States  author 
ities  stopped  33,  the  English  2;  4  were  prevented  by  storms;  27 
were  successful.  Nearly  all  the  vessels  were  but  small  tugs  of  less 
than  100  tons.  Only  4  were  larger  ships:  the  American  Laurada  of 
899  net  tons;  the  English  Bermuda  of  823;  the  Norwegian  Leon 
of  490,  and  the  Danish  Horsa  of  459.  The  responsibility  for  the 
last  three  rested  largely  with  the  consuls  of  the  nations  to  which  they 
belonged,  as  they  could  not  have  left  American  ports  without  their 
consent.  The  Bermuda  made  5  trips,  the  Ilorsa  2.  The  Three 
Friends,  a  tug  of  89  tons,  made  8,  the  Dauntless,  of  77  tons,  made  12. 

Said  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  speaking  of  an  expedition  by 
the  Laurada,  in  February,  1897:  "If  the  Spanish  patrol  of  2,200 
miles  of  Cuban  coast  had  frustrated  one-half  the  number  of  the 
expeditions  that  were  frustrated  by  the  United  States  authorities 
along  a  coast-line  of  5,470  miles,  not  one  man  nor  one  cartridge 
would  have  been  illicitly  landed  in  Cuba  from  the  United  States 
in  the  past  two  years  and  a  half.  In  this  particular  instance  the 
vessel  landed  her  men  and  arms  unmolested  for  two  days  in  a 
prominent  seaport  [Banes],  though  all  Cuban  seaports  have  been 
reported  under  Spanish  control,  and  though  the  Spanish  authori 
ties  had  been  informed  of  her  landing  and  even  minutely  of  the 
situation  of  torpedoes  which  had  been  laid  for  her  protection." 

1  Benson,  62,  citing  Woolsey,  American  Foreign  Policy,  37. 

2  Letter  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  November  30,  1897.    House  Doc. 
326,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  10  and  18. 


1896]  EFFECT  OF  PROXIMITY  419 

It  was  the  proximity  of  the  United  States  and  not  merely  Cuban 
energy,  supported  by  the  popular  good-will  of  the  country,  which 
made  the  Union  the  principal  source  of  Cuban  supply.  Exactly 
the  same  elements  that  made  the  close  and  extensive  commercial 
relations  in  time  of  peace  caused  the  active  commerce  in  war  ma 
terial  in  the  time  of  war.  Had  the  American  government  been  suc 
cessful  in  preventing  absolutely  the  illegal  part  of  such  traffic  it 
would  have  been  transferred  to  other  countries,  and  supplies  of 
arms  and  men  would  have  gone  from  England  and  France  to  Cuba, 
as,  through  the  proximity  of  these  countries  to  Spain,  they  went 
thence  to  the  Carlists  in  far  greater  degree  than  from  the  United 
States  to  the  Cubans.  The  traffic,  in  so  far  as  the  employment 
of  vessels  and  men  was  concerned,  was  a  mere  question  of  money. 
The  inducements  would  have  been  the  same  to  the  Englishman  or 
Frenchman,  and  with  the  same  result;  the  only  difference  would 
have  been  the  larger  expense  to  the  Cuban  committees.  The 
suppression  of  such  committees  in  Great  Britain  more  particularly 
would  have  been  as  difficult  as  in  the  United  States.  Both  countries 
are  extremely  jealous  of  trespassing  upon  the  right  of  speech  or 
action.  The  Cuban  Junta  of  New  York  had  its  counterpart  in  the 
Carlist  committee  of  London.  It  was  impossible  in  countries  of 
such  liberalism  to  suppress  either,  or  for  any  political  party  to 
propose  so  doing. 

However  much  the  abuse  of  such  liberty  by  the  Cubans  in  the 
United  States  may  be  deplored,  it  is  impossible  not  to  admire 
the  self-sacrifice  shown  by  the  whole  body,  in  the  heavy  contribu 
tions  they  were  called  upon  to  make,  and  the  energy,  courage,  and 
ability  exhibited  by  the  leaders  in  the  hazardous  efforts,  and  their 
remarkable  persistency  in  the  face  of  such  frequent  disaster. 
This  much  must  be  granted  them  by  the  fair-minded.  It  is  a  fine 
page  in  the  history  of  their  island.1 

Scarcely  had  revolt  begun  but  that  Spanish  officials  showed, 
by  firing  upon  the  mail  steamer  Allianca,  one  of  the  line  between 
New  York  and  Colon,  passing  through  the  Windward  Passage 

1  For  a  full  list,  so  far  as  known,  of  the  vessels  engaged  in  filibustering,  and 
the  Spanish  view  of  this  question,  see  the  Marquis  de  Olivart,  "  Le  Diffe>end 
entre  1'Espagne  et  les  Etats  Unis,  au  Sujet  de  la  Question  Cubaine,"  Revue 
Generale  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  V  (1898),  358-422. 


420  THE   "ALLIAN^A"   CASE  [1895 

twice  weekly,  the  same  fatuity  of  conduct  in  ignoring  the  need  of 
not  uselessly  arousing  American  feeling  adversely  as  had  been 
shown  in  the  previous  contest. 

The  Allianca  was  on  her  homeward  voyage.  Sighted  off  Cape 
Maysi  by  the  cruiser  Venadito,  March  8,  the  latter,  distant,  by  the 
commander's  own  account,  a  mile  and  a  half  from  shore  and  a 
like  distance  from  the  Allianca,  fired  a  blank  shot.  To  this  the 
Allianqa  paid  no  attention,  nor  did  she  do  so  to  the  two  projectiles 
fired  later.  She  continued  her  course,  her  speed  soon  carrying  her 
beyond  further  risk  of  interference.  By  her  captain's  statement  she 
was  six  miles  from  shore,  a  distance  evidently  much  nearer  the 
truth,  as  the  mile  and  a  half  stated  by  the  Spanish  captain  as  his 
own  distance  would  be  a  most  unlikely  proximity  to  land,  at  such 
a  point,  for  a  cruising  vessel.  Mr.  Gresham,  the  American  secre 
tary  of  state,  telegraphed  Mr.  Hannis  Taylor,  the  American  minister 
at  Madrid:  "The  Windward  Passage,  where  this  occurred,  is  the 
natural  and  usual  highway  for  vessels  plying  between  [northern] 
ports  of  the  United  States  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Through  it 
several  lines  of  American  mail  and  commercial  steamers  pass 
weekly  within  sight  of  Cape  Maysi.  They  are  well  known,  and 
this  voyage  embraces  no  Cuban  port  of  call.  Forcible  interference 
with  them  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  belligerent  act,  whether  they  pass 
within  three  miles  of  the  Cuban  coast  or  not,  and  can  under  no 
circumstances  be  tolerated  when  no  state  of  war  exists.  This 
government  will  expect  prompt  disavowal  of  the  unauthorized  act 
and  due  expression  of  regret  on  the  part  of  Spain,  and  it  must  in 
sist  that  immediate  and  positive  orders  be  given  to  Spanish  naval 
commanders  not  to  interfere  with  legitimate  American  commerce 
passing  through  that  channel."  1 

On  presenting  this,  in  audience  with  the  minister  of  state,  March 
16,  Mr.  Taylor  was  informed,  as  usual,  that  on  reception  of  official 
information  from  Cuba  the  minister  would  adopt,  "according 
to  the  principles  of  international  law  and  without  prejudice  to  the 
authority  which  he  has  a  right  to  exercise  in  the  territorial  waters 
of  Cuba,  the  proper  measures  if  an  involuntary  wrong  has  been 
committed  against  the  government  of  the  United  States."  2  "I  was 

1  Telegram,  March  14,  1895,  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  1177. 
*Ibid.,  1179. 


1895]  THE   "ALLIANCA"   CASE  421 

promised,"  said  Mr.  Taylor,  "that  this  preliminary  answer  should 
be  followed  by  a  specific  and  formal  reply  to  your  demand  the' 
moment  the  facts  can  be  obtained  from  Cuba  by  telegraph."  1 

On  March  24,  1895  the  Duke  of  Tetuan  became  minister  of 
state,  and  promised  "  to  consider  the  Allianca  incident  before  every 
thing."'  A  month  passed,  and  the  American  secretary  of  state 
pressed  for  reply.  On  April  18  it  was  acknowledged  that  the 
Venadito  fired  upon  the  Allianca  when  the  latter  was  outside  the 
three-mile  limit,  and  on  May  16  the  act  was  disavowed  in  a  note 
from  the  minister  of  state,3  which  was  accepted  at  Washington, 
"  without  conceding  that  the  exact  location  of  the  Allianca  at  the 
time  the  shot  was  fired  can  be  considered  a  controlling  circum 
stance."  4 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  1178.  2  Ibid.,  1180.  3  Ibid.,  1184. 

<  Acting  secretary  of  state  Uhl  to  American  minister,  June  5,  1895,  Ibid., 
1185.  In  discussing  this  question  with  the  Spanish  authorities,  Mr.  Taylor 
had  adopted  as  his  guide  the  instructions  in  1880  of  Mr.  Evarts,  then  secretary 
of  state,  to  General  Fairchild,  minister  at  Madrid,  relative  to  the  visit  and 
search  of  four  American  schooners  in  rapid  succession  between  May  and  June 
of  that  year,  all  of  which  claimed  to  be  not  less  than  six  miles  distant  from 
the  Cuban  coast,  and  two  of  them  much  more.  Said  Mr.  Evarts:  "The 
question  does  not  appear  to  this  government  to  be  one  to  be  decided  alone 
by  the  geographical  position  of  the  vessels,  but  by  the  higher  considerations 
involved  in  this  unwonted  exercise  of  search  in  a  time  of  peace;  and  to  a  greater 
extent  than  the  existing  treaty  of  1795  between  the  two  nations,  in  its  eigh 
teenth  article,  permits  it  to  be  exercised  even  in  time  of  recognized  public  war, 
that  article  permitting  visitation  only,  with  inspection  of  the  vessels'  sea 
letters,  and  not  search.  These  interferences  with  our  legitimate  commerce 
do  not  even  take  the  form  of  revenue  formality  performed  by  the  revenue 
vessels  of  Spain,  but  carry  in  their  methods  most  unequivocal  features  of 
belligerent  searches  made  by  the  war  vessels  of  Spain.  From  the  unhappy 
history  of  the  events  of  the  last  ten  years  in  and  about  the  waters  of  the  An 
tilles  it  is  only  too  cogently  to  be  inferred  that  these  proceedings  of  Spanish 
war  vessels  assume  a  right  thus  to  arrest  our  peaceful  commerce  under  mo 
tives  not  of  revenue  inspection,  but  of  warlike  defence.  In  this  aspect  of  the 
case  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether,  under  cover  of  revenue  investigation  to 
intercept  smuggling  or  other  frauds,  jurisdictional  power  within  the  limit  of 
the  recognized  maritime  league  could  be  invoked  in  time  of  peace  to  justify  the 
interference  of  Spanish  cruisers  with  lawful  commerce  of  nations  passing  along 
a  public  maritime  highway,  in  a  regular  course  of  navigation  which  brings 
them  near  the  Cuban  coast,  though  not  bound  to  its  ports.  It  is  not  to  be  sup 
posed  that  the  world's  commerce  is  to  be  impeded,  and  the  ships  of  foreign  and 
friendly  nations  forced  to  seek  an  unwonted  channel  of  navigation.  ..." 

Reverting  to  the  larger  question  of  right  of  search  on  the  high  sea,  Mr. 
Evarts  continued:  "This  government  never  has  recognized,  and  never  will 
recognize  any  pretence  or  exercise  of  sovereignty  on  the  part  of  Spain,  beyond 


422  THE  "ALLIAN^A"   CASE  [1895 

"Known  only  in  a  vague  and  confused  way  by  the  reports  in 
the  foreign  press,  the  incident  and  its  solution  had  awakened  in 
Spain  scarcely  any  public  interest.  .  It  was  only  about  the  end  of 
August  that  this  was  moved.  At  this  time  a  Polish  adventurer, 
Count  Hobkirk,  stating  himself  to  have  been  a  passenger  of  the 
Allianca,  published  in  a  newspaper  an  account  [which  he  stated  to 
be]  supported  by  the  assertions  of  Senor  Muruaga,  the  Spanish 
minister  at  Washington,  and  by  *  interviews'  even  of  the  captain 
of  the  Venadito,  affirming  that  the  ship  was  the  property  of  a  well- 
known  filibuster,  filled  with  warlike  stores;  that  she  was  in  Spanish 
waters,  and  very  near  the  shore.  The  satisfaction  conceded  to  the 
United  States  by  the  Spanish  government  was  then  criticised  with 
the  greatest  vehemence.  When,  in  the  early  days  of  September, 
the  president  of  the  council  declared  to  a  journalist  that,  war  not 
existing,  it  was  not  possible  to  exercise  the  right  of  search,  either 
within  or  without  the  territorial  waters,  and  that  one  could  only 
demand  in  these  waters  the  character  of  the  ship  and  prevent  her 
entry  into  ports  and  places  not  open  to  commerce,  the  whole  Span 
ish  press  stupidly  cried  against  the  abdication  of  the  sovereign 
rights  of  Spain  and  the  humiliation  of  the  national  honor. 

"Such  a  misunderstanding  of  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations 
was  the  most  melancholy  proof  of  the  ignorance  and  presumption 
which  were  to  lead  Spanish  opinion  to  the  final  conflict.  The  most 
popular  evening  journal  of  Madrid,  the  Heraldo,  wrote,  September 

the  belt  of  a  league  from  the  Cuban  coast,  over  the  commerce  of  this  country 
in  time  of  peace.  This  rule  of  the  law  of  nations  we  consider  too  firmly  es 
tablished  to  be  drawn  into  debate,  and  any  dominion  over  the  sea  outside 
this  limit  will  be  resisted  with  the  same  firmness  as  if  such  dominion  were  as 
serted  in  mid-ocean." 

Spain  had,  for  more  than  a  hundred  years,  established  both  for  the  Penin 
sula  and  her  oversea  possessions  two  leagues  as  the  measure  of  maritime 
jurisdiction.  This  regulation  Mr.  Evarts  regarded  as  applicable  to  revenue 
regulations  only  against  smuggling,  and  to  be  taken  in  the  same  light  as  the 
revenue  regulations  of  the  United  States,  in  force  since  1799,  which  "not 
only  allow  but  enjoin  visitation  of  vessels  bound  to  our  ports  within  four 
leagues  from  land."  (Mr.  Evarts  to  General  Fairchild,  August  11, 1880,  Foreign 
Relations,  1880,  922-927.)  Spain  had  previously  advanced  this  claim,  and 
much  correspondence  with  the  American  government  had  taken  place  in  1863, 
with  the  result  that  the  latter  had  offered  to  submit  the  question  to  the 
King  of  the  Belgians.  Though  a  convention  was  made  to  this  effect,  the 
question  was  never  submitted.  For  this  subject  of  jurisdiction  over  the 
Marginal  Sea,  see  Moore,  Digest,  I,  698-735. 


1895]  IGNORANCE  OF  SPANISH  PRESS  423 

14,  1895,  that  Senor  Canovas  would  have  certainly  held  other 
principles  and  have  given  a  different  solution  to  the  affair  of  the 
Allianca  '  if  he  had  not  been  profoundly  deceived  as  to  two  things : 
the  effective  power  of  the  republic  of  Washington  and  the  deca 
dence  which  he  thinks  inevitable  of  the  country  whose  fate  he 
holds  in  his  hands/  One  was  to  see  two  years  later  who  was  de 
ceived  in  this  regard;  unfortunately,  Senor  Canovas  was  no  longer 
of  this  world  to  recall  it  to  the  Madrid  journal."  * 

The  quotation  thus  given  by  Senor  Olivart  to  mark  the  folly  of  the 
press,  shows  not  only  ignorance  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1795, 
but  the  incapacity  for  any  real  appreciation  of  the  case.  However 
much  may  be  granted  to  the  necessities  of  self-defence,  such  ne 
cessity  could  hardly  be  evident  in  the  case  of  a  large  steamship, 
one  of  several  (the  appearance  of  which  must  have  been  perfectly 
familiar  to  the  commander  of  the  cruiser),  standing  her  usual 
northerly  course  at  high  speed,  past  the  extreme  eastern  end  of 
Cuba,  where  no  harbor  existed.  The  act  of  the  Spanish  com 
mander  was  simply  one  of  utter  want  of  judgment  and  wholly 
inexcusable  from  any  point  of  view. 

Almost  coincident  with  the  Allianca  affair  the  question  of  the 
payment  of  the  large  claim  of  Mr.  Mora,  an  American  citizen, 
whose  extensive  estates  in  Cuba  had  been  confiscated  during  the 
ten  years'  war,  assumed  an  acute  form,  and  did  much  to  disturb 
Spanish  feeling.  The  claim  was  one  which  had  been  brought  be 
fore  the  commission  established  by  the  convention  of  1871.  In 

1  The  Marquis  de  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public, 
tome  VII  (1900),  544-546.  The  principal  owner  of  El  Heraldo  was  Captain 
Moreu,  who  commanded  the  Cristobal  Colon  in  1898.  This  paper  published 
an  interview  with  Senor  Canovas,  September  9,  1895,  in  which  the  latter  ex 
pressed  on  the  subject  the  very  correct  views  of  international  law  to  which 
the  paper  took  such  exception.  The  Impartial  also  said,  September  12, 1895, 
referring  to  the  government:  "They  will  not  be  able  to  escape  the  humilia 
tion  imposed  on  Spain  in  the  Allianca  affair;  they  will  not  be  able  to  repair 
the  injustice  committed  against  the  commander  of  the  Venadito.  It  is  not 
less  certain  that  Spain  can  and  ought  to  scrutinize  and  detain  all  ships  which 
give  reason  for  suspicion.  There  is  nothing  established  against  this  right.  Ad 
mitted  by  writers,  mutually  signed  in  the  treaty  of  1795,  ratified  in  1869 
(1877),  this  has  neither  been  modified  nor  weakened  by  any  later  treaty; 
it  has  its  foundation  in  the  law  of  self-defence.  Against  all  that  they  knew  but 
one  offset  .  .  .  the  power  of  the  United  States.  But  the  dignity  of  Spain  is 
still  greater  than  the  power  of  the  United  States."— Ibid.,  456. 


424  THE  MORA  CLAIM  [1895 

November,  1886,  Senor  Moret  made  a  formal  offer  to  pay  the  sum 
of  $1,500,000  as  a  full  and  definite  indemnity,  which  was  accepted 
by  the  United  States,  and  a  formal  agreement  was  made.  But 
the  Spanish  Chambers  having  refused  to  accord  the  necessary 
credit  the  money  remained  unpaid.  The  principal  reason  for 
the  refusal  of  the  Cortes  was  the  existence  of  still  larger  Spanish 
claims  for  the  cession  of  Florida  and  for  indemnities  to  Spanish 
subjects  for  injuries  during  the  American  civil  war.  On  March 
16, 1894,  a  project  of  a  convention  of  arbitration  of  these  claims  was 
presented  by  the  American  minister  at  Madrid,1  but  at  the  same 
time  declaring  expressly  that  the  payment  of  the  Mora  indem 
nity  would  not  be  submitted  to  the  proposed  arbitration,  and 
that  the  definitive  arrangement  of  this  latter  could  no  longer  be 
awaited. 

A  note  from  the  American  minister,  on  December  28,  1894, 
stating  that  he  was  "instructed  to  respectfully,  yet  firmly,  insist 
upon  a  reply,  without  further  delay,"  2  to  his  communication  in  the 
matter  six  months  previous,  brought  reply  that  "when  the  occasion 
arrives  the  Cortes  will  be  disposed  to  vote  the  necessary  credit  .  .  . 
provided  such  vote  coincides  with  the  decision  of  the  United  States 
to  settle  the  pending  Spanish  claims."  ; 

The  passage  of  a  joint  resolution  in  Congress,  approved  March 
2,  1895,  requesting  the  President  to  insist  upon  this  payment,  with 
interest  from  December,  1886; — its  presentation  to  the  Spanish 
government  by  the  American  minister,  June  18; 4  and  a  note  from 
the  American  secretary  of  state  to  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  "still  more  energetic  and  truly  comminatory,"  5  brought 
an  ending  of  the  matter.  Mr.  Olney's  proposal  to  Senor  Dupuy 
de  Lome  was  for  an  immediate  payment  of  a  half  of  the  claim, 
and  the  remainder  on  January  1,  1896.  It  ended:  "If  the 
Cortes  shall  take  such  action  as  both  the  law  and  the  justice  of  the 
case  as  well  as  the  true  interests  of  Spain  require,  a  long-stand 
ing  grievance  and  source  of  irritation  between  the  two  countries 
would  be  happily  removed.  If  such  action  is  refused,  it  wouty 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1894.     (Appen.  442.     Draft  of  proposed  convention, 
Ibid.,  435-438.) 

2  Ibid.,  1895,  1160.  » Ibid.,  1161.  4  Ibid.,  1895,  1165. 
5  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  VII,  551. 


1895]  THE  MORA  CLAIM  425 

leave  the  United  States  to  consider  what  course  its  honor  and 
interests  and  the  due  protection  of  its  citizens  call  for." 

"But  the  Spanish  government  could  not  dream  of  sending  to  the 
parliament,  which  was  hostile  to  it,  a  question  which  the  preceding 
cabinets  had  not  succeeded  in  resolving  with  friendly  majorities. 
Thus  the  legislature  closed  July  1  without  being  consulted."  2 
On  July  17  it  was  determined  in  the  council  of  ministers  to  offer 
to  execute  the  stipulation  of  1886  by  three  payments  of  a  half 
million  Spanish  dollars  each,  the  form  and  time  of  payment  to  be 
the  subject  of  ulterior  arrangement.3  By  a  memorandum  agreed 
upon  at  Boston,  August  10,  signed  by  the  secretary  of  state,  the 
Spanish  minister,  and  the  representatives  of  Senor  Mora  and  of  all 
interested,  Spain  agreed  to  pay  the  $1,500,000  in  Spanish  gold  by 
September  15,  1895,  which  offer  was  accepted  as  in  full  of  all  de 
mands.  On  August  19  a  royal  decree  opened  an  extraordinary 
credit  with  the  ministry  of  the  colonies,  to  be  covered  by  the  floating 
debt  of  Cuba  and  to  be  submitted  to  the  Cortes  on  their  first  meet 
ing.  On  the  date  set  payment  was  made  in  Washington,  the  sum 
finally  received  amounting  in  American  gold  to  $1,449,000.4 

One  can  well  recognize  that  the  pressure  of  the  American  govern 
ment  at  this  time  for  such  an  amount  of  money  could  not  be  taken 
otherwise  than  as  a  grievance  by  Spain.  The  sum  was  one  which 
Spain  at  no  time  was  able  to  pay  without  difficulty,  and  still  less 
at  a  moment  when  the  resources  of  the  country  were  so  heavily 
strained  by  the  immense  efforts  it  was  making,  with  revolt  also 
active  in  the  Philippines,  to  increase  her  force  in  Cuba  which  was 
rapidly  becoming  a  gulf  into  which  was  to  be  swept  whatever 
wealth  had  come  from  the  comparative  prosperity  of  the  previous 
fifteen  years  of  Cuban  and  peninsular  peace. 

President  Cleveland  in  his  annual  message,  December  2,  1895, 
made  an  appeal  to  the  country  for  support  of  the  laws.  "  Whatever, " 
he  said,  "may  be  the  traditional  sympathy  of  our  countrymen  as 
individuals  with  a  people  who  seem  to  be  struggling  for  larger 
autonomy  and  greater  freedom,  deepened,  as  such  sympathy 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  1196. 

2  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  tome  VII,  551. 

3  Senor  de  Lome  to  Mr.  Olney,  July  17,  1895,  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  1170. 

4  Five  Spanish  duros  are  equal  to  $4.83  American. 


426  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1895  [1895 

naturally  must  be,  in  behalf  of  our  neighbors,  yet  the  plain  duty 
of  their  government  is  to  observe  in  good  faith  the  recognized  ob 
ligations  of  international  relationship.  The  performance  of  this 
duty  should  not  be  made  more  difficult  by  a  disregard  on  the  part 
of  our  citizens  of  the  obligations  growing  out  of  their  allegiance  to 
their  country,  which  should  restrain  them  from  violating  as  in 
dividuals  the  neutrality  which  the  nation  of  which  they  are  mem 
bers  is  bound  to  observe  in  its  relations  to  friendly  sovereign  states." 

He  referred  to  the  case  of  the  Allianca  as  an  act  "promptly 
disavowed,  with  full  expression  of  regret  and  assurance  of  non- 
recurrence  of  such  just  cause  of  complaint,  while  the  offending 
officer  was  relieved  of  his  command.  Military  arrests  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  had  occasioned  frequent  reclamations. 
Where  held  on  criminal  charges  their  delivery  to  the  ordinary  civil 
jurisdiction  for  trial  had  been  demanded  and  obtained  in  con 
formity  with  treaty  provision,  and  where  merely  detained  by  way  of 
military  precaution  under  a  proclaimed  state  of  siege,  without  form 
ulated  accusation,  their  release  or  trial  had  been  insisted  upon.  The 
right  of  American  consular  officers  in  the  island  to  prefer  protests 
and  demands  in  such  cases  having  been  questioned  by  the  insular 
authority,  their  enjoyment  of  the  privilege  stipulated  by  treaty  for 
the  consuls  of  Germany  was  claimed  under  the  most-favored-nation 
provision  of  our  own  convention  and  was  promptly  recognized."  l 

He  announced  the  settlement  of  the  Mora  claim,  and  mentioned 
the  conclusion  of  an  arrangement  in  January,  1895,  brought  about 
by  the  enforcement  of  differential  duties  against  United  States  ex 
ports  to  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  and  the  immediate  claim  thereupon 
for  the  benefit  of  the  minimum  tariff  of  Spain  in  return  for  the  most 
favorable  treatment  permitted  by  our  laws  as  regarded  the  pro 
ductions  of  Spanish  territory.  He  noted  that  "vigorous  protests 
against  excessive  fines  imposed  on  our  ships  and  merchandise  by 
the  customs  officers  of  these  islands  for  trivial  errors  have  resulted 
in  the  remission  of  such  fines  in  instances  where  the  equity  of  the 
complaint  was  apparent,  though  the  vexatious  practice  had  not  been 
wholly  discontinued."  2 

1  For  the  correspondence  covering  these  jcases,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1895, 
1209-1214  . 
3  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  IX,  636-637. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

CASES  OF  AMERICAN  CITIZENS. — WEYLER  SUCCEEDS  CAMPOS. — 
WEYLER'S  PROCLAMATIONS. — CUBA  IN  THE  SENATE. — THE 
SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  THE  NEWSPAPERS. — SENOR  CANOVAS. 
— SENATE  DEBATE 

THE  difficulties  arising  from  the  arrest  of  American  citizens 
of  Cuban  birth,  many  of  whom  had  merely  taken  out  American 
citizenship  ad  hoc,  were,  by  the  wise  prescience  of  Senor  Canovas, 
avoided  in  most  cases  during  1895  by  expulsion  from  the  island, 
instead  of  bringing  them  before  the  courts  and  submitting  to  the 
terms  of  the  protocol  of  1877,  which  were  so  irritating  to  Spanish 
sentiment  through  the  precautions  thus  established  against  sum 
mary  action.1 

Sefior  Cdnovas  was  happily  supported  throughout  the  year,  by 
the  humanity  and  excellent  judgment  of  General  Campos,  though 
individual  cases  of  extreme  hardship  arose  through  the  harshness 
and  arbitrary  action  of  subordinate  Spanish  officers.  In  the  cases 
of  three  of  the  Ansley  family  and  a  Mr.  Somers,  in  September, 
the  American  government  took  marked  exception  to  their  treat 
ment.  "The  right  of  Spain,"  said  Mr.  Olney,  "as  of  every  other 
sovereign  state  to  expel  aliens  need  not  be  discussed.  If  the  right 
be  conceded  in  its  fullest  extent,  the  mode  of  its  exercise  may  be  so 
harsh,  unreasonable,  and  oppressive  as  to  give  just  ground  of  com 
plaint,  and  was  so  beyond  all  doubt  in  the  four  cases  now  under 
consideration.  Whether  there  be  regard  to  the  arbitrary  charac 
ter  of  the  decree  of  deportation,  to  the  successive  steps  by  which 
it  was  apparently  proposed  to  be  enforced,  to  the  separation  of 
husbands  and  fathers  from  dependent  families,  or  to  the  constrained 
abandonment  of  the  latter  in  destitute  circumstances  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  strangers,  the  proceedings  at  every  stage  and  in  every 
particular  seem  to  have  been  characterized  by  wilful  disregard, 
not  merely  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens,  but  of  the  dictates  of 

1  Supra,  226. 
427 


428  AMERICAN  CITIZENS  IN   CUBA  [1895 

common  humanity.  This  government  cannot  be  expected  to  look 
upon  such  proceedings  except  with  indignation,  nor  to  pass  them 
over  without  remonstrance."  l 

"It  was  only  in  the  first  months  of  1896  that  this  moderation  and 
this  mildness  of  action  [to  which  it  must  be  said  the  above  was  an 
exception]  began  to  change,  when  General  Weyler  succeeded  Mar 
shal  Martinez  Campos  in  Cuba.  Misinterpreting  the  prudent 
policy  of  Senor  Canovas,  the  new  governor-general  held  for  two 
or  three  months  in  close  solitary  confinement  a  moderate  number 
[seven]  of  individuals  whom  he  had  caused  to  be  arrested  without 
ever  arriving  at  declaring  against  them  the  existence  of  any  crime."  2 

Such  difficulties  were,  however,  in  the  main  determined  with 
tact  and  judgment.  Spain,  as  so  frequently  mentioned,  had  much 
reason  for  suspicion  and  complaint  in  regard  to  the  large  number 
of  Cubans  who  had  taken  out  American  citizenship  merely  for  pro 
tection  in  Cuba,  a  phase  of  nationalization,  be  it  said,  which  had 
existence  elsewhere,  as  in  Germany,  Turkey,  and  Morocco,  and 
which  everywhere  gave  the  United  States  much  trouble.  A  notable 
instance  was  that  of  Julio  Sanguily,  who  had  been  a  brave  and 
efficient  officer  in  the  insurgent  army  during  the  ten  years*  war, 
who  claimed  to  have  been  an  American  citizen  since  1889,  and  was 
residing  in  Havana.3  He  was  arrested  February  24,  1895,  accused 
of  conspiracy  on  the  ground  of  a  statement  in  a  letter  found  on  the 
person  of  Senor  Coluna  addressed  to  Senor  Betancourt,  one  of  the 
insurgent  leaders,  in  which  he  declared  himself  unable  to  put 
"himself  at  the  head  of  the  work  of  redemption"  for  want  of  funds, 
and  through  a  letter  found  later  in  the  cravat  of  a  Senor  Azcuy  who 
had  been  arrested,  but  who  seizing  the  letter  had  so  chewed  it  that 
it  was  partially  illegible.  It  was  held  by  the  court  that  this  letter 
was  by  Sanguily  and  was  an  appointment  by  him  of  Azcuy  as  a  colo 
nel  in  the  insurgent  army. 

Brought  first  before  a  military  court,  on  the  ground  that  Sanguily 
had  not,  as  required,  inscribed  himself  in  Havana  as  an  American 

1  Mr.  Olney  to  Senor  de  Lome,  September  27,  1895,  Foreign  Relations,  1895, 
1230.     Senor  de  Olivart  finds  this  particular  remonstrance  "tout  d  fait  tegi- 
time,"  Revue  Generate,  vol.  VII,  567. 

2  De  Olivart,  Ibid.,  565. 

3  Senator  Hoar  stated  in  specific  terms  that  Sanguily's  naturalization  was 
fraudulent,  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  2239. 


1895]  AMERICAN  CITIZENS  IN  CUBA  429 

citizen,  the  case  later,  on  demand  of  the  American  government,  was 
transferred  to  a  civil  tribunal  in  November,  1895,  under  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty  of  1795  and  the  protocol  of  1877.  He  was 
found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  life  or,  in  case  the 
penalty  should  be  remitted,  to  absolute  deprivation  of  civil  rights 
and  subjection  to  the  vigilance  of  the  authorities  during  his  life 
time. 

The  arrest  and  trials  had  attracted  great  attention  in  the  United 
States,  and  in  December,  on  a  resolution  of  Senator  Call,  of  Florida, 
the  Senate  called  for  the  papers  from  the  department  of  state. 
Appeal  was  taken  by  Sanguily  to  the  Supreme  Court  at  Madrid. 
This  latter  decreed  a  new  trial,  which  began  December  21,1896, 
and  ended  by  his  being  sentenced  to  perpetual  imprisonment.  He 
was  finally,  through  the  good  offices  of  the  department  of  state, 
released  February  25,  1897,  on  condition  that  he  would  leave  the 
island  and  not  return  before  the  termination  of  the  war.  Sanguily 
signed  a  pledge  given  on  his  "own  free  will  and  without  compulsion 
on  the  part  of  any  one,"  "sacredly"  affirming  "to  the  United  States 
and  to  Spain  that  if  ...  released  by  the  pardon  of  the  latter 
government  he  would  "leave  and  remain  away  from  Cuba  and 
"  not  aid  directly  or  indirectly  the  present  insurrection."  1 

"  It  is  with  reason,"  says  Senor  de  Olivart,  "  that  President  Cleve 
land  in  his  message  of  December  2,  1895,  was  able  to  speak  of  the 
tact  shown  by  the  two  governments  in  their  relations.  ...  In  some 
forty  cases  there  was  but  one  where  condemnation  was  pronounced 
and  still  this  sentence  was  not  executed.  The  protocol  of  1877, 
so  vexing  to  Spanish  sovereignty,  was  in  the  end  interpreted  on  one 
side  and  the  other,  in  a  conciliatory  manner,  and  with  moderation; 
it  was  only  later  in  the  grave  affair  of  the  Competitor  that  pacific 
relations  were  in  danger.  At  the  period  now  in  question  (1895- 
96)  two  other  proofs  of  the  good  feeling  between  the  two  states 
may  be  cited — without  speaking,  besides,  of  the  perfect  correctness 
with  which  the  United  States  tried  then  to  prevent  the  filibustering 
expeditions  to  Cuba  and  the  infractions  of  the  law  of  neutrality. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1896,  844,  in  which  96  pages  (750-846)  are  devoted 
to  this  case.  See  also  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International 
Public,  VII,  569-573.  De  Olivart  also  states,  "as  a  fact  well  known,"  that 
Sanguily,  some  days  after  the  rupture  between  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
joined  the  Cuban  army. 


430  WEYLER  REPLACES  CAMPOS  [1896 

On  one  hand,  the  American  government  recognized  fully  the  true 
principles  on  the  subject  of  the  responsibility  of  Spain  regarding 
damages  caused  by  the  destruction  committed  in  Cuba  by  the  in 
surgents  during  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1895.  On  the  other,  the 
Madrid  government,  correcting  the  misunderstanding  of  General 
Martinez  Campos,  recognized  not  less  fully  .  .  .  the  right  of  the 
American  consuls,  in  virtue  of  the  clause  of  the  most  favored  nation 
(a  like  right  being  expressly  conceded  to  Germany)  of  presenting 
to  the  Spanish  authorities  of  Cuba  their  complaints  and  observa 
tions  touching  the  execution  of  the  treaties."  l 

On  January  18,  1896,  Campos,  having  failed  in  the  field,  was 
forced  by  the  attitude  of  the  peninsular  party  in  Havana  to  give  up 
his  office.  In  his  farewell  of  that  date  to  the  army  he  said:  "I 
have  not  been  fortunate  in  my  endeavors  as  commander,  despite 
your  bravery  and  sufferings.  As  governor  I  have  failed  to  pursue 
the  war  policy  which  the  constitutionalist  and  reformist  parties 
desired  me  to  follow  and  which  my  conscience  prevented  me  from 
carrying  into  effect";2  this  policy  having  been  too  mild,  too  con 
ciliatory  for  the  volunteers  and  other  extremists  who,  in  Havana, 
controlled  the  situation.  General  Marin  took  over  affairs,  pending 
the  arrival  of  General  Weyler,  shortly  appointed  to  succeed,  and 
Campos,  two  days  later,  left  for  Spain,  arriving  at  Coruna  February 
3,  to  meet  not  only  coldness  but  insult  from  the  populace.  "A 
majority  of  the  newspapers  here,"  said  a  despatch  from  Madrid, 
"are  indignant  with  General  Campos  for  suggesting  that  autonomy 
should  be  granted  to  the  Cubans.  They  declare  that  the  suggestion 
is  an  insult  to  the  nation  after  the  sacrifices  it  has  made." 

At  this  time  the  insurgents  were  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Havana.  All  efforts  had  failed  to  confine  them  to  the  eastern 
provinces,  and  thenceforward  the  great  sugar  estates  of  the  island 
were  at  their  mercy,  but  little  of  which  was  shown.  The  well- 
being  of  the  island  was  to  be  wrecked  until  it  should  become  value 
less  to  the  Spaniards.  Already  its  production  had  fallen  off  in 
value  $55,000,000.  On  January  10, 1896,  Gomez  issued  a  circular: 
"  Inasmuch  as  the  work  of  grinding  sugar  is  now  suspended  in  the 

1  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  VII,  573-574. 

2  Telegram  to  New  York  Herald  from  Havana,  January  18,  1896. 
8  Telegram,  Madrid,  February  4,  1896,  New  York  Herald. 


1896]  WEYLER'S  POLICY  431 

western  districts  the  burning  of  cane  fields  is  prohibited.  The  boil 
ing  houses  and  machinery  of  sugar  estates  shall  be  destroyed  in  case 
their  owners  or  managers  shall  attempt  to  resume  work,  notwith 
standing  this  order  for  the  protection  of  property."  How  ruthlessly 
this  last  was  obeyed  was  seen  in  the  gaunt  walls  and  blackened 
ruins  scattered  everywhere  throughout  the  sugar  districts  of  the 
unfortunate  island  at  the  end  of  the  war.1  The  fact  that  Campos 
had  endeavored  to  save  these  by  guarding  them  with  detachments 
of  his  men,  which  thus  weakened  the  army  for  offensive  action, 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  Spanish  popular  complaint. 

General  Weyler  came  with  a  new  determination.  The  war 
was  to  be  ruthless  in  character.  He  proclaimed:  "I  take  charge 
with  the  confidence,  which  never  abandons  a  cause,  of  preserving 
the  island  for  Spain.  I  shall  always  be  generous  with  those  who 
surrender,  but  will  have  the  decision  and  energy  to  punish  rigorously 
those  who  in  any  way  help  the  enemy.  Without  having  in  mind  any 
political  mission,  I  would  not  oppose  the  government  of  his  majesty 
when  in  its  wisdom,  having  peace  in  Cuba,  it  should  think  con 
venient  to  give  this  country  reforms  with  the  same  spirit  of  love  in 
which  a  mother  gives  all  things  to  her  children.  Inhabitants  of  the 
island  of  Cuba,  lend  me  your  help.  So  you  will  defend  your  in 
terests,  which  are  the  interests  of  the  country." 

Again  appears  the  unfortunate  attitude  of  mind  that  reform 
must  follow  pacification  instead  of  being  a  means  toward  it. 

On  February  16  General  Weyler  issued  three  proclamations: 
one  ordering  all  inhabitants  of  the  district  of  Sancti  Spiritus  and  the 
provinces  of  Puerto  Principe  and  Santiago  de  Cuba  to  concen 
trate  in  places  which  were  military  head-quarters;  forbidding 
travel  within  the  radius  of  operations  without  a  pass,  and  ordering 
the  vacation  of  all  commercial  establishments  in  the  country 
districts. 

A  second  delegated  the  judicial  attributes  of  the  governor-general 
to  the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  first  and  second  corps  and  to  the 
general  of  the  first  division  in  Puerto  Principe;  declared  that 

1  For  the  character  of  this  destruction  and  incidentally  for  evidence  of 
the  value  of  American  holdings  in  the  island,  see  the  letter  of  Messrs.  E.  At 
kins  &  Co.,  of  Boston,  December  9,  1895,  regarding  the  ruin  on  their  estates 
worked  by  the  insurgents,  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  1217. 


432  AMERICAN  POPULAR  FEELING  [1896 

prisoners  caught  in  action  would  be  subjected  to  the  most  summary 
trial  without  any  other  investigation  except  that  indispensable  for 
the  objects  of  the  trial.  If  the  sentence  were  deprivation  of  liberty, 
the  culprit  was  to  be  brought  to  Havana  for  final  judgment.  No 
sentence  of  death  was  to  be  carried  out  without  the  authority  of  the 
captain-general,  except  where  no  means  of  communication  existed 
or  in  cases  of  insult  to  superiors  or  of  military  sedition. 

The  third  declared  all  subject  to  military  law  who  propagated 
any  notice  or  assertion  favorable  to  the  rebellion;  who  destroyed 
or  damaged  railways,  telegraphs,  or  other  means  of  communication; 
all  incendiaries;  all  who  facilitated  the  supply  of  arms  or  am 
munition;  telegraphers  who  divulged  army  information;  those 
who  through  the  press  or  otherwise  reviled  the  prestige  of  Spain  or 
her  army;  those  who  extolled  the  enemy  or  supplied  the  enemy  with 
horses,  cattle,  or  other  resources;  who  acted  as  spies;  who  served 
as  guides;  who  adulterated  army  food  or  conspired  to  alter  prices; 
who  used  explosives,  and  those  who  communicated  with  the  enemy 
by  homing  pigeons,  fireworks,  or  other  signals.  "The  offences 
enumerated,"  said  clause  14,  "when  the  law  prescribes  the  death 
penalty  or  life  imprisonment,  will  be  dealt  with  most  summarily."  1 

The  tide  of  popular  feeling  in  the  United  States  was  now  rapidly 
rising.  A  great  democracy,  the  education  of  whose  mass  usually 
ends  with  the  public  school,  and  whose  library,  later,  is  the  news 
paper,  does  not  reason  with  a  volume  of  international  law  in  its 
hand  or  trouble  itself,  if  the  question  takes  form  in  its  mind  at  all, 
with  what  seems  to  it  minor  distinctions  which  weigh  not  at  all  with 
its  prejudices  and  sympathies.  For  a  hundred  years  the  American 
democracy  had  been  in  antagonistic  contact  with  Spanish  rule 
in  Louisiana,  in  Florida,  in  Mexico,  and  it  knew  but  one  mode  of 
settlement  of  the  difficulties  which  had  thus  arisen;  a  mode  which 
had  swept  Spanish  authority  from  huge  empires  of  territory  which 
constitute  to-day  more  than  half  the  dominion  of  the  Union. 
At  the  same  time  it  had  seen  the  same  authority  driven  from  the 
remainder  of  North  America  and  from  the  whole  of  South  America. 
It  was  to  be  expected  that  in  such  a  question  as  that  of  Cuba, 
its  base  of  reasoning  would  be  the  inherited  views  of  these  many 

1  For  the  full  text  of  these  edicts  see  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess., 
2345-46. 


1896]  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  433 

generations,  and  that  its  starting-point  would  be  that  Spain  was 
in  the  wrong.  When  to  this  was  added  the  destruction  of  a  great 
commerce,  and  a  daily  account,  too  often  in  overlurid  form,  of 
Cuban  happenings,  but  which  frequently  in  the  calmest  statement 
was  deeply  harrowing,  it  was  impossible  that  American  popular 
sympathy  should  not  go  to  a  people  fighting  for  relief  from  a  politi 
cal  system  which  some  thoughtful  Spaniards  themselves  believed 
unbearable. 

This  sympathy  found  its  natural  reflex  in  Congress,  the  great 
majority  of  the  members  of  which  were,  equally  with  the  public, 
convinced  that  the  situation  demanded  action  from  the  American 
government;  it  has  to  be  added  that  many  favoring  action  were 
not  too  accurate  as  to  "the  laws  of  war"  which  they  so  often 
recalled,  and  to  which  they  appealed  so  strongly  as  a  reason  for 
interference.  Thus,  on  the  first  day  of  the  new  Congress,  December 
3,  1895,  Senator  Call,  of  Florida,  offered  a  resolution  recognizing 
Cuban  belligerency,  and,  protesting  against  the  character  of  the 
war,  demanded  that  the  President  take  measures  to  assure  its 
being  carried  on  in  a  civilized  manner.1  Senator  Allen,  of  Nebraska, 
followed  with  a  resolution  which  included  the  independence  and 
annexation  of  Cuba,  the  purchase  of  all  the  islands  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  the  United  States,  the  prompt  and  effective  observation  of 
the  Monroe  doctrine  in  "its  purity  and  primary  intentions/'  and  a 
firmer  and  prompter  policy  in  the  protection  and  maintenance  of 
the  rights  of  American  citizens  abroad.  Senator  Kyle,  on  January 
13,  1896,  asked  that  the  President  be  authorized  to  receive  the  ac 
credited  representatives  of  the  Cuban  patriots  after  verifying  the 
fact  that  they  had  an  established  place  of  government. 

These  propositions,  referred  to  the  committee  on  foreign  re 
lations,  brought  a  report  from  the  majority,  January  29,  1896, 
which  declared  that  "  Congress  would  welcome  with  satisfaction  the 
concession  by  Spain  of  complete  sovereignty"  to  the  people  of 
Cuba,  "and  would  cheerfully  give  to  such  voluntary  concession  the 
cordial  support  of  the  United  States."  It  spoke  of  the  damage 
to  American  interests;  stated  that  the  United  States  had  always 
met  "with  vigor,  impartiality,  and  justice"  the  difficult  task  of 
supporting  its  neutrality;  that  the  devastation  of  the  war  now 
1  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  205. 


434  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  [1896 

waged  "creates  strong  grounds  of  protest  against  the  continuance 
of  the  struggle  .  .  .  which  is  rapidly  changing  the  issue  to  one  of 
existence  on  the  part  of  a  great  number  of  the  native  population"; 
that  "it  becomes  a  duty  of  humanity  that  the  civilized  powers 
should  insist  upon  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  recognized 
among  civilized  nations  to  both  armies." 

The  report  then  proceeded  to  declare,  despite  the  fact  that  such 
persons  had  been  so  frequently  declared  in  the  proclamations  of 
the  Presidents  to  have  no  right  to  the  protection  of  their  own  gov 
ernment,  that  "as  our  own  people  are  drawn  into  the  struggle  on 
both  sides  .  .  .  their  treatment  when  wounded  or  captured  .  .  . 
should  not  be  left  to  the  revengeful  retaliations  which  expose  them 
to  the  fate  of  pirates  or  other  felons."  It  ended  by  declaring  that 
"  the  inability  of  Spain  to  subdue  the  revolutionists  by  the  measures 
and  within  the  time  which  would  be  reasonable  when  applied  to 
occasions  of  ordinary  civil  disturbance  is  a  misfortune  that  cannot 
be  justly  visited  upon  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  nor  can  it 
be  considered  that  a  state  of  civil  war  does  not  exist,  but  [or]  that 
the  movement  is  a  mere  insurrection  and  its  supporters  a  mob  of 
criminal  violators  of  the  law,  when  it  is  seen  that  it  requires  an  army 
of  100,000  men  and  all  the  naval  and  military  power  of  a  great 
kingdom  even  to  hold  the  alleged  rebellion  in  check. 

"It  is  due  to  the  situation  of  affairs  in  Cuba  that  Spain  should 
recognize  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  in  the  island,  and  should 
voluntarily  accord  to  the  armies  opposed  to  her  authority  the  rights 
of  belligerents  under  the  laws  of  nations. 

"The  Congress  of  the  United  States  recognizing  the  fact  that  the 
matters  herein  referred  to  are  properly  within  the  control  of  the 
Ch\ef  Executive  until,  within  the  principles  of  our  Constitution, 
it  becomes  the  duty  of  Congress  to  define  the  final  attitude  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  toward  Spain,  presents  these 
considerations  to  the  President  in  support  of  the  following  reso 
lution:  Resolved  by  the  Senate  (the  House  of  Representatives  con 
curring),  That  the  present  deplorable  war  in  the  island  of  Cuba  has 
reached  a  magnitude  that  concerns  all  civilized  nations  to  the  ex 
tent  that  it  should  be  conducted,  if  unhappily  it  is  longer  to  con 
tinue,  on  those  principles  and  laws  of  warfare  that  are  acknowledged 
to  be  obligatory  upon  civilized  nations  when  engaged  in  open 


1896]  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  435 

hostilities,  including  the  treatment  of  captives  who  are  enlisted  in 
either  army;  due  respect  to  cartels  for  exchange  of  prisoners  and 
for  other  military  purposes;  truces  and  flags  of  truce;  the  pro 
vision  of  proper  hospitals  and  hospital  supplies  and  services  to  the 
sick  and  wounded  of  either  army. 

"Resolved,  further,  That  this  representation  of  the  views  and 
opinions  of  Congress  be  sent  to  the  President;  and  if  he  concurs 
therein  that  he  will,  in  a  friendly  spirit,  use  the  good  offices  of  this 
government  to  the  end  that  Spain  shall  be  requested  to  accord  to 
the  armies  with  which  it  is  engaged  in  war  the  rights  of  belligerents, 
as  the  same  are  recognized  under  the  law  of  nations."  l 

It  is  clear  that  the  newspaper  reports  of  inhumanity  had  had  a 
deep  effect  upon  the  minds  of  the  committee;  that  whatever  cause 
might  exist  for  its  action,  there  was  an  underlying  feeling  that  a 
continuance  of  the  savagery  of  the  war,  whether  on  the  part  of 
the  one  or  other  side,  must  cease.  How  this  was  to  be  brought 
about  by  a  recognition  of  belligerency  is  scarcely  to  be  seen.  The 
resolution  in  itself  was  vague  and  valueless  except  as  an  opinion  on 
the  part  of  the  majority  of  the  committee  that  affairs  in  Cuba  were 
deplorable. 

Senator  Cameron  submitted  from  the  minority  of  the  com 
mittee  a  review  of  the  ten  years'  war  and  of  the  circumstances 
.which  had  caused  the  United  States  to  proclaim  their  right  to  in 
tervene.  "As  was  said  by  Mr.  Fish,"  said  the  report,  "the  mere 
offer  on  our  part  to  mediate  as  between  the  contending  forces  was 
in  itself  a  concession  of  belligerency  and  a  recognition  of  the  ex 
istence  of  that  condition.  But  for  various  reasons  this  argument 
was  not  pressed  by  our  government,"  the  main  of  these  being  the 
expectancy  of  concessions  from  Spain  to  Cuba;  the  civil  war  in 
Spain;  the  irritation  on  account  of  the  activity  of  Cubans  in  the 
United  States;  the  pressing  questions  of  reconstruction  in  the 
South,  and  the  difficulties  at  the  time  of  the  negro  problem.  The 
report  recalled  that  Spain  had  recognized  the  belligerency  of  th* 
South  before  a  battle  had  been  fought;  reviewed  the  declarations  of 
General  Campos;  cited  the  reports  of  the  consul-general  in  Havana 
in  1885  declaring  the  island  under  an  unparalleled  tyranny,  and 
that  "what  with  governmental  oppression  and  illegal  tyranny, 
1  Senate  Report  141,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess. 


436  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  [1896 

emancipation,  brigandage,  low  prices  for  sugar  and  high  taxes  on 
everything,  the  ruin  of  the  island  is  already  almost  consummated." 

"The  danger  and  scandal  of  the  situation,"  said  the  report, 
"have  been  such  as  can  be  compared  with  nothing  but  the  con 
dition  of  Armenia.  .  .  .  The  precedents  are  clear,  and  if  our  action 
were  to  be  decided  by  precedents  alone,  we  should  not  be  able 
to  hesitate.  The  last  great  precedent  was  that  of  the  [American] 
civil  war.  ...  In  that  instance,  without  waiting  for  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  further  than  the  bloodless  attack  on  Fort  Sumter  and 
its  surrender,  April  13,  1861,  the  British  government  issued  its 
proclamation  of  neutrality  on  the  13th  of  May  following,  before 
it  received  official  information  that  war  existed  except  as  a  blockade 
of  certain  insurgent  ports.  The  French  government  acted  in  con 
cert  with  Great  Britain,  but  delayed  the  official  announcement 
until  June.  The  Spanish  government  issued  its  proclamation  of 
belligerency  June  17;  and  the  first  battle  of  the  war  was  not 
fought  until  July  21,  or  known  at  Madrid  until  August.  .  .  ." 

The  report  recalled  the  defeat  of  Campos,  "the  military  pos 
sessions  of  the  whole  eastern  half  of  the  island"  by  the  insurgents 
(the  important  fact  that  the  ports  were  an  exception  was  over 
looked),  and  stated  that  they  had  gained  military  control  of  the 
western  provinces  (again  overlooking  the  very  important  question 
of  the  towns  and  ports).  It  continued:  "If  the  government  of 
the  United  States  still  refrained  from  recognizing  the  belligerency 
of  the  insurgents  after  this  conclusive  proof  of  the  fact,  the  reason 
doubtless  was  that  in  the  absence  of  any  legal  complication  the 
question  became  wholly  political,  and  that  its  true  solution  must 
lie  not  in  a  recognition  of  belligerency  but  in  a  recognition  of 
independency.  In  1875,  when  the  situation  was  very  far  from 
being  as  serious  as  it  is  now,  President  Grant,  after  long  considera 
tion  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  public  action,  decided  against 
the  recognition  of  belligerency  as  an  act  which  might  be  delusive 
to  the  insurgents,  and  would  certainly  be  regarded  as  unfriendly 
by  Spain.  He  decided  upon  a  middle  course.  The  documents 
above  quoted  show  that  he  proposed  to  the  Spanish  government 
a  sort  of  intervention  which  should  establish  the  independence  of 
Cuba  by  a  friendly  agreement.  In  doing  so  he  not  only  recog 
nized  both  parties  to  the  conflict  as  on  an  equal  plane,  but  he  also 


1896]  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  437 

warned  Spain  that  if  such  mediation  should  not  be  accepted, 
direct  intervention  would  probably  be  deemed  a  necessity  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States. 

"Spain  preferred  to  promise  the  insurgents  terms  so  favorable 
as  to  cause  for  a  time  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  Since  then 
twenty  years  have  passed.  The  insurrection,  far  from  having 
ceased,  has  taken  the  proportions  of  a  war  almost  as  destructive 
to  our  own  citizens  as  to  the  contending  parties.  The  indepen 
dence  of  Cuba  was  then  regarded  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  as  the  object  of  his  intervention,  and  has  now  become  far 
more  inevitable  than  it  was  then.  Evidently  the  government  of 
the  United  States  can  do  no  less  than  to  take  up  the  subject  pre 
cisely  where  President  Grant  left  it,  and  to  resume  the  friendly 
mediation  which  he  actually  began,  with  all  the  consequences  which 
would  follow  its  rejection." 

The  review  ended  with  the  offer  of  a  resolution  very  different 
to  the  colorless  formula  of  the  majority,  and  which  was  perfectly 
definite  as  to  intention,  viz.:  "That  the  President  is  hereby  re 
quested  to  interpose  his  friendly  offices  with  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba."  * 

On  February  5  Senator  Morgan  brought  from  the  majority  of 
the  committee  a  substitute  for  their  proposition  of  January  29,  as 
follows:  "That  in  the  opinion  of  Congress  a  condition  of  public 
war  exists  between  the  government  of  Spain  and  the  government 
proclaimed  and  for  some  time  maintained  by  force  of  arms  by  the 
people  of  Cuba;  and  that  the  United  States  of  America  should 
maintain  a  strict  neutrality  between  contending  powers,  according 
to  each  all  the  rights  of  belligerents  in  the  ports  and  territory  of  the 
United  States."  2 

The  debate,  which  began  February  20,  at  first  chiefly  upon  the 
relative  constitutional  powers  of  the  executive  and  of  Congress  as 
to  the  recognition  of  belligerency  and  independence,  and  which 
occupied  most  of  the  period  February  25-28,  brought  on  the  28th 
a  severe  speech  from  Senator  Sherman,  who  quoted  from  the 
New  York  Journal  an  article  which  purported  to  be  a  translation 
from  a  book  by  one  Enrique  Donderio  [Donderis],  a  Spaniard, 

1  Senate  Report  141,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

2  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1317. 


THE 

UNIVERSITY 


438  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  [1896 

"who,"  said  Mr.  Sherman,  "was  so  horror-stricken  with  the 
awful  crimes  he  saw  committed,  that  he  fled  to  the  United  States 
and  there  compiled  his  manuscript."1  The  account,  which 
should  have  been  unbelievable  on  its  face,  but  which  was  read  as 
veritable  history  by  Senator  Sherman,  made  of  Weyler  (later 
shown  not  to  have  been  at  the  period  in  the  field  at  all)  a  monster 
of  unheard-of  brutality  and  coarseness.  To  have  given  credence 
to  statements  of  such  character;  to  unfold  with  dramatic  ear 
nestness  at  such  a  time  and  place  and  on  such  evidence  unbeliev 
able  horrors  which,  "if  they  had  been  true,  would  have  made  the 
Spanish  general  the  greatest  monster  of  history,"  naturally  causes 
one  to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  the  senator  uttering  them.  It  was  not 
a  happy  augury  for  the  appointment  soon  to  be  made  to  the  post 
of  secretary  of  state,  now  of  such  extreme  importance. 

On  February  28,  1896,  were  passed  by  the  Senate  the  amended 
resolution  offered  by  Senator  Morgan  February  5,  and  the  resolu 
tion  of  Senator  Cameron  altered  to  read:  "That  the  friendly 
offices  of  the  United  States  should  be  offered  by  the  President  to 
the  Spanish  government  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of 
Cuba."  There  were  64  yeas  and  but  6  nays,  19  not  voting. 

The  resolutions  of  the  House  which  called  directly  for  interven 
tion  if  necessary 2  passed,  March  2,  by  262  to  17  votes,  brought  a 

1  For  Senator  Sherman's  speech,  see  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Feb 
ruary  28. 

2  "  Resolved,  That  in  the  opinion  of  Congress  a  state  of  public  war  exists 
in  Cuba,  the  parties  to  which  are  entitled  to  belligerent  rights,  and  the  United 
States  should  observe  a  strict  neutrality  between  the  belligerents. 

"  Resolved,  That  Congress  deplores  the  destruction  of  life  and  property 
caused  by  the  war  now  waging  in  that  island,  and  believing  that  the  only 
permanent  solution  of  the  contest,  equally  in  the  interest  of  Spain,  the  people 
of  Cuba,  and  other  nations,  would  be  in  the  establishment  of  a  government 
by  the  choice  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  it  is  the  sense  of  Congress  that  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  should  use  its  good  offices  and  friendly  influence 
to  that  end. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  United  States  has  not  intervened  in  struggles  between 
any  European  governments  and  their  colonies  on  this  continent;  but  from 
the  very  close  relations  between  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  those  of 
Cuba  in  consequence  of  its  proximity  and  the  extent  of  the  commerce  between 
the  two  peoples,  the  present  war  is  entailing  such  losses  upon  the  people  of 
the  United  States  that  Congress  is  of  opinion  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  should  be  prepared  to  protect  the  legitimate  interests  of  our 
citizens,  by  intervention  if  necessary." — Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess., 
March  2,  1896,  2342. 


1896]          THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  PRESS  439 

conference  committee  of  the  two  houses,  which  on  the  5th  reported 
in  favor  of  the  House  resolution.  The  question,  now  again  before 
the  Senate,  was,  through  the  opposition  of  Mr.  Hale  to  immediate 
action,  set  as  the  order  of  the  day  for  March  9.  The  new  debate 
lasted  two  weeks. 

The  news  of  the  discussion  in  Congress  brought  a  climax  of 
feeling  in  Spain,  shown  forcibly  in  Madrid,  but  more  particularly 
in  Barcelona,  where  the  American  consulate  was  attacked.  The 
Madrid  government  presented  formal  regrets  for  the  occurrence, 
and  an  offer  of  complete  reparation,  with  the  assurance  that  every 
necessary  disposition  had  been  taken  at  the  capital  to  protect  the 
American  legation  and  the  person  of  the  minister.1 

That  the  loose  defamation  of  Spain,  both  in  the  Senate  and 
House,  by  men  of  prominence  and  leading,  who  were  naturally 
more  fully  quoted  than  were  the  more  conservative,  should  have 
caused  such  demonstrations,  and  have  brought  the  Spanish  press 
to  call  for  war,  is  certainly  not  a  cause  for  surprise.  There  were, 
fortunately,  some  in  both  houses  of  Congress  of  saner  mind  than 
those  quoted,  but  the  general  tone  of  the  debates,  violent,  loose  as 
to  facts  and,  in  marked  instances,  as  to  law,  did  no  credit  to  Con 
gress  or  the  country. 

Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  the  Spanish  minister,  had  entered  the 
field  by  the  publication,  in  the  New  York  Herald  of  February  23, 
1896,  of  the  Spanish  view,  declaring  the  existence  of  "a  conspiracy 
in  order  not  to  present  to  the  Americans  .  .  .  the  Spanish  side  of 
the  question."  When  he  left  Spain,  he  said,  in  March,  1895,  in 
the  same  steamer  with  Campos,  the  mulatto  leaders,  the  brothers 
Maceo,  had  not  reached  Cuba.  He  learned  of  their  coming  on 
reaching  Puerto  Rico.  Gomez  and  Marti  arrived  from  Santo 
Domingo  a  few  days  later.  For  nearly  two  months  only  the  black 

1  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  VII  (1900), 
604.  De  Olivart  gives  the  following  as  published  in  the  Madrid  El  Liberal 
of  March  from  Barcelona:  "The  mob  arrived  at  the  United  States  consulate. 
The  rioters,  hissing  and  shouting,  '  Abajo  los  tocineros  Americanos'  (down  with 
the  American  pig-killers),  threw  stones  and  potatoes,  which  broke  many 
windows  of  the  consulate  residence.  They  then  went  to  the  prefecture  and 
the  residence  of  the  captain-general  where  they  tore  up  a  Spanish  flag. 
They  returned  again  to  the  consulate.  They  were  at  least  15,000;  they  had 
a  very  lively  struggle  with  the  police,  and  finished  by  tearing  to  pieces  an 
American  flag."— (De  Olivart,  Ibid.,  604.) 


440  THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  PRESS          [1896 

leaders  Moncada  and  Rabi,  and  Masso,  "a  white  and  honest 
Cuban,"  were  at  the  head  of  small  bands  aided  by  "  noted  highway 
men  and  robbers  like  Matagas,  Mirabal,  and  Miro,  the  latter  a  ren 
egade  Spaniard  who  fought  during  the  Carlist  war  in  Spain  on  the 
side  of  absolute  monarchy,  and  now  fights  against  his  own  country 
for  a  republic."  He  had  been  of  the  opinion  when  he  reached  New 
York  that  the  revolt  would  be  ended  before  the  rainy  season  began. 

He  thought  it  necessary  to  state  clearly  that  the  revolution  had 
been  imported.  "  All  the  representative  leaders  were  and  have  been 
abroad,  and  have  obeyed  the  junta  which  has  been  established  in 
New  York  and  which  had  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  revolu 
tionary  clubs,  tke  greater  part  of  them  being  in  the  United  States. 
The  revolution  is  not  a  popular  uprising  of  a  discontented  nation. 
It  is  a  filibustering  movement,  principally  of  demagogues  without 
standing  in  the  island,  who  have  nothing  to  lose  and  are  trying 
their  chances." 

The  conservative  or  union-constitutional  party,  he  said,  had  had 
its  way;  Cuba  was  now  treated  as  a  part  of  Spanish  territory. 
All  the  three  parties,  the  most  extreme  of  which,  the  autonomist, 
wanted  home-rule  the  same  as  Canada,  were,  under  the  law  of 
1895,  represented  in  the  Spanish  Cortes,  under  the  same  laws  as 
the  Spanish  home  provinces  themselves,  there  being  a  deputy 
for  each  forty-five  thousand  inhabitants  and  two  senators  for  each 
of  the  six  provinces;  and,  besides,  "senators  representing  the 
universities  and  the  business  interests  of  the  island."  He  dwelt 
upon  the  great  effect  of  the  economic  conditions,  for  which  Spain 
was  not  responsible,  in  causing  the  uprising:  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
the  competition,  with  its  European  bounty  system,  of  the  beet  root; 
the  abolition  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  by  Congress  and  the  conse 
quent  increased  duty  on  sugar  in  the  United  States  which  had  all 
tended  to  depress  Cuban  industry  and  throw  out  of  employment 
men  on  the  plantations;  the  increased  duty  on  cigars  and  the  de 
creased  duty  on  leaf  tobacco  had  also  tended  to  injure  the  island 
industries,  and  caused  the  migration  of  many  to  the  United  States, 
where  they  had  become  part  of  the  revolutionary  juntas. 

"I  am  sure,"  said  Sefior  Depuy  de  Lome,  "that  it  will  amaze 
the  American  people  to  know  .  .  .  that  the  persons  leading  the 
present  revolution  from  New  York  are  American  citizens.  Every 


1896]          THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  PRESS  441 

one  of  them  has  sworn  allegiance  to  the  American  flag  and  constitu 
tion,  and  when  they  went  to  Cuba  the  first  thing  with  which  they 
were  provided  was  an  American  passport.  It  is  very  strange  that 
American  citizens  are  conducting  a  war  against  a  country  with 
which  the  United  States  is  at  peace.  ...  It  will  also  seem  very 
strange  to  the  honest  American  citizen  that  the  president  of  what 
they  call  the  Cuban  republic  is  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  only  two  of  those  whom  he  calls  his  ministers  or 
secretaries  are  not  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  .  .  . 
and  the  most  extraordinary  thing  is  that  those  American  citizens 
do  not  ask  and  do  not  intend  to  be  annexed  to  the  United  States." 
After  a  somewhat  lengthy  review  of  the  military  conditions  of  the 
preceding  twelve  months,  he  said:  "I  am  of  the  same  opinion  as 
President  Van  Buren  when  he  said  [referring  to  events  in  1837  on 
the  Canadian  frontier],  'Our  laws  are  insufficient  to  prevent  inva 
sions  of  neighboring  powers, '  and  of  the  same  opinion  as  President 
Buchanan,  when  he,  as  chairman  of  the  committee  on  foreign  rela 
tions,  expressed  the  opinion  that  '  the  duty  of  good  neighborhood 
and  the  preservation  of  peace  along  the  borders  require  that  the 
rights  of  our  citizens  under  the  law  of  nations  should  be  abridged 
in  furnishing  arms,  etc.,  to  insurgents.' l  If  the  laws  were  differ 
ent  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  the  jury  to  declare  in  Wil 
mington,  Delaware,  that  a  body  of  men  caught  in  the  moment  of 
embarking,  under  cover  of  the  night,  with  belts  full  of  cartridges, 
with  arms,  and  ammunition  and  with  letters  for  the  Cuban  leaders 
in  the  field,  were  not  a  military  expedition.  It  would  have  been  im 
possible  for  a  jury  in  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  to  declare  that 
Captain  Hughes,  of  the  Laurada,  who  took  out  of  port  a  party  of 
men  with  guns,  arms,  and  ammunition,  and  who  suffered  those 
men  to  be  drilled  during  the  voyage  and  had  them  landed  in  a 
deserted  place  on  the  Cuban  coast,  was  not  guilty  of  transporting 
a  military  expedition.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  return 
the  arms  and  ammunition  found  hidden  in  a  barn  on  a  deserted 
key,  near  Cedar  Key.  And  it  would  have  been  impossible  for 
the  Commodore  to  make  her  extraordinary  voyage,  which  has 
taken  from  the  middle  of  August  to  the  middle  of  February  to  go 
from  New  London,  Connecticut,  to  Charleston,  South  Carolina, 
1  Benton's  Debates,  vol.  XIII,  pp.  638-641. 


442  THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  PRESS          [1896 

where  she  lies  with  a  full  cargo  of  war  material.  It  would  have 
been  also  impossible  to  discharge  the  men  arrested  in  the  schooners 
Lark  and  Antoinette,  or  to  have  set  free  the  expedition  of  Collazo 
when  the  men  returned  to  Key  West  after  their  failure  and  after 
having  camped  for  several  weeks  at  Cape  Sable,  Florida.  Dif 
ferent  laws  would  have  made  it  impossible  for  Calixto  Garcia  and 
his  men,  sent  to  sea  in  a  death  trap,  the  Hawkins,  and  miracu 
lously  saved,  to  return  to  New  York,  to  conspire  again  publicly, 
and  to  try  again  to  reach  Cuba.  It  would  have  been  impossible 
for  the  Cuban  revolutionary  junta  to  remain  unchecked,  making 
the  United  States  .its  basis  of  operations  against  a  country  with 
which  the  United  States  is  at  peace." 

He  refrained  from  discussing  the  question  of  belligerency  more 
than  to  say  that  he  held  the  same  opinions  as  those  held  by  Mr. 
Adams  when  in  London  during  the  civil  war;  by  Lincoln  and 
Seward;  by  Grant,  Fish,  and  Evarts.  He  recalled  the  Spanish 
decree  of  June  17,  1861,  acknowledging  the  belligerency  of  the 
South,  article  5  of  which  forbade  "the  transportation  of  effects 
of  war  ...  as  well  as  the  carrying  of  papers  or  communications 
for  belligerents."  "Transgressors,"  said  the  article,  "shall  have 
no  right  to  the  protection  of  my  government. " 

He  claimed  that  the  Cubans  were  taxed  less  per  capita  than  the 
people  of  Spain,  and  that  "all  is  forgotten  about  the  majority  of 
Cubans  who  are  loyal  to  Spain;  about  the  foreigners,  principally 
Americans,  who  declare  that  they  can  only  be  protected  by  Spain, 
and  about  the  many  thousands,  not  to  say  hundreds  of  thousands, 
of  Spanish-born  citizens  who  went  to  Cuba  when  mere  children, 
who  with  their  thrift  and  economy  have  expanded  the  resources 
of  the  island."  He  concluded  with  a  question,  which  had  un 
doubted  point :  "I  will  only  ask  impartial  persons  to  compare  Cuba 
with  many  other  countries,  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  Cape  Horn, 
and  see  if  there  is  more  liberty,  order,  and  good  government,  and  if 
Spanish  Cuba  is  not  more  free  and  happy  than  many  other  nations 
which  are  independent.  As  to  the  commercial  relations  with  the 
United  States,  I  will  only  say  that  Cuba  under  the  Spanish  regime 
buys  sixty  per  cent,  more  than  Mexico,  more  than  Canada,  and 
taking  into  consideration  the  population  of  the  countries,  more 
than  all  the  South  American  republics  combined." 


189G]          THE  SPANISH  MINISTER  USES  PRESS  443 

The  newspaper  account  of  infamous  actions  attributed  to  Gen 
eral  Weyler  and  read  by  Mr.  Sherman  in  the  Senate,  February  28, 
as  veritable  history,  aroused  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  a  second 
newspaper  article,  in  which  he  showed  that  the  newspaper  had  it 
self  injected  the  name  of  Weyler  into  the  translation  of  its  account 
from  the  pamphlet  of  forty-three  pages  by  Donderis,  in  which 
Weyler 's  name  was  not  even  mentioned.  He  showed  the  origin  of 
the  report  of  the  killing  of  43,500  prisoners  by  the  Spanish  to  have 
come  from  a  remark  by  General  Sickles,  at  the  time  minister  to 
Spain,  who,  August  16,  1872,  quoting  the  statement  of  the  Im- 
parcial,  of  Madrid,  that  "  from  the  beginning  of  hostilities  in  Cuba 
13,600  insurgents  have  been  killed  in  battle  and  43,500  taken  pris 
oners,"  added  on  his  own  account,  "it  is  believed  that  all  prisoners 
of  war  are  shot  or  garroted."  Referring  to  Senator  Lodge's  reading 
of  the  report  in  the  Madrid  El  Liberal,  January  29,  of  General 
Weyler's  parting  words  at  Cadiz,  "I  propose  to  exterminate  the 
filibusters,"  Senor  de  Lome  showed  that  El  Liberal  had  used  a 
colloquial  word  which  could  only  be  translated  "to  clean  out."  * 
Continuing,  Senor  de  Lome  said:  "I  have  before  my  eyes  a  sum 
mary  of  charges  of  inhumanity  in  connection  with  the  war  of  the 
rebellion  in  the  United  States.  ...  I  am  sure  that  many  of  them 
are  false,  most  of  them  exaggerated,  some  necessary,  others  un 
avoidable.  ...  In  an  English  paper  of  those  days  I  read  the  fol 
lowing  opinion  of  the  American  civil  war:  'Stripped  of  its  trap 
pings,  it  is  a  mere  quarrel  for  territory.  The  antagonists  are  acting 
like  Delawares  and  Pawnees.  War  to  the  knife,  pushed  to  abso 
lute  extermination,  is  what  they  have  resolved  on,  and  people 
breathe  a  language  of  massacre  and  extermination/  "  2 

The  passage  by  the  House,  on  March  2,  of  its  own  resolutions, 
brought  a  conference  committee  of  the  two  chambers:  Sherman, 
Morgan,  and  Lodge  of  the  Senate,  and  Hitt,  McCreary,  and  Adams 
of  the  House.  The  result,  an  almost  immediate  agreement  that 
the  Senate  should  recede  and  adopt  the  House  resolutions,  was 
reported  March  5,  1896.  Through  the  opposition  of  Mr.  Hale, 
the  consideration  of  the  report  was  deferred  to  March  9,  when 
Mr.  Hale  began  the  debate  by  declaring  his  unalterable  resolution 

1  Limpiar,  to  clean,  to  scour;   as  limpiar  ropa,  to  wash  clothes. 

2  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2591. 


444  SENATOR  HALE  IN  OPPOSITION 

to  oppose  the  recognition  of  belligerency.  He  referred  to  Senor 
de  Lome's  paper,  arousing  thereby  strong  objections  from  several 
senators  to  the  reading  of  communications  of  an  unofficial  char 
acter  from  foreign  ministers  in  the  United  States.  The  objection 
was  however  withdrawn,  Senor  de  Lome's  good  faith,  his  moder 
ation,  and  his  personal  popularity  inclining  most  to  pass  over 
what  was  in  itself  a  transgression  in  diplomacy.  Senator  Gray's 
question  weighed  much  in  the  determination.  " Suppose,"  he 
said,  "some  member  of  Parliament  .  .  .  had  said  that  it  was  a 
matter  of  history  .  .  .  that  when  Major  Andre*  was  executed,  or 
before  he  was  executed,  he  was  tortured  by  General  Washington, 
had  his  eyes  burned  out  with  red-hot  irons,  do  you  suppose  that 
the  American  ambassador  in  London  might  not,  with  perfect  pro 
priety,  point  out  either  that  the  history  was  an  unauthentic  one, 
or  that  a  mistake  had  been  made  in  the  reading  of  such  a  grew- 
some  and  false  statement?"  l 

Senator  Hale  quoted  from  "one  of  the  last  issues  of  the  [New 
York]  World"  a  despatch  from  its  correspondent  in  Cuba,  Mr. 
William  Shaw  Bowen:  "  General  Weyler  has,  in  my  opinion,  been 
grossly  traduced.  I  should  add  that  I  feel  confident  that  it  is 
owing  to  misinformation,  to  erroneous  prejudice,  to  systematic 
attacks  on  him  personally  by  interested  enemies  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  and  their  public  representatives  have  formed 
a  monstrously  erroneous  opinion  about  the  governor-general.  .  .  . 
I  am  astonished  to  perceive  how  unacquainted  with  the  true  con 
ditions  are  the  public  men  of  Washington."  2  He  quoted  from 
the  New  York  Journal,  strongly  pro-Cuban:  "So  effectual  has 
been  the  work  of  the  insurgent  general  [Maceo]  that  thirteen 
towns  held  by  the  Spaniards  have  been  destroyed  and  the  rich 
tobacco  lands  throughout  the  province  have  been  laid  waste. 
Practically  all  the  island  west  of  Havana  is  a  wilderness.  .  .  . 
Whole  towns  have  been  obliterated  or  reduced  to  a  heap  of  ashes 
and  their  inhabitants  are  wandering  helpless  over  the  face  of  the 
country,  without  a  place  to  lay  their  heads  or  wherewithal  to  be 
clothed,  and  many  of  them  starving."  '  If  I  vote  alone,"  said 
Mr.  Hale,  "I  shall  vote  for  no  resolution  which  gives  aid  and 

1  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2633. 
9  Ibid.,  2591. 


1896]  DESPATCH  FROM  CANOVAS  445 

comfort  to  the  red-handed  foray  of  this  guerilla  leader,  whose 
exploits  are  so  exultingly  chronicled  as  I  have  read  them 
here." 

He  quoted  from  the  New  York  World,  in  this  instance  a  mes 
sage  by  cable,  March  6,  from  Senor  Canovas:  "We  have  as  yet 
no  official  notification  of  the  intentions  of  the  American  govern 
ment,  and  cannot,  therefore,  take  cognizance  of,  or  protest  by  vote 
against,  any  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  of  the  United  States.  Nor  have  we  sounded  the  European 
powers  or  courts  regarding  their  support  in  any  form.  All  we  have 
done  is  to  show  to  the  American  government  and  to  Minister 
Taylor  that  we  have  endeavored  to  enforce  respect  for  the  American 
legation  and  consulates,  repressing  so  sternly  the  disturbances  that 
we  have  ordered  the  Madrid,  Granada,  Barcelona,  and  Valencia 
universities  closed,  and  we  will  close  all  universities,  schools,  and 
establishments  whose  students  dare  to  make  demonstrations 
hostile  to  the  United  States.  We  will  send  to  prison  and  prompt 
trial  all  the  authors  and  promoters  of  such  disturbances.  We  be 
lieve  they  are  prompted  by  the  advanced  republicans.  Nothing 
will  be  omitted  on  our  side  to  show  our  desire  to  preserve  cordial 
relations  with  America.  .  .  .  The  situation  now  is  one  of  extreme 
delicacy.  Indeed  I  cannot  define  how  far  it  is  possible  for  the 
government  of  Spain  to  permit  amicable  and  careful  mediation  of 
a  foreign  power,  however  honorable  and  disinterested  it  may  be, 
without  incurring  the  grave  risk  of  being  accused  of  submitting  to 
outside  interference,  pressure,  and  dictation  in  the  midst  of  a  civil 
war.  The  United  States  are  a  great  power,  and  until  they  recognize 
the  object  and  encourage  the  aims  of  the  insurrectionists  in  Cuba 
they  are  friendly  to  Spain.  After  the  recognition  of  the  belligerents 
in  Cuba  by  the  United  States  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  govern 
ment  of  Spain  to  accept  the  good  offices  of  President  Cleveland,  or 
to  permit  any  interference  whatever. 

"Nevertheless,  I  still  hope  some  means  will  be  found  by  the 
President  to  avoid  alienating  the  friendly  relations  with  the  United 
States,  which  Spain  has  shown  this  week  she  prizes  highly.  I  am 
fully  alive  to  the  significance  and  the  possible  consequences  of  the 
vote  of  the  United  States  Congress  to  the  rebels  as  well  as  to  Spain 
in  her  relations  with  the  United  States,  especially  in  connection 


446  CANOVAS  AND   CASTELAR  [1896 

with  the  right  of  search  on  the  high  seas  and  in  the  matter  of 
privateers  and  filibustering  expeditions. 

"The  only  new  and  seemingly  warlike  preparations  yet  made  by 
Spain  are  made  simply  with  a  view  to  equipping  a  fleet  of  war  ships 
and  transatlantic  steamers  to  chase  filibusters  and  to  guard  the 
coasts  of  Cuba.  That  is  the  sole  object  in  view.  General  Weyler 
having  said  that  he  had  enough  troops,  only  the  usual  reliefs  will 
be  sent  to  Cuba  until  autumn,  and  no  naval  demonstration  is 
contemplated." 

Senor  Canovas  deprecated  the  misapprehension  of  Weyler's 
character  and  methods;  before  the  latter  left  for  Cuba  his  views 
had  been  approved,  and  he  had  only  acted  in  harmony  with  the 
requirements  of  the  war.  He  declared  himself  determined  to 
carry  out  the  administrative  political  reforms  "as  soon  as  the 
pacification  of  the  island  permits  and  even  such  economical  tariff 
reforms  as  may  be  consistent  with  the  interests  of  both  the  colony 
and  the  mother  country.  But  it  is,"  he  said,  "impossible  to 
attempt  reforming  during  a  civil  war  or  any  foreign  pressure  in 
the  present  condition  of  the  island.  When  Marshal  Campos  was 
sent  to  Cuba  as  governor-general,  ...  he  soon  discovered  that 
it  was  impossible  to  do  so."  Senor  Canovas  ended  declaring 
that  "we  cannot  admit  that  the  slightest  ground  exists  for  the 
recognition  of  the  belligerency  of  the  Cuban  insurgents."1 

This  very  important  and  frank  declaration  of  policy  was  fitly 
described  by  Senator  Hale  as  a  credit  to  the  Spanish  government, 
under  sore  temptations  to  be  querulous  and  complaining  and  to  use 
retaliatory  language.2  Its  publication  was  wise  and  opportune. 

Following  this  with  an  appeal  from  Castelar  for  peace,  Mr. 
Hale  said:  "I  will  not  contrast  the  tone  of  these  communications 
of  these  great  men  representing  Spain,  with  the  interest  and  fate 
of  her  government  and  her  future  depending,  and  with  much  temp 
tation  to  exacerbation  of  spirit — I  will  not  contrast  the  language 
in  which  they  are  couched  or  the  spirit  which  pervades  them  with 
certain  other  declarations  to  which  some  of  us  have  listened." :  It 
was  well-merited  reproof  to  the  extravagant  declamation  both  in  the 
Senate  and  House,  which  was  but  too  frequently  of  a  character 
which  sober  thought  could  not  commend,  and  "the  heat,  rapidity, 

1  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2593.         2  Ibid.,  2593.        » Ibid.,  2594. 


1896]  SENATOR  HOAR  IN  OPPOSITION  447 

and  carelessness"  of  which,  Mr.  Hoar  declared,  had  "almost  turned 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  I  will  not  quite  say,  into  a  mob." 

Mr.  Hoar  showed  the  insufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  justify 
the  action  contemplated,  but  he  did  more;  he  said:  "Our  honorable 
friends  come  in  here  and  shrink — I  will  not  say  flinch — from  send 
ing  their  declaration  where  it  alone  can  have  any  political  effect. 
They  undertake  to  make  this  utterance  in  a  way  that  will  accom 
plish  all  the  mischief  that  it  is  capable  of  and  have  none  of  its  vigor, 
potency,  or  effect.  It  is  not  the  act  of  the  American  people.  It  is 
not  binding  on  a  single  American  citizen.  It  is  not  binding  on  the 
President.  It  is  not  binding  on  either  House  of  Congress.  It  is  not 
binding  on  any  member  of  Congress.  It  is  not  binding  for  any 
future  year.  It  is  a  declaration  to  which  the  constitution  adds,  in 
letters  that  cannot  be  effaced,  'This  means  nothing;  it  has  no 
power.'  The  President  of  the  United  States  alone  can  give  it  life 
and  vigor  and  potency  and  authority,  and  the  committee,  when 
they  wrote  the  word  'concurrent'  at  the  top  of  that  resolution, 
wrote  in  brief  these  words :  '  It  is  distinctly  to  be  understood  that 
this  is  a  Pickwickian  resolution,  without  vigor  or  potency  or  mean 
ing/  We  have  not  dared  to  tell  Spain  that  we  recognize  the  insur 
gents  as  belligerents  and  are  prepared  to  take  the  consequences. 
We  have  not  dared  to  give  the  President  of  the  United  States  the 
constitutional  authority  to  protect  any  American  citizen.  We  give 
Spain  the  right  of  search  in  terms,  but  if  she  undertakes  to  exercise  it, 
we  can  turn  upon  her  and  say,  'This  did  not  mean  anything.  It 
was  .  .  .  merely  moot  court  debate,  brought  in  to  see  which  mem 
ber  of  the  Senate  or  of  the  other  House  could  make  the  most  elo 
quent  and  inspiring  speech;  but  it  had  no  constitutional  effect 
on  the  great  question  of  peace  or  foreign  policy  or  international  re 
lations.  .  .  .'  There  is  but  one  organ  in  this  country  to  foreign 
countries,  and  that  is  the  executive.  He  cannot  declare  war  and 
he  cannot  make  laws  regulating  commerce  except  as  a  part  of  the 
legislative  powers  of  the  country,  but  everything  else  is  his.  It 
is  for  him  to  make  treaties;  it  is  for  him  to  appoint  and  receive 
ambassadors,  and  it  is  for  him,  as  it  has  been  the  custom  of  this 
country  for  a  hundred  years,  to  determine  the  question  of  recog 
nition  or  belligerency."  2 
1  Speech,  March  11, 1896,  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2680.  *  Ibid.,  2683. 


448  VIEWS  OF  PI  Y  MARGALL  [1896 

Mr.  Hoar's  remark  concerning  the  moving  cause  of  over  decla 
mation  must  however  not  be  taken  too  literally.  Undoubtedly  the 
presidential  election  of  the  coming  fall  had  weight,  but  back  of  all 
was  a  very  real  feeling  of  deep  indignation  with  the  events  in  Cuba 
and  of  very  real  sympathy  with  the  Cubans.  While  there  had  been 
intemperate  statement,  the  foreign  relations  committee  of  the  Senate 
had  had  access  to  the  documents  of  the  department  of  state  which 
policy  forbade  making  public,  and  had  at  least  assured  itself  of  the 
necessity  of  having  Congress  declare  its  state  of  mind,  which  was 
all  that  a  concurrent  resolution  could  effect.  Mr.  Sherman  showed 
that  there  was  even  some  notable  Spanish  opinion  in  support  of  the 
view  that  it  was  Spain's  duty  to  stop  the  war.  He  quoted  the 
former  Spanish  minister  of  state,  Sefior  Pi  y  Margall,  who  a  few 
months  before  had  said:  "Let  us  be  just  to  the  men  who  to-day 
are  fighting  us  in  Cuba.  We  ought  long  ago  to  have  granted  them 
the  autonomy  to  which  they  have  an  undeniable  right;  we  should 
have  kept  them  united  to  the  Peninsula  by  the  single  tie  of  com 
mon  interests,  national  and  international.  How  much  blood  and 
treasure  we  would  have  been  spared  by  such  a  course!  We  were 
urged  to  it  by  reason,  by  right,  by  our  self-interest,  by  the  thought 
of  the  vast  colonial  empire  we  have  lost.  Unfortunately,  for  na 
tions  even  more  than  for  individuals,  the  force  of  habit  is  irresisti 
ble.  Nothing  could  make  us  give  up  our  old  policy,  a  policy  dis 
credited  by  disaster  to  ourselves  and  to  others.  If  there  is  now  a 
war  in  Cuba  the  fault  is  ours  and  ours  alone.  .  .  .  The  com 
promise  with  which  we  shall  have  to  terminate  the  present  war, 
if  Cuba  does  not  prove  stronger  than  we,  let  us  make  now  while 
we  are  still  the  more  powerful  and  our  generosity  cannot  be  branded 
as  weakness.  .  .  .  Seventeen  years  ago  we  gave  them  freedom; 
let  us  now  give  them  autonomy.  Let  us  make  them  masters  and 
arbiters  of  their  own  destinies.  Let  us  leave  them  to  rule  them 
selves  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  their  internal  life — political,  ad 
ministrative,  and  economic.  .  .  .  Against  such  conduct  the  senti 
ment  of  patriotism  is  invoked.  But  above  the  idea  of  country  rises 
that  of  humanity;  and  above  both  that  of  justice.  Cuba  is  the 
grave  of  our  youth  in  these  deplorable  wars.  ...  It  is  irritating 
to  read  and  to  hear,  day  after  day,  that  it  is  necessary  to  send  to 
Cuba  regiment  after  regiment  in  order  to  make  an  end  of  the  rebels 


1896]  RESOLUTIONS  ADOPTED  449 

and  to  leave  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation  firmly  planted  and 
established.  .  .  .  The  sovereignty  of  the  nation !  Must  the  nation 
to  be  sovereign  drain  the  life  of  the  groups  composing  it?  Does 
its  sovereignty  necessarily  carry  with  it  the  slavery  of  the  colonies  ? 
Its  sovereignty  is  limited  to  the  national  interests.  It  must  be  con 
fined  to  a  form  which  will  permit  relations  between  the  mother 
country  and  the  colonies  to  exist." 

The  long  debate  in  the  Senate  did  not  end  until  March  23,  when 
it  resolved  to  stand  by  its  own  resolutions.  On  this  same  date 
Senator  Mills,  of  Texas,  offered  a  resolution  which,  coming  from 
such  a  source,  shows  the  extent  to  which  feeling  had  risen.  The 
first  section  of  this  resolution  directed  the  President  to  request 
Spain  to  grant  Cuba  "such  local  government  as  they  may  wish"; 
the  second  was  the  forerunner  of  a  very  similar  one  to  come  two 
years  later:  "In  case  Spain  shall  refuse  to  grant  to  the  inhabitants 
of  Cuba  the  rightful  power  of  local  self-government,  then  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  hereby  directed  to  take  possession 
of  the  island  of  Cuba  with  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States  and  hold  the  same  until  the  people  of  Cuba  can  organ 
ize  a  government  deriving  its  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  arm  and  equip  such  military  force  as  ma£  be  neces 
sary  to  protect  them  from  invasion."  2 

The  House  on  April  6, 1896,  by  a  vote  of  287  to  27  (80  not  voting), 
accepted  the  Senate's  resolutions,  though  not  without  a  prolonged 
debate.  Mr.  Boutelle,  of  Maine,  was  one  of  the  small  number 
who  stood  firmly  in  opposition  to  the  movement.  He  quoted  a 
letter  of  March  23  by  twenty-five  Spanish  residents  of  New  York 
which  declared  that  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  in  being  allowed  to  send 
more  than  sixty  members  to  the  Spanish  parliament,  had,  in  such  a 
representation,  a  greater  liberty  than  was  enjoyed  by  Canada  or 
Jamaica;  that  Cuba  with  a  territory  the  size  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
a  population  of  1,500,000,  was  taxed  but  $22,000,000;  less  than  the 
taxation  for  municipal  purposes  alone  of  the  city  of  New  York; 
that  while  Cuba's  taxable  property  was  about  that  of  Boston,  it  was 
taxed  at  less  than  half  the  rate  in  either  Boston  or  New  York;  that 
every  province  had  its  legislature  and  every  municipality  its  council ; 

1  Madrid,  El  Don  Quijote,  July  12,  1895.  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess., 
2726.  2  Ibid.,  3077. 


450  AUTONOMY  A  NECESSITY  [1896 

that  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of  Cuba  "having  got  what 
reforms  they  asked  are  satisfied  to  remain  in  the  Spanish  empire."  l 
All  this  may  have  been;  but  the  actuality  of  conditions  was  now 
such  that  the  only  thing  possible  to  Spain  to  prevent  American 
intervention  was,  if  not  wholly  to  sever  connection  with  the  island, 
to  grant  it  a  measure  of  autonomy  which  should  make  it  as  free  of 
the  mother  country  as  was  Canada  of  England,  and  thus  remove  the 
impression  of  injustice  which  was  the  foundation  of  American 
sympathy. 

1  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  3551. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE   ATTITUDE    OF  THE    CLEVELAND  ADMINISTRATION   DEFINED. — 
THE   CASE   OF  THE   "  COMPETITOR  " 

THOUGH  the  concurrent  resolution  just  passed  had  no  legal 
weight  beyond  giving  form  to  the  sentiment  in  Congress  and  was  in 
nowise  mandatory  upon  the  President,  and  though  the  better  class 
of  opinion  throughout  the  Union,  as  shown  in  the  press,  was  opposed 
to  such  action  as  declaring  a  state  of  belligerency  which  did  not 
exist  and  at  the  same  time  demanding  the  independence  of  Cuba, 
and  thus  practically  declaring  victory  to  rest  with  the  insurgents,1 
a  vote,  and  by  such  majorities,  could  not  be  wholly  ignored.  It  had 
the  effect  of  bringing  from  the  American  government  an  official 
and  solemn  document  on  the  subject  of  intervention  in  a  note  to 
the  Spanish  minister  from  Mr.  Olney,  April  4,  1896. 

In  transmitting  this  note,  Senor  de  Lome  said:  "When  one 
considers  the  numerous  resolutions  of  the  two  houses  of  Congress, 
the  popular  agitation,  the  tide  of  public  opinion,  superficial  but 
widespread,  which  has  been  inspired  against  Spain  by  our  enemies, 
the  attitude  of  the  press  and  what  it  has  been  asking  and  is  asking 
even  to-day — nay,  more,  what  has  been  demanded  and  is  demanded 
even  now  of  the  President  of  the  republic — we  can  do  no  less  than 
admire  the  high  qualities  of  rectitude  and  honor,  the  fearlessness 
and  the  respect  toward  the  legitimate  rights  of  Spain  shown  in  this 
note  addressed  by  this  government  through  me  to  the  government^ 
of  his  majesty."  2 

This  note,  so  complete  an  exposition  of  the  attitude  of  the  Ameri 
can  government,  needs  to  be  given  in  full. 

1  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate,  vol.  IX  (1902),  162. 

2  Senor  Enrique  Dupuy  de  Lome,  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  April 
10,  1896,  Spanish  Diplomatic  Correspondence  and  Documents,  4. 

451 


452  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S   NOTE  [1896 

"DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 
"  WASHINGTON,  April  4,  1896. 
"  SENOR  DON  ENRIQUE  DUPUY  DE  LOME. 

" Sir:  It  might  well  be  deemed  a  dereliction  of  duty  to  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  a  censurable  want  of  candor 
to  that  of  Spain,  if  I  were  longer  to  defer  official  expression  as  well 
of  the  anxiety  with  which  the  President  regards  the  existing  situa 
tion  in  Cuba  as  of  his  earnest  desire  for  the  prompt  and  permanent 
pacification  of  that  island.  Any  plan  giving  reasonable  assurance 
of  that  result  and  not  inconsistent  with  the  just  rights  and  reason 
able  demands  of  all  concerned  would  be  earnestly  promoted  by 
him  by  all  the  means  which  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  this 
country  place  at  his  disposal. 

"It  is  now  some  nine  or  ten  months  since  the  nature  and  pros 
pects  of  the  insurrection  were  first  discussed  between  us.  In  ex 
planation  of  its  rapid  and,  up  to  that  time,  quite  unopposed  growth 
and  progress  you  called  attention  to  the  rainy  season,  which,  from 
May  or  June  until  November,  renders  regular  military  operations 
impracticable.  Spain  was  pouring  such  numbers  of  troops  into 
Cuba  that  your  theory  and  opinion  that,  when  they  could  be  used 
in  an  active  campaign,  the  insurrection  would  be  almost  instantly 
suppressed,  seemed  reasonable  and  probable.  In  this  particular 
you  believed — and  sincerely  believed — that  the  present  insurrec 
tion  would  offer  a  most  marked  contrast  to  that  which  began  in 
1868,  and  which,  being  feebly  encountered  with  comparatively 
small  forces,  prolonged  its  life  for  upward  of  ten  years. 

"It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  expectations  thus  entertained 
by  you  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1895,  and  shared  not  merely  by 
all  Spaniards,  but  by  most  disinterested  observers  as  well,  have 
been  completely  disappointed.  The  insurgents  seem  to-day  to 
command  a  larger  part  of  the  island  than  ever  before.  Their  men 
binder  arms,  estimated  a  year  ago  at  from  ten  to  twenty  thousand, 
are  now  conceded  to  be  at  least  two  or  three  times  as  many. 
Meanwhile,  their  discipline  has  been  improved  and  their  supply  of 
modern  weapons  and  equipment  has  been  greatly  enlarged,  while 
the  mere  fact  that  they  have  held  out  to  this  time  has  given  them 
confidence  in  their  own  eyes  and  prestige  with  the  world  at  large. 
In  short,  it  can  hardly  be  questioned  that  the  insurrection,  instead 


1896]  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  453 

of  being  quelled,  is  to-day  more  formidable  than  ever  and  enters 
upon  the  second  year  of  its  existence  with  decidedly  improved 
prospects  of  successful  results. 

"Whether  a  condition  of  things  entitling  the  insurgents  to  recog 
nition  as  belligerents  has  yet  been  brought  about  may,  for  the  pur 
poses  of  the  present  communication,  be  regarded  as  immaterial. 
If  it  has  not  been,  it  is  because  they  are  still  without  an  established 
and  organized  civil  government  having  an  ascertained  situs,  pre 
siding  over  a  defined  territory,  controlling  the  armed  forces  in  the 
field,  and  not  only  fulfilling  the  functions  of  a  regular  government 
within  its  own  frontiers,  but  capable  internationally  of  exercising 
those  powers  and  discharging  those  obligations  which  necessarily 
devolve  upon  every  member  of  the  family  of  nations.  It  is  imma 
terial  for  present  purposes  that  such  is  the  present  political  status 
of  the  insurgents,  because  their  defiance  of  the  authority  of  Spain 
remains  none  the  less  pronounced  and  successful  and  their  dis 
placement  of  that  authority  throughout  a  very  large  portion  of  the 
island  is  none  the  less  obvious  and  real.  When  in  1877  the  presi 
dent  of  the  so-called  Cuban  republic  was  captured,  its  legislative 
chamber  surprised  in  the  mountains  and  dispersed,  and  its  presid 
ing  officer  and  other  principal  functionaries  killed,  it  was  asserted 
in  some  quarters  that  the  insurrection  had  received  its  death-blow 
and  might  well  be  deemed  to  be  extinct.  The  leading  organ  of  the 
insurrectionists,  however,  made  this  response: 

"  *  The  organization  of  the  liberating  party  is  such  that  a  brigade, 
a  regiment,  a  battalion,  a  company,  or  a  party  of  twenty-five  men 
can  operate  independently  against  the  enemy  in  any  department 
without  requiring  any  instructions  save  those  of  their  immediate 
military  officers,  because  their  purpose  is  but  one,  and  that  is  known 
by  heart,  as  well  by  the  general  as  his  soldier,  by  the  negro  as  well 
as  the  white  man  or  the  Chinese,  viz.,  to  make  war  on  the  enemy 
at  all  times,  in  all  places,  and  by  all  means;  with  the  gun,  th« 
machete,  and  the  firebrand.  In  order  to  do  this,  which  is  the  duty 
of  every  Cuban  soldier,  the  direction  of  a  government  or  a  legis 
lative  chamber  is  not  needed;  the  order  of  a  subaltern  officer, 
serving  under  the  general  in  chief,  is  sufficient.  Thus  it  is  that 
the  government  and  chamber  have  in  reality  been  a  superfluous 
luxury  for  the  revolution. ' 


454  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  [1896 

"The  situation  thus  vividly  described  in  1877  is  reproduced 
to-day.  Even  if  it  be  granted  that  a  condition  of  insurgency  pre 
vails  and  nothing  more,  it  is  on  so  large  a  scale  and  diffused  over 
so  extensive  a  region,  and  is  so  favored  by  the  physical  features 
and  the  climate  of  the  country,  that  the  authority  of  Spain  is 
subverted  and  the  functions  of  its  government  are  in  abeyance 
or  practically  suspended  throughout  a  great  part  of  the  island. 
Spain  still  holds  the  seaports  and  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  large  towns 
in  the  interior.  Nevertheless  a  vast  area  of  the  territory  of  the 
island  is  in  effect  under  the  control  of  roving  bands  of  insurgents, 
which,  if  driven  from  one  place  to-day  by  an  exhibition  of  superior 
force,  abandon  it  only  to  return  to-morrow  when  that  force  has 
moved  on  for  their  dislodgment  in  other  quarters.  The  conse 
quence  of  this  state  of  things  cannot  be  disguised.  Outside  of 
the  town,  still  under  Spanish  rule,  anarchy,  lawlessness,  and  ter 
rorism  are  rampant.  The  insurgents  realize  that  the  wholesale  de 
struction  of  crops,  factories,  and  machinery  advances  their  cause 
in  two  ways.  It  cripples  the  resources  of  Spain  on  the  one  hand; 
on  the  other,  it  drives  into  their  ranks  the  laborers  who  are  thus 
thrown  out  of  employment.  The  result  is  a  systematic  war  upon 
the  industries  of  the  island  and  upon  all  the  means  by  which  they 
are  carried  on,  and  whereas  the  normal  annual  product  of  the 
island  is  valued  at  something  like  eighty  or  a  hundred  millions,  its 
value  for  the  present  year  is  estimated  by  competent  authority  as 
not  exceeding  twenty  millions.  Bad  as  is  this  showing  for  the 
present  year,  it  must  be  even  worse  for  the  next  year,  and  for  every 
succeeding  year  during  which  the  rebellion  continues  to  live. 
Some  planters  have  made  their  crops  this  year  who  will  not  be  al 
lowed  to  make  them  again.  Some  have  worked  their  fields  and 
operated  their  mills  this  year  in  the  face  of  a  certain  loss,  who  have 
neither  the  heart  nor  the  means  to  do  so  again,  under  the  present 
even  more  depressing  conditions.  Not  only  is  it  certain  that  no 
fresh  money  is  being  invested  on  the  island,  but  it  is  no  secret  that 
capital  is  fast  withdrawing  from  it,  frightened  away  by  the  hope 
lessness  of  the  outlook.  Why  should  it  not  be  ?  What  can  a  pru 
dent  man  foresee  as  the  outcome  of  existing  conditions  except  the 
complete  devastation  of  the  island,  the  entire  annihilation  of  its 
industries,  and  the  absolute  impoverishment  of  such  of  its  inhabi- 


1896]  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  455 

tants  as  are  unwise  or  unfortunate  enough  not  to  seasonably 
escape  from  it.  The  last  preceding  insurrection  lasted  for  ten 
years  and  then  was  not  subdued,  but  only  succumbed  to  the  in 
fluence  of  certain  promised  reforms.  Where  is  found  the  promise 
that  the  present  rebellion  will  have  a  shorter  lease  of  life,  unless 
the  end  is  sooner  reached  through  the  exhaustion  of  Spain  herself  ? 
Taught  by  experience,  Spain  wisely  undertook  to  make  its  struggle 
with  the  present  insurrection  short,  sharp,  and  decisive;  to  stamp 
it  out  in  its  very  beginning  by  concentrating  upon  it  large  and  well- 
organized  armies — armies  infinitely  superior  in  numbers,  in  disci 
pline,  and  in  equipment  to  any  the  insurgents  could  oppose  to  them. 
Those  armies  were  put  under  the  command  of  its  ablest  general  as 
well  as  its  most  renowned  statesman — of  one  whose  very  name 
was  an  assurance  to  the  insurgents  both  of  the  skilful  generalship 
with  which  they  would  be  fought  and  of  the  reasonable  and  liberal 
temper  in  which  just  demands  for  redress  of  grievances  would  be 
received.  Yet  the  efforts  of  Campos  seem  to  have  utterly  failed, 
and-'his  successor,  a  man  who,  rightfully  or  wrongfully,  seems  to 
have  intensified  all  the  acerbities  of  the  struggle,  is  now  being  re- 
enforced  with  additional  troops.  It  may  well  be  feared,  therefore,  ; 
that  if  the  present  is  to  be  of  shorter  duration  than  the  last  insur 
rection,  it  will  be  because  the  end  is  to  come  sooner  or  later  through 
the  inability  of  Spain  to  prolong  the  conflict,  and  through  her 
abandonment  of  the  island  to  the  heterogeneous  combination  of 
elements  and  of  races  now  in  arms  against  her.  Such  a  conclusion 
of  the  struggle  cannot  be  viewed  even  by  the  most  devoted  friend 
of  Cuba  and  the  most  enthusiastic  advocate  of  popular  government, 
except  with  the  gravest  apprehension.  There  are  only  too  strong 
reasons  to  fear  that,  once  Spain  were  withdrawn  from  the  island, 
the  sole  bond  of  union  between  the  different  factions  of  the  insur 
gents  would  disappear;  that  a  war  of  races  would  be  precipitated, 
all  the  more  sanguinary  for  the  discipline  and  experience  acquired 
during  the  insurrection;  and  that,  even  if  there  were  to  be  tem 
porary  peace,  it  could  only  be  through  the  establishment  of  a  white 
and  a  black  republic,  which,  even  if  agreeing  at  the  outset  upon 
a  division  of  the  island  between  them,  would  be  enemies  from  the 
start,  and  would  never  rest  until  the  one  had  been  completely 
vanquished  and  subdued  by  the  other. 


456  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  [1896 

"The  situation  thus  described  is  of  great  interest  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States.  They  are  interested  in  any  struggle  anywhere 
for  freer  political  institutions,  but  necessarily  and  in  special  meas 
ure  in  a  struggle  that  is  raging  almost  in  sight  of  our  shores. 
They  are  interested,  as  a  civilized  and  Christian  nation,  in  the 
speedy  termination  of  a  civil  strife  characterized  by  exceptional 
bitterness  and  exceptional  excesses  on  the  part  of  both  combatants. 
They  are  interested  in  the  non-interruption  of  extensive  trade  re 
lations  which  have  been,  and  should  continue  to  be,  of  great  ad 
vantage  to  both  countries.  They  are  interested  in  the  prevention 
of  that  wholesale  destruction  of  property  on  the  island  which,  mak 
ing  no  discrimination  between  enemies  and  neutrals,  is  utterly  de 
stroying  American  investments  that  should  be  of  immense  value 
and  is  utterly  impoverishing  great  numbers  of  American  citizens. 
On  all  these  grounds  and  in  all  these  ways  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  the  existing  situation  in  Cuba  yields  in  extent  only 
to  that  of  Spain  herself,  and  has  led  many  good  and  honest  persons 
to  insist  that  intervention  to  terminate  the  conflict  is  the  immedi 
ate  and  imperative  duty  of  the  United  States.  It  is  not  proposed 
to  now  consider  whether  existing  conditions  would  justify  such 
intervention  at  the  present  time,  or  how  much  longer  those  condi 
tions  should  be  endured  before  such  intervention  would  be  justified. 
That  the  United  States  cannot  contemplate  with  complacency 
another  ten  years  of  Cuban  insurrection,  with  all  its  injurious  and 
distressing  incidents,  may  certainly  be  taken  for  granted.  The 
object  of  the  present  communication,  however,  is  not  to  discuss 
intervention,  nor  to  propose  intervention,  nor  to  pave  the  way  for 
intervention.  The  purpose  is  exactly  the  reverse — to  suggest 
whether  a  solution  of  present  troubles  cannot  be  found  which  will 
prevent  all  thought  of  intervention  by  rendering  it  unnecessary  e 
What  the  United  States  desires  to  do,  if  the  way  can  be  pointed  out, 
is  to  co-operate  with  Spain  in  the  immediate  pacification  of  the 
island  on  such  a  plan  as,  leaving  Spain  her  rights  of  sovereignty, 
shall  yet  secure  to  the  people  of  the  island  all  such  rights  and 
powers  of  local  self-government  as  they  can  reasonably  ask./ To 
that  end,  the  United  States  offers  and  will  use  her  good  offices  at 
such  time  and  in  such  manner  as  may  be  deemed  most  advisable. 
Its  mediation,  it  is  believed,  should  not  be  rejected  in  any  quar- 


1896]  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  457 

ter  since  none  could  misconceive  or  mistrust  its  purpose.  Spain  v 
could  not,  because  our  respect  for  her  sovereignty  and  our  deter 
mination  to  do  nothing  to  impair  it  have  been  maintained  for  many 
years  at  great  cost,  and  in  spite  of  many  temptations.  The  in 
surgents  could  not,  because  anything  assented  to  by  this  govern 
ment  which  did  not  satisfy  the  reasonable  demands  and  aspira 
tions  of  Cuba,  would  arouse  the  indignation  of  our  whole  people. 
It  only  remains  to  suggest  that,  if  anything  can  be  done  in  the  di 
rection  indicated,  it  should  be  ddne  at  once  and  on  the  initiative  of 
Spain.  The  more  the  contest  is  prolonged,  the  more  bitter  and  more 
irreconcilable  is  the  antagonism  created,  while  there  is  danger  that 
concessions  may  be  so  delayed  as  to  be  chargeable  to  weakness 
and  fear  of  the  issue  of  the  contest,  and  thus  be  infinitely  less  accep 
table  and  persuasive  than  if  made  while  the  result  still  hangs  in 
balance,  and  they  could  be  properly  credited,  in  some  degree  at 
least,  to  a  sense  of  right  and  justice.  Thus  far  Spain  has  faced 
the  insurrection  sword  in  hand,  and  has  made  no  sign  to  show  that 
surrender  and  submission  would  be  followed  by  anything  but  a  ^ 
return  to  the  old  order  of  things.  Would  it  not  be  wise  to  modify 
that  policy  and  to  accompany  the  application  of  military  force 
with  an  authentic  declaration  of  the  organic  changes  that  are 
meditated  in  the  administration  of  the  island  with  a  view  to  remove 
all  just  grounds  of  complaint  ?  It  is  for  Spain  to  consider  and  de 
termine  what  those  changes  would  be.  But  should  they  be  such 
that  the  United  States  could  urge  their  adoption  as  substantially 
removing  well-founded  grievances,  its  influence  would  be  exerted 
for  their  acceptance,  and,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted,  would  be  most 
potential  for  the  termination  of  hostilities  and  the  restoration  of 
peace  and  order  to  the  island.  One  result  of  the  course  of  proceed 
ing  outlined,  if  no  other,  would  be  sure  to  follow,  namely,  that  the 
rebellion  would  lose  largely,  if  not  altogether,  the  moral  counte 
nance  and  support  it  now  enjoys  from  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 

"In  closing  this  communication,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  repeat 
that  it  is  prompted  by  the  friendliest  feeling  toward  Spain  and  the 
Spanish  people.     To  attribute  to  the  United  States  any  hostile  or 
hidden  purposes  would  be  a  grave  and  most  lamentable  error.  , 
The  United  States  has  no  designs  upon  Cuba  and  no  designs  against  \ 


458  SECRETARY  OLNEY'S  NOTE  [1896 

the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  Neither  is  it  actuated  by  any  spirit  of 
meddlesomeness  nor  by  any  desire  to  force  its  will  upon  another 
nation.  Its  geographical  proximity  and  all  the  considerations  above 
detailed  compel  it  to  be  interested  in  the  solution  of  the  Cuban 
problem,  whether  it  will  or  no.  Its  only  anxiety  is  that  the  solution 
should  be  speedy,  and  by  being  founded  on  truth  and  justice  should 
also  be  permanent.  To  aid  in  that  solution  it  offers  the  suggestions 
herein  contained.  They  will  be  totally  misapprehended  unless 
the  United  States  be  credited  with  entertaining  no  other  purpose 
toward  Spain  than  that  of  lending  its  assistance  to  such  termina 
tion  of  a  fratricidal  contest  as  will  leave  honor  and  dignity  unim 
paired  at  the  same  time  that  it  promotes  and  conserves  the  true 
interests  of  all  parties  concerned. 

"I  avail  myself,  etc., 

"RICHARD  OLNEY.*M 

This  very  important  document,  temperate,  wise,  and  abounding 
in  good  counsel,  the  sending  of  which  at  this  moment  was  evidently 
dictated  by  an  administration  which  wished  Spain  well  and  which 
frankly  but  in  the  most  friendly  manner  set  before  the  Spanish 
government  the  realities  of  the  situation,  was  carried  to  Madrid 
by  one  of  the  secretaries  of  the  Spanish  legation  at  Washington. 
A  full  month  intervened  between  its  arrival  and  the  sending  of  a 
reply,  May  22,  1896. 

In  the  meantime  two  important  events  occurred:  The  one,  the 
capture  by  an  armed  launch  of  the  schooner  Competitor  and  her 
crew  of  five  men,  which  had  just  landed  an  expedition  of  fifty-nine 
men  near  Punta  Berracos,  west  of  Havana,  and  the  sentence  to 
death  of  the  crew  by  a  summary  court-martial,  regardless  of  existing 
conventions  as  to  the  trial  of  the  Americans  aboard;  the  other,  the 
reading,  on  May  11,  at  the  opening  of  the  Spanish  parliament,  of  a 
speech  from  the  Queen  Regent,  which  practically  anticipated  the 
reply  of  the  American  note,  and,  no  doubt,  was  so  intended. 

After  an  historical  summary  of  the  contest,  the  speech,  says  De 

Olivart,  proclaimed  "  that  the  Spanish  nation  was  always  ready  to 

pardon  and  to  make  peace;   that,  in  the  unanimous  opinion  of  all 

true  friends  of  Spain  in  the  Antilles,  an  immediate  application  of 

1  Spanish  Corres.  and  Docs.,  4-8. 


1896]  THE  QUEEN  REGENTS  SPEECH  459 

reforms  and  a  change  of  political  organization  while  the  strife  was 
in  full  vigor,  far  from  favoring  the  solution  of  the  problem,  would 
but  make  it  more  difficult.1  One  has  to  consider  from  the  govern 
ment's  point  of  view  that  the  insurrectionist  forces  were  already 
much  weakened,  and,  if  they  were  not  more  so,  it  was  by  reason  of 
the  protection  and  aid  which  the  insurgents  received  from  abroad 
and  from  the  chimerical  hope  that  one  day,  misunderstanding  the 
law  of  nations,  their  cause  would  be  taken  in  hand  by  a  great 
nation.  Having  said  this,  the  Queen  Regent  solemnly  affirmed 
that  'once  the  insurrection  reached  an  end,  it  would  be  indispen 
sable,  in  order  that  a  solid  peace  should  be  established,  to  give  the 
Antilles  an  administrative  and  economic  personality  which  would 
render  the  part  taken  by  the  country  in  its  own  affairs  easy  and  expe 
ditious,  all  the  while  safeguarding  the  rights  of  Spanish  sovereignty 
and  leaving  intact  the  conditions  necessary  to  its  maintenance; 
it  is  to  this  end  that  the  efforts  of  the  government  shall  tend/  " 2 

Almost  at  the  same  moment  the  Cuban  president,  Estrada 
Palma  (at  New  York,  be  it  said),  was  putting  forth  a  manifesto 
which  declared  that  "with  few  exceptions  the  idea  could  come  to 
no  one  in  the  United  States  of  supporting  any  project  destined  to 
put  an  end  to  the  actual  strife  which  should  not  have  as  a  base  the 
independence  of  Cuba."  He  continued:  "It  is  useless  to  speak 
of  reforms  and  even  of  a  large  autonomy.  To  hold  such  language 
would  be  to  create  illusions  and  lose  time  which  could  be  profitably 
used  to  avoid  the  ruin  and  desolation  of  the  island.  The  revolution 
is  powerful,  it  is  incarnate  in  the  Cuban  people,  and  there  exists 
no  power,  neither  Spanish  nor  human,  which  can  arrest  it  in  its 
course."  3 

The  queen's  speech  foreshadowed,  as  mentioned,  the  reply  to 
the  American  note.  This  reply,  though  signed  by  the  Duke  of 
Tetuan  as  foreign  minister,  was  of  course  the  work  of  the  forceful 
head  of  the  ministry,  Senor  Canovas.  Dated  at  Madrid,  May  22, 

1  Says  Senof  de  Olivart  in  a  note  to  his  discussion  of  this  speech:  "The 
events  which  occurred  in  the  last  days  of  1897  and  the  early  ones  of  1898 
show  the  justice  of  this  affirmation,  which  seemed  when  made  paradoxical." 
He  ignores  that  there  was  to  intervene  a  full  year  and  a  half  of  struggle  of 
increasing  bitterness. 

*  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  IX  (1902),  169. 

'  In  the  Republwa  Cubana,  May  14,  1896,  De  Olivart,  Ibid.,  170. 


460          SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE         [1896 

1896,  it  was  embodied  in  a  note  from  the  Spanish  minister  at 
Washington  to  Mr.  Olney,  June  4.  The  original,  in  full,  was  as 
follows : 

"MADRID,  M ay  22,  1896. 

"EXCELLENCY:  In  due  course  I  received  your  excellency's 
despatch  of  the  10th  of  last  April,  accompanied  by  the  original 
note  of  Mr.  Olney,  of  the  4th  of  the  same  month,  regarding  the 
Cuban  situation,  and  by  the  literal  translation  which  your  excel 
lency  has  made  of  said  note. 

"The  importance  of  the  communication  from  the  government 
of  Washington  has  led  the  government  of  his  majesty  to  examine 
it  with  the  greatest  care,  and  to  postpone  an  answer  until  such 
times  as  its  own  views  on  the  complicated  and  delicate  Cuban 
question  should  be  made  public.  In  this  way  the  previous  volun 
tary  decisions  of  the  Spanish  government  may  serve,  as  they  are 
now  serving,  as  the  basis  of  the  reply.  The  ample  and  liberal 
purposes  made  known  to  the  Cortes  by  the  august  lips  of  his 
majesty  in  the  speech  from  the  throne  permit  the  taking  up  of 
the  matter  in  all  sincerity. 

"The  government  of  his  majesty  fully  appreciates  the  noble 
frankness  with  which  the  government  of  the  United  States  has 
advised  it  of  the  very  definite  views  it  has  formed  touching  the 
juridical  impossibility  of  recognizing  the  Cuban  insurgents  as 
belligerents.  Indeed,  those  who  are  fighting  in  Cuba  against  the 
integrity  of  the  Spanish  mother  country  do  not  possess  any  qualifi 
cations  which  entitle  them  to  the  respect  or  even  the  consideration 
of  other  nations;  they  do  not  possess — as  the  secretary  of  state 
expresses  it — an  established  and  organized  civil  government,  with 
a  known  seat  and  administration  of  defined  territory;  and  they 
have  not  succeeded  in  permanently  occupying  any  town,  much  less 
any  city,  large  or  small.  It  is  impossible,  therefore — as  the  secre 
tary  of  state  also  said,  voluntarily,  and  with  great  legal  acumen — 
for  the  Cuban  insurgents  to  perform  the  functions  of  a  regular 
government  within  their  own  frontiers,  and  much  less  to  exercise 
the  rights  and  fulfil  the  obligations  that  are  incumbent  on  all  the 
members  of  the  family  of  nations.  Moreover,  their  systematic 
campaign  of  destruction  against  all  the  industries  of  the  island,  and 
the  means  by  which  the  campaign  is  carried  on,  would  of  itself  be 


1896]        SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE          461 

sufficient  to  keep  them  without  the  pale  of  the  rules  of  international 
law  universally  recognized  and  applicable  to  the  case,  leaving  to 
them  the  character  to  which  they  are  entitled  by  their  acts  of  van 
dalism  and  destruction. 

"No  less  gratifying  to  the  government  of  his  majesty  has  been 
the  explicit  and  spontaneous  declaration  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States  seeks  no  advantage  in  connection  with  the  Cu 
ban  question,  its  only  wish  and  purpose  being  that  the  ineluctable 
and  lawful  sovereignty  of  Spain  be  conserved  and  even  strength 
ened  through  the  submission  of  the  rebels,  which,  as  the  secretary 
of  state  himself  declares,  is  of  paramount  necessity  to  the  Spanish 
government  in  order  to  maintain  its  authority  and  honor.  No 
less  could  have  been  expected  from  the  lofty  sense  of  right  cher 
ished  by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  the  government 
of  his  majesty  recognizes  with  pleasure  all  the  weight  carried  by  the 
emphatic  declarations  of  Mr.  Olney  touching  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  and  the  decision  of  the  United  States  not  to  do  anything  de 
rogatory  to  it.  In  view  of  so  correct  and  so  friendly  an  attitude  it 
is  unnecessary  to  discuss,  as  Mr.  Olney  remarks,  the  hypothesis  of 
intervention,  which  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  aforesaid  views. 

"There  can  be  no  greater  accuracy  of  judgment  than  that  dis 
played  by  the  secretary  of  state  touching  the  future  of  the  island  of 
Cuba  in  the  event,  which  cannot  and  shall  not  be,  of  the  insurrec 
tion  terminating  in  its  triumph.  As  Mr.  Olney  says,  with  much 
reason,  such  a  termination  of  the  conflict  would  be  looked  upon 
with  the  most  serious  misgivings,  even  by  the  most  enthusiastic 
advocates  of  popular  government,  because,  as  he  rightly  adds, 
with  the  heterogeneous  combination  of  races  that  exist  there  the 
disappearance  of  Spain  would  be  the  disappearance  of  the  only 
bond  of  union  which  can  keep  them  in  balance  and  prevent  an  in 
evitable  struggle  among  the  men  of  different  color,  contrary  to  the 
spirit  of  Christian  civilization.  The  accuracy  of  the  statement 
of  the  secretary  of  state  is  the  more  striking  as,  owing  to  the  con 
ditions  of  population  on  the  island,  no  part  of  the  natives  can  be 
conceded  superiority  over  the  others,  if  the  assistance  of  the  Eu 
ropean  Spaniards  is  not  taken  into  account. 

"The  island  of  Cuba  has  been  exclusively  Spanish  from  its 
discovery;  the  great  normal  development  of  its  resources,  what- 


462          SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE        [1896 

ever  they  are,  whatever  their  value,  and  whatever  they  represent 
in  the  community  of  mankind,  is  due  entirely  to  the  mother  coun 
try;  and  even  at  this  day,  among  the  diverse  groups  that  inhabit 
it,  whatever  be  the  stand-point  from  which  the  question  is  ex 
amined,  the  natives  of  the  Peninsula  are  absolutely  necessary 
there  for  the  peace  and  advancement  of  the  island. 

"All  these  reasons  clearly  demonstrate  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
think  that  any  benefit  can  come  to  the  island  of  Cuba  except  through 
the  agency  of  Spain,  acting  under  her  own  convictions,  and  actu 
ated,  as  she  has  long  been,  by  principles  of  liberty  and  justice. 
The  Spanish  government  is  aware  that,  far  from  having  justice 
done  it  on  all  sides  on  these  points,  there  are  many  persons  ob 
viously  deceived  by  incessant  calumnies  who  honestly  believe  that 
a  ferocious  despotism  prevails  in  our  Antilles,  instead  of  one  of  the 
most  liberal  political  systems  in  the  world  being  enjoyed  there  now, 
as  well  as  before  the  insurrection.  One  need  only  glance  over  the 
legislation  governing  the  Antilles — laws  which  ought  to  be  suffi 
ciently  known  in  the  United  States  at  this  day — to  perceive  how 
absolutely  groundless  such  opinions  are.  A  collection  of  the  Cuban 
newspapers  published  in  recent  years  would  suffice  to  show  that 
few  civilized  countries  then  enjoyed  in  an  equal  degree  freedom 
of  thought  and  of  the  press — the  foundation  of  all  liberty. 

"Naturally  the  government  of  his  majesty  and  the  people  of 
Spain  wish  and  even  long  for  the  early  pacification  of  Cuba.  In 
order  to  secure  it  they  are  ready  to  exert  their  utmost  efforts  and  at 
the  same  time  to  adopt  such  reforms  as  may  be  useful  or  necessary 
and  compatible,  of  course,  with  their  inalienable  sovereignty,  as 
soon  as  the  submission  of  the  insurgents  be  an  accomplished  fact. 
It  is  truly  gratifying  to  me  here  to  observe  that  our  opinions  on  this 
point  coincide  with  those  of  the  secretary  of  state. 

"No  one,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  fully  aware  of  the  serious 
evils  suffered  by  Spaniards  and  aliens  in  consequence  of  the  insur 
rection  than  the  government  of  his  majesty.  It  realizes  the  im 
mense  injury  inflicted  on  Spain  by  the  putting  forth,  with  the 
unanimous  co-operation  and  approbation  of  her  people,  of  such 
efforts  as  were  never  before  made  in  America  by  any  European 
country.  It  knows,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  interests  of  foreign 
industry  and  trade  suffer — as  well  as  the  Spanish  interests — by 


1896]         SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE          463 

the  system  of  devastation  of  the  insurgents.  But  if  the  insur 
rection  should  triumph  the  interests  of  all  would  not  merely  suffer, 
but  would  entirely  and  forever  disappear  amid  the  furors  of 
perpetual  anarchy. 

"It  has  already  been  said  that  in  order  to  avoid  evils  of  such 
magnitude  the  cabinet  of  Madrid  does  not  and  will  not  confine  itself 
exclusively  to  the  employment  of  armed  force.  The  speech  from 
the  throne,  read  before  the  national  representation,  promised,  motu 
proprio,  not  only  that  all  that  was  previously  granted  would  be 
carried  into  effect  as  soon  as  opportunity  offers,  but  also,  by  fresh 
authorization  of  the  Cortes,  all  that  which  may  appear  to  be  nec 
essary  to  amplify  and  extend  the  original  reforms,  to  the  end  that 
both  Antilles  may,  in  the  administrative  department,  enjoy  a  per 
sonnel  of  a  local  character;  that  the  intervention  of  the  mother 
country  may  be  dispensed  with  in  their  domestic  affairs,  with  the 
limit  merely  that  the  rights  of  sovereignty  be  not  impaired,  or  the 
powers  of  the  government  to  preserve  the  same.  This  solemn 
promise,  guaranteed  by  the  august  word  of  his  majesty,  will  be 
fulfilled  by  the  Spanish  government  with  a  true  liberality  of  views. 
The  foregoing  facts,  being  better  known  every  day,  will  make  it 
patent  to  the  just  people  of  other  nations  that  Spain,  far  from  pro 
posing  that  her  subjects  in  the  West  Indies  should  return  to  a 
regime  unfit  for  the  times,  when  she  enjoys  such  liberal  laws, 
would  never  have  withheld  these  same  laws  from  the  islands  but 
for  the  incessant  separatist  conspiracies,  which  compelled  her  to 
look  above  all  to  self-defence. 

"Under  the  promises  thus  made  I  entertain  the  confidence  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  will  readily  see  that  Spain, 
while  grateful  in  the  highest  degree  for  the  kind  advice  bestowed, 
has  forestalled  it  for  a  long  time  past.  It  follows,  therefore,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  it  will  comply  with  it  in  a  practical  manner  as 
soon  as  circumstances  make  it  possible.  But  Mr.  Olney  will  have 
seen  by  the  public  press  that  already  the  insurgents,  elated  by  the 
strength  which  they  have  acquired  through  the  aid  of  a  certain 
number  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  have  contemptuously  re 
pelled,  through  the  medium  of  the  Cubans  residing  in  that  country, 
any  idea  that  the  government  of  Washington  can  intervene  in  the 
contest,  either  with  its  advice  or  in  any  other  manner,  on  the  sup- 


464          SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE        [1896 

position  that  the  declarations  of  disinterestedness  of  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  are  false,  and  that  it  wishes  to  get  pos 
session  of  that  island  in  the  future.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  no 
success  would  attend  such  possible  mediation,  which  they  repel, 
even  admitting  that  the  mother  country  would  condescend  to  treat 
with  its  rebellious  subjects,  as  one  power  with  another,  thus  cer 
tainly  jeopardizing  its  future  authority,  detracting  from  its  natural 
dignity,  and  injuriously  affecting  its  independence,  for  which  it 
has  always  shown  so  jealous  a  care  in  all  times,  as  history  teaches. 
In  brief,  there  is  no  effectual  way  to  pacify  Cuba  apart  from  the 
actual  submission  of  the  armed  rebels  to  the  mother  country. 

"Notwithstanding  this,  the  government  of  the  United  States 
could,  by  use  of  proper  means,  contribute  greatly  to  the  pacification 
of  the  island  of  Cuba.  The  government  of  his  majesty  is  already 
very  grateful  for  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  prosecute 
the  unlawful  expeditions  of  some  of  its  citizens  to  Cuba  with  more 
vigor  than  in  the  past,  after  making  a  judicial  investigation  to  de 
termine  the  adequacy  of  its  laws,  when  honestly  enforced.  Still, 
the  high  moral  sense  of  the  government  of  Washington  will  un 
doubtedly  suggest  to  it  other  more  effectual  means  of  preventing 
from  henceforth  what  is  now  the  case,  the  prolongation  of  a 
struggle  so  close  to  its  borders  and  so  injurious  to  its  commerce 
and  trade  (which  Mr.  Olney  justly  deplores)  being  especially  due 
to  the  powerful  assistance  which  the  rebellion  finds  in  the  territory 
of  the  great  American  Republic,  against  the  wishes  of  the  larger 
part  of  its  population.  The  constant  violation  of  international 
law  is  especially  manifest  on  the  part  of  Cuban  emigrants,  who 
care  nothing  for  the  losses  suffered  in  the  interim  by  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  and  of  Spain  through  the  prolongation  of 
the  war. 

"The  Spanish  government,  on  its  part,  has  already  done  much 
and  will  do  more  each  day  in  order  to  achieve  so  desirable  an  end, 
by  endeavoring  to  correct  the  mistakes  of  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  and  by  exposing  the  plots  and  calumnies  of  its  re 
bellious  subjects.  It  may  well  happen  that  the  declarations  re 
cently  made  in  the  most  solemn  form  by  the  government  of  his 
majesty  concerning  its  intentions  for  the  future,  will  also  contribute 
in  large  measure  to  gratify  the  wish  expressed  by  Mr.  Olney  that 


1896]        SPAIN'S  REPLY  TO  THE  OLNEY  NOTE          465 

all  the  people  of  the  United  States,  convinced  that  the  right  is  with 
us,  will  completely  cease  to  extend  unlawful  aid  to  the  insurgents. 

"If,  with  such  an  object  in  view,  the  government  of  the  United 
States — which  shows  itself  so  hopeful  that  the  justice  of  Spain  may 
be  recognized  by  all — should  desire  additional  information  to  that 
it  already  has  upon  the  Cuban  question,  the  government  of  his 
majesty  will  have  the  greatest  pleasure  in  supplying  it  with  the 
most  accurate  details.  When  the  government  of  the  United  States 
shall  once  be  convinced  of  our  being  in  the  right,  and  that  honest 
conviction  shall  in  some  manner  be  made  public,  but  little  more 
will  be  required  in  order  that  all  those  in  Cuba  who  are  not  striv 
ing  merely  to  accomplish  the  total  ruin  of  the  beautiful  country  in 
which  they  were  born,  being  then  without  hope  of  outside  aid  and 
powerless  by  themselves,  will  lay  down  their  arms. 

"Until  that  happy  state  of  things  has  been  attained,  Spain,  in 
the  just  defence  not  only  of  her  rights,  but  also  of  her  duty  and 
honor,  will  continue  the  efforts  for  an  early  victory  which  she  is 
now  exerting,  regardless  of  the  greatest  sacrifices. 

"  In  these  terms  you  will  reply  to  the  above-mentioned  note 
from  Mr.  Olney. 

"Dios,  etc., 

"THE  DUKE  OF  TETUAN." 

Senor  de  Lome  wrote,  June  11,  1896,  to  the  Spanish  minister 
of  state:  "The  secretary  of  state,  whom  I  have  seen  to-day,  has 
shown  himself  very  reserved,  understanding  that  the  note  contains 
a  courteous  refusal  to  the  government  of  his  majesty  to  accept  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States,  and  showing  an  interest  in  being 
informed  at  the  proper  time  of  the  discussion  of  matters  concerning 
the  island,  and  the  propositions  of  law  which  are  presented  to  the 
Cortes,  because  he  believes  that  the  situation  here  and  in  Cuba 
must  be  bettered."  *  This  last  was  an  ominous  sentence,  the  weight 
of  which  neither  Senor  Cdnovas  nor  Senor  de  Lome  seemed  to 
appreciate. 

The  American  note  was,  indeed,  the  turning-point  of  the  affairs  < 
of  Spain.     Its  rejection  meant,  could  only  mean  as  a  finality,  the 
forcible  intervention  by  the  United  States,  and  war.     The  Spanish 
1  Spanish  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  1896-1900,  13. 


466  SPAIN'S  FAILURE  TO  UNDERSTAND  [1896 

government  saw  in  the  American  proposals,  despite  the  earnest 
assurances  to  the  contrary,  a  desire  to  acquire  the  island.  It 
looked  back  over  the  three-quarters  of  a  century,  which  had  begun 
with  a  frank  declaration  of  covetousness,  which  had  culminated 
in  the  Ostend  manifesto,  and  to  the  repeated  wishes  to  acquire  the 
island  which  had  only  ceased  with  the  war  between  the  States  in 
1861.  It  was  unable  to  recognize  the  changed  attitude  toward 
Cuba  of  the  American  mind,  already  more  than  sufficiently  con 
cerned  with  a  race  question  of  its  own,  and  which  desired  no  ad 
dition  to  such  a  weighty  difficulty  as  was  involved  in  Cuban  an 
nexation. 

It  was  again  the  question  of  pundonor,  the  sensitiveness  which 
would  not  brook  the  interference  of  a  foreign  power  with  the  affairs 
of  Spain.  But  interference  of  some  sort  was  certain.  The  only 
question  was  whether  it  should  be  friendly  and  in  support  of  Spain's 
dominancy,  or  unfriendly  and  disruptive  of  her  American  dominion. 
Senor  Canovas,  though  no  doubt  he  did  not  forecast  the  latter  as  a 
result  of  the  despatch  of  the  minister  of  state  of  May  22,  deliberately, 
in  his  ignorance  of  the  American  mind,  risked  the  latter  alternative. 
A  country,  the  king  of  which  had  in  1823  invited  the  occupancy  of 
its  entire  territory  by  a  foreign  army  which  was  to  hold  the  land  for 
years  from  the  Pyrenees  to  Cadiz,  could  well  afford  the  friendly  aid 
and  counsel,  to  be  given  in  all  confidence,  which  the  American  de 
partment  of  state  stood  ready  to  offer.  Had  an  autonomy  been 
offered  on  principles  thus  agreed  upon,  meeting,  as  it  necessarily 
must  have  done  in  order  to  be  approved,  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  of 
free  government,  a  non-acceptance  by  the  Cubans  would  have 
totally  destroyed  American  sympathy.  The  result  in  such  case,  it 
is  not  too  much  to  say,  would  have  been  a  deep  revulsion  of  Ameri 
can  feeling.  Every  moral  aid  possible  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  would  have  been  at  the  command  of  Spain.  There  can 
scarcely,  despite  the  pronouncement  of  Estrada  Palma  for  nothing 
short  of  independence,  have  been  any  question  as  to  the  result. 
>  As  it  was,  the  note  sounded  the  knell  of  Spanish  dominion 
in  Cuba.  The  Spanish  minister  in  Washington  was  warned  by 
the  American  secretary  of  state,  in  a  friendly  conversation  going 
beyond  the  usual  limits  of  official  reserve,  of  the  danger  of  await 
ing  the  coming  to  power  of  a  new  administration,  which  might  not 


1896]  SPAIN'S  FAILURE  TO  UNDERSTAND  467 

be  able  to  hold  so  well  in  hand  the  forces  antagonistic  to  Spain. 
But  C&novas,  with  mind  cast  in  the  same  mould  with  that  of  Philip 
II,  was  determined  to  first  assert  the  authority  of  Spain  over  the 
insurgents,  as  Philip  was  determined  to  assert  the  authority  of  a 
unified  religion  over  all  races  of  the  Peninsula,  whatever  the  cost 
to  Spain.  Ruin  followed  the  policy  of  the  one  as  of  the  other.  l 

1  Says  the  Marquis  de  Olivart:  "  From  confidential  information  which  we 
have  received  (and  which  we  are  ready  to  rectify  if  it  is  not  exact)  we  are 
led  to  believe  that  General  Martinez  Campos  and  the  minister  of  state  him 
self,  the  Duke  of  Tetuan,  had  been  partisans  of  a  different  reply  in  the  first 
days  of  the  discussion  of  the  American  proposition  at  Madrid.  They  would 
have  preferred  that,  in  one  form  or  another,  the  proposition  made  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States  should  be  accepted."  (Revue  Generate  de 
Droit  International  Public,  IX  (1902),  171.) 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

THE    CASE    OF    THE    "COMPETITOR." — THE    ANNUAL    MESSAGE    OF 
1896. — THE  ACTION  IN  CONGRESS 

THE  affair  of  the  Competitor  came  to  accentuate  the  gravity  of 
Spain's  decision.  This  schooner,  April  20,  1896,  had  cleared 
from  Key  West  for  Port  Lemon,  Fla.,  with  twenty-four  passengers; 
her  crew  was  composed  of  the  master,  Laborde;  Gildea,  mate; 
Leavitt  and  Barnett,  seamen;  and  Gurk,  the  cook.  There  was 
also  aboard  a  young  man  from  Kansas,  named  Melton,  a  news 
paper  correspondent. 

Off  Cape  Sable,  April  22,  if  we  are  to  believe  the  affidavits  of 
the  master,  mate,  and  Melton,  which  in  the  circumstances  need  to 
be  taken  with  doubt,  the  passengers  took  charge  by  force,  went  to 
Cape  Sable,  and  there  received  twenty-five  others,  with  arms  and 
ammunition.  The  schooner  reached  the  north  shore  of  Cuba  at 
Point  Berracos,  some  seventy  miles  west  of  Havana,  April  25,  and 
there  landed  her  passengers  and  material.  Shortly  after  she  was 
sighted  by  the  Spanish  armed  launch,  Mensajora.  There  were 
aboard  the  schooner  at  this  moment,  Laborde,  Gildea,  Melton,  and 
three  passengers,  Vedia,  Masa,  and  Quesada.  The  two  seamen 
and  the  cook  had  gone  ashore.1  Laborde,  Gildea,  and  Quesada 
attempted  to  escape  by  swimming  ashore;  the  two  first  were 
seized  in  the  water,  but  the  last  was  drowned.  All  the  others  were 
taken  to  Havana  where  they  arrived  May  29. 

Laborde  claimed  to  be  born  in  New  Orleans  of  Cuban  parents; 
Gildea,  born  in  Liverpool,  was  a  British  subject,  but  both  were  en 
titled  under  article  171  of  the  American  Consular  Regulations  to 
American  protection.2  The  consul-general  at  once  demanded  that 
the  case  should  come  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1795  and  the 
protocol  of  1877. 

1  The  seamen  were  captured  on  May  11  and  taken  to  Havana. 

2  This  article,  based  on  statutes,  reads: 

"That  the  circumstance  that  the  vessel  is  American  is  evidence  that  the 

468 


1896]  THE   "COMPETITOR"   CASE  469 

The  extended  and  active  correspondence  of  the  next  few  days 
(from  the  7th  to  the  9th  of  May)  developed  the  views  of  the  judge- 
advocate  that  "  foreigners  without  distinction  of  nationality  are 
subject  to  the  laws  and  courts  of  Spain  for  crimes  committed  within 
Spanish  territory";  that  whatever  interpretation  "may  be  given  to 
the  treaty  and  its  meaning  given  by  the  protocol,  this  [latter]  from 
its  beginning  declares  it  only  embraces  resident  American  citizens, 
and  these  only  in  the  case  of  not  being  arrested  with  arms  in  hand," 
circumstances  which  he  claimed  "do  not  concur  in  the  present 
case."  He  also  assumed  that  foreigners  must  be  inscribed  in  the 
register  of  the  provincial  governments  and  at  their  consulates  in 
order  to  be  regarded  residents,  and  that  the  law  of  April,  1821, 
invoked  by  the  consul-general  was  derogated  by  Spanish  laws  of 
subsequent  enactment.1 

The  judge-advocate  finally  extended  his  views  sufficiently  to  de 
clare  the  protocol  of  1877  an  expression  only  of  private  opinion; 
that  it  was  not  "  even  an  addition  nor  complement  of  any  pre-exist 
ing  treaty,"  2  to  all  of  which  the  consul-general  steadily  replied 
that  the  treaty  of  1795  was  still  existent,  that  the  protocol  could  in 
no  wise  detract  from  the  force  of  the  treaty,  and  that  in  the  inter 
pretation  of  the  protocol  the  latter  must  "conform  to  the  treaty, 
and  not  the  treaty  to  the  protocol."  3 

The  summary  court  proceeded  with  the  case  and  on  May  8 
pronounced  sentence  of  death  upon  all  with  the  exception  of  the 
man  Masa.  But  already,  in  response  to  a  request  from  Wash 
ington,  May  1,  telegraphic  instructions  had  arrived  from  Madrid 

crew  on  board  are  such,  and  that  in  every  regularly  documented  vessel,  the 
crew  will  find  their  protection  in  the  flag  which  covers  them." 

The  British  consul-general,  requesting  Consul-General  Williams,  May  8, 
to  extend  his  aid  to  Gildea,  said:  "As  I  understand  the  Competitor  is  an 
American  vessel,  it  appears  to  me  that  you  alone  are  competent  to  inter 
vene."  On  hearing,  on  the  8th,  of  the  sentence  of  death,  Mr.  Gollan  (the 
British  consul-general)  wrote  the  governor-general  and  admiral  requesting 
suspension  of  execution  until  he  could  telegraph  the  British  Foreign  Office. 
On  the  9th  the  admiral  informed  him  that,  in  deference  to  his  wishes,  he  had 
telegraphed  the  government  at  Madrid.  On  the  10th  he  was  informed  that 
the  execution  had  been  suspended  and  that  the  case  had  been  remitted  to  the 
supreme  council  of  war.  Foreign  Relations,  1896,  731,  732. 

1  Judge-advocate  to  commander-in-chief  of  West  Indian  Station  (under 
whom  the  case  came),  May  7,  1896,  Senate  Doc.  79,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  211. 

8  Ibid.,  216.  3  Ibid.,  209-217. 


470  THE   "COMPETITOR"   CASE  [1896 

suspending  all  executive  action  until  examination  could  be  made 
as  to  the  citizenship  of  the  prisoners,1  and  the  entire  record  shortly, 
after  was  ordered  sent  to  Madrid  for  review,  the  final  outcome 
being  the  release,  November,  1897,  of  all  the  prisoners,  including 
the  two  seamen  escaped  ashore  who  were  captwred  May  11. 

But  this  unhappy  case,  which,  if  dealt  with  with  greater  judg 
ment,  would  probably  have  helped  the  cause  of  Spain,  aroused 
deepest  feeling  in  Cuba,  the  Peninsula,  and  the  United  States. 
Both  at  Havana  and  Madrid  the  public  demanded  that  the  pris 
oners  be  shot  as  pirates,  while  in  Washington  it  was  seized  upon 
as  a  new  and  terrible  case  of  martyrdom  of  heroes  of  Cuban  lib 
erty  and  independence.2 

Before  the  question  had  become  imminent,  Senator  Call,  on 
May  5,  demanded  that  Congress  should  request  the  President  to 
protest  against  the  execution  of  the  Competitor  prisoners,  and  en 
deavor  to  obtain  for  them  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war.  Sena 
tor  Morgan  made  a  violent  speech,  May  15,  ending  in  declaring 
that  all  relations  should  be  suspended  with  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  until  the  proceedings  of  the  court  at  Havana  should  have 
been  annulled.  The  resolution  which  he  offered,  calling  for  the 
correspondence  in  the  case,  was  adopted  by  the  committee  on 
foreign  affairs  and  by  the  Senate,  but  the  President  refused  to 
communicate  the  correspondence.  On  June  3  and  5  Senator 
Morgan  appealed  to  the  statutes  giving  all  citizens  of  the  United 
States  abroad  the  protection  of  their  government,3  declaring  that 
every  day  passed  by  the  Competitor  prisoners  in  confinement 
and  under  sentence  of  death  was  a  day  of  black  dishonor  for  the 
United  States.4 

As  just  said,  less  precipitancy  and  a  greater  regard  for  existing 
treaties  by  the  Havana  authorities  would  have  saved  mucli  to  Spain. 
The  able  publicist  so  often  quoted,  and  who  has  dealt  with  the 
subject  of  Spanish  and  American  differences  throughout  in  so 
broad  and  enlightened  a  way,  finds  them,  without  reserve,  in  the 
wrong.  The  application  of  the  procedure  of  the  summary  court- 

1  Mr.  Taylor  to  Mr.  Olney,  May  4, 1896,  Senate  Doc.  79,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  202. 
3  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International  Public,  IX  (1902),  195. 
8  Sections  2000  and  2001. 
« Cong.  Record,  June  5,  1896,  p.  6718. 


1896]  THE   "COMPETITOR"   CASE  471 

martial  "supposes,"  he  says,  "that  the  capture  is  proven  at  the 
instant  of  the  perpetration  of  the  crime,  or  during  an  uninter 
rupted  pursuit,  or  finally  because  effects  or  instruments  which 
show  participation  in  the  crime  are  found  upon  the  accused;  [the 
summary  court  thus]  can  only  apply  in  a  case  where  the  crime  is 
punishable  by  death  or  perpetual  chains.  The  Competitor  was 
arrested;  pursuit  was  then  impossible.  As  to  arms,  none  were 
found  but  in  the  pocket  of  Vedia;  Melton  [Laborde]  and  Gildea 
were  absolutely  disarmed  in  the  water.  .  .  .  The  prisoners  having 
surrendered  on  demand  and  having  offered  no  resistance,  an  in 
ferior  punishment,  by  two  degrees,  had  to  be  applied:  submission 
to  the  procedure  of  a  summary  court  was  thenceforward  no  longer 
possible.  If  considered  as  executive  agents  they  were  still  less 
punishable,  for  in  this  case  they  could  only  be  condemned  to  prison 
under  article  231. 

"The  allegations  of  the  assessor  were  erroneous.  It  is  not  pos 
sible  to  refuse  the  character  of  an  international  treaty  to  the  proto 
col  of  1877,  by  reducing  it  to  a  simple  diplomatic  conversation. 
Besides,  it  cannot  be  said  that  trial  by  a  summary  court  gives 
the  same  guarantees  of  justice  and  defence  as  does  an  ordinary 
court-martial.  We  must  maintain  .  .  .  that  the  Spanish  courts 
had  to  hold  to  their  substantial  laws  of  procedure.  It  was  no  less 
the  duty  of  the  government  to  suspend  the  execution  of  a  judgment 
the  accord  of  which  with  existing  international  stipulations  was 
doubtful.  It  was  indisputable  that  judgment  had  been  pronounced 
despite  the  provisions  of  the  protocol  and  of  almost  all  the  articles 
relative  to  American  citizens  taken  arms  in  hand.  It  was  the  very 
grave  situation  which  was  had  in  view  at  the  time  of  the  signature 
of  the  agreement.  It  was  equally  certain  that  in  the  trial  the  rules 
of  the  law  of  1821  *  had  not  been  followed.  It  may  well  be  allowed 
that  this  was  abrogated,  so  far  as  Spanish  law  was  concerned,  by 
later  laws;  but  in  international  law  it  bound  Spain  so  far  as  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  were  concerned.  The  only  point 
truly  doubtful  was  this :  Was  the  protocol  applicable  to  individuals 
non-resident  in  Spanish  territory,  but  coming  there  only  to  commit 
a  crime?  At  first  view,  both  good  sense  and  patriotism  would 

1  For  the  decree  in  full,  establishing  this  law,  see  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  2227.  * 


472  THE  PROTOCOL  OF  1877  [1896 

incline  one  to  say  no.  If  the  real  soldiers  of  the  expedition,  and 
in  great  number,  had  been  taken,  very  few  Spaniards  would 
have  dared  to  sustain  that  a  contrary  solution  would  have  been 
admissible.  Consul  [-General]  Williams  and  Mr.  Olney  replied 
that  a  treaty  gives  the  same  rights  to  subjects  of  the  two  contracting 
states.  Consequently  the  guarantees  of  a  fair  trial  being  assured  to 
all  Spaniards  finding  themselves  in  the  territory  of  the  Union,  an 
identic  situation  had  to  be  allowed  to  all  Americans  finding  them 
selves  in  Spanish  territory,  whatever  the  time  and  reason  of  their 
presence.  The  argument  has  a  certain  force.  One  should,  never 
theless,  make  some  difference  between  the  tourist  and  traveller 
(cases  cited  by  the  Americans)  who,  being  in  a  foreign  land,  com 
mit  a  crime  or  mix  in  a  conspiracy,  and  the  filibuster  who  carries 
aid  and  succor  to  a  revolt. 

"The  important  point  to  our  mind,"  continues  the  Marquis 
de  Olivart,  "was  the  general  spirit  of  the  protocol.  This,  in  effect, 
had  for  its  object  to  protect  completely,  by  avoiding  the  precipitate 
action  and  the  severities  of  the  Spanish  military  authorities,  the 
American  citizens  concerned  in  attempts  against  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain.  It  thus  derogated  a  fixed  principle  of  international  law, 
by  virtue  of  which  no  account  of  nationality  should  be  taken  in 
repressing  such  crimes.  This  it  was  that  irritated  the  dignity  and 
good  sense  of  the  Spaniards.  But  once  the  exception  admitted,  it 
mattered  little  that  the  foreign  individual  thus  privileged  came 
openly  to  fight  a  nation  friendly  to  his  own,  or  did  so  secretly,  in 
violating  the  sacred  laws  of  hospitality.  It  is  evident  that  if  the 
point  in  question  had  been  a  clause  of  an  ordinary  treaty,  such 
as  article  7  of  the  treaty  of  1795,  the  pretension  of  the  American 
government  would  have  been  inadmissible.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  presence  of  an  unfair  stipulation  (une  stipulation  de  mauvaise 
foi),  if  one  can  thus  express  himself  in  speaking  of  the  protocol,  one 
had  to  undergo  the  consequences  of  this  want  of  candor  (mauvaise 
foi).  It  had  to  recognize  that  trial  by  an  ordinary  court-martial 
under  the  forms  of  the  laws  of  1821  was  the  worst  which  could 
happen  to  an  American  citizen  brought  before  Spanish  tribunals." 

It  was  most  unfortunate  that  this  excellent  common-sense  should 
not  have  been  recognized  in  the  beginning.  Whatever  the  general 
1  De  Olivart,  Revue  Ge'ne'rcde  de  Droit  Intern&ional  Public,  IX,  200. 


1896]  THE   "COMPETITOR"   CASE  473 

principle  of  international  law  (and  it  is  unquestionably  correctly 
stated  by  the  distinguished  and  candid  author  quoted),  the  exception 
(and  it  practically  was  an  exception  in  favor  of  Americans  in  view 
of  the  unlikelihood  of  reversed  conditions)  was  a  necessity  to  the 
preservation  of  peace.  It  was  the  precipitancy  mentioned  which 
the  American  government  was  so  anxious  to  avoid;  and  its  curbing/ 
was  in  the  interest  of  Spain  far  more  than  in  its  own.  To  hav^ 
allowed  the  continuance  of  such  precipitancy  as  that  in  the  case 
of  the  Virginius  sufferers;  to  have  yielded  full  swing  to  the  Oriental 
idea  that  death  swiftly  dealt  was  the  only  true  means  of  repres 
sion,  would  have  been,  throughout  the  insurrection,  to  court  war  be 
tween  Spain  and  the  United  States.  The  Spanish  home  government  _^ 
had  come  to  see  this;  the  official  in  Cuba  could  never  be  brought  to 
open  his  eyes  fully  to  it.  It  was  the  tenacious  holding  to  this  view  of 
sudden  and  severe  vengeance  by  the  latter  which,  more  than  all  else, 
the  effects  of  reconcentration  excepted,  finally  brought  war  in  1898. 

"Hasty  in  form  and  excessively  severe  au  fond,"  says  De  Olivart, 
"  the  sentence  of  death  [in  the  case  of  the  Competitor  crew]  was 
wisely  and  prudently  suspended  by  Senor  Canovas.  Thus  was  put 
off  for  two  years  the  opening  of  hostilities.  The  decision  of  the  su 
preme  council  of  war  taken  in  the  last  days  of  August,  1896,  which 
ordered  a  new  trial  of  the  case  by  an  ordinary  court-martial  was  a 
yielding  to  equity  and  law.  It  showed,  besides,  that  excessive 
severity  and  harshness  are  much  less  efficacious  than  respect  for 
law.  For  the  first  time  one  has  not  forgotten  that  to  go  step  by 
step  in  affairs  in  which  foreigners  are  interested,  and  as  a  conse 
quence  their  governments,  is  nevertheless,  to  go  faster. 

"The  matter  here  rested.  It  was  out  of  mind  during  the  rest 
of  the  governments  of  Senor  Canovas  and  of  Mr.  Cleveland,  and 
during  a  part  of  those  of  Mr.  McKinley  and  Senor  Sagasta.  In 
November,  1897,  the  accused  were  liberated.  This  compromise, 
express  or  tacit,  was  the  only  solution  possible  at  the  moment.  A 
new  trial  would  have  ended  either  in  the  acquittal  of  the  three 
terrible  pirates,  or  at  most,  and  this  would  have  been  about  the 
same  thing,  their  condemnation  to  very  light  penalties.  Such  a 
solution  would  have  exasperated  public  opinion  at  Havana  and 
Madrid  to  a  paroxysm;  Madrid  could  never  have  been  persuaded 
of  its  justice;  to  have  confirmed  the  first  sentence  and  caused  its 


474  THE  "COMPETITOR"   CASE  [189G 

execution,  would  have  given  to  the  jingoes  and  insurgents  a  pretext 
of  war.  It  is  the  ridiculus  mus  of  the  fableist  which  emerges  from 
the  whole  of  this  affair.  It  teaches  us  but  one  very  melancholy 
lesson.  It  shows  clearly  what  Spain  could  do  after  three  years' 
watch  of  its  coast  by  the  navy:  the  capture  of  one  empty  vessel 
and  the  arrest  of  two  swimmers  and  three  filibusters,  one  of  whom 
had  to  be  pardoned  in  order  to  condemn  the  others  .  .  .  on  paper." 

But  it  taught  more:  it  showed  the  ineradicable  idea  in  the  mind 
of  the  Spanish  official  that  death  without  delay  must  be  measured 
out  to  certain  offenders  despite  treaties  or  conventions.  Nor  were 
the  offences  over  heinous  to  the  world  at  large;  but  they  were  such 
as  to  which  the  Spaniard  and  his  forbears  had  been  accustomed  to 
applying  the  last  penalty.  It  mattered  little  what  the  rest  of  the 
world  called  piracy  or  rebellion;  to  him,  and  under  his  decrees  in 
Cuba,  the  five  unarmed  men  of  the  Competitor  were  both  pirates 
and  rebels,  though  no  robbery  or  violence  upon  the  sea,  which 
alone  under  the  law  of  nations  constitutes  piracy,  had  been  com 
mitted;  and  no  allegiance  to  the  King  of  Spain  was  claimed  by  the 
authorities  to  exist  in  the  case  of  three  at  least,  without  which  there 
could  be  no  rebellion.  The  game  was  not  worth  the  candle.  The 
Competitor  affair,  small  in  itself,  was  made  momentously  large  by 
folly,  and  went  far  to  fix  in  the  American  mind  an  idea  of  Spanish 
bloodthirst  and  cruelty  which  had  its  reflex  in  the  declaration,  in 
the  platform  of  the  Republican  convention  which  in]  June  nominated 
Mr.  McKinley  for  president,  of  the  "best  hopes"  for  the  "full 
success"  of  the  Cuban  insurgents,  and  the  expression  of  the  belief 
that  "  the  United  States  should  actively  use  its  influence  and  good 
offices  to  restore  peace  and  give  independence  to  the  island." 
This  conviction  was  soon  to  be  made  ineradicable  by  the  effects  of 
the  decree  which,  first  ordering  a  partial  concentration  of  the  rural 
population  of  Cuba,3  was  later  to  be  made  general. 

1  De  Olivart,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit,  International  Public,  202. 

2  McKee,  National  Conventions  and  Platforms,  303. 

3  This  decree  was  as  follows: 

HAVANA,  October  21,  1896. 

Don  Valeriano  Weyler  y  Nicolau,  Marquis  of  Teneriffe,  Governor-General 
and  Captain-General  of  this  Island,  and  General  in  Chief  of  its  Army,  etc. : 

I  order  and  command: 

First.  All  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  or  outside  of  the  line  of  fortifica 
tions  of  the  towns  shall,  within  the  period  of  eight  days,  concentrate  them- 


1896]  RECONCENTRATION  475 

In  strict  fairness  one  is  obliged  to  say  that  the  merciless  plunder 
ing  by  the  insurgents  of  loyalist  plantations,  the  burning  of  cane 
fields,  and  the  ruthless  destruction  of  costly  estates,  whether  be 
longing  to  loyalists  or  to  sympathizers  with  the  insurrection,  or  to 
Cuban  or  foreign  owners,  the  protection  of  which  by  detachments 
of  Spanish  troops  took  largely  from  the  efficiency  of  the  army, 
called  for  action  of  drastic  character.  The  grievous  error  of  the 
Spanish  government  was  in  disregarding  the  precautions  which 
should  have  been  taken  to  feed  the  people  thus  herded  together. 
Apparently  none  such  were  taken.  Driven  into  the  garrisoned 
places,  their  huts  burned,  their  fields  destroyed,  their  live  stock 
driven  away  or  killed,  without  adequate  shelter,  or  in  most  cases 
without  shelter  of  any  kind,  without  agricultural  tools  for  culti 
vating  the  zones  set  aside  in  some  instances  for  cultivation,  the 
wretched  people,  unclothed,  unfed,  and  under  appalling  unhygienic 
conditions,  died  at  a  rate  which,  long  kept  up,  would  have  gone 
far  toward  the  depopulation  of  Cuba. 

That  such  a  policy  was  not  needed  in  order  to  create  a  most 
difficult  situation  may  be  seen  by  the  last  annual  message  of  Presi 
dent  Cleveland,  December  7,  1896,  in  which  he  set  forth  in  kindly 
language,  but  in  terms  of  justifiable  strength,  the  serious  character 
of  affairs.  The  message  said: 

".  .  .  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  that  any  progress  has  thus  far 
been  made  toward  the  pacification  of  the  island  or  that  the 

selves  in  the  town  occupied  by  the  troops.  Any  individual  who  after  the  ex 
piration  of  this  period  is  found  in  the  uninhabitedfparts  will  be  considered 
a  rebel  and  tried  as  such. 

Second.  The  extraction  of  provisions  from  the  towns,  and  their  transpor 
tation  from  one  town  to  another  by  land  or  water  without  permission  of  the 
military  authority  of  the  point  of  departure,  is  absolutely  prohibited.  The 
infringers  will  be  tried  and  punished  as  abettors  of  the  rebellion. 

Third.  The  owners  of  beeves  should  transport  them  to  towns  or  their 
vicinity,  to  which  end  they  will  be  given  proper  protection. 

Fourth.  At  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  eight  days,  which  in  each  munici 
pal  district  shall  be  counted  from  the  publication  of  this  proclamation  in  the 
head  town  of  same,  all  insurgents  who  present  themselves  shall  be  placed  at 
my  disposal  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  them  a  place  where  they  shall  reside, 
serving  them  as  a  recommendation  if  they  furnish  news  of  the  enemy  which 
can  be  made  use  of,  if  the  presentation  is  made  with  firearms,  and  more 
especially  if  it  be  collective. 

Fifth.  The  provisions  of  this  proclamation  are  only  applicable  to  the  Prov 
ince  of  Pinar  del  Rio.  VALERIANO  WEYLER. 


476  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  [1896 

situation  of  affairs  as  depicted  in  my  last  annual  message  has 
in  the  least  improved.  If  Spain  still  holds  Havana  and  the  sea 
ports,  and  all  the  considerable  towns,  the  insurgents  still  roam  at 
will  over  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  inland  country.  If  the  deter 
mination  of  Spain  to  put  down  the  insurrection  seems  but  to 
strengthen  with  the  lapse  of  time,  as  is  evinced  by  her  unhesitating 
devotion  of  largely  increased  military  and  naval  forces  to  the  task, 
there  is  much  reason  to  believe  that  the  insurgents  have  gained  in 
point  of  numbers  and  character  and  resources,  and  are  none  the 
less  inflexible  in  their  resolve  not  to  succumb  without  practically 
securing  the  great  objects  for  which  they  took  up  arms.  If  Spain 
has  not  yet  re-established  her  authority,  neither  have  the  insurgents 
yet  made  good  their  title  to  be  regarded  as  an  independent  state. 
Indeed,  as  the  contest  has  gone  on,  the  pretence  that  civil  govern 
ments  exists  on  the  island,  except  so  far  as  Spain  is  able  to  maintain 
it,  has  been  practically  abandoned.  Spain  does  keep  on  foot  such 
a  government,  more  or  less  imperfectly,  in  the  large  towns  and 
their  immediate  suburbs.  But,  that  exception  being  made,  the 
entire  country  is  either  given  over  to  anarchy  or  is  subject  to  the 
military  occupation  of  one  or  the  other  party.  It  is  reported, 
indeed,  on  reliable  authority,  that,  at  the  demand  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  insurgent  army,  the  putative  Cuban  gov 
ernment  has  now  given  up  all  attempt  to  exercise  its  functions, 
leaving  that  government  confessedly  (what  there  is  the  best  rea 
son  for  supposing  it  always  to  have  been  in  fact)  a  government 
merely  on  paper. 

"Were  the  Spanish  armies  able  to  meet  their  antagonists  in  the 
open,  or  in  pitched  battle,  prompt  and  decisive  results  might  be 
looked  for  and  the  immense  superiority  of  the  Spanish  forces  in 
numbers,  discipline,  and  equipment  could  hardly  fail  to  tell  greatly 
to  their  advantage.  But  they  are  called  upon  to  face  a  foe  that 
shuns  general  engagements,  that  can  choose  and  does  choose  its 
own  ground,  that,  from  the  nature  of  the  country,  is  visible  or  in 
visible  at  pleasure,  and  that  fights  only  from  ambuscade  and  when 
all  the  advantages  of  position  and  numbers  are  on  its  side.  In  a 
country  where  all  that  is  indispensable  to  life  in  the  way  of  food, 
clothing,  and  shelter  is  so  easily  obtainable,  especially  by  those 
born  and  bred  on  the  soil,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  hardly  a  limit 


1896]  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF  1896  477 

to  the  time  during  which  hostilities  of  this  sort  may  be  prolonged. 
Meanwhile,  as  in  all  cases  of  protracted  civil  strife,  the  passions  of 
the  combatants  grow  more  and  more  inflamed  and  excesses  on  both 
sides  become  more  frequent  and  more  deplorable.  They  are  also 
participated  in  by  bands  of  marauders,  who,  now  in  the  name  of 
one  party  and  now  in  the  name  of  the  other,  as  may  best  suit  the 
occasion,  harry  the  country  at  will  and  plunder  its  wretched  in 
habitants  for  their  own  advantage.  Such  a  condition  of  things 
would  inevitably  entail  immense  destruction  of  property,  even 
if  it  were  the  policy  of  both  parties  to  prevent  it  as  far  as  prac 
ticable.  But  while  such  seemed  to  be  the  original  policy  of  the 
Spanish  government,  it  has  now  apparently  abandoned  it  and 
is  acting  upon  the  same  theory  as  the  insurgents — namely,  that 
the  exigencies  of  the  contest  require  the  wholesale  annihilation 
of  property,  that  it  may  not  prove  of  use  and  advantage  to  the 
enemy. 

"It  is  to  the  same  end  that,  in  pursuance  of  general  orders, 
Spanish  garrisons  are  now  being  withdrawn  from  plantations  and 
the  rural  population  required  to  concentrate  itself  in  the  towns. 
The  sure  result  would  seem  to  be  that  the  industrial  value  of  the 
island  is  fast  diminishing,  and  that  unless  there  is  a  speedy  and 
radical  change  in  existing  conditions  it  will  soon  disappear  alto 
gether.  That  value  consists  very  largely,  of  course,  in  its  capacity 
to  produce  sugar,  a  capacity  already  much  reduced  by  the  inter 
ruptions  to  tillage  which  have  taken  place  during  the  last  two  years. 
It  is  reliably  asserted  that  should  these  interruptions  continue 
during  the  current  year  and  practically  extend,  as  is  now  threatened, 
to  the  entire  sugar-producing  territory  of  the  island,  so  much  time 
and  so  much  money  will  be  required  to  restore  the  land  to  its  nor 
mal  productiveness  that  it  is  extremely  doubtful  if  capital  can  be 
induced  to  even  make  the  attempt. 

"The  spectacle  of  the  utter  ruin  of  an  adjoining  country,  by 
nature  one  of  the  most  fertile  and  charming  on  the  globe,  would 
engage  the  serious  attention  of  the  government  and  people  of  the 
United  States  in  any  circumstances.  In  point  of  fact,  they  have  a 
concern  with  it  which  is  by  no  means  of  a  wholly  sentimental  or 
philanthropic  character.  It  lies  so  near  to  us  as  to  be  hardly  sepa 
rated  from  our  territory.  Our  actual  pecuniary  interest  in  it  is 


478  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  [1896 

second  only  to  that  of  the  people  and  government  of  Spain.  It  is 
reasonably  estimated  that  at  least  from  $30,000,000  to  $50,000,000 
of  American  capital  are  invested  in  plantations  and  in  railroad, 
mining,  and  other  business  enterprises  on  the  island.  The  volume 
of  trade  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba,  which  in  1889 
amounted  to  about  $64,000,000,  rose  in  1893  to  about  $103,000,000, 
and  in  1894,  the  year  before  the  present  insurrection  broke  out, 
amounted  to  nearly  $96,000,000.  Besides  this  large  pecuniary 
stake  in  the  fortunes  of  Cuba,  the  United  States  finds  itself  inex 
tricably  involved  in  the  present  contest  in  other  ways  both  vexa 
tious  and  costly. 

..  - .  "  Many  Cubans  reside  in  this  country,  and  indirectly  promote  the 
insurrection  through  the  press,  by  public  meetings,  by  the  pur 
chase  and  shipment  of  arms,  by  the  raising  of  funds,  and  by  other 
means,  which  the  spirit  of  our  institutions  and  the  tenor  of  our 
laws  do  not  permit  to  be  made  the  subject  of  criminal  prosecutions. 
Some  of  them,  though  Cubans  at  heart  and  in  all  their  feelings 
and  interests,  have  taken  out  papers  as  naturalized  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  a  proceeding  resorted  to  with  a  view  to  possible  pro 
tection  by  this  government,  and  not  unnaturally  regarded  with 
much  indignation  by  the  country  of  their  origin.  The  insurgents 
are  undoubtedly  encouraged  and  supported  by  the  widespread 
sympathy  the  people  of  this  country  always  and  instinctively  feel 
for  every  struggle  for  better  and  freer  government,  and  which,  in 
the  case  of  the  more  adventurous  and  restless  elements  of  our  popu- 

/lation,  leads  in  many  instances  to  active  and  personal  participation 
in  the  contest.  The  result  is  that  this  government  is  constantly 
called  upon  to  protect  American  citizens,  to  claim  damages  for 
injuries  to  persons  and  property,  now  estimated  at  many  millions 
of  dollars,  and  to  ask  explanations  and  apologies  for  the  acts  of 
Spanish  officials,  whose  zeal  for  the  repression  of  rebellion  some 
times  blinds  them  to  the  immunities  belonging  to  the  unoffending 
citizens  of  a  friendly  power.  It  follows  from  the  same  causes  that 
the  United  States  is  compelled  to  actively  police  a  long  line  of 
sea-coast  against  unlawful  expeditions,  the  escape  of  which  the 
_  utmost  vigilance  will  not  always  suffice  to  prevent. 

"These  inevitable  entanglements  of  the  United  States  with  the 
rebellion  in  Cuba,  the  large  American  property  interests  affected, 


ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  479 

and  considerations  of  philanthropy  and  humanity  in  general  have 
led  to  a  vehement  demand  in  various  quarters  for  some  sort  of 
positive  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  It  was  at 
first  proposed  that  belligerent  rights  should  be  accorded  to  the  in 
surgents — a  proposition  no  longer  urged  because  untimely  and  in 
practical  operation  clearly  perilous  and  injurious  to  our  own  in 
terests.  It  has  since  been  and  is  now  sometimes  contended  that  the 
independence  of  the  insurgents  should  be  recognized.  But  im 
perfect  and  restricted  as  the  Spanish  government  of  ^he  island  may 
be,  no  other  exists  there,  unless  the  will  of  the  military  officer  in 
temporary  command  of  a  particular  district  can  be  dignified  as  a 
species  of  government.  It  is  now  also  suggested  that  the  United 
States  should  buy  the  island,  a  suggestion  possibly  worthy  of  con 
sideration  if  there  were  any  evidence  of  a  desire  or  willingness  on 
the  part  of  Spain  to  entertain  such  a  proposal.  It  is  urged,  finally, 
that,  all  other  methods  failing,  the  existing  internecine  strife  in 
Cuba  should  be  terminated  by  our  intervention,  even  at  the  cost 
of  a  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain — a  war  which  its 
advocates  confidently  prophesy  could  be  neither  large  in  its  pro-  S\ 
portions  nor  doubtful  in  its  issue. 

"The  correctness  of  this  forecast  need  be  neither  affirmed  nor 
denied.  The  United  States  has,  nevertheless,  a  character  to  main 
tain  as  a  nation,  which  plainly  dictates  that  right  and  not  might 
should  be  the  rule  of  its  conduct.  Further,  though  the  United 
States  is  not  a  nation  to  which  peace  is  a  necessity,  it  is  in 
truth  the  most  pacific  of  powers  and  desires  nothing  so  much  as 
to  live  in  amity  with  all  the  world.  Its  own  ample  and  diversified^^-** 
domains  satisfy  all  possible  longings  for  territory,  preclude  all 
dreams  of  conquest,  and  prevent  any  casting  of  covetous  eyes  upon 
neighboring  regions,  however  attractive.  That  our  conduct  tow 
ard  Spain  and  her  dominions  has  constituted  no  exception  to  this 
national  disposition  is  made  manifest  by  the  course  of  our  govern 
ment,  not  only  thus  far  during  the  present  insurrection,  but  during 
the  ten  years  that  followed  the  rising  at  Yara  in  1868.  No  other 
great  power,  it  may  safely  be  said,  under  circumstances  of  similar 
perplexity,  would  have  manifested  the  same  restraint  and  the  same 
patient  endurance.  It  may  also  be  said  that  this  persistent  atti 
tude  of  the  United  States  toward  Spain  in  connection  with  Cuba  un- 


480  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  [1896 

questionably  evinces  no  slight  respect  and  regard  for  Spain  on  the 
part  of  the  American  people.  They  in  truth  do  not  forget  her  con 
nection  with  the  discovery  of  the  western  hemisphere,  nor  do  they 
underestimate  the  great  qualities  of  the  Spanish  people,  nor  fail  to 
fully  recognize  their  splendid  patriotism  and  their  chivalrous  de 
votion  to  the  national  honor. 

"They  view  with  wonder  and  admiration  the  cheerful  resolution 
with  which  vast  bodies  of  men  are  sent  across  thousands  of  miles 
of  ocean,  and  an  enormous  debt  accumulated,  that  the  costly  pos 
session  of  the  Gem  of  the  Antilles  may  still  hold  its  place  in  the 
Spanish  crown.  And  yet  neither  the  government  nor  the  people 
of  the  United  States  have  shut  their  eyes  to  the  co^s^  of  events 
in  Cuba,  nor  have  failed  to  realize  the  existence  of  conceded  griev 
ances,  which  have  led  to  the  present  revolt  from  the  authority  of 
Spain — grievances  recognized  by  the  Queen  Regent  and  by  the 
Cortes,  voiced  by  the  most  patriotic  and  enlightened  of  Spanish 
statesmen,  without  regard  to  party,  and  demonstrated  by  reforms 
proposed  by  the  executive  and  approved  by  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  Spanish  government.  It  is  in  the  assumed  temper  and  dis 
position  of  the  Spanish  government  to  remedy  these  grievances, 
fortified  by  indications  of  influential  public  opinion  in  Spain,1  that 
this  government  has  hoped  to  discover  the  most  promising  and 
effective  means  of  composing  the  present  strife,  with  honor  and 
advantage  to  Spain  and  with  the  achievement  of  all  the  reasonable 
objects  of  the  insurrection. 

"It  would  seem  that  if  Spain  should  offer  to  Cuba  genuine 
autonomy — a  measure  of  home-rule  which,  while  preserving  the 
sovereignty  of  Spain,  would  satisfy  all  rational  requirements  of 
her  Spanish  subjects — there  should  be  no  just  reason  why  the 
pacification  of  the  island  might  not  be  effected  on  that  basis.  Such 
a  result  would  appear  to  be  in  the  true  interest  of  all  concerned. 
It  would  at  once  stop  the  conflict  which  is  now  consuming  the 
resources  of  the  island  and  making  it  worthless  for  whichever 

1 "  In  this,"  says  Senor  de  Olivart,  "  Mr.  Cleveland  was  deceived.  Spanish 
opinion,  supported  and  directed  by  the  newspapers,  which,  almost  without 
exception,  wished  war  and  promised  the  chastisement  of  the  rebels  and  of 
their  protectors,  did  not  demand  the  reforms,  which  they  considered  as  a 
humiliating  and  useless  remedy." — Note,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit  International 
Public,  XII  (1905),  488. 


1896]  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  481 

party  may  ultimately  prevail.  It  would  keep  intact  the  possessions 
of  Spain  without  touching  her  honor,  which  will  be  consulted 
rather  than  impugned  by  the  adequate  redress  of  admitted  griev 
ances.  It  would  put  the  prosperity  of  the  island  and  the  fortunes 
of  its  inhabitants  within  their  own  control,  without  severing  the 
natural  and  ancient  ties  which  bind  them  to  the  mother  country, 
and  would  yet  enable  them  to  test  their  capacity  for  self-govern 
ment  under  the  most  favorable  conditions.  It  has  been  objected 
on  the  one  side  that  Spain  should  not  promise  autonomy  until  her 
insurgent  subjects  lay  down  their  arms;  on  the  other  side,  that 
promised  autonomy,  however  liberal,  is  insufficient  because  with 
out  assurance  of  the  promise  being  fulfilled. 

"  But  the  reasonableness  of  a  requirement  by  Spain  of  uncon 
ditional  surrender  on  the  part  of  the  insurgent  Cubans  before  their 
autonomy  is  conceded  is  not  altogether  apparent.  It  ignores  im 
portant  features  of  the  situation — the  stability  two  years'  dura 
tion  has  given  to  the  insurrection;  the  feasibility  of  its  indefinite 
prolongation  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  as  shown  by  past  ex 
perience;  the  utter  and  imminent  ruin  of  the  island,  unless  the 
present  strife  is  speedily  composed;  above  all,  the  rank  abuses 
which  all  parties  in  Spain,  all  branches  of  her  government,  and  all 
her  leading  public  men  concede  to  exist  and  profess  a  desire  to 
remove.  Facing  such  circumstances,  to  withhold  the  proffer  of 
needed  reforms  until  the  parties  demanding  them  put  themselves 
at  mercy  by  throwing  down  their  arms,  has  the  appearance  of 
neglecting  the  gravest  of  perils  and  inviting  suspicion  as  to  the 
sincerity  of  any  professed  willingness  to  grant  reforms.  The  ob 
jection,  on  behalf  of  the  insurgents,  that  promised  reforms  cannot 
be  relied  upon  must  of  course  be  considered,  though  we  have  no 
right  to  assume,  and  no  reason  for  assuming,  that  anything  Spain 
undertakes  to  do  for  the  relief  of  Cuba  will  not  be  done  according 
to  both  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  undertaking. 

"  Nevertheless,  realizing  that  suspicions  and  precautions  on  the 
part  of  the  weaker  of  two  combatants  are  always  natural  and  not 
always  unjustifiable — being  sincerely  desirous  in  the  interest  of 
both  as  well  as  on  its  own  account  that  the  Cuban  problem  should 
be  solved  with  the  least  possible  delay — it  was  intimated  by  this 
government  to  the  government  of  Spain  some  months  ago  that  if  a 


482  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896 

satisfactory  measure  of  home-rule  were  tendered  the  Cuban  in 
surgents  and  would  be  accepted  by  them  upon  a  guarantee  of  its 
execution,  the  United  States  would  endeavor  to  find  a  way  not 
objectionable  to  Spain  of  furnishing  such  guarantee.  While  no 
definite  response  to  this  intimation  has  yet  been  received  from  the 
Spanish  government,  it  is  believed  to  be  not  altogether  unwelcome, 
while,  as  already  suggested,  no  reason  is  perceived  why  it  should 
not  be  approved  by  the  insurgents.  Neither  party  can  fail  to  see 
the  importance  of  early  action,  and  both  must  realize  that  to  pro 
long  the  present  state  of  things  for  even  a  short  period  will  add 
enormously  to  the  time  and  labor  and  expenditure  necessary  to 
bring  about  the  industrial  recuperation  of  the  island.  It  is  there 
fore  fervently  hoped  on  all  grounds  that  earnest  efforts  for  healing 
the  breach  between  Spain  and  the  insurgent  Cubans,  upon  the 
lines  above  indicated,  may  be  at  once  inaugurated  and  pushed  to 
an  immediate  and  successful  issue.  The  friendly  offices  of  the 
United  States,  either  in  the  manner  above  outlined  or  in  any  other 
way  consistent  with  our  Constitution  and  laws,  will  always  be  at 
the  disposal  of  either  party. 

"  Whatever  circumstances  may  arise,  our  policy  and  our  in 
terests  would  constrain  us  to  object  to  the  acquisition  of  the  island 
or  an  interference  with  its  control  by  any  other  power." 
The  President  sounded  a  deep  note  of  warning,  saying  : 
"It  should  be  added  that  it  cannot  be  reasonably  assumed  that 
the  hitherto  expectant  attitude  of  the  United  States  will  be  defi 
nitely  maintained.  While  we  are  anxious  to  accord  all  due  respect 
to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain,  we  cannot  view  the  impending  conflict 
in  all  its  features,  and  properly  apprehend  our  inevitably  close 
relations  to  it  and  its  possible  results,  without  considering  that  by 
the  course  of  events  we  may  be  drawn  into  such  an  unusual  and 
unprecedented  condition  as  will  fix  a  limit  to  our  patient  waiting 
for  Spain  to  end  the  contest,  either  alone  and  in  her  own  way,  or 
^vith  our  friendly  co-operation. 

r"When  the  inability  of  Spain  to  deal  successfully  with  the  in 
surrection  has  become  manifest  and  it  is  demonstrated  that  her 
sovereignty  is  extinct  in  Cuba  for  all  purposes  of  its  rightful  exist 
ence,  and  when  a  hopeless  struggle  for  its  re-establishment  has 
degenerated  into  a  strife  which  means  nothing  more  than  the  use- 


1896]  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  OF   1896  483 

less  sacrifice  of  human  life  and  the  utter  destruction  of  the  very 
subject-matter  of  the  conflict,  a  situation  will  be  presented  in  which 
our  obligations  to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  will  be  superseded  by 
higher  obligations,  which  we  can  hardly  hesitate  to  recognize  and 
discharge.  Deferring  the  choice  of  ways  and  methods  until  £Ee~~~ 
time  for  action  arrives,  we  should  make  them  depend  upon  the  f^ 
precise  conditions  then  existing;  and  they  should  not  be  determined 
upon  without  giving  careful  heed  to  every  consideration  involving 
our  honor  and  interest  or  the  international  duty  we  owe  to  Spain. 
Until  we  face  the  contingencies  suggested,  or  the  situation  is  by 
other  incidents  imperatively  changed,  we  should  continue  in  the 
line  of  conduct  heretofore  pursued,  thus  in  all  circumstances  ex 
hibiting  our  obedience  to  the  requirements  of  public  law  and  our 
regard  for  the  duty  enjoined  upon  us  by  the  position  we  occupy 
in  the  family  of  nations. 

"A  contemplation  of  emergencies  that  may  arise  should  plainly 
lead  us  to  avoid  their  creation,  either  through  a  careless  disregard 
of  present  duty  or  even  an  undue  stimulation  and  ill-timed  expres 
sion  of  feeling.  But  I  have  deemed  it  not  amiss  to  remind  the 
Congress  that  a  time  may  arrive  when  a  correct  policy  and  care  for 
our  interests,  as  well  as  a  regard  for  the  interests  of  other  nations 
and  their  citizens,  joined  by  considerations  of  humanity  and  a 
desire  to  see  a  rich  and  fertile  country,  intimately  related  to  us, 
saved  from  complete  devastation,  will  constrain  our  government 
to  such  action  as  will  subserve  the  interests  thus  involved  and  at 
the  same  time  promise  to  Cuba  and  its  inhabitants  an  opportunity 
to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace.  .  .  ." 

Congress,  however,  was  inclined  to  go  farther.  On  December 
21,  1896,  Senator  Cameron  reported  from  the  majority  of  the 
committee  on  foreign  relations  a  joint  resolution:  "That  the  in 
dependence  of  the  republic  of  Cuba  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby, 
acknowledged  by  the  United  States  of  America/'  and  "That  the 
United  States  will  use  its  friendly  offices  with  the  government  of 
Spain  to  bring  to  a  close  the  war  between  Spain  and  the  Republic  of 
Cuba."  The  resolution  was  accompanied  by  an  elaborate  and 
able  report  upon  the  general  subject  of  recognition,  citing  all 
previous  cases  in  Europe  and  America. 

After  an  analysis  of  those  of  Europe,  the  report  said:    "From 


484  PRECEDENTS  IN  INTERVENTION  [1896 

this  body  of  precedent  it  is  clear  that  Europe  has  invariably  as 
serted  and  practised  the  right  to  interfere,  both  collectively  and 
separately,  amicably  and  forcibly,  in  every  instance,  except  that 
of  Poland,  where  a  European  people  has  resorted  to  insurrection 
to  obtain  independence.  The  right  has  been  based  on  various 
grounds:  'impediments  to  commerce,'  'burdensome  measures  of 
protection  and  repression/  'requests'  of  one  or  both  parties  'to 
interpose/  'effusion  of  blood/  and  'evils  of  all  kinds/  'humanity' 
and  'the  repose  of  Europe'  (Greek  treaty  of  1827);  'a  warm  desire 
to  arrest  with  the  shortest  possible  delay  the  disorder  and  the 
effusion  of  blood'  (protocol  of  November  4,  1820,  in  the  case  of 
Belgium);  'his  own  safety  or  the  political  equilibrium  on  the  fron 
tiers  of  his  empire'  (Russian  circular  of  April  27,  1849,  in  the  case 
of  Hungary);  'to  safeguard  the  interest  and  honor'  and  to  'main 
tain  the  political  influence'  of  the  intervening  power  (French 
declarations  of  1849-50  in  regard  to  the  States  of  the  Church). 
Finally,  in  the  latest  and  most  considerable,  because  absolutely 
unanimous  act  of  all  Europe,  simply  the  'desire  to  regulate'  (pre 
amble  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878,  covering  the  recognition  of 
Servia,  Roumania,  Montenegro,  and  Bulgaria)." 

The  report  also  referred  to  "  the  declaration  of  Lord  John  Rus 
sell  on  the  part  of  the  British  government  in  the  House  of  Com 
mons,  May  6, 1861,  in  which  he  announced  that  the  law  officers  of 
the  crown  had  already  '  come  to  the  opinion  that  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  of  America,  according  to  those  principles  which  seem  to 
them  to  be  just  principles,  must  be  treated  as  a  belligerent.'  This 
astonishing  promise  of  belligerency  to  an  insurrection  which  had 
by  the  latest  advices  at  that  time  neither  a  ship  at  sea  nor  an  army 
on  land,  before  the  fact  of  war  was  officially  known  in  England  to 
have  been  proclaimed  by  either  party,  was  accompanied  by  a 
letter  of  the  same  date  from  Lord  John  Russell  to  the  British  am 
bassador  at  Paris,  in  which  he  said  that  the  accounts  which  had 
been  received  from  America  were  'sufficient  to  show  that  a  civil 
war  had  broken  out  among  the  states  which  lately  composed  the 
American  Union.  Other  nations  have  therefore  to  consider  the 
light  in  which,  with  reference  to  the  war,  they  are  to  regard  the 
confederacy  into  which  the  Southern  states  have  united  them 
selves;  and  it  appears  to  her  majesty's  government  that,  looking 


1896]  PRECEDENTS  IN  INTERVENTION  485 

at  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  they  cannot  hesitate  to  admit 
that  such  confederacy  is  entitled  to  be  considered  as  a  belligerent 
invested  with  all  the  rights  and  prerogatives  of  a  belligerent/ 

"On  May  8  the  French  minister  ' concurred  entirely  in  the 
views  of  her  majesty's  government'  and  pledged  himself 
joint  action.  .  .  .  We  know  that  early  as  March,  1861,  the  Fi 
minister  at  Washington  advised  his  government  to  recognize  the 
Confederate  States,  and  in  May,  he  advised  it  to  intervene  by 
forcibly  raising  the  American  blockade.  Mercier's  recommenda 
tion  was  communicated  to  Russell,  who  entertained  no  doubt  as  to 
the  right  of  intervention,  either  diplomatic  or  military,  even  at 
that  early  moment  when  the  serious  operations  of  war  had  hardly 
begun. 

'There  is  much  good  sense  in  Mercier's  observations  [wrote 
Russell  to  Palmerston,  October  17].  But  we  must  wait.  I  am  per 
suaded  that  if  we  do  anything  it  must  be  on  a  grand  scale.  It  will 
not  do  for  England  or  France  to  break  a  blockade  for  the  sake  of 
getting  cotton;  but  in  Europe  powers  have  often  said  to  bellig 
erents:  'Make  up  your  quarrels.  We  propose  to  give  terms  of 
pacification  which  we  think  fair  and  equitable.  If  you  accept  them, 
well  and  good.  But  if  your  adversary  accepts  them  and  if  you 
refuse  them,  our  mediation  is  at  an  end,  and  you  must  expect  to 
see  us  your  enemies.'  "l 

The  offer  of  the  resolution  "caused  much  excitement.  Stocks 
fell  and  the  financial  interests  of  the  great  Eastern  cities  rose  in 
wrathful  opposition.  They  declared  without  any  reservation  that 
'war  would  unsettle  values' — a  horrid  possibility  not  to  be  con 
templated  with  calmness  by  any  right-thinking  man.  The  error 
of  the  financial  interests  was  in  thinking  that  war  would  '  unsettle 
values.'  That  which  'unsettled  values 'was  the  Cuban  question, 
and  so  long  as  that  remained  unsettled,  'values'  would  follow 
suit."  2 

1  Senate  Report,  1160,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess. 
3  Lodge,  The  War  with  Spain,  19. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

CUBA     IN     CONGRESS. — THE     NEW     ADMINISTRATION. — RECONCEN- 

TRATION 

THE  numerous  joint  resolutions  offered  at  this  time  in  the  Senate 
bore  witness  to  the  trend  of  popular  sentiment.  On  December 
9, 1896,  Senator  Mills,  of  Texas,  introduced  a  joint  resolution  that 
the  President  be  directed  to  take  possession  of  Cuba  and  hold  the 
same  until  the  people  of  Cuba  could  organize  "a  government  de 
riving  its  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed."  1  Senator 
Call,  of  Florida,  offered  a  joint  resolution  recognizing  the  inde 
pendence  of  Cuba,2  and  on  the  same  date  Senator  Cullom,  of 
Illinois,  whose  character  and  reputation  gave  weight  to  his  action, 
proposed  to  resolve  "that  the  extinction  of  Spanish  title  and  the 
termination  of  Spanish  control  of  the  islands  at  the  gateway  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  are  necessary  to  the  welfare  of  those  islands  and 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States." 3  On  December  21  Senator  Hill, 
of  New  York,  offered  a  joint  resolution  declaring  "that  a  state  of 
public  war  exists  in  Cuba,  and  that  the  parties  thereto  are  en 
titled  to  and  hereby  are  accorded  belligerent  rights  .  .  .  and  the 
United  States  will  preserve  a  strict  neutrality  between  the  bellig 
erents."  4  Later,  on  February  4, 1897,  Senator  Allen,  of  Nebraska, 
in  another  joint  resolution  showed  himself  eager  that "  United  States 
battle-ships  should  be  sent  without  delay  to  Cuban  waters  to  enforce 
upon  Spain  the  elimination  of  all  unusual  and  unnecessary  cruelty 
and  barbarity"  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.5  Memorials  were  re 
ceived  from  the  legislatures  of  Louisiana,  Nebraska,  South  Carolina, 
and  Wyoming,  favoring  belligerent  rights,  or  Cuban  independence.8 

1  Cong.  Record,  54  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  39.  2  Ibid.,  39.  3  Ibid.t  60.     - 

4  Ibid.,  355.  B  Ibid.,  2226. 

6  Ibid.,  130,  1088,  1638,  1419. 

486 


1897]          ADMINISTRATION'S  FIRM  ATTITUDE  487 

The  firm  attitude  of  the  Cleveland  administration,  and  the  an 
nouncement  by  Mr.  Olney,  the  secretary  of  state,  that  no  attention 
would  be  paid  to  a  joint  resolution  of  recognition  of  belligerency 
or  independence  of  Cuba  even  if  passed  by  both  houses  over  the 
President's  veto,  as  the  right  of  recognition  rested  solely  with  die 
executive  and  the  resolution  would  only  be  "  the  opinion  of  cerflnn 
eminent  gentlemen," *  brought  congressional  action  for  the  «  p/ 
moment  to  a  nullity,  the  question,  through  the  influence  of  the 
speaker,  Reed,  not  even  being  considered  by  the  House. 

By  the  end  of  1896  over  160,000  men  of  all  arms  and  ranks  had, 
since  the  outbreak,  been  sent  to  Cuba;  an  amazing  effort  which 
spoke  in  strongest  terms  for  the  efficiency  of  the  Spanish  war  office. 
But  the  ability  of  Cuban  finance  to  meet  such  an  effort  was  in 
inverse  ratio  to  the  volume  of  war  traffic.  The  $76,000,000  of 
imports  from  Cuba  to  the  United  States  in  1894  had  fallen  to 
$40,000,000  in  1896,  and  to  $18,000,000  in  1897.  The  exports 
from  the  United  States  to  Cuba  were  now  but  $8,000,000,  a  third 
of  what  they  were  four  years  before.  The  continuance  of  the  \i 
struggle  clearly  meant  ruin  to  the  island. 

In  the  last  days  of  1896,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Germany 
combined  to  counsel  Spain  to  accept  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States  with  a  view  to  assure  a  prompt  termination  of  the  war. 
Spain  refused  the  invitation,2  but  it  had  its  effects  in  a  decree  dated 
December  31,  1896,  granting  Puerto  Rico  an  elective  provincial 
assembly,  and  on  February  6,  1897,  was  published  the  long-looked- 
for  decree  establishing  "...  as  soon  as  the  state  of  war  in  Cuba 
will  permit  it,"  what  was,  from  the  Spanish  point  of  view  at  least,  a 
reformed  system  of  government  for  both  the  Spanish  islands.3 

But  whatever  the  influences  which  had  brought  Senor  Ca"novas 
(for  it  was  he  who  was  the  actual  government  of  Spain)  to  this 
point,  his  delayed  action  was  but  another  unhappy  example  of  the 
fatal  habit  of  procrastination  of  his  race.  It  came  at  the  very  end 
of  Mr.  Cleveland's  term  of  office  and  at  a  moment  when  his  ad 
ministration,  which  had  shown  itself  so  desirous  of  doing  strict 
justice  to  Spain,  and  which  took  a  liberal  view  of  the  projected 

1  The  Evening  Star  (Washington). 

3  Le  Fur,  Etude  sur  la  Guerre  Hispano-Americaine  de  1898,  12. 

a  For  the  decree,  see  Spanish  Diplom.  Cor.,  21-23. 


488  PROJECTED  REFORMS  [1897 

reforms,  was  powerless.  Moved  by  the  general  satisfaction  ex 
pressed  in  Washington,  the  Spanish  minister,  with  natural  exulta 
tion  and  hope  in  his  heart,  wrote  home:  "The  opinion  of  the 
secretary  of  state — which  is  also  that  of  the  President  of  the  Re- 
p^plic — concerning  the  reforms  is,  that  they  are  as  extensive  as 
c*ld  be  asked  and  more  than  they  expected.  This  is  also  the 
opinion  of  most  of  the  principal  politicians  who  have  not  been 
openly  unfriendly  to  us — including  many  of  those  who  have  great 
influence  in  the  new  administration,  and  Mr.  McKinley  himself. 
The  press  which  began  to  attack  them  without  knowing  them  has 
lately  been  silent  in  the  matter.  The  Cuban  question  is  to-day 
dead  in  Congress  and  before  the  public,  and  to  this  is  to  be  at 
tributed  the  little  excitement  the  matter  is  creating  here."  He  adds : 
"I  should  not  conceal  that  I  note  a  certain  tendency  to  inaction  on 
the  part  of  the  secretary  of  state  during  the  little  time  that  remains 
to  him  in  the  discharge  of  his  office."  l 

But  whatever  the  Spanish  view  of  its  liberality  or  that  of  the 
American  administration — and  it  was,  in  fact,  weighted  with  reser 
vations  and  conditions  which  nullified  markedly  its  liberal  pro 
visions — the  Cuban  leaders  were  determined  to  have  none  of  it. 
Senor  Estrada  Palma  "reiterated  his  emphatic  assertion  that  the 
Cubans  would  accept  independence  only.  Rather  than  allow 
Spain  any  voice  in  the  government  of  Cuba  the  Cubans  would 
suffer  death  and  the  devastation  of  the  island."  The  reforms,  he 
said,  "  amount  to  nothing.  They  are  practically  the  same  that  were 
voted  before  the  war  broke  out.  If  the  Cubans  did  not  then  accept 
them  and  rose  in  arms,  can  they  be  expected  to  accept  them  now  ?" 
Said  another:  "If  real  autonomy,  such  as  Canada  has  from  Great 
Britain,  had  been  offered  to  us  before  the  war  it  would  have  been 
accepted.  Do  you  think  it  would  be  fair  or  just  to  those  who  have 
fought  and  fallen  for  independence  for  us  to  outrage  their  memories 
by  such  terms  as  these?"  2 

The  bellicose  attitude  of  so  large  a  number  of  members  both  of 
the  Senate  and  the  House,  the  evident  strong  sympathy  of  Congress 
and  the  American  people  in  general,  the  support  of  so  large  a  por- 

1  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  February  13,  1897, 
Spanish  Diplom.  Cor.,  24. 

2  New  York  Herald,  February  5,  1897. 


1897]      ALL  IMPRISONED  AMERICANS  RELEASED        489 

tion  of  the  American  press,  could  not  but  fix  the  hopes  of  the  Cubans 
and  determine  them  in  their  demand  for  independence.  In  the 
circumstances  the  issue  of  any  decree  of  autonomy  short  of  one 
akin  to  that  of  Canada,  which  would  have  disarmed  criticism,  was 
a  useless  waste  by  Spain  of  time  and  energy.  Perhaps,  in  the  n|ind 
of  Canovas,  steeped  as  it  was  in  the  absolutist  spirit  of  ancient 
Spain,  it  was  so  intended;  if  not  so,  it  was  a  mind  unequal  to  ap 
preciating  the  effect  of  an  attempt  to  leave  in  the  new  law  a  loop 
hole  for  exerting  so  much  of  the  personal  power  which  existed  in 
the  old  regime. 

The  close  of  the  Cleveland  administration  was  a  period  of  pro 
tests  regarding  the  treatment  of  American  citizens  (all  but  one,  it 
should  be  said,  of  Cuban  birth),  who  had  been  arrested  for  com 
plicity  with  the  insurgents.  Special  feeling  had  been  aroused  by 
the  death,  under  strong  suspicions  of  cruelty,  of  Richard  Ruiz,  a 
dentist  of  American  citizenship,  who,  with  his  wife  and  children, 
lived  at  Guanabacoa,  four  miles  from  Havana.  He  had  been  ar 
rested  February  4,  for  suspected  complicity  in  an  attack  on  a  railway 
train  but  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Havana  on  January  16,  1897. 
He  wras  confined  for  thirteen  days  without  being  allowed  communi 
cation  with  any  one,  and  at  the  end  of  this  time  was  found  dead  in 
his  cell.  Consul-General  Lee  reported,  after  an  examination  of  the 
case,  that  Ruiz  was  arrested  on  a  false  charge;  that  he  was  kept 
incomunicado  for  three  hundred  and  fifteen  hours  in  violation  of 
treaty  rights  which  limited  such  confinement  to  seventy-two  hours; 
that  he  died  from  congestion  of  the  brain  produced  by  a  blow  on 
top  of  the  head,  whether  given  by  the  jailer  or  produced  by  his  own 
maniacal  act  could  not  be  decided.1 

In  the  end,  however,  all  were  released,  nor  can  it  be  said  that, 
excepting  the  case  of  Ruiz,  there  was  undue  delay  on  the  part  of 
Spain  in  meeting  the  American  demands,  or  undue  harshness  of 
treatment.2  The  Competitor  prisoners  had  already  all  been  freed 
in  December,  1896.  The  notorious  Sanguily,  whose  detention  had 
caused  much  inflammatory  discussion  in  Congress,  and  had  created 
much  ill-deserved  sympathy  throughout  the  Union  and  the  authen- 

1  Report  of  Consul-General  Lee,  May  31,  1897. 

3  For  the  correspondence  on  this  subject  see  Foreign  Relations,  1897,  483 


490  CHANGE  OF  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

ticity  of  whose  citizenship  was  denied  by  such  an  authority  as  Sena 
tor  Hoar,  was  released  February  25,  1897.1 

The  Cleveland  administration  closed  with  the  preservation  of 
the  status  quo.  It  left  a  most  vigorous  patrol  of  the  southern  coasts 
by  tfie  navy  and  revenue  marine  against  filibustering  expeditions;2 
it  had  pressed  to  a  successful  conclusion  in  the  courts  the  actions 
against  transgressors  of  the  neutrality  laws,3  the  decisions  in  which 
made  escape  in  the  future  much  more  difficult;4  it  had  upheld 
throughout  American  rights,  and  had  preserved  not  unkindly  re 
lations  with  Spain;  it  closed  with  the  general  commendation  and 
support  of  the  country  as  to  its  conduct  of  our  foreign  relations.^ 

On  March  4,  1897,  Mr.  McKinley  succeeded  Mr.  Cleveland 
whose  independence  in  judgment  had  shown  strongly  throughout 
his  administration  in  stemming  the  tide  of  emotional  feeling  in 
the  Cuban  question.  Mr.  Cleveland  by  character  and  tempera 
ment  stood  as  a  leader  of  public  opinion;  Mr.  McKinley  as  a  fol 
lower.  The  two  men,  equally  conscientious,  were  marked  ex 
amples  of  these  two  schools  of  statesmanship,  which  have  had 
historic  recognition  from  the  time  of  Moses  and  Aaron:  the  one 
felt  it  a  duty  to  resist  a  popular  demand  not  in  accord  with  his 
judgment;  the  other  equally  felt  it  a  duty  to  yield. 

The  change  in  the  personality  of  the  secretary  of  state  was  no 
less  momentous.  At  no  moment  since  the  civil  war  did  the  depart 
ment  of  state  more  need  a  vigorous  and  able  head,  but  Mr.  Olney, 
one  in  temperament  and  character  with  his  chief,  was  succeeded  by 
Senator  John  Sherman,  who  not  only  had  been  conspicuous  in  the 
Senate  in  his  attacks,  sometimes  of  an  illogical  and  inconsiderate 
character,  upon  Spanish  policy  and  conduct  in  Cuba,  but  whose 
infirm  health,  soon  to  become  painfully  evident,  combined  with 
advanced  age,  now  seventy-four  years,  made  the  appointment 
one  to  be  justly  criticised.  Mr.  Sherman's  appointment,  even  had 

1  Sanguily  was  arrested  at  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  April  7,  1897,  charged  with 
attempting  to  fit  out  a  filibustering  expedition.     The  charge  seems  to  have 
been  not  pressed. 

2  One  has  but  to  examine  the  newspaper  files  of  1897  to  be  assured  of  the 
activity  and  zeal  of  this  patrol.    The  American  ships  were,  in  fact,  doing  the 
duty  which  should  have  been  done  by  the  Spanish  navy  on  the  Cuban  coast. 

3  The  owner  of  the  steamer  Laurada  was  sentenced  in  March,  1897,  to  two 
years  in  prison  and  $500  fine.  *  Vide  supra. 


1897]         THE  QUESTION  OF  CONCENTRATION  491 

he  been  in  vigorous  health  and  equal  to  the  heavy  duties  of  his 
office,  was  in  the  critical  condition  of  affairs,  on  account  of  his 
previous  pronounced  antagonistic  views  to  Spanish  procedure,  a 
blow  to  peace.  The  mere  fact  that  Mr.  Sherman  from  the  earlier 
days  of  the  ten  years'  war  had  fulminated  so  vigorously  against 
Spain's  dominion  in  Cuba,  and,  too,  with  so  little  knowledge  of  the 
subject  that  he  was  in  1873  even  ignorant  of  so  important  an  inter 
national  document  as  the  treaty  of  1795,1  made  his  appointment, 
in  the  critical  condition  of  affairs,  a  mistaken  one.  That  the  ap 
pointment  was  a  concession  to  certain  political  adjustments  in  his 
state,  of  a  decidedly  personal  nature,  did  not  add  to  the  political 
morality  of  the  appointment.  The  affairs,  however,  of  the  depart 
ment  of  state  soon  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  assistant  secre 
tary,  Mr.  Day,  later  to  become  secretary,  and  virtually  such  from 
the  beginning  of  his  service  in  the  department. 

The  new  Congress  called  together  at  once  after  the  inauguration 
of  the  new  President  to  discuss  the  tariff  became  also,  in  the  Senate 
at  least,  a  field  for  effort  led  by  Senator  Morgan,  of  Alabama,  in 
favor  of  the  recognition  of  Cuban  belligerency.  His  resolution,  in 
troduced  April  1,  was  passed  May  20,  by  a  vote  of  41  to  14,  33 
senators  not  voting.  Introduced  in  the  House  it  was  referred  to  the 
committee  on  foreign  affairs  "when  it  should  be  appointed,"  but 
as  Speaker  Reed  did  not  appoint  the  committee,  action  was  never 
taken. 

The  question  of  the  reconcentrados  was  now  becoming  one  of 
first  importance.  A  wave  of  strongest  sympathy  was  sweeping  over 
the  United  States,  moved  by  the  reports  of  the  sufferings  and  deaths 
caused,  so  far  as  the  press  informed  the  people,  by  the  system 
established  by  General  Weyler.  It  was  the  feeling  thus  engendered 
against  Spain  which  gradually  moved  the  country  toward  war. 
It  is  necessary  that  the  justice  of  this  feeling,  which  took  powerful 
hold  of  the  great  mass  of  Americans  and  affected  the  President 
and  Congress,  should  be  examined. 

Within  the  first  six  months  of  the  insurrection  a  series  of  orders 
were  issued,  as  has  been  seen,2  by  the  insurgent  leaders  which 
practically  decreed  the  cessation  of  labor  in  Cuba.  In  case  of 
disobedience,  they  commanded  a 


1  Supra,  307.  »  Supra,  408. 


492         PRIMARY  CAUSE  OF  CUBAN  SUFFERING       [1897 

out,  has  no  parallel  in  history  in  savage  destructiveness.  It  ruined 
what  was  practically  Cuba's  one  support,  the  production  of  sugar. 
Should  any  plantation  attempt  to  grind,  the  cane  was  to  be  burned 
and  the  buildings  demolished.  One,  to  understand  the  destruction 
and  fear  which  followed  these  edicts,  has  but  to  note  the  fact  that 
production  fell  from  1,004,264  tons  in  1894-95,  to  225,221  in  the 
following  year.  The  guards  furnished  by  the  Spanish  authorities 
availed  little;  their  mere  presence  was  a  signal  of  ruin,  for  in  the 
dry  weather  and  high  winds  of  the  grinding  season  it  was  "a  simple 
matter  for  one  person  (who  can  easily  conceal  himself  in  the  tall 
cane)  to  start  a  conflagration  that  [would]  unless  promptly  extin 
guished,  destroy  hundreds  of  acres  in  a  few  hours."  1  The  sad 
pictures  of  gaunt  walls  and  chimneys,  remnants  of  once  splendid 
establishments  which  could  be  seen  throughout  central  and  western 
Cuba,  were  witness  to  the  shocking  waste  of  capital  and  production 
which  these  orders  brought. 

It  is  thus  upon  the  insurgents  themselves  that,  primarily,  the 
burden  of  the  miseries  of  the  great  unemployed  mass  of  Cubans 
must  be  laid;  for  Cuba,  through  the  action  of  its  own  sons,  became 
a  land  of  enforced  idleness.  Thus,  even  before  concentration  was 
ordered,  large  numbers  of  laborless  people  had  assembled  in  the 
towns  in  search  of  work  and  food/  Of  work  there  was  none,  and 
food  was  to  be  had  only  by  charity.  The  Spanish  officials,  until 
General  Weyler's  order  of  reconcentration  was  issued,  were  not 
officially  responsible  for  affording  aid,  nor  were  they  usually  in  a 
position  to  do  so,  the  food  supply  of  the  Spanish  army  itself  being 
at  all  times  during  the  war  a  difficult  and  very  uncertain  problem. 
Many  of  the  unemployed  men,  as  already  said,  joined  the  insur 
gents;  the  greater  part  of  these  unhappy  poor  were  women  and 
children. 

General  Weyler's  proclamation  ordering  concentration  had 
now,  on  Mr.  McKinley's  advent  to  office,  been  in  force  a  year. 
The  great  increase,  caused  by  this  order,  of  demoralized,  poverty- 
stricken,  and  shiftless  humanity,  crowded  with  the  wreck  of  their 
slight  belongings  into  the  small  Cuban  towns,  could,  in  the  inability 
of  the  Spanish  government  to  furnish  them  food,  but  result  in  ap- 

1  Mr.  Owen  McGarr,  American  consul  at  Cienfuegos,  to  department  of 
state,  January  10,  1898,  Senate  Doc.  230X  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.  28. 


1897]  CUBAN  AND  SPANIARD  ALIKE  RESPONSIBLE    493 

palling  mortality.  Though  the  decree  had  been  issued  February  16, 
1896,  it  was  not  until  December  1  of  that  year  that  zones  of  culti 
vation  were  ordered  set  aside  for  these  miserable  people,  who  had  so 
little  means  with  which  to  cultivate;  and  even  now  persons  whose 
husbands  or  fathers  were  with  the  insurgents,  were  excepted  from 
the  permission  to  till  the  zone. 

Cuban  and  Spaniard  thus  alike  were  responsible  for  the  misery 
which  was  to  sweep  off  nearly  200,000  people  of  the  island. l  Had 
either  of  the  antagonists  justification  for  action  involving  such 
terrible  results?  That  Spain  was  justified,  in  the  light  of  public 
law,  was  to  be  judicially  announced  four  years  later,  by  an  Ameri 
can  commission  itself,  which  held,  subject  to  certain  limitations 
and  restrictions,  neither  of  which  applied  to  Spain  in  Cuba,  that 
"it  is  undoubtedly  the  general  rule  of  international  law  that  con 
centration  and  devastation  are  legitimate  war  measures."2 

Not  only  had  concentration  thus  the  support  of  international  law, 
but  it  had  American  precedent  itself  in  an  order,  by  General 
Thomas  Ewing,  August  25,  1863,  by  which  the  inhabitants  of  a 
large  district  of  Missouri  were  directed  to  remove  from  the  region 
within  fifteen  days.3  Nor,  though  it  met  but  two  years  later,  did 
the  Hague  convention,  signed  July  29,  1899,  by  the  delegates  of 
fifteen  nations,  including  the  United  States,  make  mention  of  con 
centration  among  things  prohibited.4  Nor  did  Great  Britain  hesi 
tate  to  use  the  same  methods  in  the  war  of  1899-1902,  with  results 
much  less  tragic  than  in  Cuba,  through  England's  greater  re 
sources  and  better  administration. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Spain  was  legally  within  her  rights; 
that  she  was  so  under  the  greater  law  of  humanity,  is  a  larger  and 
more  difficult  question,  though  it  is  but  fair  to  her  to  bear  in  mind 

1  The  last  Spanish  census  was  in  1887  and  gave  1,631,687  as  the  population 
in  that  year.    The  report  of  the  census  of  1899  says:    "The  number  of  inhab 
itants  was  certainly  not  overstated  (p.  72)."     The  latter  census,  taken  in 
October,  1899,  gave  a  population  of  1,572,797.    "  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that 
the  direct  and  indirect  losses  by  the  war  and  the  reconcentration  policy,  in 
cluding  a  decrease  of  births  and  of  immigration,  and  an  increase  of  deaths  and 
emigration,  reached  a  total  not  far  from  200,000."— Census  of  Cuba,  1899, 
p.  72. 

2  Rules  of  the  Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission  (rule  8),  announced  No 
vember  24,  1902,  Senate  Doc.  25,  58  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  7. 

3  Ibid.,  125.  *  Ibid.,  124.     Nor  has  any  yet  been  made. 


494        WHAT  ALLOWABLE  BY  LAW  AND  USAGE      [1897 

that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  concentrated  would  have  remained 
on  the  land,  employed  and  fed,  had  the  insurgents  permitted.  Both 
Cuban  and  Spaniard  must  thus,  as  just  said,  bear  the  weight  of  this 
great  destruction  of  life,  but  with  a  difference  in  responsibility. 
The  Spanish  action  was  legalized  action;  the  insurgent  devastation, 
which  was  the  forerunner  and  real  cause  of  Spain's  action,  was 
warranted  by  no  rule  of  war;  for  no  rule  covers  the  remote  and 
problematic  effect  sought  by  the  insurgents;  viz.,  cutting  off  the 
monetary  support  of  Cuba  to  Spain  and  thus  rendering  it,  at  some 
remote  and  indefinite  period,  an  undesirable  possession. 

The  rules  governing  American  armies  in  the  field  allow:  "Of 
all  destruction  of  property  and  obstruction  of  the  ways  and  channels 
of  traffic,  travel,  or  communication,  and  of  all  withholding  of  sus 
tenance  or  means  of  life  from  the  enemy."  "  War,"  they  again  say, 
"is  not  carried  on  by  arms  alone.  It  is  lawful  to  starve  the  bel 
ligerents,  armed  or  unarmed,  so  that  it  leads  to  the  speedier  sub 
jection  of  the  enemy."  1 

But,  on  the  part  of  the  insurgents,  there  was  no  question  of 
starvation  or  subjection  of  a  besieged  enemy;  it  was  one  of  pro 
ducing  a  desert  which  the  Spaniards  might  not  care  to  retain. 
By  no  rule  of  international  law,  by  no  law  of  military  necessity,  can 
their  action  be  upheld. 

Nor  as  ex-Senator  Chandler,  one  of  the  commission  on  the 
Spanish  Treaty  Claims,  showed,  were  the  United  States  in  a  posi 
tion  to  accuse  Spain  of  cruelty  without  the  riposte  from  her  of  tu 
quoque,  which  was  soon  to  come  forcibly.  He  quoted  General 
Sherman's  proposal  to  "sally  forth  to  ruin  Georgia,"  2  and  Grant's 
order  to  Sheridan,  August  16,  1864:  "If  you  can  possibly  spare  a 
division  of  cavalry,  send  them  through  Loudon  County  to  destroy 
and  carry  off  the  crops,  animals,  negroes,  and  all  men  under  fifty 
years  of  age,  capable  of  bearing  arms.  .  .  .  All  male  citizens  under 
fifty  years  of  age  can  fairly  be  held  as  prisoners  of  war,  not  as  citi 
zen  prisoners.  If  not  already  soldiers,  they  will  be  made  so  the  mo 
ment  the  Rebel  army  gets  hold  of  them."  3  And  again,  Sheridan's 
own  report,  October  7,  1864:  "I  have  destroyed  2,000  barns  filled  I 
with  wheat,  hay,  and  farming  implements;  over  70  mills  filled  with  \ 

1  General  Order  No.  100.    See  Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission,  p.  124.    ^ 

2  Sherman,  Memoirs,  II,  159.  3  Ibid.,  I,  486. 


1897]  APPROPRIATION  FOR  SUFFERING  AMERICANS  495 

flour  and  wheat;  have  driven  in  front  of  the  army  over  4,000  head 
of  stock,  and  have  killed  and  issued  to  the  troops  not  less  than  3,000  / 
sheep.  .  .  .  To-morrow  I  will  continue  the  destruction  of  wheat,/ 
forage,  etc.,  down  to  Fisher's  Hill.  When  this  is  completed  the 
valley  from  Winchester  up  to  Staunton,  92  miles,  will  have  but! 
little  in  it  for  man  or  beast"  l 

The  rules  agreed  to  by  three  of  the  five  members  of  the 
Treaty  Claims  Commission,  emphasized  by  the  documents 
quoted  by  ex-Senator  Chandler,  require  us,  in  fairness,  to  admit 
that  the  charges  against  Spain  of  violation  of  the  law  of  nations, 
so  far  as  concentration  and  devastation  are  concerned,  cannot 
be  upheld.  It  must  thus  be  conceded  that  the  administration, 
in  communications  to  Congress  and  in  its  correspondence,  was,  in 
some  of  its  statements  of  unjustifiable  procedure,  not  in  ac 
cord  with  existing  international  law  or  established  usage  in  war. 
However  honorable  to  our  government  and  people  were  the 
more  humane  views  of  the  rules  of  war  so  frequently  put  for 
ward  in  public  documents  and  speeches,  they  could,  when  dif 
fering  from  established  international  law,  hold,  for  the  rest  of 
the  world,  no  more  than  could  Spain's  singular  definition  of 
piracy  which  she  had  so  frequently  advanced.2 

On  May  6,  1897,  the  President,  moved  by  the  consular  reports 
of  destitution  and  suffering  of  a  large  number  of  American  citizens, 
estimated  at  from  six  to  eight  hundred,  sent  a  special  message  ad 
vising  the  appropriation  of  fifty  thousand  dollars  for  their  relief  and 
the  transportation  to  the  United  States  of  those  who  wished  to 
return.  A  bill  in  accord  with  this  was  passed  and  approved  by  the 
President  May  24. 

The  general  acceptance  by  the  American  press  of  the  view  of 
Spanish  cruelty  added  to  the  public  feeling,  and  no  doubt  aided  in 
bringing  from  the  secretary  of  state  a  note  to  the  Spanish  minister 
of  a  very  warm,  vigorous,  and,  it  must  be  said,  ill-advised  statement, 

1  Official  Records,  Union  and  Confederate  Armies,  series  I,  vol.  XLIII, 
part  I,  pp.  30,  31.  Quoted  by  ex-Senator  William  E.  Chandler,  Spanish 
Treaty  Claims  Commission,  in  Senate  Doc.  25,  58  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  130-133.  For 
quotations  as  to  limitations  of  devastation,  see  Ibid.,  134,  135.  See  also  Flack, 
Span.-Amer.  Dip.  Relations,  Preceding  War  of  1898,  Johns  Hopkins  Univer 
sity  Studies,  1906. 

1  The  Treaty  Claims  Commission  (3  to  2)  refused  to  accept  the  declara 
tions  of  the  executive  as  conclusive  in  questions  of  international  law.  (Re 
port,  p.  99.) 


496       SHERMAN'S  NOTE  TO  SPANISH  MINISTER     J1897 

for  it  both  traversed  international  law,  and,  by  confining  animad 
versions  to  one  alone  of  the  contesting  parties,  and  to  the  less  guilty, 
was  manifestly  unfair.  Mr.  Sherman  said: 

"No  incident  has  so  deeply  affected  the  sensibilities  of  the 
American  people  or  so  painfully  impressed  their  government  as 
the  proclamations  of  General  Weyler,  ordering  the  burning  or  un 
roofing  of  dwellings,  the  destruction  of  growing  crops,  the  suspension 
of  tillage,  the  devastation  of  fields,  and  the  removal  of  the  rural 
population  from  their  homes  to  suffer  privation  and  disease  in  the 
overcrowded  and  ill-supplied  garrison  towns.  The  latter  aspect 
of  this  campaign  of  devastation  has  especially  attracted  the  attention 
of  this  government,  inasmuch  as  several  hundreds  of  American 
citizens  among  the  thousands  of  concentrados  of  the  central  and 
eastern  provinces  of  Cuba  were  ascertained  to  be  destitute  of  the 
necessaries  of  life  to  a  degree  demanding  immediate  relief,  through 
the  agencies  of  the  United  States,  to  save  them  from  death  by  sheer 
starvation  and  from  the  ravages  of  pestilence. 

"From  all  parts  of  the  productive  zones  of  the  island,  where  the 
enterprise  and  capital  of  Americans  have  established  mills  and 
farms,  worked  in  large  part  by  citizens  of  the  United  States,  comes 
the  same  story  of  interference  with  the  operations  of  tillage  and 
manufacture,  due  to  the  systematic  enforcement  of  a  policy  aptly 
described  in  General  Weyler's  bando  of  May  27  last  as  'the  con 
centration  of  the.  inhabitants  of  the  rural  country  and  the  destruction 
of  resources  in  all  places  where  the  instructions  given  are  not  car 
ried  into  effect/  Meanwhile,  the  burden  of  contribution  remains, 
arrears  of  taxation  necessarily  keep  pace  with  the  deprivation  of 
the  means  of  paying  taxes,  to  say  nothing  of  the  destruction  of  the 
ordinary  means  of  livelihood,  and  the  relief  held  out  by  another 
bando  of  the  same  date  is  illusory,  for  the  resumption  of  industrial 
pursuits  in  limited  areas  is  made  conditional  upon  the  payment  of 
all  arrears  of  taxation  and  the  maintenance  of  a  protecting  garrison. 
Such  relief  cannot  obviously  reach  the  numerous  class  of  con 
centrados,  the  women  and  children  deported  from  their  ruined 
homes  and  desolated  farms  to  the  garrison  towns.  For  the  larger 
industrial  ventures,  capital  may  find  its  remedy,  sooner  or  later,  at 
the  bar  of  international  justice,  but  for  the  labor  dependent  upon  the 
slow  rehabilitation  of  capital  there  appears  to  be  intended  only  the 
doom  of  privation  and  distress. 


1897]     SHERMAN'S  NOTE  TO  SPANISH  MINISTER       497 

"Against  these  phases  of  the  conflict,  against  this  deliberate 
infliction  of  suffering  on  innocent  non-combatants,  against  such 
resort  to  instrumentalities  condemned  by  the  voice  of  humane 
civilization,  against  the  cruel  employment  of  fire  and  famine  to 
accomplish  by  uncertain  indirection  what  the  military  arm  seems 
powerless  to  directly  accomplish,  the  President  is  constrained  to 
protest,  in  the  name  of  the  American  people  and  in  the  name  of 
common  humanity.  The  inclusion  of  a  thousand  or  more  of  our 
citizens  among  the  victims  of  this  policy,  the  wanton  destruction  of 
the  legitimate  investments  of  Americans  to  the  amount  of  millions 
of  dollars,  and  the  stoppage  of  avenues  of  normal  trade — all  these 
give  the  President  the  right  of  specific  remonstrance;  but  in  the 
just  fulfilment  of  his  duty  he  cannot  limit  himself  to  these  formal 
grounds  of  complaint.  He  is  bound  by  the  higher  obligations  of  his 
representative  office  to  protest  against  the  uncivilized  and  inhu 
man  conduct  of  the  campaign  in  the  island  of  Cuba.  He  con 
ceives  that  he  has  a  right  to  demand  that  a  war,  conducted  almost 
within  sight  of  our  shores  and  grievously  affecting  American  citizens 
and  their  interests  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land, 
shall  at  least  be  conducted  according  to  the  military  codes  of  civili 
zation.  ...  If  the  friendly  attitude  of  this  government  is  to  bear 
fruit  it  can  only  be  when  supplemented  by  Spain's  own  conduct 
of  the  war  in  a  manner  responsive  to  the  precepts  of  ordinary  hu 
manity  and  calculated  to  invite  as  well  the  expectant  forbearance 
of  this  government  as  the  confidence  of  the  Cuban  people  in  the 
beneficence  of  Spanish  control."  1 

The  Spanish  minister,  while  forwarding  the  note  to  his  home 
government,  and  quick  to  recognize  the  injustice  of  applying  to 
Spain  alone,  views  which  with  even  greater  force  applied  to  the 
conduct  of  the  insurgents,  himself  made  a  reply  protesting  against 
"  the  partiality  and  exaggeration  of  the  information"  received  by  the 
American  government  "and  which  is  doubtless  the  cause  of  the 
attitude  which  it  has  now  assumed."  After  appealing  to  the  history 
of  our  own  civil  contest,  he  said:  "Allow  me  further  to  say  that 
the  sufferings  and  hardships  of  the  non-combatants  have  been 
mainly  due  to  the  system  and  the  policy  pursued  by  the  insurgents 
when  they  invaded  the  central  and  western  provinces.  They  then 

1  Mr.  Sherman  to  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  June  26,  1897,  Spanish  Diplom. 
Cor.,  25. 


498  SPANISH  REPLY  [1897 

burned  crops,  destroyed  dwellings,  and  set  fire  to  the  towns  which 
they  found  without  garrisons,  and  compelled  all  loyal  persons,  or 
those  who  did  not  sympathize  with  them  and  aid  them,  to  seek 
refuge  in  the  forts  which  surrounded  the  cities." 

After  discussing  the  question  of  exaggeration  and  misconception 
at  some  length,  he  ended  with  that  demand  of  the  impossible  ever 
present  in  the  Spanish  mind,  and  the  impossibility  of  which,  in  a 
free  nation,  it  could  never  be  brought  to  understand.  He  said : 

"If  the  American  people,  to  whose  philanthropic  sentiments 
reference  is  made  in  your  excellency's  note  of  June  26,  under 
stood,  from  a  dispassionate  examination  of  this  question,  that  the 
insurrection  lives  for  evil  only,  and,  instead  of  encouraging  it  by 
holding  out  the  fallacious  hope  of  assistance,  which  is  the  basis  of 
all  its  trust,  would  counsel  peace;  if,  instead  of  aiding  and  abetting 
the  violations  of  law  which  are  constantly  committed  by  the  Cuban 
emigrants  organized  here  for  the  purpose  of  making  war  upon  a 
nation  friendly  to  the  United  States,  they  would  aid  the  Federal 
government  in  its  efforts  to  prevent  the  departure  of  filibustering 
expeditions,  which  render  this  long  and  desolating  war  possible, 
all  the  evils  would  very  soon  cease  which  are  deplored  by  his 
majesty's  government  and  by  all  Spaniards,  as  well  as  by  the 
President  and  people  of  the  United  States."  * 

The  reply  of  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  himself,  August  4, 
1897,  was  an  enlargement  of  the  contentions  already  advanced 
by  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome.  He  said: 

"The  secretary  of  state  supposes,  in  his  note,  that  among  the 
thousands  of  Spanish  reconcentrados  who  have  been  compelled  to 
transfer  their  abode  from  the  country  to  the  towns  and  fortified  in- 
closures  there  are  hundreds  of  North  Americans  who,  owing  to  the 
want  of  the  means  of  subsistence,  have  had  to  be  assisted  by  their 
government;  and  yet  its  own  official  experience  could  have  shown 
it  the  great  mistake  in  the  reports  relative  to  this  point,  since,  when 
the  time  arrived  for  the  distribution  of  the  sums  voted  by  the 
Federal  parliament  at  the  request  of  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
its  consuls  found  hardly  any  North  American  citizens  actually  in 
need,  to  such  an  extent  that  at  the  time  that  the  secretary  of  state 
addressed  you  the  note  of  June  26  they  had  only  succeeded  in  using 

1  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  Mr.  Sherman,  June  30,  1897,  Spanish  Diplom. 
Cor.,  27. 


1897]  SPANISH  REPLY  499 

among  them  six  thousand  dollars  of  the  fifty  thousand  dollars 
appropriated  for  that  benevolent  object,  including  the  amount 
appropriated  for  bringing  them  home.  The  very  men  who  reported 
the  evil  were,  therefore,  those  who  were  called  upon  to  correct  the 
mistake,  since,  upon  investigating  the  evil  closely,  they  were  finally 
compelled  to  admit,  in  obedience  to  the  irresistible  force  of  facts, 
that  there  had  been  much  more  imagination  than  reality  in  the  re 
ports.  The  case  of  the  said  concentrated  North  Americans  applies 
perfectly  to  the  other  suppositions  in  Mr.  Sherman's  note  to  which 
I  am  replying,  and  if  it  were  possible  to  make  an  official  verification 
of  the  whole  of  it,  like  that  which  was  made  in  the  case  of  the  ap 
portionment  of  the  assistance,  the  injustice  of  the  charges  which 
are  made  would  be  rendered  equally  evident. 

"It  cannot  be  denied,  it  is  true,  that  interests  are  injured,  suf 
ferings  caused,  and  the  normal  condition^  of  labor  and  property 
changed  by  General  Weyler's  proclamations,  as  they  would  be  by 
all  others  issued  in  similar  cases  by  generals  in  the  field,  but  this 
is  owing  to  the  imperative  duties  arising  from  circumstances; 
and  they  are  likewise  animated  by  a  truly  humane  purpose — that  of 
putting  as  speedy  an  end  as  possible  to  the  struggle  by  securing  the 
complete  submission  of  the  insurgents,  and,  as  its  consequence, 
the  re-establishment  of  the  law  wrongfully  disturbed  by  them.  The 
object  of  some  of  these  proclamations  is  to  deprive  the  rebels  of  the 
means  which  they  employ  in  the  prosecution  of  their  plans;  others 
are  intended  to  protect  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  who  are 
loyal  to  Spain  from  the  outrages,  misery,  and  robberies  to  which 
they  are  subjected  by  the  rebels,  by  the  express  orders  of  their 
commanders;  and  both  objects  are  equally  lawful  and  necessary, 
although  in  their  application  they  may,  as  has  been  said,  injure 
certain  private  interests,  as  these  must  everywhere  and  always  be 
subordinated  to  the  superior  claims  of  the  community  and  the 
state. 

"All  civilized  countries  which,  like  Spain  at  present,  have  found 
themselves  under  the  harsh  necessity  of  resorting  to  arms  to  crush 
rebellions,  not  always  so  evidently  unjustifiable  as  that  of  Cuba, 
proceed  and  have  proceeded  in  the  same  manner.  In  the  United 
States  itself,  during  the  war  of  secession,  recourse  was  had  to  concen 
trations  of  peaceable  inhabitants,  to  seizures  and  confiscation  of 


500  SPANISH  REPLY  [1897 

property,  to  the  prohibition  of  commerce,  to  the  destruction  of  all 
agricultural  and  industrial  property,  particularly  of  cotton  and 
tobacco,  without  the  safeguard  of  their  foreign  flags,  in  the  case  of 
the  important  factories  of  Roswell,  for  instance,  sufficing  to  save 
them;  to  the  burning  of  entire  cities;  to  the  ruin  and  devastation  of 
immense  and  most  fertile  regions— in  short,  to  the  destruction  of  all 
the  property  of  the  adversary,  to  the  abolition  of  constitutional 
rights  by  the  total  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  and  to 
the  development  of  a  military  and  dictatorial  system  which,  in  the 
states  opposed  to  the  Union,  lasted  many  years  after  the  termina 
tion  of  the  bloody  contest. 

'There  are  found  at  every  step,  not  only  in  the  most  reliable 
historians,  including  North  American  patriots,— the  staunch  cham 
pions  of  the  Union — but  also  in  the  official  documents  published 
in  Washington  and  in  the  reports  and  memoirs  published  by  the 
illustrious  generals  who  conquered,  orders,  measures  of  severity, 
and  acts  of  destruction  not  only  similar  to,  but  even  more  severe 
than,  those  which  General  Weyler  has  found  himself  forced  to 
issue  in  Cuba. 

"  Hunter's  and  Sheridan's  invasion  of  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah,  of  which  it  was  said,  to  show  its  total  ruin,  that  'if  a  crow 
wants  to  fly  down  the  valley  he  must  carry  his  provisions  with  him ' 
(Draper,  vol.  Ill,  p.  408);  the  expedition  of  General  Sherman, 
that  illustrious  and  respected  general,  through  Georgia  and  South 
Carolina;  the  taking  of  Atlanta  and  the  subsequent  expulsion  of 
non-combatants — women  and  children — and  their  concentration 
at  remote  distances;  the  shootings  at  Palmyra;  the  burning  of 
Columbia;  the  horrors  connected  with  the  treatment  of  the  prisoners 
and  peaceable  suspects  who  were  confined  together  in  the  ware 
houses  and  prisons  at  Richmond  and  Danville,  and,  more  particu 
larly,  in  the  prisons  at  Andersonville,  where,  according  to  official 
data,  more  than  twelve  thousand  perished;  and  many  other  inci 
dents  of  that  horrible  struggle,  that  genuine  contest  of  Titans  which 
put  the  wisdom  and  vigor  of  the  North  American  people  to  so 
severe  a  test,  furnish  an  eloquent,  though  mournful,  example  of 
the  distressing  but  unavoidable  severity  which  accompanies  war, 
even  when  it  is  carried  on  by  armies  educated  in  a  republic  and 
directed,  from  the  summit  of  the  civil  power  and  the  military 


1897]  SPANISH  REPLY  501 

command,  by  personalities  so  famous,  so  honored,  and  so  devoted 
to  duty  and  human  liberty  as  Lincoln  and  Grant. 

"The  invincible  General  Sherman  explained  on  various  occa 
sions  the  supreme  justice  of  these  acts,  and  in  perusing  his  me 
moirs  and  the  official  reports  which  he  addressed  to  the  directing 
council  of  war  at  Washington  are  found  remarkable  statements 
as  to  the  severity  with  which  it  is  necessary  to  proceed  against  the 
enemy  to  make  the  operations  of  the  military  forces  efficient  and 
successful.  'War  is  war/  said  this  able  general,  'and  the  tre 
mendous  responsibility  for  civil  wars  rests  upon  their  authors  and 
upon  those  who  are  their  direct  or  indirect  instruments.'  And 
when  replying  to  the  city  council  of  Atlanta  this  wise  leader  also 
said: 

" '  You  can  not  condemn  war  with  more  horror  than  I;  war  is 
cruelty  personified,  .  .  .  but  I  shall  not  recoil  from  any  sacrifice 
until  I  have  brought  it  to  an  end.  .  .  .  The  Union  must  main 
tain  its  authority  to  the  extent  of  its  ability.  If  it  yields  it  is  lost, 
and  that  is  not  the  will  of  the  nation.  Recognize  the  Union  and  the 
authority  of  the  national  government,  and  then  this  army  which 
is  now  devastating  your  fields,  houses,  and  roads  for  military  pur 
poses  will  be  your  protector.' 

"  Lofty  and  patriotic  views,  which  his  majesty's  government  does 
not  hesitate  to  appropriate  and  to  apply  to  Cuba. 

"It  may  well  be — and  his  majesty's  government  hastens  to  ad 
mit  it — that,  in  spite  of  the  reliability  of  the  sources  from  which  the 
foregoing  statements  relative  to  the  war  of  secession  have  been 
drawn,  there  may  be  some  exaggeration  in  them,  too;  but  in  that 
case  that  very  fact  would  prove  the  danger  of  forming  a  settled 
opinion  as  to  matters  equally  important  without  seeking  to  inform 
ourselves  of  the  facts,  and  trusting  merely  to  the  reports  of  others, 
however  truthful  they  may  appear.  .  .  .  Nor  can  the  devastation 
of  its  landed  wealth,  unless  we  close  our  eyes  to  the  evidence,  be 
attributed  to  the  Spanish  authorities  as  their  own  peculiar  system; 
it  was  the  insurgents  that,  in  obedience  to  the  instructions  of  their 
principal  leader,  Maximo  Gomez,  began  by  burning  sugar-cane 
plantations  and  destroying  the  cane  mills,  making  extensive  use 
of  dynamite  for  this  purpose  and  for  the  destruction  of  the  rail- 
roacLs,  and  boasting  that  they  would  carry  desolation  and  ruin 


502  SPANISH  REPLY  [1897 

everywhere.  They  were  the  ones,  also,  who  reduced  these  cruel 
practices  to  a  system,  and  destroyed  even  the  cattle,  the  basis  of 
subsistence,  if  they  found  more  than  they  needed  at  the  time— all 
this  in  the  vain  hope  of  inducing  Spain  to  abandon  the  island  upon 
seeing  it  in  ashes  and  incapable  of  furnishing  her  with  supplies  of 
any  kind,  as  if  right  and  honor  were  of  no  importance  in  the  eyes  of 
civilized  nations.  In  a  circular  of  Maximo  Gomez,  dated  Sancti- 
Spiritus,  November  6,  1895,  it  was  ordered  that  the  sugar  mills 
should  be  entirely  destroyed,  their  sugar  cane  and  the  outbuildings 
burned,  and  their  railroads  torn  up;  that  any  laborer  lending  the 
assistance  of  his  arms  to  the  sugar  mills  should  be  considered  a 
traitor;  and  that  the  penalty  of  death  should  be  inflicted  upon  all 
who  failed  to  execute  these  atrocities.  Not  less  than  one  hundred 
and  twenty  mills  (bateyes)  suffered  the  terrible  consequences  of  this 
atrocious  order.  If  we  add  to  this  the  blowing  up  of  bridges 
and  trains,  the  systematic  dispersion  of  their  bands,  without  ever 
fighting  for  victory  and  honor,  and,  above  all,  the  use  of  explosive 
projectiles,  which  civilized  and  international  conventions  repudiate, 
the  inhuman  procedure  of  the  rebels  will  be  fully  shown. 

"Moreover,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  this  system  of  the  total 
destruction  of  Cuban  property  has  always  been  advocated  by  the 
filibustering  junta  at  New  York,  composed,  in  great  part,  of  natu 
ralized  North  Americans,  and  that  this  very  junta  has  issued  the 
most  cruel  orders;  so  that,  by  a  most  amazing  coincidence,  the 
authors  of  the  admittedly  abominable  devastation  which,  accord 
ing  to  the  secretary  of  state,  has  so  greatly  aroused  the  sympathies 
of  the  North  American  people,  are  citizens  of  the  Union  and  organi 
zations  working  without  hinderance  in  its  bosom.  ..." 

The  despatch  concluded,  declaring  that  Spain  expected  to  per 
severe  in  this  system,  resolved  to  establish  the  new  regime  now 
ordered.  The  minister  of  state  also  expected  that  the  Washington 
cabinet  would  "doubtless  see  that  the  truly  humane  and  reasonable 
course  "  was  to  co-operate  with  Spain  "  by  putting  an  end  to  the 
existence  of  the  public  and  organized  direction  which  [the  revolt] 
receives  from  [the  United  States]  and  without  which  the  rebellion 
would  long  ago  have  been  entirely  subdued  by  arms."  J 

1  The  Duke  of  Tetuan  to  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  August  4,  1897,  Spa,7iish 
Diplom.  Cor.,  29-33. 


1897]  THE  SUFFERING  IN  CUBA  503 

There  is  no  denying  the  force  of  the  Spanish  argument.  It 
must  necessarily  be  considered  a  complete  reply  to  the  contention 
of  the  American  secretary  of  state  that  the  desolation  of  Cuba  was 
wholly  or  even  mainly  the  work  of  the  Spanish  administration,  and 
also  as  to  the  right  under  international  law  to  concentration.  Nor 
in  the  face  of  the  occurrences  of  the  American  civil  war,  with  its  stop 
page  of  commerce  and  the  reduction  thereby  to  starvation-point  of 
the  cotton  operatives  of  Great  Britain,  could  mere  injury*  to  com 
merce  be  made  a  just  ground  of  intervention. 

While  the  assertions  of  Secretary  Sherman's  paper  cannot  be 
justified,  either  in  law  or  precedent,  American  feeling  had,  however, 
justification  in  the  carelessness  for  results  shown  by  the  Spanish 
authorities  in  concentrating  the  people  with  what  must  have  been 
full  knowledge  of  their  inability  to  support  them,  and  the  -delay  in 
effort  to  establish  zones  of  cultivation  which  should  have  at  once 
been  taken  in  hand.  Nor  can  the  general  advance  in  humane  feel 
ing  during  what  was  now  a  whole  generation  after  the  American 
civil  war  be  ignored. 

All  reports,  official  and  other,  gave  a  most  melancholy  account 
of  the  condition  of  the  Cubans.  They  were  but  the  forerunners  of 
the  still  more  harrowing  details  of  the  next  year  given  with  such 
emphasis  in  the  consular  and  other  reports  from  the  island.  Says 
a  correspondent  accompanying  a  Spanish  column  and  whose  state 
ments  thus  have  the  undenied  verity  of  a  censored  document: 
"The  misery  among  the  pacificos  at  San  Cristobal  was  appalling. 
Their  only  shelter  consisted  of  huts  of  palmetto  leaves.  They 
slept  on  the  ground.  They  have  no  money,  and  were  it  not  for  the 
rations  given  them  by  the  Spanish  alcalde  they  must  have  perished. 
I  visited  the  spot  where  they  receive  their  food  at  noon  on  the  day 
of  my  arrival.  There  I  found  hundreds  of  emaciated  women  and 
children  gathered  around  four  great  caldrons  of  soup,  which  they 
took  away  with  them  in  old  tin  cans  or  in  any  receptacle  they  could 
lay  their  hands  on. 

"In  many  cases  the  fathers,  husbands,  and  brothers  of  these 
wretched  persons  were  with  the  insurgents;  but  give  the  Spanish 
authorities  credit  for  the  fact  that  they  fed  all  alike  as  far  as  possible, 
after  providing  for  the  troops.  The  supplies  dealt  out  were  meagre, 
but  it  was  the  best  the  alcalde  could  do.  . 


504  THE  SUFFERING  IN  CUBA  [1897 

"From  San  Cristobal  I  went,  according  to  directions,  to  Los 
Palacios,  or  the  Palaces.  What  a  mockery  was  the  name!  Better 
might  it  have  been  called  the  City  of  Ruins — burnt  to  the  ground 
by  the  insurgents.  A  city  of  leaves  had  arisen  from  the  ashes  of 
a  city  of  stone.  A  large  area  enclosed  by  fortifications,  built  for  the 
most  part  of  loose  stones  and  railroad  iron,  was  covered  largely  by 
the  inevitable  huts  of  palmetto  leaves,  and  the  largest  edifices  con 
sisted  of  thatched  roofs  built  across  the  half-burned  walls  of  ante 
bellum  buildings. 

"The  ' hotel'  where  I  stayed  was  of  such  a  character.  Its  one 
large  room  served  as  reception-room,  dining-room,  and  bedchamber 
for  myself,  my  interpreter,  two  priests,  three  sick  soldiers,  and  two 
civilians.  Rats  ran  riot  at  night  and  fleas  and  other  insects  held 
high  carnival.  For  a  Gehenna  on  earth  commend  me  to  Los 
Palacios  under  present  conditions. 

"  While  waiting  for  Weyler's  column,  which  had  made  a  devour 
to  the  southward,  I  had  a  chance  to  talk  to  many  pacificos  within 
the  line.  They  one  and  all  bear  testimony  to  what  has  already 
been  said,  that  neither  Cuban  nor  Spanish  regular  troops  harm 
women  or  children,  unless  through  accident  when  they  get  in  line 
of  fire. 

"That  the  Spanish  have  slaughtered  male  pacificos  found 
between  lines  in  cold  blood  and  in  large  numbers  is  true,  but  I 
was  surprised  to  learn  that  the  insurgent  general  Bermudez  is  as 
much  feared  by  pacificos  as  Weyler.  One  woman  told  me  how 
Bermudez  had  hanged  her  brother  because  he  was  unwilling  to  give 
up  his  horse  to  the  insurgents.  Bermudez  took  the  horse  and  sent 
the  man  where  he  didn't  need  one.  In  fact,  there  was  no  dif 
ference  of  opinion  as  to  Bermudez's  cruelty,  and  on  one  occasion 
he  narrowly  escaped  being  executed  by  Maceo  for  his  sanguinary 
work  in  spite  of  the  great  general's  orders."  l 

The  report,  October  15,  1897,  of  the  American  consul  at  the 
important  port  of  Matanzas,  but  sixty  miles  east  of  Havana,  is  but 
one  of  a  series  from  consuls,  naval  officers,  and  Red  Cross  observ 
ers,  all  persons  of  highest  character  and  veracity  in  whose  state 
ments  it  was  impossible  not  to  confide.  Said  Mr.  Brice,  the 
consul  mentioned: 

1  New  York  Herald,  January  4,  1897. 


1897]  THE  SUFFERING  IN  CUBA  505 

"  Over  two  thousand  (I  have  the  list  of  names)  have  died  in  this 
city— want  of  food— since  January  1  up  to  October  1,  1897. 
Since  the  latter  date  the  daily  average  death-rate  has  been  over 
forty-five  persons.  Sixty-two  died  last  Sunday;  of  these  fifty-seven 
from  actual  starvation.  Normal  death-rate  of  Matanzas  city  prior 
to  Weyler's  concentration  order,  six  persons  daily  (not  including 
soldiers). 

"In  the  interior  towns  of  the  province  the  situation  is  beyond 
belief.  In  some  towns  one-third  to  one-half  the  population  has  dis 
appeared.  .  .  . 

"Local  authorities  are  powerless  and  unable  to  cope  with  the 
situation.  Cities  and  towns  are  bankrupt  and  can  give  little  or 
no  relief  to  the  starving  thousands.  Last  Monday  morning  six  to 
seven  hundred  starving  women  unexpectedly  raided  the  market 
and  carried  off  everything  in  sight.  .  .  .  Allow  these  people  to  go 
out  into  the  country  and  plant  crops,  and  in  less  than  sixty  days  all 
will  be  well  and  starvation  a  thing  of  the  past."  * 

Though  there  was  no  doubt  some  exaggeration  in  Consul 
Brice's  report,  and  a  very  great  exaggeration  in  the  supposed 
number  of  deaths  during  the  whole  period,2  the  situation  was 
appalling  enough  to  arouse  the  sympathies  of  any  people.  Com 
mander  (later  rear-admiral)  Converse,  commanding  the  cruiser 
Montgomery  visiting  Matanzas,  reported  February  6,  1898:  "The 
present  population  of  the  city  of  Matanzas  is  variously  estimated  to 
be  from  50,000  to  60,000  (including  the  reconcentrados).  In  the 
city  of  Matanzas  there  have  been  between  11,000  and  12,000  deaths 
(ascribed  to  starvation  and  incident  diseases)  during  the  past 
year,  and  the  rate  is  increasing  daily.  In  October,  1897,  there 
were  974  deaths;  in  November,  1,260;  and  in  December,  1,733. 
Reports  from  the  cemetery  show  that  at  the  present  time  the  daily 
death-rate  averages  46.3 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  596. 

3  Viz.  500,000  as  against  the  200,000  estimated  by  the  census  officials  in 
1899  (supra,  493). 

3  This  would  be  an  annual  death-rate  of  about  300  per  thousand,  or  nearly 
one-third  of  the  population.  At  the  end  of  November,  609  deaths  were  re 
ported  for  the  week  in  Havana  and  its  suburb  Regla;  an  annual  rate  of 
158  per  thousand.  (New  York  Times,  November  28,  1897.  Report  by  In 
spector  Brunner  to  Surgeon-General  Wyman  of  the  Marine  Hospital  Service.) 


506  THE  SUFFERING  IN  CUBA  [1897 

"Within  the  city  limits  there  are  at  present  about  14,000  people 
absolutely  without  food  and  clothing.  Of  these  11,000  live  in  the 
streets  of  the  city  and  are  wholly  without  homes  or  shelter.  The 
remaining  3,000  live  in  three  small  villages,  located  on  three  hills 
just  beyond  the  built-up  portion  of  the  city.  Each  village  con 
tains  about  1,000  persons  who  live  in  small  huts  constructed  of 
palm  branches.  .  .  .  Most  of  them  are  women  and  children,  and 
they  are  all  emaciated,  sick,  and  almost  beyond  relief,  unless  they 
could  have  the  benefit  of  regular  treatment  in  the  hospitals.  T.hey 
are  dying  in  the  streets  for  want  of  food,  one  body  having  been 
passed  by  myself  on  the  occasion  of  my  official  visit  to  the  civil  au 
thorities  and  another  having  been  seen  by  other  officers  of  the  ship. 

"The  distress  is  no  longer  confined  to  the  original  reconcentrados 
(the  laboring  country  people,  most  of  whom  have  already  per 
ished),  but  has  now  extended  to  the  better  classes,  who  before  the 
war  were  in  moderately  comfortable  circumstances.  Those  now 
begging  in  the  streets  are,  for  a  large  part,  well-to-do  people  or 
their  children,  and  the  citizens  of  Matanzas  are  themselves  begin- 
ing  to  suffer  for  the  actual  necessaries  of  life,  having  drained  their 
resources  to  supply  the  urgent  needs  of  the  thirty  thousand  or 
more  reconcentrados  who  have  been  quartered  upon  them. 

"The  citizens  of  Matanzas  have  established  three  places  where 
they  issue  rations  of  ...  cooked  rice  and  fish.  .  .  .  Every  day 
about  nine  hundred  people  receive  a  meal.  It  is  needless  to  add  that 
this  supply  is  entirely  inadequate  for  the  large  number  (fourteen 
thousand)  of  destitute  starving  people  within  the  city  limits.  .  .  . 

"The  Spanish  authorities  have  rendered  some  assistance  to  the 
starving,  and  on  two  occasions  gave  one  thousand  dollars  toward 
the  relief  fund.  This  was  but  a  small  amount,  but  it  is  said  to 
have  been  all  that  the  government  could  give.  .  .  . 

"The  urgent  necessity  for  immediate  relief  and  assistance  can 
not  be  exaggerated.  Whenever  the  officers  of  the  Montgomery 
landed  they  were  constantly  followed  by  clamoring  crowds  of 
starving  men,  women,  and  children,  importuning  them  in  the 
most  heart-rending  manner  for  food,  for  the  want  of  which  they 
are  dying.  ..." 

Commander  Converse  to  the  secretary  of  the  navy,  February  6,  1898, 
Foreign  Relations,  1898,  669.  See  also  Captain  Sigsbee's  report,  February 


1897]  THE  SUFFERING  IN   CUBA  507 

8,  1898,  Ibid.,  671.  Also  the  reports  of  consuls  in  Cuba,  Senate  Doc.  230 
("Consular  Correspondence  Respecting  the  Condition  of  Reconcentrados  in 
Cuba," etc.),  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.  See  also  the  article  "The  Cuban  Insurrection," 
by  G.  C.  Musgrave  (an  Englishman),  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  July,  1898. 
The  account,  by  Mr.  Musgrave,  of  the  conditions  are  more  harrowing  than 
any  even  of  the  American  reports.  He  says:  "Even  in  Havana  city,  where 
they  can  beg  in  the  streets,  and  where  food  was  never  scarce  among  the  resi 
dents  as  in  less-favored  towns,  I  have  seen  children  lick  the  blood  off  the 
stones  at  the  shambles,  and  all  the  inhabitants  of  Los  Fossos  [the  point 
where  the  reconcentrado  were  herded]  that  had  strength  to  crawl  hastened 
one  day  to  the  beach  to  fightvover  the  putrid  carcass  of  a  cow  that  had  washed 
ashore"  (p.  7).  His  account  is  very  terrible  throughout  and  is  a  very  severe 
arraignment  of  Spanish  procedure  and  policy. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  NEW  AMERICAN  ADMINISTRATION. —  A  LIBERAL  SPANISH  GOV 
ERNMENT. — MR.  MCKINLEY'S  FIRST  ANNUAL  MESSAGE 

ON  September  13, 1897,  Mr.  Hannis  Taylor  presented  his  letters 
of  recall  and  General  Stewart  Lyndon  Woodford  1  his  letters  of 
credence  as  American  minister  at  Madrid. 

The  instructions  of  the  new  minister,  after  a  short  history  and 
statement  of  conditions,  declared  in  plain  words  the  unity  of  the 
administration  with  Congress  in  feeling  and  intention.  They  said : 
"In  the  judgment  of  the  President  the  time  has  come  for  this  gov 
ernment  to  soberly  consider  and  clearly  decide  the  nature  and 
methods  of  its  duty  both  to  its  neighbors  and  itself.  .  .  .  [It]  has 
labored  and  is  still  laboring  under  signal  difficulties  in  its  ad 
ministration  of  its  neutrality  laws.  It  is  ceaselessly  confronted 
with  questions  affecting  the  inherent  and  treaty  rights  of  its  citizens 
in  Cuba.  It  beholds  the  island  suffering  an  almost  complete 
paralysis  of  many  of  its  most  important  commercial  functions  by 
reason  of  the  impediments  imposed  and  the  ruinous  injuries 
wrought  by  this  internecine  warfare  at  its  very  doors;  and  above 
all  it  is  naturally  and  rightfully  apprehensive  lest  some  untoward 
incident  may  abruptly  supervene  to  inflame  passions  beyond  con 
trol  and  thus  raise  issues  which  cannot  be  avoided. 

"In  short,  it  may  not  be  reasonably  asked  or  expected  that  a 
mere  policy  of  inaction  can  be  safely  prolonged.  There  is  no  longer 
question  that  the  sentiment  of  the  American  people  strongly  de 
mands  that  if  the  attitude  of  neutrality  is  to  be  maintained  toward 
these  combatants,  it  must  be  a  genuine  neutrality  as  between  com 
batants  fully  recognized  as  such  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name.  The 
problem  of  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  often  presented,  but 

1  General  Woodford  had  been  an  officer  of  volunteers  during  the  civil  war, 
from  1862  to  1865.  He  received  a  brevet  as  brigadier-general. 

508 


1897]  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  NEW  MINISTER  509 

never  perhaps  more  explicitly  than  now.  Both  houses  of  Congress 
adopted,  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote,  a  concurrent  resolution 
recognizing  belligerency  in  Cuba,  and,  latterly,  the  Senate,  by  a 
large  majority,  has  voted  a  joint  resolution  of  like  purport,  which 
is  now  pending  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

"At  this  juncture  our  government  must  seriously  inquire  whether 
the  time  has  not  arrived  when  Spain,  of  her  own  volition,  moved  by 
her  own  interests  and  by  every  paramount  sentiment  of  humanity, 
will  put  a  stop  to  this  destructive  war  and  make  proposals  of  settle 
ment  honorable  to  herself  and  just  to  her  Cuban  colony  and  to 
mankind.  The  United  States  stands  ready  to  assist  her  and  tender 
good  offices  to  that  end. 

"  It  should  by  no  means  be  forgotten  that  besides  and  beyond  the 
question,  of  recognition  of  belligerency,  with  its  usual  proclamation 
of  neutrality  and  its  concession  of  equal  rights  and  impartial  im 
position  of  identical  disabilities  in  respect  to  the  contending  parties 
within  our  municipal  jurisdiction,  there  lies  the  larger  ulterior 
problem  of  intervention,  which  the  President  does  not  now  discuss.1 
It  is  with  no  unfriendly  intent  that  this  subject  has  been  mentioned, 
but  simply  to  show  that  this  government  does  not  and  cannot 
ignore  the  possibilities  of  duty  hidden  in  the  future,  nor  be  unpre 
pared  to  face  an  emergency  which  may  at  any  time  be  born  of  the 
unhappy  contest  in  Cuba.     The  extraordinary,  because  direct  anc 
not  merely  theoretical  or  sentimental,  interest  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Cuban  situation  cannot  be  ignored,  and  if  forced  the  issue 
must  be  met  honestly  and  fearlessly,  in  conformity  with  our  nationa 
life  and  character.     Not  only  are  our  citizens  largely  concerned  in 
the  ownership  of  property  and  in  the  industrial  and  commercial 
ventures  which  have  set  on  foot  in  Cuba  through  our  enterprising 
initiative  and  sustained  by  their  capital,  but  the  chronic  condition 
of  trouble  and  violent  derangement  in  that  island  constantly  causes 
disturbance  in  the  social  and  political  condition  of  our  own  people. 
It  keeps  up  a  continuous  irritation  within  our  own  borders,  in 
juriously  affects  the  normal  functions  of  business,  and  tends  to 
delay  the  condition  of  prosperity  to  which  this  country  is  entitled. 

'  No  exception  can  be  taken  to  the  general  proposition  that  a 
neighboring  nation,  however  deeply  disturbed  and  injured  by  the 
existence  of  a  devastating  internal  conflict  at  its  doors,  may  be  con- 


510  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  NEW  MINISTER  [1897 

strained,  on  grounds  of  international  comity,  to  disregard  its  en 
dangered  interests  and  remain  a  passive  spectator  of  the  contest 
for  a  reasonable  time  while  the  titular  authority  is  repressing  the 
disorder.     The  essence  of  this  moral  obligation  lies  in  the  reason 
ableness  of  the  delay  invited  by  circumstances  and  by  the  effort  of 
pthe  territorial  authority  to  assert  its  claimed  rights.    The  on-looking 
I  nation  need  only  wait  'a  reasonable  time'  before  alleging  and 
]  acting  upon  the  rights  which  it,  too,  possesses.     This  proposition 
is  not  a  legal  subtlety,  but  a  broad  principle  of  international  comity 
'and  law. 

/     "  The  question  arises,  then,  whether  Spain  has  not  already  had  a 
1   reasonable  time  to  restore  peace  and  been  unable  to  do  so,  even  by  a 
\  concentration  of  her  resources  and  measures  of  unparalleled  severity 
which  have  received  very  general  condemnation.     The  methods 
i  which  Spain  has  adopted  to  wage  the  fight  give  no  prospect  of 
I  immediate  peace  or  of  a  stable  return  to  the  conditions  of  prosperity 
which  are  essential  to  Cuba  in  its  intercourse  with  its  neighbors. 
Spain's  inability  entails  upon  the  United  States  a  degree  of  injury 
and  suffering  which  cannot  longer  be  ignored.     Assuredly  Spain 
1  cannot  expect  this  government  to  sit  idle,  letting  vast  interests 
suffer,  our  political  elements  disturbed,  and  the  country  perpetually 
embroiled,  while  no  progress  is  being  made  in  the  settlement  of  the 
Cuban  question.     Such  a  policy  of  inaction  would  in  reality  prove 
of  no  benefit  to  Spain,  while  certain  to  do  the  United  States  incal 
culable  harm.     This  government,  strong  in  its  sense  of  right  and 
'duty,  yet  keenly  sympathetic  with  the  aspirations  of  any  neighboring 
community  in  close  touch  with  our  own  civilization,  is  naturally 
desirous  to  avoid,  in  all  rational  ways,  the  precipitation  of  a  result 
which  would  be  painfully  abhorrent  to  the  American  people.  .  .  . 
"  You  are  hereby  instructed  to  bring  these  considerations  as 
promptly  as  possible,  but  with  due  allowance  for  favorable  condi 
tions,  to  the  attention  of  the  government  of  her  majesty  the  queen 
regent,  with   all  the  impressiveness  which  their  importance  de 
mands,  and  with  all  the  earnestness  which  the  constantly  imperilled 
national  interests  of  the  United  States  justifies.     You  will  em 
phasize  the  self-restraint  which  this  government  has  hitherto  ob 
served  until  endurance  has  ceased  to  be  tolerable  or  even  possible 
for  any  longer  indefinite  term.     You  will  lay  especial  stress  on  the 


1897]  CANOVAS  ASSASSINATED  511 

unselfish  friendliness  of  our  desires,  and  upon  the  high  purpose  and 
sincere  wish  of  the  United  States  to  give  its  aid  only  in  order  that  a 
peaceful  and  enduring  result  may  be  reached,  just  and  honorable 
alike  to  Spain  and  to  the  Cuban  people,  and  only  so  far  as  such  aid 
may  accomplish  the  wished-for  ends.     In  so  doing  you  will  not^ 
disguise  the  gravity  of  the  situation  nor  conceal  the  President's/ 
conviction  that,  should  his  present  effort  be  fruitless,  his  duty  to  his 
countrymen  will  necessitate  an  early  decision  as  to  the  course  of 
action  which  the  time  and  the  transcendent  emergency  may  de-   / 
mand. 

"  As  to  the  manner  in  which  the  assistance  of  the  United  States 
can  be  effectively  rendered  in  the  Cuban  situation,  the  President 
has  no  desire  to  embarrass  the  government  of  Spain  by  formulating  / 
precise  proposals.    All  that  is  asked  or  expected  is  that  some  safe"\ 
way  may  be  provided  for  action  which  the  United  States  may  under 
take  with  justice  and  self-respect,  and  that  the  settlement  shall  be 
a  lasting  one,  honorable  and  advantageous  to  Spain  and  to  Cuba, 
and  equitable  to  the  United  States."  * 

The  new  minister  found  a  changed  condition  in  Spanish  politics. 
The  forceful  and  able  man  who  had  hitherto  been  the  government 
of  Spain  for  many  years  as  much  as  Richelieu  had  embodied,  in  his 
day,  that  of  France,  was  no  more.  Sefior  Cdnovas  had  been  mur 
dered  by  an  Italian  anarchist  on  August  8.  Senor  Azc£rraga  be 
came  the  head  of  a  ministry  ad  interim,  to  be  succeeded  on  October 
4  by  a  new  ministry,  with  Sefior  Sagasta  at  its  head,  Sefior  Gullon, 
minister  of  state,  and  Senor  Moret,  minister  of  ultramar.  These 
names  were  in  themselves  a  promise  of  a  new  order  in  Cuba;  a 
promise  made  doubly  sure  by  the  manifesto  2  of  their  party  which 
had  been  issued  when  in  opposition,  June  24,  1897,  and  in  which 
they  declared  themselves  as  ever  eager  for  a  policy  as  to  Cuba 
differing  from  that  of  the  conservatives,  and  as  having  "initiated 
and  developed  a  policy  before — and  long  before — the  insurrection 
broke  out,  and  it  did  so  expressly  to  avoid  and  prevent  it.  To  this 
policy  responded,  and  by  this  purpose  were  inspired,  the  reforms 
of  Senor  Maura,  which,  had  they  not  met  with  such  parliamentary 

1  Instructions  to  Gen.  Woodford,  July  16,  1897,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  558. 

2  Published  June  24,  1897,  in  the  evening  paper  El  Correo  (The  Post)  of 
Madrid.     For  this,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  592,  593. 


512  SPANISH  SACRIFICES  [1897 

obstacles  and  they  been  enacted,   could  have  been  reasonably 
applied,  and,  we  rightfully  believe,  would  have  averted  the  dis 
asters  and  prevented  the  horrors  of  the  present  insurrection." 
The  manifesto  was  an  augury  of  a  change  which  was  to  be  loyally 
attempted. 

The  new  government  was  in  the  face  of  a  most  serious  situation. 
"Sagasta  before  taking  office  declared  that  the  financial  situation 
was  deplorable,  if  not  desperate.  ...  It  is  confessed  that  the 
troops  in  Cuba  are  six  months  in  arrear  in  their  pay  and  there  is 
no  money  to  send  them.  .  .  .  Never  before  in  the  world's  history- 
has  a  nation  made  such  sacrifices  and  put  forth  such  an  effort 
to  subdue  revolting  colonies  as  has  Spain  since  1895.  Between 
November,  1895,  and  May,  1897,  no  less  than  181,738  men,  6,261 
officers,  and  40  generals  have  been  sent  to  Cuba.  Counting  the 
garrisons  already  in  the  island,  the  total  fighting  force  must  have 
been  hard  on  225,000  men.  In  addition  and  during  the  same 
period,  Spain  has  had  to  send  28,000  men  to  the  Philippines.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  no  nation  in  modern  or  in  ancient  times  ever  sent 
across  the  seas  so  many  of  her  fighting  men  in  her  own  ships  in  the 
same  length  of  time.  It  has  been  a  supreme  and  unequalled  dis 
play  of  energy,  but  it  has  been  fruitless.  .  .  .  The  pity  of  it  all  is 
that  Spain  has  spent  every  power,  has  exhausted  herself,  and  yet 
has  not  quickly  ended  the  rebellion.  In  other  words,  the  insurgent 
policy  has  triumphed  in  both  its  great  aims;  Spain  is  baffled  and 
breathless;  sympathy  for  Cuban  independence  has  risen  to  great 
heights  in  the  United  States  and  is  rising  higher  every  day.  ...  It 
is  clear  that  the  new  ministry  intends  to  try  ...  the  plan  of 
placating  by  reforms  and  a  grant  of  autonomy  while  still  making  a 
show  of  crushing  out  opposition  by  force.  It  is  a  question  if  this  is 
not  too  late — if  the  change  will  not  mean  to  the  insurgents  a  final 
confession  of  weakness,  and  cause  them  to  stand  more  stubbornly 
than  ever  for  independence.  ...  If  so,  Sagasta's  task  will  be  the 
difficult  one  of  inducing  the  Spanish  people  to  submit  to  the  inevita 
ble.  He  may  be  aided  or  he  may  be  hampered  by  the  attitude  of 
our  own  government.  At  present,  we  must  confess,  a  diplomatic 
collision  and  a  rupture  appear  the  most  probable.  But  whichever 
way  Spain  turns  the  dilemma  that  confronts  her  is  most  cruel; 
and  no  one  possessed  of  the  historic  imagination  can  fail  to  see 


1897]         INTERCHANGE  OF  NOTES  AT  MADRID          513 

pathos  in  the  situation  to-day  of  the  nation  that,  three  centuries  ago, 
was  at  the  head  of  Europe  and  of  civilization." 

On  September  18,  1897,  General  Woodford  had  his  first  inter 
view  with  the  Spanish  minister  of  state,  still  the  Duke  of  Tetuan, 
to  whom  he  read  the  essential  part  of  his  instructions.  The  inter 
view  was  one  of  nearly  three  hours,  "friendly  in  manner,  posi 
tive  in  meaning."  He  pressed  the  necessity  of  early  peace  and 
informed  the  minister  that  the  Spanish  government  should  give, 
"before  the  first  of  November  next,  such  assurance  as  would  satisfy 
the  United  States  that  early  and  certain  peace  can  be  promptly 
secured,  and  that  otherwise  the  United  States  must  consider  itself 
free  to  take  such  steps  as  its  government  should  deem  necessary  to 
procure  this  result,  with  due  regard  to  our  own  interests  and  the 
general  tranquillity."  2 

On  September  23,  1897,  the  American  minister  presented  the 
formal  note,  promised  during  the  interview,  practically  a  tran 
script  of  his  instructions.  Six  days  later,  September  29,  the  min 
istry  resigned,  and  on  October  6  their  successors  were  announced : 
Sagasta,  president  of  the  council;  Gullon,  minister  of  state;  Moret, 
minister  of  the  colonies. 

Meanwhile  the  British,  French,  Russian,  and  German  ambas 
sadors  at  Madrid  had  severally  called  upon  the  new  American 
minister  for  information  as  to  the  attitude  and  intentions  of  his 
government,  and  had  received  from  him  a  full  and  frank  expres 
sion  of  the  views  embodied  in  his  instructions.  In  answer  to  a 
question  from  the  French  ambassador,  General  Woodford  made 
a  reply  which  unquestionably  was  the  mind  of  the  American  ad 
ministration:  that  we  "sought  neither  annexation  nor  a  protector 
ate,  but  only  peace." 

Sefior  Gullon,  the  new  minister  of  state,  replied  to  General 
Woodford's  note  on  October  23.  He  said,  very  truly,  as  shown 
by  the  manifesto  of  his  party  just  mentioned: 

"The  present  government  of  his  majesty  is  now  most  advan 
tageously  situated  for  investigating  the  points  referred  to  and  for 
securing  the  pacification  of  Cuba  on  the  proper  basis,  since  its  own 
character,  the  antecedents  of  those  who  compose  it,  and  the  public 

1  The  Nation,  October  17,  1897. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  567.  '  Ibid.,  1898,  580. 


514  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  J1897 

and  solemn  promises  which  in  the  past  and  of  its  own  sole  initiative 
it  has  made  to  the  representatives  of  the  country  involve,  in  the 
colonial  policy  of  Spain  and  in  the  manner  of  conducting  the  war, 
a  total  change  of  immense  scope,  which  must  exercise  considerable 
influence  upon  the  moral  and  material  situation  of  the  Greater 
Antilla.  .  .  .  [It]  is  determined  to  put  into  immediate  practice  the 
political  system  which  the  present  president  of  the  council  of  min 
isters  announced  to  the  nation  in  his  manifesto  of  the  24th  of  June 
of  this  year.  The  acts  accomplished  by  the  present  government, 
notwithstanding  the  short  time  which  has  elapsed  since  its  eleva 
tion  to  power,  are  a  secure  guarantee  that  not  for  any  one  nor  for 
anything  will  it  halt  in  the  path  which  it  has  traced,  and  which, 
in  its  best  judgment,  is  that  which  will  bring  us  to  the  longed-for 
peace. 

"To  military  operations,  uninterrupted  for  a  single  day  and  as 
energetic  and  active  as  circumstances  demand,  but  ever  humani 
tarian  and  careful  to  respect  all  private  rights  as  far  as  may  be 
possible,  must  be  joined  political  action  honestly  leading  to  the 
autonomy  of  the  colony  in  such  a  manner  that  upon  full  guarantee 
of  the  immutable  Spanish  sovereignty  shall  arise  the  new  per 
sonality  which  is  to  govern  itself  in  all  affairs  peculiar  to  itself  by 
means  of  an  executive  organization  and  the  insular  council  or 
chamber.  .  .  . 

"In  order  to  realize  this  plan,  which  it  advocates  as  a  solemn 
political  engagement  voluntarily  assumed  while  its  members  were  in 
opposition,  the  government  of  his  majesty  proposes  to  modify 
existing  legislation  so  far  as  necessary,  doing  so  in  the  form  of  de 
crees  to  admit  of  its  more  speedy  application,  and  leaving  for  the 
Cortes  of  the  kingdom,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  senators  and 
deputies  of  the  Antillas,  the  solution  of  the  economical  problem 
and  a  patriotic  and  fair  apportionment  of  the  payment  of  the 
debt.  .  .  ." 

Seiior  Gullon,  having  thus  stated  the  views  and  intentions  of  his 
government,  remarked  that  while  General  Woodford's  note  stated 
that  the  President  felt  it  his  duty  to  make  the  strongest  effort  to 
contribute  effectively  toward  peace,  he  did  not  state  the  measures 
he  proposed  to  take.  The  minister  himself  had  views  as  to  what 
these  should  be,  but  they  were  simply  a  reiteration  of  a  demand 


1897]  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  515 

which  the  American  government  was  already  doing  its  utmost, 
under  the  law,  to  meet;  his  proposition  being  that  while  Spain 
should  "continue  to  put  forth  armed  efforts,  at  the  same  time 
decreeing  the  political  concessions  which  she  may  deem  prudent 
and  adequate,"  the  United  States  should  "exert  within  their  bor 
ders  the  energy  and  vigilance  necessary  to  absolutely  prevent  the 
procurement  of  the  resources  of  which  from  the  beginning  the 
Cuban  insurrection  has  availed  itself  from  an  inexhaustible  ar 
senal." 

Senor  Gullon,  recurring  to  the  unwise  terms  of  President  Taylor's 
proclamation  in  1850,  which  gave  such  an  opening  to  cruel  and 
bloody  action  by  Spanish  officials  in  Cuba,  proceeded  to  say  how 
this  should  be  done:  "That  while  condemning  by  means  of  an 
energetic  proclamation  those  violating  the  Federal  laws  and  aiding 
the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  [the  President]  notify  all  American  citi 
zens  doing  so  that  they  cannot  henceforth  count  upon  the  diplo 
matic  protection  of  the  government  of  Washington  in  however 
grave  a  situation  their  wrongful  conduct  may  place  them.  By  thus 
abandoning  to  their  fate  those  who  infringe  the  fundamental 
statutes  of  the  Union  and  openly  conduct  illegal  filibustering  ex 
peditions,  and  by  energetically  and  constantly  restraining  those 
who  convert  Federal  territory  into  a  field  of  action  for  reprehensi 
ble  filibustering  schemes,  by  exacting,  lastly,  of  all  superior  and 
subordinate  officials  the  strictest  fulfilment  of  their  duties  in  all 
that  relates  to  the  laws  of  neutrality,  the  President  would  do  more 
toward  peace  than  is  possible  by  any  other  means  or  procedure  what 
ever.  If,  however,  it  be  alleged  that  the  powers  of  the  executive 
are  limited  on  this  point,  we  must  recall  the  doctrine  advanced  by 
the  United  States  before  the  arbitral  tribunal  of  Geneva,  according 
to  which  '  no  nation  may,  under  pretext  of  inadequate  laws,  fail  in 
the  fulfilment  of  its  duties  of  sovereignty  toward  another  sovereign 
nation/  " 

He  then  cited,  as  an  instance  of  what  might  be  done,  the  act  of 
March  10,  1838,  passed  on  account  of  the  difficulties  on  the  Cana 
dian  border,  which  had  arisen  through  the  McKenzie  rebellion,1 

1  The  first  two  of  the  nine  sections  of  this  act  (with  the  salient  points  itali 
cized)  were  as  follows:  "Sec.  1.  That  the  several  collectors,  naval  officers  [etc.] 
...  of  the  United  States  shall  be  and  they  are  hereby  respectively  authorized 


516  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  ,[1897 

adding:  "He  who  is  not  disposed  to  grant  the  means  does  not 
earnestly  desire  the  end  in  view;  and  in  this  case  the  end — to  wit, 
peace — will  be  attained  by  the  United  States  exerting  itself  ener 
getically  to  enforce  with  friendly  zeal  the  letter  and  spirit  of  its 
neutrality  laws." 

Senor  Gullon  reviewed  the  depressed  military  situation  of  the 
insurgents,  the  more  tranquil  conditions,  and  the  better  agricul 
tural  prospects  of  the  western  part  of  the  island,  and  declared  that 
a  change  of  attitude  toward  the  combatants,  in  the  circumstances 

and  required  to  seize  and  detain  any  vessel,  or  any  arms  or  munitions  of  war 
which  may  be  provided  or  prepared  for  any  military  expedition  or  enter 
prise  against  the  territory  or  dominions  of  any  foreign  prince  or  state,  or  of  any 
colony,  district,  or  people  coterminous  with  the  United  States  and  with  whom 
they  are  at  peace,  .  .  .  and  retain  possession  of  the  same  until  the  decision 
of  the  President  be  had  thereon,  or  until  the  same  shall  be  released  as  here 
inafter  directed. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  several  officers  mentioned  in  the  foregoing  section  shall  be 
and  they  are  hereby  respectively  authorized  and  required  to  seize  any  vessel 
or  vehicle,  and  all  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  about  to  pass  the  frontier  of  the 
United  States  for  any  place  within  any  foreign  state  or  colony,  coterminous  with 
the  United  States,  when  the  character  of  the  vessel  or  vehicle  shall  furnish 
probable  cause  to  believe  that  the  said  vessel  or  vehicle,  and  the  quantity  of  arms 
and  munitions,  or  other  circumstances  shall  furnish  probable  cause  to  believe 
that  the  said  vessel  or  vehicle,  arms  or  munitions  of  war,  are  intended  to  be 
employed  by  the  owner  or  owners  thereof,  or  any  other  person  or  persons,  with 
his  or  their  privity,  in  carrying  on  any  military  expedition  [etc.,  as  in  Sec.  1]. 
.  .  .  Provided  that  nothing  in  this  act  contained  be  so  construed  as  to  ex 
tend  to  or  interfere  with  any  trade  in  arms  or  munitions  of  war,  conducted  in 
vessels  by  sea  with  any  port  or  place  whatsoever,  or  with  any  other  trade  which 
might  have  been  lawfully  carried  on  before  the  passage  of  this  act,  under  the 
law  of  nations  and  the  provisions  of  the  act  hereby  amended." 

Such  a  law  even  if  made  permanent  and  extended  to  cases  beyond  sea 
would  not  have  effected  more  than  that  of  1818,  which,  so  far  as  it  concerned 
the  main  question  with  Spain,  forbade  to  "  provide  or  prepare  the  means  for 
any  military  expedition  or  enterprise  to  be  carried  on  "  from  the  United  States. 
The  gist  of  the  whole  matter  was  in  the  thoroughly  established  usage  common  to 
all  countries  and  held  to  with  great  tenacity,  particularly  by  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  of  traffic  in  arms  and  in  munitions  of  war,  these  being  sub 
ject  to  seizure  outside  the  country  of  origin  under  given  circumstances.  Had 
the  United  States  at  this  juncture  applied  the  law  of  1838  to  Cuban  circum 
stances  (a  thing  impossible  to  have  brought  about),  and  even  had  the  efforts 
for  prevention  of  supply  to  the  Cubans  been  thoroughly  effective,  the  latter 
would  have  turned  to  Great  Britain  or  elsewhere.  The  United  States  were  sim 
ply  the  most  convenient  source.  (For  a  discussion  of  the  law  of  1838,  which 
differs  from  the  view  here  expressed,  see  George  Bemis,  American  Neutrality, 
Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  1866;  for  the  law  in  full,  Niles's  Register,  LIV,  50;  or 
Stat.  V.,  212.  See  further  references  in  Moore's  Digest,  VII,  920.) 


1897]  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  517 

described  "would  be  so  ungrounded,  so  unjust,  so  unjustifiable,  so 
contrary  to  the  correct  procedure  of  the  Washington  cabinet  under 
circumstances  when  discrimination  was  much  more  difficult,  that 
it  must  be  rejected  as  utterly  improbable.  Whatever  passions  may, 
at  a  given  moment,  blind  the  judgment  of  a  deliberative  chamber  in 
countries  like  the  United  States,  where  right  and  justice  always 
triumph,  the  executive  power  will  act  as  a  secure  safeguard,  of 
whose  fitness  and  energy  any  doubt  would  be  offensive.  .  .  . 

"It  is  timely  to  remember  that  the  American  government  had  to 
admit  in  its  note  of  April  4, 1896,  that  it  was  impossible  to  recognize 
the  belligerency  of  the  rebels  at  that  time,  although  the  insurrection 
was  in  a  much  more  flourishing  condition,  and  that,  if  Spain  were 
withdrawn  from  the  island  of  Cuba,  the  sole  bond  of  union  between 
the  many  heterogeneous  elements  in  the  island  would  disappear, 
which  proves  the  necessity  of  her  presence  and  the  absurdity  of  the 
idea  that  there  can  be  any  other  organization  in  the  island  possessing 
the  attributes  of  lawful  international  personality.  The  insurgents, 
as  has  already  been  said  on  another  occasion  by  his  majesty's  gov 
ernment,  have  always  been  and  still  are  without  real  civil  govern 
ment,  fixed  territory,  courts  of  their  own,  a  regular  army,  coasts, 
ports,  navy,  everything  that  the  principal  American  writers  on 
international  law  and  statesmen  require  as  preliminary  to  the 
discussion  of  a  recognition  of  belligerency.  The  rebel  bands  never 
fight  for  honor  and  victory,  nor  do  they  even  defend  themselves; 
they  hide  behind  the  dense  thickets  of  the  tropical  soil  and  sally 
with  impunity  when  the  situation  is  temporarily  in  their  favor. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  impossible  to  admit  that  there  can 
be  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  com 
batants  in  Cuba. 

"As  his  majesty's  government  has  decided,  freely  and  deliber 
ately,  to  establish  autonomy  in  Cuba,  there  arises  by  the  force  of 
circumstances  the  case  foreseen  by  the  eminent  Mr.  Cleveland  in 
his  message  of  December  7,  1896;  and,  admitting  the  continuing 
international  accountability  (solidarity)  of  the  governments  which 
succeed  each  other  in  a  country,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  the 
present  most  worthy  President  will  agree  with  his  predecessor  that 
no  just  reason  exists  for  conjecturing  that  the  pacification  of  the 
island  of  Cuba  will  fail  to  be  effected  upon  this  basis.  The  govern- 


518  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  [1897 

ment  of  his  majesty  the  King  of  Spain  expects  with  confidence  from 
the  rectitude,  love  of  peace,  and  friendship  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  that  he  will  aid  it  in  this  noble  and  humane  under 
taking,  and  that  he  will  exert  himself  energetically  to  prevent  the 
insurrection  from  receiving  from  the  United  States  the  moral  and 
material  aid  which  gives  it  its  only  strength  and  without  which  it 
would  have  already  been  subdued  or  would  certainly  be  subdued 
very  speedily. 

"It  is,  therefore,  above  all,  indispensably  necessary  that  the 
President  should  decide  upon  his  course  toward  Spain  so  far  as 
regards  the  Cuban  problem,  and  that  he  should  state  clearly 
whether  he  is  ready  to  put  a  stop  absolutely  and  forever  to  those 
filibustering  expeditions  which,  by  violating  with  the  greatest 
freedom  the  laws  of  friendship,  injure  and  degrade  the  respect 
which  the  American  government  owes  to  itself  in  the  discharge  of 
its  international  engagements." 

Seiior  Gullon  now  made  reference,  very  mistakenly,  as  will  be 
seen,  to  a  late  occurrence,  saying  in  language  hardly  becoming  the 
situation:  "There  must  be  no  repetition  of  such  lamentable  acts 
as  the  last  expedition  of  the  schooner  Silver  Heels,  which  left  New 
York  in  spite  of  the  previous  notification  of  his  majesty's  legation 
at  Washington  and  before  the  eyes  of  the  Federal  authorities, 
because  it  is  only  thus  that  the  peaceful  intentions  of  the  United 
States  government  will  be  proved  and  that  the  friendly  understand 
ing  to  which  I  have  referred  will  be  possible." 

He  declared  "the  advances  and  improvements"  in  Cuba,  "which 
the  Washington  cabinet  itself,  not  many  months  ago,  in  an  official 
note,  declared  would  be  'most  potential'  for  the  termination  of 
hostilities,  and  for  bringing  about  a  change  in  the  tendencies  and 
feelings,  not  of  the  North  American  government,  but  of  the  very 
people  of  the  United  States  on  this  subject,  are  also  realized  by  the 
voluntary  initiative  of  the  mother  country." 

Sefior  Gullon  ended,  saying:  "Her  majesty's  government,  now 
and  always  faithful  to  the  ties  of  affection  which  unite  it  with 
the  United  States,  and  cherishing,  moreover,  the  firm  intention  of 
drawing  them  closer,  in  reply  to  the  courteous  wishes  expressed  of 
your  excellency,  will  be  most  happy  to  have  your  excellency  state 
whatever  you  may  think  proper,  with  entire  liberty,  and  in  the 


1897]  UNCHANGED  SPANISH  VIEW  519 

form  that  you  may  deem  most  fitting  with  regard  to  the  alterna 
tives  mentioned,  or  upon  any  other  points,  with  the  assurance  that 
your  excellency's  views,  opinions,  or  assertions  will  always  be 
heard  with  friendly  interest,  and  will  be  respected  so  far  as  may  be 
permitted  to  a  government  by  primary  and  permanent  duties,  the 
neglect  of  which  the  Madrid  cabinet  cannot  imagine  that  so  re- 
spectworthy  and  so  friendly  a  nation  as  the  United  States  will 
advise."  l  * 

The  attitude  of  mind,  evident  throughout  Senor  Gullon's  paper, 
and  ever  that  of  the  Spanish  cabinet,  of  whatever  complexion, 
could  not  be  changed  either  by  evidence  or  argument.  It  could 
not  see  that  American  law  could  not  go  beyond  existing  statutes 
without  contravening  what,  in  Anglo-Saxondom,  were  esteemed 
established  rights;  that  the  rights  of  free  speech,  free  discussion 
in  the  press,  and  of  public  meeting  were  rights  which  no  government 
such  as  that  of  the  United  States  could  suppress  or  would  attempt 
to  suppress;  that  the  American  government,  the  first  which  ever 
enacted  a  neutrality  law,  stood  on  unassailable  ground  in  its  decla 
ration;  that  "a  friendly  government  violates  no  duty  of  good 
neighborhood  in  allowing  the  free  sale  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
war  to  all  persons,  to  insurgents  as  well  as  to  the  regularly  consti 
tuted  authorities,  and  such  arms  and  munitions,  by  whichever 
party  purchased,  may  be  carried  in  its  vessels  on  the  high  seas 
without  liability  to  question  by  any  other  party.  In  like  manner 
its  vessels  may  freely  carry  unarmed  passengers,  even  though  known 
to  be  insurgents,  without  thereby  rendering  the  government  which 
permits  it  liable  to  a  charge  of  violating  its  international  duties. 
But  if  such  passengers,  on  the  contrary,  should  be  armed  and  pro 
ceed  to  the  scene  of  the  insurrection  as  an  organized  body,  which 
might  be  capable  of  levying  war,  they  constitute  a  hostile  expedition 
which  may  not  be  knowingly  permitted  without  a  violation  of  in 
ternational  obligation."  2 

Nor  would  the  Spanish  government  recognize  the  great  lengths 
to  which  the  American  government  had  gone  in  its  endeavors  to 

1  Senor  Gullon  to  General  Woodford,  October  23,  1897,  Foreign  Relations, 
1898,  582. 

2  Mr.  Fish  to  Admiral  Polo  de  Bernabe",  Spanish  minister,  April  18,  1874, 
Ibid.,  1875, 1 190.    Quoted  by  Mr.  Sherman  to  General  Woodford,  November  20, 
1897,  Ibid.,  1898,  610. 


520  MR.  SHERMAN'S  REPLY  [1897 

suppress  filibustering.  "The  Spanish  reply,"  said  the  secretary 
of  state,  "appears  to  be  unaware  or  heedless  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  task  which  this  government  has  performed  and  is  still  perform 
ing  with  the  single  purpose  of  doing  its  whole  duty  in  the  premises. 
To  give  a  proof  of  this  I  need  but  cite  the  work  of  our  navy  toward 
the  enforcement  of  the  municipal  obligations  of  neutrality.  Since 
June,  1895,  our  ships  of  war  have,  without  intermission,  patrolled 
the  Florida  coast.  At  various  times  the  Raleigh,  Cincinnati, 
Amphitrite,  Maine,  Montgomery,  Newark,  Dolphin,  Marblehead, 
Vesuvius,  Wilmington,  Helena,  Nashville,  Annapolis,  and  Detroit 

ive  been  employed  on  this  service. 

"Starting  with  one  ship  having  Key  West  as  its  head-quarters, 
the  number  on  continuous  duty  was  gradually  increased  to  four, 
without  counting  additional  service  performed  as  special  occasion 
demanded  at  other  seaboard  points.  At  the  present  time  a  vessel 
with  head-quarters  at  Pensacola  patrols  the  coast  from  the  north 
west  as  far  south  as  Tampa,  another  with  head-quarters  at  Key 
West  patrols  the  coast  from  Tampa  around  to  Miami  on  the  east 
side,  and  a  third  with  head-quarters  at  Jacksonville  patrols  the 
Atlantic  coast  from  Miami  to  Georgia.  The  action  of  these 
regularly  stationed  ships  is  at  all  times  concerted.  Their  com 
manders  are  ordered  to  communicate  directly  with  one  another, 
with  the  United  States  district  attorneys  in  Florida,  with  the  custom 
house  officials  in  that  state,  and  with  the  commanding  officers  of 
the  several  revenue-cutters  likewise  on  duty  in  that  quarter.  Act-, 
ing  upon  the  information  thus  received,  they  take  such  immediate 
action  as  they  may'deem  advisable  or  necessary  in  order  to  prevent 
the  violation  of  the  neutrality  laws. 

"  In  addition  to  this  stated  detail  on  the  Florida  coasts,  vessels 
belonging  to  the  North  Atlantic  station  have  been  sent  at  different 
times  to  the  various  Atlantic  ports  north  of  Georgia  at  the  request 
of  the  Spanish  minister  and  the  department  of  state  or  upon  receipt 
of  information  from  the  department  of  justice  or  the  treasury 
department  concerning  reported  filibustering  expeditions.  Many 
hundreds  of  official  letters  and  telegrams  record  the  orders  given 
to  these  vessels  and  the  action  had  by  their  commanders.  It  may 
be  asserted,  in  short,  that  every  vessel  of  the  navy  which  could 
practically  be  employed  in  the  shallow  waters  of  the  Florida  coast 


1897]  GENERAL  WEYLER'S  RECALL  521 

has  been  detailed  for  this  work,  while  for  a  time  two  revenue-cutters 
were  transferred  to  the  navy  department  to  assist,  besides  the  effi 
cient  co-operation  of  the  regularly  stationed  cutters  under  the  orders 
of  the  treasury  department. 

"  No  less  degree  of  activity  has  marked  the  operations  of  the 
treasury  department  and  the  department  of  justice.  Every  means 
at  lawful  command  have  been  employed  by  them  in  co-operation 
to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  Alertness  in  every  regard 
has  been  peremptorily  enjoined  upon  all  officials,  high  and  low, 
and  has  been  sedulously  practised  by  them. 

"  In  the  light  of  these  undisputable  facts,  and  with  this  honorable 
record  spread  before  him,  the  President  is  constrained  to  the  con 
viction  that  nothing  can  be  more  unwarrantable  than  the  impu 
tation  of  the  government  of  Spain  that  this  government  has  in  any 
wise  failed  to  faithfully  observe  and  enforce  its  duties  and  obli 
gations  as  a  friendly  nation." 

The  animadversions  of  Senor  Gullon  in  the  case  of  the  Silver 
Heels  were  equally  unjust.  The  escape  of  this  schooner,  October 
16,  1897,  with  an  expedition  from  New  York  was  wholly  due  to 
to  the  officiousness  of  the  Spanish  officials  themselves,  on  whose 
pressing  request  and  against  the  judgment  of  the  United  States 
authorities,  the  treasury  officials  waited  aboard  the  revenue-cutter 
in  the  stream,  instead  of  seizing  the  schooner,  as  the  latter  had 
wished,  at  her  wharf.  She  thus  escaped  under  cover  of  the 
night.2 

The  desire  of  the  new  government  of  Spain  to  meet  the  views 
of  that  of  the  United  States,  and  its  earnestness  in  the  question  of 
reform,  were  shown  by  its  decision  October  6,  to  recall  General 
Weyler,  and  in  the  steps  taken  to  issue  an  autonomistic  constitu 
tion  for  Cuba.  General  Blanco  thus  relieved  General  Weyler 
as  governor-general,  on  October  31,  1897.  Weyler  left  the  same 
day  in  the  mail  steamer,  Montserrat,  for  Spain.  Before  leaving  he 
received  a  deputation  and  said  among  other  things:  "I  had  ex 
pected  my  release  from  the  time  of  the  death  of  Senor  Canovas,  not 
believing  that  any  political  leader  would  be  strong  enough  to  sus- 

1  Secretary  of  state  to  American  minister,  November  20,  1897,  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  1898,  603-611.  General  Woodford  to  Senor  Gullon,  December  20, 
1897,  Ibid.,  653.  2See  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  611-615. 


522  GENERAL  BLANCO'S  EFFORTS  .[1897 

tain  me  when  the  United  States  and  the  rebels  were  together  con 
stantly  demanding  that  Spain  should  come  to  a  settlement";  a 
speech  which  was  near  to  bringing  him  before  a  court-martial. 
He  disembarked  at  Barcelona,  where  he  met  an  enthusiastic 
reception,  the  Catalan  protectionists  being  inimical  to  the  new 
government  on  account  of  the  fiscal  autonomy  now  to  be  granted 
Cuba;  in  itself  one  of  the  strongest  proofs  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
Sagasta  cabinet. 

General  Blanco  at  once  attempted  an  alleviation  of  concentration, 
issuing  a  decree,  November  13,  1897,  that  the  reconcentrados  be 
furnished  a  daily  ration,  the  sick  attended  to,  and  agricultural  and 
industrial  labor  reorganized  as  rapidly  as  circumstances  would 
allow. 

Those  owning  or  leasing  farms  were,  however,  obliged  to  show 
that  they  had  the  means  of  working  them;  ordinary  laborers  were 
obliged  to  pass  the  night  in  the  fortified  place  of  the  estate  on  which 
they  labored,  and  owners  were  obliged  to  build  centres  of  defence 
for  the  zones  of  cultivation,  in  the  outer  lines  of  which  would  be  a 
defensive  force  of  the  army.  Owners  and  laborers  were  allowed  to 
carry  arms  for  their  defence;  boards  were  ordered  to  be  organized 
for  the  protection  and  care  of  those  who  could  not  meet  the  con 
ditions  for  going  again  into  the  fields.1 

It  would  have  been  impossible,  even  had  circumstances  favored, 
to  remedy  at  once  the  woful  conditions  established  by  the  two 
combatants  during  these  nearly  three  wretched  years.  But  circum 
stances  did  not  favor.  Thus  a  month  later  the  American  consul  at 
Matanzas  was  reporting  that  "the  scenes  of  misery  and  distress 
daily  observed  are  beyond  belief.  .  .  .  General  Blanco's  order  .  .  . 
is  inoperative  and  of  no  avail."  Later  on  in  the  same  report  he  gave 
a  very  good  reason.  The  attitude  of  the  insurgents  made  better 
ment  impossible.  The  consul  said:  "A  few  plantations  are 
grinding  cane.  In  every  case  they  are  heavily  guarded  by  Spanish 
troops,  and  have  paid  insurgents  for  so  doing.  Was  shown  a  letter 
from  insurgent  chief  to  owner  of  large  plantation,  in  which  price 
demanded  for  grinding  was  two  thousand  centones  (ten  thousand 
six  hundred  dollars  United  States  gold).  It  was  paid."  2 

1  Senate  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  6. 

3  Consul  Brice,  Matanzas,  December  17,  1897,  Ibid.,  30. 


1898]  INSURGENTS  PREVENT  WORK  523 

But  this  was  not  the  worst.  The  consul  at  Santiago  wrote: 
''[I]  inclose  herewith  an  order  issued  by  command  of  General 
Maximo  Gomez  .  .  .  forbidding  the  grinding  of  the  sugar  crops 
for  the  years  1897  and  1898.  In  this  part  of  Cuba,  so  far  as  I  can 
learn,  all  idea  of  making  a  sugar  crop  is  entirely  abandoned.  I 
regret  to  say  that  the  stoppage  of  industries,  from  present  appear 
ances,  will  not  halt  at  the  sugar  crop,  but  coffee  and  other  agricul 
tural  crops  fall  under  the  same  ban.  I  had  hoped  that  after  the 
reconcentration  order  was  revoked  by  the  energetic  action  of  the 
present  administration,  we  would  find  no  trouble  in  reinstating 
American  industries;  but  it  appears  that  all  the  benefits  that  should 
have  accrued  to  our  citizens  are  thwarted  by  the  insurgents  who 
refuse  to  allow  them  to  return  to  their  sugar,  coffee,  and  other 
estates.  The  Pompo  Manganese  mines,  owned  by  Americans, 
which  would  at  the  present  time  be  a  very  profitable  investment  if  al 
lowed  to  operate,  are  also  being  held  up  by  the  same  power."  He 
ended  by  saying:  "It  is  beyond  the  power  of  my  pen  to  de 
scribe  the  situation  in  eastern  Cuba.  Squalidity,  starvation, 
sickness,  and  death  meet  one  in  all  places.  Beggars  throng  our 
doors  and  stop  us  in  the  streets.  The  dead  in  large  numbers  re 
main  over  from  day  to  day  in  the  cemeteries  unburied." 

Three  weeks  later  Consul  Barker  reports  from  Sagua  la  Grande : 
"One  sugar-mill  is  running,  not  without  interruption,  with  chances 
of  making  one-fourth  of  a  crop.  Another — just  started  up — was 
attacked  yesterday  by  a  band  of  insurgents,  killing  fourteen  and 
wounding  five  of  the  guerrillas  paid  by  the  estate  to  protect  the 
operatives.  Seven  laborers  were  killed,  the  insurgents  leaving  two 
of  their  dead."  2 

In  the  face  of  such  orders  and  of  such  deeds,  the  letter  addressed 
to  President  McKinley  and  purporting  to  be  signed  by  the  insur 
gent  commander-in-chief,  under  whose  directions  such  atrocities 
were  enacted,  was  deeply  false  both  in  statement  and  spirit.  The 
letter  said:  "However  true  and  minute  may  be  the  reports  you 
have  heard,  never  will  you  be  able  to  form  a  just  conception  of  all 
the  bloodshed,  the  misery,  the  ruin,  and  sorrow  caused  to  afflicted 
Cuba  to  obtain  her  independence;  and  how  the  despotic  spirit  of 

1  Consul  Hyatt,  January  12,  1898,  Senate  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  38. 
a  Report,  January  31,  1898. 


524  LETTER  FROM  GOMEZ  11898 

Spain,  irritated  to  the  last  degree  before  the  most  just  of  all  rebel 
lions,  has  revelled  in  the  most  implacable  destruction  of  everything, 
lives  and  property."  It  continued  later  in  a  phrase  which  shows 
an  extraordinary  faculty  of  stifling  one's  moral  perceptions,  say 
ing  :  "The  revolution  as  master  of  the  country  has  never  prohibited 
any  citizen,  whatever  his  nationality,  from  earning  his  living."  * 

The  deliberate  destruction  of  the  support  of  a  people  and  the 
inhumanity  shown  in  the  orders  of  Gomez  are  deep  stains  upon 
the  conduct  of  the  Cuban  cause.  In  1894  there  were  more  than 
three  hundred  and  fifty  sugar-mills  in  the  island,  many  of  which 
were  great  and  costly  establishments.  Few  of  these  escaped  in 
jury  and,  says  an  English  authority,  "about  one-half  were  either 
totally  destroyed  or  so  thoroughly  wrecked  as  to  render  necessary 
their  almost  complete  reconstruction."  Such  wreckage  of  prop 
erty  was  in  itself  brutal;  but  when  it  involved,  as  it  did  to  vast 
numbers  of  working  people,  deprivation  of  work  and  consequent 
suffering  and  death  on  a  gigantic  scale,  it  rises  to  the  height  of  a 
crime  which  no  ruler  of  military  procedure  can  condone.  Historic 
truth  demands  the  setting  forth  of  the  fact  that  Cuban  and  Spaniard 
were  alike  regardless  of  the  misery  caused  by  their  methods  and  of 
its  extent. 3 

On  November  25,  1897,  three  decrees  were  signed  by  the  queen 
regent;  the  two  first  extended  to  the  Antilles  all  rights  enjoyed 
by  peninsular  Spaniards;  the  second  established  in  the  island 
the  electoral  laws  of  Spain  (neither  of  these  required  the  consent 
of  the  Cortes);  the  third,  granting  autonomy,  required  such 
consent. 

The  right  was  given  to  frame  the  insular  budget  both  as  to 
revenues  and  expenditure;  to  set  apart  the  Cuban  share  of  the 
national  budget,  which  latter  was  to  be  voted  by  the  national 
Cortes  with  the  assistance  of  the  Cuban  members;  to  initiate  or 

1  This  letter  with  a  translation  was  handed  in  at  the  office  of  the  American 
consul-general  at  Havana  by  an  unknown  messenger,  and  forwarded  by  Consul- 
General  Lee  to  Washington,  February  15,  1898.  (Sen.  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  25.) 

2  Robinson,  Cuba  and  Intervention,  97. 

3  Mr.  Robinson,  just  quoted  above,  estimates  that  of  the  3,000,000  cattle 
in  Cuba  before  the  war,  ninety  per  cent,  were  slaughtered  by  the  opposed 
forces.    As  the  Cuban  farmer  depended  chiefly  upon  oxen  for  his  agriculture, 
the  effect  of  this  slaughter  was  most  disastrous.     (Ibid,,  96,) 


1897]  ANNUAL  MESSAGE  525 

take  part  in  commercial  treaties  affecting  Cuban  interest;  to  accept 
or  reject  commercial  treaties  made  without  Cuban  participation; 
to  frame  the  colonial  tariff,  acting  in  accord  with  the  peninsular 
government  in  scheduling  articles  of  mutual  commerce  between  the 
mother  country  and  the  colonies.1  It  fell  short  of  Canadian 
autonomy  in  that  the  Canadian  governor-general  performs  all  his 
executive  acts  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  a  council  of 
ministers  who  are  the  leaders  of  the  majority  in  the  lower  house, 
are  thus  created  by  it,  as  is  the  British  cabinet,  and  must  reflect 
the  popular  will.  In  any  case,  however,  the  decrees  were  far  more 
/  liberal  than  anything  theretofore  offered;  their  very  liberality  was 
to  cause  their  overthrow.2 

The  fact  of  the  signing  of  the  decrees,  telegraphed  from  Madrid 
November  26,  reached  Washington  in  time  for  lengthened  men 
tion  in  the  President's  message,  sent  on  the  convening  of  Congress, 
December  6.  The  message  dealt  with  Cuban  affairs  at  great 
length.  It  declared  that  "The  cruel  policy  of  concentration  .  .  . 
initiated  February  16,  1896  .  .  .  has  utterly  failed  as  a  war  meas 
ure.  It  was  not  civilized  warfare.  It  was  extermination." 

Unconscious,  apparently,  of  the  true  status  of  this  subject  in 
usage  and  in  the  rules  of  war,  the  President  continued:  "Against 
this  abuse  of  the  rights  of  war,  I  have  felt  constrained,  on  repeated 
occasions,  to  enter  the  firm  and  earnest  protest  of  this  government. 
There  was  much  of  public  condemnation  of  the  treatment  of  Ameri 
can  citizens  by  alleged  illegal  arrests  and  long  imprisonment  await 
ing  trial  or  pending  protracted  judicial  proceedings.  I  felt  it  my  first 
duty  to  make  instant  demand  for  the  release  or  speedy  trial  of  all 
American  citizens  under  arrest.  Before  the  change  of  the  Span 
ish  cabinet  in  October  last,  twenty-two  prisoners,  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  had  been  given  their  freedom." 

The  President  continued  with  a  resume*  of  the  correspondence 
between  General  Woodford  and  the  Spanish  minister  of  state, 
and  declared  the  Spanish  charge  of  failure  by  the  United  States  to 
perform  its  international  duties  wholly  "without  any  basis  in  fact. 
It  could  not  have  been  made,"  he  said,  "if  Spain  had  been  cog 
nizant  of  the  constant  efforts  this  government  has  made  at  the 

1  Nation,  December  9,  1897. 

2  For  these  decrees  in  full,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  616-644. 


526  ANNUAL  MESSAGE,    1897  [1897 

cost  of  millions,  and  by  the  employment  of  the  administrative 
machinery  of  the  nation  at  command  to  perform  its  full  duty  ac 
cording  to  the  law  of  nations.  That  it  has  successfully  prevented 
the  departure  of  a  single  military  expedition  or  armed  vessel  from 
our  shores  in  violation  of  our  laws  would  seem  to  be  a  sufficient 
answer.  ...  Of  the  untried  measures  [of  pacification]  there  re 
main  only  recognition  of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents;  recogni 
tion  of  the  independence  of  Cuba;  neutral  intervention  to  end 
the  war  by  imposing  a  rational  compromise  between  the  contest 
ants,  and  intervention  in  favor  of  one  or  the  other  party.  I 
speak  not  of  forcible  annexation,  for  that  cannot  be  thought  of. 
That  by  our  code  of  morality  would  be  criminal  aggression." 

The  President  quoted,  at  much  length,  President  Grant's  mes 
sage  of  December  7,  1875,  with  full  acceptance  of  its  conclusions 
regarding  recognition.  He  gave  a  synopsis  of  the  newly  decreed 
law  for  Cuba,  saying:  "That  the  government  of  Sagasta  has 
entered  upon  a  course  from  which  recession  with  honor  is  impos- 

Isible  can  hardly  be  questioned;  that  in  the  few  weeks  it  has  existed 
it  has  made  earnest  of  the  sincerity  of  its  professions  is  undeniable. 
I  shall  not  impugn  its  sincerity,  nor  should  impatience  be  suffered 
I  to  embarrass  it  in  the  task  it  has  undertaken.  It  is  honestly  due 
to  Spain  and  to  our  friendly  relations  with  Spain  that  she  should 
be  given  a  reasonable  chance  to  realize  her  expectations  and  to 
approve  the  asserted  efficacy  of  the  new  order  of  things  to  which 
she  stands  irrevocably  committed.  She  has  recalled  the  com 
mander  whose  brutal  orders  inflamed  the  American  mind  and 
shocked  the  civilized  world.  She  has  modified  the  horrible  order 
of  reconcentration,  and  has  undertaken  to  care  for  the  helpless  and 
to  permit  those  who  desire  to  resume  the  cultivation  of  their  fields 
to  do  so,  and  assures  them  of  the  protection  of  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  in  their  lawful  occupations.  She  has  just  released  the 
Competitor  prisoners  heretofore  sentenced  to  death,  and  who  have 
been  the  subject  of  repeated  diplomatic  corespondence  during 
both  this  and  the  previous  administration.  j_Not  a  single  American 
citizen  is  now  in  arrest  or  confinement  in  Cuba  of  whom  this  gov 
ernment  has  any  knowledge." 

The  message  ended  with  a  phrase  that  could  not  be  misunder 
stood,  saying:  "The  near  future  will  demonstrate  whether  the 


1897]  SPANISH  OPINION  OF  MESSAGE  527 


indispensable  condition  of   a  righteous  peace,  just  alike  to  the 
Cubans  and  to  Spain  as  well  as  equitable  to  all  our  interests  sc 
intimately  involved  in  the  welfare  of  Cuba,  is  likely  to  be  attained 
If  not,  the  exigency  of  further  and  other  action  by  the  United  \ 
States  will  remain  to  be  taken.     When  that  time  comes  that  action  I 
will  be  determined  in  the  line  of  indisputable  right  and  duty. 
It  will  be  faced  without  misgiving  or  hesitancy.  ...  If  it  shall  i 
hereafter  appear  to  be  a  duty  imposed  by  our  obligations  to  our 
selves,  to  civilization,  and  humanity  to  intervene  with  force,  it 
shall  be  without  fault  on  our  part  and  only  because  the  necessity 
for  such  action  will  be  so  clear  as  to  command  the  support  and  ap 
proval  of  the  civilized  world."  * 

The  conservative  Spanish  view  of  the  message  is  shown  in  a 
telegram  from  the  minister  at  Washington,  December  8,  which 
said:  "The  greater  part  of  the  newspapers — among  them  many 
which  have  constantly  demanded  intervention  in  Cuban  matters — 
compliment  the  message  .  .  .  and  consider  its  tone  very  conser 
vative  and  its  tendency  pacific  which  will  assure  security  to  the 
country  by  not  bringing  on  a  crisis.  .  .  .  Although  there  is  much 
in  it  that  is  annoying,  it  is  explicable  in  view  of  the  sentiment  of 
the  Congress.  To  the  democrats  and  opponents  of  the  President, 
the  message  has  seemed  without  force.  Taylor  [ex-minister  to 
Spain]  .  .  .  says  that  the  message  is  the  most  short-sighted  and 
discreditable  of  the  United  States."  2 

The  general  impression  in  Spain  was  one  at  least  not  of  dis 
satisfaction;  the  crisis  had  been  tided  over,  and  the  announce 
ment  that  the  new  autonomy  was  to  have  a  fair  trial  was  an  offset 
to  the  threats  which  could  be  of  value  only  in  case  of  its  failure. 
"It  was  remarked  with  reason  that  it  was  singular  to  see  a  govern 
ment  arrogate  the  right  of  distributing  praise  and  blame  to  the 
authorities  of  a  foreign  nation.  General  Weyler,  who  was  par 
ticularly  aimed  at  in  the  presidential  message,  made  violent  prot 
estation,  in  the  form  of  an  address  to  the  queen  regent,  against 
this  intrusion  into  the  affairs  of  a  foreign  country.  He  was  de- 

1  President  McKinley,  annual  message,  December  6,  1897,  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  1897,  XI-XXI. 

2  De  Lome  to  minister  of  state,   December   8,    1897,   Spanish   Cor.  and 
Docs.,  51. 


528  GENERAL  WEYLER'S  PROTEST  -  [1897 

nounced  before  a  council  of  war  on  account  of  this,  which  might 
have  given  cause  for  grave  diplomatic  difficulties;  but  the  United 
States,  where,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  attacks  of  this  kind  were 
almost  of  daily  occurrence,  had  the  good  taste  to  attach  no  im 
portance  to  this  act  of  one  who  had  become  a  private  person."  l 

1  Le  Fur,  Etude  sur  la  Guerre  Hispano  Americaine,  15.     Weyler's  protest 
appeared  in  the  Paris  Temps,  2-3,  January,  1898. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

CUBAN  RELIEF. — HAVANA  RIOTS. — THE  INTERCEPTED  LETTER  AND 
RESIGNATION   OF   DUPUY   DE    LOME. — DESTRUCTION    OF    THE 


WHATEVER  the  cause  of  Cuban  suffering,  the  situation  was  one 
to  call  for  sympathy  from  the  coldest  heart.  The  President  took 
the  initiative,  and  on  December  24,  1897,  the  eve  of  the  day  which 
most  appeals  to  kindly  feeling  among  the  Christian  nations,  a  cir 
cular  was  sent  from  the  department  of  state  announcing  that  "in 
deference  to  the  earnest  desire  of  the  government  to  contribute 
effective  action  toward  the  relief  of  the  suffering  people  in  the 
island  of  Cuba,  arrangements  have  been  perfected  by  which  -char 
itable  contributions  in  money  or  the  kind  can  be  sent  to  the  island 
by  the  benevolently  disposed  people  of  the  United  States."  It 
was  arranged  with  the  Cuban  authorities  to  admit  all  such  articles 
free  of  duty,  Consul-General  Lee  was  directed  to  receive  the 
offerings  and  to  co-operate  with  the  local  authorities  and  the  char 
itable  boards  in  their  distribution.  The  response  was  immediate 
and  effective.  The  Red  Cross  Society  lent  its  aid,  both  in  con 
tribution  and  in  management,  the  president  of  the  society,  Miss 
Clara  Barton,  going  herself  with  an  excellently  organized  staff  to 
Cuba.1 

Though  nothing  beyond  what  has  been  already  said  is  needed 
to  show  the  necessity  of  such  relief  in  general,  a  few  words  may  be 
quoted  from  the  report,  January  18,  1898,  of  Consul  Brice  at 
Matanzas,  which  show  that  misery  had  extended  to  all  classes. 

1  The  earlier  shipments  were  carried  to  Havana  free  of  cost  by  the  Ward  line 
of  steamships.  Later  the  naval  supply  steamer  Fern  was  used  for  the  out 
lying  ports,  twelve  thousand  persons  applied  for  relief  on  the  first  day  of 
issuing  rations.  (See  Miss  Clara  Barton,  in  North  American  Review,  May,  1898, 
p.  554.)  The  aid  thus  rendered  was  continued  until  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
and  did  much  to  relieve  the  misery  of  the  population. 

529 


530      BLANCO'S  EFFORTS  TO  RELIEVE  DISTRESS   '[1898 

Declaring  that  there  were  90,000  people  in  the  province  of  Matan- 
zas  alone  in  a  starving  condition,  he  added:  "There  are  thou 
sands  of  families  (of  the  better  classes,  formerly  well-to-do)  who 
to-day  are  living  on  one  meal  a  day,  and  that  very  scant.  They 
have  sold  or  pawned  furniture,  jewelry,  clothing,  etc.,  to  eke  out 
an  existence,  until  all  is  gone  or  nearly  so.  ...  The  daughter 
of  a  former  governor  of  this  province  was  seen  begging  in  the 
streets  (incognito)  of  this  city.  Many  of  these  people  call  on 
me  privately  at  my  residence  asking  and  praying  for  God's 
sake  to  be  remembered  when  this  relief  comes  from  the  United 
States."  l 

It  was  under  such  conditions  that  General  Blanco  had  taken 
office.  His  earnest  efforts  to  relieve  distress,  which  included  the 
appropriation  of  $100,000  for  this  purpose,  a  special  tax  on  real 
estate  in  Havana,  which  by  November  27  had  already  reached  the 
amount  of  $88,000,  and  the  formation  of  relief  committees  wher 
ever  the  Spanish  authorities  had  power,  availed  little  against  the 
disinclination  of  many  subordinate  officers  to  help  forward  auton 
omy.  Both  Spaniard  and  Cuban  were  against  it.  The  conse 
quence  even  of  a  message  of  peace  to  the  Cubans  in  the  field  meant 
death  to  the  messenger.2  Said  Consul  Hyatt  at  Santiago  de  Cuba: 
"Personal  appeals  of  provincial  governors  and  other  important 
officers  have  been  made  earnestly  and  often  to  the  same  individuals. 
.  .  .  Wholesale  removals  of  Spanish  officers  from  civil  positions 
are  made  by  sweeping  orders  with  instructions  to  fill  their  places 
with  Cuban  autonomists.  About  a  week  since  came  an  order  dis 
missing  every  employee  of  the  custom-house  in  this  city,  to  take 
effect  as  soon  as  proper  autonomists  could  be  found  to  fill  their 
places.  As  yet  only  two  have  been  named.  ...  It  is  given  out 
that  sometime  in  the  month  of  February  there  will  be  an  election 
held  for  ...  sixty  members  of  the  council  of  administration,  while 
seventeen  additional  ones  are  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor- 
general.  .  .  .  The  Cuban  leaders  declare  that  they  will  neither 

1  Senate  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  31. 

2  Consul  Hyatt  to  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Day,  January  1,  1898,  Senate 
Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  31.     The  trial  by  a  summary  court-martial  and 
execution  of  Colonel  Ruiz  of  the  Spanish  army  for  an  endeavor  to  lay  such 
a  message  before  his  friend  Colonel  Aranguren,  of  the  Cuban  forces,  was  a 
notable  case  in  point.     (See  Pepper,  To-morrow  in  Cuba,  86.) 


RIOTS  IN  HAVANA  531 

make  nominations  nor  go  near  the  polls."       Less  than  a  month 
later  the  same  official  could  say:   "Extremists  of  both  sides  seem 
able  to  dominate  the  sentiments  of  their  respective  parties.  .  .  ,\ 
Autonomy  is  already  a  dead  issue."  2     It  is  not  unfair  to  say  that 
the  state  of  affairs  in  the  island  was  now  not  far  from  anarchic. 

On  January  12  Consul-General  Lee  telegraphed  that  serious\) 
riots  were  occurring  in  which  mobs  led  by  Spanish  officers  had  y 
attacked  the  offices  of  the  newspapers  advocating  autonomy.  The  ' 
palace  was  reported  heavily  guarded  and  the  consulate  protected 
by  armed  men.  Next  day  he  telegraphed:  "  After  a  day  and  night 
of  excitement,  all  business  suspended,  and  rioting.  Everything 
quiet  at  this  hour,  City  heavily  guarded.  Soldiers  protect  public 
squares  and  threatened  points.  Mobs  shouted  yesterday,  '  Death 
to  Blanco,  and  death  to  autonomy/  while  'Viva  Weyler'  was  fre 
quently  heard.  Contest  between  Spanish  factions.  Attention  has 
not  been  directed  to  other  issues.  Heard  once  yesterday  of  a  few 
rioters  shouting  a  proposal  to  march  to  our  consulate.  Presence 
of  ships  may  be  necessary,  but  not  now."  Later  in  the  day  he  was 
more  uncertain  as  to  the  control  by  General  Blanco  of  the  situation. 
"  If  demonstrated  he  cannot  maintain  order,  preserve  life,  and  keep 
the  peace,  or  if  Americans  and  their  interests  are  in  danger  ships 
must  be  sent,  and  to  that  end  should  be  prepared  to  move  promptly. 
Excitement  and  uncertainty  predominate  everywhere." 

On  the  next  day  the  consul-general  reported:  "All  quiet";  nor 
was  there  a  renewal  of  the  rioting.  "The  recent  disorders,"  said 
General  Lee,  "are  to  be  primarily  attributed  to  a  group  of  Spanish 
officers  who  were  incensed  at  articles  appearing  in  three  of  the 
newspapers  of  Havana,  El  Reconcentrado,  La  Discwion,  and  El 
Diario  de  la  Marina.  ...  It  is  probable  that  the  Spanish  officers 
were  first  provoked  by  the  denunciations  of  Weyler  in  the  columns 
of  one  of  these  papers,  and  determined  to  stop  it,  and  afterward, 
being  supported  by  the  mob,  turned  the  demonstration  into  an  anti- 
autonomistic  affair.  .  .  .  The  intense  opposition  to  [the  autono- 
mistic  plan]  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  first  appointment  of  officers 
to  put  into  form  its  provisions  were  made  generally  outside  of  their 

1  Mr.  Lee  to  Mr.  Day,  January  8,  1898,  Sen  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  38. 

*Ibid.,  February  1,  1898,  41. 

3  Telegram,  January  13,  1898,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  1025. 


532  THE  NORTH  ATLANTIC  SQUADRON          -  [1898 

party  in  order  to  show  the  Cubans  in  arms  that  autonomy  was 
instituted  for  their  benefit  and  protection.1 

The  decision  made  early  in  the  winter  to  send  south  what  was 
known  as  the  North  Atlantic  Squadron,  whose  area  of  duty  was  the 
Atlantic  coast  and  the  Caribbean,  had  caused  an  inquiry  on  De 
cember  16, 1897,  from  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  to  Senor  Dupuy 
de  Lome  as  to  its  mission.  This  was  in  itself  entirely  peaceful;  it 
had  already  been  detained  in  the  bleak  northern  waters  during  two 
winters,  in  deference  to  Spanish  sentiment  and  to  the  detriment  of 
efficiency  and  health,  and  it  was  in  no  sense  unreasonable  that  it 
should  now  be  sent  to  the  warmer  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Florida,  an 
admirable  exercising  ground  specially  adapted  as  such  through  its 
calms  and  the  shallowness  which  allowed  anchorage  many  miles 
from  land.  The  Spanish  minister  was  informed  that  the  decision 
to  send  the  squadron  had  been  made  some  time  before,  and  that 

I  its  usual  drills  had  been  resumed  in  southern  waters  in  order  not  to 
arouse  excited  public  sentiment,  and  also  with  the  purpose  of 
demonstrating  that  the  situation  had  improved,  and  to  avoid  the 
demand  for  ships  to  go  to  Cuba.2 

While  events  just  mentioned  gave  reason  for  concern  for  the 
safety  of  the  many  Americans  resident  in  Havana,  the  departure 
of  the  squadron  at  Hampton  Roads,  assembled  in  anticipation  of  its 
southern  cruise,  was  not  hastened;  nor  was  there  necessity  for  so 
doing  as  there  was  already  ample  force  in  Florida  waters,  engaged 
in  looking  after  filibusters,  to  render  assistance  in  case  of  need. 3 

The  riots,  though  the  result  of  party  antagonism  among  the 
Spaniards  themselves,  had  greatly  disturbed  American  feeling,  a 
change  which  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  was  quick  to 
recognize.  He  telegraphed  Madrid,  January  14, 1898,  that  while  no 
ships  would  be  sent,  the  change  of  "sentiment  has  been  so  abrupt, 
and  our  enemies,  influenced  by  it,  so  numerous,  that  any  sensational 

1  Mr.  Lee  to  Mr.  Day  (confidential),  January  18,  1898,  Senate  Doc.  230, 
55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  p.  20. 

3  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  Senor  Gullon,  December  16,  1897,  Spanish  Cor. 
and  Docs.,  52. 

3  The  vessels  at  or  near  Key  West  were  the  battle-ship  Maine,  cruiser 
Montgomery,  torpedo-boats  Gushing,  Ericsson,  and  Dupont,  and  several 
revenue  vessels.  The  original  purpose,  however,  of  the  Maine  was  to  have  a 
ship  at  hand  which  could  render  assistance  to  Americans,  should  need  arise, 
in  Havana. 


1898]  THE  "MAINE"  TO  GO  TO  HAVANA  533 

occurrence  might  produce  a  change  and  disturb  the  situation."  * 
Two  days  later  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  telegraphed:  "The  news* 
from  Havana  has  not  improved;  if  it  continues  it  will  cause  the, 
situation  here  to  change.  The  sensational  press  is  just  as  it  was 
in  the  worst  period,  and  the  government  and  cabinet  seem  to  have 
lost  all  faith  in  Spain's  success,  and,  to  some  extent,  to  have  lost 
tranquillity.  I  have  just  had  a  conference  with  the  head  of  staff 
of  the  Herald,  a  person  of  importance  here  and  generally  well  in 
formed.  He  told  me  that  in  view  of  recent  events  the  President 
has  stated  that,  according  to  information  he  has  received,  autonomy 
in  Cuba  has  come  to  nothing;  that  grave  disorders  are  feared  in 
Havana  and  throughout  the  island,  and  that,  if  the  disorders  are 
repeated,  he  had  determined  to  land  troops  from  the  war  vessels 
to  protect  the  consulate.  He  asked  me  what  would  be  done  if  that 
occurred.  I  told  him  that  it  would  mean  fighting;  that  Spain 
would  never  submit  to  what  was  done  in  Korea  and  Crete  ...  it 
indicates  a  state  of  things  that  would  have  been  impossible  a  week 
ago."  2  The  minister  of  state  at  once  replied  that  Senor  Dupuy  de 
Lome  had  "very  properly  considered"  the  eventuality  reported  to 
him  "as  intolerable."  3 

Havana  continued  calm,  the  Spanish  minister  telegraphed  Janu 
ary  24,  1898,  that  in  "a  long  and  important  conference,"  on  the 
same  date  with  Mr.  Day,  he  was  informed  that  "  the  President  had 
not  departed  in  any  way  from  the  attitude  set  forth  in  the  message, 
which  left  the  Spanish  government  in  entire  liberty  to  develop  its 
policy."  Later,  the  same  day,  the  minister  was  told  that  the  result 
of  his  morning  conference  "and  the  reports  concerning  the  com 
mercial  negotiations  confirmed  by  Woodford  have  been  so  satis 
factory  that  the  President  has  determined  to  send  the  Maine  to 
Havana  as  a  mark  of  friendship,  and  the  secretary  of  the  navy 
would  so  state  to  the  press  .  .  .  the  sending  of  the  vessel  simply  , 
as  a  visit  must  be  taken  as  an  act  of  friendly  courtesy,  and  not 
looked  upon  in  any  other  aspect;  that  the  President  believes  it  has , 
been  a  mistake  not  to  have  had  an  American  war  vessel  visit  Cuba 
in  the  past  three  years,  because  now  what  is  a  fresh  proof  of  inter-* 
national  courtesy  is  looked  upon  as  a  hostile  act.  The  secretary 

1  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  Senor  Gullon,  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  64. 

2  Ibid.,  65.  3  Ibid.,  65. 


534  SPAIN  ON  AMERICAN  ATTITUDE  •  [1898 

of  the  navy  has  given  to  the  press  the  following  statement:  'The 
rumors  which  were  current  yesterday  regarding  the  movements  of 
the  fleet  and  disturbances  in  Havana  are  far  from  having  founda 
tion.  Circumstances  have  become  so  normal,  the  situation  so 
quiet,  and  relations  so  cordial  that  our  war  vessels  are  to  renew 
their  friendly  visits  to  Cuban  ports,  entering  and  leaving  those  ports 
to  go  to  ports  of  other  neighboring  friendly  countries.  The  first 
vessel  to  make  a  visit  of  this  kind  will  be  the  Maine.'  " l 

The  Spanish  minister  of  state,  while  commending  Senor  Dupuy 
de  Lome's  discussion  with  Mr.  Day,  replied:  ''The  attitude  of 
that  government  does  not  completely  satisfy  me,  because  it  does  not 
heed  your  excellency's  request  that  the  outcome  of  autonomy  be 
awaited,  nor  does  it  publish  its  unalterable  determination  to  con 
tinue  in  the  path  of  peace,  scorning  or  overcoming  every  agitation 
to  the  contrary  which  may  be  set  in  motion.  Bearing  in  mind  that 
the  evidence  of  the  important  acts  initiated  and  already  realized  by 
the  insular  government  of  Cuba  is  apparent  to  all,  the  government 
of  the  United  States  ought  to  inaugurate  toward  Spain  a  more 
considerate,  frank,  and  favorable  policy  than  that  proclaimed  in 
the  presidential  message.  Until  this  happens  and  we  are  satisfied 
in  regard  to  Lee,  we  shall  endeavor  to  maintain  ourselves  as  here 
tofore  in  the  most  correct  path."  He  cordially  accepted  the  state- 

1  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  Senor  Gullon  (telegram) ,  January  24,  1898, 
Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  68. 

General  Lee  was  informed  by  telegram,  January  24:  "It  is  the  purpose 
of  this  government  to  resume  friendly  naval  visits  at  Cuban  ports.  In  that 
view  the  Maine  will  call  at  the  port  of  Havana  in  a  day  or  two.  Please  arrange 
for  a  friendly  interchange  of  calls  with  the  authorities." 

Lee  answered  the  same  day:  "Advise  visit  be  postponed  six  or  seven  days 
to  give  last  excitement  more  time  to  disappear.  Will  see  authorities  and  let 
you  know  result.  Governor-general  away  for  two  weeks.  I  should  know  day 
and  hour  [of]  visit." 

To  this  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Day  replied  on  the  same  date:  "Maine 
has  been  ordered.  Will  probably  arrive  at  Havana  some  time  to-morrow. 
Cannot  tell  hour;  possibly  early.  Co-operate  with  authorities  for  her  friendly 
visit.  Keep  us  advised  by  frequent  telegrams." 

On  January  25,  before  the  ship's  arrival,  at  11  A.  M.,  Lee  telegraphed: 
"At  an  interview  authorities  profess  to  think  United  States  has  ulterior 
purpose  in  sending  ship.  Say  it  will  obstruct  autonomy,  produce  excitement, 
and  most  probably  a  demonstration.  Ask  that  it  is  not  done  until  they  can  get 
instructions  from  Madrid,  and  say  that  if  for  friendly  motives,  as  claimed, 
delay  unimportant."  (Sen.  Doc.  230,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  84,  85.) 


1898]      THE  PRESIDENT  AND  SPANISH  MINISTER        535 

ments  regarding  the  visit  of  the  Maine,  and  added  that  "  to  recipro 
cate  such  friendly  and  courteous  demonstrations,  we  shall  arrange 
also  that  vessels  of  our  squadron  may  visit  the  ports  of  the  United 
States  in  passing  to  and  from  the  island  of  Cuba."  1  On  the  same 
date  as  that  of  this  message  the  Maine  anchored  in  Havana  harbor, 
with  no  unusual  or  untoward  incident.  2 

Three  days  later  at  the  annual  diplomatic  dinner  at  the  White 
House  the  Spanish  minister  reports  that  the  President,  after  the 
dinner,  requested  the  minister  to  sit  with  him  and  the  English, 
German,  and  French  ambassadors,  although  there  were  nine  other- 
ministers  having  precedence.  On  rising  the  President  approached 
Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  and  said:  "I  see  that  we  only  have  good 
news;  I  am  well  satisfied  with  what  has  occurred  in  the  House  and 
with  the  discipline  of  the  Republicans.  You,  who  comprehend 
this,  will  understand  this,  and  will  understand  how  strong  our 
position  is  and  how  much  it  has  changed  and  bettered  in  the  past 
year;  you  have  no  occasion  to  be  other  than  satisfied  and  confi 
dent."  "This  jincere  declaration,"  said  Senor  de  Lome  in  the 
telegram  which  he  sent  the  minister  of  state  next  day,  "was  wit 
nessed  by  all  the  foreign  diplomats." 3 

On  February  1,  1898,  Senor  Gullon  replied  to  the  American 
minister's  note  of  December  20,  1897.  He  complained  that  the 
satisfaction  from  the  statements  "giving  eloquent  expression  to  the 
recognition  of  the  irreproachable  procedure  of  Spain  is  to  a  great 
extent  destroyed  or' diminished  by  the  blame  cast  upon  the  pred 
ecessors  of  the  present  government,  and  still  more  so  by  the  fact 
that  the  numerous  and  incredible  excesses  committed  by  the  Cuban 
insurgents  are  confounded  in  the  same  category  with  the  conduct 
of  the  regular  army,"  a  criticism  the  justice  of  which  cannot  be 
denied.  The  minister  protested  that  his  government  could  not 
consent  to  a  foreign  cabinet's  making  use  of  party  struggles  or  re- 

1  Senor  Gullon  to  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  (telegram),  January  25,  1898, 
Spanish  (for.  and  Docs.,  69. 

2  The  Maine  arrived  without  any  demonstration,  the  usual  visits  were  made 
and  returned,  and  everything,  in  so  far  as  the  visit  was  concerned,  was  normal. 
Two  German  naval  vessels  were  also  at  Havana. 

On  February  18,  three  days  after  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  the  Spanish 
armored  cruiser  Vizcaya  arrived  at  New  York  where  she  remained  a  week  and 
then  went  to  Havana.  3  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  71. 


536  SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  ,  [1898 

criminations  as  a  basis  for  its  views  in  its  diplomatic  relations,  as 
they  were  "domestic  matters  entirely  foreign  to  the  judgment  or 
decision  of  other  nations."  He  said  not  very  appositely :  "  The  more 
expressive  and  earnest  the  congratulations  with  which  you  admit 
that  the  Spanish  government  has  drawn  the  plans  and  laid  the 
foundations  of  a  noble  structure  in  Cuba,  so  much  the  less  justi 
fiable  and  so  much  [the]  less  intelligible  is  the  hint"  that  the  United 
ptates  could  only  reasonably  be  expected  by  Spain  to  maintain  its 
present  attitude  until  facts  should  prove  that  the  indispensable  req- 
(  uisites  to  a  peace,  fair  and  just  to  all  concerned,  should  be  attained. 

Continuing,  he  said:  "The  Spanish  government  assuredly  did 
not  admit  that  reasons  of  proximity  or  damages  caused  by  war 
to  neighboring  countries  might  give  such  countries  a  right  to  limit, 
to  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  the  duration  of  a  struggle  disastrous 
to  all,  but  much  more  to  the  nation  in  which  it  breaks  out  or  is 
maintained."  He  referred  to  his  note  of  October  23,  1897,  as  prov 
ing  that  while  anxiety  for  peace  or  friendly  suggestions  might  be  ex 
pressed,  "never  and  under  no  circumstances"  could  foreign  in 
trusion  or  interference  be  justified.  Spain  would,  he  said,  act 
upon  these  honorable  principles,  "just  as  the  United  States  nobly 
acted  upon  them"  in  1861.  He  cited  the  instructions  of  Mr. 
Seward  to  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  April  22,  1861,  as 
constituting  "a  notable  example  for  all  countries  which,  like 
Spain,  value  their  honor  above  all  else,  even  to  (the  execution  of) 
the  declared  purpose  to  '  struggle  with  the  whole  world/  rather 
than  to  yield  to  pressure  from  without." l 

The  minister  declared  that  while  the  radical  reforms  instituted 
were  in  progress,  "it  is  certainly  not  the  time  for  the  United  States 
government  to  substitute  for  its  former  offers  of  its  good  offices 
hints  of  a  change  of  conduct  in  the  event  of  more  or  less  remote 
contingencies,  and  to  base  this  notification  of  its  change  not  only 
upon  the  contingency  of  a  material  success  .  .  .  but  upon  its  own 
estimate  of  the  success  itself." 

He  cited  Calvo's  statement  that  "international  law  does  not 

merely  oblige  states  to  prevent  their  subjects  from  doing  anything 

to  the  detriment  of  the  dignity  or  interests  of  friendly  nations  or 

governments;    it  imposes  upon  them,  in  addition,  the  strict  duty 

1  Presidents'  Messages  and  Docs.,  1861-65,  200. 


SENOR  GULLON'S  NOTE  537 

of  opposing  within  their  own  territory  all  plots,  machinations,  or 
combinations  of  a  character  to  disturb  the  security  of  countries 
with  which  they  maintain  relations  of  peace,  friendship,  and  good 
harmony."  *  Under  this,  he  stated,  had  been  addressed  the  request 
to  Washington  "on  numerous  occasions  to  prevent,  with  a  firm 
hand,  the  departure  of  filibustering  expeditions  against  Cuba,  and 
to  dissolve  or  prosecute  the  Junta  which  is  sitting  publicly  in  New 
York,  and  which  is  the  active  and  permanent  centre  of  attacks  upon 
the  Spanish  nation."  In  this  connection,  he  said  that  all  that  the 
Spanish  government  had  allowed  itself  to  do  was  "to  suggest  the 
means  of  rendering  real  and  effectual  those  obligations  which  are 
derived  from  true  friendship,  such  as  the  Spanish  government  under 
stands  it,  either  by  the  proclamation  of  the  same  nature  and  as 
emphatic  as  those  which  illustrious  predecessors  of  the  illustrious 
President,  Mr.  McKinley,  thought  themselves  called  upon  to  pub 
lish  under  similar  circumstances,  or  by  the  severe  application  of  the 
regulations  in  force,  or  by  their  amendment  or  enlargement,  as 
occurred  in  the  act  of  March  10,  1838."  2 

The  watchfulness  "during  the  last  few  months  along  the   ex-  " 
tended  coasts  of  America"  was  recognized  "with  genuine  gratitude." 
The  paper  closed  with  a  declaration  of  the  "firm  resolution  [of 
the  Spanish  people  and  government]  to  maintain  their  legitimate 
and  traditional  sovereignty  in  the  island  of  Cuba  at  every  hazard,  " 
and  with  an  appeal  to  the  United  States  to  recognize  the  changed 
conditions  saying:     "It  is  only  in  this  formula  of  colonial  self-  ; 
government  and  Spanish  sovereignty  that  peace,  which  is  so  neces-  j 
sary  to  the  Peninsula  and  to  Cuba,  and  so  advantageous  to  the 
United  States,  can  be  found."  3 

The  movement  southward  of  the  American  squadron  continued 
to  give  much  concern  to  the  Spanish  government.    Senor  Gullon  i 


,  Le  Droit  International,  §1298,  III,  156.  2  Supra,  515  (note). 

3  Senor  Gullon  to  General  Woodford,  February  1,  1898,  Spanish  Cor.  and 
Docs.,  71-78.  Also  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  658.  To  this  note  no  return  was 
ever  made;  a  few  weeks  later  General  Woodford,  in  an  interview  with  Senores 
Gullon  and  Moret,  informed  them  that  he  regarded  the  note  as  a  serious 
mistake;  that  he  would  advise  all  possible  delay  in  answering  it;  and  that 
whether  the  answer  would  be  pleasant  or  disagreeable  must  depend  entirely 
on  practical  results  in  Cuba.  General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley, 
February  26,  1898,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  664. 


538  DE  LOME'S  INTERCEPTED  LETTER          '  [1898 

telegraphed  Sefior  Dupuy  de  Lome,  February  8,  1898:  "The 
display  and  concentration  of  naval  forces  near  Havana  and  in  the 
waters  near  the  Peninsula  (Spain),  and  the  persistency  with  which 
the  Maine  and  Montgomery  remain  in  the  Greater  Antilles  are 
causing  increasing  anxiety  and  might,  through  some  mischance, 
bring  about  a  conflict.  We  are  trying  to  avoid  it  at  any  cost,  mak 
ing  heroic  efforts  to  maintain  ourselves  in  the  severest  rectitude."  l 

Even  while  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  was  sending  this,  the 
first  serious  blow  was  being  given  to  the  improved  understanding  be 
tween  the  two  governments.  At  the  same  moment  of  Senor  Gul- 
lon's  despatch,  Sefior  Dupuy  de  Lome  was  telegraphing  that  a 
letter  sent  by  him  to  Sefior  Jose*  Canalejas,  the  editor  of  the 
Madrid  Herald,  who  had  been  visiting  the  United  States,  but 
was  now  inspecting  conditions  in  Cuba,  had  been  intercepted, 
and  Sefior  Dupuy  de  Lome  was  informed  of  its  prospective  publi 
cation  next  day  in  a  New  York  paper.2  While  not  remembering  the 
"humiliating"  terms  in  which,  the  paper  claimed,  he  had  spoken 
of  the  President,  he  said:  "It  may  be  true,  and  my  position  here 
would  be  untenable.  I  notify  your  excellency  in  order  that  you 
may  decide  upon  the  course  best  for  the  queen  and  Spain,  without 
considering  me  in  any  way."  3 

The  publication  was  made  on  February  9,  as  promised.  While 
undated,  internal  evidence  showed  it  to  have  been  written  about 
the  middle  of  December,  1897.  It  began  with  some  frank  truths, 
saying:  "The  situation  remains  here  the  same.  Everything 
depends  on  the  political  and  military  outcome  in  Cuba.  The 
prologue  of  all  this,  in  this  second  phase  of  the  war,  will  end  the 
day  when  the  colonial  cabinet  shall  be  appointed,  and  we  shall 
be  relieved  in  the  eyes  of  this  country  of  a  part  of  the  responsibility 
for  what  is  happening  in  Cuba,  while  the  Cubans,  whom  these 
people  think  so  immaculate,  will  have  to  assume  it.  Until  then 

1  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  80. 

2  The  American  minister  at  Madrid  was  informed  by  Senor  Moret,  minister 
of  ultramar,  that  the  letter  had  been  stolen  from  the  Havana  post-office  by 
a  Spanish  clerk  in  the  office  and  who  was  a  spy  in  the  service  of  the  insurgents. 
General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley,  March  4,  1898,  Foreign  Relations, 
1898,  676. 

3  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  to  Senor  Gullon,  February  8,  1898  (telegram), 
Ibid.,  80. 


1898]  DE  LOME'S  INTERCEPTED  LETTER  539 

nothing  can  be  clearly  seen,  and  I  regard  it  as  a  waste  of  time  and 
progress  by  a  wrong  road  to  be  sending  emissaries  to  the  rebel 
camp,  or  to  negotiate  with  the  autonomists  who  have  as  yet  no 
legal  standing  or  to  try  and  ascertain  the  intentions  and  plans  of 
this  government.  The  [Cuban]  refugees  will  keep  on  returning 
one  by  one,  and  as  they  do  so,  will  make  their  way  into  the 
sheepfold,  while  the  leaders  in  the  field  will  gradually  come  back. 
Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  had  the  courage  to  leave  in  a  body, 
and  they  will  not  be  brave  enough  to  return  in  a  body." 

The  letter  continued  with  the  first  of  the  two  passages  which  were 
notably  objectionable.    "The  message  has  been  a  disillusionment 
to  the  insurgents,  who  expected  something  different;  but  I  regard 
it  as  bad  [for  us].    Besides  the  ingrained  and  inevitable  ill-breeding 
(groseria)  with  which  is  repeated  all  that  the  press  and  public 
opinion  in  Spain  have  said  about  Weyler,  it  once  more  shows  what  j 
McKinley  is,  weak  and  a  bidder  for  the  admiration  of  the  crowd,  / 
besides  being  a  would-be  politician   (politicastro)  who  tries  to  [ 
leave  a  door  open  behind  himself  while  keeping  on  good  terms  ' 
with  the  jingoes  of  his  party." 

The  second,  following  at  some  interval,  was  regarded   more 
gravely  than  even  the  animadversions  against  the  President,  "by 
reason  of  the  want  of  candor  which  appeared  to  underlie  the 
proposition  for  a  reciprocity  arrangement  with  the  autonomous 
government  of  Cuba,  which  [Dupuy  de  Lome]  shortly  afterward 
brought  forward  and  advocated  with  much  profession  of  earnest^ 
ness."1    It  read:    "It  would  be  very  advantageous  to  take  up,  { 
even  if  only  for  effect,  the  question  of  commercial  relations,  and  to  ( 
have  a  man  of  some  prominence  sent  hither  in  order  that  I  may   / 
make  use  of  him  here  to  carry  on  a  propaganda  among  the  senators   \ 
and  others,  in  opposition  to  the  Junta  and  to  try  and  win  over  the  -' 
refugees."  2 

1  Secretary  of  state  to  General  Woodford,  February  23,  1898,  Foreign  Re 
lations,  1898, 1018. 

2  For  the  letter  in  full,  see  Moore's  Digest,  VI,  176,  177.    A  paragraph  inter 
vening  between  the  two  quoted  said:     "I  do  not  think  sufficient  attention 
has  been  paid  to  the  part  England  is  playing.     Nearly  all  the  newspaper 
rabble  that  swarms  in  your  hotels  are  Englishmen  and  while  writing  for  the 
Journal,  they  are  also  correspondents  of  the  most  influential  journals  and 
reviews  of  London.    It  has  been  ever  so  since  this  thing  began.    As  I  look  at 


540        RESIGNATION  OF  SPANISH  MINISTER  '[1898 

Mr.  Day,  calling  upon  the  Spanish  minister,  was  informed  by  the 
latter  that  the  letter  was  his;  "that  as  minister  from  Spain,  [he] 
could  say  nothing,  but  claiming  right  to  express  [his]  opinion 
privately,  as,  with  such  frequency  and  less  discretion,  the  American 
agents  have  done."  In  his  telegram  conveying  this  conversation, 
Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome  added:  "My  position, you  will  see,  cannot  be 
what  it  was  before;  I  do  not  believe  I  can  continue  here."  * 

On  the  next  day,  February  10,  1898,  the  minister  of  state  tele 
graphed:  "In  accordance  with  your  excellency's  urgent  initiative, 
in  view  of  recent  incidents  and  before  any  manifestation  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  government  could  be  provoked,  the  acceptance 
of  your  excellency's  resignation  was  adopted  and  communicated 
to  the  representative  of  the  United  States." 2 

A  telegram  stating  that  the  immediate  recall  of  the  offending 
minister  was  expected  had  been  sent  on  the  9th,  but  was  not  re 
ceived  by  General  Woodford  until  the  next  day.  On  calling  in 
the  afternoon  upon  the  minister  of  state  to  whom  the  message  was 
read,  he  found  the  action  just  mentioned  already  taken,  and 
telegraphed  that  the  resignation  had  been  proffered  and  accepted 
by  cable  before  the  interview.  On  February  14,  General  Wood- 
ford  called  attention  in  a  note  to  the  minister  of  state  that  although 
it  was  the  fourth  day  since  their  interview,  he  had  "  not  yet  had  the 
satisfaction  of  receiving  any  formal  indication  that  his  majesty's 
government  regrets  and  disavows  the  language  and  sentiments 
which  were  employed  and  expressed"  in  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome's 
letter.  Hoping  and  believing  that  the  Spanish  government  had 
not  received  the  text,  he  enclosed  the  two  offending  paragraphs.3 
Senor  Gullon  replied  the  next  day  that  the  Spanish  government 
"with  entire  sincerity  lamented  the  incident."  He  however 
'deprecated  the  stress  laid  upon  the  second  paragraph  quoted  as 
objectionable,  which,  written  at  a  date  now  relatively  distant, 
could  not  be  used  to  throw  doubt  upon  the  good  faith  in  such 
negotiations  of  the  Spanish  government,  which,  "with  respect  to 
the  new  colonial  regime  and  the  projected  treaty  of  commerce,  gave 

it,  England's  only  object  is  that  the  Americans  should  amuse  themselves  with 
us  and  leave  her  alone,  and  if  there  should  be  a  war,  that  would  the  better 
stave  off  a  conflict  which  she  dreads,  but  which  will  never  come  about." 

1  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  81. 

*-Senor  Gullon  to  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  Ibid.,  81.  3  Ibid.,  83. 


1898]  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  "MAINE"  541 

such  evident  proofs  of  its  real  designs  and  of  its  innermost  con 
victions  that  it  does  not  now  consider  compatible  with  its  prestige 
to  lay  stress  upon  or  to  demonstrate  anew  the  truth  and  sincerity 
of  its  purposes  and  the  unstained  good  faith  of  its  intentions." 
The  American  government  recognized  that  the  safety  of  the  minis 
try  did  not  permit  it  tot  go  further  in  open  concession  and  the  in 
cident  was  closed  by  a  note  from  the  American  minister,  February 
19,  stating  his  government's  satisfaction  with  Senor  Gullon's 
reply.2 

"The  publication  of  the  letter,"  says  a  personal  and  confidential 
note   from  Assistant  Secretary  Day   to   General  Woodford,   on 
March  3,  "created  a  good  deal  of  feeling  among  Americans,  and 
but  for  the  fact  that  it  was  a  private  letter,  surreptitiously,  if  not     ^ 
criminally  obtained,  it  might  have  raised  considerable  difficulty^   \fi 
in  dealing  with  it  diplomatically.  ...  If  a  rupture  between  the  '' 
countries  must  come,  it  should  not  be  upon  any  such  personal  and 
comparatively  unimportant  matter."  3 

The  assistant  secretary  could  well  mention  the  incident  as 
"comparatively  unimportant,"  for  at  9.40  P.  M.,  February  15,  the 
Maine  had  been  blown  up  in  Havana  harbor,  with  the  loss  of  two 
officers  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  men. 

The  ship  had  been  lying  in  the  harbor  just  three  weeks.    There 
had  been  question  of  her  removal  for  sanitary  reasons,  and  the 
assistant  secretary  of  state,  telegraphing  this  on  February  4,  had 
also  said:    "Should  some  vessel  be  kept  there  all  the  time?    If 
another  sent,  what  have  you  to  suggest  as  to  kind  of  ship?"    To 
this  Consul-General  Lee  had  replied  the  same  day:    " Do  not  think 
slightest  sanitary  danger  to  officers  or  crew  until  April  or  even  May. 
Ship  or  ships  should  be  kept  here  all  the  time  now.    We  should 
not  relinquish  peaceful  control  of  situation,  or  conditions  would  be\ 
worse  than  if  vessel  had  never  been  sent.    Americans  would  depart  \ 
with  their  families  in  haste  if  no  vessel  in  harbor,  on  account  of 
distrust  of  preservation  of  order  by  authorities.     If  another  riot  , 
occurs,  [it]  will  be  against  the  governor-general  and  autonomy,  f 
but  might  include  anti-American  demonstration  also.     First-class 
battle-ship  should  replace  present  one  if  relieved,  as  object-lesson 

1  Senor  Gullon  to  General  Woodford,  February  15,  1898,  Spanish  Cor.  and 
Docs.,  84.  *Ibid.,  85.  *  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  680. 


542  THE  COURT  OF  INQUIRY  '[1898 

and  to  counteract  Spanish  opinion  of  our  navy,  and  should  have 
torpedo-boat  with  it  to  preserve  communication  with  admiral."  l 

The  Maine,  in  consequence  of  this  opinion,  remained.  On  the 
occurrence  of  the  disaster  there  was  immediate  expression  to  the 
American  minister  at  Madrid  of  deep  sympathy  from  the  Spanish 
government,  Admiral  Camara  bearing  from  the  minister  of  marine 
a  special  message  of  sympathy  from  the  Spanish  navy.  The 
Spanish  minister  at  Washington  presented  personally  the  expression 
of  grief  of  the  queen  regent,  and  warm  messages  of  condolenca 
were  received  from  Governor-General  Blanco  and  the  alcalde  of 
Havana.  The  recovered  dead,  after  lying  in  state  in  the  civil 
government  building  of  Havana,  were  buried  at  the  Havana 
cemetery  in  ground  presented  to  the  United  States.  "They  were 
escorted  to  the  cemetery  by  representatives  of  all  military,  naval, 
and  civil  organizations,  and  foreign  consular  officers,  and  through  a 
vast  concourse  of  people  spreading  over  the  route."  2  The  sur 
vivors  were  cared  for  at  the  hospitals  with  every  kindness.3 

The  "court  of  inquiry"  of  three  members  and  a  judge-advocate, 
customary  under  the  American  naval  regulations  in  cases  of  ac 
cidents  to  ships,  was  ordered  to  inquire  into  the  disaster.  The 
members  were  Captains  Sampson  and  Chadwick  and  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Potter,  all  of  the  squadron  which  had  been  engaged  in 
drills  in  the  Gulf  of  Florida,  with  head-quarters  at  the  Dry  Tor- 
tugas,  and  Lieutenant-Commander  Marix,  sent  from  Washington 
as  judge-advocate.  The  court  left  for  Havana  on  the  20th  of  Feb 
ruary  in  the  lighthouse  steamer  Mangrove,  aboard  which,  while  in 
Havana,  the  members  of  the  court  lived  and  carried  on  their  duties. 
The  tender  Fern,  the  coast-survey  steamer  Bache,  and  the  cruiser 
Montgomery,  were  ordered  to  Havana  to  assist  the  court  in  various 
ways  and  to  aid  in  caring  for  the  survivors  of  the  Maine.  In  the 
call  made  by  the  members  of  the  court  of  inquiry  on  their  arrival 
upon  Governor-General  Blanco,  any  examination  beyond  the 
ship's  side  was  objected  to  by  the  latter,  and  the  Spanish  authorities 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  1027.  The  torpedo-boat  Gushing  was  sent 
February  11,  but  remained  only  two  days. 

3  Sigsbee,  The  Maine,  110. 

8  For  the  expressions  of  condolence  from  Spanish  authorities  and  the  re 
plies  thereto,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  1029-1035. 


1898]  THE  GOVERNMENT'S  EXCELLENT  ATTITUDE      543 

instituted  an  examination  by  their  own  people,  which  was  carried 
on  simultaneously  with  that  of  the  American  court. 

The  gravity  of  the  situation  and  the  responsibility  resting  on 
the  court  was  fully  felt  by  the  members.  The  situation  precluded 
any  haste  and  the  inquiry  was  carried  on  deliberately,  carefully, 
and  searchingly  for  twenty-three  days,  and  with  every  effort  to 
reach  a  fair  and  just  finding. 

Necessarily  the  destruction  of  a  battle-ship  and  two-thirds  of  her 
people  would  be  an  appalling  event  under  any  circumstances^ 
"For  a  brief  time,"  as  said  the  President  in  his  message,  " intense! 
excitement  prevailed"  in  the  United  States,  but  with  the  exception 
of  a  certain  class  of  newspapers,  the  general  attitude  was  in  every 
way  to  be  praised.  Said  the  Nation:  "The  admirable  conduct 
of  the  government  officials  at  Washington  renders  the  course  of 
the  sensational  press  in  this  city  [New  York]  the  more  shameful 
by  contrast.  ...  It  speaks  well  for  the  good  sense  of  the  masses 
that  so  little  effect  has  been  produced  by  all  this  stuff.  It  is  evident 
that  a  large  proportion  of  the  public  refuses  to  take  the  sensational 
newspapers  seriously."  1 

1  The  Nation,  February  24,  1898,  p.  139. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE    FIFTY    MILLION    BILL. — EXCHANGE    OF    VIEWS    AT    MADRID. — 
SPAIN'S    FATAL   PROCRASTINATION 

THE  Spanish  government  now  complained  seriously  of  Consul- 
General  Lee.  Sefior  Moret,  minister  of  ultramar,  during  a  frank 
conversation  with  the  American  minister,  on  March  1,  requested  by 
the  former,  insisting  that  autonomy  was  making  real  and  effective 
progress,  that  it  was  winning  the  business  classes,  the  planters, 
and  all  the  great  middle  class  to  its  support,  said,  "it  will  surely  suc 
ceed  if  it  can  have  the  sympathy  of  the  American  consul-general 
at  Havana  and  the  friendship  of  the  United  States."  "Moret," 
said  General  Woodford,  reporting  the  conversation,  "believes  that 

f  ^General  Lee's  home  and  legation  are  centres  of  sympathy  for  the 
\  insurrection,  and  that  through  General  Lee's  conversation,  reports, 
and  general  personal  and  official  influence  the  insurrection  is 
helped  and  autonomy  retarded."  On  leaving  he  handed  General 
Woodford  a  memorandum  which  said:  "Spain  cannot  consider 
him  a  reliable  man  and  is  entitled  to  say  that  his  reports  are  mis 
leading  and  untrustworthy.  Consul  Lee  freely  admits  that  he  is 
corresponding  with  the  insurgents  and  openly  avows  that  he  is 
deadly  against  autonomy.  The  insular  government  distrusts  him 
as  well,  and  is  much  inclined  to  solicit  his  recall."  To  this  reply 

/"came  by  telegram  of  the  next  day :  "The  President  will  not  consider 
any  proposal  to  withdraw  General  Lee.  Even  a  suggestion  of  his 

|  recall  at  this  time  would  be  most  unfortunate  from  every  point  of 
\j   view:    Our  information  and  belief  is  that  throughout  this  crisis 

v^  General  Lee  has  borne  himself  with  great  ability,  prudence,  and 
fairness."  x  General  Woodford  was  able  to  reply  on  March  4 
that  there  would  be  no  suggestion  of  recall  of  Consul-General  Lee; 

\  "the  minister  fully  appreciates  the  situation."  2 

The  death-blow  to  autonomy  was  given  on  March  9  in  the  appro- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  675,  676.  2  Ibid.,  676. 

544 


1898]         THE  FIFTY  MILLION  APPROPRIATION  545 

priation  by  Congress,  without  a  dissentient  vote,  of  fifty  million 
dollars,  "  for  the  national  defence  and  for  each  and  every  purpose 
connected  therewith,  to  be  expended  by  the  President,  and  to  re 
main  available  until  January  1,  1899."  l 

It  was  now  impossible  that  the  insurgents,  with  hopes  raised  to  J  ^/ 
highest  pitch  by  action  which  could  to  them  have  but  one  meaning,  f 
should  now  yield  to  Spain's  offers.     Coming  so  quickly  upon  the 
dismissal  of  a  trusted  minister  and  the  destruction  of  the  Maine, 
it  was  as  a  knell  to  Spain's  hopes  for  Cuba.    The  news  in  Spain,, 
said  General  Woodford,  writing  to  the  President  on  the  date  of  the  \/)6  ,f 
passage  of  the  act,  "has  not  excited  the  Spaniards — it  has  stunned 
them.    To  appropriate  fifty  millions  out  of  money  in  the  treasury, 
without  borrowing  a  cent,  demonstrates  wealth  and  power.    Even 
Spain  can  see  this.    To  put  this  money,  without  restriction  and  by  , 
unanimous  vote,  absolutely  at  your  disposal  demonstrates  entire  j 
confidence  in  you  by  all  parties.    The  ministry  and  the  press  are 
simply  stunned."  2    Two  days  later  the  new  minister  of  Spain  to 
Washington,  Senor.Polo  de  Bernabe',  was  at  his  post,  and  tele 
graphed,  "In  spite  of  the  supremeness  of  this  measure,  the  situ 
ation  at  the  moment  appears  more  tranquil,  while  still  of  unde 
niable  gravity,"  8  an  opinion  which  could  not  have  much  value 
so  long  as  the  effect  in  Cuba  should  not  be  taken  into  account. 
On  March  12  the  minister  telegraphed  that  he  had  been  received 
by  the  President,  "who  made  a  most  gracious  address.     I  fear, 
nevertheless,  that  the  acts  will  not  bear  out  the  words."  4 

The  American  minister  throughout  had  had  correspondence  with 
the  President,  to  whom  he  wrote  frequently  and  at  great  length,  as 
well  as  to  his  direct  superior,  the  secretary  of  state.  On  March  17 
he  wrote  the  former  in  a  letter  numbered  forty-three:  "With 
the  exception  of  Minister  Moret  and  those  whom  his  splendid 
courage  and  personal  magnetism  inspire  and  control,  I  do  not 
think  that  any  thoughtful  man  in  Madrid  now  believes  that  auton 
omy,  and  what  is  euphemistically  called  '  influencing  rebel  chiefs/ 
and  military  operations  combined,  can  practically  suppress  'the 

1  Cong.  Record,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  p.  2631. 
3  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  684. 

1  Senor  Polo  de  Bernabe"  to  minister  of  state,  March  10,  1898,  Spanish 
Cor.  and  Docs.,  90.  *  Ibid.,  91. 


546          AMERICAN  MINISTER'S  HOPE  OF  PEACE     '  [1898 

rebellion  before  the  rainy  season  begins.  Senor  Sagasta,  an  ex 
perienced  statesman,  a  loyal  Spaniard,  and  a  faithful  friend  of  the 
queen  .  .  .  waits  hoping  against  hope.  I  think  he  would  do  any 
thing  for  peace  that  Spain  would  approve  and  accept.  Senor 
Gullon  evidently  doubts  whether  peace  can  be  maintained.  .  .  . 
[On]  February  7  I  ...  reported  that  the  present  ministry  had  de 
cided  that  they  have  made  all  the  concessions  to  the  United  States 
that  they  can  make  without  endangering  their  own  power  and  the 
continuance  of  the  present  dynasty;  that  they  will  do  no  more  and 
will  fight  if  what  they  have  done  does  not  secure  our  continued  neu 
trality.  In  my  No.  33  of  February  19  [the  numbers  referred  to  the 
letters  to  the  President],  I  confirmed  my  belief  in  the  disposition 
and  decision  of  the  Spanish  government  to  make  no  further  con 
cessions  .  .  .  [Senor  Moret's  admission]  that  the  delay  of  one 
month  in  dissolving  the  old  Cortes  and  convening  the  new  one  was 
due  to  the  request  of  the  insular  government,  throws  much  light 
upon  the  Cuban  question." 

The  minister  continued:  "To-day  I  have  more  hope  in  pos 
sible  peace  than  I  have  had  since  I  sailed  from  New  York.  The 
unanimous  passage  of  the  Cannon  [fifty  million  dollars]  bill  at 
Washington  and  the  reception  of  the  news  here  in  Madrid,  give  me 
this  hope.  .  .  .  The  thought  of  sale  is  to-day  in  the  air  of  Madrid. 
...  I  think  the  largest  shareholders  of  the  Spanish  debt  will  soon 
advise  the  sale.  But  Senor  Moret  has  now  made  a  speech  ...  in 
which  he  has  taken  very  positive  ground  that  autonomy  will  suc 
ceed.  His  speech  is  clever  and  strong;  but  .  .  .  even  he  may 
change.  ...  I  believe  that  Spain,  tired  out  and  exhausted, 
threatened  with  practical  famine,  and  confronted  with  the  imme 
diate  necessity  of  tremendous  outlay,  would  thank  the  queen  for 
her  wisdom  and  courage  should  she  dare  to  part  with  Cuba  without 
war,  and  would  sustain  her  even  if  she  were  compelled  to  change  her 
ministry  to  secure  this  result."  After  analyzing  the  prospect  of 
continued  famine  and  anarchy  throughout  the  summer,  he  said: 
"I  am  thus,  reluctantly,  slowly,  and  entirely  a  convert  to  the  Ameri 
can  ownership  and  occupation  of  the  island.  ...  I  therefore  ask 
your  permission  to  treat  [if  we  could  purchase  at  a  reasonable 
price]  .  .  .  should  the  opportunity  ever  be  presented." 

1  General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley,  March  17,  1898,  Foreign  Re 
lations,  1898,  685. 


1898]  THE  DISCUSSIONS  AT  MADRID  547 

It  was  but  the  next  day  that  he  again  wrote  the  President  (No. 
44)  at  great  length,  saying:  "At  noon  I  learned  that  the  council 
of  ministers  had  held  long  and  heated  meeting;  that  the  ministers 
of  war  and  navy  had  advised  immediate  action  by  Spain,  urging 
that  each  day  of  delay  increased  our  preparation  for  war  and 
lessened  any  chance  of  Spanish  success;  that  Moret  had  argued 
for  peace;  that  Sagasta  had  finally  and  positively  declared  for 
peace  on  any  terms  at  all  consistent  with  Spanish  honor;  that  the 
peace  party  had  triumphed  and  that  the  ministers  of  war  and 
navy  had  withdrawn  their  threats  of  possible  resignation."  Later 
in  the  day  General  Woodford  had  an  interview  of  an  hour  and  a 
half  with  Senor  Moret,  who  requested  that  the  talk  should  be  as 
between  "Mr.  Woodford  and  Mr.  Moret,  as  he  thought  the  time 
had  come  for  a  full  and  free  understanding  between  us  in  the  inr 
terest  of  peace."  Senor  Moret  asked:  " Can  you  not,  and  will  you; 
not  ask  your  President  to  advise  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  their 
arms  and  accept  autonomy?"  General  Woodford  replied:  "I 
cannot;  you  would  not  accept  our  good  offices  last  autumn,  and  the 
self-respect  of  my  government  forbids  our  tendering  them  again 
except  at  the  official  request  of  Spain,  and  such  request,  to  be\ 
efficient  now,  should  leave  us  a  very  free  hand." 

Requested  by  Senor  Moret  to  "talk  freely.  ...  If  we  can 
understand  each  other  fully  we  can  work  together  for  peace,  and 
that  is  what  my  unhappy  country  needs,"  General  Woodford, 
after  referring  to  the  oncoming  rainy  season  and  the  continuation 
of  disorder  and  suffering,  said:  "The  Spanish  flag  cannot  give 
peace;  the  rebel  flag  cannot  give  peace;  there  is  but  one  flag  and 
one  power  that  can  secure  peace  and  compel  peace;  that  power  is 
the  United  States  and  that  flag  is  our  flag."  Encouraged  by  Senor 
Moret,  he  gave  his  views,  mentioning  that  they  were  wholly  personal 
and  without  authority:  "The  United  States  to  pay  a  fixed  sum  for 
the  purchase  of  the  island;  a  part  of  such  price  to  be  retained  as 
a  fund  for  the  payment  of  all  claims  due  from  the  United  States 
to  Spain  or  to  Spanish  citizens,  and  from  Spain  to  the  United 
States  or  citizens  of  the  United  States";  the  claims  to  be 
determined  by  a  commission;  the  agreement  to  sell  need  not  be 
published,  the  public  memorandum  might  only  provide  for  ad 
justment  of  all  differences,  with  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain  as 
arbitrator. 


548  THE  DISCUSSIONS  AT  MADRID  '  [1898 

Senor  Moret  asked  if  serious  opinion  in  the  United  States  would 
be  willing  to  purchase  Cuba;  also  whether  it  was  thought  the 
United  States  would  be  willing  to  guarantee  the  Cuban  debt  if  in 
dependence  were  granted,  which  would  be  a  practical  protectorate, 
and  what  General  Woodford  thought  would  be  the  effect  upon 
Spain  if  she  were  to  part  with  the  island. 

He  was  answered  that  it  was  believed  that  the  great  body  of 
thoughtful  Americans  were  as  opposed  to  immediate  annexation 
as  General  Woodford  himself  was;  "that  after  all  the  excitement 
of  temporary  and  passionate  discussion  our  people  think  carefully 
and  act  deliberately."  General  Woodford  rehearsed  the  exagger 
ated  views  as  to  the  reduction  of  Cuban  population  from  1,600,000 
to  no  more  than  1,200,000,  and  "that  many  careful  judges  fixed 
the  present  population  and  soldiers  at  less  than  1,000,000";  restated 
the  condition  of  devastation  and  prevention  of  commerce  still  pre 
vailing,  and  mentioned  his  belief  "that  the  most  conservative 
public  opinion  in  the  United  States  would  not  justify"  the  Presi 
dent  or  government  "in  delaying  action  beyond  a  very  early  day, 
and  that  since  we  must  act,  I  believed  that  our  people  would 
prefer  to  buy  rather  than  suffer  the  pains  of  war,  since  purchase 
or  war  must  result  in  the  same  thing — the  occupation  and  own 
ership  of  the  island.  As  to  guarantee  of  the  Cuban  debt  and 
practical  protectorate  over  the  island,  .  .  .  many  of  our  people 
would  prefer  this  to  occupation  and  ownership,"  but  General 
Woodford  hoped  this  would  not  be  the  solution,  on  account  of 
"syndicate  deals  and  private  financial  operations." 

"As  to  the  effect  upon  Spain  .  .  .  the  business  men  and  the 
plain  people  .  .  .  are  tired  of  a  useless  and  exhausting  war;  that 
Spain  had  lost  Cuba;  that  if  autonomy  succeeded  in  securing 
peace,  the  autonomisitc  government  would  each  year  ask  and  get 
larger  and  larger  independence;  that  disagreement  would  probably 
come  over  the  distribution  of  the  present  debt,  and  that  certain 
quarrels  would  arise  over  future  contributions  by  Cuba  to  the  ex 
penses  of  the  home  government;  that  if  autonomy  succeeded,  a  new 
nation  would  be  created  and  that  nation  could  not  be  expected  to 
continue  subject  and  tributary  to  Spain;  that  when  the  autonomic 
government  resisted  there  would  be  rebellion  which  Spain  could 
neither  coax  nor  coerce." 


1898]  THE  DISCUSSIONS  AT  MADRID  549 

At  the  close  Senor  Moret  said:  "Substantially,  I  do  not  commit 
myself  to  details.  The  right  way  can  be  found  if  we  will  both  do 
our  best,  and  I  will  work  with  you  for  peace,  and  I  am  sure  we  shall 
get  together  as  to  details.  This  must  be  confidential  between  us, 
for  we  are  not  talking  as  officials." 

The  next  day,  March  19,  General  Woodford  sent  a  telegram  to 
the  President,  after  having  shown  it  to  Sefior  Moret,  who  said  that 
without  being  able  to  approve  it  officially  he  would  personally  work 
with  the  American  minister  to  secure  the  results  which  the  latter  had 
indicated.  The  telegram  said:  "Unless  report  on  Maine  requires 
immediate  action,  I  suggest  that  nothing  be  decided  or  done  until 
after  the  receipt  of  my  personal  letters  43,  44,  and  46,  which  my 
second  secretary  of  legation  will  carry  from  Gibraltar,  Monday, 
March  21.  I  also  suggest  that  you  authorize  me  to  tell  the  queen 
informally,  or  any  minister  indicated  by  her,  that  you  wish  final 
agreement  before  April  15.  If  you  will  acquaint  me  fully  with 
general  settlement  desired,  I  believe  Spanish  government  will  offer 
without  compulsion,  and  upon  its  own  motion,  such  terms  of  settle 
ment  as  may  be  satisfactory  to  both  nations.  Large  liberty  as  to 
details  should  be  offered  to  Spain,  but  your  friendship  is  recognized 
and  appreciated,  and  I  now  believe  it  will  be  a  pleasure  to  Span 
ish  government  to  propose  what  will  probably  be  satisfactory  to 
you."  2 

The  minister  sent,  the  same  day,  the  No.  46  referred  to  in  his 
telegram.  He  said:  "Senor  Moret  said  to  me  this  morning  that 
justice  to  the  queen  required  him  to  assure  me  in  the  most  positive 
manner  that  she  had  not  been  privy  to  or  cognizant  of  any  sugges 
tion  that  she  wished  to  talk  with  me  about  any  possible  cession  of 
Cuba,  either  to  the  insurgents  or  to  the  United  States;  that  she- 
wished  to  hand  over  his  patrimony  unimpaired  to  her  son  when/ 
he  should  reach  his  majority,  and  that  she  would  prefer  to  abdicate 
her  regency  and  return  to  her  Austrian  home  rather  than  be  the 
instrument  of  ceding  or  parting  with  any  of  Spain's  colonies.  .  .  . 
I  am  sure  that  Mr.  Moret  regards  this  [parting  with  Cuba]  as  in 
evitable  and  is  only  seeking  the  way  in  which  to  do  it  and  yet  save 
Spanish  honor.  He  will  probably  find  the  way  to  do  it  even  if  he 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  688-692. 
3  Ibid.,  692. 


550  A  PROMPT  PEACE  DEMANDED  -[1898 

has  to  sacrifice  himself.     I  hope  this  last  may  not  be  necessary. 
I  do  not  believe  it  will  be.  ..."  l 

The  historian  who  has  carefully  studied  the  documents  which 
have  been  made  public  cannot  resist  the  conclusion  that  the  secre- 
i  tary  of  state  was  very  early  convinced  that  the  guns  would,  sooner 
or  later — the  sooner  the  better — have  to  be  invoked  to  blow  away 
stacles  that  resisted  diplomacy,  but  that  President  McKinley  was 
reluctant  to  take  the  step  because  he  felt  that  with  sufficient  time  his 
diplomatic  efforts  could  bring  peace  to  Cuba.     General  Woodford, 
as  seen,  zealously  seconded  the  optimism  of  the  President.     The 
next  day  Assistant  Secretary  Day  informed  the  minister:    "Presi 
dent  is  at  loss  to  know  just  what  your  telegram  19th  covers.  Whether 
loss  of  Maine  or  whole  situation.     [The  unanimous  report  that 
Maine  was  blown  up  by  submarine  mine]  must  go  to  Congress 
i    SJoon.     Feeling  in   the  United  States  very  acute.     People  have 
ijorne  themselves  with  great  forbearance  and  self-restraint  last 
month.      President   has  no  doubt  Congress  will  act  wisely  and 
immediate  crisis  may  be  avoided,  particularly  if  there  be  certainty 
of  prompt  restoration  of  peace  in  Cuba.     Maine  loss  may  be  peace 
fully  settled  if  full  reparation  is  promptly  made  such  as  the  most 
•  .  civilized  nation  would  offer.      But  there  remain  general  condi- 
"/tions  in  Cuba  which  cannot  be  longer  endured,  and  which  will 
|  demand  action  on  our  part  unless  Spain  restores  honorable  peace 
I  which  will  stop  starvation  of  people  and  give  them  an  opportunity 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898, 693.  The  turn  of  opinion  in  Spain  had  already  found 
voice  in  a  portion  of  the  press,  the  National,  of  Madrid,  proposing  that  the  island 
be  sold  to  the  United  States,  the  Spanish  debt  ($400,000,000)  pertaining  to  it  to 
be  assumed  by  the  Union,  Spain  to  enjoy  for  a  certain  time  her  tariff  privileges, 
and  that  life  and  property  of  Spaniards  in  the  island  be  guaranteed.  The 
proposal  to  assume  such  a  debt  would  have  made  acceptance  of  the  island 
impossible.  Says  the  Nation  (March  10,  1898):  "The  chances  of  such  a  step 
are  not  one  in  a  hundred.  The  truth  is  that  if  the  island  were  offered  to  us  as 
a  free  gift  we  should  be  by  no  means  in  haste  to  accept  it.  ...  The  spur 
X/that  pricks  us  on  has  been  the  spectacle  of  a  people  near  our  shores  fighting 
.  for  independence.  ...  It  may  be  a  mistaken  one  in  the  sense  that  we  have 
too  hastily  assumed  that  the  insurgents  are  the  people  of  Cuba,  but  it  is  not 
soiled  with  the  desire  of  gain." 

i^  These  words,  in  the  view  of  the  present  writer,  fairly  express  the  attitude 
of  the  American  mind  of  the  period.  Spain's  attitude  was  colored  throughout 
by  the  idea  that  the  United  States  wished  Cuba  for  its  own  purposes.  Time 
has  shown  the  falsity  of  this  view. 


AFFAIRS  AT  MADRID  551 

to  take  care  of  themselves  and  restore  commerce  now  wholly  lost. 
April  15  is  none  too  early  date  for  accomplishment  of  these  \ 
purposes.  Relations  will  be  much  influenced  by  attitude  of  Spanish 
government  in  Maine  matter,  but  general  conditions  must  not  be 
lost  sight  of.  It  is  proper  that  you  should  know  that,  unless  events 
otherwise  indicate,  the  President,  having  exhausted  diplomatic 
agencies  to  secure  peace  in  Cuba,  will  lay  the  whole  question  before 
Congress.  Keep  President  fully  advised,  as  action  of  next  few 
days  may  control  situation."  l 

On  March  21  the  minister  telegraphed  that  he  had  had  no 
intimation  of  the  character  of  the  report  on  the  Maine  previous  to 
the  word  just  received,  so  that  the  Maine  was  not  in  consideration 
in  anything  which  he  had  sent.  The  subject  had  never  been  dis 
cussed  between  the  Spanish  government  and  himself.2  On  March 
22  he  had  an  interview  with  Senor  Moret  in  which,  speaking  un 
officially,  he  informed  the  latter  of  the  reception  of  a  reply  to  his 
telegram  of  March  19,  shown  Senor  Moret.  General  Woodford 
mentioned  that  the  report  on  the  Maine  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the 
President,  but  that  he  himself  was  not  authorized  to  disclose  its 
character  or  conclusions.  He  repeated  to  Senor  Moret  the  purport 
of  the  remainder  of  the  telegram  just  received,  and  said:  "I  will 
telegraph  immediately  to  the  President  any  suggestion  that  Spain 
may  make,  and  I  hope  to  receive  within  a  very  few  days  some 
definite  proposition  that  shall  mean  immediate  peace."  3  In  the 
telegram  reporting  the  interview  General  Woodford  mentioned 
that  he  had  arranged  an  interview  with  the  minister  of  state  for 
March  23,  and  asked  instructions  in  case  he  should  be  asked  to 
suggest  what  might  be  acceptable  to  the  President.  He  received 
none  until  three  days  after. 

The  ministers  met,  as  arranged,  on  the  23d.  Senor  Moret,  who 
spoke  English,  and  who  thus,  frequently,  in  the  interest  of  accuracy, 
acted  as  interpreter,  was  present  at  this  interview  and  conveyed 
to  the  minister  of  state  the  repetition  by  General  Woodford  of  that 
which  the  latter  had  already  stated  to  himself.  Senor  Gullon  re 
plied  that  his  government  had  not  received  the  text  of  the  Spanish 

si    '  Foreign  Relations,  692.    (March  20,  1898.)  3  Ibid.,  695. 

3  General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley  (telegram),  March  22,  1898, 
Ibid.,  696. 


552  AFFAIRS  AT  MADRID  '  [1898 

report,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  statement  from  the  minister 
"as  to  the  character  of  the  American  report  he  could  not  discuss  the 
matter,  but  that  the  Spanish  government  would  certainly  do  what 
ever  right  and  justice  should  require  when  [it]  should  have  full 
knowledge  of  all  the  facts."  He  then  said  that  he  was  surprised  at 
the  apparent  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  as  indicated 
by  the  statement  just  made,  and  added  that  he  would  be  glad  to 
have  the  minister  tell  him  why  it  was  presented  at  the  present 
time. 

General  Woodford  replied  that  "  the  United  States  has  not  varied 
its  attitude  since  I  came  to  Spain  last  September.  My  first  words  to 
her  majesty  when  I  was  presented  at  San  Sebastian  were  the  sincere 
expression  of  the  desire  of  the  United  States  for  peace  in  Cuba  and 
peace  between  Spain  and  the  United  States.  Peace  seemed  to  be 
made  possible  by  the  removal  of  General  Weyler,  by  the  attempted 
change  in  the  methods  of  conducting  the  war,  and  by  the  proffer 
ttf  autonomy  to  the  island.  I  believe  that  the  present  Spanish  govern 
ment  was  sincere  in  the  efforts  it  indicated.  .  .  .  The  peace  .  .  . 
(has  not  been  secured  .  .  .  and  the  time  has  come  when  the 
United  States  must,  in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  because  of  the 
;  great  and  pressing  commercial,  financial,  and  sanitary  needs  of 
»  our  country,  ask  that  some  satisfactory  agreement  be  reached  within 
,  a  very  few  days  which  will  assure  immediate  and  honorable  peace." 

General  Woodford,  saying  that  "neither  the  present  judgment  of 
the  civilized  world  nor  the  final  judgment  of  history  would  excuse  the 
United  States  in  longer  permitting  the  present  condition  of  affairs 
in  an  island  lying  within  one  hundred  miles  of  our  coast,"  con 
tinued  at  some  length  respecting  Cuba's  dark  conditions,  closing  his 
remarks  with  the  statement  of  the  telegram  that "  the  great  and  con 
trolling  questions  of  humanity  and  civilization  require  that  perma 
nent  and  immediate  peace  be  established  and  enforced." 

Sefior  Gullon,  repeating"  that  Spain  might  be  relied  upon  to  do 
what  is  right  and  just  and  honorable  in  the  matter  of  the  Maine" 
expressed  his  belief  that  the  insurrection  would  be  practically  sup 
pressed  before  the  rainy  season  began;  that  all  the  rebel  leaders, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  chiefs,  were  willing  now  to  submit  if 
the  United  States  would  only  advise  them  to  do  so,  and  that  if  we 
would  withhold  intervention  until  the  beginning  of  the  rainy  season 


1898]  AFFAIRS  AT  MADRID  553 

he  believed  that  he  could  assure  the  government  of  the  United 
States  that  the  rebellion  would  then  be  ended  and  that  autonomy 
would  be  assured  in  its  successful  operation.  He  added  that  the 
Spanish  government  is  ready  to  enlarge  and  increase  the  present 
grant  of  autonomy  in  all  honorable  ways  that  will  add  to  its  effi 
ciency  and  guarantee  its  success. 

"He  then,"  says  General  Woodford,  "asked  if  I  would  not  tele-   \ 
graph  my  government  to  withhold  action  until  the  beginning  of  the 
rainy  season."    General  Woodford,  after  saying  that  he  "  had  come^ 
reluctantly  but  positively  to  the  judgement  that  autonomy  could  not 
give  peace  to  Cuba  in  any  reasonable  time,"  said,  "kindly,  buL^ 
firmly,  that  I  did  not  believe  the  delay  for  which  he  asked  to  be 
possible  and  that  my  government  wished  immediate  and  honorable 
peace;  and  I  repeated  that  unless  some  satisfactory  agreement  B| 
reached  within  a  very  few  days  the  President  must  submit  the 
whole  question  to  Congress." 

On  the  following  day  (Marclu24)  Senor  Moret,  who  was  now 
eager  for,  and  optimistic  as  to  the  possibility  of,  an  adjustment, 
called  by  prearrangement  upon  the  American  minister,  the  inter 
view  being  purely  personal  and  in  no  sense  official.  He  proposed 
that  the  question  of  "an  early  and  honorable  peace"  be  submitted 
to  the  Cuban  congress,  to  meet  May  4,  and  that  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment  give  the  congress  all  necessary  authority  to  negotiate  and 
conclude  such  peace. 

"I  asked  him,"  said  General  Woodford,  "what  about  military 
operations  in  Cuba  between  now  and  May  4  ?  He  replied  an  im 
mediate  armistice  or  truce  to  be  enforced  by  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  upon  its  army,  provided  the  United  States  can  secure  the 
acceptance  and  enforcement  of  like  immediate  truce  by  the  insur 
gents. 

"I  then  asked,  supposing  the  insular  government  and  Congress 
cannot  arrange  terms  for  permanent  peace  with  the  insurgent 
government  before  the  15th  of  next  September,  which  will  be  the 
end  of  the  rainy  season?  He  replied  that  he  would  personally 
advise  his  minister  that  the  government  of  Spain  and  the  United 
States  should  in  such  event  jointly  compel  both  parties  in  Cuba  to 

1  General  Woodford  to  Secretary  Sherman,  No.  189,  March  25, 1898,  Foreign 
Relations,  698-701. 


554  AFFAIRS  AT  MADRID  [1898 

accept  such  settlement  as  the  two  governments  should  then  jointly 
advise,  such  terms  to  be  arranged  .  .  .  before  the  15th  of  next 
September.  He  told  me  that  the  minister  for  foreign  affairs 
would  probably  communicate  some  such  proposition  to  me  offi 
cially  to-morrow  (Friday),  in  answer  to  my  official  statement  of 
yesterday.  I  replied  that  I  could  give  him  no  assurance  or  inti 
mation  as  to  whether  such  proposition  would  be  acceptable  to 
you."  l 

On  March  25,  in  an  interview  requested  by  Sefior  Gullon  with 
General  Woodford,  the  former  "was  very  earnest  in  his  desire  that 
the  report  ...  on  the  subject  of  the  Maine  should  not  be  sent  to 
Congress  but  should  be  held  as  the  subject  of  diplomatic  adjust 
ment  between  the  two  governments.  He  assured  me,"  says  General 
Woodford  in  his  account  of  the  interview,  "that  Spain  would  do  in 
this  matter  whatever  was  just  and  right.  He  repeated  the  sug 
gestion,  made  informally  by  Sefior  Moret  the  day  before,  of  leaving 
the  question  of  peace  to  the  insular  government.  General  Woodford 
asked  if  his  government  would  be  willing  to  grant  an  immediate 
and  effective  armistice,  or  truce,  provided  the  insurgents  on  their 
part  would  agree  to  and  enforce  the  same.  Senor  Gullon  replied 
that  he  could  not  give  a  final  answer  without  consulting  his  asso 
ciates,  but  that  personally  he  feared  that  such  an  armistice  was 
impossible." 2 

Again  was  Spain  to  suffer  from  the  fatal  habit  of  procrastination. 
Had  her  government  now  done  what  it  was  to  grant  a  fortnight 
later,  in  terms  independent  of  action  by  the  insurgents,  the  situation 
might  have  been  saved.  The  report  of  the  court  upon  the  Maine 
was  not  to  go  to  Congress  for  yet  three  days.  Had  the  President 
in  his  message  transmitting  this  been  able  to  append  the  words  in 
which,  on  April  11,  he  announced  the  order  from  Spain  to  General 
Blanco  to  suspend  hostilities,  affairs  would  have  had  a  very  different 
color,  and  the  message  of  April  11  might  never  have  been  sent 
in  the  fateful  form  in  which  it  went.  Instead,  the  Spanish  minister 
of  state  sent  to  the  American  minister,  Friday  evening,  March  25, 
a  vague  memorandum,  which  Senor  Moret  declared  to  the  latter  to 

\  l  General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley  (telegram),  March  24,  1898, 
foreign  Relations,  697. 
vj  3  General  Woodford  to  Secretary  Sherman,  March  25,  1898,  Ibid.,  701. 


1898]  THE  SPANISH  MEMORANDUM  555 

mean  "  that  the  question  of  an  early  and  honorable  peace  shall  be 
submitted  by  the  Spanish  government  to  (the)  Cuban  congress  on 
May  4,  and  that  (the)  Spanish  government  will  give  [the]  Cuban 
congress  all  necessary  authority  to  negotiate  and  conclude  peace, 
provided  such  authority  shall  not  diminish  or  interfere  with  the  con 
stitutional  power  vested  by  the  Cuban  constitution  in  the  central 
government."  He  said,  states  the  American  minister,  "  that  if 
we  asked  for  immediate  armistice  he  believes  Spanish  government 
will  grant  and  enforce  armistice  on  sole  condition  that  insurgent 
government  does  same.  If  you  approve  these  suggestions  and 
believe  they  will  lead  to  immediate  peace,  I  ask  authority  to  put 
these  two  direct  questions  to  Spanish  minister  for  foreign  affairs: 
First,  Does  your  memorandum  mean  exactly  what  the  minister 
for  colonies  says,  employing  his  precise  words  ?  Second,  Will  you 
decree  and  enforce  immediate  armistice  until  the  end  of  the  rainy 
season  if  insurgent  government  will  do  the  same  ?  I  believe  that  if 
immediate  peace  can  be  secured  now,  lasting  until  September  15, 
hostilities  will  not  be  resumed.  I  expect  to  see  Minister  Moret 
this  (Saturday)  evening  at  my  house."  1 

Accompanying  the  vague  memorandum  translated  into  under 
standable  terms  by  Sefior  Moret  was  a  second  part,  which  men 
tioned  an  unfortunate  request  from  the  wrecking  company  em 
ployed  on  the  Maine  to  recover  the  bodies  and  examine  the  wreck. 
This  request,  conveyed  by  Captain  Sigsbee  to  the  governor-general, 
was  for  permission  to  employ  dynamite  to  blow  away  some  of  the 
upper  works  for  the  easier  recovery  of  the  dead.  Finding  that  the 
object  was  mistaken — as  being  to  destroy  the  ship  and  thus  "anni 
hilate  the  only  proofs  "  of  cause,  the  request  was  immediately  with 
drawn.  The  memorandum  said:  "Even  without  seeing  in  the 
request  of  the  captain  of  the  Maine  any  other  meaning  than  that 
personally  expressed  in  the  petition  signed  by  him,  the  Spanish 
government  considers  as  utterly  unjustifiable  and  inadmissible 
the  resolution  which  submits  to  a  political  assembly  the  report 
drawn  up  by  the  official  American  board  of  inquiry.  ...  As  yet 
nothing  is  known  of  the  report  of  the  Spanish  commission.  After 
having  invited  in  vain  the  United  States  naval  officers  to  take  part 

1  General  Woodford  to  President  McKinley  (telegram),  March  25,  1898, 
Foreign  Relations,  1898,  703. 


556  SPANISH  CIRCULAR  NOTE 

in  its  labors  and  go  through  the  necessary  investigations  con 
jointly  with  its  members,  it  has  finished  and  drawn  up  its  con 
clusions  with  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  scene  of  a  disaster  so 
deplorable  and  painful  for  all  Spaniards.  One  of  the  principal, 
if  not  the  principal,  bases  of  judgment  is  therefore  wanting  for 
every  individual  or  body  of  men  who  may  wish  to  weigh  the  facts 
with  perfect  impartiality.  Under  these  circumstances,  to  place 
before  a  popular  deliberating  assembly,  without  correction,  ex 
planation,  or  counterproof  of  any  kind,  a  report  which,  issued  by 
the  fellow-citizens  of  the  members  of  that  body,  must  necessarily 
meet  with  approval  inspired  rather  by  sentiment  than  by  reason,  is 
not  only  to  resolve  beforehand  a  possible  future  discussion,  but 
apparently  reveals  an  intention  of  allowing  national  enthusiasm, 
commiseration,  or  other  like  natural  and  comprehensible  feelings, 
so  frequently  found  in  all  numerous  and  patriotic  assemblies,  to 
form  an  a  priori  judgment  not  founded  on  proof,  and  to  reject,  be 
fore  even  knowing  its  terms,  any  affirmation  which  may  give  rise 
to  doubt  or  seem  distasteful.  The  most  elementary  sense  of  justice 
makes  it  ...  a  duty  to  previously  examine  and  discuss  in  an 
atmosphere  of  absolute  calmness  two  different  inquiries  tending 
to  one  common  end." 

The  several  communications  of  the  last  few  days  from  the  Amer 
ican  minister  caused  the  sending  by  the  Spanish  government  of 
telegrams,  on  March  24  and  25,  to  the  representatives  of  Spain 
abroad  for  the  information  of  the  governments  to  which  they  were 
accredited.  The  first  set  forth  the  situation  as  described  by  the 
American  minister,  the  protest  against  a  reference  of  the  Maine 
report  to  Congress,  and  the  necessity  of  knowing  the  sentiments 
and  wishes  of  the  insular  congress  in  order  "  to  assure  an  immedi 
ate  and  satisfactory  peace  to  the  Cubans."  The  second  directed 
the  representatives  to  inform  the  governments  to  which  they  were 
accredited  of  the  circumstances  and  to  ask  their  "  friendly  offices 
in  order  that  the  Preisdent  of  the  United  States  may  retain  under 
Federal  [executive]  control  all  questions  affecting  the  relations  or 
differences  with  Spain  in  order  to  bring  them  to  an  honorable 
conclusion.  So  convinced  is  Spain,"  continued  the  circular,  "of 
her  right  in  this  matter  and  of  the  prudence  with  which  she  is 

1  For  both  parts  of  this  memorandum,  see  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  702. 


1898]  AMERICAN  TERMS  557 

acting  that,  if  the  aforesaid  suggestion  does  not  avail,  she  will  not 
hesitate  to  at  once  ask  the  counsel  of  the  great  powers  and,  in  the 
last  resort,  their  mediation  to  adjust  the  pending  differences, 
which  differences  in  the  near  future,  may  disturb  a  peace  that  the 
Spanish  nation  desires  to  preserve,  as  far  as  its  honor  and  the 
integrity  of  its  territory  will  permit,  not  only  on  its  own  account, 
but  because  war  once  begun  affects  all  other  powers  of  Europe  and 
America."^/ 

It  was  not  until  March  26  that  Mr.  Day  telegraphed  a  reply  to 
General  Woodford's  request  of  the  22d  for  instructions.    He  said: 
"The  President's  desire  is  for  peace.     He  cannot  look  upon  thel 
suffering  and  starvation  in  Cuba  save  with  horror.    The  concentra-\ 
tion  of  men,  women,  and  children  in  the  fortified  towns,  and  per 
mitting  them  to  starve,  is  unbearable  to  a  Christian  nation  geograph 
ically  so  close  as  ours  to  Cuba.    All  this  has  shocked  and  inflamed 
the  American  mind,  as  it  has  the  civilized  world,  where  its  extent 
and  character  are  known.    It  was  represented  to  him  in  November 
that  the  Blanco  government  would  at  once  release  the  suffering  and 
so  modify  the  Weyler  order  as  to  permit  those  who  were  able  to  re 
turn  to  their  homes  and  till  the  fields  from  which  they  had  been 
driven.    There  has  been  no  relief  to  the  starving  except  such  as  the 
American  people  have  supplied.     The  reconcentration  order  has 
not  been  practically  superseded.     There  is  no  hope  for  peace 
through  the  Spanish  arms.  .  .  .  More  than  half  the  island  is  under 
control  of  the  insurgents.  .  .  .  We  do  not  want  the  island.    The    ' 
President  has  evidenced  in  every  way  his  desire  to  preserve  and  con 
tinue  friendly  relations  with  Spain.      He  has  kept  every  interna-  i 
tional  obligation  with  fidelity.    He  wants  an  honorable  peace.    He  * 
has  repeatedly  urged  the  government  of  Spain  to  secure  a  peace. 
She  still  has  the  opportunity  to  do  it,  and  the  President  appeals  to 
her  from  every  consideration  of  justice  and  humanity  to  do  it.    WihS 
she  ?    Peace  is  the  desired  end.    For  your  own  guidance,  the  Presi 
dent  suggests  that  if  Spain  will  revoke  the  reconcentration  order  and 
maintain  the  people  until  they  can  support  themselves,  and  offer  the 
Cubans  full  self-government  with  reasonable  indemnity,  the  Presi 
dent  will  gladly  assist  in  its  consummation.    If  Spain  should  invite 
the  United  States  to  mediate  for  peace  and  the  insurgents  would 
1  For  the  first  telegram,  see  Spanish  Cor.  and  Does.,  95;  for  second,  Ibid,  98. 


558      SPAIN'S  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  "MAINE"    [1898 

make  like  request,  the  President  might  undertake  such  office  of 
friendship."  l 

On  March  26,  also,  a  summary  of  the  report  of  the  court  of  in 
quiry  was  telegraphed  by  the  state  department  to  General  Wood- 
ford.  The  telegram  ended :  "  Upon  the  facts  thus  disclosed  a  grave 
responsibility  appears  to  rest  upon  the  Spanish  government.  The 
Maine,  upon  a  peaceful  errand,  and  with  the  knowledge  and  consent 
of  that  government,  entered  the  harbor  of  Havana,  relying  upon  the 
security  and  protection  of  a  friendly  port.  Confessedly  she  still 
remained,  as  to  what  took  place  on  board,  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
her  own  government,  yet  the  control  of  the  harbor  remained  in  the 
Spanish  government  which,  as  the  sovereign  of  the  place,  was  bound 
to  render  protection  to  persons  and  property  there,  and  especially 
to  the  public  ship  and  the  sailors  of  a  friendly  power.  The  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  has  not  failed  to  receive  with  due  ap 
preciation  the  expressions  of  sympathy  by  the  government  of  the 
queen  regent.  .  .  .  This  fact  can  only  increase  its  regret  that  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  as  disclosed  by  the  report  of  the  board 
of  inquiry,  are  such  as  require  of  the  Spanish  government  such 
action  as  is  due  where  the  sovereign  rights  of  one  friendly  nation 
have  been  assailed  within  the  jurisdiction  of  another.  The  Presi 
dent  does  not  permit  himself  to  doubt  that  the  sense  of  justice  of 
/. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  704.  The  assistant  secretary  of  state  would 
seem  somewhat  in  error  in  view  of  the  official  statements  from  the  gov 
ernor-general  of  Cuba,  sent  on  this  date  by  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash 
ington  to  the  secretary  of  state  (but  which  no  doubt  had  not  been  received 
when  the  telegram  was  sent),  that  there  had  been  no  relief  to  the  starving 
in  Cuba  except  that  supplied  by  the  American  people.  General  Blanco 
mentioned  that  $100,000  had  been  distributed  on  November  23,  1897,  and 
$50,000  on  March  2,  1898.  His  report  continued:  "The  zeal  of  the  local 
governors  and  alcaldes  was  invoked,  those  authorities  being  invited  to  set 
an  example,  which  they  have  done  with  a  devotion  worthy  of  all  praise. 
In  this  manner  private  charity  being  stimulated,  and  with  the  confidence  of 
official  support,  likewise  took  active  measures,  organizing  productive  boards, 
economical  kitchens,  and  beneficent  associations,  .  .  .  thus  contributing 
greatly  to  the  alleviation  of  the  suffering."  He,  as  well  as  the  provincial 
governors  in  their  reports,  gratefully  acknowledged  the  relief  which  had 
come  from  the  United  States.  (For  these  reports,  see  Foreign  Relations, 
v  1898,  705-710  and  714-717.)  On  March  28  it  was  arranged  that  supplies 
could  be  sent  to  the  reconcentrados  by  the  American  government,  to  be 
conveyed  and  distributed  under  the  same  conditions  as  the  private  supplies 
which  had  been  sent.  (Ibid.,  717.) 


1898]       SPECIFIC  TERMS  OF  PEACE  SUGGESTED          559 

the  Spanish  nation  will  dictate  a  course  of  action  suggested  by  the 
friendly  relations  of  the  two  governments." 

On  Sunday,  March  27,  Mr.  Day  telegraphed  General  Woodford : 
"Believed  the  Maine  report  will  be  held  in  Congress  for  a  short 
time  without  action.  A  feeling  of  deliberation  prevails  in  both 
Houses  of  Congress.  See  if  the  following  can  be  done: 

"First.  Armistice  until  October  1.  Negotiations  meantime 
looking  for  peace  between  Spain  and  insurgents  through  friendly 
offices  of  President  United  States. 

"  Second.  Immediate  revocation  of  reconcentrado  order  so  as  to 
permit  people  to  return  to  their  farms,  and  the  needy  to  be  relieved 
with  provisions  and  supplies  from  United  States,  co-operating  with 
authorities  so  as  to  afford  full  relief. 

"Add  if  possible: 

"  Third.  If  terms  of  peace  not  satisfactorily  settled  by  October  1, 
President  of  the  United  States  to  be  final  arbitrator  between  Spain 
and  insurgents. 

"  If  Spain  agrees,  President  will  use  friendly  offices  to  get  insur 
gents  to  accept  plan."  : 

On  the  evening  of  the  day  (March  25)  that  the  memorandum 
expressing  willingness  to  submit  the  question  of  peace  to  the 
Cuban  congress  was  received,  General  Woodford  was  called  upon  by 
Senor  Moret,  who  informed  him  that  Sefior  Sagasta,  the  president 
of  the  council  of  state,  "would  be  glad  to  talk  with  him  informally 
on  the  subject  of  an  immediate  suspension  of  hostilities  in  Cuba 
through  the  means  of  an  armistice  or  truce."  General  Woodford  tele 
graphed  for  instructions,  acknowledging  at  the  same  time  the  re 
ception  of  the  state  department's  telegram  of  March  26,  and  asking 
the  meaning  of  the  words  "full  self-government"  and  "with  rea 
sonable  indemnity"  used  therein.  He  added:  "Under  Spanish 
constitution,  ministry  cannot  recognize  independence  of  Cuba  or 
part  with  nominal  sovereignty  over  Cuba.  Cortes  alone  can  do 
this,  and  Cortes  will  not  meet  until  April  25.  If  I  can  secure  im 
mediate  and  effective  armistice  or  truce  between  Spanish  troops 
and  insurgents,  to  take  effect  on  or  before  April  15,  will  this  be 
satisfactory?"  He  mentioned  the  possibility  of  submission  of  the 
question  of  peace  to  the  Cuban  congress,  and  continued:  "If  I 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  1036.  2  Ibid.,  712. 


560         HOPEFULNESS  OF  AMERICAN  MINISTER        [1898 

can  secure  these  two  things,  with  absolute  and  immediate  revoca 
tion  of  concentration  order,  may  I  negotiate?  I  believe  that  an 
immediate  armistice  means  present  and  permanent  peace.  Also, 
I  believe  that,  negotiations  once  open  between  insurgents  and  the 
Cuban  government,  some  arrangement  will  be  reached  during  the 
summer  which  the  Spanish  government  will  approve,  and  that 
Cuba  will  become  practically  independent  and  pass  from  Spanish 
control."  * 

This  was  answered  next  day.  "Full  self-government  with  in 
demnity  would  mean  Cuban  independence."  For  the  answer  to 
the  remainder  of  the  inquiry  General  Woodford  was  referred  to 
the  state  department's  telegram  of  Sunday  the  27th,  adding:  "  Very 
important  to  have  definite  agreement  for  determining  peace  after 
armistice,  if  negotiations  pending  same  fail  to  reach  satisfactory 
conclusions."  A  second  telegram  followed,  saying:  "Important 
to  have  prompt  answer  on  armistice  matter." 

1  General  Woodford  to  secretary  of  state,  March  27, 1898,  Foreign  Relations, 
1898,  713. 
1  Mr.  Day  to  General  Woodford,  March  28, 1898,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  713, 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  REPORT  ON  THE  "MAINE"  BEFORE  CONGRESS. — RESOLUTIONS 
IN  CONGRESS. — SPANISH  PROPOSITIONS 

ON  March  28  the  President  sent  the  report  of  the  court  of  in 
quiry  to  Congress  with  a  special  message  dignified  and  reserved  in 
tone,  and  which  was  strictly  confined  to  a  presentation  of  the  facts 
and  statements  before  him.1    It  ended  with  the  final  sentence  quoteoN 
in  the  state  department  telegram  of  March  26 ,2  adding:   "It  will! 
be  the  duty  of  the  executive  to  advise  the  Congress  of  the  result  [of  i 
Spain's  action  in  the  premises],  and  in  the  meantime  deliberate 
consideration  is  invoked."     The  report  was  referred  without  de-  ** 
bate  to  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs.     The  House  adjourned. 
On  this  same  date  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  transmitted 
to  the  secretary  of  state  a  resume*  of  the  findings  of  the  Spanish 
court,  declaring  the  ship  destroyed  by  an  internal  explosion.     The 

1  The  report  signed  on  March  21,  1898,  on  board  the  battle-ship  Iowa  (of 
which  the  senior  member  of  the  court,  Sampson,  was  captain)  found  that  "  the 
Maine  was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a  submarine  mine,  which  caused 
the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  the  forward  magazines.     The  court 
has  been  unable  to  obtain  evidence  fixing  the  responsibility  for  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Maine  upon  any  person  or  persons."     (For  the  finding  in  full 
see  Senate  Doc.  207,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.;  also  Sigsbee,  The  Maine,  Appendix 
A.)     The  finding  was  based  chiefly  upon  the  fact  that  "at  frame  17  the 
outer  shell  of  the  ship  from  a  point  eleven  and  a  half  feet  from  the  middle 
line  of  the  ship  and  six  feet  above  the  keel  when  in  a  normal  position,  has 
been  forced  up  so  as  to  be  now  about  four  feet  above  the  surface  of  the 
water,  and  therefore  about  thirty-four  feet  above  where  it  would  be  had 
the  ship  sunk  uninjured,"  also  that  the  outside  bottom  plating  was  bent  into 
a  reversed  V-shape,  and  at  frame  18  the  vertical  keel  was  broken  in  two,  and 
the  flat  keel  bent  into  an  angle  similar  to  that  just  mentioned.     This  break 
was  about  thirty  feet  above  its  normal  position.     It  was  impossible  to  the 
court  to  conceive  such  lifting  effects  upon  a  ship's  bottom  from  an  interior 
explosion,  a  judgment  borne  out  by  the  results  of  the  explosions  of  the  for 
ward  magazines  in  the  Spanish  ships  destroyed  in  the  battle  of  Santiago, 
where  there  was  no  disturbance  of  the  ships'  bottoms.    It  is  to  the  mind  of  the 
present  writer  also  impossible  to  conceive  that  the  bottom  of  the  Maine  could 

2  Supra. 

561 


562  THE  "MAINE"  REPORT  [1898 

weight  of  the  finding  was,  however,  greatly  weakened  by  the  state 
ment  that  "the  divers,  when  examining  the  hull  of  the  Maine, 
could  not  see  its  bottom  as  it  was  buried  in  the  mud";  whereas, 
in  fact,  the  state  of  the  bottom,  so  clearly  described  by  the  American 
court,  was  the  essential  element  in  the  latter's  finding. 

The  presentation  to  Congress  of  the  report  of  the  court  brought 

next  day  a  flood  of  joint  resolutions,  among  the  more  important  of 

which  were  those  of  Senators  Frye  and  Foraker,  both  of  which 

demanded  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spanish  forces  and  the  recognition 

\of  the  independence  of  Cuba.1     The  resolution  of  the  former  re- 

,  pea  ted  the  technical  error  so  frequently  made,  that  "  the  warfare 

!  for  the  past  three  years  has  been  conducted  by  the  Spanish  govern- 

j  ment  in  violation  of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare."     That  of 

Senator  Foraker,  while  giving  the  reason  for  interference,  held 

insufficient  in  international  law,  that  the  war  was  "destructive  of 

the  commercial  and  property  interests  of  the  United  States,"  was 

be  bent  as  described  by  any  lurching  forward  of  the  after  body  of  the  ship  as 
it  sank  in  the  shallow  water.  For  this  sank  so  slowly  that  no  such  effort 
could  have  bent  the  heavy  girder  formed  by  the  strong  cellular  bottom  of  the 
Maine,  strengthened  as  this  was  by  the  vertical  keel  and  six  longitudinals. 

It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  the  scantling  of  the  Maine  was  far  heavier 
than  that  of  any  other  ship  in  the  service. 

That  an  interior  explosion  may  be  caused  by  an  exterior  one  was  shown 
conclusively  in  the  Russian-Japanese  war,  in  the  cases  of  Admiral  Makar- 
off's  flag-ship,  the  Petropavlovsk,  and  of  the  Japanese  battle-ship  Hatsuse. 

The  writer  would  also  mention  that  when  the  court  was  ordered,  he  was  one 
of  two  members  who  thought  the  explosion  internal.  Both  were  convinced 
otherwise  against  their  prepossessions. 

The  incompleteness  of  the  Spanish  examination  on  which  was  found  an 
internal  explosion,  is  shown  by  the  statement  (Sen.  Rep.  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess., 
625)  of  the  principal  Spanish  diver,  that  "the  bilge  and  keel  of  the  vessel 
throughout  its  entire  extent  were  buried  in  the  mud,  but  did  not  appear  to 
have  suffered  any  damage,"  a  statement  in  most  complete  disaccord  with 
the  facts.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  total  work  of  the  Spanish  divers 
was  but  seventeen  and  a  half  hours,  as  shown  by  the  records  in  the  Spanish 
report. 

Even  if  proof  which  seemed  so  conclusive  to  the  American  court  of  inquiry 
had  not  existed,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  theory  of  accident  the 
destruction  of  an  American  man-of-war  at  such  a  time  and  in  such  a  place, 
by  the  only  occurrence  of  such  a  character  known  in  American  naval  history. 
That  a  ship  peculiarly  safe  as  to  her  arrangement  of  magazines,  with  no  powder 
aboard  except  that  known  to  be  of  stable  character  (the  usual  brown  powder 
of  the  period),  with  all  her  high  explosives,  as  gun-cotton,  in  the  after  part  of 
1  Cony.  Record,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  3293. 


THE  "MAINE"  REPORT  AT  MADRID  563 

much  more  correct  in  terming  it  cruel,  barbarous,  and  inhuman,  if 
he  meant  to  apply  these  words  to  the  conduct  of  both  parties  to 
the  contest. 

On  March  28  the  American  minister  had  an  official  interview 
with  Senor  Gullon.  He  read  to  the  latter  the  summary  of  the 
report  of  the  court  of  inquiry  on  the  loss  of  the  Maine,  and  left 
an  official  note  giving  the  summary  and  stating  the  expectancy 
by  the  United  States,  "that  the  sense  of  justice  of  the  Spanish 
nation  will  dictate  a  course  of  action  suggested  by  the  friendly 
relations  between  the  two  governments." 1  At  this  interview 
General  Woodford  requested  a  conference  next  day  (March  29) 
between  himself  and  Senores  Sagasta,  Gullon,  and  Moret.  The 
conference,  the  details  of  which  are  given  in  the  minister's 
letter  of  March  29  to  the  President,  was  opened  by  the  reading, 
by  General  Woodford,  of  the  following  statement: 

"The  President  instructs  me  to  have  direct  and  frank  conversa- 

the  ship  where  no  explosion  took  place,  and  with  a  crew  of  officers  and  men 
in  a  special  state  of  watchfulness,  should  have  waited  until  her  arrival  in 
Havana  to  undergo  this  extraordinary  and  most  exceptional  experience 
through  accident  aboard,  seems  now  to  the  writer,  though  unthought  of  then, 
to  transcend  the  bounds  of  probabilities  to  such  degree  that  this  is  almost 
sufficient  of  itself  to  settle  the  question  as  against  interior  accident,  apart  from 
the  reasons  which  seemed  to  the  court  conclusive. 

The  presence  of  the  Maine  was  regarded  undoubtedly  by  a  large  number 
of  the  Spanish  in  Havana  as  a  threat;  she  commanded  the  city;  she  was  a 
great  fortress  planted  in  their  midst  which  completely  dominated  the  city 
and  harbor.  It  required  but  a  fanatic  to  anticipate  a  situation  which  to 
some  no  doubt  seemed  likely,  and  there  were  many  such  in  Havana  who 
wished  war  in  any  case.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  general  attitude  of 
the  Spanish  mind  was  one  of  extreme  and  foolish  contempt  for  the  military 
power  of  the  United  States,  and  that  a  desire  to  precipitate  war,  joined  with 
unreasoning  hatred,  only  needed  an  opportunity  which  combined  in  itself  the 
serious  weakening  of  an  enemy's  power,  revenge  for  supposed  injuries,  and  a 
dramatic  stroke  dear  to  such  a  temperament.  Nor  is  it  impossible  to  sup 
pose  that  some  of  the  Cuban  side  should,  in  their  desire  to  force  a  war,  have 
been  concerned.  That  the  Spanish  government  was  in  anywise  responsible 
for  the  detonation  of  the  fateful  fuse,  except  through  want  of  precautions 
against  such  action,  is  not  and  was  not  by  any  member  of  the  board  for  a 
moment  supposed. 

The  writer,  as  a  member  of  the  court,  would  welcome  an  examination  of 
the  wreck  by  a  complete  exposure  of  it  as  it  lies.  It  could  only  result  in  sub 
stantiating  the  description  of  the  injuries  by  the  court,  whose  examination 
was  too  complete  to  leave  chance  of  serious  error. 

1  American  minister  to  secretary  of  state,  March  28,  1898,  Ibid.,  1040. 


564        PRESENTATION  OF  AMERICAN  DEMANDS      [1898 

tion  with  you  about  the  present  condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba,  and 
present  relations  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

"The  President  thinks  it  is  better  not  to  discuss  the  respective 
views  held  by  each  nation.  This  might  only  provoke  or  incite 
argument  and  might  delay  and  possibly  prevent  immediate  decision. 

"The  President  instructs  me  to  say  that  we  do  not  want  Cuba. 

"He  also  instructs  me  to  say,  with  equal  clearness,  that  we  do 
wish  immediate  peace  in  Cuba.  He  suggests  an  immediate  armis 
tice,  lasting  until  October  1,  negotiations  in  the  meantime  being 
had  looking  to  peace  between  Spain  and  the  insurgents,  through  the 
friendly  offices  of  the  United  States. 

"He  wishes  the  immediate  revocation  of  reconcentration  order, 
so  as  to  permit  the  people  to  return  to  their  farms  and  the  needy  to 
be  relieved  with  provisions  and  supplies  from  the  United  States,  the 
United  States  co-operating  with  the  Spanish  authorities  so  as  to 
afford  full  relief." 

Sefior  Sagasta  replied,  agreeing  that  discussion  of  views  would 
be  inopportune  and  useless,  stated  that  the  present  government 
was  arranging  to  furnish  employment  for  those  of  the  reconcen- 
trados  able  to  work  and  to  supply  the  necessities  of  the  feeble  and 
of  the  women  and  children.  He  accepted  the  assistance  of  the 
United  States  in  this  work.  He  expressed  his  appreciation  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  President  had  presented  the  subject  [of  the 
Maine]  to  Congress,  and  added  that  he  believed  his  method  of  deal 
ing  with  this  question  would  enable  the  two  governments  to  ex 
amine  and  adjust  the  matter  in  some  way  honorable  and  fair  to  both 
nations.  He  was  in  thorough  accord  with  the  President  in  desiring  an 
early  and  honorable  peace.  He  suggested  that  there  were  difficul 
ties  in  the  Spanish  situation  in  the  Peninsula  which  General  Wood- 
ford,  as  a  stranger,  could  hardly  understand,  which  made  it  almost 
impossible  for  the  Spanish  government  to  offer  such  an  armistice, 
but  that  if  it  were  asked  by  the  insurgents  it  would  be  at  once 
granted;  that  the  insular  congress  would  meet  on  May  4,  when 
the  insular  government  could  make  such  a  proposition;  that  only 
six  weeks  would  intervene  before  that  time,  and  he  hoped  the 
United  States,  which  had  waited  so  long,  would  now  wait  for  these 
few  weeks;  that  the  offer  of  autonomy  had  been  accompanied  by 
firm  declaration  that  Spain  would  employ  military  operations  in  aid 


1898]      PRESENTATION  OF  AMERICAN  DEMANDS        565 

of  civil  reforms;  that  these  operations  were  being  successfully 
conducted,  and  that  he  hoped  that  the  rebellion  would  be  largely 
reduced  before  the  Cuban  congress  met. 

General  Woodford  replied  substantially  that  the  sober  sense  of 
the  American  people  insisted  upon  immediate  cessation  of  hostili-  . 
ties;  that  the  recent  speech  of  Senator  Proctor,1  one  of  the  most 
reliable  of  American  public  men,  had  so  convinced  public  senti 
ment,  that  longer  prosecution  of  the  war  must  now  be  prevented. 

On  a  request  for  answer  to  the  two  suggestions  of  the  statement 
(an  immediate  armistice  and  revocation  of  the  concentration  order), 
it  was  arranged  that  there  should  be  a  meeting  on  Thursday  after 
noon  (March  31)  at  the  office  of  the  president  of  the  council. 

"I  then,"  says  General  Woodford,  "sat  down  at  Sefior  Sagasta's 
desk  and  wrote  the  following  telegram  which  I  have  sent  you  in 
cipher : 

"  No.  60.  Have  had  conference  this  afternoon  with  the  president 
of  the  council,  the  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  and  minister  for 
colonies  [Sen ores  Sagas ta,  Gullon,  and  Moret].     Conference  ad-  } 
journed  until  Thursday  afternoon,  March  31.     I  have  sincere  / 
belief  that  arrangement  will  then  be  reached,  honorable  to  Spain  1 
and  satisfactory  to  the  United  States  and  just  to  Cuba.     I  beg  you 
to  withhold  all  action  until  you  receive  my  report  of  such  conference, 
which  I  will  send  Thursday  night,  March  31. 

"I  had  Sefior  Moret."  continued  General  Woodford,  "read  this 
telegram  and  translate  it  twice  to  his  colleagues  so  that  there  could 
be  no  misunderstanding  as  to  its  language  and  meaning." 

In  the  evening  Senor  Moret  called  upon  the  American  minister 
and  said  that  "  he  thought  the  latter  had  made  positive  and  favor 
able  impression  on  President  Sagasta's  mind;  that  the  ministers 
would  meet  [March  30]  for  discussion;  that  a  further  meeting 

1  In  the  Senate,  March  17,  1898.  Mr.  Proctor  had  just  returned  from  a  visit 
to  Cuba,  whither  he  had  gone  to  make  acquaintance  at  first  hand  with  affairs. 
His  visit  was  wholly  unofficial  and  unsuggested  by  any  one.  His  account  of 
conditions  outside  Havana  was  one  of  "desolation  and  distress,  misery  and 
starvation."  He  found  the  accounts  of  the  condition  of  the  reconcentrados 
not  overdrawn,  and  of  the  hospitals  he  said:  "It  is  not  within  the  narrow 
limits  of  my  vocabulary  to  portray  it."  Coming  from  one  universally  es 
teemed  for  character,  sound  sense,  and  reticence  of  statement,  the  speech,  as 
General  Woodford  rightly  said,  had  a  great  effect  upon  public  sentiment. 


566  IMPRESSION  MADE  AT  MADRID  [1898 

would  be  held  .  .  .  March  31,  under  the  presidency  of  the  queen, 
and  that  he  hoped  a  satisfactory  adjustment  would  be  reached  at 
our  adjourned  conference  to  be  held  Thursday  afternoon.1 

The  assistant  secretary  of  state  made  reply  to  General  Wood- 
ford's  telegram  (No.  60)  the  day  it  was  sent  and  received.  He  said : 
"It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  conference  be  not  post 
poned  beyond  next  Thursday  and  definite  results  then  reached. 
Feeling  here  is  intense."  He  added  next  day:  "Your  No.  60  is 
encouraging,  but  vague  as  to  details.  The  United  States  cannot 
assist  in  enforcement  of  any  system  of  autonomy."  2 

General  Woodford  returned:  "There  will  be  no  delay  beyond 
Thursday,  March  31.  If  definite  results  are  not  then  reached  I 
shall  close  negotiations."  Mr.  Day  answered  at  once: 

"You  should  know  and  fully  appreciate  that  there  is  profound 
feeling  in  Congress,  and  the  gravest  apprehension  on  the  part  of 
most  conservative  members  that  a  resolution  for  intervention  may 
pass  both  branches  in  spite  of  any  effort  that  can  be  made.  Only 
assurance  from  the  President  that  if  he  fails  in  peaceful  negotia 
tions  he  will  submit  all  the  facts  to  Congress  at  a  very  early  day, 
will  prevent  immediate  action  on  the  part  of  Congress.  The 
President  assumes  that  whatever  may  be  reached  in  your  negotia 
tions  to-morrow  will  be  tentative  only,  to  be  submitted  as  the 
proposal  of  Spain.  We  hope  your  negotiations  will  lead  to  a  peace 
acceptable  to  the  country." 4 

One  immediate  effect  of  the  conference  of  March  29  was  the 
complete  revocation  of  the  reconcentration  orders,  by  proclama 
tion  of  Governor- General  Blanco,  on  March  30.  The  act  gave 
good  augury  for  the  meeting  which  was  to  take  place  next  day, 
but  the  fates  were  against  it.  The  meeting  was  held  as  arranged 
at  4  P.  M.  Senor  Gullon  handed  General  Woodford  the  Spanish 
propositions,  which  dealt  separately  with  each  of  the  subjects 
before  them,  as  follows: 

"CATASTROPHE  OF  THE  *  MAINE/ — Spain  is  ready  to  submit  to 
an  arbitration  the  differences  which  can  arise  in  this  matter. 

"RECONCENTRADOS. — General   Blanco,   following   the   instruc- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  718-721.  2  Ibid.,  718. 

3  General  Woodford  to  Mr.  Day,  March  30,  1898,  Ibid.,  721. 

4  Mr.  Day  to  General  Woodford,  March  30,  1898,  Ibid.,  721. 


1898]  SPAIN'S  TERMS  567 

tions  of  the  government,  has  revoked  in  the  western  provinces1 
the  bando  relating  to  the  reconcentrados,  and  although  this  measure 
will  not  be  able  to  reach  its  complete  developments  until  the  mili 
tary  operations  terminate,  the  government  places  at  the  disposal 
of  the  governor-general  of  Cuba  a  credit  of  three  million  of  pesetas 
[six  hundred  thousand  dollars],  to  the  end  that  the  countrymen 
may  return  at  once  and  with  success  to  their  labors. 

"The  Spanish  government  will  accept,  nevertheless,  whatever 
assistance  to  feed  and  succor  the  needy  may  be  sent  from  the 
United  States  in  the  form  and  conditions  agreed  upon  by  the  as 
sistant  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Day,  and  the  Spanish  minister  in 
Washington. 

"PACIFICATION  OF  CUBA. — The  Spanish  government,  more 
interested  than  that  of  the  United  States  in  giving  to  the  Grand 
Antilla  an  honorable  and  stable  peace,  proposes  to  confide  its 
preparation  to  the  insular  parliament,  without  whose  intervention 
it  will  not  be  able  to  arrive  at  the  final  result,  it  being  understood 
that  the  powers  reserved  by  the  constitution  to  the  central  govern 
ment  are  not  lessened  and  diminished. 

"TRUCE. — As  the  Cuban  chambers  will  not  meet  until  the  4th 
of  May,  the  Spanish  government  will  not,  on  its  part,  find  it  in 
convenient  to  accept  at  once  a  suspension  of  hostilities  asked 
for  by  the  insurgents  from  the  general-in-chief,  to  whom  it  will  be 
long  in  this  case  to  determine  the  duration  and  conditions  of  the 
suspension."  2 

A  circular  telegram  sent  the  same  day  to  Spanish  representa 
tives  abroad  said:  "If  these  bases  of  argument,  which  meet  in 
great  part  McKinley's  demands  and  are  the  limit  of  our  concessions 
and  efforts  to  preserve  peace,  are  to  be  accepted  at  Washington,  the 
valued  good  offices  of  the  sovereign  (or  president  of  republic)  and 
government  to  which  you  are  accredited  ought  to  be  immediately 
determined  upon  and  put  into  effect  at  once,  if,  as  we  hope  by  the 
reports  from  your  excellency,  they  desire  to  co-operate  to  effect  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  the  reasonable  protection  of  our  rights."  3 

1  This  was  an  error  in  so  far  as  General  Blanco's  actual  action  was  concerned. 
His  proclamation  of  March  30  declared  reconcentration  terminated  "through 
out  the  island."     (See  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  738,  for  the  order  in  full.) 

2  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  107;  Ibid.,  726.         3  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  108. 


568  THE  MAIN  POINT  LEFT  UNSOLVED  [1898 

The  bases  did  indeed  "meet  in  great  part  McKinley's  demands," 

y\  but  not  in  the  most  essential;   that  is,  action  looking  to  immediate 

^  cessation  of  hostilities,  for  nothing  could  be  more  vain  at  this 

moment  than  expectancy  that  a  truce  would  be  asked  for  by  the 

insurgents.    General  Woodford  expressed  to  the  Spanish  ministers 

at  the  conference  that  the  final  proposition  would  not  be  acceptable. 

"Taken,"  he  said,  "in  connection  with  the  one  relating  to  the 

'pacification  of  Cuba/  [it]  does  not  mean  immediate  or  assured 

peace.    It  means,  when  read  with  the  other,  continuation  of  this 

destructive,  cruel,  and  now  needless  war." 

"The  conference,"  telegraphed  the  minister  to  the  President, 

"has  turned  as  I  feared  on  a  question  of  punctilio.     Spanish  pride 

will  not  permit  the  ministry  to  propose  and  offer  an  armistice; 

which  they  really  desire  because  they  know  that  armistice  now 

means  certain  peace  next  autumn.     I  am  told  confidentially  that 

I  the  offer  of  armistice  by  the  Spanish  government  would  cause 

*  revolution  here.     Leading  generals  have  been  sounded  within  the 

last  week  and  the  ministry  have  gone  as  far  as  they  dare  go  to-day. 

I  believe  the  ministry  are  ready  to  go  as  far  and  as  fast  as  they  can 

and  still  save  the  dynasty  here  in  Spain.     They  know  that  Cuba  is 

*  lost.     Public  opinion  in  Spain  has  steadily  moved  toward  peace. 

No  Spanish  ministry  would  have  dared  to  do  one  month  ago  what 

this  ministry  has  proposed  to-day."  2 

/^"This  telegram  was  at  once  an  expression  of  the  American  minis- 
'ter's  disappointment,  an  attempt  to  excuse  the  inaction  of  the 
Spanish  ministry,  and  the  transmission  of  a  covert  hope  that  the 
American  government  would  give  Spain  another  opportunity. 

The  president  of  the  home-rule  government  of  Cuba,  Senor 
Jose*  Maria  Galvez,  now  took  part  in  the  question,  become  so 
deeply  momentous  and  acute,  in  a  telegram  sent  through  the 
governor-general  to  Washington,  which  was  a  protest  against  any 
effort  of  the  American  government  to  force  upon  Cuba  any  form  of 
government  without  the  consent  of  its  people,  and  an  expression  of 
the  hope  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  would  aid  in  the 
re-establishment  of  peace  in  Cuba  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 

1  General  Woodford  to  Mr.  Day,  March  31,  1898,  Foreign  Relations,  1898, 
727. 

3  Telegram,  March  31,  Ibid.,  727. 


1898]         THE  POPE'S  OFFER  OF  GOOD  SERVICE  569 

mother  country.1  A  manifesto  was,  at  the  same  time,  issued  by  the 
home-rule  government  to  the  people  of  Cuba  to  join  in  the  realiza 
tion  of  peace  and  concord.2 

Affairs  were,  however,  sweeping  with  a  torrential  force  which 
only  one  thing  could  stay:  a  declaration  that,  for  the  time  at  least, 
no  more  shot  were  to  be  fired  by  Spain.     The  Vatican,  kept  in 
formed  evidently  by  Archbishop  Ireland  (now  in  Washington  by 
order  of  the  Pope  to  work  for  peace)  ,3  appreciated  this  if  Spain 
did  not,  and  the  Spanish  ambassador  near  the  Holy  See  tele-  j 
graphed  from  Rome  that  he  was  informed  that  "the  President! 
of  the  republic  desires  to  reach  a  settlement,  but  he  is  finding  { 
himself   helpless    against    Congress.     The  difficulty  lies  in  who 
should  ask  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities.     The  President   .   .   . 
seems  well  disposed  to  accept  the  offices  of  the  Pope;  and  the  latter, 
willing  to  aid  us,  inquires,  first,  if  the  intervention  of  his  holiness 
to  ask  the  armistice  would  save  the  national  honor;    second,  if 
such  intervention  would  be  acceptable  to  her  majesty  and  the 
government."4 

Senor  Gullon  replied  to  the  ambassador:  "The  moment  the 
United  States  government  is  disposed  to  accept  the  aid  of  the 
Pope,  Spain  and  her  government  will  gladly  accept  his  mediation," 
promising  "further  to  accept  the  proposal  that  the  holy  father 
shall  formulate  a  suspension  of  hostilities;  informing  his  holiness 
that  for  the  honor  of  Spain  it  is  proper  that  the  truce  should  be  I 
accompanied  by  the  retirement  of  the  American  squadron  from  the 
waters  of  the  Antilles,  in  order  that  the  American  republic  may  also 
show  its  purpose  not  to  support — voluntarily  or  involuntarily — 
the  insurrection  in  Cuba,"  5  a  not  surprising  request  in  view  of 
the  proportions  of  the  fleet  now  assembled  at  Key  West. 

Senor  Gullon,  calling  at  once  upon  the  American  minister,  by  a 
not  unnatural  error  mentioned  the  offer  of  the  Pope  as  made  at  the 
suggestion  of  President  McKinley.  He  gave  General  Woodford  to 
understand  that  his  government  would  accede  to  the  Pope's  desire; 
but  going  so  far,  said  General  Woodford  in  telegraphing  the  inter- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  728.  3  Ibid.,  731. 

3  Polo  de  Bernabe"  to  minister  of  state,  April  4,  1898,  Spanish  Cor.  and 
Docs.,  111. 

4  Senor  Merry  del  Val  to   minister   of   state,  April  2,  1898,  Ibid.,  109. 

5  Telegram,  April  3,  1898,  Ibid.,  110. 


570      SPAIN  OFFERS  UNCONDITIONAL  ARMISTICE    [1898 

view,  "asks  that  the  United  States  will  show  its  friendship  for  Spain 
by  withdrawing  our  war-ships  from  the  vicinity  of  Cuba  and  from 
Key  West  as  soon  as  the  armistice  has  been  proclaimed.  That  the 
Spanish  government  will  continue  this  armistice  so  long  as  there 
are  any  reasonable  hopes  that  permanent  peace  can  be  secured  in 
Cuba.  He  asks  your  immediate  answer  as  to  withdrawal  of  war 
ships  at  once  after  proclamation  of  armistice.  I  still  believe  that 
when  armistice  is  once  proclaimed  hostilities  will  never  be  resumed 
and  that  permanent  peace  will  be  secured.  If  under  existing 
conditions  at  Washington  you  can  still  do  this,  I  hope  that  you 
will. 

"The  Austrian  ambassador,"  he  continued,  "has  heard  me  read 
this  despatch  and  says  he  will  guarantee  that  Spain  will  do  this. 
...  I  know  that  the  queen  and  her  present  ministry  sincerely 
desire  peace  and  that  the  Spanish  people  desire  peace,  and  if  you 
can  still  give  me  time  and  reasonable  liberty  of  action,  I  will  get  you 
the  peace  you  desire  so  much  and  for  which  you  have  labored  so 
hard."  l 

The  immediate  reply  to  General  Woodford  from  Washington 
was  that  "the  President  has  made  no  suggestions  to  Spain  except 
through  you.  He  made  no  suggestions  other  than  those  which 
you  were  instructed  to  make  for  an  armistice  to  be  offered  by  Spain 
to  negotiate  a  permanent  peace  between  Spain  and  insurgents, 
sand  which  Spain  has  already  rejected.  An  armistice  involves  an 
(  agreement  between  Spain  and  insurgents  which  must  be  voluntary 
j  on  the  part  of  each,  and  if  accepted  by  them  would  make  for  peace. 
The  disposition  of  our  fleet  must  be  left  to  us.  An  armistice  to  be 
effective  must  be  immediately  proffered  and  accepted  by  insur 
gents.  Would  the  peace  you  are  so  confident  of  securing  mean 
the  independence  of  Cuba  2  The  President  cannot  hold  his  message 
longer  than  Tuesday."  2 

On  April  4  General  Woodford  was  informed  that  "  Congress  may 

i  very  possibly  take  decisive  action  [at]  middle  or  end  of  this  week," 

and  was  directed  to  notify  consular  officers  to  arrange  to  leave 

Spain  in  case  of  rupture  of  relations.3    He  was  also  instructed  the 

1  Telegram,  April  3,  1898,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  732. 

2  Mr.  Day  to  General  Woodford,  April  3,  1898  (telegram),  Ibid.,  732. 
8  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  733. 


1898]  QUEEN  REGENTS  PROPOSED  PROCLAMATION    571 

next  day,  "In  case  of  necessity  intrust  the  legation  to  British 
embassy."  * 

On  April  5  General  Woodford  telegraphed  the  President: 
"Should  the  queen  proclaim  the  following  before  12  o'clock  noon 
of  Wednesday,  April  6,  will  you  sustain  the  queen,  and  can  you 
prevent  hostile  action  by  Congress? 

"  'At  the  request  of  the  holy  father,  in  this  passion  week,  and 
in  the  name  of  Christ,  I  proclaim  immediate  and  unconditional 
suspension  of  hostilities  in  the  island  of  Cuba. 

"  'This  suspension  is  to  become  immediately  effective  so  soon  as 
accepted  by  the  insurgents  in  that  island,  and  is  to  continue  for  the 
space  of  six  months,  to  the  5th  of  October,  1898. 

"  'I  do  this  to  give  time  for  passions  to  cease,  and  in  the  sincere 
hope  and  belief  that  during  this  suspension  permanent  and  hon 
orable  peace  may  be  obtained  between  the  insular  government 
of  Cuba  and  those  of  my  subjects  in  that  island  who  are  now  in 
rebellion  against  the  authority  of  Spain. 

"  '  I  pray  the  blessing  of  Heaven  upon  this  truce  of  God,  which 
I  now  declare  in  His  name  and  with  the  sanction  of  the  holy  father 
of  all  Christendom/ 

"Please  read  this  in  the  light  of  all  my  previous  telegrams  and 
letters.  I  believe  this  means  peace,  which  the  sober  judgment  of 
our  people  will  approve  long  before  next  November,  and  which 
must  be  approved  at  the  bar  of  final  history. 

"I  permit  the  papal  nuncio  to  read  this  telegram,  upon  my  own 
responsibility  and  without  committing  you  in  any  manner.  I  dare 
not  reject  this  last  chance  for  peace.  I  will  show  your  reply  to  the 
queen  in  person,  and  I  believe  that  you  will  approve  this  last 
conscientious  offer  for  peace."  2 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  734.  2  Ibid.,  734. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

SPAIN'S  PRACTICAL  ACCEPTANCE  OF  AMERICAN  DEMANDS. — COLLEC 
TIVE  NOTE  OF  THE  FOREIGN  POWERS. — THE  PRESIDENT'S  MES 
SAGE.— THE  JOINT  RESOLUTION  OF  CONGRESS. — THE  DECLARA 
TION  OF  WAR 

SPAIN  had  now  practically  accepted  the  American  demands  in 
full,  unless  Mr.  Day's  telegram  of  March  25,  mentioning  "full  self- 
government  with  reasonable  indemnity,"  which  his  telegram  of 
March  28  defined  as  meaning  Cuban  independence,  and  which 
was  given  as  the  basis  on  which  the  President  would  "  assist  in  [the] 
consummation  [of  peace],"  was  to  be  considered  a  demand  for 
immediate  independence.1  But  the, minister's  message  brought 
a  telegram,  sent  at  midnight  of  Marcii  5,  which  he  could  hardly 
consider  encouraging,  and  which  apparently  shows  that  the  die 
was  already  considered  cast.  It  said:  "The  President  highly 
/appreciates  the  Queen's  desire  for  peace.  He  cannot  assume  to 
i  influence  the  action  of  the  American  Congress  beyond  a  discharge 
iof  his  constitutional  duty  in  transmitting  the  whole  matter  to  them 
fwith  such  recommendation  as  he  deems  necessary  and  expedient. 
The  repose  and  welfare  of  the  American  people  require  restoration 
of  peace  and  stable  government  in  Cuba.  If  armistice  is  offered 
by  the  government  of  Spain  the  President  will  communicate  that 
fact  to  Congress.  The  President's  message  will  go  to  Congress  to 
morrow.  It  will  recount  the  conditions  in  Cuba;  the  injurious 
effect  upon  our  people;  the  character  and  conditions  of  the  conflict, 
and  the  apparent  hopelessness  of  the  strife.  He  will  not  advise  the 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  insurgents,  but  will  recom 
mend  measures  looking  to  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  the  restora- 

1  This  was  communicated  unofficially  but  never  officially  to  the  Spanish 
government. 

572 


1898]    THE  POWERS  PRESENT  A  COLLECTIVE  NOTE       573 

tion  of  peace  and  stability  of  government  in  the  island  in  the  in 
terests  of  humanity,  and  for  the  safety  and  tranquillity  of  our  own 
country."  1 

This  was  transmitted  at  once  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state. 
The  sending  of  the  presidential  message  was,  however,  postponed 
through  the  presentation  that  day  to  the  President  of  a  collective 
note  by  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France, 
Austria-Hungary,  Russia,  and  Italy,  making  "a  pressing  appeal 
to  the  feelings  of  humanity  and  moderation  of  the  President  and  of 
the  American  people  in  their  differences  with  Spain.  They  earnestly 
hope/'  continued  the  note,  "that  further  negotiations  will  lead  to 
an  agreement  which,  while  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace,  will 
afford  all  necessary  guarantees  for  the  re-establishment  of  order 
in  Cuba."  2 

The  President's  reply  after  recognizing  the  good-will  which 
prompted  the  action  continued  in  terms  which  could  leave  little 
doubt  as  to  the  action  to  be  advised  to  the  Congress.  He  said: 
"The  government  of  the  United  States  appreciates  the  humani 
tarian  and  disinterested  character  of  the  communication  now  madei 
on  hehalf  of  the  powers  named,  and  for  its  part  is  confident  that 
equal  appreciation  will  be  shown  for  its  own  earnest  and  unselfish 
endeavors  to  fulfil  a  duty  to  humanity  by  ending  a  situation  the 
indefinite  prolongation  of  which  has  become  insufferable. " 3 

Three  days  later  the  representatives  of  the  greater  European 
powers  made  a  like  visit  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state;  their 
suggestion  that  Spain  should  accede  to  the  solicitation  of  the  Pope, 
and  their  belief  that  the  suspension  of  hostilities  was  "compatible 
with  the  honor  and  prestige  "  of  the  Spanish  arms,  caused  the  or 
der,  the  same  day  (April  9),  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities.4 

Meanwhile,  on  April  6,  General  Woodford  received  a  telegram  \ 
saying:   "The  President's  message  will  not  be  sent  to  Congress  j 
until  next  Monday,  to  give  the  consul-general  at  Havana  the  time 
he  urgently  asks  to  insure  safe  departure  of  Americans,"  a  word 
which  caused  General  Woodford  to  withdraw  his  note  of  that  day 
to  Senor  Gullon,  and  to  express  a  hope,  in  his  answer  to  Washing 
ton,  "  that  this  will  also  give  the  Spanish  government  the  time  in 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  735.  2  Ibid.,  1898,  740.  3  Ibid.,  741. 

4  Spanish  Cor.  and  Docs.,  114. 


574  THE  AMERICAN  MINISTER  [1898 

which  to  issue  a  frank  and  effective  proclamation  of  such  an  armis 
tice  as  may  lead  to  an  early  and  honorable  peace."  l 

On  April  7  General  Woodford  caused  to  be  corrected  in  the 
Madrid  newspapers  misstatements  as  to  the  movements  of  members 
of  the  legation  and  his  family.  The  communication  ended  by 
saying:  "[General  Woodford]  is  working  for  peace,  and,  despite 
all  rumors  to  the  contrary,  he  still  hopes  that  peace  will  be  kept 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  and  that  peace  will  very  soon 
be  again  established  in  Cuba — a  peace  that  shall  be  based  upon 
absolute  justice,  with  protection  to  the  great  American  interests 
in  that  island  and  with  the  maintenance  of  the  honor  of  Spain." 

He  gave  the  next  day  to  the  American  and  English  correspond 
ents  at  Madrid  an  interview  saying:  "I  have  never  lost  my  faith; 
and  doubtful  as  conditions  seem  to-day,  I  still  believe  that  these 
great  and  good  purposes  of  my  President  may  be  secured.  I  shall 
not  desist  from  my  labors  for  a  just  and  honorable  peace  until  the 
guns  actually  open  fire;  and  my  faith  is  still  strong  that  war,  with 
all  its  horrors,  can  be  averted.  Enough  blood  has  been  shed  in 
Cuba  already,  and  I  cannot  believe  that  the  closing  hours  of  the 
nineteenth  century  will  be  reddened  by  conflict  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States.  My  country  asks  for  peace  based  upon  con 
ditions  that  shall  make  peace  permanent  and  beneficent,  and  I 
have  faith  that  Spain  will  yet  do  what  is  necessary  to  assure  justice 
for  Cuba,  and  with  justice  peace  is  certain." 3 

On  April  9  he  followed  up  a  telegram  stating  that  the  Spanish 

propositions  had  not  been  modified,  sent  early  in  the  day,  by  a 

\Jater  one  announcing  that  authority  to  proclaim  an  armistice  had 

/been  cabled  to  Governor-General  Blanco,  information  of  action 

on  which  was  formally  conveyed  next  day  by  Senor  Polo  de  Ber- 

nabe*  to  Mr.  Day.4 

General  Woodford  apparently  now  satisfied  that  the  goal  for 
which  he  had  so  earnestly  striven  had  been  reached,  telegraphed  the 
President:  "In  view  of  the  action  of  the  Spanish  government,  .  .  . 
I  hope  that  you  can  obtain  full  authority  from  Congress  to  do  what 
ever  you  shall  deem  necessary  to  secure  immediate  and  permanent 
peace  in  Cuba  by  negotiations,  including  the  full  power  to  employ 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  743,  744.  2  Ibid.,  745.  8  Ibid.,  745. 

4  Ibid.,  747.     For  text  of  proclamation,  see  Ibid.,  750. 


1898]   THE  CRUX  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  SITUATION      575 

the  army  and  navy,  according  to  your  own  judgment,  to  aid  and 
enforce  your  action.     If  this  be  secured  I  believe  that  you  will  get 
final  settlement  before  August  1  on  one  of  the  following  bases: 
Either  such  autonomy  as  the  insurgents  may  agree  to  accept  or 
recognition  by  Spain  of  thejn3epeiideiit'ej>f  the  istainfr  or  cession  \  ^ 
of  the  island  toJt^Umted_States.     I  hope  that  nothing  will  now 
be  done  to  humiliate  Spain,  as  I  am  satisfied  that  the  present  gov 
ernment  is  going,  and  is  loyally  ready  to  go,  as  fast  and  far  as  it  can.  < 
With  your  power  of  action  sufficiently  free,  you  will  win  the  fight : 
on  your  own  lines."  l 

The  crux  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  phrase  of  the  last  sentence-y~\ 
"with  your  power  of  action  sufficiently  free."  But  this  freedom, 
the  retention  of  which,  if  peace  was  to  be  preserved,  was  a  necessity, 
the  President  now,  though  his  diplomacy  had  been  crowned  with 
all  the  success  the  American  envoy  at  Madrid  had  hoped  for, 
had  determined  to  yield,  evidently  convinced  that  war  could  be  • 
the  only  real  solution,  f  The  question  once  referred  to  Con-  / 
gress,  it  would  have  required,  in  order  to  prevent  warlike  action, 
a  calmness  of  judgment  and  discussion  which  it  was  impossible 
to  find  in  the  majority  of  a  large  popular  body  stimulated, 
through  the  three  years  of  the  Cuban  strife,  by  a  highly 
wrought  popular  sentiment.  Congress  equally  with  the  great  ma 
jority  of  the  American  people  had  been  brought  to  view  the  im 
mediate  extinguishment  of  Spanish  dominion  in  the  island  a 
necessity.  President  Grant,  facing  a  situation  of  like  character 
in  the  ten  years'  war,  had,  supported  by  Mr.  Fish,  unyieldingly 
determined  to  keep  hold  of  the  reins  of  diplomacy.  President 
Cleveland  had  been  equally  firm  in  holding  a  like  course.  Had 
either,  in  the  critical  moments  of  their  administrations,  transferred 
the  Cuban  question  to  Congress,  war  would  have  been  the  result 

This,  naturally,  was  clear  to  President  McKinley.  There  were 
clearly  but  two  courses  open:  one  to  put  aside  the  diplomatic  suc 
cess  attained  and  act  upon  the  view  that  anything  short  of  an  im 
mediate  abrogation  of  Spanish  authority  in  Cuba  was  a  useless 
continuation  of  an  unbearable  situation,  and  thus  advise  its  imme 
diate  discontinuance;  the  other,  in  the  new  light  of  the  Spanish 
declaration  of  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  to  withhold  such  advice  for 
1  Telegram,  April  10,  1908,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  747. 


576  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  [1898 

the  moment  and,  instead,  to  lay  before  Congress  the  diplomatic  cor- 

/respondence,  in  full,  of  the  last  three  weeks,  and  advise  Congress 

that  he  proposed  to  await  the  results  of  the  armistice  now  declared. 

The  President  chose  the  former  coursej_tLa  best,  judged  by 
our  knowledge  to-day,  ior  Spain,  forCuba  and  for  the  United 
States.  On  April  11,  1898,  he  sent  his  message  to  Congress. 

After  a  general  statement  of  the  conditions  repeated  so  frequently 
in  the  messages  of  his  predecessors  and  in  his  own,  the  President 
mentioned  the  efforts,  including  those  of  Spain,  made  to  relieve 
suffering,  and  then  said : 

"The  war  in  Cuba  is  of  such  a  nature  that  short  of  subjugation 
or  extermination  a  final  military  victory  for  either  side  seems  im 
practicable.  The  alternative  lies  in  the  physical  exhaustion  of  the 
one  or  the  other  party,  or  perhaps  of  both — a  condition  which  in 
»  effect  ended  the  ten  years'  war  by  the  truce  of  Zanjon.  The  pros 
pect  of  such  a  protraction  and  conclusion  of  the  present  strife  is  a 
contingency  hardly  to  be  contemplated  with  equanimity  by  the 
civilized  world,  and  least  of  all  by  the  United  States,  affected  and 
injured  as  we  are,  deeply  and  intimately,  by  its  very  existence. 

"Realizing  this,  it  appeared  to  be  my  duty,  in  a  spirit  of  true 
friendliness,  no  less  to  Spain  than  to  the  Cubans,  who  have  so  much 
to  lose  by  the  prolongation  of  the  struggle,  to  seek  to  bring  about 
an  immediate  termination  of  the  war.  To  this  end  I  submitted 
on  the  27th  ultimo,  as  a  result  of  much  representation  and  corre 
spondence,  through  the  United  States  minister  at  Madrid,  propo 
sitions  to  the  Spanish  government  looking  to  an  armistice  until 
October  1  for  the  negotiation  of  peace  with  the  good  offices  of  the 
President. 

"In  addition,  I  asked  the  immediate  revocation  of  the  order  of 
reconcentration,  so  as  to  permit  the  people  to  return  to  their  farms 
and  the  needy  to  be  relieved  with  provisions  and  supplies  from  the 
United  States,  co-operating  with  the  Spanish  authorities,  so  as  to 
afford  full  relief. 

"The  reply  of  the  Spanish  cabinet  was  received  on  the  night  of 
the  31st  ultimo.  It  offered,  as  the  means  to  bring  about  peace  in 
Cuba,  to  confide  the  preparation  thereof  to  the  insular  parliament, 
inasmuch  as  the  concurrence  of  that  body  would  be  necessary  to 
reach  a  final  result,  it  being,  however,  understood  that  the  powers 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  577 

reserved  by  the  constitution  to  the  central  government  are  not 
lessened  or  diminished.  As  the  Cuban  parliament  does  not  meet 
until  the  4th  of  May  next,  the  Spanish  government  would  not  ob 
ject,  for  its  part,  to  accept  at  once  a  suspension  of  hostilities  if  asked 
for  by  the  insurgents  from  the  general-in-chief,  to  whom  it  would 
pertain,  in  such  case,  to  determine  the  duration  and  conditions  of 
the  armistice. 

"The  propositions  submitted  by  General  Woodford  and  the 
reply  of  the  Spanish  government  were  both  in  the  form  of  brief 
memoranda,  the  texts  of  which  are  before  me,  and  are  substantially 
in  the  language  above  given.  The  function  of  the  Cuban  parlia 
ment  in  the  matter  of  '  preparing '  peace  and  the  manner  of  its 
doing  so  are  not  expressed  in  the  Spanish  memorandum;  but  from 
General  Woodford's  explanatory  reports  of  preliminary  discus 
sions  preceding  the  final  conference  it  is  understood  that  the 
Spanish  government  stands  ready  to  give  the  insular  congress  full 
powers  to  settle  the  terms  of  peace  with  the  insurgents — whether 
by  direct  negotiation  or  indirectly  by  means  of  legislation  does  not 
appear. 

"With  this  last  overture  in  the  direction  of  immediate  peace,  and 
its  disappointing  reception  by  Spain,  the  executive  is  brought  to  the 
end  of  his  effort." 

The  President  then  referred  to  his  acceptance  in  his  message  of 
December,  1896,  of  the  views  of  President  Grant  in  1875,  showing 
the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba  to  be  indefensible  and 
impracticable.  "Nothing,"  he  said,  "has  occurred  to  change  my 
view  in  this  regard."  In  support  of  this  he  also  quoted  the  words  of 
President  Jackson  in  his  message  of  December  21,  1836,  on  the 
proposed  recognition  of  Texas,  in  which  Jackson  said:  "Prudence 
.  .  .  seems  to  dictate  that  we  should  still  stand  aloof  and  main 
tain  our  present  attitude  ...  at  least  until  the  lapse  of  time  or 
the  course  of  events  shall  have  proved  beyond  cavil  or  dispute  the 
ability  of  the  people  of  that  country  to  maintain  their  separate 
sovereignty  and  to  uphold  the  government  constituted  by  them. " 

"They  are,"  said  Mr.  McKinley,  "evidence  that  the  United 
States,  in  addition  to  the  test  imposed  by  public  law  as  the  con 
dition  of  the  recognition  of  independence  by  a  neutral  state  (to  wit, 
that  the  revolted  state  shall  '  constitute  in  fact  a  body  politic,  hav- 


578  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE 

ing  a  government  in  substance  as  well  as  in  name,  possessed  of  the 
elements  of  stability/  and  forming  de  facto,  'if  left  to  itself,  a  state 
among  the  nations,  reasonably  capable  of  discharging  the  duties  of 
a  state'),  has  imposed  for  its  own  governance  in  dealing  with  cases 
like  these  the  further  condition  that  recognition  of  independe/it 
statehood  is  not  du£jto_a  revolted  dependency  until  the  danger* 
of  its  being  again  subjugat3n5y~~Sie~~pafettt  state  has  entirely 
passed  away.  .  .  . 

"I  said  in  my  message  of  December  last,  'It  is  to  be  seriously 
considered  whether  the  Cuban  insurrection  possesses  beyond  dis 
pute  the  attributes  of  statehood  which  alone  can  demand  the  recog 
nition  of  belligerency  in  its  favor.'  The  same  requirement  must 
certainly  be  no  less  seriously  considered  when  the  graver  issue  of 
recognizing  independence  is  in  question,  for  no  less  positive  test  can 
be  applied  to  the  greater  act  than  to  the  lesser;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  influences  and  consequences  of  the  struggle  upon  the  in 
ternal  policy  of  the  recognizing  state,  which  form  important  factors 
when  the  recognition  of  belligerency  is  concerned,  are  secondary,  if 
not  rightly  eliminable,  factors  when  the  real  question  is  whether  the 
community  claiming  recognition  is  or  is  not  independent  beyond 
peradventure. 

"Nor  from  the  stand-point  of  expediency  do  I  think  it  would  be 
wise  or  prudent  for  this  government  to  recognize  at  the  present  time 
the  independence  of  the  so-called  Cuban  republic.  Such  recogni 
tion  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  enable  the  United  States  to  intervene 
and  pacify  the  island- — To  commit  this  country  now  to  the  recogni 
tion  of  any  particular  government  in  Cuba  might  subject  us  to  em 
barrassing  conditions  of  international  obligation  toa^rd  the  organi 
zation  so  recognized.  In  case  of  intervention  our  conduct  would  be 
subject  to  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  such  government.  We 
would  be  required  to  submit  to~its  direction'and  to  assume  to  it  the 
mere  relation  of  a  friendly  ally. 

"When  it  shal^appear  hereafter  that  there  is  within  the  island  a 
government  capable  T>f-performing  the  duties  and  discharging  the 
functions  of  a  separate  nation,  and  having^  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
proper  forms  and  attributes  of  nationality,  such  government  can  be 
promptly  and  readily  recognized  and  trreretetions  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  with  such  nation  adjusted: 


1898]  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  579 

"There  remain  the  alternative  forms  of  intervention  to  end  the 
war,  either  as  an  impartial  neutral  by  imposing  a  rational  compro 
mise  between  the  contestants,  or  as  the  active  ally  of  the  one  party 
or  the  other. 

"As  to  the  first,  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  during  the  last  few 
months  the  relation  of  the  United  States  has  virtually  been  one  of 
friendly  intervention  in  many  ways,  each  not  of  itself  conclusive,  but 
all  tending  to  the  exertion  of  a  potential  influence  toward  an  ulti 
mate  pacific  result,  just  and  honorable  to  all  interests  concerned. 
The  spirit  of  all  our  acts  hitherto  has  been  an  earnest,  unselfish 
desire  for  peace  and  prosperity  in  Cuba,  untarnished  by  differences 
between  us  and  Spain,  and  unstained  by  the  blood  of  American 
citizens. 

"The  forcible  intervention  of  the  United  States  as  a  neutral  to 
stop  the  war,  according  to  the  large  dictates  of  humanity  and  follow 
ing  many  historical  precedents  where  neighboring  states  have  inter 
fered  to  check  the  hopeless  sacrifices  of  life  by  internecine  conflicts 
beyond  their  borders,  is  justifiable  on  rational  grounds.  It  in 
volves,  however,  hostile  constraint  upon  both  the  parties  to  the 
contest  as  well  to  enforce  a  truce  as  to  guide  the  eventual  settlement. 

"The  grounds  for  such  intervention  may  be  briefly  summarized 
as  follows: 

"  First.  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  bar 
barities,  bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  miseries  now  existing 
there,  and  which  the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  either  unable  or  un 
willing  to  stop  or  mitigate.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  this  is  all  in 
another  country,  belonging  to  another  nation,  and  is  therefore  none 
of  our  business.  It  is  specially  our  duty,  for  it  is  right  at  our  door. 

"Second.  We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  afford  them  that 
protection  and  indemnity  for  life  and  property  which  no  govern 
ment  there  can  or  will  afford,  and  to  that  end  to  terminate  the  con 
ditions  that  deprive  them  of  legal  protection. 

"Third.  The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the  very 
serious  injury  to  the  commerce,  trade,  and  business  of  our  people, 
and  by  the  wanton  destruction  of  property  and  devastation  of  the 
island. 

"Fourth,  and  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  present 
condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba  is  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace,  and 


580  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  [1898 

entails  upon  this  government  an  enormous  expense.  With  such  a 
conflict  waged  for  years  in  an  island  so  near  us  and  with  which  our 
people  have  such  trade  and  business  relations — when  the  lives  and 
liberty  of  our  citizens  are  in  constant  danger  and  their  property  de 
stroyed  and  themselves  ruined — where  our  trading  vessels  are  liable 
to  seizure  and  are  seized  at  our  very  door  by  war-ships  of  a  foreign 
nation,  the  expeditions  of  filibustering  that  we  are  powerless  to  pre 
vent  altogether,  and  the  irritating  questions  and  entanglements  thus 
arising — all  these  and  others  that  I  need  not  mention,  with  the  re 
sulting  strained  relations,  are  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace,  and 
compel  us  to  keep  on  a  semiwar  footing  with  a  nation  with  which 
we  are  at  peace. 

"These  elements  of  danger  and  disorder  already  pointed  out  have 
been  strikingly  illustrated  by  a  tragic  event  which  has  deeply  and 
justly  moved  the  American  people.  I  have  already  transmitted  to 
Congress  the  report  of  the  naval  court  of  inquiry  on  the  destruction 
of  the  battle-ship  Maine  in  the  harbor  of  Havana  during  the  night 
of  the  15th  of  February.  The  destruction  of  that  noble  vessel  has 
filled  the  national  heart  with  inexpressible  horror.  Two  hundred 
and  fifty-eight  brave  sailors  and  marines  and  two  officers  of  our 
navy,  reposing  in  the  fancied  security  of  a  friendly  harbor,  have  been 
hurled  to  death,  grief  and  want  brought  to  their  homes  and  sorrow 
to  the  nation. 

"The  naval  court  of  inquiry,  which,  it  is  needless  to  say,  com 
mands  the  unqualified  confidence  of  the  government,  was  unani 
mous  in  its  conclusion  that  the  destruction  of  the  Maine  was  caused 
by  an  exterior  explosion,  that  of  a  submarine  mine.  It  did  not 
assume  to  place  the  responsibility.  That  remains  to  be  fixed. 

"In  any  event  the  destruction  of  the  Mainey  by  whatever  ex 
terior  cause,  is  a  patent  and  impressive  proof  of  a  state  of  things  in 
Cuba  that  is  intolerable.  That  condition  is  thus  shown  to  be  such 
that  the  Spanish  government  cannot  assure  safety  and  security 
to  a  vessel  of  the  American  navy  in  the  harbor  of  Havana  on  a 
mission  of  peace,  and  rightfully  there. 

"Further  referring  in  this  connection  to  recent  diplomatic  cor 
respondence,  a  despatch  from  our  minister  to  Spain,  of  the  26th 
ultimo,  contained  the  statement  that  the  Spanish  minister  for  for 
eign  affairs  assured  him  positively  that  Spain  will  do  all  that  the 


1898]  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  581 

highest  honor  and  justice  require  in  the  matter  of  the  Maine.  The 
reply  above  referred  to  of  the  31st  ultimo  also  contained  an  ex 
pression  of  the  readiness  of  Spain  to  submit  to  an  arbitration  all  the 
differences  which  can  arise  in  this  matter,  which  is  subsequently 
explained  by  the  note  of  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  of 
the  10th  instant,  as  follows: 

" '  As  to  the  question  of  fact  which  springs  from  the  diversity 
of  views  between  the  reports  of  the  American  and  Spanish  boards, 
Spain  proposes  that  the  facts  be  ascertained  by  an  impartial  in 
vestigation  by  experts,  whose  decision  Spain  accepts  in  advance/ 

"To  this  I  have  made  no  reply." 

The  President  then  quoted  at  some  length  President  Grant's 
opinion  expressed  in  his  message  of  1875,  that  "the  agency  of 
others,  either  by  mediation  or  by  intervention,  seems  to  be  the  only 
alternative  which  must  sooner  or  later  be  invoked  for  the  termi 
nation  of  the  strife,"  and  also  quoted  the  similar  views  expressed 
by  President  Cleveland  in  his  last  annual  message  in  1896,  and  in 
his  own  in  1897.  He  then  said : 

"The  long  trial  has  proved  that  the  object  for  which  Spain  has 
waged  the  war  cannot  be  attained.  The  fire  of  insurrection  may 
flame  or  may  smoulder  with  varying  seasons,  but  it  has  not  been  and 
it  is  plain  that  it  cannot  be  extinguished  by  present  methods.  The 
only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a  condition  which  can  no  longer 
be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacification  of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of 
humanity7~m  the  naffire"  of  civilization,  in  behalf  of  endangered 
American  interests  which  give  us  the  right  and  the  duty  to  speak 
and  to  act,  the  war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

"In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  these  considerations,  I  ask  the 
Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take  measures 
to  secure  a  full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities  between  the 
government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the 
island  the  establishment  of  a  stable  government,  capable  of  main 
taining  order  and  observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring 
peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as 
our  own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  as  may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes. 

"And  in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  to  aid  in  preserving  the 
lives  of  the  starving  people  of  the  island  I  recommend  that  the 


582  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  [1898 

distribution  of  food  and  supplies  be  continued,  and  that  an  ap 
propriation  be  made  out  of  the  public  treasury  to  supplement  the 
charity  of  our  citizens. 

"The  issue  is  now  with  the  Congress.-  It  is  a  solemn  responsi 
bility.  I  have  exhausted  every  effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable  con 
dition  of  affairs  which  is  at  our  doors.  Prepared  to  execute  every 
obligation  imposed  upon  me  by  the  constitution  and  the  law,  I 
await  your  action." 

^^Only  now,  however,  did  the  President  mention  the  yielding 
I  by  Spain  to  all  demands  officially  placed  before  her,  saying  with  a 
/  terseness  which  could  only  be  held  to  mean  that  the  concession 
came  too  late : 

"Yesterday,  and  since  the  preparation  of  the  foregoing  message, 
official  information  was  received  by  me  that  the  latest  decree  of  the 
Queen  Regent  of  Spain  directs  General  Blanco,  in  order  to  prepare 
and  facilitate  peace,  to  proclaim  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  the  dura 
tion  and  details  of  which  have  not  yet  been  communicated  to  me. 
"This  fact  with  every  other  pertinent  consideration  will,  I  am 
sure,  have  your  just  and  careful  attention  in  the  solemn  delibera 
tions  upon  which  you  are  about  to  enter.  If  this  measure  attains 
a  successful  result,  then  our  aspirations  as  a  Christian,  peace- 
loving  people  will  be  realized.  If  it  fails,  it  will  be  only  another 
justification  for  our  contemplated  action." 

It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  many  and  various  resolutions 
brought  forward  in  each  House,  beginning  April  13;  referred  to 
the  committees  on  foreign  affairs,  reported,  and  debated  until 
on  April  19  (though  the  legislative  day  was  the  18th),  final  action 
was  taken  on  a  joint  resolution,  of  which  that  reported  on  April  13 
by  the  Senate  committee  on  foreign  affairs  was  the  basis.  The 
report  of  this  committee  was  prefaced  by  many  pages  dealing  with 
the  general  question  of  Cuba,  but  first  with  the  destruction  of  the 
Maine. 

It  regarded  this  "as  only  a  single  incident  in  the  relations"  with 
Spain,  and  "if  that  calamity  had  never  happened  the  questions 
between  the  United  States  and  that  government  would  press  for 
immediate  solution."  It  considered  that  it  "was  compassed 
either  by  the  official  act  of  the  Spanish  authorities  or  was  made 


1898]  RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS  583 

possible  by  negligence  on  their  part  so     Ailing  and  gross  as  to  be 
equivalent  in  culpability  to  positive  crimin  vl  action." 

The  control  of  Spain  over  the  western  part  of  the  island  was 
declared  a  "dominance  over  a  desolation  which  she  herself  has 
created."  Elaborate  argument  was  made  in  justification  of  recog 
nition  and  intervention,  but,  notwithstanding,  the  majority  of  the 
committee  evaded  the  question  of  recognition  in  the  joint  resolu 
tion  offered,  which  was  as  follows: 

"Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for  more 

than  three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own  borders,  have 

shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  have 

been  a  disgrace  to  Christian  civilization,  culminating,  as  they  have, 

in  the  destruction  of  a  United  States  battle-ship,  with  two  hundred 

and  sixty-six1  of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly  visit  in  the 

.  harbor  of  Havana,  and  cannot  longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set 

\  forth  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to  Con- 

f  gress  of  April  eleventh,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  upon 

(  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited:  Therefore, 

"  Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled:  First.  That 
the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be, 
free  and  independent. 

"Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand, 
and  the  government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that 
the  government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  gov 
ernment  in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

"Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the 
United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  states,  to  such  extent  as  may 
be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect." 

Four  members  of  the  committee,  while  "cordially"  concurring 
in  the  report,  favored  "the  immediate  recognition  of  the  republic 
of  Cuba,  as  organized  in  that  island,  as  a  free,  independent,  and 
sovereign  power,"  and  reported  an  amendment  of  the  first  para 
graph  by  inserting  after  the  word  independent:  "and  the  govern- 
1  An  error;  the  number  was  two  hundred  and  sixty. 


584  THE  FLVAL  RESOLUTION  [1898 

j  ment  of  the  United  Sta  ,-s  hereby  recognize(s)   the  republic  of 
Cuba  as  the  true  and  kwful  government  of  that  island."  * 

Debate  in  the  Senate  lasted  until  late  Saturday,  April  16.  The 
amendment  of  the  minority  of  the  committee  was  adopted  by  a  vote 
of  51  to  37,  the  dissentients  being  33  republicans  and  4  democrats. 
Ten  republicans  voted  with  the  majority.  An  amendment  offered 
on  the  16th  by  Senator  Teller  disclaiming  any  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  of  seeking  sovereignty  or  dominion  over 
Cuba  was  agreed  to  without  a  division.  The  resolutions  as 
amended  were  passed  by  a  vote  of  67  to  21,  24  republicans  voting 
with  the  democrats  and  populists  in  the  majority;  19  republicans 
and  2  democrats  forming  the  minority.  Sunday  intervened. 
/The  House  on  Monday,  the  18th,  wisely  and  fortunately,  but 
/  somewhat  surprisingly,  it  must  be  said,  considering  its  more  popular 
I  character,  struck  out,  through  the  exextjo^s^jhe_re£ublican  leaders, 
1  the  resolution  of  recognition.  The  adherence  of  the  Senate,  when 
the  bill  wasr-TettrraedrJaLits.  original  vote  caused  twice  a  reference 
to  conferences,  the  final  result  being  that  at  1.20  A.  M.  of  April  19  a 
joint  resolution  from  the  conference  committee  was  adopted  in  the 
Senate  by  a  vote  of  42  to  35,  and  at  2.40  o'clock  in  the  House  by 
311  to  6.  Twelve  senators  and  38  representatives  did  not  vote. 
The  resolution,  prefaced  as  it  originally  came  from  the  Senate 
committee  on  foreign  affairs,  was  as  follows: 

"Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled:  First.  That 
the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free 
and  independent. 

"SeTttHcTP  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand, 
and  the  government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand, 
that  the  government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and 
government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

"Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the 
United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  states,  to  such  an  extent 
as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 
1  Senate  Report,  885,  55  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


1898]      SPANISH  MINISTER  LEAVES  WASHINGTON       585 

"Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  dis 
position  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control 
over  said  island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its 
determination  when  that  is  accomplished  to  leave  the  government 
and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people. " 

The  resolution  was  signed  by  the  President  at  11.24  A.  M.  of 
April  20. 

Within  a  few  minutes  (at  11.35  A.  M.)  the  secretary  of  state 
received  a  note  from  the  Spanish  minister  stating  that,  the  passage 
of  the  joint  resolution  and  its  signing  by  the  President  making  his 
continuance  in  Washington  impossible,  he  requested  his  passports, 
announcing  that  Spanish  interests  would  be  looked  after  by  the 
French  ambassador  and  Austro-Hungarian  minister.1  He  left 
Washington  the  same  evening  for  Canada,  having  first  telegraphed 
his  action  to  the  Spanish  minister  of  state. 

The  resolution  was  telegraphed  to  the  American  minister  at 
Madrid  with  directions  "to  immediately  communicate"  it  to  the 
government  of  Spain,  with  the  formal  demand  which  the  resolution  ' 
embodied,  with  the  addition  that  "if  by  the  hour  of  noon  on  Sat 
urday  next,  the  23d  day  of  April,  instant,  there  be  not  communi 
cated  to  this  government  by  that  of  Spain  a  full  and  satisfactory 
response  to  this  demand  and  resolution,  whereby  the  ends  of  peace 
in  Cuba  shall  be  assured,  the  President  will  proceed  without  fur 
ther  notice  to  use  the  power  and  authority  enjoined  and  conferred 
upon  him  by  the  said  joint  resolution  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
necessary  to  carry  the  same  into  effect."  2 

The  Spanish  minister  of  state,  before  the  instructions  telegraphed 
could  be  acted  upon,  and  in  order  "  to  avoid  receiving  the  American 
ultimatum,"  3  sent  to  General  \Voodford  a  note  stating  that  "  the 
President  having  approved  a  resolution  of  both  chambers  of  the 
United  States,  which  in  denying  the  legitimate  sovereignty  of  Spain 
and  in  threatening  armed  intervention  in  Cuba,  is  equivalent  to 
an  evident  declaration  of  war,  the  government  of  his  majesty  has 
ordered  its  minister  in  Washington  to  withdraw  without  loss  of 
time  from  American  territory  with  all  the  personnel  of  the  legation. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  765.  2  Ibid.,  762. 

3  Senor  Gullon  to  Spanish  representatives  abroad,  April  21,  1898,  Spanish 
Cor.  and  Docs.,  136. 


586  WAR  FORMALLY  DECLARED  [1898 

By  this  act  the  diplomatic  relations  which  previously  existed  be 
tween  the  two  countries  are  broken  off,  all  official  communication 
between  their  representatives  ceasing,  and  I  hasten  to  communi 
cate  this  to  your  excellency  in  order  that  on  your  part  you  may 
make  such  dispositions  as  seem  suitable."  l 

General  Woodford,  acknowledging  the  reception  of  the  note, 
announced  to  Senor  Gullon  that  he  had  directed  all  the  consular 
representatives  of  the  United  States  in  Spain  to  turn  over  their 
consulates  to  the  British  consuls  and  leave  Spain  at  once,  and  that 
he  himself  had  placed  the  affairs  of  his  legation  in  the  hands  of  the 
British  embassy,  which  would  have  the  care  of  American  interests. 
He  ended  with:  "I  now  request  passports  and  safe-conduct  to 
the  French  frontier  for  myself  and  the  personnel  of  this  legation. 
I  intend  leaving  at  four  o'clock  for  Paris."  2 

At  daylight  the  next  morning,  April  22,  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet 
was  crossing  the  narrow  sea  between  Key  West  and  Cuba,  with 
orders  to  blockade  the  Cuban  coast  from  Cardenas  to  Bahia 
Honda  on  the  north  and  Cienfuegos  on  the  south.  Two  days 
later,  on  April  24,  Admiral  Dewey  received  orders  to  proceed  at 
once  to  the  Philippines  and  "capture  or  destroy"  the  Spanish 
squadron. 

On  April  25  it  was  enacted  by  the  American  Congress:  "That 
war  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby  declared  to  exist,  and  that  war  has 
existed  since  the  21st  day  of  April  A.  D.,  1898,  including  said  day, 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  kingdom  of  Spain." 

The  appeal  had  at  last  been  made  to  the  law  of  force  on  which 
has  everjlej)ended,_and  apparently  for  ages  wilt  llepend,  the 
arbitrament  of  the7greater_j:|uestions^  of  life.  Though  nearly 
twenty  centuries  have  passed  sincelEegreat  preachment  of  peace, 
more  than  ever  are  land  and  sea  under  martial  threat.  The  facts 
of  the  universe  are  stronger  than  human  theory.  If  we  acknowl 
edge  an  Almighty  oversight  of  our  world,  who  shall  say  that  the 
existence  of  war  and  preparation  for  war  are  immoral  and  not  in 
the  intention  of  things  ?  If  this  be  allowed,  war  of  itself  cannot  be 

1  Senor  Gullon  to  General  Woodford,  April  21, 1898,  Spanish  Cor.  and  Does., 
135. 
3  Ibid.,  135. 


1898]         END  OF  A  300  YEARS  RACE  STRUGGLE  587 

the  great  evil;  the  evil  is  in  the  horrors,  many  of  which  are  not 
necessarily  concomitant.  Militant  operations  have  been  softened 
equally  with  those  of  civil  justice,  and  the  war  now  beginning 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  was  one  in  which  these 
greater  horrors  were  largely  to  be  absent.  The  combatant  forces 
almost  alone  were  to  suffer,  and  they  in  moderate  degree.  At 
least  the  short  struggle  ended  the  immensely  greater  evils  of  the 
contest  between  Cuban  and  Spaniard. 

The  war  was  the  final  act  in  the  struggle  for  supremacy  betweei 
Anglo-Saxons  and  men  of  the  Latin  race  in  North  America,  ii 
which  Philip,  Elizabeth,  Drake,  Howard,  Chatham,  Vernon,  Wolf,^ 
Montcalm,  Washington  had,  all,  a  part.     The  expedition  of  the' 
Great  Armada;    the  murderous  early  struggles  in  Carolina  and 
Florida;  the  seven  years'  war  which  drove  France  from  the  Ameri 
can  continent,  were  but  acts  in  the  drama  the  culmination  of 
which,  in  1898,  left  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  American  in  Mexico 
masters  of  the  whole  of  the  northern  continent.     It  was  the  end  of 
a  race  struggle  which  had  lasted  full  three  hundred  years. 

Spanish  dominion  in  America,  in  which  there  had  been  much 
both  of  glory  and  of  shame,  with  splendid  episodes  of  heroic  en 
deavor,  noble  self-abnegation,  and  great  attainment,  was  to  end  in 
the  final  sacrifice,  nobly  met,  in  the  sea  which  had  through  genera 
tions  witnessed  so  many  conflicts  of  the  two  races. 

Though  Spain  was  to  lose  her  American  dominion,  she  was  not 
to  lose  the  good-will  and  kindly  regard  of  the  American  people, 
linked  as  these  are  with  her  by  the  chain  wrought  by  the  great 
discoverer,  and  to  whom  Spain  must  ever  be  the  land  which  has 
made  so  much  of  the  history  of  the  Western  world.  Those  who 
know  Spain  know  a  country  in  which  kindliness,  courtesy,  and 
simplicity  of  character  much  more  than  offset  the  want  of  the 
more  energetic  qualities  on  which  modern  life  lays  so  great  store; 
and  in  those  who  have  this  knowledge  there  can  but  be  the  wish 
for,  in  time  to  come,  the  peace  and  prosperity  which  through  so 
many  centuries  have  failed  to  be  her  portion,  and  that  Spanish 
statesmanship  to  come  will  meet  the  true  deserts  of  the  Spanish 
people. 


INDEX 


ABARZUZA,  Spanish  statesman,  author  of 
Cuban  law  passed  Feb.,  1895,  406. 

Act,  the  Mobile,  70;  practically  withdrawn 
by  proclamation,  71. 

Act,  strengthening  neutrality  act,  passed 
March  3,  1817,  123. 

Adams,  John,  27. 

Adams,  secretary  of  state,  1817,  124;  con 
cerning  charges  in  Baltimore  against 
privateers,  122;  best  equipped  and  ablest 
statesman  who  has  held  the  office,  124; 
correspondence  with  De  Onis,  re  treaty, 
124;  opposes  yielding  Texas,  125;  sup 
ports  Jackson,  134;  overbears  opposi 
tion,  134;  reply  to  Spanish  minister,  134; 
reply  to  Pizarro,  135-137;  reply  silenced 
European  comment,  137;  preserves 
Northwest  to  U.  S.,  139;  land  grants  by 
Spain  in  Florida,  139;  holds  delay  in 
ratification  of  treaty  unjustified,  142; 
sharp  reply  to  Vives,  145;  re  South 
American  independence,  150;  reply, 
April  6,  1822,  to  Spanish  minister's 
protest  re  South  American  recognition, 
153;  re  South  American  revolutionary 
governments,  155;  re  privateers  and 
pirates,  180;  instruction  to  Nelson, 
American  minister  in  Spain,  1823,  180; 
Cuba  indispensable  to  Union,  183;  fears 
British  occupancy  of  Cuba,  185;  does  not 
believe  Holy  Alliance  could  restore  Span 
ish  dominion  in  South  America,  195; 
anticipates  Monroe  declaration  in  in 
forming  Russian  minister,  July  15,  1823, 
that  "  American  continents  are  no  longer 
subjects  for  any  new  colonial  establish 
ments,"  198;  views  of  stand  to  be  taken, 
198;  author  of  Monroe  doctrine,  198 
(note);  answer  to  Russian  minister, 
Nov.  27,  1823,  a  full  exposition  of 
American  policy,  199;  opposes  touching 
European  situation  in  message  of  1823, 
200;  reasons  for  joining  in  Panama 
congress,  209,  210;  action  sound,  210; 
president,  message,  Dec.  6,  1825,  noti 
fies  Congress  of  proposed  action  re  Pana 
ma  congress  and  nominates  envoys 
thereto,  209;  second  message  on  Pana 
ma  congress,  213,  214. 

Addington  informs  Mr.  King  New  Orleans 
might  be  occupied  by  England,  46. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  meeting  of  alliance  at, 
Oct.  1,  1818,  160;  sovereigns  present, 
160;  the  two  protocols,  161,  162. 

Albemarle,  Lord,  13. 


Alexander,  Emperor  of  Russia,  107;  directs 
minister  in  Washington  to  "plead  cause 
of  peace,"  144;  religious  exalte",  156; 
wholly  subservient  to  Metternich,  171. 

Allen  H.,  minister  to  Chile,  155. 

Allen,  William  Vincent,  Senator,  offers 
joint  resolution  re  Cuba,  486. 

AllianQa,  case  of,  fired  on  by  Venadito, 
419-423;  discussion  by  Olivart,  422,  423. 

Amadeo,  called  to  throne  of  Spain,  Nov., 
1870,  282;  abdication  of,  Feb.  11,  1873; 
election  of,  305  (note) ;  king  from  Janu 
ary,  1871,  to  February,  1873,  313. 

Ambrister,  Lieutenant,  116;  accompanies 
Woodbine  in  endeavor  to  arouse  Indi- 

•  ans,  125;  executed  by  Jackson,  130; 
violent  feeling  in  England,  130,  137. 

Amelia  Island,  115;  seized  by  adventurers, 
led  by  Sir  Gregor  McGregor,  125. 

America  (U.  S.),  humiliation  of,  through 
failure  to  follow  Gallatin's  advice,  89; 
ships  seized,  90;  a  victim,  104;  true 
course  to  arm,  to  occupy  Texas  and 
let  war  come  if  it  would,  105;  affairs 
tending  to  war  with  Great  Britain,  114; 
American  slavery  bulwark  of  Spain  in 
Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  215. 

America,  South,  why  Spanish  in  character 
instead  of  Anglo-Saxon,  111;  lost  to 
Great  Britain,  111. 

America,  Spanish,  secession  precipitated 
by  Spaniards  of  Spain,  110. 

Amistad,  extraordinary  case  of,  270  (note). 

Anderson,  R.  C.,  minister  to  Colombia,  155; 
nominated  envoy  to  Panama  congress, 
209;  did  not  attend,  dying  at  Bogota, 
214. 

Anduaga,  Don  Joaquin  de,  Spanish  minis 
ter,  protests  against  recognition  of  South 
American  independence,  153;  Adams's 
reply,  153,  154. 

Appalachicola,  fort  on,  great  value  of 
stores,  118. 

Aranda,  Count,  boundaries  proposed  by, 
in  1782,  25;  often  declared  France  mis 
taken  in  encouraging  American  inde 
pendence,  27. 

Arbuthnot  tried  and  hanged  by  Jackson, 
130;  serious  character  of  act,  130;  ex 
ecution  near  to  bringing  war  with  Great 
Britain,  131,  136. 

Armstrong  General  John,  minister  to 
France,  writes  Monroe  that  France  will 
side  with  Spain,  82;  advises  Jefferson  to 
occupy  Texas,  86,  92;  arrival  of  defi- 


589 


590 


INDEX 


nite  propositions  from  French  govern 
ment,  93;  new  proposition  from  French 
emissary,  94;  receives  note  re  Santo  Do 
mingo,  97,  98;  beseeches  government 
to  take  positive  ground,  99;  to  French 
government,  declining  alliance,  100. 

Aury,  "Commodore,"  seizes  Fernandina 
as  a  conquest  of  Mexican  republic,  126. 

Austria  dominates  largely  Italy,  170; 
treaty  binding  Naples  to  monarchical 
institutions,  170;  moves  85,000  men 
into  Italy  and  suppresses  Naples  and 
Piedmont  revolutions,  172;  action  in 
Italy  but  prelude  to  designs  as  to  Spain, 
173;  results  in  Italy,  173. 

Autonomy  in  Cuba,  $50,000,000  appro 
priation  death-blow  to,  545. 

Avenero,  Spanish  admiral,  232  (note). 

Azara,  Spanish  minister  to  Paris,  unable 
to  state  if  the  Floridas  were  included  in 
cession  to  France,  44. 

Azcarraga  succeeds  Canovas  as  minister 
of  state  ad  interim,  511. 

BARKER,  consul  at  Sagua  la  Grande,  re 
ports  laborers  killed  by  insurgents,  523. 

Barrancas,  Fort,  116;  taken  by  Jackson, 
131. 

Barton,  Miss  Clara,  in  Cuba,  529. 

Bathurst,  Lord,  letter  to  Castlereagh,  re 
Canning's  objections  to  action  of  Holy 
Alliance,  168-170. 

Baton  Rouge  seized,  112. 

Bayou  Pierre,  strong  Spanish  garrison  at, 
102. 

Becerra,  minister  of  state  ad  interim,  cold 
reception  of  U.  S.  proposals,  299;  un 
fortunate  absence  of  Prim  and  Silvela, 
299;  bitterly  opposed  to  propositions, 
299;  requests  withdrawal  of  Sickles's 
note  of  Sept.  3,  300;  while  accepting 
good  offices  of  U.  S.,  bases  rejected, 
301. 

Bedoya,  Serrano,  282. 

Belligerency,  recognition  of ,|  demanded  in 
U.  S.,  286;  report  upon,  by  majority  of 
Senate  committee  on  foreign  affairs, 
Dec.  21,  1896,  483-485. 

Benton,  Senator,  on  Panama  congress, 
212. 

Berlin  decree,  99. 

Bermuda,  British  filibustering  steamer, 
418. 

Bernadotte  to  command  Louisiana  ex 
pedition,  44. 

Bernadotte,  King  of  Sweden,  160. 

Bernstorff,  Prussian  representative  at  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  160. 

Berthier,  ordered  to  prepare  Santo  Do 
mingo  expedition,  48. 

Berrien,  Senator,  on  Panama  congress,  812. 

Beurnonville,  General,  50. 

Bill  for  $2,000,000  for  Floridas  passed,  97. 

Billy  Butts,  American  schooner  carrying 
arms,  etc.,  to  Virginius,  315. 


Black  Warrior,  mail  steamer  and  cargo 
seized  at  Havana  for  alleged  violation 
of  customs  laws,  255;  impossible  to  find 
excuse  for  action,  256;  despatch  regard 
ing,  to  Souie,  257;  Spain's  attitude, 
258;  matter  arranged  by  owners  with 
Cuban  authorities,  259. 

Blanco,  Guzman,  connection  with  Vir 
ginius,  315. 

Blanco  y  Erenas,  Don  Ramon,  marquis 
of  Pena  Plata,  succeeds  Weyler,  Oct. 
31,  1897,  522;  attempts  alleviation  of 
concentration,  522;  non-success,  522; 
efforts  to  relieve  distress,  530;  opposi 
tion  to  his  policy  of  reform,  530;  com 
plete  recall  of  concentration  orders,  566. 

Bland,  Theodoric,  a  commissioner  to  South 
America,  149. 

Blockade,  of  New  York,  92;  of  Spanish 
main,  declared  by  Spanish  authorities, 
179;  protest  against  by  American  and 
British  commanders,  180. 

Bolivar,  149;  treaty  with  Marshal  Morillo, 
1820,  179;  circular  calling  a  congress  to 
include  Spanish-American  states  and 
U.  S.,  205;  objects  of  Panama  congress, 
210,  211. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  45. 

Bonaparte.     See  Napoleon. 

Boone,  Daniel,  30. 

Boundaries,  nothing  could  be  clearer,  69; 
proposed  in  cabinet  meeting,  Nov.  12, 
1805,  92,  94. 

Boutelle,  Charles  Addison,  M.  C.,  speech 
of,  on  Cuba,  449. 

Bowdoin,  James,  to  succeed  Pinckney  at 
Madrid,  82,  84,  98. 

Brest,  48. 

Brice,  U.  S.  consul,  Matanzas,  report  of 
conditions  at,  504,  505;  Blanco's  order 
re  concentration  ineffective,  522;  report 
of  misery  in  Matanzas,  529,  530. 

British  occupancy  of  the  Floridas  feared, 
113:  British  protest  against  U.  S.  oc 
cupancy  of  West  Florida,  113. 

Brougham,  praises  Monroe  declaration, 
202. 

Buchanan,  James,  secretary  of  state,  des 
patch  proposing  »;o  buy  Cuba,  221-223; 
minister  to  England,  to  ascertain  views 
of  British  government  re  Cuba,  253;  to 
bring  to  notice  continuance  of  slave- 
trade,  253;  member  of  Ostend  confer 
ence,  261;  president;  continued  recom 
mendation  to  purchase  Cuba  a  painful 
demonstration  of  inability  to  read  signs 
of  the  times.  272. 

Buenos  Ayres,  declares  for  Fernando  and 
against  France,  May  25,  1810,  149; 
declares  independence,  July  9,  1816, 
149. 

Bulgary,  Count,  Russian  minister  to 
Spain,  requested  by  Spanish  minister  of 
state  to  call  upon  American  minister, 
143. 


INDEX 


591 


Bullock,  captain  of  Black  Warrior,  hauls 

down  flag,  256. 
Burr,    schemes    of,    100;     intrigues    with 

British  minister,  101;   turns  to  Spanish 

minister,  101. 
Burriel,    General,    governor   of   Santiago; 

defence  of,  322.     See  Virginius,  case  of, 

351-353. 
Butler,    Robert,    commissioner,    receives 

transfer  of  Florida,  147. 

CABALLERO  DE  ROSAS,  GENERAL,  Captain- 
General  of  Cuba,  in  place  of  Dulce,  290; 
issues  unwarranted  decrees,  290;  de 
crees  modified  on  protest  of  U.  S.,  292. 

Cabinet,  action  of,  on  Jefferson's  pro 
posals  for  joining  with  Great  Britain,  57; 
memoranda  of,  92;  accepts  Napoleon's 
terms.  94;  terms  agreed  upon  in,  re 
Spanish  question,  94;  English,  almost 
wholly  Tories,  168;  Canning  announces 
in,  opposition  to  Aix  meeting,  168; 
Monroe's,  except  Adams,  think  Jackson 
wrong,  134. 

Cadiz,  48;   merchants  of,  109. 

Calderon,  Seflor,  Spanish  minister  of  state, 
sends  note  to  American  minister,  Nov. 
15,  1875,  meeting  U.  S.  demands,  375, 
379;  memorandum  from,  Feb.  3,  1876, 
387,  388;  signs  protocol  of  1877,  393. 

Calhoun,  stimulates  panic  re  Holy  Alliance, 
195. 

Call,  Wilkinson,  senator,  re  Competitor, 
470;  offers  joint  resolution,  486. 

Cambrian,  British  frigate,  outrageous  con 
duct  of,  104. 

Cameron,  James  Donald,  senator,  reports 
joint  resolution  acknowledging  Cuban 
independence,  Dec.  21,  1896,  483;  re 
port  on  precedents,  483-485;  excite 
ment  following  offer  of  resolution,  485. 

Campos,  General  Martinez,  his  patriotic 
declaration,  397-400;  prime-minister  in 
1879,  400;  resigns,  400;  again  sent  to 
Cuba,  April,  1895,  with  unlimited  powers 
and  credit,  407;  humanity  and  excellent 
judgment  of,  427;  succeeded  by  Wey- 
ler,  428,  430. 

Canada  yielded,  1763,  to  Great  Britain,  13. 

Canalejas,  Sefior  Jos6,  editor  Madrid 
Herald,  letter  to,  from  De  Lome,  in 
tercepted,  538. 

Canning,  George,  cabinet  minister,  107; 
announces  opposition  to  the  policy  of 
the  Holy  Alliance,  168;  letter  from  Lord 
Bathurst  to  Castlereagh  discussing  Can 
ning's  opposition,  168-170;  final  English 
attitude  due  to,  170;  succeeds  Castle 
reagh  as  prime-minister,  174;  adds  forci 
bly  to  Wellington's  instructions,  174; 
note  to  ambassador  at  Paris  declaring 
separation  of  Spanish  colonies  an  ac 
complished  fact,  178;  instructions  to 
minister  at  Madrid,  181;  "double  char 
acter  of  Spain, "  181 ;  sends  British 


squadron  to  Cuban  waters,  186;  note  to 
Rush  mentioning  intentions  of  Holy 
Alliance,  187;  views  as  to  combined 
action  of  England  and  U.  S.,  187,  188; 
writes  Rush  and  has  interview,  188; 
defence  of  inaction  in  Spain,  190;  ex 
planation  to  Rush  of  long  silence,  196; 
disclaims  desire  for  any  portion  of 
Spanish  possessions,  196;  objects  to 
Monroe's  declaration  on  account  of  the 
Northwest,  203. 

Canovas  del  Castillo,  president  of  commis 
sion  on  Cuban  reforms,  277;  unwilling 
to  accept  liberal  views  of  Campos  and 
resigns,  400;  again  in  power,  400;  new 
laws  for  Cuba  ineffective,  400;  charac 
terization  of,  406;  wise  action  re  U.  S. 
citizens,  427;  cable  message  to  N.  Y. 
World,  quoted  by  Senator  Hale,  445,  446; 
in  ignorance  of  the  American  mind 
risked  American  unfriendliness  by  re 
jecting  good  offices  of  U.  S.,  466;  assas 
sinated,  Aug.  8,  1897,  511. 

Capo  d'Istria,  Russian  representative  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  160. 

Captain-General  of  Cuba,  action  re 
Crescent  City  and  Ohio,  246-249;  his 
authority  an  irresponsible  one,  248,  249; 
above  the  law,  249;  Spain  opposed  to  al 
terations  in  status  of,  254;  much-desired 
commercial  treaty  impossible,  254;  ex 
amination  of  relations  between,  and 
agents  of  U.  S.,  326. 

Caracas,  junta  of,  proclaimed  treasonable, 
110;  elects  supreme  junta,  1810,  148; 
destruction  by  earthquake  causes  tem 
porary  failure  of  revolution,  149;  U.  S. 
Congress  votes  $50,000  for  earthquake 
sufferers,  149  (note). 

Carmichael,  William,  charge  d'affaires, 
Madrid,  instructions  to,  1792,  35. 

Carondelet,  governor  of  Louisiana,  propo 
sitions  of,  to  intriguers,  39. 

Carron,  British  sloop  of  war,  116. 

Carvajal,  Spanish  minister  of  state  re  Vir 
ginius  (which  see),  320,  321,  322,  328, 
329,  330,  331,  332,  333,  334-338,  340, 
344. 

Casa  Calvo,  to  leave  New  Orleans,  93. 

Casa  Yrujo,  Marquis  of.     See  Yrujo. 

Cass,  Lewis,  secretary  of  state,  236  (note). 

Castelar,  president  of  republic,  313;  tele 
gram  from,  re  Virginius,  ordering  non- 
imposition  of  death  penalty  without  ref 
erence  to  Spain,  319;  deeply  moved  by 
executions,  321,  322. 

Castlereagh,  to  Rush,  re  execution  of 
Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister,  130;  prime- 
minister,  represents  Great  Britain  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  160;  commits  suicide, 
174. 

Cevallos,  Spanish  minister  of  state,  refers 
U.  S.  to  France,  62;  severe  remarks  to 
Pinckney,  75;  much  alarmed  by  Pinck- 
ney,  75;  appeals  to  French  minister,  75; 


592 


INDEX 


discloses  French  note  forbidding  dis 
cussion  of  French  spoliations,  82;  dis 
cusses  Louisiana  boundary,  82;  feels 
secure  under  ffigis  of  Napoleon,  83; 
states  boundary  acceptable  to  Spain,  83; 
informs  American  minister  that  De 
Onis  was  empowered  to  open  negotia 
tions  re  Florida,  124. 

Chadwick,  Captain  French  Ensor,  member 
Maine  court  of  inquiry,  542. 

Champagny,  99,  100. 

Chandler,  William  Eaton,  ex-senator,  on 
laws  of  war  in  report  of  Spanish  treaty 
claims  commission,  493,  494. 

Charles  IV,  King  of  Spain,  37,  42;  ab 
dication  of,  106. 

Charles  V  the  cause  of  Spain's  ruin,  8. 

Chateaubriand,  French  foreign  minister, 
note  giving  reasons  for  French  action, 
177. 

Chesapeake,  attacked  by  Leopard,  104. 

Chile,  revolution  begins,  1810,  149. 

Citizens,  American,  cases  of,  in  Cuba,  427; 
mildness  of  proceedings  against  changed 
under  Weyler,  428;  cases  determined  in 
main  with  tact  and  judgment,  428. 

Claiborne,  governor  of  Louisiana,  63,  93; 
described  by  French  prefect,  101. 

Clark,  George  Rogers,  capture  of  Kas- 
kaskia,  24,  37. 

Clay,  Henry,  M.  C.,  attacks  in  Congress 
Jackson's  course,  138;  opposes  yielding 
Rio  Grande  as  boundary,  139;  motion 
of,  1818,  for  appropriation  for  minister  to 
Rio  de  la  Plata  lost,  151;  renews  motion 
in  1820,  without  result,  152;  same  defeat 
ed,  1821,  152;  secretary  of  state;  sees 
minister  of  Mexico,  Central  America,  and 
Colombia  re  Congress,  205;  U.  S.  cannot 
be  party  to  existing  war  with  Spain,  205; 
aims  of  Spanish- American  states,  205; 
despatch  urging  Spain  to  accept  situa 
tion,  206,  207;  despatch  to  minister  in 
Russia  to  engage  Russia  to  influence 
Spain  to  stop  war  against  revolted  colo 
nies,  207;  Spain's  reply,  207;  reply  of, 
to  explanation  by  South  American  re 
publics  re  proposed  conference,  209; 
"seizure  of  Cuba,"  by  England  or 
France,  "would  mean  war,"  216. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  president,  proclaims 
rigorous  prosecution  of  transgressions 
of  neutrality  law,  411;  second  procla 
mation  of,  July  27,  1896,  415;  annual 
message,  Dec.  2,  1895,  425,  426;  last 
annual  message,  Dec.  7,  1896,  475-483; 
close  of  administration  a  period  of  pro 
tests  re  treatment  of  American  citizens, 
489;  succeeded  by  President  McKinley, 
490. 

Clinch,  Colonel,  attacks  negro  fort,  120. 

Clubs,  Cuban,  more  than  200  in  the  Ameri 
cas,  407. 

Colonies,  trade  of,  perquisite  of  parent 
state,  90. 


Colorado  River  offered  as  west  boundary 
by  American  envoys,  83;  boundary, 
94. 

Commission,  to  South  America,  sails  in 
frigate  Congress,  Dec.  4,  1817,  150; 
reports  from,  Nov.  1,  1818,  150. 

Commission,  royal,  sits  in  Spain  on  Cuban 
reforms;  Canovas  del  Castillo,  presi 
dent  of,  277;  economic  propositions 
of,  278;  reports  Jan.  30,  1867;  proposals 
of  commission,  278,  279;  final  result, 
fatal  to  Spain  in  issuance  of  decree  of 
Feb.  12,  1867,  antagonistic  to  commis 
sion's  views,  279;  bitter  denunciations 
of,  in  Cuba,  279;  political  reforms  pro 
posed,  279,  280;  favored  by  Serrano, 
280,  281;  1867,  plans  presented  for 
abolition  of  slavery  in  Cuba  and  Puerto 
Rico,  281;  only  result  of  commission 
increased  taxation,  281;  turning-point 
of  Cuban  and  Spanish  relations,  281. 

Commodore,  filibuster  tug,  416. 

Competitor,  filibustering  schooner,  the  only 
filibustering  vessel  seized  by  Spain  during 
war,  418;  history  of,  468;  captured,  468; 
persons  seized,  468;  case  of,  469-474; 
condemnation  of  crew,  as  "pirates," 
469;  release  of,  Nov.,  1897;  feeling 
aroused  by  case  in  Spain,  470;  action 
in  Congress,  470;  De  Olivart's  discus 
sion  of  case  of,  471-474;  "  the  ridiculus 
mus  of  the  fabulist,"  474;  case  made 
momentous  by  folly,  474,  489. 

Concentration,  its  standing  in  interna 
tional  law  examined,  491-495;  effect  of, 
492,  493;  U.  S.  precedent,  493;  used  by 
British  in  Boer  war,  493;  number  of 
deaths,  493  (and  note). 

Concha,  General  Jose"  de  la,  captain- 
general,  237;  appointed  governor-gen 
eral,  etc.,  of  Cuba,  362. 

Congress  of  Holy  Alliance,  See  Holy  Al 
liance. 

Congress,  U.  S.  proposes  to  yield  claim  of 
navigation  of  Mississippi  below  31°,  20; 
instructions  of  re  peace  negotiations 
disregarded  by  American  commissioners, 
26;  effect  which  would  have  resulted 
from  following  instructions  of,  26;  refers 
Spanish  treaty  to  new  federal  govern 
ment,^;  House  unalterably  determined 
not  to  yield  navigation  of  Mississippi,  52; 
debate  on  Jackson's  course,  138;  joint 
resolution,  expressing  friendly  interest  in 
South  American  independence,  148;  de 
bates  on  Panama  congress,  211,  212; 
Southern  opposition  overborne,  213; 
nominations  of  envoys  to  Panama  con 
firmed,  213;  great  emotion  in,  re  Cuba, 
306;  Senator  Morgan's  resolution,  passed 
in  Senate,  recognizing  Cuban  belliger 
ency,  did  not  come  before  House  through 
action  of  speaker,  491;  resolutions,  Sen 
ate,  433;  report  of  Senate  committee  on 
foreign  relations,  433,  434;  the  resolution 


INDEX 


593 


offered  by  majority  of  committee,  434, 
435;  minority  report  and  resolution,  435- 
437;  majority  offer  substitute  for  their 
previous  resolution,  437;  speech  of  Sen 
ator  Sherman,  437,  438;  Senate  passes 
resolutions,  Feb.  28,  1896,  438;  resolu 
tions  in  House  passed  March  2,  438;  text 
of,  438  (note);  passage  of  resolutions 
causes  climax  of  feeling  in  Spain,  439; 
House  passes  Senate  resolutions,  449; 
Senate,  joint  resolution  reported  from 
majority  of  committee  on  foreign  rela 
tions  recognizing  Cuban  independence, 
483;  report  accompanying  same,  483- 
485;  excitement  following  offer  of  reso 
lution,  485;  question  of  Cuban  recogni 
tion  not  brought  to  vote  in  House,  487; 
Senate,  resolution  offered  by  Mr.  Mor 
gan  for  recognition  of  Cuban  bellig 
erency,  491;  passes  bill  appropriating 
$50,000  (approved  May  24,  1897)  for 
relief  of  Americans  in  Cuba,  495;  ap 
propriates  $50,000,000  March  9,  1898, 
for  national  defence,  545;  death  blow 
to  autonomy,  545;  Spain  stunned, 
545;  action  in,  on  President's  message 
of  April  11,  1898,  583-585;  war  de 
clared  to  exist  since  April  21,  1898, 
586. 

Consul  (s)  American,  at  Santiago  reports 
complete  anarchy,  289;  British,  ap 
pointed  for  South  American  ports,  197; 
question  of,  in  Cuba,  218;  no  new  Span 
ish,  received  exequators,  112;  Spanish, 
office  of,  at  New  Orleans  attacked  by 
mob,  239;  event  characterized  by  secre 
tary  of  state,  239;  vice-,  at  Santiago,  in 
sulting  action  toward,  by  General  Bur- 
riel,  317. 

Convention,  ratification  of  re  Spanish 
claims  refused  by  Spain,  71. 

Converse,  Commander,  U.  S.  N.,  reports 
conditions  at  Matanzas,  505,  506. 

Copenhagen,  115. 

Coppinger,  Don  Jose",  governor  transfers 
Florida,  July  10,  1821,  146. 

Cordoba,  banished,  282. 

Cortes,  permanent  commission  of,  on 
transmarine  affairs  opposed  to  treating 
with  any  foreign  power  re  Cuba,  301. 

Creeks,  destructive  blow  against,  117; 
treaty  with,  by  Jackson,  117. 

Creole,  of  Lopez  expedition,  confiscated, 
233. 

Crescent  City,  brings  news  of  executions  of 
members  of  Lopez  expedition,  239; 
refused  privileges  of  port,  246;  ordered 
to  leave  port  without  landing  mails  or 
passengers,  247;  order  suspended,  247; 
U.  S.  protest,  247,  248. 

Crimean  war  removes  American  ap 
prehension  re  Cuba,  260. 

Crittenden,  Colonel,  W.  S.,  with  Lopez 
expedition,  1851,  237;  captured  and 
executed,  237. 


Cuba,  might  have  been  a  Spanish  Canada, 
12;  seizures  in,  of  American  property, 
96;  saved  to  Spain  by  slave  power  of 
U.  S.,  Ill;  future  of,  in  doubt,  182; 
fear  of  French  occupancy,  182;  Adams 
on  Cuba,  183-186;  importance  of,  to 
U.  S.,  183;  desire  of  U.  S.  that  Cuba 
should  remain  Spain's,  186;  U.  S.  ner 
vous  as  to  British  intentions  re  Cuba,  186; 
independence  of,  opposed  by  the  South, 
206;  desirability  of  annexation  to  U.  S., 
215;  Adams  on,  215;  Jefferson  on,  215, 
216;  efforts  of  U.  S.  to  preserve  status 
quo,  216;  seizure  of,  by  England  or 
France,  would  mean  war,  216;  despatch 
from  Duke  of  Alcudia  arouses  suspicion 
re  Cuba,  216,  217;  questions  of  consuls 
in,  218;  proposition  of  Polk  adminis 
tration  to  buy,  221;  purchase  by  U.  S. 
would  have  been  fiercely  resisted,  223; 
never  assumed  serious  form,  223;  edict 
of  1825  governing,  224;  early  discon 
tent  in,  225;  government  of,  remained 
a  despotism,  228;  in  1850,  228-229; 
salaries  paid  by,  229;  trade  of,  and 
revenues,  229;  revolt  begins,  229; 
increased  tyranny,  246;  interference 
with  American  shipping,  246;  ques 
tion  of  sale  of,  reopened  by  U.  S.,  260; 
question  of  purchase  practically  dead 
by  1856,  271;  statesmanship  of  both 
Spain  and  U.  S.  at  period  re  Cuba  sadly 
astray,  271;  last  bill  for  purchase  of, 
offered  by  Slidell,  1859,  272;  antago 
nism  to  joining  U.  S.  in,  274;  extensive 
character  of  slave-trade  in  Cuba  in  1864, 
274;  impetus  to  sugar  production,  274; 
organization  of  volunteers  in,  275;  great 
political  influence  of  clubs  and  volun 
teers,  275;  letter,  signed  by  24,000 
Cubans,  to  Serrano,  275;  a  commission 
established  in  Madrid,  to  consider  re 
forms  in,  276;  bases  of  Cuban  demands, 
276,  277;  passions  aroused  by  failure 
of  Spain  to  adopt  recommendations  of 
commission  in  1867,  279,  281;  increased 
taxation  only  result  of  commission  in 
1867,  281;  turning-point  in  relations 
with  Spain,  281;  insurrection  beginning 
Oct.  1868,  282;  time  ill  chosen,  283; 
negotiations  for  peace  made  impossible 
by  assassination  of  Arango,  284;  civil 
war  spread  through  island,  284;  ex 
traordinary  decrees  issued  in,  284,  285; 
decrees  antagonize  treaty  of  1795,  285; 
New  York  junta  issues  bonds  payable 
on  independence,  285;  junta  in  U.  S. 
demands  recognition  of  belligerency, 
286;  troops  in,  306;  law  of  emancipa 
tion,  312;  not  allowed  by  volunteers 
to  be  published  for  two  years,  313; 
examination  of  government  relations 
between,  and  Spain,  326;  vicious  circle 
of  procrastination,  327;  war  ends,  396; 
terms  of  peace  signed  by  Campos  and 


594 


INDEX 


by  Garcia  and  Gomez,  Feb.  10,  1878, 
396;  Campos  on  affairs  of,  397-400;  new 
laws  for,  ineffective,  400;  parties  in, 
401,  402;  Cuba  in  the  Spanish  parlia 
ment,  402;  analysis  of  legislation  of 
1878,  403;  Cuban  finance,  404;  influ 
ence  in  1895  of  economic  situation,  406; 
ground  between  American  and  Spanish 
protection,  407;  greed  of  protectionists 
at  bottom  of  revolt  of  1895,  407;  situa 
tion  in  Cuba,  430,  431;  situation  in,  at 
end  of  1896,  487;  extension  of  decree 
to,  granting  provincial  legislative  assem 
bly  when  state  of  war  would  permit, 
487;  satisfaction  in  Washington,  488; 
Estrada  Palma  on  decree,  488;  devas 
tation  in,  chiefly  due  to  orders  of  in 
surgent  chiefs,  492;  melancholy  condi 
tion  of,  503-507;  report  of  same  in 
N.  Y.  Herald,  503,  504 ;  report  of  consul 
at  Matanzas,  504;  report  of  Commander 
Converse,  505,  506;  destruction  of 
sugar  mills,  524;  brutality  of  action, 
524;  decrees,  Nov.  25,  1897,  extending 
to  Antilles  all  rights  of  Spaniards,  524; 
riots  in  Havana,  531. 

Cullom,  Shelby  Moore,  Senator,  offers  joint 
resolution  re  Cuba,  486. 

Gushing,  Commander  of  Wyoming.  See 
Virginius. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  attorney-general,  report 
upon  status  of  Governor-General  of 
Cuba,  326;  vicious  circle  of  procrastina 
tion,  327;  appointed  minister  to  Spain, 
358;  his  special  fitness,  358,  359;  reaches 
Madrid,  end  of  May,  1874,  359;  in 
structions  to,  359,  360;  finds  Spain  in 
same  condition  as  Cuba,  360,  362;  on 
change  of  government  in  Spain,  363;  373; 
receives,  Nov.  16,  1875,  note  from  Seftor 
Calderon  meeting  U.  S.  demands,  375; 
telegram,  Nov.  25,  to  Mr.  Fish,  "Spain 
will  succumb  in  sullen  despair,"  375,  376; 
letter  of  same  date,  376;  receives  and 
communicates  No.  266  and  a  telegram 
of  Nov.  27  re  President's  message, 
378;  is  received  by  Seflor  Calderon  in 
friendly  spirit,  379,  380;  help  of  Eng 
land  cannot  be  relied  upon,  381;  on 
Spain  and  the  Cubans,  388,  389,  also 
391-393;  arranges  protocol  of  1877,  394. 

DALLAS,  93. 

Daniells,  Edward,  tarred  and  burned  to 
death,  119. 

Dauntless,  filibuster  tug,  416,  418. 

Day,  William  Rufus  (assistant  secretary 
of  state,  March,  1897,  secretary  of  state, 
April  26,  1898),  491;  on  De  Lome  letter, 
541;  informs  Woodford  general  con 
ditions  in  Cuba  cannot  be  longer  en 
dured,  550,  551;  to  Woodford,  detailing 
attitude  of  U.  S.  government,  557;  sends 
summary  of  Maine  report,  558;  to 
Woodford,  "See  if  following  can  be 


done,"  559;  meaning  of  term  "full  self- 
government,"  561;  to  Woodford,  "pro 
found  feeling  in  Congress";  hopes  ne 
gotiations  will  lead  to  peace  acceptable 
to  country,  566;  telegram  of  March  5  in 
reply  to  Woodford's  sending  queen  re 
gent's  proposed  proclamation,  572;  re 
armistice  and  disposition  of  fleet,  570; 
informs  Woodford  possible  decisive  ac 
tion  at  "middle  or  end"  of  week;  ar 
range  for  consular  officers  to  leave  in 
case  of  rupture,  571. 

Dgcazes,  Duke,  French  foreign  minister, 
reasons  for  not  interfering  in  Spanish 
affairs,  385. 

Decree,  of  Berlin,  99;  of  Milan,  99;  of 
reform,  by  Cadiz  regency,  109;  revoca 
tion  of,  109;  forbidding  alienation  of 
property  in  Cuba,  285. 

Decrees  by  Napoleon,  effect  of,  92. 

Decres,  instructions  as  to  boundaries  of 
Louisiana,  68;  instructions  to  Laussat 
re  boundaries,  69. 

Deposit,  right  of,  at  New  Orleans  annulled, 
1802,  51. 

Depredations,  by  Spanish,  95;  Spain's 
conduct  authorized  warlike  action,  105. 

Derby,  Lord,  foreign  minister,  re  inter 
ference  in  Cuba,  regards  "  time  ill-chosen 
and  move  premature,"  383. 

Devastation  in  Cuba  chiefly  due  to  orders 
of  insurgent  chiefs,  492. 

Dulce,  General,  banished,  282;  Governor- 
General  of  Cuba,  Jan.  4,1869,  283;  cold 
reception  of,  283 ;  extraordinary  powers, 
283;  forced  to  issue  blood-thirsty  de 
crees,  284;  driven  from  Cuba  by  vol 
unteers,  290. 

Duponceau,  P.  S.,  gives  opinion,  72. 

Dupuy  de  Lome,  Enrique,  Spanish  min 
ister  to  U.  S.,  in  Mora  claim,  424;  pub 
lishes  statement  in  New  York  Herald, 
Feb.  23,  1896,  439-443;  second  news 
paper  article,  443;  objections  in  Senate 
to  such  publication,  444;  transmitting 
the  Olney  note  with  high  praise,  451; 
interview  with  Mr.  Olney  re  reply  to  the 
Olney  note,  465;  satisfaction  re  feel 
ing  in  Washington  over  decree  granting 
legislative  assembly  to  Cuba  when  war 
would  permit,  488;  inquiry  re  move 
ment  of  squadron  south,  532;  disturbed 
by  events  in  Havana,  533;  reports  con 
ference  with  Mr.  Day,  533;  telegraphs 
encouraging  remarks  of  President,  535; 
intercepted  letter  to  Canal ej as,  538;  539; 
statement  to  Mr.  Day,  54O;  telegram, 
offering  resignation,  540. 

Duval,  circuit  judge,  "feeble,  inefficient," 
domineered  over  by  Pinkney,  122. 

EMBARGO,  ignoble  answer  to  British  in 
sults,  104. 

England,  time  to  recognize  magnanimity 
of  government  of,  in  terms  of  peace 


INDEX 


595 


of  1783,  27;  meditates  emancipation 
of  Spanish  America,  45;  relations  with, 
explained,  90;  only  flag,  except  Ameri 
can,  on  the  sea,  90;  invokes  "rule  of 
1756,"  90;  seizes  American  ships,  90; 
commerce  of,  "languid  and  prostrate" 
through  relaxation  of  rule  of  1756,  91; 
not  in  human  nature  for,  to  endure  trade 
situation,  91;  course  of,  called  for  war, 
104;  loses  an  empire  on  the  Plate,  106; 
swept  into  bloody  torrent,  170;  affairs 
tending  to  war  with  U.  S.,  114;  fear  of 
action  of,  justified  action  of  U.  S.  in  the 
Floridas,  116;  U.  S.  declares  war 
against,  116,  proposition  to,  of  joint 
recognition  of  Buenos  Ay  res,  144;  re 
fuses  any  plan  to  re-establish  Spanish 
authority  in  South  America  which 
would  involve  use  of  force,  164;  circu 
lar  note  from,  opposing  Metternich 
system,  168;  opposes  in  toto  claims 
enunciated  at  Troppau,  172;  foreign 
office  issues  circular  note  re  Holy  Alli 
ance  173;  similarity  of  relations  of,  and 
those  of  U.  S  with  Spain,  179;  rights 
by  treaty  of  1810,  179;  powerful  squad 
ron  in  Carribean  alarms  U.  S.  re  Cuba, 
186;  offers  to  guarantee  Cuba  to  Spain, 
187;  reception  in,  of  Monroe's  message 
of  1823,  with  general  satisfaction,  202; 
newspaper  comment  in,  202,  203;  abol 
ishes  slavery,  1830,  220;  gives  Spain 
£400,000  as  compensation  for  abolish 
ing  slave-trade,  220;  slave-trade  con 
tinues,  220;  takes  concurrent  action 
with  France  and  orders  squadron  to 
prevent  filibustering  by  force,  241; 
identic  notes  proposing  declaration  re 
Cuba,  241,  242,  243;  takes  higher  plane 
re  Cuba,  on  account  of  slave-trade, 
254. 

Enna,  Spanish  general,  killed  by  Lopez 
expedition,  237. 

Envoys,  American,  threaten  Spain  with 
war,  83;  state  ultimate  conditions,  83; 
end  negotiation,  84. 

Erving,  G.  W.,  sent  to  Madrid  as  charge" 
d'affaires,  84;  left  Madrid  1810,  112; 
made  minister  1814,  112:  directed  to 
present  points  of  redress  and  indemni 
ty,  123. 

Essex,  ship,  case  of,  91 ;  secondary  effect  of 
decision  in  case  of,  92;  frigate,  attack 
on  at  Valparaiso,  included  in  U.  S. 
claims,  124. 

Estrada  Palma,  Cubans  would  accept  in 
dependence  only,  459;  re  new  decree, 
reiterates  that  independence  only  will 
satisfy  Cubans,  488. 

Evarts,  speaks  at  New  York  meeting,  de 
nouncing  seizure  of  Virginius,  325; 
secretary  of  state,  instructions  to  minis 
ter  at  Madrid,  in  1880,  re  visit  and 
search  of  four  American  schooners,  421 
(note). 


Everett,  A.  H.,  minister  to  Spain,  217. 

Everett,  E.,  reply  to  identic  notes,  re  Cuba, 
of  England  and  France,  243-245;  reply 
to  Lord  John  Russell,  246  (note). 

Expedition,  British,  intended  to  restore 
New  Orleans  to  Spain,  117. 

Expeditions,  filibustering,  many  from 
England  to  aid  Venezuela,  238  (note); 
"military,"  the  question  of,  412,  415, 
the  law,  412;  filibustering,  number 
stopped,  418;  secretary  of  treasury  on 
prevention  of ,  418. 

FELICIANA,  West,  convention  of,  112;  West 
Florida  independence  declared,  112. 

Fernandina,  seized  by  Commissioner 
Matthews,  115;  a  nest  of  smugglers, 
115;  Spanish  garrison  surrender,  115; 
occupation  maintained  until  May,  1813, 
116. 

Fernando  VII,  abdication  of  Charles  IV 
in  favor  of,  106,  110,  112;  returned  to 
Spain,  1814,  121;  refused  Cadiz  con 
stitution,  121;  reverted  to  absolutism, 
121;  crowning  act  to  decree  death  to 
any  one  who  spoke  in  favor  of  constitu 
tion,  121 ;  appeals  to  Louis  XVIII  for  aid 
of  Holy  Alliance,  174;  requests  French 
troops  to  remain  in  Spain,  208;  murder 
ous  activity  of,  basis  of  continuance  of 
French  occupation,  218;  edict  of  1825 
re  Cuba,  224;  restores  ancient  law  of 
succession,  225;  questions  of  succession, 
226;  dies,  Sept.  29,  1833,  leaving  widow, 
queen-governess,  226. 

Fillmore,  President,  message  condemning 
filibustering  expeditions,  238. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  secretary  of  state,  287; 
confronted  by  Alabama  and  Cuban 
questions,  287;  formulated  rule  applic 
able  to  both  situations  and  held  Presi 
dent  to  same,  287;  protests  against  de 
crees  in  Cuba,  288;  agrees  with  forcible 
language  of  Hoff's  report  and  directs 
minister  to  solemnly  protest  against 

.  barbarous  conduct  of  war,  289;  protests 
against  decrees  of  Caballero  de  Rosas, 
291;  decrees  modified,  292;  good  offices 
of  U.  S.  tendered  to  Spain,  292,  293; 
bases  of,  293;  declination  may  involve 
recognition  of  belligerent  rights  to  Cu 
bans,  294 ;  President  ready  to  advise  to 
guarantee  sum  Cuba  should  pay,  294; 
declares  terms  suggested  by  Spain  im 
possible  of  attainment,  296;  despatch  on 
subject,  297,  298;  new  terms  suggested, 
offer  of  which  to  be  withdrawn  if  not  ac 
cepted  by  Oct.  1  (1869),  298;  new  basis 
proposed  of  action  re  Cuba,  301;  Cuban 
contest  cannot  end  without  abolition  of 
slavery,  304;  holds  proclamation  signed 
by  President  granting  belligerency,  307; 
states  action  of  Cuban  agents  in  U.  S. 
had  decreased  American  sympathy,  308; 
No.  266,  Nov.  5,  1875,  to  Gushing,  364- 


596 


INDEX 


373;  encloses  copy  of  instruction  to 
Schenck,  minister  to  England,  373;  copy 
of  No.  266  sent  in  confidence  to  all  dip 
lomatic  representatives,  374;  character 
of  No.  266,  374;  telegram  to  Cushing  re 
President's  message  and  No.  266,  377;  in 
Virginius  case,  323,  325,  327,  329,  330, 
333,  340,  341,  342,  343,  344,  345,  346, 
347,  349,  353,  354,  356,  357;  only  object 
of  in  No.  266,  384;  emphatic  declaration 
re  supposed  desire  of  U.  S.  for  Cuba, 
what  the  administration  desires,  389, 
390,  See  also  Virginius. 

Florida  Blanca,  Count,  Spanish  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  objects  to  use  of 
Mississippi  by  U.  S.,  17. 

Florida  exchanged,  1763,  for  Havana, 
13;  way  seems  clear  to  acquirement  of, 
98;  a  nest  of  piracy,  127. 

Florida,  East,  temporary  occupation  of, 
116. 

Florida,  West,  facts  regarding  ownership, 
64;  question  of  ownership  a  burning 
dispute,  64;  ^American  claim  to,  dis 
creditable,  66;  seizures  in,  of  American 
property,  96;  northern  boundary,  under 
England,  parallel  of  32°  28',  15;  to  be  a 
part  of  Orleans  territory,  113. 

Floridas,  extraordinary  population  of  tho, 
112. 

Flushing,  48. 

Folch,  Don  Vicente,  Governor  of  Florida, 
decides  to  deliver  West  Florida  to  U.  S., 
113;  only  means  to  save  from  ruin,  113. 

Foronda,  Valentino  de,  succeeds  Yrujo, 
111. 

Forsyth,  John,  new  minister  to  Spain,  140; 
carries  new  treaty,  140;  instructions 
to,  140;  notes  between,  and  Spanish 
minister  of  state,  141;  authorized  to 
extend  time  of  ratification  of  treaty, 
141;  requests  "immediate,  explicit,  and 
unequivocal  reply,"  143;  threatening 
note  from,  143. 

Fort  Bowyer,  attack  upon  by  British  re 
pulsed,  117. 

Fort,  Negro,  centre  of  raids  on  Georgia 
frontier,  118;  its  suppression  demanded, 
119;  destroyed,  120. 

Fort  Scott,  massacre  of  soldiers  and  women 
on  way  to,  127. 

Foster,  Augustus  I.,  British  minister,  pro 
tests  against  action  in  West  Florida, 
114;  letter  to  British  foreign  minister, 
115. 

Fowltown,  attack  on,  127. 

France,  as  early  as  1781,  looks  to  restitu 
tion  of  Louisiana,  26;  seizes  American 
shipping  and  carries  to  Spanish  ports, 
40;  will  side  with  Spain  in  event  of 
rupture,  82;  dictates  terms  for  Florida, 
83;  seizes  American  ships,  90;  opened 
colonial  ports  in  1793,  90;  her  own  car 
riers  swept  from  the  sea,  90;  proposes 
terms  re  Florida,  94;  intrigue  with, 


ended,  100;  concession  to,  re  Florida, 
fails,  103;  swept  into  bloody  torrent, 
107;  remonstrates  with  Spain,  144; 
proposes  Bourbon  prince  for  Buenos 
Ayres,  150,  151;  offer  accepted  by 
Buenos  Ayres  contingent  on  action  of 
Great  Britain,  151;  failure  of,  151;  de 
mands  admission  to  quadruple  alliance, 
161;  French  army  moved  to  Pyrenees, 
174;  assists  Fernando  with  money  to 
foment  counter  revolution,  174;  Urgel 
regency  take  refuge  in,  174;  demands 
release  of  Fernando  and  abrogation 
of  Spanish  constitution,  176;  king's 
speech  announcing  invasion  of  Spain, 
178;  occupation  of  Spain  178;  war 
with  Spain  makes  Cuban  question  im 
portant  to  U.  S.,  186;  administration 
journal,  L'Etoile,  denounces  message  of 
1823,  202;  powerful  squadron  of,  in 
West  Indies  causes  alarm,  208;  explana 
tion  requested  by  U.  S.,  207;  takes 
concurrent  action  with  England,  and 
orders  squadron  to  prevent  filibustering 
by  force,  241;  identic  notes  proposing 
declaration  re  Cuba,  241,  242,  243. 

Francisco  de  Borja,  court-martial  aboard, 
317. 

Franklin,  B.,  opposes  yielding  of  Missis 
sippi  navigation,  22;  advises  Jay  to 
leave  Spain,  24;  27. 

Frere,  John  Hookham,  British  minister  at 
Madrid,  50. 

Fry,  Joseph,  captain  of  Virginius,  314; 
shot,  Nov.  7, 1873,  with  thirty-six  others. 
317. 

GAINES,  GENERAL  EDMUND  P.,  builds  Fort 
Scott,  near  Florida  boundary,  119; 
ordered  to  Amelia  Island,  127;  in 
structed,  if  necessary,  to  cross  Florida 
border  against  Indians,  128. 

Gallatin,  general  views  of  situation  in 
letter  to  Jefferson,  87;  urges  building 
a  navy,  88;  his  views,  truest  statesman 
ship,  89,  93;  advocates  true  and  states 
manlike  course,  105. 

Galvez,  governor  of  Louisiana,  captures 
Pensacola,  March  9,  1781,  24. 

Galvez,  Jos6  Maria,  president  of  Cuban 
home-rule  government,  568. 

Garcia,  Calixto,  Cuban  general,  in  the 
Hawkins  expedition,  442. 

Gardoqui,  Diego  de,  first  Spanish  envoy, 
30;  has  grounds  for  hoping  to  regain 
Louisiana,  30;  denies  right  to  Mississippi 
navigation,  32;  returns  to  Spain,  1789, 
34;  again  Spanish  negotiator,  1793;  his 
impressions  of  U.  S.,  36. 

Genet,  French  minister,  enlists  men  in 
West  to  act  against  Spain,  37. 

Georgiana  (and  Susan  Loud),  of  Lopez 
expedition,  seizure  at  Contoy  Island, 
233;  release  demanded  at  Havana  by 
American  consul  and  Captain  Randolph, 


INDEX 


597 


of  Albany,  233;  Commodore  Morris, 
special  commissioner  of  state  depart 
ment,  to  demand  release  of  prisoners 
233;  crew  and  passengers  tried  as  "pi 
rates,"  233;  U.  S.  would  view  their  pun 
ishment  as  an  outrage  upon  its  rights,  233 ; 
Spanish  minister  of  state  insists  upon 
right  of  capture,  234;  American  minister 
denies  right  of  seizure  in  waters  of 
friendly  power,  234;  argument  of  Span 
ish  minister  of  state,  234,  235;  stand  of 
American  minister  234,  235;  Spain  quali 
fies  expeditionaries  as  "pirates,"  235; 
passengers  for  California  released,  235; 
crew  sentenced,  235;  American  de 
mands  cause  pardon,  235;  vessels  con 
fiscated  though  no  state  of  war  and  there 
could  be  no  prize  court,  235;  extraor 
dinary  apathy  of  state  department,  236; 
importance  of  cases,  236;  capture  of 
Virginius  less  flagrant,  236. 

Gerard,  French  minister  to  U.  S.,  17. 

Germany  swept  into  bloody  torrent,  107. 

Gildea,  British  subject,  mate  of  Compet 
itor  (which  see),  468. 

Glenn,  district-attorney,  Baltimore,  "  weak 
and  incompetent,"  122. 

Godoy,  Prince  of  the  Peace,  signs  treaty 
with  U.  S.,  Oct.  27,  1795,  37,  48;  appeal 
to  vanity  of,  82;  offers  war  or  peace,  84, 
85;  agrees  to  refer  Florida  negotiation 
to  Paris,  99,  107. 

Gollan,  British  consul-general  at  Havana, 
letter  to  U.  S.  consul-general  re  British 
subject  aboard  Competitor,  469  (note). 

Gomez,  Maximo,  made  Cuban  commander- 
in-chief,  408;  cruel  orders  of,  408-410; 
extraordinary  letter  attributed  to  523. 

Government,  American,  conscious  of  lend 
ing  itself  to  immoral  scheme  re  Florida, 
104. 

Graham,  John,  a  commissioner  to  South 
America,  149. 

Grant,  President,  since  March  4,  1869, 
287;  orders  capture  of  all  concerned 
in  violating  eighth  section  of  act  of  1818, 
292;  signs  proclamation  granting  bel 
ligerent  rights  to  Cubans,  307;  held  by 
Mr.  Fish,  307;  annual  message  Dec.  7, 
1875,  379,  380;  administration  criticised 
re  supposed  violation  of  Monore  doctrine, 
384;  General,  quoted  by  Ex-Senator 
Chandler  in  question  of  rules  of  war,  494. 

Gravina,  Admiral,  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris,  77. 

Gray,  George,  Senator,  defends  Dupuy  de 
Lome's  publication,  444. 

Great  Britain.     See  England. 

Greece  revolts,  174. 

Grenville,  Lord,  signs  treaty  with  U.  S., 
1794,  37. 

Gresham,  W.  Q.,  secretary  of  state,  tele 
gram  to  American  minister,  Madrid,  re 
firing  on  Allianoa,  420;  acceptance  of 
Spain's  disavowal,  421. 


Gullon,  new  minister  of  state,  511;  re 
plies  to  American  minister's  note,  Octo 
ber  23,  1897,  513-519;  reference  to 
amendment  in  1838  of  U.  S.  neutrality 
laws,  515;  replies,  Feb.  1, 1898,  to  Amer 
ican  minister's  note  of  Dec.  20,  1897, 
535-537;  on  De  Lome  incident,  540;  dis 
cusses  situation  with  American  minister, 
552-557;  subject  of  the  Maine,  554-556; 
important  meetings  with  American 
minister,  564-566;  the  President's  de 
mands  presented,  564;  re  Vatican's 
movement  for  peace,  569;  accedes  to 
Pope's  request,  569;  hopes  withdrawal 
of  U.  S.  fleet,  570;  U.  S.  declines  this 
last,  570. 

Gun-boats,  Jefferson's,  105;  absurdity 
of,  105;  Spanish,  held  on  Peru's  protest, 
300;  release  of,  300. 

HALE,  EUGENE,  SENATOR,  speech  on  Cuba, 
444-446. 

Hardenburg,  Prussian  representative  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  160. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  Governor  of  Virginia, 
31. 

Hart,  condemnation  of,  under  neutrality 
act,  416. 

Havre,  48. 

Hawkins,  filibustering  steamer,  lost,  442. 

Hay,  John,  secretary  at  Madrid,  287. 

Hayne,  Senator,  on  Panama  congress, 
213. 

Henley,  Captain  J.  D.,  U.  S.  N.,  reports 
character  of  Aury's  followers,  126; 
hoists  American  flag  at  Fernandina  and 
causes  Aury  to  withdraw,  127. 

Hermes,  British  sloop  of  war,  116;  loss 
of,  117. 

Hill,  David  B.,  Senator,  offers  joint  reso 
lution  re  Cuba,  486. 

Hoar,  George,  Frisbie,  Senator,  speech  on 
recognition  of  Cuban  belligerency,  447, 
448. 

Hoff,  Rear- Admiral,  U.  S.  N.,  reports 
re  Speakman  and  Wyeth,  289. 

Holy  Alliance,  how  formed,  156;  a  relig 
ious  rhapsody,  156;  text  of,  157  (note); 
all  powers,  except  Turkey  and  Spain, 
requested  to  join,  158;  apparent  harm- 
lessness  deceptive,  159;  inception,  159 
(note) ;  the  protocols  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
161;  proposed  mediation  of,  in  affairs  of 
South  America,  164;  argument  against 
joining,  by  U.  S.,  165;  meet  at  Trop- 
pau,  Oct.  9,  1820,  170;  resolved  not  to 
recognize  governments  produced  by 
rebellion,  171;  moves  to  Laybach,  172; 
Canning's  opinion  of ,  173;  main  question 
now  Spain  and  revolted  American  prov 
inces,  174;  would  follow  France's  pro 
cedure  in  Spain,  175;  British  repre 
sentative  protests,  176,  tenor  of  instruc 
tions  to  representatives  at  Madrid,  176; 
representatives,  except  English,  with- 


598 


INDEX 


draw  from  Madrid,  177;  designs  of,  re 
South  America,  187,  188. 

Hornet,  sloop  of  war,  carries  new  minister 
to  Spain,  140;  returns  to  U.  S.,  141; 
again  at  Cadiz,  143;  arrival  produces 
anxiety,  143;  leaves  for  U.  S.  Oct.  20, 
1819,  without  signature  of  treaty,  143. 

Horsa,  Danish  steamer,  case  of,  412-415. 

Houston,  district  judge,  "feeble,  ineffi 
cient,  "  domineered  over  by  Pinkney,122. 

Hoyas  banished,  282. 

Hubbert,  R.,  accompanies  McGregor  in 
seizure  of  Amelia  Island,  125;  dies  of 
mortification,  126. 

Hyatt,  consul  at  Santiago,  reports  failure 
of  autonomy,  530. 

IBERIAN,  a  Semite,  4;  akin  to  Kabyl,  4. 

Indians,  southern,  begin  war  assisted  by 
Georgia  negroes,  127. 

Ingersoll,  Jared,  gives  opinion,  72. 

Innes,  Judge,  deep  in  Spanish  plot,  39. 

Instructions  to  envoys,  of  March  2,  1803, 
express  no  desire  to  go  beyond  the 
Mississippi,  54,  55. 

Insults,  ignoble  answer  of  U.  S.  govern 
ment  to,  104. 

Insurgents,  Cuban  devastation  chiefly  due 
to,  492. 

Insurrection,  of  second  of  May  at  Madrid, 
106;  forerunner  of  dissolution  of  Span 
ish  empire,  106;  swept  into  bloody 
torrent,  107;  duties  of  neutrals  in  cases 
of,  417. 

Ireland,  Archbishop,  his  efforts  for  peace, 
569. 

Isabel  I,  religious  fervor  of,  9. 

Isabella  II,  born,  Oct.  10,  1G30,  226; 
heirship  brings  Carlist  war,  226. 

JACKSON,  British  minister,  lends  himself 
to  Burr's  views,  101; 

Jackson,  General  Andrew,  treaty  with 
Creeks,  117;  expels  British  from  Pensa- 
cola,  117;  commands  southern  division, 
118;  calls  attention  of  Spanish  governor 
to  nuisance  of  Negro  Fort,  119;  ordered 
to  take  personal  command  and  conduct 
war  against  Seminoles,  128;  letter  to 
President  Monroe,  urging  seizure  of  East 
Florida,  128;  enlists  1,000  militia,  128; 
occupies  St.  Marks,  129;  report,  129; 
sends  garrison  to  Pensacola,  129;  con 
duct  of,  in  cases  of  Arbuthnot  and  Am- 
brister  a  violation  of  international  law 
and  good  sense,  130;  receives  remon 
strance  from  governor  of  Pensacola,  131 ; 
takes  Pensacola,  131;  attacks  and  takes 
Fort  Barrancas,  131;  directs  Gaines  to 
seize  St.  Augustine,  132;  organizes 
Pensacola  district  as  if  a  U.  S.  prov 
ince,  132;  (in  Adams's  reply  to  Pizarro), 
136;  public  feeling  with,  138;  debate  on, 
in  Congress,  138;  appointed  governor  of 
Florida,  147. 


James  I,  "  King  of  Spain  greater  than  u 
all,"  9. 

Jay,  John,  envoy  to  Madrid,  1780,  17; 
embarrassing  situation  of,  19;  per 
plexed  by  instructions  from  Congress, 
21 ;  informs  Spanish  minister  of  action  of 
Congress,  22;  submits  basis  of  treaty 
yielding  Mississippi  navigation  and 
guaranteeing  Spanish  dominions  in 
North  America,  23;  limits  offer  in  pro 
posed  treaty  thus  saving  situation,  23; 
leaves  Spain  for  Paris,  June,  1782,  25; 
27;  secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  re 
ceives  powers  to  treat  with  Gardoqui, 
right  to  Mississippi  navigation  stipu 
lated  32;  advises  yielding  Mississippi 
navigation  for  thirty  years,  32;  signs 
British  treaty,  1794,  37. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  vice-president,  1798, 
writes  Madison  of  serious  situation,  40; 
president,  stirred  by  proposed  occupancy 
of  New  Orleans  by  France,  46;  bellicose 
letter  to  Livingston,  46;  letter  to  Du- 
pont  de  Nemours,  47;  weak  message  to 
Talleyrand,  48;  powerless  between 
Spain  and  France,  50;  annual  message, 
1802,  53;  special  message  on  cession  of 
Louisiana,  Jan.  11,  1803,  54;  leans  to 
British  alliance,  57;  not  eager  for  west 
ward  expansion,  70;  agrees  in  expedi 
ency  of  leaving  things  in  statu  quo,\76; 
80;  timidity  prevents  accepting  Arm 
strong's  advice,  86;  extraordinary  view 
of  relations  with  Spain,  87;  thoughts 
turn  to  a  British  alliance,  87;  sounds 
cabinet,  87;  letter  to  Madison  re  sug 
gested  alliance,  87;  now  leans  to  occu 
pancy  of  Texas,  89;  suggestions  in  letter 
to  Madison,  89;  turns  from  English 
alliance,  92;  bold  words  regarding  Na 
poleon,  92;  turns  to  France,  92;  re 
port  of  cabinet  meeting,  92;  acts  upon 
Talleyrand's  advice,  94;  warlike  annual 
message  of  1805,  95;  meets  Miranda, 
102;  favoring  Miranda  would  have 
hazarded  friendship  of  France,  103; 
such  action  not  in  reason,  103;  stifled 
conscience  and  threw  over  constitu 
tional  scruples  re  Florida,  104;  course 
of  administration  worse  than  war,  105; 
not  a  statesman  in  true  sense,  105;  a 
navy  "a  ruinous  folly,"  105;  the  gun 
boats,  105;  107;  view  of  right  of  every 
nation  to  change  government,  154; 
small  regard  to  such  principle  by  Euro 
pean  powers,  154;  answers  Monroe, 
favoring  joining  with  England  in  dec 
laration,  190;  Cuba  most  interesting 
addition  which  could  be  made  to  Union, 
191. 

Jesuits,  restoration  of,  demanded,  109. 

Jovellar,  "everything  to  be  subordinated 
to  war,"  314;  with  Martinez  Campos, 
proclaims  Alfonso  XII,  362. 

Joyeuse,  48. 


INDEX 


599 


Junta,  Cuban,  such  committees  difficult 
of  suppression  both  in  U.  S.  and  Eng 
land,  419. 

Juntas  formed  in  Spain,  108;  central  junta 
at  Cadiz,  108;  formation  of  provincial 
juntas;  acts  of  self-preservation,  109; 
declare  for  Fernando  VII,  109;  contrib 
ute  millions  to  central  junta  in  Spain, 
109;  of  Caracas  proclaimed  treasonable, 
110. 

KENTUCKY,  people  of,  look  to  Mississippi 
as  their  proper  highway  to  ocean,  30. 

King,  Rufus,  minister  to  England,  sends 
rumors  of  cession  of  Louisiana  to  France, 
43;  sends  copy  of  French-Spanish  treaty 
of  1801,  43;  probable  plans  of  Great 
Britain,  45;  regards  affairs  of  U.  S.  and 
Spain  serious,  102;  Miranda's  projects 
welcome  aid  in  case  of  war,  102. 

King  of  Spain,  makes  great  grants  of  land 
in  Florida,  139;  held  void  by  U.  S., 
139. 

Krudener,  Madame,  "friend  and  guide," 
of  Alexander,  156,  158. 

LABORDE,  master  of  Competitor,  468. 

Latouche-Treville,  48. 

Laurada,  case  of,  415-416;  418. 

Laussat,  French  prefect  of  Louisiana,  63, 
68;  only  duty  was  to  deliver  Louisiana 
to  the  U.  S.,  68. 

Lawyers  seldom  good  administrators,  79. 

Layard,  British  ambassador,  action  of,  un 
der  direction  of  government,  re  slavery, 
aids  U.  S.  proposals,  304;  at  Madrid, 
340;  381. 

Leander,  ship,  furnished  Miranda,  102. 

Leander,  British  frigate,  outrageous  con 
duct  of,  104. 

Leclerc  to  command  Santo  Domingo  ex 
pedition,  48. 

Lee,  Consul-General  Fitzhugh,  on  Ruiz 
case,  489;  to  receive  charity  offerings 
and  co-operate  with  Cuban  authorities, 
529;  reports  riots  in  Havana,  531;  tele 
grams  re  visit  of  Maine,  534  (note);  on 
retention  of  Maine  at  Havana,  541; 
complained  against  by  Spain,  544; 
President  declares,  has  "borne  himself 
with  great  ability,  prudence,  and  fair 
ness,"  and  will  not  consider  with 
drawal,  544. 

Leo  XIII,  takes  part  in  endeavor  to  pre 
serve  peace,  569. 

Leon,  Norwegian  filibuster,  418. 

Leopard,  British  man-of-war,  fires  on 
Chesapeake,  104. 

Lersundi,  a  reactionary,  made  captain- 
general  of  Cuba,  May  30,  1866,  282. 

Letona  banished,  282. 

Little  Belt,  British  slopp  of  war,  fired  into 
by  President,  frigate,  114. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  minister  to  France, 
gets  evasive  replies  from  Talleyrand, 


believes  Floridas  are  given  to  France, 
French  armament  preparing  to  take 
possession  of  Louisiana,  44;  convinced 
Floridas  not  included,  45;  informs 
Joseph  Bonaparte  U.  S.  has  no  wish  to 
go  beyond  Mississippi,  45;  nominated 
minister  plenipotentiary  jointly  with 
Monroe,  54;  presses  subject  of  purchase 
east  of  Mississippi,  57;  informs  Tal 
leyrand  U.  S.  desires  only  New  Orleans 
and  Floridas,  58;  changes  his  mind  re 
garding  West  Florida,  65;  advises  Mad 
ison  to  claim  to  Perdido,  66;  joins  Monroe 
in  advising  to  claim  West  Florida,  66; 
forced  to  maintain  that  Spain  had  re- 
troceded  West  Florida  without  knowing 
it,  etc.,  68;  to  Madison  re  French  de 
mands,  80  (note). 

Livingston,  Edward,  gives  opinion,  72. 

Loomis,  Jairus,  sailing-master,  in  command 
of  convoy  from  New  Orleans,  119;  as 
sists  in  attack  on  negro  fort,  120;  blows 
up  negro  fort,  120. 

Lopez,  Narciso,  organizes  revolt  1848,  230; 
expedition  in  1849  suppressed,  230; 
Taylor's  proclamation,  230;  expedition 
organized  1850,  230;  offers  leadership 
to  Quitman,  230;  expedition  sails  in 
Creole,  Georgiana,  and  Susan  Loud, 
April  25,  1850,  231;  rendezvous  off 
Yucatan,  231;  lands  at  Cardenas  and 
surprises  garrison,  231;  re-embarks, 
disappointed  in  support,  231;  starts  for 
Key  West,  231;  discovered  and  pur 
sued  by  Pizarro,  232;  expedition  dis 
perses,  232;  Lopez  arrested  but  re 
leased,  233;  second  expedition,  1851, 
237;  events  of,  237;  Lopez  garroted  at 
Havana,  237;  execution  as  "pirates," 
of  many  of  the  men,  237;  sentences 
of  others,  237;  release  of  remainder, 
237;  final  release  of  all  survivors, 
238;  criminality  of  expedition!  strongly 
condemned  by  administration,  238; 
message  of  President  Fillmore,  238; 
such  expeditions  not  unknown  else 
where,  238;  execution  of  members  of 
expedition  causes  intense  excitement, 
239;  riot  in  New  Orleans,  239;  satisfac 
tion  demanded  by  Spain,  239. 

Lorient,  48. 

Loss,  American,  through  seizure  of  ships, 
enormous,  91. 

Louisiana,  ceded  by  France  to  Spain,  1763, 
13;  transfer  made  public,  1764,  13; 
rumors  of  transfer  to  France,  1801,  43; 
transfer  to  France  delayed,  48;  order  for 
delivery  signed  at  Barcelona,  Oct.  15, 
1802, 50;  treaty  of  cession,  April  30, 1803 ; 
60;  sum  paid  by  U.  S.  for,  60;  west  of 
Mississippi  forced  upon  us,  60;  transfer 
wholly  act  of  Napoleon,  60;  precau 
tions  to  secure  delivery,  62;  delivered 
Nov.  30,  1803,  63;  79;  proposed  to 
cede  from  Rio  Bravo  to  Guadeloupe 


600 


INDEX 


(Texas),  92;  95;  seizures  in,  of  Ameri 
can  property,  96;  population  disaf 
fected,  101;  ready  to  turn  to  France  or 
Spain,  101;  serious  feeling  in  French- 
Spanish  population,  102. 
Luffborough,  midshipman,  killed  with  two 
of  his  men,  119. 

McGiLLiVRAY,  half-breed,  desires  Spanish 
protection,  31. 

McGregor,  Sir  Gregor,  adventurer,  seizes 
Amelia  Island,  125;  deposed  by  "Com 
modore"  Aury,  126. 

McKean,  J.  B.,  gives  opinion,  72. 

McKee,  John,  commissioner  with  G.  Mat 
thews  to  accept  surrender  of  East  Flor 
ida,  if  offered,  114. 

McKinley,  William,  President,  succeeds 
Cleveland,  490;  special  message  re  relief 
of  Americans  in  Cuba,  495;  bill  for  same 
approved  May  24,  1897;  annual  mes 
sage  of  Dec.  1897,  525-527;  issues 
circular,  Dec.  24,  1897,  calling  for  con 
tributions  for  relief  of  Cuban  distress, 
529;  encouraging  remarks  to  Spanish 
minister,  535;  answer,  March  5,  1898 
to  General  Woodford's  telegram  for 
warding  queen  regent's  proposed  proc 
lamation,  572;  receives  collective  note 
of  powers,  573;  reply  to  same,  573; 
message  of  April  11,  1898,  576-582; 
action  justified  by  events,  576;  signs 
on  April  20,  the  joint  resolution  of  April 
19  (legislative  day,  April  18),  585. 

Mackintosh,  Sir  James,  protests  in  parlia 
ment  against  passage  of  foreign  enlist 
ment  bill,  238  (note). 

Madison,  James,  despair  of,  on  account  of 
proposed  closure  of  Mississippi,  33;  letter 
to  Jefferson  respecting  same  34;  secre 
tary  of  state,  instructs  Livingston  re 
specting  anxiety  to  obtain  the  Floridas, 
43 ;  instructs  Charles  Pinckney  in  Madrid, 
May,  1802,  44;  to  guarantee  Spanish 
territory,  44;  writes  Pinckney  re  with 
drawal  of  deposit,  51;  replies  to  Yrujo 
re  cession  of  Louisiana,  62;  letter  to 
Pinckney  re  boundaries,  67 ;  instructions 
of,  April,  1804,  to  Monroe  and  Pinck 
ney,  73;  weak  explanation  of  Mobile 
act,  76;  80;  "Spain  must  swallow 
claim,"  81;  advises  Monroe  to  use  skil 
ful  appeal  to  fears  of  Spain,  82;  to 
Monroe  re  Pinckney 's  recall,  82;  not 
blind  to  truth  re  West  Florida,  85;  87; 
writes  Armstrong  of  "  venal  suggestions  " 
of  French  functionaries,  92;  writes  Arm 
strong  and  Bowdoin  to  express  views 
conciliating  France,  98;  to  Armstrong, 
refusing  Napoleon's  demands,  100; 
meets  Miranda,  102;  statement  of'course 
re  Miranda,  103;  107;  President,  proc 
lamation  taking  possession  of  West 
Florida,  112;  sends  confidential  message 
to  Congress  advising  enabling  President 


to  occupy  East  Florida,  114;  Mat 
thews  action  makes  a  "  distressing  dilem 
ma,"  115;  special  message  recommend 
ing  strengthening  neutrality  act,  123; 
expresses  in  message,  Nov.  5,  1811, 
interest  in  South  American  develop 
ments,  148;  writes  Monroe  favoring  join 
ing  England  in  declaration  re  Holy  Al 
liance,  193,  194;  favors  declaration  also 
re  Greece,  195. 

Maine,  to  go  to  Havana,  534;  telegrams 
re  visit,  534  (note) ;  destruction  of  Feb. 
15,  1898,  541;  burial  of  dead  at  Havana 
and  honors  shown,  542;  court  of  inquiry, 
542;  report  on,  sent  to  Congress,  561, 
562;  Spanish  report  on,  562;  report  of 
court,  561-563  (note). 

Marbois,  Barbe",  Count  of,  conference  with 
Napoleon,  59. 

Marcy,  secretary  of  state,  directs  Soule"  to 
open  question  of  sale  of  Cuba  should  op 
portunity  offer,  268;  repudiates  Ostend 
manifesto,  269. 

Maria  Cristina,  widow  of  Fernando  VII, 
queen  regent,  226. 

Marti  Jose",  soul  of  Cuban  revolt  of  1895,407. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  minister  to  France,  mem 
ber  of  Ostend  conference,  261. 

Matanzas,  terrible  conditions  at,  505,  506. 

Matthews,  George,  commissioner,  with 
I.  McKee,  instructed  to  accept  surrender 
of  East  Florida  if  offered,  114;  over 
steps  instructions  in  seizing  Fernan- 
dina,  115;  not  policy  of  U.  S.  to  wrest 
Florida  from  Spain,  115;  powers  re 
voked,  115;  situation  not  changed,  115. 

Maura,  Spanish  statesman,  law  submitted 
in  1893,  failed  through  genuineness  of 
attempt,  406. 

Melton,  American  correspondent  aboard 
Competitor  (which  see),  468. 

Mcnsajora,  Spanish  armed  launch,  capt 
ures  Competitor,  468. 

Message,  Dec.  3,  1805,  95;  Dec.  9,  1805,  96; 
of  Dec.  3,  1805,  a  play  for  benefit  of 
France,  96;  to  be  taken  to  heart  by 
Spain,  97;  annual,  Dec.,  1869,  307; 
special,  June  13,  1870,  307-311;  Cleve 
land's  annual,  Dec.  2,  1895,  425,  426; 
annual,  Dec.  7,  1896,  475-483;  of  Presi 
dent  McKinley  sending  report  on  Maine, 
561,  562;  of  April  11,  1898,  576-582. 

Metternich,  represents  Austrian  govern 
ment  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  160;  deus  ex 
machina  of  Holy  Alliance,  162;  a  char 
acter  fraught  with  evil,  163;  172. 

Mexico,  revolts,  1820,  149;  aims  in  com 
bination  with  South  American  states  to 
wrest  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  from  Spain, 
205;  Vera  Cruz  falls  to  Mexican  forces, 
1825,  206;  calls  on  U.  S.  to  fulfil  pledge 

of  1823,  208. 

Milan  decree,  99. 

"Military"  expeditions.  See  Expeditions, 
"military." 


INDEX 


601 


Militia  to  be  organized,  96. 

Mills,  Roger  Quarles,  Senator,  resolution 
of,  re  Cuba,  449;  offers  joint  resolution, 
486. 

Minister,  French,  view  of  character  of  U.  S. 
government,  104. 

Minister,  Spanish,  well  informed  of  at 
titude  of  France,  81;  had  knowledge  of 
Burr's  plans,  101 ;  recommends  watching 
Burr,  101,  remarks  re  Wilkinson,  101; 
has  full  knowledge  of  Miranda's  prepa 
rations,  103;  warns  Spanish  main,  103; 
demands  satisfaction  for  events  at  New 
Orleans,  239. 

Ministers,  foreign,  both  England  and  U.  S. 
fortunate  in,  at  time  of  Holy  Alliance, 
197;  of  Mexico,  Central  America,  and 
Colombia.  See  Clay  re  Panama  Con 
gress,  205.  See  Depuy  de  Lome. 

Miralles,  Don  Juan  de,  Spanish  agent, 
1779,  to  U.  S.,  17;  letter  to  Congress, 
Nov.  24, 1779,  urging  capture  of  Florida, 
17. 

Miranda,  Francisco  de,  100;  history  of, 
102;  comes  to  U.  S.  in  1805,  102;  ex 
cellent  standing  with  prominent  men, 
102;  writes  Madison  a  compromising 
letter,  i02;  expedition  leaves  New  York, 
102;  expedition  fails,  103;  reappears  in 
Venezuela,  149;  surrenders  and  dies  in 
Spain,  July  14,  1816,  149. 

Miro,  Spanish  governor,  treaty  of,  with 
Indians,  31;  39. 

Mississippi  River,  free  to  Great  Britain  and 
France  by  treaty  of  1763,  14;  to  close 
outlet  to  American  Southwest  meant 
war  or  independence,  30;  the,  value  to 
West,  35;  vital  to  the  West,  52;  93. 

Mississippi,  territory  of,  95. 

Mobile,  95. 

Monroe  James,  nominated  as  joint  envoy 
with  Pinckney  to  Spain,  54;  nominated 
minister  extraordinary,  54;  joins  Liv 
ingston  in  advising  to  claim  West  Flori 
da,  66;  basis  of  action,  76;  ordered  to 
Madrid  without  delay,  76;  leaves  Lon 
don  en  route  for  Madrid,  79;  fatuous 
idea  of  influencing  Napoleon,  79;  letter 
to  Talleyrand,  79;  leaves  Paris  for  Mad 
rid,  79;  learns  before  leaving  Paris 
that  West  Florida  is  not  included  in  ces 
sion  to  France,  and  claims  for  spolia 
tions  excluded  by  treaty  of  1800,  80; 
negotiation  opened  by  himself  and 
Pinckney,  81;  only  alternative  to  return 
to  London  or  submit  to  French  terms, 
83;  leaves  Madrid,  May  26,  1805,  84; 
arrives  Paris,  June  20;  London,  July 
23,  "conscious  of  failure, "  84;  secretary 
of  state,  makes  vigorous  reply  to  Brit 
ish  protest  re  Florida,  114;  mention  of 
Florida  question  to  French  minister, 
115;  warns  Jackson  re  involving  gov 
ernment  in  contest  with  Spain,  117;  re 


iterates  claim  to  Florida,  122;  never 
doubted  that  Louisiana  extended  to  Rio 
Bravo,  122;  enterprises  of  revolutionists 
forestalled,  122;  president,  124;  letter 
to,  from  Jackson  inexplicably  disregard 
ed,  128;  thinks  Jackson  acted  against 
instructions,  134;  nervously  anxious  to 
conclude  treaty  (1819),  139;  Texas 
might  have  been  saved,  139;  views  of 
importance  of  treaty  of  1819,  140,  141; 
if  treaty  not  ratified  proposes  action 
by  Congress,  142;  remarks  in  annual 
message,  142  (note);  secretary  of  state, 
Dec.  19,  1811,  acknowledges  receipt  of 
declaration  of  Venezuelan  independence, 
148;  president,  on  South  America  in 
annual  message,  1818,  150;  message 
March  8,  1822,  recognizing  South  Ameri 
can  independence,  152;  protest  by 
Spanish  minister,  153;  writes  Jefferson 
and  Madison  for  advice  re  Rush's  dis 
patch,  190;  thinks  should  meet  Can 
ning's  proposal,  191;  unsettled  as  to 
course  re  Canning's  proposal,  195;  in 
sketch  of  message,  1823,  lays  more 
stress  on  European  than  South  Ameri 
can  situation,  200;  carried  away  by 
sympathy  for  Greece,  200;  protest  by 
Adams,  200;  message  of  Dec.  2,  1823, 
200-202. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  Adams  the  true  author, 
198  (note);  as  it  appears  in  message, 
Dec.  2,  1823;  200-202;  declaration  of, 
decisive,  204;  Mr.  Fish  accused  of  vio 
lating,  in  sending  No.  266,  384. 

Montevideo,  110. 

Montmorency,  Duke  of,  puts  three  ques 
tions  to  allied  conference,  174;  answer  of 
allies,  175. 

Montreal,  107. 

Moors,  number  of,  driven  from  Spain,  5; 
resident  race,  6;  expulsion  of,  1609,  9. 

Mora,  Antonio  Maximo,  claim  of,  423-425; 
settled,  425. 

Morales,  Spanish  commander  in  Venezuela, 
brutal  decree  of,  179. 

Moret,  new  minister  of  ultramar,  511;  dis 
cussions  with  American  minister,  551- 
557;  important  meetings  with,  564-566; 
the  President's  demands  presented,  564. 

Morgan,  Senator,  John  Tyler,  speech  re 
Competitor  prisoners,  470;  resolution  in 
favor  of  Cuban  belligerency,  April  1, 
1897,  491;  passed  Senate,  May  20,  491; 
did  not  come  to  vote  in  House,  491. 

Morier,  British  charge  d'affaires,  protests 
against  occupancy  of  West  Florida,  113. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  speech  calling  for  war, 
56;  advocates  strong  navy,  56  (note); 
minister  to  France,  letter  to,  from  Jeffer 
son  re  right  of  nations  to  change  gov 
ernment,  154. 

Morris,  Commodore  Charles.  See  Georg- 
iana. 


602 


INDEX 


NAPLES  adopts  Spanish  constitution 
July  2,  1820,  166;  King  of,  invited  to 
Troppau,  171;  absolutism  restored  by 
Austria  and  Holy  Alliance,  172;  ques 
tion  of,  arouses  British  feeling,  173;  Can 
ning's  speech  on,  173. 

Napoleon,  price  paid  by,  for  Louisiana,  42; 
fails  to  obtain  Floridas,  43;  opens  minds 
of  commissioners  to  true  destiny  of 
U.  S.,  45;  reverses  proclamation  of  free 
dom  to  blacks,  49;  orders  preparation  of 
Louisiana  armament,  49;  thwarted  by 
Godoy,  50;  disquieting  remarks  of,  to 
British  Ambassador,  March,  1803,  57; 
decides  to  transfer  Louisiana,  58;  views 
as  to  Louisiana,  59;  broken  promise  of, 
re  transfer  of  Louisiana,  61;  good  policy 
to  put  obscurity  in  question  of  boun 
dary,  65;  determined  that,  if  Florida 
ceded,  U.  S.  must  pay,  80;  changes 
menace  from  England  to  Austria,  93; 
his  schemes  demand  money,  93;  en 
route  for  Austria,  94;  attempted  pro 
pitiation  of,  97;  angry  because  of 
American  support  of  blacks  in  Santo 
Domingo,  97;  holding  Florida  as  bait  for 
alliance,  98;  informs  Talleyrand  that 
Charles  IV  declines  to  alienate  Florida, 
98;  commands  American  intercourse 
with  Santo  Domingo  to  cease,  98;  order 
obeyed  by  passage  of  bill  Feb.  28,  1806, 
98;  determined  to  force  U.  S.  to  take 
sides  against  England,  99;  directs 
Champagny  as  to  terms  on  which  will  aid 
U.  S.,  99;  offers  Florida  if  America  join 
France,  99;  throws  over  question  of 
Florida,  100,  104;  imagination  reached 
too  far,  106;  107,  111,  112. 

Natchez,  a  Spanish  post,  29. 

Natchitoches,  Spanish  force  close  to,  102. 

Navarro,  Don  Diego  Joseph,  Captain- 
General  of  Cuba,  17. 

Navy,  effect  of  putting  afloat  naval  force, 
105;  what  it  would  have  saved,  106; 
placed  on  war  footing  re  Virginius,  325 ; 
French,  powerless,  105;  Spanish,  a 
negligible  quantity,  105. 

Negro  fort  destroyed,  120. 

Nesselrode,  Russian  representative  at  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  160. 

Neutrality  law  of  1838,  515,  516  (note). 

Neuville,  De,  French  minister,  141;  to 
influence  U.  S.  to  preserve  peace  with 
Spain,  144;  startled  by  proposal  of 
South  American  independence,  150. 

New  Orleans,  104;  riot  in,  239;  Spanish 
consulate  attacked,  239. 

New  York  at  times  a  blockaded  port,  104. 

Nichols,  Lt.-Col.  Edward,  hoists  British 
flag  with  Spanish  in  Pensacola  forts, 
116;  proclamation  to  Kentuckians,  116; 
proclamation  described  by  Adams,  116; 
returns  to  Florida,  118;  makes  treaty 
with  Seminoles,  118;  builds  fort  in 
Florida,  118;  leaves  for  England,  118, 136. 


Niobe,  British  man-of-war.    See  Virginius. 

North,  the,  demands  trade  facilities  with 
Spain,  ready  to  sacrifice  West,  33;  favors 
yielding  Mississippi  navigation,  33. 

Note,  collective,  of  the  powers  presented  to 
President,  573;  President's  reply,  573; 
collective,  of  powers  to  Spain,  advising 
accepting  Pope's  proposal  of  suspen 
sion  of  hostilities,  573. 

Nunez,  filibuster,  416. 

OFFICERS,  SPANISH,  to  leave  New  Orleans, 
93. 

Ogden,  Samuel,  aids  Miranda,  102. 

Ohio,  mail  steamer,  treatment  of,  at  Ha 
vana,  248,  249. 

Olivart,  Marquis  de,  publicist,  on  mis 
conception  of  sovereign  rights,  338; 
discussion  of  protocol  of  1877,  394,  395 
(note) ;  discussion  of  AllianQa  case,  422, 
423;  on  Spanish- American  situation,  429; 
on  speech  of  Queen  Regent,  458,  459; 
on  Competitor  case,  471-474. 

Olney,  Richard,  secretary  of  state,  ener 
getic  note  re  Mora  claim,  424;  impor 
tant  note  of  April  4,  1896,  to  Spanish 
minister,  tendering  good  offices  of  U.  S., 
452-458;  note  praised  by  minister,  451; 
Dupuy  de  Lome's  interview  with,  465; 
Spanish  reply  a  declination  of  good 
offices  of  U.  S.,  460,  465;  U.  S.  note  a 
turning-point  for  Spain,  465,  466;  suc 
ceeded  as  secretary  of  state  by  Mr.  Sher 
man,  490. 

Onis,  Chevalier  Don  Luis  de,  U.  S.,  re 
fused  to  receive  him  as  minister  until 
status  of  Spain  should  be  decided,  112; 
received  as  minister,  1815,  112;  demands 
return  of  West  Florida  to  Spain,  121; 
calls  attention  to  fitting  out  of  priva 
teers  in  U.  S.  ports,  121;  states  desire 
of  Spain  to  arrange  differences,  123; 
contentions  re  treaty,  124;  135;  new 
note  from,  renewing  negotiations,  135. 

Orders  in  council,  effect  of,  92. 

Orleans,  territory  of,  95. 

Ostend,  meeting  of  ministers  at,  Oct.  9, 
1854,  262;  the  manifesto,  262-267. 

Oswald,  27. 

Pampero,  in  Lopez  expedition,  236. 

Panama  congress,  chap.  XI,  205;  circu 
lar  from  Bolivar,  205;  terms  on  which 
U.  S.  will  take  part,  209;  meets  June 
22,  1826,  214;  no  representative  from 
U.  S.,  214;  adjourned  to  Tucubaya, 
Mexico,  but  never  met,  215. 

Parker,  Commodore,  special  commissioner 
at  Havana,  237;  obtains  release  of 
some  of  Lopez  expedition,  237;  opinion 
of  Cuban  situation,  237. 

Parma,  offered  Spain  for  Florida,  50. 

Patterson,  John  F.,  nominal  owner  of 
Virginius,  314. 

Peace,  negotiations  for,  begun  1782,  25. 


INDEX 


Pensacola,  occupied  by  British,  116;  a 
centre  of  distribution  of  arms  to  Indians, 
117;  taken  by  Jackson,  131. 

Percy,  W.  H.,  captain  R.  N.,  116. 

Peru,  no  movement  toward  revolt  until 
1819,  149;  protest  against  delivery  of 
Spanish  gun-boats  built  in  U.  S.,  300; 
case  similar  to  Spain's  protest  of  year 
before,  300;  Prim  says  war  with,  absurd 
and  foolish,  300;  release  of  gun-boats, 
300. 

Philip  II,  expels  Moors,  1609,  9. 

Philippines,  109. 

Pichon,  French  minister,  62. 

Piedmont  revolution,  March  10,  1821, 
172. 

Pierce,  President,  message  re  Black  War 
rior,  256. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  Minister  to  Spain,  51, 
to  negotiate  the  enlarging  of  rights  and 
interests  in  the  Mississippi  and  terri 
tories  eastward,  54;  presses  Spain,  73; 
threatens  war,  74;  creates  panic  in  Med 
iterranean,  75;  negotiation  opened  by 
himself  and  Monroe,  81;  recalled,  84. 

Pinckney,  Thomas,  minister  to  England, 
appointed  negotiator  at  Madrid,  1795, 
37. 

Pinkney,  William,  lawyer,  domineers  over 
judges,  122. 

Piracy  in  Caribbean,  97. 

Pirates,  swarms  of,  from  Cuba,  180. 

Pitt,  William,  British  premier,  78;  inter 
ested  in  Miranda,  102. 

PI  y  Margall,  president  of  republic,  313; 
minister  of  state  on  Cuban  rights,  448, 
449. 

Pizarro,  minister  of  state,  note  to  Ewing, 
minister,  with  threat  of  war,  135. 

Pizarro,  Spanish  steamer,  intention  to 
seize  Virginius,  316. 

Pocock,  Admiral,  13. 

Poinsett,  Joel,  appointed  agent  to  Buenos 
Ayres,  149;  instruction  to,  149;  minister 
to  Mexico,  155. 

Poletica,  Russian  minister  to  U.  S.,  di 
rected  to  "plead  cause  of  peace,"  144; 
instructed  to  approach  U.  S.  government 
re  joining  Holy  Alliance,  165. 

Polignac,  French  ambassador,  London, 
spoken  to  by  Canning  with  great  plain 
ness,  196;  defines  views  of  France,  196; 
proposes  consideration  of  combined  ac 
tion  by  allies,  197. 

Polly,  ship,  decision  regarding,  90. 

Polo  de  Bernabe",  Admiral,  Spanish  min 
ister  at  Washington,  re  Virginius  (which 
see),  323,  324,  325,  327,  340,  341,  343, 
345,  346,  347,  353-356. 

Polo  de  Bernab6,  new  Spanish  minister 
to  Washington,  545;  leaves  Washington 
April  20,  1898,  585. 

Population,  rapid  flow  of,  to  West,  35. 

Porter,  David  D.,  lieutenant  U.  S.  N., 
commanding  Crescent  City,  246. 


Portugal,  adopts  Spanish  constitution, 
August  20,  1820,  168;  fears  for  her  in 
dependence,  385. 

Potter,  Lieutenant  Commander  William 
Parker,  member  Maine  court  of  in 
quiry,  542. 

Power,  Thomas,  39. 

Pragay,  Hungarian,  with  Lopez  expedition, 
237. 

Price,  Dr.,  favors  control  of  Mississippi 
valley  by  men  of  English  blood,  27. 

Prim,  an  exile  in  France,  282;  one  of 
new  government,  282;  mention,  283; 
liberal  views  of,  295;  explains  views  re 
conditions  of  concessions,  296,  297;  un 
fortunate  absence  when  U.  S.  proposals 
were  handed  in,  299;  "  must  wait  a  year 
or  two,"  299;  war  with  Peru  "absurd  and 
foolish,"  300;  "not  another  shot  will 
be  fired  in  it,"  300;  U.  S.  propositions 
now  a  general  topic  of  discussion,  302; 
broad  views  of,  302;  his  life  to  be  the 
forfeit,  305;  shot  Dec.  27,  1870,  died 
Dec.  30,  313. 

Privateers,  French,  use  Spanish  ports  as 
their  own,  40;  swarms  of,  121 ;  Baltimore 
and  Charleston  largely  concerned  in  fit 
ting  out,  122;  indictments  in  Balti 
more,  122;  list  of,  illegally  fitted  out, 
furnished,  123;  akin  to  pirates,  180. 

Proclamation  of  Madison,  taking  posses 
sion  of  West  Florida,  112. 

Proclamation  of  belligerency,  signed  by 
President  Grant,  held  by  Mr.  Fish,  307. 

Protocol  signed  at  Troppau,  171;  cir 
cular,  giving  "short  view  of  first  re 
sults,"  171. 

Protocol  of  1877,  394;  discussion  of,  394, 
395  (note);  in  case  of  Competitor,  468- 
474;  discussion  of,  by  de  Olivart,  471- 
474. 

Protocols  by  allies,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1818, 
161,  162. 

Puerto  Rico,  seizures  in,  of  American 
property,  96;  saved  to  Spain  by  slave 
power  of  U.  S.,  Ill;  project  for  reforms 
brought  forward,  303;  American  min 
ister  assured  these  would  be  extended 
to  Cuba  when  hostilities  should  cease, 
303;  new  laws  relating  to,  312;  eman 
cipation  of  slaves,  312;  an  elective 
provincial  assembly  granted  Dec.  31, 
1896,  487. 

Puflon  Rostro,  Count  of,  immense  grants 
of  land  to,  139. 

Purre,  Don  Eugenic,  takes  possession  of 
St.  Joseph,  23. 

QUEBEC,  made  a  governmental  district. 
1763, 14. 

Queen  Regent,  speech  of,  458,  459;  fore 
shadows  reply  to  Olney  note,  459;  signs 
decrees,  Nov.  25,  1897,  extending  to  An 
tilles  all  rights  of  Spaniards,  524;  not 
privy  to  any  suggestion  of  cession  of 


604 


INDEX 


Cuba,  549;  proposed  proclamation  sus 
pending  hostilities,  571;  reply  of  U.  S., 
572. 

RAWLE,  WILLIAM,  gives  opinion,  72. 

Randolph,  Edmund  J.,  secretary  of  state, 
1794,  fears  separation  of  Kentucky,  36. 

Randolph,  John,  chairman  of  committee, 
informed  of  need  of  $2,000,000  ap 
propriation,  97;  told  by  Madison  that 
we  must  give  France  money  or  "take 
a  Spanish  or  French  war,"  97;  propo 
sition  regarded  by,  a  base  prostration  of 
national  character,  97. 

Recognition,  right  of,  rests  solely  with 
President,  487. 

Reconcentrados,  question  of,  now  of  first 
importance,  491;  justice  of  feeling  re, 
examined,  491-495. 

Reconcentration,  Weyler's  first  decree, 
Oct.  21,  1896,  474,  475  (note);  the 
Spanish  error  involved,  475;  revoked 
entirely,  566. 

Red  Cross  in  Cuba,  529. 

Reed,  Thomas  Brackett,  speaker  of  House, 
491. 

Reform,  appeal  for  reforms  by  Spain's 
Amerkan  provinces,  109;  character  of, 
demanded,  109. 

Regency,  the,  in  Spain,  108;  folly  of, 
109;  madness  of,  110. 

Relations  of  Spain  and  U.  S.  compara 
tively  quiet  from  1855  to  1868,  273. 

Religious  fanaticism,  instigated  by  Fer 
nando  and  Isabella,  8. 

Republic,  declared  in  Spain,  Feb.,  1873, 
313. 

Resolutions,  joint,  granting  Cuban  belliger 
ency,  introduced,  Jan.,  1870,  307;  passed 
House,  lost  in  Senate,  311;  offered  in 
Senate  acknowledging  Cuban  indepen 
dence,  Dec.  21,  1896,  483;  excitement 
following,  485;  numerous  joint,  offered 
re  Cuba,  486;  of  Senator  Morgan  re 
Cuban  belligerency  passed  Senate  May 
20,  1897,  491;  did  not  come  before 
House,  491. 

Revolt  against  Napoleon,  108. 

Rhea,  John,  insurgent  president,  West 
Florida,  writes  proposing  incorporation 
with  U.  S.,  112. 

Rights,  neutral,  annulled,  99. 

Rio  Bravo,  west  boundary  of  Louisiana, 
68. 

Rios  Rosas,  banished,  282. 

Riot  at  New  Orleans,  239. 

Riots  in  Havana,  531;  American  feeling 
disturbed  by,  532. 

Rochefort,  48. 

Rochester,  Wm.  B.,  nominated  secretary 
to  mission  to  Panama  congress,  209. 

Rodas  banished,  282. 

Rodney,  Caesar  A.,  commissioner  to  South 
America,  149;  minister  to  Argentina, 
155. 


Roloff,  filibuster,  416. 

Ruiz,  Richard,  case  of,  489. 

Rule  of  1756,  90;  greatly  relaxed,  91. 

Rules  of  war,  493. 

Rush,  note  to,  from  Canning  re  Holy  Al 
liance,  167,  188;  has  interview  with 
Canning,  188;  offers  to  join  with  Can 
ning  if  South  American  independence 
recognized,  189;  views  of,  189;  writes 
six  despatches  and  letters  re  proposed 
declaration,  195;  disappointed  in  Can 
ning's  silence,  196;  on  reception  of 
Monroe's  message  in  England,  203. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  reply  to  Everett's 
note  re  Cuba,  245;  re  recognition  of 
belligerency  of  Confederate  government, 
484,  485. 

Russia  objects  to  giving  Parma  to  Spanish 
prince,  50;  remonstrates  with  Spain, 
144;  supplies  ships  to  Spain  for  South 
American  expedition,  166;  issues  cir 
cular  note  re  Spanish  revolution.  166, 
167;  ominous  warning  of  note,  168; 
unsatisfactory  reply  of,  to  Clay's  de 
spatch  requesting  aid  re  Spain,  208. 

SACO,  opinion  of,  regarding  Cuba's  need 
of  autonomy,  227. 

Sagasta,  Praxfides  Mateo,  mention,  283; 
proclamation  vs.  action  proclaiming 
Alfonso  XII,  362;  head  of  new  ministry, 
511;  important  meetings  with  American 
minister,  564-566;  the  President's  de 
mands  presented,  564;  Spanish  propo 
sitions,  567. 

St.  Cyr,  French  ambassador,  ordered  to 
press  Spain  to  deliver  Louisiana,  49; 
promise  to  Spain  never  to  alienate 
Louisaina,  50. 

St.  Mary's  River,  115. 

St.  Michael,  fort  at  Pensacola,  116;  taken 
by  Jackson,  131. 

Salmeron,  president  of  Spanish  republic, 
313. 

Samana,  bay,  French  expedition  arrives 
January,  1802,  48. 

Sampson,  Captain  William  Thomas,  presi 
dent  of  Maine  court  of  inquiry,  542. 

Sanguily,  Julio,  case  of,  428,  429;  released 
Feb.  25,  1897,  490. 

Santo  Domingo,  trade  of,  97;  act  prohibit 
ing  trade  with,  98. 

Saunders,  Spanish  agent,  threatening 
letter  of,  35. 

Scott,  Sir  William,  decision  of,  re  ship  Polly, 
90;  effect  of  decision  re  Essex,  91;  re 
verses  decision  regarding  continuous 
voyage,  91;  condemns  ship  Essex,  91. 

Seaboard  in  a  state  of  anxiety,  96. 

Seamen,  a  thousand  yearly  impressed  from 
American  ships,  104. 

Seaports  to  be  furnished  with  cannon,  96. 

Sebastian,  chief  justice,  in  Spanish  pay,  39. 

Seizures  of  American  property  in  Cuba, 
etc.,  96. 


INDEX 


605 


Seminole  war,  127. 

Senate,  ratifies  treaty  of  1819,  Feb.  19, 
1821,  146.  (See  Congress  and  Resolu 
tions.) 

Sergeant,  John,  nominated  envoy  to 
Panama  congress,  209;  did  not  attend, 
214. 

Serrano,  Duke  de  la  Torre,  letter  to,  signed 
by  24,000  Cubans,  275;  favors  reform, 
275;  declares  Cuban  aspirations  legiti 
mate,  281;  banished,  282;  head  of  new 
government,  282;  mention,  283. 

Serrurier,  French  minister,  115. 

Sevier,  ex-governor  of  Franklin,  writes 
Spanish  governor  of  desire  by  South 
west,  of  Spanish  protection  31. 

Shelburne,  27. 

Shepperd,  F.  E.,  first  captain  of  Virginius, 
315. 

Sheridan,  General  Philip  H.,  quoted  by 
ex-Senator  Chandler  in  question  of  rules 
of  war,  494,  495. 

Sherman,  Senator  John,  inconsiderate- 
ness  of  action  in  moving  for  belligerency, 
307  (note);  speech  on  recognition  of 
Cuban  belligerency,  437,  438;  speech 
quoting  Pi  y  Margall,  Spanish  minis 
ter  of  state,  448,  449;  succeeds  Mr. 
Olney  as  secretary  of  state,  490;  ap 
pointment  criticised,  490,  491;  note  to 
Spanish  minister,  June  26,  1897,  re  suf 
fering  in  Cuba,  496,  497;  Spanish  min 
ister's  reply,  497 ;  instructions  to  General 
Woodford,  508-511;  despatch,  replying 
to  Senor  Gullon's  note  of  Oct.  23,  1897, 
showing  enforcement  of  neutrality  ob 
ligations,  520,  521. 

Sherman,  General  William  Tecumseh, 
quoted  by  ex-Senator  Chandler  in  ques 
tion  of  rules  of  war,  494. 

Shipowner,  American,  despair  of,  99. 

Shipping  American,  takes  trade  of 
British,  90;  American,  prospered  amaz 
ingly,  90;  interference  with  American, 
by  Spain  continued,  250. 

Ships,  American,  90;  seizure  of,  in  large 
numbers,  91;  armed  for  Santo  Do 
mingo  trade,  97;  superfluous  equip 
ment  of  reaches  Santo  Domingo  blacks, 
97 ;  sequestered  could  be  released  by  tak 
ing  sides  with  France,  99;  American, 
seized  by  British,  104;  natural  prey,  104, 

Short,  William,  American  commissioner, 
instructions  to,  1792,  35. 

Sickles,  General,  Daniel  E.,  minister  to 
Spain,  287;  reports  conversations  with 
Prim,  296,  297;  sends  new  propositions 
valid  until  Oct.  1,  298;  unfortunately 
obliged  to  hand  in  U.  S.  proposals  while 
Prim  and  Silvela  absent,  299;  withdraws 
note  of  Sept.  3,  302;  report  of  Spanish 
conditions,  303;  re  Virginius  (which  see), 
320,  321,  327,  328,  329,  330,  332,  333, 
334,  340,  341,  343,  344,  345,  346,  347, 
349;  tenders  resignation,  358;  discharged 


trying  duties  with  marked  zeal  and  abil 
ity,  358;  succeeded  by  Caleb  Gushing, 
358. 

Sigsbee,  Captain  Charles  Dwight,  of 
Maine,  555. 

Silvela,  Spanish  minister  of  state  supports 
Santiago  officials,  but  enjoins  mercy  and 
humanity  on  captain  general,  290;  de 
clares  intention  to  give  self  government 
to  Cuba,  295;  unfortunate  absence  when 
U.  S.  proposals  handed  in,  299. 

Skinner,  postmaster  at  Baltimore,  indicted 
re  privateering,  122. 

Slavery,  plans  for  abolition  of,  in  Cuba, 
presented  by  commission  in  1867,  281; 
contest  in  Cuba  must  end  slavery,  304. 

Slave-trade  in  full  vigor  in  Cuba  notwith 
standing  Spain's  treaty  with  England, 
220. 

Smith,  Adam,  favors  control  of  Mississippi 
valley  by  men  of  English  blood,  27. 

Smith,  William,  surveyor  of  customs. 
N.  Y.,  warm  friend  of  Miranda's,  102, 

Smith,  William,  purser  of  Crescent  City, 
accused  of  maligning  captain-general, 
246;  ship  refused  courtesies  of  port  on 
account  of,  246. 

Soule",  Pierre,  minister  to  Spain,  251;  an 
improper  appointment,  251;  instruc 
tions  to,  252,  253;  reports  Spanish  situa 
tion  re  U.  S.,  254;  sharp  note  re  BlacK' 
Warrior,  258;  regards  outrage  on  owners 
insignificant  compared  with  that  on  flag, 
260;  declares  Spain  does  not  fear  our  re 
sentment,  261;  member  of  Ostend  con 
ference,  261;  resigns,  269. 

South  America,  states  of,  combine  to  wrest 
Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  from  Spain,  205. 

Spain,  decadence  due  to  inaptitude  for  ad 
ministration  and  government,  11;  ef 
fort  to  keep  pace  with  democratic  spirit 
stifled  by  French  invasion  of  1823,  12; 
gives  France  1,000,000  francs  for  Ameri 
ca,  1776,  15;  disinclination  to  aid  U.  S. 
revolution,  15,  16,  17;  immense  posses 
sions  under  treaty  of  1763,  15;  hope 
of  weakening  English  race,  15;  policy 
in  American  revolution,  16;  fears  Ameri 
can  example,  16;  declares  war  against 
Great  Britain,  May  3,  1779,  16;  atti 
tude  of  Spain,  16;  powerless  to  aid 
U.  S.,  17;  fleet  ill-manned,  ill -equipped, 
17;  never  ally  of  U.  S.,  17;  makes 
known  her  views,  18;  denies  right  of 
U.  S.  to  use  the  Mississippi,  18;  wishes 
America  to  build  ships  for  Spanish  use, 
19;  desires  exclusive  use  of  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  20,  21;  seizes  St.  Joseph,  23; 
disappointment  of,  in  recognition  of 
American  independence,  27;  claims 
32°  28'  as  northern  boundary  of  Florida, 
29;  extends  posts  to  Natchez  and  Wal 
nut  Hills,  29;  accepts  American  situa 
tion,  Feb.  22,  1783,  27;  sinister  position 
of,  with  regard  to  America,  28;  again 


606 


INDEX 


ready  to  treat,  1791,  35;  proposed 
guarantee  of  territory  by  U.  S.  44;  ob 
jects  to  transfer  of  Louisiana,  61;  re 
nounces  opposition  to  same,  63;  strong 
case  of  72;  war  declared  against  England, 
81;  minister  declares  American  terms 
inadmissible,  84;  strained  relations  of 
U.  S.  with,  84;  seizes  American  ships, 
90;  Talleyrand  proposes  frightening,  93; 
terms  to,  93;  no  intention  of  yielding 
Texas,  102;  follows  Berlin  decree,  104; 
nationality  effaced,  106;  "The  Re 
gency,"  108;  independent  action  of 
River  Plate  region  against,  in  1810, 
110;  thenceforward  ally  of  Great  Britain, 
111;  revolt  against  Napoleon  brings 
peace  with  Great  Britain,  111;  in 
fluence  of  occupancy  of,  by  French, 
111;  recognizes  the  Floridas  as  lost  to 
her,  123;  policy  recognized  of  giving 
the  Floridas  for  as  much  of  Texas  as 
U.  S.  would  yield,  123;  first  conditions 
of,  re  Florida  treaty,  included  return 
of  all  Louisiana  west  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  124;  unable  to  preserve  peace  on 
borders  of  Gulf  of  Mexico,  127;  minister 
of,  demands  reparation  for  Jackson's 
conduct  in  Florida,  132,  133;  proposes 
new  negotiator,  143;  General  Vives  se 
lected,  143;  revolution  of  1820,  146; 
new  government  reconciled  to  treaty, 
146;  king  signs  order  transferring 
Florida,  Oct  24,  1820;  forces  of,  in 
Venezuela  successful  until  1819,  149; 
declines  any  mediation  which  would 
not  guarantee  restoration  of  her  South 
American  dominion,  164;  offers  gen 
eral  amnesty  to  South  Americans,  164; 
conditions  of,  164;  expedition  organ 
ized  to  subdue  South  America,  166; 
never  sailed,  166;  destitution  and  mis 
rule  in,  166;  French  consuls  in  West 
Indian  ports,  182;  immediate  concession 
to  British  demands,  182;  American 
claims  of  like  character  not  settled 
until  1834,  182  (note);  opens  Cuba  to 
trade,  182;  urged  by  U.  S.  to  accept 
situation,  206;  "would  never  abandon 
claim  to  ancient  and  rightful  posses 
sions,"  207;  informed  "Cuba  must  in 
no  event  and  under  no  pretext  pass  into 
the  possession  of  or  under  protection 
of"  any  other  European  power,  217; 
American  complaints  against,  218;  cost 
of  French  occupation  borne  by,  218, 
219  (note);  reasons  for  refusing  to  re 
ceive  American  consuls,  219;  request 
for  guarantee  of  continued  possession 
declined,  219;  proposition  to,  in  1848,  to 
buy  Cuba,  221;  rejects  same,  223;  edict 
of  1825,  re  Cuba,  224;  the  Salic  law, 
225;  constitution  and  parliament  es 
tablished,  226;  Cuban  and  Puerto 
Rican  representatives  denied  seats  in 
Parliament,  227;  this  denial  foundation 


of  Cuban  revolt,  227;  policy  of  delay  re 
Black  Warrior,  258,  259;  offers  mixed 
commission  re  American  claims,  which 
is  refused  by  U.  S.  as  some  are  not  of 
character  to  submit  to  such  tribunal, 
270;  convention  agreed  upon  in  1860, 
270  (note);  relations  of,  with  U.  S. 
comparatively  quiet,  1855-1868,  273; 
wasting  strength  in  useless  adventures, 
273;  reason  for,  personal,  273;  joins 
England  and  France  in  Mexican  ex 
pedition,  273,  withdraws  from  Mexico, 
273;  failure  to  adopt  recommendations  of 
commission,  in  1867,  fatal  to,  279,  281; 
turning-point  in  relations  with  Cuba, 
281;  a  volcano  in  unrest,  282;  revolu 
tion  begins  Sept.,  1868,  282;  Isabella 
dethroned  and  deported,  282;  Ser 
rano,  Prim,  Topete,  and  Sagasta,  heads 
of  new  government,  282;  tender  to,  of 
good  offices  of  U.  S.,  293;  bases  of,  293; 
declination  may  involve  recognition  of 
belligerent  rights  to  Cubans,  294. 
President  ready  to  advise  to  guarantee 
sum  Cuba  should  pay,  294;  intimates 
willingness  to  accept  good  offices  of 
U.  S.  on  certain  bases,  295;  Mr.  Fish 
declares  terms  incapable  of  attainment, 
296;  refuses  good  offices  of  U.  S.  on 
terms  proffered,  301;  marked  signs  of 
changed  attitude  of,  303;  adjustment 
nearly  in  reach,  303;  loses  great  oppor 
tunity,  304;  fundamental  difficulty  in, 
herself,  304;  woful  condition  of,  305; 
errs  in  sending  so  many  infantry  to 
Cuba,  306;  amazing  energy  shown,  306; 
special  powers  conferred  on  minister  at 
Washington  re  Cuban  affairs,  and  with 
drawn,  311,  312;  new  laws  re  Puerto 
Rico,  312;  law  of  emancipation,  312; 
republic  declared  Feb.,  1873,  313;  part 
of  coast  declared  blockaded,  313; 
state  of,  313;  low  credit  of,  314;  exam 
ination  of  government  relations  between, 
and  Cuba,  326;  vicious  circle  of  pro 
crastination,  327;  mollifying  effect  in,  of 
President's  annual  message  of  1875,  390; 
ends  Cuban  war,  395;  terms  of  peace, 
396;  new  legislative  regimen  for  Cuba, 
400;  observations  on  Spanish  cabinets, 
402;  cost  of  Spanish  government  in 
Cuba,  404;  government  of  Spain  de 
scribed,  405;  inertness  in  preventing 
landing  of  expeditions  in  Cuba,  418;  but 
one  seizure  made  afloat,  418;  climax  of 
feeling  on  account  of  passage  of  bellig 
erency  resolutions  in  Congress,  439;  con 
sulate  in  Barcelona  attacked,  439;  note 
on  riot,  439;  only  thing  which  would 
prevent  American  intervention  in  Cuba, 
450;  speech  of  queen  regent,  458,  459; 
reply  to  the  plney  note,  460-465; 
reply  a  declination  of  American  good 
offices,  465;  the  Olney  note  a  turning 
point  for,  465,  466;  agitation  in,  re  Com- 


INDEX 


607 


petitor,  470;  decree  granting  elective 
provincial  assembly  to  Puerto  Rico, 
with  extension  to  Cuba  when  state  of 
war  would  permit,  487;  refusal  of  good 
offices  offered  by  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Germany,  487;  minister  of  state, 
reply  of,  Aug.  4,  1897,  to  the  Ameri 
can  secretary  of  state,  498-502;  Spain 
expects  to  persevere  in  present  course, 
502;  new  ministry  [in,  511;  previous 
party  manifesto  promises  new  order 
in  Cuba,  511;  serious  situation  of  new 
ministry,  512;  Spain's  great  efforts, 
512;  decrees  signed,  Nov.  25,  1897,  ex 
tending  all  rights  of  Spaniards  to  An 
tilles,  524;  condolences  re  destruction 
of  Maine,  542;  circular  notes  to  repre 
sentatives,  556;  presents  final  propo 
sitions,  567;  sends  circular  telegram  to 
representatives,  March  30,  1898,  567, 
568;  practical  acceptance  of  demands  of 
U.  S.,  572;  receives  collective  note  of  pow 
ers  advising  acceptance  of  Pope's  pro 
posals  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  573. 

Spaniard,  a  Moro-Iberian,  6;  great  quali 
ties  of,  6,  7. 

Spanish,  the,  qualities  of,  10. 

Spanish-America,  explanation  by  repub 
lics  of,  re  proposed  conference,  208; 
Clay's  reply,  209. 

Speakman,  Charles,  shot  at  Santiago,  289. 

Spoliations,  French,  94. 

Squadron,  North  Atlantic,  to  go  South, 
532;  movements  of,  give  concern  to 
Spain,  537,  538. 

Supreme  Court,  ruling  of,  414,  415. 

Surplus,  Gallatin  advises  spending  two 
or  three  millions  of,  in  ships,  105. 

Susan  Loud,  of  Lopez  expedition.  See 
Georgiana. 

TACON,  CAPTAIN-GENERAL  OF  CUBA,  227. 

Talleyrand,  Prince,  again  agent  of  ces 
sion  of  Louisiana  to  France,  42;  seeks 
to  put  limits  to  extension  of  U.  S., 
43:  his  venality,  48;  hints  that  whole 
of  Louisiana  may  be  had,  58;  remarks 
on  boundary  of  Louisiana,  65;  mis 
carriage  of  effort  to  recover  Louisiana 
for  France,  77;  Louisiana  to  be  a  wall 
of  brass  against  U.  S.  and  England,  77; 
note  to  Spanish  ambassador  re  Ameri 
can  claims,  77;  informs  Spain  that  U.  S. 
claims  for  French  spoliations  must  not 
become  "subject  of  a  new  discussion," 
78;  report  to  emperor,  81;  "unjust 
pretensions  of  U.  S.  to  West  Florida" 
81 ;  Monroe  has  note  of,  denying  right  to 
West  Florida,  82;  unsigned  note  from, 
to  American  minister,  93;  advises  fright 
ening  Spain,  93;  writes  American  minis 
ter  with  indignation  re  Santo  Domingo, 
97;  directs  French  ambassador  at  Madrid 
to  obtain  transference  of  negotiation  to 
Paris,  98;  107. 


Taylor,  Hannis,  American  minister,  Ma 
drid,  420;  adopts  as  guide  in  Allian$a  case 
the  instructions  of  Mr.  Evarts  in  1880 
to  Fairchild,  American  minister,  re  visit 
and  search  of  four  American  schooners, 
421  (note);  presents  letter  of  recall, 
Sept.  13,  1897,  508. 

Tecumseh,  117. 

Tennessee,  people  of,  look  to  Mississippi 
as  their  proper  highway  to  ocean,  30. 

Tetuan,  Duke  of,  in  the  AllianQa  case, 
421;  Spanish  minister  of  state,  reply  to 
the  Olney  note  a  declination  of  Ameri 
can  good  offices,  460-465;  minister  of 
state,  reply  Aug.  4,  1897,  to  secretary 
Sherman's  note,  498-502. 

Texas,  part  of  Louisiana,  69;  to  be  hy 
pothecated  by  Spain,  94. 

Thames,  battle  of,  117. 

Three  Friends,  filibuster  tug,  416,  418. 

Thurston,  writes  Washington  of  scheme 
to  place  West  under  British  protection, 
37. 

Times,  London,  upholds  Monroe  declara 
tion,  202;  leader  in,  381,  382. 

Topete,  Admiral,  squadron  of,  raises  flag 
of  revolt  at  Cadiz,  Sept.  10,  1868,  282; 
one  of  new  government,  282;  mention, 
283. 

Tornado,  Spanish  man-of-war,  captures 
Virginius,  Oct.  31,  1873,  317. 

Toulon,  48. 

Toussaint  1'Ouverture,  48. 

Trade,  controlled  by  American  ships,  91. 

Trafalgar,  99,    105. 

Treaty  of  1763,  13,  limits  assigned  by, 
13;  provisional,  Nov.  30,  1782,  25; 
secret  article  of,  between  U.  S.  and  Great 
Britain,  29;  of  1783,  yielded  the  Flori- 
das  to  Spain  without  mention  of  limits, 
29;  with  Spain,  arguments  for,  33; 
terms  of,  with  Spain,  38;  of  1800  be 
tween  France  and  U.  S.,  42;  of  St.  Ilde- 
fonso,  1800,  ceding  Louisiana  to  France, 
42;  of  1819,  terms  proposed  by  each 
party,  124;  negotiation  of,  with  Spain, 
renewed,  138;  propositions  of  Spain  and 
U.  S.,  138;  signed,  Feb.  22,  1819,  139; 
opposition  of  Clay  to  giving  up  Texas, 
139;  question  of  land  grants,  140; 
of  1819,  obstacle  to  ratification  of  by 
Spain,  the  question  of  South  American 
recognition,  144;  of  1819,  accepted  by 
Spain,  146;  ratified  by  Senate,  146; 
ratifications  exchanged,  Feb.  22,  1821; 
of  Nov.  20,  1815,  sixth  article  of,  real 
basis  of  Holy  Alliance,  160. 

Troops,  Spanish,  in  Red  River  region,  102. 

Troppau,  meeting  at,  of  Holy  Alliance, 
Oct.  9,  1820,  170;  personages  at,  170; 
Alexander's  remarks  at,  171;  protocol 
signed  at,  171;  King  of  Naples  invited 
to,  171. 

Turreau,  General,  French  minister  to  U.  S. 
instructions  to,  re  boundaries,  78;  in- 


608 


INDEX 


formed  of  attitude  of  France  re  spolia 
tion  claims,  78. 

Tuyll,  Baron,  Russian  minister,  declara 
tion  to,  by  Adams,  198;  note  from,  Oct. 
3,  1823,  198;  Adams's  reply  to,  Nov.  27, 
1823,  a  full  exposition  of  U..S.  policy,  199. 

UHL,  acting  secretary  of  state,  421. 

United  States,  difficulties  with  Spain  be 
gan  with  independence,  13;  claim  to 
navigation  of  Mississippi,  under  treaty 
of  1763,  14;  boundaries  under  treaty  of 
1783  due  to  disregard  of  instructions 
from  Congress,  26;  at  end  of  war  finds 
outlets  of  all  its  rivers  leading  to  Gulf 
of  Mexico  in  hands  of  Spain,  30;  abor 
tive  efforts  toward  a  treaty  with  Spain, 
30,  37;  treaty  of  1795,  37,  38;  shipping 
seized  by  Spain  and  France,  40;  half  of 
territory  of,  despoiled  of  Spanish  empire, 
41;  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  46-60, 
(see  Jefferson,  Livingston,  Madison, 
Monroe,  Napoleon,  Talleyrand,  etc.); 
the  world's  carrier,  90;  the  only  flag 
except  England's  on  the  sea,  90;  ports  of, 
entrepots  for  European  goods,  91 ;  French 
proposals  for  arrangement  with  Spain, 
94;  only  nation  to  find  splendid  and  inex 
haustible  booty  in  ruin  of  Spanish  em 
pire,  107,  108;  to  reckon  with  Spain  as 
ally  of  Great  Britain,  111;  the  treaty  of 
1819,  123,  138-146  (see  Spain;  also 
Adams,  De  Onis,  Monroe,  Vives);  on 
firm  ground  in  claiming  to  Rio  Grande, 
124;  South  American  independence, chap. 
VIII;  government  of,  wholly  frank  re 
garding  attitude  toward  South  America, 
155;  invited  to  join  in  mediation  between 
Spain  and  South  America,  164;  de 
clines  any  action  short  of  recognition  of 
independence,  164;  I  declines  joining 
Holy  Alliance,  165;  membership  in  Holy 
Alliance  offered,  165;  similarity  of  re 
lations  of,  with  those  of  England  with 
Spain,  179;  the  Monroe  doctrine,  chap. 

X  (see     Adams,     Canning,     Monroe, 
Rush);    desire    that    Cuba    should    re 
main  Spain's,  186;  nervous  as  to  British 
intentions  re  Cuba,  186;   looks  askance 
at  Cuban  independence,  206;  the  South 
opposed  to  a  free  Cuba,  206;  urges  Spain 
to  accept   situation,   206;    letter  from 
Clay   on   Spanish    American   situation, 
206,  207;   the  Panama  congress,  chap. 

XI  (see  Adams) ;  declares  could  not  con 
sent  to  occupation  of  Cuba  and  Puerto 
Rico  by  other  power  than  Spain,  "  under 
any  contingency  whatever,"  208;  policy 
of    re    Panama    congress,    opposed   by 
South  as  meaning  freedom  to  slaves  in 
Cuba,   211;  minister  to   Madrid,    1840, 
directed  to  inform  Spain  she  may  de 
pend  on  U.  S.  for  preservation  of  Cuba 
and  Puerto  Rico,   220;    proposition  of 
Polk  administration  to  buy  Cuba,  221; 


purchase  of  Cuba  would  have  been 
fiercely  resisted  through  growing  anti- 
slavery  sentiment,  223;  never  assumed 
serious  form,  223;  firm  ground  taken 
in  1858  re  rights  of  vessels,  236;  sub 
mission  to  surveillance  over  Cuba  by 
French  and  English  squadrons  impos 
sible,  241;  reply  to  identic  notes  re 
Cuba,  of  France  and  England,  243-245; 
remonstrances  of,  re  interference  with 
shipping,  247-250;  extraordinary  reply 
of  Spain  as  to  powers  of  captain-general, 
249;  decided  attitude  in  Black  War 
rior  case,  257;  empowers  minister  to 
open  anew  the  question  of  sale  of  Cuba, 
260;  refuses  mixed  commission  re 
claims,  270;  convention  agreed  upon  in 
1860,  270  (note);  relations  of  with  Spain, 
comparatively  quiet,  1855-1868,  273;  use 
of,  by  Cubans  and  principles  involved, 
286;  the  Grant  administration,  287-394 
(see  Caleb  Cushing,  Fish,  Grant,  Polo 
de  Bernabe"  (admiral),  Prim,  Sickles, 
Spain);  tenders  good  offices  to  Spain, 
293;  bases  of,  293;  declination  may 
involve  recognition  of  belligerent  rights 
to  Cubans,  294;  President  ready  to 
advise  to  guarantee  sum  Cuba  should 
pay,  294;  terms  on  which  good  offics  of, 
would  be  given,  not  accepted,  by  Spain, 
301;  reclamations  against  Spain  pre 
sented,  312;  The  Virginius  case,  314- 
357  (see  Virginius) ;  reserve  of  European 
cabinets  toward  advances  of,  385;  why 
basis  of  Cuban  intrigue  and  supply,  411; 
the  Cleveland  administration  and  the 
Cuban  war,  411-489  (see  Cameron, 
Cleveland,  Congress,  Dupuy  de  Lome, 
Morgan,  Olney,  Sherman,  Cuba,  Spain); 
exertions  of,  to  repress  filibustering, 
411;  proclamation  declaring  violations 
of  neutrality  laws  would  be  rigorously 
prosecuted  in  effect  a  recognition  of 
a  state  of  insurgency,  411;  popular  feel 
ing  rising,  re  Cuba,  432;  the  McKinley 
administration  and  Cuba  (see  Cameron, 
Congress,  Day,  Dupuy  de  Lome,  Hale, 
Hoar,  McKinley,  Morgan,  de  Olivart, 
Sherman,  Reconcentrados,  Woodford, 
Cuba,  Spain);  declares  war  with  Spain, 
585. 

Upshur,  on  preservation  of  Cuba  to  Spain, 
221. 

Urgel,  Seo  de,  regency  set  up  at,  174. 

VALDES,  CAPTAIN-GENERAL  GERONIMO, 
bando  of,  228. 

Valmaseda,  Count  of,  brutal  proclama 
tion  of,  285. 

Valparaiso,  107. 

Varona,  Cuban  agent,  testimony  re  owner 
ship  of  Virginius,  349. 

Vatican,  attempts  to  preserve  peace,  569; 
telegram  from  Spanish  ambassador  to 
Madrid,  569. 


INDEX 


609 


Venadito,  Spanish  steamer,  fires  on  Al- 
lianfa,  mail  steamer,  419. 

Venezuela,  sends  U.  S.  word  of  severance 
from  Spain,  148. 

Verona,  Congress  of  allies  at,  175;  no 
stranger  allowed  at,  175. 

Viar,  Spanish  agent  threatening  letter  of, 35. 

Victor  to  command  expeditionary  army 
to  Louisiana,  68. 

Villaret,  48. 

Virginius,  capture  of,  Oct.  31,  1873,  314; 
history  of,  314-317;  53  of  crew  shot, 
317;  protest  of  captain  of  Niobe,  318; 
Bumel's  reply,  318;  protest  of  Com 
mander  Gushing  of  Wyoming,  319; 
treatment  of  protests  of  American, 
British,  and  French  consuls,  319;  Presi 
dent  Castelar  telegraphs,  before  knowl 
edge  of  executions,  that  death  penalty 
must  not  be  imposed  without  approval 
of  Cortes,  or  sanction  of  executive, 
319,  320;  Mr.  Fish  telegraphs  American 
minister:  "  If  an  American  citizen  wrong 
fully  executed,  U.  S.  will  require  most 
ample  reparation,"  320;  steps  which 
minister  had  already  taken,  320;  Span 
ish  minister  of  state  calls  on  American 
minister  and  expresses  deep  regret  on 
hearing  of  executions,  321;  President 
Castelar  "greatly  moved,"  321;  Mr. 
Fish  in  note  to  Spanish  minister  asked 
him  to  relieve  anxiety  as  to  news 
"too  shocking  to  be  credible,"  323; 
telegraphs  minister,  Madrid,  Nov.  12, 
to  protest  against  action,  if  confirmed, 
as  "brutal,  barbarous,  and  an  outrage 
upon  the  age,"  and  to  demand  most 
ample  reparation;  warns  that  grave 
suspicions  exist  as  to  right  of  Virginius 
to  carry  American  flag,  323;  letter  to 
minister,  323,  324;  Spanish  minister  at 
Washington  receives  two  telegrams, 
325;  mass  meetings  in  New  York  and 
elsewhere;  Mr.  Evarts  speaks  at  New 
York;  Mr.  Fish  denounced;  navy  or 
dered  on  war  footing;  war  in  sight,  325; 
inaccurate  reports  reach  Spain,  327; 
Spanish  minister  of  state  informs 
American  minister  "with  deep  regret" 
of  shooting  of  49  prisoners,  328;  the 
conference  of  the  two  ministers,  328, 
329;  minister  telegraphs  belief  that 
Spain  would  spontaneously  offer  repa 
ration,  329;  Mr.  Fish  telegraphs  ulti 
matum,  Nov.  13,  329;  American  min 
ister  on  reception  of  telegram  of  12th 
sends  note,  Nov.  14,  embodying  same, 
330;  Spanish  minister  of  state  returns 
an  indignant  note,  330,  331;  his  error, 
331;  American  minister's  reply,  331, 
332;  he  renews  demands,  Nov.  15,  in 
terms  of  ultimatum  sent  Nov.  13,  333; 
calls  attention  to  Burriel's  conduct  to 
consul  at  Santiago,  333;  Mr.  Fish  tele 
graphs,  Nov.  15:  "If  Spain  cannot  redress 


outrages,  U.  S.  will,"  333;  note  from 
American  minister  warning  Spanish 
government,  334;  note,  Nov.  17,  from 
minister  of  state  declaring  limits  to 
which  Spain  will  go,  334-338;  American 
minister  proposes  to  leave  Madrid; 
British  ambassador  demands  repara 
tion,  340;  Spain  now  convinced  of  dan 
ger  of  war,  340;  transfers  negotiations  to 
Washington,  340;  telegram  to  Spanish 
minister  proposing  new  terms  of  ar 
rangement,  340;  American  minister 
directed  to  defer  departure  from  Madrid, 
341;  Spain,  Nov.  23,  proposes  arbitra 
tion,  341;  U.  S.  refuses,  as  subject  was 
one  of  national  honor,  341;  Spain's  tele 
gram  of  Nov.  24  asking  if  U.  S.  would 
await  her  solution  on  receipt  of  facts, 
if  President  would  withhold  reference 
to  Congress,  and  if  points  of  offence 
could  be  designated,  341,  342;  Mr. 
Fish's  reply,  342;  Spain  cannot  under 
stand  precipitancy  of  U.  S.,  must  be  sat 
isfied  of  right  of  Virginius  to  flag,  tele 
gram  Nov.  24,  342,  343;  Mr.  Fish  re 
plies  U.  S.  must  reserve  right  to  inquire 
into  question  of  right  of  Virginius  to 
flag,  Nov.  25,  343;  telegraphs  minister 
Nov.  25,  if  accommodation  not  reached 
on  close  of  to-morrow,  withdraw  from 
Madrid,  344;  minister  telegraphed, 
Nov.  25,  Lord  Granville  expresses 
through  minister  his  sense  of  modera 
tion  of  the  demands,  344;  on  Nov.  26, 
Spain  recognizes  principles  of  American 
demand,  344,  345;  American  minister 
requests  passports  before  reception  of 
Spain's  note,  but  notifies  reply  may  be 
deferred,  344,  345;  Spanish  proposals 
declined;  new  ones  proffered  by  Ad 
miral  Polo  accepted,  346;  protocol 
drawn,  Nov.  29,  1873,  346;  minister  of 
state  informs  U.  S.  minister  of  arrange 
ment,  347;  final  arrangements  Dec.  8, 
347,  348;  Virginius  delivered  to  U.  S. 
at  Bahia  Honda,  Cuba,  Dec.  16,  1873, 
348;  survivors  delivered  at  Santiago 
Dec.  18,  348;  Virginius  papers  proved 
fraudulent,  348,  349;  attorney-general 
holds  that  she  was,  notwithstanding, 
exempt  from  capture;  that  only  the 
U.  S.  could  raise  the  question,  349; 
Spain  pays  indemnity  of  $80,000,  349; 
England  demands  arid  receives  indem 
nity  for  the  slaughter  of  19  subjects, 
349;  remarks,  350;  case  of  General 
Burriel,  351,  353;  Spain's  claims  for 
damages,  353,  354;  Mr.  Fish's  complete 
answer,  354,  357. 

Vives,  General,  appointed  minister  to  U.  S., 
143;  presents  credentials  April  12,  1820, 
145;  presents  note  "opening and  almost 
closing  negotiation,"  145. 

Vives,  denies  having  stated  to  Gallatin  that 
he  had  authority  to  deliver  Florida,  146. 


610 


INDEX 


Vizcaya  arrives  at  New  York,  535  (note). 
Volunteers,  power  in  Cuba  in  hands  of, 

284. 
Voyage,   direct,   not   allowed,    90;    what 

constituted  direct  voyage,  90. 

WALNUT  HILLS  (Vicksburg),  a  Spanish 
post,  29. 

War,  imminent  between  France  and  Great 
Britain,  57;  message  of  1805  received 
by  public  as  equivalent  to  declaration 
of,  95;  some  things  worse  than,  105; 
declaration  of  by  U.  S.  against  England, 
June  18,  1812,  116;  against  Spain, 
April  18,  1898,  585. 

Washington,  fears  separation  of  Western 
states,  31;  letter  to  Governor  Harrison, 
1784,  31,  37;  hopes  new  treaty  with 
Spain  will  quiet  West,  39;  having  a 
navy  would  have  saved  capture  of,  106. 

Webster,  on  preservation  of  Cuba  to  Spain, 
1843,  221;  replies  to  Spanish  minister 
re  New  Orleans  riot,  239. 

Wellesley.     See  Wellington. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  ready  to  invade 
South  America,  111;  lands  in  Portugal 
instead  of  South  America,  111;  at  Aix- 
la-Chaprlle,  160;  alone  represents  Great 
Britain  at  Verona,  174;  instructions  to, 
174,  217,  219. 

West  Florida.     See  Florida,  West. 

West,  hatred  of  Spaniard  as  natural  as  of 
Indian,  41;  impossible  to  accept  Spain's 
control  of  way  to  sea,  41. 

Weyler  y  Nicolau,  Valeriano,  marquis  of 
Teneriffe,  succeeds  Campos  as  governor- 
general  of  Cuba,  430;  proclamations  of, 
431,  432;  relieved  by  Blanco,  Oct.  31, 
1897,  o  . ;  remarks  near  bringing  court- 
martial,  521,  522;  protests  against 
criticism  in  President's  message,  527. 

White,  Senator,  on  Panama  congress,  213. 

White,  Commander  Edwin,  of  U.  S.  S. 
Kansas,  protects  Virginius,  316;  action 
approved,  316  (note). 

Whitlock,  English  general,  surrender  of, 
106. 

Whitworth,  Lord,  British  ambassador,  57. 

Wilkinson,  General  James,  paid  agent  of 
Spain,  35;  receives  money  from  Spain, 
39:  commissioner  with  Claiborne  to  re 
ceive  transfer  of  Louisiana,  63;  base 
character  of,  63;  deep  in  Burr's  con 
spiracy,  101. 

Williams,  consul-general  at  Havana,  letter 
to,  from  British  consul-general  re  British 
subject  aboard  Competitor,  469  (note). 


Woodbine,  Captain,  116;  accompanies  Mc 
Gregor  in  seizure  of  Amelia  Island,  125. 
137. 

Woodford,  General  Stewart  L.,  presents 
letters  of  credence  as  U.  S.  minister  at 
Madrid,  Sept.  13,  1897,  508;  instruc 
tions  to,  508-511;  presents  note,  Sept. 
23,  1897,  513;  called  on  for  information 
by  the  several  ambassadors  at  Madrid, 
513;  note  replied  to,  Oct.  23,  513;  re  the 
De  Lome  letter,  540;  Spain  stunned  by 
$50,000,000  appropriation  of  March  9, 
1898,  545;  his  number  43  to  President 
hoping  peace,  546;  his  conversations  with 
Seftor  Moret,  547-549;  meetings  with 
Spanish  ministers,  551-557;  answer  to 
inquiry  for  instructions,  557;  receives 
telegram,  re  Maine,  558;  asks  instruc 
tions,  559,  560;  pressed  for  answer,  re 
armistice,  561;  important  meetings  with 
Spanisn  ministers,  564-566;  presents 
President's  demands,  564;  sends  details 
of  conferences  with  Spanish  ministers, 
564-567;  sends  Spanish  propositions, 
568;  Spain's  attitude  a  question  of 
punctilio  and  means  continuation  of 
war,  568;  reports  acceptance  by  Span 
ish  government  of  Pope's  proposal  for 
armistice  with  request  for  withdrawal 
of  U.  S.  fleet  from  vicinity  of  Cuba,  569, 
570;  receives  reply,  570;  telegraphs 
proposed  proclamation  of  Queen  Regent 
suspending  hostilities:  "I  believe  this 
means  peace,"  571;  reply  to  same,  572; 
causes  corrections  of  newspaper  mis- 
statements  in  Madrid,  574;  sends  tele 
gram,  April  9,  announcing  armistice 
ordered,  574. 

Wyeth,  Albert,  shot  at  Santiago,  289. 

YARA,  pronunciamiento,  Oct.  10,  1868. 
282. 

Yrujo,  Marquis  of  Casa  de,  Spanish  minis 
ter,  adverse  to  intendant's  action,  re 
deposit,  51;  states  re-establishment  of 
right  of  deposit,  52;  protests  of,  against 
transfer  of  Louisiana,  61;  angry  com 
ment  on  Mobile  act,  70;  thorn  in  side 
of  government,  71;  obtains  opinions 
upon  hypothetical  case,  72,  76;  presence 
at  Washington  disagreeable,  93. 

ZABALA,  banished,  282. 

Zea  Bermudez,  Spanish  minister  in  Rus 
sia,  informs  Russia  of  adoption  of  con 
stitution,  166. 


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